Vasilios N.

Makrides (Erfurt)

Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under

Communism: Differences and Parallels1

Introduction

The particular relations between the various Christian Churches and

the communist regimes (including the communist heritage) in Eastern,
East Central and South Eastern Europe have each attracted consider­able
attention after the fall of Eastern Bloc (Kunter / SchjØrring 2007). The
attention revolves around a quite complex topic that defies both a sing-
le categorical answer and a concomitant classification. These church-state
relations were indeed multi-faceted and multi-layered, even within one
and the same context. For example, the Soviet religious policies from 1917
until 1991 were not uniform, but exhibited different phases, depending on
the specific leaders and the overall socio-political circumstances. Even so,
the Soviet case differs significantly from the case of communist Albania –
especially in the period after 1967, where the latter country’s extreme anti-
religious policies reached their peak.
Certainly, this is a huge topic to be treated within the limited space of
a single paper. Nonetheless, I propose to consider it here on the basis of
my own research interests in the comparative religious and cultural his-
tory of Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Christianity in Europe. My
proposed method is to look at both the common aspects and the different
trajectories of these churches across history in relation to politics and soci-
ety. The era of communism is particularly illuminating in this context, for
it can reveal some of the key features – both common and diverging – of
the various Christian Churches. In the former communist countries there
was namely a large variety of Christian traditions and establishments: Or-
thodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant (Evangelical or Reformed). These
traditions took on various local constellations and forms (as majority or
minority churches), which also included certain special cases, such as the
This paper is based on the opening lecture at the Conference “Kirchen und Staats­
1

gewalt in Mittel- und Osteuropa”, organized by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für

Osteuropakunde e.V. in Berlin (6-7 December 2012).

703
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

existence of a large number of Eastern Catholics (Uniates). One may thus

put forth the following questions: How exactly were the main Christian
Churches treated by the respective communist regimes? Specifically, were
they treated in the same, in similar or in completely different ways? Fur-
ther, what were the attitudes of these Christian Churches towards such
communist regimes, which were not particularly friendly towards them?
How did all these churches face the challenges of secularity and modernity
during the communist period? Also, how did they transform in the post-
communist era? Is it perhaps possible to locate any significant differen­
ces or common features along these borders and separating lines between
Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Christianity? Finally, what can all
this tell us about the religious and cultural specificities of these churches?
In this paper I will thus focus on two points. The first is the issue of church-
state relations and the church opposition to the state, where the differences
between these churches are more than conspicuous; the second relates to
the challenges posed by secularity and modernity to these churches, where
some interesting parallels may be located.

Church-State Relations and Church Opposition

under Communism

An important issue that can be examined comparatively concerns

church-state relations under communism, including church opposition to
the state. Were church-state relations in a historically predominant Ortho-
dox context (e.g. Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria) more or less the same
as those existing in a majoritarian Roman Catholic (e.g. Poland) or Protes-
tant (e.g. the German Democratic Republic/GDR) milieu? No doubt, the
respective communist regimes basically had an overall anti-religious agen-
da in mind, yet in practice they followed different policies on religions and
were ready to make compromises for their own interest. Nonetheless, it is
worth noting some conspicuous differences that have a lot to do with the
historical background of these churches, especially as far as their attitudes
towards political power are concerned.
In order to better capture the main argument here, it is necessary to re-
sort to history and to offer a short overview of how church-state relations
were articulated in the history of European Christianity after the Chris-
tianization of the Roman Empire. We can locate two predominant models

704
 Vasilios N. Makrides

of church-state relations in East and West. In the Byzantine (East Roman)

Empire, church and state represented two different institutions, yet they
were conceived as being intrinsically and inextricably connected with one
another. Both had a divine origin, being the gifts and blessings of God to
humankind for the better handling of divine and human/worldly affairs.
Hence, both had to support each other, to mutually legitimate one another
and collaborate in harmony with the aim of pleasing and praising God, as
well as with the aim of guarding the true Christian faith (Orthodoxy). This
ideal had clearly been expressed by the 6th Novella of Emperor Justinian I
(527-565) and from thereon out was known as symphony between church
and state. In reality, this ideal was not realized as such, and the Byzantine
model of church-state relations came much closer to caesaropapism. Im-
portantly enough, this model left a long-lasting legacy in the Orthodox
East – granted, with various local expressions and modifications, such as
in Tsarist Russia (Uspenskij 1998). In other words, this doctrine of sym-
phony signified that church and state, although formally separated, have
to remain in one way or another in a mutual and reciprocal relationship
and support each other. In the Byzantine political philosophy this spe-
cial relationship between church and state was portrayed as analogous to
the one between soul and body in the human organism. In the present
day, this legacy survives mutatis mutandis in many predominantly Ortho-
dox countries (e.g. Russia, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria), although
the political systems of these countries have been largely influenced by
Western secular modernity. Yet the secular models have never quite fully
neutralized the traditional ideal of a symphony between church and state
(Leuştean 2011). This explains why today in such Orthodox countries we
encounter various mixed situations involving the crafting of a new form of
symphony – in the sense of a privileged partnership that represents neither
the Western secular model nor the old Byzantine tradition of church-state
regulation. This situation was aptly described as “symphonic secularism”
(Ghodsee 2009), an expression pointing to the above-mentioned Orthodox
ambiguities; or as “asymmetric symphonia” (Anderson 2007), thus point-
ing to the stronger role of the modern sovereign state in decision-taking,
which by definition is superior to the church and which can regulate the
religious affairs within its territory by its own will and power.
Another aspect of this long tradition in the Orthodox East relates to the
willingness and the potential of the church to act as an opposition pow-
er and even to overthrow a government for several reasons (e.g. on the
grounds that the government is going against the will of God). This is a

705
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

point closely related to the communist period, as well. Historically speak-

ing, caesaropapistic attitudes predominated in the Orthodox East, yet the
church (not only the official hierarchy, but also the monastics and the be-
lievers) was often in a position to oppose certain state decisions that were
considered detrimental to the Orthodox faith. This happened, for exam-
ple, during the iconoclastic debates (8th–9th c.) or during the numerous
attempts to unite the churches in East and West after the “Great Schism” of
1054. On the other hand, it is also true that the Orthodox Church through-
out its long history usually acted as a legitimizing force of political power.
This was another consequence of the aforementioned Byzantine model,
with its fundamental twofold character of perceived symphony between
church and state as reflecting the divine and earthly order. Accordingly,
neither church nor state (and, by extension, neither the patriarch nor the
emperor) could exist in separation from its counterpart. This indispensable
twofold character becomes evident in the answer of Patriarch of Constan-
tinople Anthony IV to the Grand Prince of Moscow Vasilii I in 1393: “It
is not possible for Christians to have a church and not to have an empire.
Church and empire have a great unity and community; nor is it possible
for them to be separated from one another” (Barker 1957, 195).
The question is, however, what happens when the political regime is
against the perceived will of God or inimical towards the church and the
right faith. Should the church still support it, or at least tolerate it as a
temporary stage in human history that was permitted by God? Without a
doubt, many different options have circulated in the Orthodox world, yet
one strong tendency has generally been that of toleration and conditional
support of any political power. The issue is primarily that of the submis-
siveness of the Orthodox Church to the state. The Orthodox are prepared
to accommodate themselves to the state in a pragmatic way, to obey it, to
avoid resistance or revolt, and to find a modus vivendi of coexistence. This
may even happen with an oppressive government or a principally athe-
ist state – which was in fact the case with communism. The Orthodox
have usually interpreted well-known and related Biblical passages (Rom.
13, 1-3; 1 Pet. 2, 13-16) as supporting this kind of submissiveness. The
perception is that, if any power is ordained by God, then whoever resists it
is guilty of resisting the ordinance of God and will be eventually damned.
This passive attitude is also related to the “internal human freedom” pro-
claimed by Christianity, which is far more important than (and cannot
be influenced by) external factors including not only political control, but
further any exterior pressure whatsoever. No doubt, these and other re-

706
 Vasilios N. Makrides

lated Biblical passages reflect specific Christian attitudes towards the Ro-
man political authorities, which also included cases of disobedience to
the state (cf. the numerous Christian martyrs). Still, the point is how this
early Christian tradition was interpreted later on, especially once Chris-
tianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire. In the East, the
Byzantine Empire managed to preserve a central imperial structure and
a concomitant political ideology over its long history, which was closely
connected with the church. In this context, the church could not be char-
acterized as a revolutionary force, or at least not as a force that would pose
constant challenges to imperial power. After all, such behavior was hardly
an option for Orthodox and other Oriental Christians in the Near East,
who fell quickly under Islamic rule (from the 7th century onward), and
had to develop various survival strategies as minority religions. However,
there is plenty of evidence that various mainstream Orthodox Churches
followed this tradition of submissiveness. Even when they found them-
selves under foreign rule – such as in the case of the Orthodox in Russia
under Mongolian rule and of the Orthodox in the Balkans under Ottoman
rule – they usually articulated moralistic explanations bent on rational-
izing or even legitimizing such developments. The Patriarchate of Con-
stantinople and other Orthodox circles, for example, promoted the idea of
the “voluntary slavery” to the Ottomans and presented their rule as being
ordained by God. It was namely God (so the argument went) who allowed
the Ottomans to subjugate the Orthodox in order to save the latter from
a union with the “heretics” of Latin Christendom, and in so doing God
had preserved the Orthodox faith intact. The “tolerance” of the Ottomans
towards their subjugated religious communities, which was based on the
Millet system, was regarded as beneficial for the Orthodox and for their
self-perceivedly unique religious faith (Ohme 2011).
If we take a quick look at the Western Latin model of church-state re-
lations, we can observe another development. This happened early on in
Western history and led to significantly different consequences. Because of
its strong authority, power and influence the Papal See in Rome acquired
a self-understanding of superiority, and thus was not ready to surrender
its independence to any political power. It was a model of church-state
relations that emphasized the fundamental autonomy of the church. Not
long after, this was to become the dominant strategy in the Latin West, and
was even theologically legitimated (cf. Augustine’s work De civitate Dei,
written between 413 and 426). Concrete historical circumstances (e.g. the
political end of the Western Roman Empire in 476) afterwards left the Pa-

707
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

pal See without political support. The popes used this development to fur-
ther corroborate their claims for independence from political control and
for the priority of the church over political power. This became evident in
the so-called Doctrina Gelasiana, namely the letter written by Pope Gela-
sius I to the Byzantine Emperor Anastasios I in 494. Striving to avoid the
political control of the Byzantine Emperor, Gelasius clearly distinguished
between the two powers (“two swords”), the spiritual and the temporal,
while distinctly pleading for the independence of the church from earth-
ly politics and making a case for the church’s inherent supremacy due to
its divine origin and nature. This was the continuation of a long West-
ern strategy to keep the church independent from any political control,
whereas the church itself was later in a position to acquire its own political
power (cf. the foundation of the Papal State in 754 through the alliance
with the Franks). It was the beginning of a period of intense debates and
conflicts between popes and political leaders in the Middle Ages (cf. the
investiture controversy) over authority and supremacy. Characteristically
enough, this Western model of church-state relations was fundamentally
different from the Byzantine one of symphony. The emergence of Prot-
estantism did not entail any fundamental changes to this tradition, and
supported the autonomy of the church (cf. Martin Luther’s doctrine of the
“two reigns/kingdoms”, the spiritual and the worldly) while paving the way
for the modern separation between church and state. Thus, the need for
the church’s freedom from any external political constrains remained al-
ways non-negotiable in the Western tradition. Furthermore, because of
its fundamental autonomy, the church was in principle neither obedient
nor submissive to any desire of the state, and consequently maintained
the possibility of becoming a place of opposition and reaction. After all,
experts have connected the Reformation with the intensification of social
revolutionary potential, the radicalization of politics and the change of es-
tablished social order. The example of English Puritanism as the earliest
form of political radicalism is a case in point (Walzer 1968).
Turning now to our main topic – namely the role of the Orthodox, Ro-
man Catholic and Protestant Churches under communism – we can still
trace the influence of the previous two models of church-state relations.
No doubt, we cannot draw a strict separation line between these churches.
There was always a mixture of differing attitudes and stances towards the
respective regimes, ranging from instrumentalization, cooperation and
collaboration on the one hand, all the way to resistance, systematic op-
position and reaction, (including cases of martyrdom) on the other hand.

708
 Vasilios N. Makrides

All these churches faced repressive measures of different sorts with vary-
ing frequency and developed concrete strategies of survival, co-existence
or even opposition to the respective regimes. We can easily locate various
individual dissidents or dissident groups in all of these churches, yet the
point is to examine what unique and denomination-oriented tendencies
predominated in these specific constellations of church-state relations.
Starting with the Orthodox case, we can realize that in communist
countries with a predominantly Orthodox population, the respective Or-
thodox Churches were usually eager to find ways to accommodate the re-
spective states, even if they were run by atheist ideologues. The classic ex-
ample is the so-called “Sergianism” (Sergianstvo) in the Soviet Union. This
doctrine involved the church’s recognition of the Soviet regime through a
declaration of loyalty, issued by the locum tenens Sergii Stragorodskii in
1927 in the wake of Patriarch Tikhon’s deposition (Shukman 2006). In fact,
the acceptance of the communist regime went even further, as is evident
in considering the “Renovationist Church Movement” (Obnovlenchestvo).
This movement not only collaborated with the communists, but also le-
gitimized their rule theologically, in an attempt to effect a particular mod-
ernization of the church on the basis of the new socio-political and ideo-
logical order. However, many Orthodox – notably, the Russian Orthodox
Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) – criticized such bold steps, character-
izing them as a capitulation to an anti-Christian regime and as a loss of
the church’s prophetic spirit and function in the world. Certainly, there
was also opposition to the regime from different sides, both at official and
at the grass-root level (e.g. the activities of the priests Gleb P. Yakunin and
Dmitri Dudko). Yet it is true that, in most cases, the church followed a
policy of accommodating the communist regime (and developed its own
profile accordingly), while the communists kept it under control and used
it for their own purposes in spite of systematic anti-religious propaganda.
This happened even during the Stalin era after World War II, despite this
leader’s previous severe persecution of the church in the 1930s (Roccucci
2011). Undoubtedly, the church did not have enough options at the time,
and was unavoidably forced to seek compromises. Yet this was in line with
the Orthodox world’s pre-long and pre-existing tradition of non-resistance
to political power. In addition, we should not forget that, despite big differ-
ences, there were some interesting correlations between the communists
and the Orthodox tradition. For example, the anti-Westernism of the com-
munists coincided in many respects with the traditional anti-Westernism
of the Orthodox Church, a fact that contributed to bringing the two of

709
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

them closer. In 1948, the Uniate Church was outlawed in the Soviet Union
and Romania, also on the grounds that this religious community repre-
sented a Western “Trojan Horse” in the East. This development pleased the
Orthodox Church. After all, the latter profited from the situation, since it
acquired a great deal of the confiscated Uniate church property for its own
use. It was only after the fall of communism that this development was re-
versed – catalysing significant levels of inter-religious strife in the respec-
tive regions (Mahieu / Naumescu 2008). Within this context of particular
collaboration, the church was thus somehow satisfied with the established
state of affairs, and showed no real interest in opposing, undermining or
ultimately overthrowing the regime.
This history of collaboration explains why the Orthodox Churches un-
der communism have not been considered as major contributors to the
collapse of communism – in clear contrast to the Western Latin Churches.
Moreover, the Orthodox Churches have often been criticized for collabo-
rating with the communist regimes so closely that they were fully perme-
ated and controlled by them (Stan / Turcescu 2005). The post-communist
period was subsequently seen as a period of purging and regeneration
from such false political identification and alliance. Within this context,
it is not fortuitous that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has been severe-
ly challenged since the 1990s by an internal schism. Initially, this trouble
started through accusations pertaining to the extreme submissiveness of
the church leadership to the communist regime (Kalkandjieva 2014). It
is also not accidental that, in the Russian Orthodox Church’s 2000 docu-
ment entitled Bases of the Social Concept (III. 5; IV. 9), one can find explicit
talk about the opposition of the church to any regime taking on an anti-
Christian path. In such cases, the church – so the argument goes – may
employ a variety of options in order to influence state decisions. Such op-
tions include calling the people to support the church, and to develop a
non-violent civil resistance toward the state (Naletova 2001). This particu-
lar aspect was probably due to a sense of guilt, based on the institutional
servility of the church to the state under communism. Still, it is perhaps
a unique case in Russian history, in that the church negates its wholesale
loyalty to the state. At the same time, it is interesting to watch the renewed
closeness between church and state in the post-communist era, which can
be also understood in the light of several previously-mentioned phenom-
ena. Such closeness entails not only several privileges for the Orthodox
Church vis-à-vis other churches and religions, but also a state-regulated
religious establishment.

710
 Vasilios N. Makrides

There have been several voices within the Orthodox world, both in the
past and at present, that have advocated for proceeding toward a greater
separation of church and state, and for the church to liberate itself from the
alleged beneficial support of the state. The Russian religious philosopher
Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944) made such demands, reflecting on the situa-
tion under communist rule (Bulgakov 2004, 237-246). In post-communist
times, the priest Veniamin Novik has also suggested similar positions on
the basis of various theological arguments (Novik 1999, 152-159). In a long
document of 64 pages, published anonymously in 2008 by a group of Rus-
sian Orthodox clerics, the close connection between church and state in
post-communist times was also criticized as problematic for the Orthodox
Church and for its real mission in the world (Dokument 2009). Yet the situ-
ation in real church politics is a quite different one, for it depends on other
complex and interrelated parameters, as well as on pragmatic decisions.
In 1991, Patriarch Aleksii II publicly apologized for the previously strong
collaboration of the church with the communist state, yet the church lead-
ership is keen in finding useful explanations that may alleviate this sense
of guilt. For example, one can observe a tendency to evaluate “Sergianism”
as a tactical and necessary step of the church in the context of its survival
policy under a highly anti-religious regime. Be that as it may, although the
Orthodox Church is stricto sensu not a “state church” in Russia today, it is
still privileged to a great degree with respect to the state, keeps a special re-
lation with it and remains a public factor of the utmost importance (Knox
2003; Stricker 2011).
Now, if we consider the Western Latin Churches under communism,
we find a rather different situation, which has been informed by the long
Western tradition of keeping the church autonomous and free of political
control or intervention. No doubt, there were cases of collaboration be-
tween these churches and the respective communist regimes. Such cases
became the objects of investigation in the subsequent period. Yet, generally
speaking, these churches and many groups within them managed to create
their own niches of opposition and resistance, and kept on undermining
the foundations of the communist regimes. This was, for example, the case
with the Evangelical Churches in the GDR (Kunter 2006a) and the Catho-
lic Church in Poland (Bernhard 1993). These were namely considered as
instrumental in keeping alive the opposition to the respective regimes and,
more importantly, in leading to their eventual collapse – of course, in col-
laboration and interaction with other opposition actors and forces (Mi-
chel 1991; Życinski 1992). More specifically, these churches contributed

711
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

to the development of a civil society and of oppositional spaces within the

totalitarian order. They provided a symbolic resource to oppose or sub-
vert communism. Further, they preserved ties to the international order
and to global Christianity. Finally, they functioned as an intellectual force
and as a space in which opposition thinking and identities were construed
(Herbert 1999, 281-282). The Lutheran tradition about the “two king-
doms” was considered to have played a cardinal role in this development
(Krusche 1994). For example, the role of Christian Führer (1943-2014) is
well known. Beginning in 1982, this German pastor organized the “peace
prayers” in the Nikolai Church in Leipzig (in protest against the commu-
nist regime), and in 1989 was strongly involved in the peaceful demonstra-
tions against the same regime (Führer 2008). Even the minority Catholic
Church in the GDR has been considered an oppositional factor against the
regime (Schneider / Herrmann 2010). Also in the Czech Republic, one of
the least religious countries in the world today, churches played a signifi-
cant role in political transformation and democratization (Kunter 2006b).
We should finally mention that the Ecumenical Movement also provided
a platform for supporting Christians under communism and for exerting
opposition to the respective regimes during the Cold War (Garstecki 2007;
Filo 2012).
As we have already seen, such consistent and key roles of opposition
have never been attributed to the Orthodox Churches under communism.
We may more clearly discern the respective “patterns of Orthodox behav-
ior” in numerous local variations if we take into consideration two recently
published anthologies, both of them rich and informative. The first is on
the various Orthodox Churches during the Cold War, and the second is on
these churches in post-communist times (Leustean 2010 and 2014). As a
contrast, we should also consider another collective volume on the role of
Protestantism and Catholicism (in the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia) and of Orthodox Christianity (in the Soviet Union). This work
concerns the religions’ contributions to the political changes of 1989 and
to the concomitant democratization processes. In this context, the afore-
mentioned differences become again quite obvious, and have also been
explained by reference to the long Christian past (Veen / März / Schlich­
ting 2009). Another interesting comparison between the Catholic Church
in Poland and the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria vividly reveals the signifi-
cant differences inherent not only in their respective attitudes to the com-
munist regimes, but also in their willingness to resist them by enabling
various forms of opposition (Ramet 1998, 275-307).

712
 Vasilios N. Makrides

Secularity, Modernity and the Christian Churches

under Communism

Having dealt with one basic difference among the Christian Churches
under communism, let us now turn our attention to an issue where some
parallels can be located. This relates to the challenges that secularity and
modernity tend to place on various Christian Churches. It is well-known
that the communist regimes attempted to officially institutionalize secu-
larity, a plan that had strong roots in modern European intellectual, social
and political history, but truly reached a peak of growth under commu-
nism. We should also keep in mind that the opposition between the reli-
gious and the secular, although not exclusively a European invention, did
acquire a certain intensity and, specifically within the context of European
history, displayed singular characteristics with broader repercussions (cf.
the notorious secularization process with a strong deterministic character)
(Makrides 2008). Under communism, this included not only a negative at-
titude towards religions in general, but also the systematic persecution of
religions with the hope or the belief of eliminating and substituting them
entirely. This was “the plot to kill God” (Froese 2010).
Yet, from another perspective, it is debatable whether these regimes
were fully secular (in the strict meaning of the word). This is why Eric
Voegelin had already called in 1938 Marxism-Leninism a “political reli-
gion”, a term widely used afterwards in political science and philosophy, as
well as in research on totalitarianism. While it is true that the communists
attempted to establish a new secular and mundane order, this order con-
sisted of numerous elements that could be also characterized as “immanent
religion” or as “quasi-religion”. Not only in its institutionalized aspects, but
also on a personal level, the new order radiated a “religious aura”. A case in
point are the memoirs of a Bolshevik worker and later Soviet party figure
Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov (1879-1940), describing his initial “conver-
sion” to the communist system and ideology, which is reminiscent in many
respects of the Confessions of Augustine (Hernandez 2001). Aside from the
scholarly debate on whether the new system might be called religious, it is
true that the previously established Christian Churches and other religious
groups were in the end tolerated within that system, in various forms and
to differing degrees.
The question, however, is if and how the Christian Churches (Ortho-
dox, Roman Catholic and Protestant) have been affected by communist

713
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

secularity and what the potential consequences were. In the case of the
Orthodox Churches, the experience of communist persecution led to an
extreme polarization between the religious and the secular, especially in
post-communist times. Considering also that the Orthodox world in gen-
eral had very limited contact and interaction with Western secular mo-
dernity, this fact can explain the deep and ever-existing divide between
the two sides. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-
communist period is quite adamant in its opposition to Western secular-
ism and modernity. By looking at the “Bases of the Social Concept” of
2000 and at the document on human dignity, freedom and rights of 2008,
this becomes more than evident (Agadjanian 2014). When Patriarch Kirill
or Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) condemn the “militant atheism” and
“secularism” of today’s society, they are not referring solely to the com-
munist period that their country has experienced, but also to the modern
secular age brought about by Western developments that are considered
to pose serious threats to the sensitive domain of “traditional values” and
of Orthodox culture (Laitila 2012). As such, the attitudes of the Russian
Orthodox Church nowadays are clearly differentiated from the attitudes
of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches in the West, which have
accepted the legitimacy of the secular sphere in society and have to a great
extent come to terms with the project of modernity.
Still, similar attitudes can be observed in a specific Catholic Church
found under Communism: namely the one in Poland. Here we can ob-
serve critical stances towards secularity and modernity, which have shaped
its profile and which distinguish it in many ways from Italian or Span-
ish Catholicism. One important reason for these divergent attitudes can
be found in the different experiences that these local Catholicisms had
had with Western modernity. A key development in this respect was the
Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), which inaugurated a new era in the
relation of the Roman Catholic Church with modernity as a whole. This
council signified that the Roman Catholic Church no longer called the le-
gitimacy of modernity into question. Although the decisions of the coun-
cil had a crucial impact in the future course of this church worldwide, not
all local Catholicisms were able to benefit from this radical change in the
same way. This holds true for the Polish case under communist rule, where
the church was not in a position to grasp the innovative spirit unleashed by
the above-mentioned council. This explains also why in post-communist
times Polish Catholicism takes on far more hard-line positions on many
issues than is often the case in the Catholic contexts in Western Europe.

714
 Vasilios N. Makrides

The debated problems relate not so much to confessional pluralism, but

more to moral and cultural pluralism, which are seen as undermining the
Polish religious and national identity (Miller 1997; Pieronek 2003; Porter-
Szücs 2011).
In the case of Protestantism, the encounter with secularity and moder-
nity was basically a different one. This discrepancy is principally due to
the fact that Protestantism had exhibited a particular “worldly character”
from the very outset. Such a character went hand in hand with the process
of secularization in Western Europe, and rendered Protestantism compat-
ible with the modern world to a great extent. This also refers to the cultural
significance of Protestantism for the modern era, which was eloquently
analysed by Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch. This means, in the end, that
because of its inherent worldliness Protestantism represents a case of its
own. It is thus different than Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholi-
cism, which preserve a stronger sense of otherworldliness, albeit to varying
degrees and intensities. Given this worldly background, it is interesting to
observe what happened to the Protestant Churches under communist rule
– namely when Protestant worldliness encountered communist secular-
ism. Although certainly not fully compatible, there were interesting over-
laps between them, inasmuch as Protestantism lays particular emphasis on
the social presence and ministry of the church (e.g. individual rights, so-
cial justice). Further, the communist grip on the Protestant Churches was
looser and more flexible, as the communists themselves expected signifi-
cant social contributions from the Protestants, and hoped to use them for
the ideological purposes of the regime. This was, however, not necessarily
the case, since Protestants, despite their strong social engagement, simul-
taneously developed niches of opposition against the communist regimes,
as we have already seen. More important, however, is the fact that Protes-
tantism (due to its own worldliness) is more prone than other Christian
Churches to secularize itself and lose its religious specificity and otherness.
In the context of communism, this led to a greater secularization within
the Protestant ranks or even to the loss of faith and the profession of ideo-
logically atheist views. It is thus not accidental that communist countries
with a predominant Protestant tradition show in post-communist times a
high degree of religious indifference and irreligiosity. This holds true even
in comparison to liberal Western democracies, which are, after all, con-
sidered to have been secularized for much longer time during the entire
modern age. A case in point is the former GDR, where higher degrees of

715
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

religious indifference are still observed today in comparison to West Ger-

many, despite the reunification of the two parts in 1990 (Pollack 2000).
More specifically, the issue of plurality (in the broad sense of the word)
can be very revealing here, especially with regard to communist-era differ-
ences along confessional lines. Plurality is commonly regarded as the out-
come of modernity, and is connected with the central notions of religious
freedom, tolerance, secularity, acceptance of differences, and religious neu-
trality of the state. These notions have been established as the cornerstones
of the cultural heritage of Europe in modern times. How did the Christian
Churches in Western Europe react to the challenges of pluralism and mo-
dernity? Being also the result of a pluralization process within Christianity
itself, the Protestants were more receptive towards pluralities of all sorts
in the course of their own development and their own continuing internal
differentiation. For the Roman Catholic Church and its powerful estab-
lishment, the related problems were significantly bigger and more serious.
This is why it took several centuries for this church to come to terms with
this crucial transition and to become more plural – a breakthrough that
was achieved solely after the Second Vatican Council. As for the Orthodox
Churches in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, these were very margin-
ally affected by the modern changes, which is why they still have not ac-
cepted the modern notion of plurality and why they still support their tra-
dition of being privileged by the state. The growing nationalization of the
Orthodox Churches from the 19th century onwards, and the intertwining
of these churches with the respective nation-states left no room for more
plural attitudes. Only in the context of the European Union have some pre-
dominantly Orthodox member states begun to endorse more pluralist ide-
als and implement related societal changes through pertinent legislation.
The main question is how all these churches dealt with the issue of
modern pluralism while under the influence of the long communist rule.
In fact, attributes of communist totalitarianism, indoctrination and con-
trol permeated these entire societies, and left their imprint everywhere
(including on the church’s domain). The transition toward the democra-
tization and liberalization of ex-communist societies was thus thought to
involve many obstacles, and was regarded in several cases as having an
uncertain future. Yet this was considered to be more the case in the pre-
dominantly Orthodox countries, which historically lacked such a pluralist
face. When looking at the agenda of the Russian Orthodox Church in the
post-communist era, this is more than obvious. Not only did this church
try to regain what it had lost under communism, but it also attempted to

716
 Vasilios N. Makrides

re-establish its authority with the help of the state. Its aim to defend its
“canonical territory” (i.e. its territorial religious exclusivity), and to regu-
late the religious demographics of the Russian Federation accordingly, can
be characterized as indicative of this pre-pluralist spirit, which is differ-
ent from the Western modern ideals of religious and cultural pluralism.
The previously mentioned document of 2008 on human dignity, freedom
and rights has also revealed the wide and still-existing gap between East-
ern and Western Christianity (Makrides 2012; Stoeckl 2014). The Russian
Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations of 1997 was
also criticized as not reflecting the Western standards of religious plural-
ity (Elliott / Corrado 1999). Other incidents, such as the Orthodox vio-
lent reactions against the art exposition “Beware, Religion!” (Ostorozhno,
Religiia!) in Moscow in 2003, were also rated in the West as signs of intoler-
ance and as reminiscent of communist totalitarianism (Agadjanian 2014,
97-109). Similarly negative attitudes towards religious, moral and cultural
plurality were also reported in other Orthodox countries that emerged
from communist rule, such as in Romania (Ramet 1998; 181-201). Sta-
tistical data have also shown higher degrees of intolerance in Orthodox
milieus, particularly when compared with West European countries (Ger-
hards / Hölscher 2006, 81).
Nonetheless, these (and similar) phenomena can be observed mutatis
mutandis in some Western Christian Churches under communism. As al-
ready mentioned, Polish Catholicism is conspicuous in this context, since
it has problems adapting to a more open situation of moral and cultural
pluralism. Cases of intolerance, discrimination and racism (e.g. right-wing
extremism) also exist in various such countries, yet these are not necessar-
ily connected to a specific religious affiliation. Statistics have shown high
degrees of intolerance in Hungary (a religiously diverse country with a
strong Catholic presence) and in Poland (Gerhards / Hölscher 2006, 81).
No doubt, the totalitarian communist period has indeed left its imprint
and did mould the individual conscience as well, yet the related problems
are not identical with the ones in Orthodox countries. This has principally
to do with the fact that both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism have
had a multi-faceted and long-standing encounter and interaction with
modernity and with its heritage – in numerous local contexts, long before
the advent of communism in the 20th century. This included pluralization
not only in the religious sphere, but also in the realm of values. This do-
main was relativized and came to include modern secular and immanent
values as well. Western Christianity as a whole has managed to come to

717
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

terms with such challenges in the long run, and has articulated various
new agendas and policies accordingly. Thus, this long heritage could not
be lost when some of these churches, especially in East Central Europe,
came under communist control after World War II. On the other hand, the
Orthodox world in Eastern and South Eastern Europe lacked such a long
background of interaction with modernity, which explains why this world
exhibited anti-pluralist attitudes and trends under communism, and con-
tinues to do so in post-communist times. David Martin (2011) has recent-
ly opined that the “future success” of Christianity depends on its effective
role in the growing global civil society, a development that was pioneered
by Protestants, but was also supported in recent decades by Roman Catho-
lics. On the contrary, the Orthodox do not seem (at least up to the present
day) to play a significant role in this process of involvement with global
civil society, and they remain bound more to their own exclusive tradi-
tion. All this is understandable in the light of Orthodox history and past
developments. However, we are talking about long-term processes that can
eventually change the profile of a church, as has happened with Roman
Catholicism after the Second Vatican Council.

Concluding Remarks

Using selected examples from the history of the Christian Churches

(Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant) under communism, this pa-
per has tried to locate both certain differences and some parallels between
them. The purpose of the method has been to situate these phenomena in
their historical and contemporary contexts, and to analyse their signifi-
cance – all from a comparative approach to Christianity in Europe. The
same could have been done by taking on other parameters into consider-
ation (e.g. the national dimension of these churches).
The scope was not to prove the superiority or the advantages of one
Christian Church over the other, or to “orientalize/balkanize” Orthodox
Christianity. Instead, the point was to show the religio-cultural idiosyncra-
sies of each church in the light of its long past. For example, the opposition
of Western Latin Churches to political power should not be generalized
and overestimated, especially if one considers their attitudes towards Na-
tional Socialism and Fascism. There are rules and exceptions in all these
cases, yet the question is what predominates and remains more influential.

718
 Vasilios N. Makrides

Certainly, we cannot speak of a religious “exceptionalism” in the Ortho-

dox (Makrides 2010) or in the other cases. Comparative statistical data
drawn from former communist countries often show various convergen-
ces beyond confessional borders. Even so, some historically-formed idio-
syncrasies and specificities of each religious culture can still be discerned
and traced. Take for example the greater trust in the social engagement
of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in distinction to the Orthodox
ones (Tomka 2010, 187). This can be explained by reference to the history
of the social engagement of these churches respectively, which exhibits
considerable differences (Makrides 2013). Thus, the rich and varied back-
grounds of these churches must be taken into consideration in the evalu-
ation of various developments and phenomena. For example, the differ-
ences between the secular Czechs and the devout Slovaks today cannot be
explained without considering the historical relationship between religion
and nationalism in both regions (Froese 2005). In a similar way, despite
the ongoing processes of European integration and homogenization (e.g.
in terms of legislation under the influence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights), one can still discern the influence of some specific “patterns
of behavior” today that draw on the Orthodox past – for example, patterns
of church-state relations in Orthodox milieus within the contemporary
European Union (Flere / Đorđević / Kirbiš 2013).
Furthermore, this paper has attempted to show that such idiosyncrasies
are purely contextual and contingent. Thus, they are not based on some
eternal religious essence that remains unchangeable in space and time. In
general, religions are constructs formed under specific circumstances, and
echo the conditions that shaped their overall profile and course of develop-
ment. The same holds true for Christianity and its various crystallizations
in East and West across time and history. These do not reflect deep-seated
ontological differences, but are determined by historical contingencies and
other earthly factors. Such a specific period in their history was commu-
nism, which had a wide (albeit varying) impact upon all these churches in
different contexts. Yet, every church’s specific articulations and manifesta-
tions under communism have to be analysed and understood in the light
of the particular historical church trajectories, which gave rise to respec-
tive religious and cultural idiosyncrasies.

References
Agadjanian, Alexander, Turns of Faith, Search for Meaning: Orthodox Christianity and Post-
Soviet Experience, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2014.

719
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

Anderson, John, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?, Journal of
International Affairs 61 (2007), 185-201.
Barker, Ernest, Social and Political Thought in Byzantium, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957.
Bernhard, Michael, The Origins of Democratization in Poland, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1993.
Bulgakov, Sergei, Die Orthodoxie. Die Lehre der orthodoxen Kirche, Trier, Paulinus, 22004.
Dokument: Nicht länger verschweigen und verdrängen!, Glaube in der 2. Welt 4 (2009), 18-21.
Elliott, Mark / Corrado, Sharyl, The 1997 Russian Law on Religion: The Impact on Protestants,
Religion, State and Society 27 (1999), 109-134.
Filo, Július (Hg.), Christian World Community and the Cold War. International Research Con-
ference in Bratislava on 5–8 September 2011, Bratislava, Evangelical Theological Faculty of
the Comenius University, 2012.
Flere, Sergej / Đorđević, Dragoljub / Kirbiš, Andrej, Six Cases Making a Pattern: Special Prob-
lems Arising in Countries with an Orthodox Tradition, Journal of Church and State (doi:
10.1093/jcs/cst002) (2013).
Froese, Paul, Secular Czechs and Devout Slovaks: Explaining Religious Differences, Review of
Religious Research 46 (2005), 269-283.
Froese, Paul, The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization, Berke-
ley, University of California Press, 2010.
Führer, Christian, Und wir sind dabei gewesen. Die Revolution, die aus der Kirche kam, Berlin,
Ullstein, 2008.
Garstecki, Joachim (Hg.), Die Ökumene und der Widerstand gegen die Diktaturen. Nationalso-
zialismus und Kommunismus als Herausforderung an die Kirchen, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer,
2007.
Gerhards, Jürgen / Hölscher, Michael, Kulturelle Unterschiede in der Europäischen Union. Ein
Vergleich zwischen Mitgliedsländern, Beitrittskandidaten und der Türkei, Wiesbaden, VS
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.
Ghodsee, Kirsten, Symphonic Secularism: Eastern Orthodoxy, Ethnic Identity and Religious
Freedoms in Contemporary Bulgaria, Anthropology of East Europe Review 27 (2009), 227-
252.
Herbert, David, Christianity, Democratisation and Secularisation in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, Religion, State and Society 27 (1999), 277-293.
Hernandez, Richard L., The Confessions of Semen Kanatchikov: A Bolshevik Memoir as Spiri-
tual Autobiography, The Russian Review 60 (2001), 13-35.
Kalkandjieva, Daniela, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in: Leustean, Lucian N. (Hg.), Eastern
Christianity in the Twenty-First Century, London / New York, Routledge, 2014, 114-139.
Knox, Zoe, The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership, Europe-
Asia Studies 55 (2003), 575-596.
Krusche, Günter, The Church Between Accommodation and Refusal: The Significance of the
Lutheran Doctrine of the “Two Kingdoms” for the Churches of the GDR, Religion, State and
Society 22 (1994), 324-332.

720
 Vasilios N. Makrides

Kunter, Katharina, Erfüllte Hoffnungen und zerbrochene Träume. Evangelische Kirchen in

Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von Demokratie und Sozialismus (1980-1993), Göttingen,
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006a.
Kunter, Katharina, Zurück nach Europa. Die Kirchen als politischer und gesellschaftlicher Fak-
tor im demokratischen Transformationsprozess Tschechiens, Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 19
(2006b), 145-158.
Kunter, Katharina / SchjØrring, Jens Holger (Hg.), Die Kirchen und das Erbe des Kommunis-
mus, Erlangen, Martin-Luther-Verlag, 2007.
Laitila, Teuvo, The Russian Orthodox Church and Atheism, Approaching Religion 2/1 (2012),
52-57.
Leustean, Lucian N. (Hg.), Eastern Christianity and the Cold War: 1945-91, London / New
York, Routledge, 2010.
Leuştean, Lucian N., The Concept of Symphonia in Contemporary European Orthodoxy, Inter-
national Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 11 (2011), 188-202.
Leustean, Lucian N. (Hg.), Eastern Christianity in the Twenty-First Century, London / New
York, Routledge, 2014.
Mahieu, Stéphanie / Naumescu, Vlad (Hg.), Churches In-between: Greek Catholic Churches in
Postsocialist Europe, Berlin, LIT, 2008.
Makrides, Vasilios N., Die gesellschaftliche Etablierung des Säkularismus: Säkulare Kulte und
politische Religionen, in: Kippenberg, Hans G. / Rüpke, Jörg / Stuckrad, Kocku von (Hg.),
Europäische Religionsgeschichte. Ein mehrfacher Pluralismus, Bd. 2. Göttingen, Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2009, 555-580
Makrides, Vasilios N., Orthodox Eastern and South Eastern Europe: Exception or Special Case?,
in: Eberhard, Winfried / Lübke, Christian (Hg.), The Plurality of Europe: Identities and
Spaces, Leipzig, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010, 189-203.
Makrides, Vasilios N., Die Menschenrechte aus orthodox-christlicher Sicht: Evaluierung, Po-
sitionen und Reaktionen, in: Delgado, Mariano / Leppin, Volker / Neuhold, David (Hg.),
Schwierige Toleranz. Der Umgang mit Andersdenkenden und Andersgläubigen in der Chris-
tentumsgeschichte, Fribourg / Stuttgart, Academic Press / W. Kohlhammer Verlag GmbH,
2012, 293-320.
Makrides, Vasilios N., Why does the Orthodox Church Lack Systematic Social Teaching?, Skep-
sis. A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 23 (2013), 281-312.
Martin, David, The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and
Secularization, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2011.
Michel, Patrick, Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, Polity, 1991.
Miller, Stefania Szlek, Religion and Politics in Poland: The Abortion Issue, Canadian Slavonic
Papers 39 (1997), 63-86.
Novik, Veniamin, Pravoslavie, Khristianstvo, Demokratiia, St. Petersburg, Aleteiia, 1999.
Ohme, Heinz, „Gottes Zügel für das Abendland“ – „Gottes Gesandter zu unserer Rettung“: Das
Osmanische Reich in der Sicht des Ökumenischen Patriarchen im Kampf gegen Aufklärung
und Freiheitspropaganda am Vorabend der griechischen Revolution, Zeitschrift für Kir­
chengeschichte 122 (2011), 82-99.
Naletova, Inna, Symphony Re-considered: The Orthodox Church in Russia on Relations with
Modern Society, Österreichisches Archiv für Recht und Religion 48 (2001), 99-115.

721
 Eastern Orthodox and Western Latin Churches under Communism

Pieronek, Tadeusz, Die Katholische Kirche im Transformationsprozeß Polens, Stimmen der Zeit
228 (2003), 677-688.
Pollack, Detlef, Der Wandel der religiösen-kirchlichen Lage in Ostdeutschland nach 1989, in:
Pollack, Detlef / Pickel, Gert (Hg.), Religiöser und kirchlicher Wandel in Ostdeutschland
1989-1999, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 2000, 18-47.
Porter-Szűcs, B., Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2011.
Ramet, Sabrina P., Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe
and Russia, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1998.
Roccucci, Adriano, Stalin e il patriarca, Torino, Einaudi, 2011.
Schneider, Maria-Luise / Herrmann, Alfred (Hg.), 20 Jahre Mauerfall. Katholische Kirche und
Friedliche Revolution – Lernschritte und Bewährungsproben. Eine Dokumentation, Ber-
lin / Paderborn, Katholische Akademie in Berlin e.V. / Bonifatius Werk, 2010.
Shukman, Ann, Metropolitan Sergi Stragorodsky: The Case of the Representative Individual,
Religion, State and Society 34 (2006), 51-61.
Stan, Lavinia / Turcescu, Lucian, The Devil's Confessors: Priests, Communists, Spies, and In-
formers, East European Politics and Societies 19 (2005), 655-685.
Stoeckl, Kristina, The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights, London / New York,
Routledge, 2014.
Stricker, Gerd, Orthodoxe Kirche und russischer Staat, Glaube in der 2. Welt 1 (2011), 20-23.
Tomka, Miklós, Religiosity, Confessionalism and Social Identity in Eastern and Central Europe,
in: Eberhard, Winfried / Lübke, Christian (Hg.), The Plurality of Europe: Identities and
Spaces, Leipzig, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010, 173-188.
Uspenskij, Boris A., Tsar’ i patriarkh. Kharizma vlasti v Rossii (Vizantijskaia model’ i eë russkoe
pereosmyslenie, Moskva, Iazyki russkoj kul’tury, 1998.
Veen, Hans-Joachim / März, Peter / Schlichting, Franz-Josef (Hg.), Kirche und Revolution. Das
Christentum in Ostmitteleuropa vor und nach 1989, Köln / Weimar / Wien, Böhlau, 2009.
Walzer, Michael, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics, New
York, Atheneum, 1968.
Życinski, Jósef, The Role of Religious and Intellectual Elements in Overcoming Marxism in Po-
land, Studies in Soviet Thought 43 (1992), 139-157.

Abstract: The present paper examines the relations between the various Christian Chur­ches
and the communist regimes (including the communist heritage) in Eastern, East Central and
South Eastern Europe from a comparative perspective. The main aim is to look for eventual
differences between the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches and to locate the
concomitant religious and cultural specificities of these churches respectively. To this purpose,
the paper focuses on two issues. First, on the church-state relations and the church opposi-
tion to the state during the communist period, where the differences between these churches
because of historical and other reasons are more than conspicuous; second, on the challenges
posed by secularity and modernity to these churches, where, despite various differences, some
interesting parallels may be located. Further, it is argued that the specificities of these churches
do not reflect deep-seated ontological differences between them. On the contrary, the various

722
 Vasilios N. Makrides

crystallizations of Christianity in East and West are determined by historical contingencies

and depend on purely contextual factors.

Keywords: Eastern and Western Christianity, Communism, Church-State Relations, Moder-

nity, Secularity

723