152 Int. J. Automotive Technology and Management, Vol. 11, No.

2, 2011

Automotive industry in Malaysia: an assessment

of its development

Peter Wad*
Centre for Business and Development Studies,
Department of Intercultural Communication and Management,
Copenhagen Business School,
Frederiksberg DK-2000, Denmark
Email: [email protected]
*Corresponding author

V.G.R. Chandran Govindaraju

Department of Economics,
Faculty of Business Management,
Universiti Teknologi MARA,
KM 12 Jalan Muar,
85009 Segamat, Johor, Malaysia
Email: [email protected]

Abstract: This paper explains the evolution and assesses the development of
the Malaysian automotive industry within the premise of infant industry and
trade protection framework as well as extended arguments of infant industry
using a global value chain perspective. The Malaysian automotive industry
expanded in terms of sales, production, employment and local content, but
failed in industrial upgrading and international competitiveness. The failures
can be attributed to (a) lack of political promotion for high challenge-high
support environment, (b) low technological and marketing capabilities and (c)
limited participation in the global value chain. Although the Malaysian infant
industry protection policy comprised many promising initiatives, the national
and the overall domestic automobile industry ended up as a captive of the
regionalised Japanese keiretsu system in automobile manufacturing. A new
transformation is required to push the industry beyond its current performance
through a more strategic productive coalition with multiple stakeholders
including trade unions.

Keywords: automotive industry; competitiveness; infant industry; trade

protection; global value chain; performance; economic crisis; PROTON;
Malaysia.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Wad, P. and Govindaraju,

V.G.R.C. (2011) ‘Automotive industry in Malaysia: an assessment of its
development’, Int. J. Automotive Technology and Management, Vol. 11, No. 2,
pp.152–171.

Biographical notes: Peter Wad is Associate Professor at Department of

Intercultural Communication and Management (ICM) and Centre for Business
and Development Studies (CBDS) at Copenhagen Business School (CBS). His
research has focused on globalisation, competitiveness and local firms in
developing countries with particular focus at the global automobile industry.

Copyright © 2011 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

 Automotive industry in Malaysia 153

He has published in international journals like Asia Pacific Business Review

and Journal of Asia Pacific Economy. He has also recently been a consultant to
the International Labour Office (ILO) and the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) regarding the global financial crisis and
its impact on automobile industries in developing countries.

V.G.R. Chandran Govindaraju is a Senior Lecturer in Universiti Teknologi

MARA, Malaysia. He holds a PhD in Economics. His research interests
include industrial development, trade issues and technology and innovation
policy. He has served as a consultant for various institutions including United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Ministry of Science,
Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) and Malaysian Industry-Government
Group for High Tech, (MIGHT). He has involved in a number of funded
research projects including a recent project on innovation financing funded by
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada.

1 Introduction

The Heavy Industrial Policy in the early 1980s marks a significant change of
industrialisation strategy in Malaysia towards building a nationally owned and controlled
automotive industry. The inauguration of the first national automotive project, PROTON,
in 1983 with the formation of a joint venture between the Heavy Industry Corporation of
Malaysia (HICOM), Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC) and Mitsubishi Corporation
(MC) of Japan was the Malaysian government’s attempt to increase local content,
rationalise the industry to achieve economies of scale and upgrade the assembly industry
to a manufacturing industry with international competitiveness (Abdulsomad, 1999).
Equipped with the protective measures and subsidies in various ways by the government,
the first Proton cars were rolled out in 1985. Subsequently, the national automotive
programme also established a small car manufacturer (PERODUA) in 1993, a heavy
vehicle company (Malaysian Bus and Truck, MTB) in 1994, a motorcycle manufacturer
(MODENAS) in 1995, and a light vehicle commercial manufacturer (INOKOM) in 1997.
With the announcement of the ‘National Automotive Policy’ (NAP) in 2006 and its
review in 2009, the Malaysian government further confirmed the previous policy of
developing a national automotive industry of OEMs and supplier and related industries as
envisaged in the early 1980s (MIDA, 2006; MITI, 2009).
Although this kind of ‘industrial nationalism’ is evident in other developing and
developed countries, at least in the early stage of evolution of the automotive industries,
many have given up sustaining domestic automotive companies while some have moved
on and developed their ability to compete internationally. Japan built its own automotive
industry from the ashes of the WWII, and gradually increased its world market shares
until Toyota Motor Corporation became the global champion in 2008. South Korea
followed the same path from the 1970s, ending up with an automobile maker in the
top-10 league in the 21st century. However, Malaysia has not been able to replicate the
success stories from Northeast Asia. Therefore, in the case of Malaysia, two important
questions prevail:
 154 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

1 Why the Malaysian-controlled automobile industry has not become internationally

research questions competitive?
2 Whether or not the Malaysian automotive sector can still become a regional and
global export industry?
In view of this problem area, the paper first outlines the theoretical debate about the role
of active industrial policy in pursuing industrialisation of developing countries. This
review will frame the old issues of infant industry policy and import-substitution in a
larger perspective of global value chains (GVCs) and how industrial policy can help to
insert developing countries, industries and firms into the global economy. The paper
proceeds and examines the evolution and development of the automotive industry
in Malaysia until the end of the 2000s including the impact of the global crisis in
2008–2009 on the Malaysian automobile industry. Finally, within the established
framework, an assessment on the automotive development is made to answer the two
important questions. The paper ends with a conclusion summing up the arguments.

2 Theoretical background

In the pre-globalisation era of economic development the automobile industry was

considered the ‘industry of industries’ meaning that it had the potential to drive
industrialisation ahead due to its linkages and spill-over effects on other manufacturing
industries (Dicken, 2007). Because economic systems and dynamics were primarily
demarcated by national borders, the key policy intervention in favour of automobile
industrial development was infant industry support and for all ‘latecomer’ countries, in
particular developing countries, this support would have to be combined with import-
related protection against foreign automobile inflows carried by pre-independence dealer
subsidiaries, joint-ventures or franchising arrangements. Industrialisation of developing
countries therefore often meant de-internationalisation of the specific industries considered.
This template of infant industry protection has been used throughout automobile
industrial history by Western countries. However, the infant industry and protectionist
measures have been criticised in various way and completely rejected by neo-liberal
economists and politicians during the 1980s and 1990s with the emergence of economic
globalisation. Hence, Malaysia’s ‘industrial nationalism’ in the automobile sector stood
out as a counterpoint or heterodox economic policy intervention at a time where the
so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ prevailed. In East Asia it was part and parcel of
developmental state thinking that dominated governing circles in Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore, and with the new Mahathir administration in Malaysia from 1981
the strategic political intent of ‘Looking East’ meant taking Japan and South Korea as
economic developmental models (Wad, 1988; Jomo, 1994). In addition, the national
automobile project and the heavy industrial policy were part of the ‘New Economic
Policy 1971–90’ aiming for the socio-economic uplifting of the ethno-majority of
Bumiputeras (primarily ethnic Malays) to the same status as the ethno-Chinese minority.
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 155

2.1 The controversy of infant industry protection

Several arguments for and against infant industry protection have been presented (Lynn,
2003). The basic issue has been if the market or the state should drive industrialisation.
The protagonists of infant industry protection hold that establishing a new industry
is costly and will take time until it can achieve economies of scale and become
economically viable. Thus, investors and entrepreneurs would only engage in such a
long-term endeavour if they were at least temporarily compensated and shielded by the
state until the companies broke even.
The key argument against infant industry support and protection contends that if
the new industry is a fertile investment opportunity, capital will flow into the industry
and generate investments, economic growth and employment. Taking active part in
direct industrial investments against the interests of national and international capital
governments will only distort efficient market allocation of capital and labour and more
basically distort the relative comparative advantages of the country. If subsidies and anti-
competitive measures are taken, the policy will in addition create rents and rent-seeking
stakeholders and these groups will defend their privileges and make it difficult to scale
down policy support whatever the competitiveness of the industry. Moreover, temporary
infant industry protection would be very difficult to implement in an effective and
efficient way because phasing in, monitoring and phasing out state support and protection
would require a series of difficult decisions about selecting entrepreneurs and companies
of ‘lead’ firms. Besides, providing financial resources and skilled labour, developing a
capable supplier industry and related business services, setting standard and regulatory
institutional frameworks, promoting a healthier sectoral innovation system, providing
conducive physical infrastructure and finally setting an appropriate tariff and tax system
that promotes affordable automobile purchase for an increasing share of the adult
population are also made difficult. Therefore, public resources would be easily locked-in
for loss-making industrial projects and these resources would not be available for
alternative and more beneficial investments.
The debate peaked about whether it is at all possible for a state bureaucracy to ‘pick
the winners’, the specific companies and entrepreneurs that are compensated to build the
new industry. In neo-classic economic theory the market mechanism functions as the
selection device, and the market selection is best when the state provides all players with
a level playing field and follows a hands-off principle. In a ‘developmental state’
perspective the state may take on the entrepreneurship and build ‘national champions’
before they eventually commercialise or privatise the state owned enterprises (SOEs),
or the state may select a few local private companies and enable them to establish
competitive enterprises in various market segments before state support and import
protection are reduced and phased out. In retrospect the crucial problem is whether the
state combines support with performance targets and monitor and sanctions business
practices accordingly. These two positions have been partly integrated and surpassed by
Rodrik (2004) arguing that neither markets nor governments and state agencies can pick
winners ex ante, but they can pick losers ex post and take them out of the game.
156 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

2.2 Re-globalising developing country economies

According to Schmitz (2007) the global economy is a reality today and domestic based
industries cannot develop in the long run unless they link up with and become part of
the world market. Emphasising this premise, Hubert Schmitz provides a framework
that takes the discussion of infant industry protection beyond the old premise of national
industrial economics into the relatively open global economy of the 21st century.
Schmitz suggests that we conceive industrial policy as delivering industrial challenges
and industrial support. Low challenges, due to e.g. an isolated economy or erection of
protectionist trade barriers, may weaken the industry’s competitive edge and make it
rather complacent appropriating monopoly or state rents and avoid risky investments and
innovative efforts, thereby sustaining low levels of productivity. High challenges may
either invigorate the industry and bring it on a course of rapid upgrading and increased
competitiveness, or undermine existing industrial capabilities and wash-out local firms
that are less productive and competitive. The outcome of the ‘high challenge’ option
depends on the support provided to the industry by state agencies (or other stakeholders)
enabling the industry to cope with the increased challenges, e.g. foreign competition, and
restructure to a higher and adequate productivity and competitive level. The Washington
Consensus meant ‘high challenge-low support’ and implied that trade liberalisation and
deregulation of state economic and industrial interventions raised the level of competition
for domestic firms without supporting them, and many local firms were downgraded or
squeezed out of the (formal) market. Schmitz prefers the ‘high challenge-high support’
option arguing that it is possible to pursue such a route of ‘active industrial policy’ even
in a globalising economy. But the policy has to be smart and differentiated in accordance
with the technological and marketing ‘gaps’ that the particular developing country
industry and firms are facing.
The ‘gap’ theory suggests that the combination of ‘high technology and high
marketing’ gaps calls for industrial policies that focus on attracting and nursing FDI in
strategic sectors of economic development. Local entrepreneurs and firms will not be
able to triumph over high technology and marketing barriers at the same time. By way of
their competitive advantage MNCs will possess technology and marketing capabilities
that enable production and export from the developing country starting a positive
trajectory of industrial growth. However, high growth may not necessarily translate into
higher value added production as seen in e.g. the foreign controlled electronics industry
in Malaysia (Best and Rasiah, 2003; Best, 2007). Only in industries where both gaps are
small local firms have a chance to overcome the obstacles and export own products, but
such conditions may often pertain to neighbouring emerging markets and be limited to
low value added products and will require active state support (export subsidies, tax
benefits, global marketing services, etc.). If technological capabilities are available, e.g.
as a result of infant industry policies in the past, local firms may access advanced foreign
markets (Northern) through linkages with lead firms in global value chains which
command distribution networks in Northern markets. This potential has been documented
in buyer-driven global value chains linking garments and shoes industries in East Asia to
Northern markets (Gereffi, 1999). Even captive forms of insertion have often enabled
upgrading of product and process technology of local firms although this form of linkage
does not enable functional upgrading to higher value adding activities (Gereffi et al.,
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 157

2005). Again, state support of e.g. linkage formation between local and foreign firms
will enhance this kind of industrial expansion. Finally, facing a relatively high gap in
technological capabilities but a low gap in marketing capabilities, make possible
licensing agreements or joint ventures between local and foreign firms as a viable option.
Domestic industrial policy and state agencies can once again be important in identifying,
importing and transferring licences and increase absorptive capabilities among local joint
venture partners and vendors.

2.3 Reconsidering industrial policy of developing countries in a

globalising economy
Aiming to analyse industrial policy and processes in a developing country like Malaysia
from the emergence of the automotive industry in the 1960s to the global financial and
economic crisis by the end of the 2000s Schmitz’ gap-matrix must be extended with a
global-local market dimension. Adding this distinction acknowledges that the adequacy
of technological and marketing capabilities vary according to the market segment or level
that the focal firm is targeting. Moreover, the governance and the regulation of the
automotive value chain can be analysed at a domestic and global level enabling an
understanding of the interaction of local and international factors and stakeholders.
Governance of global value chains takes place at the global level (‘driveness’) and the
inter-firm level (‘coordination’) and it may also be impacted by socio-cultural or
institutional norms and values of the context within which it is operating (Coe et al.,
2008; Gibbon et al., 2008). International product and process standards have become
more and more important as mechanisms of inter-firm governance and extra-firm
regulation in global value chains (Nadvi and Wältring, 2003; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005).
Within the global automotive value chain several actors of driveness may exist, e.g.
Original equipment manufacturer
producers (OEMS), producer-supplier alliances or maybe even suppliers (Wad, 2008).
And even within one global value chain several market segments may exist which are
driven by different forms of governance and lead firms, e.g. the OEM market and the
replacement market (Wad, 2006).
This paper will only demonstrate how such a perspective can inform the explanation
of the evolution of the Malaysian automobile industry and question the options available
for Malaysian industrial policy-making.

3 Overview of Malaysian automobile industry

3.1 Structure and development

In Malaysia, the expansion of sales and production of motor vehicles took place through
different phase of development in response to different policy initiatives and other
factors: import-based industry 1957–1966; import-substitution 1967–1982; joint national
automobile programme with Japanese auto makers 1983–2003; independent national
automobile industry from 2004 to the present loosing market shares to foreign controlled
(and ‘ex-national’) firms in the domestic market. Along the way, different policy and
political factors shaped the industry (Table 1).
158 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

Table 1 Industrial, investment and trade policy

Periods Events
1957 Malaysia independent as Federation of Malaya. Import of CBUs continues.
1963 Malaysia began to encourage the establishment of the automotive industry.
1964 Policy announcement to encourage assembly and manufacturing of components
parts of automobiles.
1967 Six assembly plants approved by the government (mainly joint venture projects
with European and local partners). More approvals followed in mid-1970s.
1970 Recommendation for expansion of local content to 40% (Walker Report).
1983 1st National Car project approved and agreement struck between HICOM,
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation.
1984 EON is formed as a sales company for Proton vehicles, but not controlled by
Proton.
1985 Launch of National Car Project (PROTON) and production of Proton Saga.
1986 Promotion of Investment Act 1986 offers tax exemptions (Pioneer status &
Investment Tax Allowance).
1993 2nd National Car project (PERODUA) was established to produce smaller and
affordable vehicles (PERODUA is expected to complement PROTON and the
vendor development programs). Joint venture with Daihatsu, Mitsui and several
government controlled companies where Malaysian equity amounted to 68%
and Japanese equity to 32%.
1994 3rd National Automotive Project, Malaysian Truck and Bus (MTB), was
established to produce smaller lorries and busses. Joint venture with Diversified
Resources Berhad (DRB), Hicom Holding Bhd., Isuzu Motor Ltd, Japan and
ITOCHU Corporation.
1995 HICOM with PROTON is privatised and controlling share is acquired by Jahaya,
owner of DRB. His death March 1997 in a helicopter crash, a few months before
the outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis, turned DRB-HICOM and
PROTON into dire straits.
2000 State-controlled Petronas takes DRB-HICOM’s controlling share of PROTON.
Later government controlled investment agency, Khazanah, acquires the largest
stake of 43%. Proton Edar, established 1985, and tied to DRB-HICOM, acquired
by PROTON.
2001 PERODUA is restructured from a joint venture (72% Malaysian equity) with
a vehicle sales firm (PSSB), vehicle manufacturing firm (PMSB) and engine
manufacturing firm (PEMSB) into two joint ventures whereby Daihatsu and
Mitsui acquire 51% equity control of the new company, the Perodua Auto
Corporation (PCSB) which again controls 51% equity of the manufacturing
(PMSB) and engine (PEMSB) companies.
2004 PROTON becomes fully owned Malaysian company. MMC and MC exit as
minority shareholders.
2005–2006 Transformation of tariff protection measures to excise tax measures adapting
to AFTA. Announcement and launching of the National Automotive Policy
(NAP).
2007 MTB becomes majority owned by joint venture partner, Isuzu Motors (51%),
acquiring 31% stake from DRB-HICOM in addition to its existing 20% stake.
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 159

Table 1 Industrial, investment and trade policy (continued)

Periods Events
2009 Second stimulus package, including auto scrapping scheme for PROTON
and PERODUA and funding of the Malaysian Automotive Institute. Review
of national automotive policy (NAP) by October of 2009. Proton Edar and EON
merge whereby PROTON consolidates control of total sales network.
2010–2020 NAP policy for 2010–2020:
• Continuing liberalisation of domestic automobile market.
• Incentives for inward FDI aiming to become a hub for production
and export of high-value added vehicles (luxury cars, electric (EVs)
and hybrid vehicles (HEVs).
• Strategic partnership between PROTON and global automaker.
• Phasing out of approval permits (APs) for CBU import by end of
December 2015 (limited APs will be issued).
Source: Authors
By the end of the 2000s the automobile industry in Malaysia consisted of 15 motor
vehicle producers (OEMs) of which six are motor vehicle manufacturers and nine are
assembling companies including franchise holders having rights to assemble, and most
are non-national car assemblers like Toyota and Honda. As of June 2009, the two
designated ‘national’ car manufacturers, Proton and Perodua1, captured 57.8% of the
total vehicle market with 27.1% and 30.7% controlled by Proton and Perodua,
respectively2 (MAA, 2009a). The national automotive sector in Malaysia has de facto
been reduced to one corporation3, Proton, and the totally installed domestic capacity is
above 960,000 motor vehicles (MIDA, 2009). Compared to domestic production around
530,000 units in 2008 the capacity utilisation of the domestic automobile industry is
55.2% at the peak of production.
The competitiveness of the Malaysian automobile industry hinges very much on the
quality, efficiency and delivery capabilities of the auto components and parts sector.
These auto component and part suppliers service two markets, the original parts and
components demanded by the vehicle makers (OEMs) and replacement equipment
market (REM) where items are being bought by repair shops and individual customers.
In 2008, there are around 690 firms manufacturing and supplying over 4000 automotive
component and parts (MIDA, 2009) and of this, 70% are OEM supply. The component
and parts sector accounted for RM 6.37 billion in sales with RM 4.6 billion and RM
2.0 billion in imports and exports in 2008, respectively. Around 45 components
manufacturers export components and parts primarily within low-tech products like
steering wheels, rims, brake pads, wheels, bumpers, bodies, exhausts, radiators and shock
absorbers. Among the original equipment suppliers (OES) major players include the
foreign manufacturers such as Delphi Automotive Systems, TRW, Siemens VDO, Bosch,
Denso and Nippon Wiper Blade while the major local players include APM Automotive,
Sapura, Delloyd and Ingress (MIDA, 2009). Some of the firms (Ingress, Hicom Teck
See, Sunchirin, APM Corporation and Delloyd) have established investment in ASEAN
countries like Thailand and Indonesia. Despite some well-established firms in this
segment, a majority of the firms are still lacking in terms of technology progress
(Simpson et al., 1998; Zadry and Yosof, 2006; Rosli and Kari, 2008; Wad, 2008). In the
 160 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

OEM segments, transnational OEMs have established ever-rising international standards

of global brands including the ISO/TS 16949 (Wad, 2006). Investments in technology
and R&D are still too low with around 2% in average during 2000–2005 for OEMs,
while other equipment manufacturers only spend around 0.14% (DOSM, 2009, own
calculations). Issues of volume, quality, high price, and dependence on technology
suppliers for design have made these segments to be more vulnerable especially during
crisis. The sector is also unable to compete with the counterpart, Thailand that has well
established its parts and component manufacturing clusters.
The quality of the workforce is another pillar of industrial competitiveness. The auto
manufacturing and assembly and the parts and components manufacturers generated
nearly 50,000 jobs in 2008, with 24,310 and 24,249 employed in the motor vehicle and
parts and accessories sub-sectors, respectively, and 6614 jobs in residual transport
equipment (Table 2). Proton and Perodua have the largest share of workforce with nearly
70% of the total employment of motor vehicle manufacturers. The industry recorded
4.9% annual average growth rate of employment over the past eight years. Relatively
speaking the workforce is highly unionised (above 40%) in one industrial union and
several enterprise unions (Wad, 2009b). Employers have no employers’ association and
collective bargaining takes place at the company level.
Table 2 Total number of employment by industry, 2000–2008

MISC Code Industries 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

341 Manufacturer of motor vehicles 14,568 16,988 19,055 21,880 24,310
343 Manufacturer parts & accessories
18,380 23,499 24,188 25,644 24,249
for motor vehicles & engines
359 Transport Equipment n.e.c. 5322 5299 6021 6555 6614
Total 38,270 45,786 49,264 54,079 55,173
Source: MPC, 2009
Note: The employment number is based on survey of selected firms. In average,
16 motor vehicle manufacturers, 100 parts and component manufacturers
and 25 other transport equipments manufacturers were surveyed.
Due to the past dependence on motor vehicle assembling and low technology applied,
Facts about skilled and unskilled workers comprise of more than 80% of the workforce while skilled and semi-
un-skilled workers.
skilled is around 5–7% (Table 3). The tremendous gap in human resource recruitment
lack of trainings and development has to be overcome if the industry attempts to create new advanced
automotive technology cluster and enhance its product development. Automotive
manufacturers have engaged in skill enrichment programmes, not least the national auto
manufacturers. For instance, Perodua’s application of the Japanese production standards
and procedures requires improvements in human skills. In this aspect, employees receive
various training in production control, welding, painting, trim and final maintenance,
tooling, stamping and quality control (Rasiah, 2001; Mahidin and Kanageswary, 2004).
This has contributed to the development of skilled and semi-skilled workers. Although,
Perodua and Proton undertake skill improvements programmes, in average, the industry
still lacks the investment in training and employability of skill workers. The training
expenditure as a percentage of sales for both manufacturers of motor vehicles and other
transport equipments is below 0.10%.
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 161

Table 3 Training and skill level

Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers

Training Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled
(% of sales) Workers Workers Workers
2000 0.06 5.09 5.34 89.58
2001 0.06 5.24 5.40 89.36
2002 0.10 9.36 5.64 85.00
2003 0.07 5.80 5.66 88.54
2004 0.04 6.73 5.92 87.35
2005 0.07 7.09 6.00 86.91
Source: Authors calculation based on annual manufacturing survey dataset,
DOSM, 2009
Note: Skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers represent the percentage of
degree holders, diploma holders and non-degree and diploma holders
out of total workforce.

3.2 Domestic and international trade performance

3.2.1 The national champion of Malaysia
The automotive industry in Malaysia expanded tremendously from 1980 to 2009. Total
new vehicle sales went up from around 97,000 in 1980 to 537,000 in 2009, and
assembling of vehicles increased from around 104,000 in 1980 to 489,000 in 2009
(MAA, 2009b; MAA, 2010), roughly increasing the domestic automobile market five
times. Malaysia is primarily buying and producing passenger cars (Wad, 2009). In 2009
passenger vehicles accounted for around 91% of new vehicle registration and of vehicles
assembled. However, by the end of the 2000s Proton lacks competitiveness in domestic
and international markets in spite of several measures taken to upgrade the corporation
over the years. The national auto manufacturer upgraded technologically to original
design manufacturing (ODM) in 2000 and to engine manufacturing in 2002. These
achievements followed Proton’s collaboration with and acquisition of the British sports
car maker, Lotus, and technical collaboration with another European engineering firm
respectively. However, Proton and other Malaysian auto makers have not entered the
automobile technology frontier (e.g. energy efficient vehicles). A persistent ownership
delinking of production and sales functions has also marred Proton from its very
inception.
In the 21st century Proton lost domestic market shares but it has stayed profitable
most of the time and generated additional employment (Table 4). This indicates that in a
protected market Proton can be viable with selective government support of the national
auto sector. However, advances in domestic and international markets are conditioned by
technological and marketing capabilities, and Proton is still suffering from a double gap.
It has improved but so did its global and regional competitors.
 162

Table 4

2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09

Revenue (RM million) 6902.9 8571 7674 6361.2 8483.3 7796.9 4687.3 5621.6 6486.6
Profit after tax (RM million) 311.8 613 809 510.3 442.4 46.7 (589.6) 184.6 (301.8)
Employment 6228 9910 9466 8715 10,300 11,159 9525 11,500 11,500
Domestic Car Sales (units) 195,228 227,229 205,471 146,339 182,924 166,968 88,635 116,911 139,824
P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

Exports (units) 8838 8648 7929 7339 17,243* 12,765 20,528 17,337 17,387
Revenue (Domestic) RM Million n.a. n.a. n.a. 5494.8 7052.0 6441.0 3162.3 4131.9 n.a.
Revenue (Exports) RM Million n.a. n.a. n.a. 866.4 1413.3 1355.9 1525.0 1489.7 n.a.
Source: Company’s annual reports
Note: * Sales of new models e.g. GEN 2 increased the exports more than double. Proton also expands to new export markets such as China and Middle East.
Financial year ends on March each year.
Revenue, employment and exports, Proton, 1999–2009
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 163

3.2.2 Trade performance

In 2007, the world share of automotive exports in the total merchandise exports is 8.7%
(WTO, 2008). Among the developing and emerging economies (NIEs), China, Korea and
Thailand were the top exporters of automotive products. Malaysia’s automotive exports
are 0.6% of the total merchandise exports of Malaysia. From 2000 to 2007 the
automotive exports of Malaysia increased from US$ 121 million to US$ 1122 million
(Table 5). However, the trend shows that Malaysia’s exports share is still far below even
that of Taiwan, Philippines and India who mainly concentrate on domestic markets
(WTO, 2008). Malaysia’s imports show an increasing trend from 1990 to 2007, too. This
might also indicate that without the domestic market Malaysia’s automotive sector would
find it difficult to survive. In turn, Thailand having a positive trade balance exhibits a
better position in trade than Malaysia (Wad, 2009a).
Table 5 Exports and imports of automotive products of Malaysia, 1990–2007 (million US$)

1990 2000 2005 2006 2007

Exports 121 307 725 920 1122
Imports 1312 1833 3395 3221 3223
Source: WTO, 2008
Note: Automotive products include SITC groups 781, 782, 783, 784, and sub-groups
7132, 7783. Other transport equipment such as railway vehicles, aircraft,
spacecraft, ships and boats and its components and parts is excluded. Based on
SITC rev. 3.
In the auto components and parts segment, sales, exports and imports show an increasing
trend over the years (Table 6). However, the sector is still highly dependent on imports.
The negative trade balance of automotive products indicates that Malaysia also needs to
improve its competitiveness in component and parts manufacturing. Inability of local
suppliers to meet quality, provide cheaper component and parts has encouraged the auto
manufacturers to source for import components, and due to commitment to foreign
partners in return for technological know-how, suppliers hardly have the avenue to
export. With low R&D spending (in average 0.14% for 2000–2005), the equipments
manufacturers have limited opportunity to compete with foreign counterparts. Although,
exports of the sector increase over the years, it is still far below that of Thailand and
other emerging economies. Unlike, China for instance, Malaysia’s export competitiveness
in this sub-sector experiences very slow improvement (Loke, 2007).
Table 6 Sales, exports and imports of auto components and parts (RM billion)

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Sales 3.00 3.93 4.65 5.19 4.90 4.91 5.86 5.25 5.46 6.37
Imports 1.10 1.14 1.21 1.48 1.50 2.24 3.98 4.08 4.50 4.60
Exports 0.44 0.32 0.53 0.73 0.86 1.07 1.40 1.85 2.70 2.00
Source: MIDA, 2009

3.3 Impact of recent credit crunch

The unfolding global crisis since 2008 has had a diverse impact on the global automotive
industry hitting developing countries less severely and later than developed economies
(Wad, 2010). The shrinking exports growth and private investments of Malaysia
164 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

(as a result of the crisis) has ultimately impacted the industries, labour market and
subsequently the earnings. Overall, the industrial production index shows a contraction in
all the industries in the first and second quarter of 2009. The passenger cars and
commercial vehicles segments maintain a positive production growth in 2008 but in 2009
production index of passenger cars showed a contraction of 10.5%, 11.6% and 3.5%, in
quarter 1, 2 and 3, respectively (Table 7). Similarly, the commercial vehicle market
segments was robust in 2008 and 2009 despite the global downturn recording a positive
growth for the period of 2008 and 2009 except in first and second quarter of 2009.
However, the growth is very much lower when compared to the growth in 2008.
Table 7 Sales of passenger and commercial vehicles in Malaysia (annual change %)

2007 2008 2009

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Sales of
Passenger 4.1 4.9 25.1 42.4 25.7 27.8 10.4 10.5 –10.5 –11.6 –3.5 18.5
Cars
Sales of
Commercial –70.9 –60.1 –60.1 55.3 13.0 20.3 11.2 13.3 5.4 –10.6 –3.8 9.7
Vehicles
Source: BNM, 2010
Comparing the figures during the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 and the current global
crisis, the figure shows that the impact was much greater in 1998 where the total vehicle
sales for the year were down to 155,332, recording a decline of 59% from the previous
year (Table 8). In contrast, the decline in growth between 2008 and 2009 was only 2% on
an annual base. In 1998, the collapse was seen in production of passenger and
commercial vehicles where it decreased by nearly 170,216 and 52,693, respectively from
1997. Vehicle sales of Proton, Perodua and non-national automakers contracted by 57%,
43% and 85% respectively (MAA, 2009b), while employment were reduced by 14%,
11% and 38% respectively (Wad, 1999).
Table 8 Comparing sales during two major crises

Years Passenger Vehicles Commercial Vehicles Total Vehicles

During Asian Financial Crisis 1997/98
1997 307,907 70,334 378,241
1998 137,691 17,641 155,332
1999 239,647 26,171 265,818
During Global Financial Crisis 2008/09
2007 442,885 44,291 487,176
2008 497,459 50,656 548,115
2009 486,342 50,563 536,905
Source: MAA, 2009b (accessed 6th August 2009 and 8th March 2010)
Note: Registration of new vehicles. Reclassification of 4×4 vehicles by 1st January
2007. 4×4 vehicles are excluded for the period 1997–1999 but included in
2007–2009.
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 165

The same collapse was seen in production of vehicles in 1998 where it decreased by
nearly 194,000 units from 1997 or –57% (MAA, 2009b) distributed with –57% for
Proton, by –43% for Perodua and by –85% for non-national auto makers, while
employment were reduced by 14%, 11% and 38%, respectively (Wad, 1999).
In 2009 the government announced the 2nd Stimulus Package, totalling RM
60 billion, to cushion the impact of crisis. In assisting the private sector in facing the
crisis, RM 29 billion has been allocated for various programmes. The automotive
industry will benefit in the following ways: (a) RM200 million is allocated for the
Automotive Development Fund mainly to develop the automotive industry and vendors
as well as to establish the Automotive Institute of Malaysia; (b) support for the auto-
scrapping schemes of Proton and Perodua where RM 5000 discount is given for cars at
least ten years old (Bursa, 2009). The government’s assistance could provide cushioning
effects to the auto industry, yet, but it did not completely restore the level to that of
earlier periods. Although the auto-scrapping scheme benefits the industry in the long run,
stringent credit facilities with an increase in interest rates (as of second week of
April 2009, interest rate for hire purchase increased from 2.35% to 3.35% on average)
and lower valuation for second-hand cars did probably make the auto-scrapping scheme
less effective currently. The scheme will also consequently reduce the demand and the
sales of automotive industry. Loan disbursements for passenger cars recorded 8.2%
contraction on year to year basis (Jan–July 2008 and Jan–July 2009) while the total
disbursement contracted at 5.6% (BNM, 2009).
In sum, the weak but anyway increased export of automotive products in absolute
terms from Malaysia during the 2000s was not caused by sustained higher export
competitiveness of Proton, but rather, seemed to hinge on the overall expansion of the
domestic automobile industry and more specifically on the de-nationalisation of the other
so-called ‘national projects’ – in particular, Perodua. This trend has at the same time
re-established the hegemony of Japanese automakers in Malaysia and makes the
Malaysian automobile industry a satellite of the regional keiretsu system of Japanese
automobile corporations.

4 Assessment of the unsuccessful automotive development and

performance in Malaysia

The paradox of the national automobile policy of Malaysia is that the Malaysian
government and administration did several right things along the way but this was not
enough to break the vicious circle of low competitiveness of the national projects. Why?
The answer is to be found in the political economy of Malaysian industrialisation, its
regional position, its timing and fragility vulnerable to ‘chance’.
The foundation of Proton as a joint venture between state owned enterprise (SOE)
and Japanese MNC was a result of the New Economic Policy (NEP) aiming for creation
of a Bumiputera (primarily Malay) business community and a Bumiputera labour force in
the modern sectors of Malaysian economy, matching the strong Chinese business and
worker urban communities. This should among other things have come about through
expansion of state-controlled heavy and chemical industries launched in the early 1980s.
But forming such a local-foreign joint venture automaker presumes, theoretically speaking,
that a low marketing gap persisted in the domestic market and that marketing capabilities
for international sales could be built in time. However, the domestic automobile market
 166 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

was controlled by Chinese Malaysian businesses in assembling and distribution, and this
business elite was not part of the national automobile alliance but deliberately excluded
due to the NEP (Jomo, 2007, p.33). Thus, existing production, sales and management
experiences and competences were neglected. However, the disintegration of production
and sales companies into Proton and EON in 1984 partly included Chinese distribution
capabilities in EON but this decision went against the international norm of the
international automobile industry, also classified as a producer-driven global value chain,
where lead firms govern the whole chain of globally distributed companies. This mistake
was replicated in 2000 when the second national automaker, Perodua, was split into a
production organisation under Japanese control and a sales organisation under Malaysian
control, enabling Malaysian stakeholders to generate rents from the subsidiary of the
world’s leading automaker, Toyota Motor Corporation that controls Daihatsu which
again controls Perodua’s manufacturing units. The integration of Proton’s production and
marketing functions was finally begun in 2009.
The timing of the automotive nationalism of Malaysia did not fit the preconditions
for infant industry protection. The early move was taken in the 1980s, and although neo-
liberalism was on its rise automobile exports were still something for the future and
international sales capabilities could be created in due time. When the national automobile
manufacturers could start exporting the world automotive market was changing towards a
more liberal system influenced by the WTO trade regime which included the TRIMs
policy prohibiting in the long-term clauses requiring high local content, joint venturing
and import-export balanced subsidies. The global automobile corporations were also
competing over market shares and consolidating to reduce excess capacity and turn
around loss making or less profitable enterprises. Even though Proton had not built
marketing capabilities domestically. Proton targeted the British market in particular.
Vehicles were sold under the production cost and far below the price in Malaysia, but the
Proton vehicles were of low quality and lost reputation incurring additional costs in
servicing. Proton did the usual mistake among late coming automakers exporting from
the very start to the most competitive markets in the global North.
Finally, the Malaysian-Japanese automobile alliance did transfer standard product
and process technology and created production capabilities among workers and
administrative employees, but it did not support the creating of international sales
japanese managers and capabilities. Proton was also predominantly managed by Japanese managers and technicians
technicians preventing preventing organisational capabilities to emerge. When an experienced Bumiputera with
org cap to merge
management experience and clout was given control of Proton in mid-1990s, indigenous
leadership might have evolved but this unique industrial leader was killed in a helicopter
crash in 1997 throwing newly privatised Proton into a mess of corporate governance
which was terminated with the de facto re-nationalisation of Proton in 2000. Hence,
government-linked Proton has never been managed and owned by a large and private
local company as it was the case in Japan and South Korea. The weak technological,
marketing and management capabilities of Proton did also impact the upgrading of its
auto supplier base because such an upgrading requires that the lead OEM to transfer
technology, train vendors, form collaborative production and innovation networks and
organise the supply chain in an optimal way. This seems not to be the case in Malaysia
where an infant OEM had to upgrade itself while upgrading its suppliers, too (Wad,
2008). Indeed, there is a significant technological gap between PROTON and its suppliers
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 167

(Abdullah et al., 2008) and Proton switched partly to global first-tier suppliers in the
2000s. In addition, weak linkages with research organisations including universities
limited any indigenous technology developments (Rasiah and Chandran, 2009).
The contribution of the automotive industry is limited to the employment generation,
development of local vendors and the pride of national car ownership. However, except
the pride of national ownership, the government could have created the same or even
more spill-over effects of employment and local vendor development with less cost by
allowing foreign participation. In fact, Malaysia could probably have been the automotive
hub surpassing Thailand as the ‘Detroit of the East’. The opportunity cost of the state
interventionist strategy is numerous ranging from high societal cost in owning a car,
lack of development among suppliers, limited success of parts manufacturers, lack of
technological development, and international trade and current account deficits in
automotive products.
The NAP policy of 2006 and its review by 2009 reconfirmed the thrust of the
Malaysian automobile nationalism but scaled down the ambitions. The Malaysian
government has withdrawn from national projects it could not handle, and it now raises
the challenges allowing for FDI into high-value adding and innovative segments and
weed out protective pockets for rent seeking, thereby enabling contract manufacturing by
Proton and DRB-Hicom with large idle capacity. Moreover, it has started to internalise
gap regarding technology, marketingand institutionalise coordination and information externalities by way of establishing the
and management.
Malaysian Automotive Institute (MAI), thereby providing resources for gap filling in
technology, marketing and management. And finally, it continues the search for a
strategic partner without back-stepping on the claim for securing the Proton brand and
the survival of its local auto suppliers. In sum, it has pursued an incremental reform
policy switching path slowly and without triggering a nationalistic outcry and political
resistance while saving Malaysia’s credentials as the largest car passenger market in
ASEAN and aiming for an orderly transformation of Proton from a national project to a
corporate strong hole of a global automaker. Yet, to build a strong productivity coalition
there is a dire need to include auto- the Malaysian government must include autoworkers and their trade unions because
workers for strong productivity
coalition. they possess hands-on knowledge and organisational capabilities to contribute with
employee-driven innovation (Wad, 2009b). Autoworkers’ unions are not part of the MAI
‘automotive community’ (MAI, 2010).
Basically, Malaysia’s automobile industry is still too fragmented to provide for
economies of scale in the domestic market of Malaysia. The challenge of industrial
rationalisation faced by the Malaysian government in early 1980s is the same today, after
the national programme failed to generate international competitive automakers. The
denationalisation of Perodua and MTB has changed export potentials for the better but
also left Proton as the sole national champion struggling to become competitive. The
merger of EON and Proton Edar sales and services network at the Malaysian market in
2009 is a step forward but still has to be implemented (Fourin, 2009, p.56). Once again
Proton will go for the world market, but the world market is becoming even more
competitive with the increasing capabilities of Chinese and Indian automakers although it
is also in turmoil with defaulting US companies, restructuring and technological
problems dragging even Toyota down into a swamp of recalls and judiciary complaints.
The advantage of Malaysia is still that the trend is for a growing economy, rising
The advantage of Malaysia
incomes and improved road infrastructures enabling an auto hungry population to afford
motor vehicles purchase and use. In addition, Malaysia has huge biomass resources and
production capabilities which can be translated into biofuel with proper development and
 168 P. Wad and V.G.R.C. Govindaraju

application of bio technology. The innovation frontline is very much about renewable
energy and the greening of the automobile industry and transport system (Wad, 2010).
Malaysia has a unique change to explore and exploit this window of opportunity, but
it cannot do it alone. It has to allow biotech MNCs to network with local firms,
organisations and R&D institutions to make this opportunity a reality.
The evolution of the Malaysian automobile industry testifies to the strengths and
weaknesses of Schmitz ‘challenge-support-gap’ theory. The fragmented automobile
industry of the 1970s was determined by Malaysia’s policy of trade protection and infant
industry promotion via joint ventures (JVs) and local content requirement. JVs controlled
by foreign automakers did not deliver local production and employment, nor export and
foreign earnings. The Malaysian government embarked instead on nationally controlled
JVs and gradual upgrading and wholly ownership although it faced a double gap of
capabilities in automotive technology and marketing. It could only control the domestic
market, and increasing export over time was hampered by its MNC partner, its
outsourcing of distribution and sales (EON) and the rapidly globalisation of the
automobile industry. From the 1990s national automotive development seemed
foreclosed having captured the domestic market and the only option to capture exporting
potentials will be to closely collaborate with MNCs or other global players. Therefore,
the industry requires a shift from market seeking investment to efficient seeking
investment, that is, from a focus on the domestic market to a focus on the export
capability of the industry. In Thailand, the government allowed foreign wholly owned
automotive subsidiaries in the 1990s which again switched to exporting after the East
Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998. The foreign controlled subsidiaries in Thailand
specialised in commercial vehicles (pick-ups) and obtained a global product mandate in
this segment (Abdulsomad, 1999; Wad, 2009a). Attracting FDI became a feasible way of
building and inserting a late-late comer domestic automotive industry into an
increasingly globalised automotive sector in the 1990s characterised by a capital,
technology and marketing intensive global value chain led by transnational corporations
of OEMs and first tier suppliers. At least, for developing countries without the market
size and huge domestic capacity like China and India. However, ongoing adjustment for
new global market ups and downs may have an adverse impact on the industry. For
instance, motor vehicle exporters in Thailand were hit more than domestic market-oriented
automakers in Malaysia during the global financial crisis 2008–2009 (Wad, 2010).

5 Conclusion

Over the years from 1980 to 2009 the Malaysian automotive industry has expanded
production five times and evolved from an assembly industry towards a manufacturing
industry focusing on passenger car manufacturing while generating rising employment
proton lacks competitive advantage and average wages among its workforce. However, the national automotive programme
due to low level of skills among has been scaled down to Proton being the only OEM controlled by Malaysian capital and
employees no more being the market leader. Japanese car makers are again dominating the auto
and weak global marketing
capabilities. market and industry. Moreover, the industry still lacks the competitive advantage to
penetrate international markets due to its lack of technological and product upgrading
especially among parts and component suppliers, low levels of skills among employees
and weak global marketing capabilities. Despite the efforts of Proton in developing local
suppliers, a high dependence on domestic market and technology agreements has limited
 Automotive industry in Malaysia 169

the performance of these suppliers at a regional and global scale. Although the impact
of current global crisis is moderate because Malaysia’s automotive industry is not
significantly export oriented this is only a temporary relief, but the earning capabilities
are shrinking during the crisis, domestic demand is declining and the lacklustre performance
of the automotive industry is continuing. The stimulus packages by the government
and introduction of new models have to some extent cushioned the progress of the
industry in a positive way, but the stimulus package targets the national automotive
sector only, and this discrimination of non-national auto makers is turning them away
from investing in Malaysia. Not only is an international automotive alliance pertinent for
the stand-alone Malaysian auto maker, Proton, to reduce excess capacity through e.g.
contract manufacturing, counter market hegemony of Japanese automakers and move to
the frontier of automobile innovation. A comprehensive national productivity coalition is
a strategic necessity, too, in order to create high-performance work systems and business
models. Autoworkers and their trade unions must be part of such a coalition enabling
innovation bottom up mobilising workers with hands-on knowledge and workplace
experience about the state of production processes. Creating a more dynamic automotive
cluster through productivity enhancement and strengthening of innovation processes is
still an option for Malaysia, but not in the disguise of ‘industrial nationalism’.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for their commissioning
of the original work underpinning this paper and for their permission to publish this
heavily revised and updated work externally. We also thank the anonymous referees for
comments on this version.

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Notes
1 Formally Perodua is classified as a ‘national’ motor vehicle maker, but the manufacturing
subsidiaries are 51% equity controlled by Japanese Daihatsu Motor Co. (41%) and Mitsui &
Co. (10%) through the Perodua Auto Corporation where they have 51% equity. Thus, Perodua
is in reality controlled by Japanese firms and in particular Daihatsu Motor Co., although
Malaysian interests control the sales company and the overall holding company.
2 In passenger vehicle market, Perodua and Proton control 33.8% and 29.7%, respectively.
3 Formally speaking PERODUA, MTB and INOKOM are also ‘national’ projects, but only
INOKOM is today majority owned by local capital (controlling shareholder is Sime Darby
with 51%). INOKOM does only have 1.1% of total vehicle market in 2009 and is doing
contract assembling for Hyundai (MAA, www.maa.org.my, www.inokom.com.my).