Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Roberto Reyes was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes

(September 1, 2014) testified in court that when Lim told him to leave,
Lim did so very close to him – so close that they
452 SCRA 532 – Civil Law – Human Relations – could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended
Abuse of Rights – Volenti Non Fit Injuria that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that she’s
going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from
FACTS: One evening in October 1994, an exclusive hearing.
party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden. The party was being held for a prominent Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as
Japanese national. The person in charge at the party contra bonus mores:
was Ruby Lim who was also the executive secretary
of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. for the damage.
When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not
invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven
latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They
the party. Reyes however made a scene and began do not know each other personally. She has no reason
shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes
escort Reyes out of the party. himself is a prominent person.

Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage
Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of
was invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party
He said that while he was queuing to get his food, uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being
Lim approached him and ordered him in a loud voice turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury
to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even
invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes
Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed.
escorted out of the party like a common criminal. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence
to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be
However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of held liable for damages.
Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that
Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It
is true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals
the party but she should have done it respectfully. G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993

ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of FACTS: Petitioner Albenson Enterprises
rights. Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc.
at Baltao Building mild steel plates which the latter
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check
Lim more credible. She has been employed by the was issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.
hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job
requires her to be polite at all times. It is very Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of
unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was money due them, filed a criminal complaint against
managing. That would only make her look bad. private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter
refused to make good the amount of the bouncing
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of check despite demand. However, there was a mistake
the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides: of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos”
conducting business in the same building – Eugenio
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It was found that the signature of the check was not
of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged
unjust filing of a criminal case against him, pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita
anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in
against petitioners. consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did
not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of abuse of Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for
rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in damages based on the third and last abortion.
damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable
provision of law. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio
Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as
RULING: No, petitioners could not be said to have attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of
violated the principle of abuse of rights. What Appeals affirmed the decision.
prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent ISSUE: Is an unborn child covered with personality
was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents
due on a bounced check which they honestly believed may recover damages from the ones who caused the
was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners damage to the unborn child?
had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the
check. Private respondent, however, did nothing to RULING: Personality begins at conception. This
clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of
Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and course, essential that birth should occur later,
thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time otherwise the fetus will be considered as never
he thought was propitious by filing an action for having possessed legal personality.
damages.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of
of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks injuries it received, no such right of action could
of the general sanction for all other provisions of law derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
which do not especially provide for their own even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim place from one that lacked juridical personality.
for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with
acts contra bonus mores, and has the following It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public Code because that same article expressly limits such
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to provisional personality by imposing the condition
injure. that the child should be subsequently born alive. In
the present case, the child was dead when separated
There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted from its mother’s womb.
maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by damages. However, such damages must be those
petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages. inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.

ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Her present husband impregnated Nita

Villanueva before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent,
she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz.
After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the COMELEC and her
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. There must be a showing that there is death by
COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, positive evidence. However, it can be done by mere
respondents (No. L-16439. July 20, 1961) circumstantial evidence
Application of the law: The law is applicable in a
Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when situation where two persons are called upon to
she was pregnant by her husband before their succeed each other.
marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita
Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again Similar Presumption: Rule 131, Sec. 3, para (jj) of
became pregnant and since she was employed in the the Rules of Court: That except for purposes of
Commission on Elections, the pregnancy was succession when two persons perish in the same
inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and
Geluz. In less than two years, she again became it is not shown who died first, and there are no
pregnant and had her two-month old fetus aborted by particular circumstances from which it can be
Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos. Nita’s husband was inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
then campaigning for his election and was aware and probabilities resulting from the strength and age of
did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an the sexes, according to the following rules:
action for the award of damages. The trial court and
Court of Appeals predicated the award of damages in 1. If both were under the age of 15 years, the
the sum of three thousand pesos for moral damages. older is presumed to have survived;

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Lazo could 2. If both were above the age of 60, the
recover damages from the physician who caused the younger is deemed to have survived;
same.
3. If one is under 15 and the other above 60,
Held: The petition is meritorious. the former is deemed to have survived;

The minimum award for the death of a person does 4. If both be over 15 and under 60, and the sex
not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not be different, the male is deemed to have
endowed with personality and incapable of having survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death 5. If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other
pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of between those ages, the latter is deemed to
action could derivatively accrue to the parents or have survived.
heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the
parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to
the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal Ramon Joaquin, petitioner (Natural Child of
development of the fetus, on account of distress and Angela Joaquin) vs. Antonio C. Navarro,
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment respondent (Son of Joaquin Navarro Sr. in his
of their parental expectations. In this case, however, first marriage)
the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions
of his wife, clearly indicative that he was FACTS: On February 6, 1945, during the battle of
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70, wife
and expectations. Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33),
Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin
The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is Navarro Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought
dismissed. refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building.
The building was set on fire and the Japanese started
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or shooting hitting the three daughters and fell on the
more persons who are called to succeed to each other, ground.
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; Joaquin Navarro Sr. decided to leave the building.
in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died His wife did not want to leave so he left with his son
at the same time and there shall be no transmission of Joaquin Jr, latter’s wife and neighbor Francisco
rights from one to the other. Lopez. As they came out from the building, Joaquin
Jr. was hit at the head and fell on the ground. Minutes
later, the German Club building collapsed trapping to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. While
many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Villanueva, wife of Vicente, appealed and alleged
Joaquin Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an that her husband was declared insane.
air raid shelter where they hid for three days. On
February 10, 1945, while the three were on their way ISSUE: W/N suffering from monomania of wealth
to St. Theresa Academy, they unfortunately met necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person
Japanese patrols , who fired at the refugees, killing does not have capacity to act
Joaquin Sr and Adela.

Francisco Lopez miraculously survived the holocaust. HELD: Villanueva possess the capacity to act. No
Thus, he became the witness to this case. evidence that a person suffering from a monomania
of wealth is really insane and incapable of binding
ISSUE: Whether or not Angela Joaquin de Navarro himself in a contract. Capacity to act must be
died before Joaquin Navarro Jr. presumed to attach to every person who has not been
previously declared to be incapable, and to continue
HELD: No. Angela Joaquin de Navarro died after until the contrary is proven.
Joaquin Jr.
Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215
The law provides under Article 43 that “If there is a
doubt, as between two or more persons who are FACTS: The case was about the contract made by
called to succeed to each other, as to which of them Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant)
died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to and the heirs of his sister Margarita Mercado;
the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be
proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time of legal age to give their consent into the contract of
and there shall be no transmission of rights from one sale of the land they inherited from their deceased
to the other.” mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis Mercado).
The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the
In the instant case, the petitioner proved that Joaquin annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and
de Navarro died after Joaquin Jr. The petitioner Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.
submitted evidence which is the testimony of the
witness containing facts which was sufficient to solve
the problem of survivorship and therefore, a fair and ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid
reasonable inference would suggest that Joaquin when the minors presented themselves that they were
Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The facts are of legal age.
credible because the witness was found disinterested,
trustworthy and entitled to credence by courts. The HELD: The court declared that the contract of sale
presumption of the Court of Appeals that Angela was VALID, even if it were made and entered into by
Joaquin died before her son is based purely on minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court
surmises or speculations without any foundation in stated that they will not be permitted to excuse
the evidence. Since there are facts in this case, known themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be contracted by them, or to have them annulled.
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule
of preponderance of evidence controls. The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on
law on estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision which states that “whenever a party has, by its own
under review. In addition, holding that the declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
distribution of the decedent’s estate should be made deliberately led another party to believe a particular
in accordance with the decision of the trial court. thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
Standard Oil v. Arenas, G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.
1911

FACTS: Standard Oil sued 5 debtors for payment,

including appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as
surety to the loan. CFI Manila ordered the defendants
MERCADO v ESPIRITU FULL CASE - ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO,
plaintiff-appellant,
FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of vs.
sale in which two of the four parties were minors GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA
with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale, these minors MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
presented themselves that they were of legal age at Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.
the time they signed it, and they made the same Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-
manifestation before the notary public. appellants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid ROMUALDEZ, J.:

when the minors presented themselves that they were
of legal age. The defendants admit in their amended answer those
paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged that
RATIO: The courts laid down that such sale of real Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with
estate was still valid since it was executed by minors, Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the
who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said
and are near the adult age, and that the minors deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the
pretended that they had already reached their said land. This being so, the fundamental question to
majority. be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff
sold the land in question to the defendants.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil- The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such
interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17,
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation
acts or from property relations, such as easements. made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant
Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with
excuse themselves from compliance with the imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular
obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. point does not decisively support the plaintiff's
This is in accordance with the provisions of the law allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the
on estoppels. extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for
This is in accordance with the provisions of the law the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was
on estoppel. a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it
Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an does not appear that it was his real intention to sell
admission or representation is rendered conclusive the land in question.
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. What is deduced from the record is, that his mother
This is also in accordance with the provisions of Rule Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente
123, Sec 68, Par. A Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by
Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A...”Whenever a party has, by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915
his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and
and deliberately led another to believe a particular according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150,
thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such land within which was included that described in said
declaration, act or omission, cannot be permitted to Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the
falsify it. plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir
and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the
land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in

question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites
prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not,
according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No.
496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to
the register of deeds to make the proper registration,
inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 +
the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority
the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract.
right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken
into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y ISSUE: Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18
Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor. respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan
they have signed.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in
the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 RATIO: The SC found that Rosario will still be
Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be liable to pay her share in the contract because the
estopped from contesting the contract executed by minority of her sons does not release her from
him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2%
the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to interest.
be of age; his minority was well known to the However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision
purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who of the CA which found them similarly liable due to
purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the their failure to disclose their minority. The SC
acknowledgment of the document. sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – “in
order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants actual and not constructive. It has been held that his
allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 mere silence when making a contract as to his age
as the price of the land, the preponderance of does not constitute a fraud which can be made the
evidence shows that no amount was given by the basis of an action of deceit.”
defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the
that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they
document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that
taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her even if the written contract is unenforceable because
husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the
rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a extent that they may have profited by the money
year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is
Exhibit 1. P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine
money is equivalent to P1,166.67.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been
sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado
was the only one who testified thereto, whose FULL TEXT - MIGUELA CARRILLO, for
testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate
Genoveva Muerong who, moreover asserts that she of ADRIANA CARRILLO, deceased, plaintiff-
possesses about half of the land in question. There appellant,
are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to vs.
award the damages claimed by the plaintiff. JUSTINIANO JAOJOCO and MARCOS
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees.
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without Crispin Oben and Gibbs & McDonough for
any express findings as to the costs in this instance. appellant.
So ordered. Salinas & Salinas for appellees.

BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE AVANCEÑA, J.:

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana
De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and Carrillo executed a document of sale of eleven
in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay parcels of land, with one-half of the improvements
him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the thereon, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig,
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite,
Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in containing an area of 330,409 square meters, in favor
March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and of Marcos Jaojoco for the price of P4,000 which the
CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according seller admitted having received. Nine days afterwards
to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated
review the decision of the CA whereby they were by the Court of First Instance and later on died; and
proceeding having been instituted for the hemiplegia, and there she was attended by Doctor
administrator and settlement of her estate, her sister Ocampo until she left on the 18th of December of the
Miguela Carrillo was appointed judicial same year very much better off although not
administratrix of said estate. In her capacity as such completely cured. Asked about the mental incapacity
administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor
action for the annulment of said contract of sale Ocampo answered that he did not pay attention to it,
executed by Adriana Carrillo on December 9, 1918, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave
against Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his father him were responsive to the questions put to her, and
Justiniano Jaojoco. The defendants were absolved that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but only
from the complaint, and from this judgment the one-half of the body. After leaving the "Hospital de
plaintiff appealed. San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918, Adriana
Carrillo called at the office of the notary public, Mr.
The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the Ramos Salinas, and there executed the contract of
year 1918 and specially in the year 1917, Adriana sale in question on the 9th of that month. The notary,
Carrillo performed acts which indicated that she was Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified
mentally deranged. We have made a thorough that on that day he has been for some time with
examination of the character of those acts, and Adriana Carrillo, waiting for one of the witnesses to
believe that they do not necessarily show that the document, and he did not notice anything
Adriana Carrillo was mentally insane. The same abnormal in her countenance, which on the contrary,
thing can be said as to her having entered the appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the
"Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio de San questions he made to her without inconsistencies or
Jose," in the absence of an affirmative showing to her failure of memory, for which reason, says this
motive for entering said institutions, for while it is witness, he was surprised when afterwards he learned
true that insane persons are confined in those that the mental capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in
institutions, yet there also enter persons who are not question.
insane. Against the inference that from said acts the
plaintiff pretends to draw, in order to assert the It must be noted that the principal witness for the
mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo in that time, plaintiff and the most interested party in the case,
there is in the record evidence of acts while more being the plaintiff herself, was the surety of Adriana
clearly and more convincingly show that she must Carrillo when the latter was appointed judicial
not have been mentally incapacitated before the administratrix of the estate of her husband in 1917. It
execution of the document sought to be annulled in cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that
this action. In January, 1917, her husband having time mentally incapacitated, why Miguela Carrillo,
died, she was appointed judicial administratrix of the the plaintiff, who knew it, consented to be a surety
latter's estate, and to his end she took the oath of for her. It must likewise be noted that the other
office, gave the proper bond discharged her functions witnesses of the plaintiff, who testified to the
in the same manner and with the same diligence as incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions
any other person of knowingly sound mind would with her precisely at the time, when according to
have done. Documents, were introduced which show them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all
complex and numerous acts of administration of this, which is proven by documents and the
performed personally by said Adriana Carrillo, such testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in
as the disposition of various and considerable the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918,
amounts of money in transactions made with when Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was
different persons, the correctness of said acts never mentally incapacitated.
having been, nor can it be, put in question. We have
given special attention to the fact of Adriana Carrillo The fact that nine days after the execution of the
having executed contracts of lease, appeared in court contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally
in the testate proceeding in which she was incapacitated by the trial court does not prove that
administratrix, and in fact continued acting as such she was so when she executed the contract. After all,
administratrix of the estate of her husband until this can perfectly be explained by saying that her
August, 1917, when for the purpose of taking disease became aggravated subsequently.
vacation, she requested to be relieved from the office.
Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the
On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the document in question the usual state of Adriana
"Hospital de San Juan de Dios" by reason of having Carrillo was that of being mentally capable, and
had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with consequently the burden of proof that she was
mentally incapacitated at a specified time is upon him random without paying any attention to who it was;”
who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to and about every other night in jail he cries aloud,
this effect is presented, her capacity must be saying, “What kind of people are you to me, what are
presumed. you doing to me, you are beasts.”

Attention is also called to the disproportion between Issue: Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to
the price of the sale and the real value of the land declare the accused as insane and therefore exempt
sold. The evidence, however, rather shows that the from criminal liability
price of P4,000 paid for the land, which contained an
area of 33 hectares, represents it real value, for its is Held: No. The evidence is insufficient to declare him
little more than P100 per hectare, which is insane. The appellant’s conduct was consistent with
approximately the value of other lands of the same the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with
nature in the vicinity. But even supposing that there an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes.
is such a disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to There is a vast difference between an insane person
justify the conclusion that Adriana Carrillo was and one who has worked himself up into such a
mentally incapacitated for having made the sale frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good
under such conditions. Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew judgment in what he does. The fact that a person acts
of Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. Those who
brother-in-law, and both defendants, who are father have not lost control of their reason by mental
and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and
the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared for her restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they
during the time she was there, and for such acts they do not. Mere mental depravity, or moral insanity,
may have won her gratitude. Under these which results, not from any disease of mind, but from
circumstances there is nothing illegal, or even a perverted condition of the moral system, where the
reprehensible, and much less strange in Adriana person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from
Carrillo's having taken into account those services responsibility for crimes committed under its
rendered her by the defendants and reciprocated influence. In the absence of proof that the defendant
thereof by a favorable transaction. Having no had lost his reason or became demented a few
ascendants and descendents, she could, in moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
consideration of all these circumstances, have even crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal
given as a donation, or left by will, these lands to the condition of mind. Insanity will only excuse the
defendants. commission of a criminal act when it is made
affirmatively to appear that the person committing it
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs was insane, and that the offense was the direct
against the appellant. So ordered. consequences of his insanity.

US v. Vaquilar G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-

9472March 13, 1914 FULL TEXT - THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-
appellee,
Restrictions on capacity to act – Insanity – Criminal vs.
Liability EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
William J. Rohde for appellant.
Facts: Vaquilar was found guilty of parricide for the Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
killing of his wife and daughter, as well as injuring
other persons with a bolo. There was no known TRENT, J.:
disagreement between the family members of the The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two
appellant prior to the event. Several witnesses were separate informations with parricide, in one for the
introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of
appeared to be insane at and subsequent to the his daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment,
commission of the crimes. They also testified that he to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and
had been complaining of pains in his head and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this
stomach prior to the killing. According to testimonies, judgment he appealed. The two cases have been
appellant's “eyes were very big and red and his sight submitted to this court together.
penetrating” at the time of the killing; “he looked like
a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have "What kind of people are you to me, what are you
killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged doing to me, you are beasts."
and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The
commission of these crimes is not denied. The The health officer who examined the two deceased
defendant did not testify but several witnesses were and the other wounded parties found that the
introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head,
appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to besides several other wounds on her hands; and that
the commission of the crimes. they also testified that the daughter's skull was split "through and through
he had been complaining of pains in his head and from one side to the other." The witness stated that he
stomach prior to the killing. made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail
and that he did not notice whether defendant in the
Our attention has been directed to the following jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was
testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the suffering from any mental derangement or not.
prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his
uncle, making a noise, and that he refused into the There is vast different between an insane person and
house and saw the appellant kill his wife and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
daughter; that he was cut by the appellant; that there anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in
"were seven, including the small boys and girls who what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight
were cut by him;" that he did not know of any seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An
disagreement between the appellant and the two extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a
deceased; that on the morning before she was killed madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not
that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of
stomach." The witness further stated that the the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal
appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound
penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before
daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he indicated, one witness testified that "according to my
looked at me he was crazy because if he was not own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if
crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife he was not crazy he would not have killed his
and child." family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy"
evidently is the doing of some act by a person which
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing.
that he helped Martin Agustin capture the appellant; Another witness testified that "he looked like a
that the appellant "himself used to say before that madman; crazy, because he would cut everybody at
time he had felt pains in the head and the stomach;" random without paying any attention to who it was."
that at the moment he was cutting those people " he It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the
looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion
everybody at random without paying any attention to and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to
who it was." capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have
been crazy because he cut me." This is another
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified illustration of the popular conception of the word
that her brother had headache and stomach trouble "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an
about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
that "he looked very sad at the time, but I saw him
run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in
must have been crazy because he cut me." jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not
inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in reflection and remorse which would follow the
the same jail with the appellant, testified that he had commission of such deeds as those committed by the
observed the appellant about five months and that appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to
sometimes "his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are
since he came to the jail when he is sent for you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such
something he goes back he does without saying conduct could not be sufficient to show that the
anything, even if he comes back he does not say person was insane at the time the deeds were
anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from committed.
work he does not say a word; and that about every
other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying,
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), committed them, confined himself to the statement,
the defendant was indicated for an assault with intent in behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime
to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind
condition which would involved no guilt." The and that in one of his paroxysms he committed the
supreme court on appeal in this decision said acts, wounding his wife and the other members
distinguished between passion and insanity as of her family, without any motives whatever. In the
follows: decision in that case this court stated:

But passion and insanity are very different things, In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his
and whatever indulgence the law may extend to reason or became demented a few moments prior to
persons under provocation, it does not treat them as or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed
freed from criminal responsibility. Those who have that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is
not lost control of their reason by mental improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in
unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and order to relieve him from responsibility on the
restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his
do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them insanity and absence of will are proven.
so far as to make them reckless, the fact that they
have become at last too infuriated to keep them from Regarding the burden of proof in cases where
mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions, we
in season. There would be no safety for society if quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439;
people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):
and then to desperate acts of violence. That condition
which springs from undisciplined and unbridled But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity,
passion is clearly within legal as well as moral there is a presumption that the accused is sane, which
censure and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact.
Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.) (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and
nothing more appears, this presumption, without
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to
"The court very properly continued with an support a conviction and as the State must prove
explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and every element of the crime charged "beyond a
feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption
revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the affords such proof. This presumption however may
act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the
because a large share of homicides committed are accused that the criminal intent did not exist at the
occasioned by just such motives as these.' " time the act was committed. This being exceptional is
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. a defense, and like other defenses must be made out
170), cites many cases on the subject of anger and by the party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive
emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall
following concise statement: work a dispensation to the prisoner in the case of
established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)
is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or
moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any What then is necessary to make out this defense? It
disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity
moral system, where the person is mentally sense, to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading,
does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to
committed under its influence. Care must be taken to make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient
distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental proof must be shown to overcome in the first place
depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from the presumption of sanity and then any other proof
disease of the mind. that may be offered.

In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the
Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted of the crime court said (syllabus):
of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without
raising any question as to the actual commission of
the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a HELD: The Court of Appeals and the trial court
criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, predicated the award of damages in the sum of
which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial
moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said
insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for
a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
appear that the person committing it was insane, and unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
that the offense was the direct consequences of his Since an action for pecuniary damages on
insanity. account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal, of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he received, no such right of action could derivatively
was of unsound mind at the time he committed the accrue to its parents or heirs.
crimes, and the facts charged in each information
having been proven, and the penalty imposed being In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant. pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from on that lacked juridical personality
GELUZ VS. CA 2 SCRA 801 QUENNIE ANN N. (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
CALVA to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the because that same article expressly limits such
petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula provisional personality by imposing the condition
Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 that the child should be subsequently born alive:
before she and Oscar were legally married. As "provided it be born later with the condition
advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, specified in the following article". In the present case,
she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her there is no dispute that the child was dead when
pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she separated from its mother's womb.
found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC.
JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO 93 Phil. 257
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again
became pregnant and was accompanied by her FACTS: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the
sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida liberation of Manila. was raging, the spouses
at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela
Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and
campaigning for his election to the provincial their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife,
board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his sought refuge in the ground floor of the building
consent on the abortion. known as the German Club. During their stay, the
bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding
Court of First Instance of Manila is Convinced around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously,
of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence the Japanese started shooting at the people inside
adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of the bldg, especially those who were trying to
plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, ground near the entrance; and JN, Sr. and his son
P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer
On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division haven. They could not convince AJ, who refused to
of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the
three justices as against two, who rendered a separate latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As
dissenting opinion. they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a
Japanese soldier and immediately dropped.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unborn child endowed
with personality to constitute death of a person
The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death;
premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet.
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, her son's departure and his death. It will be said that
presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. all this is indulging in inferences that are not
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that
stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced the inference necessary to exclude the presumption
to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be
killing the two. The trial court found the deaths to inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by
have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the
2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is
that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify
The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr. a finding of fact." In conclusion, the presumption
that AJ died before her son is based purely on
HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, surmises, speculations, or conjectures w/o any
from w/c a rational conclusion can be made, the sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is
presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by
step in, and the rules of preponderance of common experience, engender the inference as a
evidence controls. Are there particular very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine
circumstances on record from w/c reasonable of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are
inference of survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be decided, this inference ought to prevail.
drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness)
testimony competent and sufficient for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts The Standard Oil Co. of NY Vs. Juan Codina
quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship Arenas and others 19, PHIL, 363 No. 5921, July 25,
bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory 1911
presumption out of the case. It is believed that in
the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair Case under the topic of Capacity to Act and
and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: Restrictions Thereon: Presumption of Capacity-
that JN, Jr. died before his mother. While the Capacity to act is presumed until the contrary is
possibility that the mother died before the son can not proven, and that it be the reason for the specific act
be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility attributed.
is entirely speculative and must yield to the
more rational deduction from proven facts that it Proof of restriction: habituality, presence at the time,
was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed , no other cause.
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the
Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have FACTS: December 15, 1908 –Juan Codina
negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals,
so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and
out of the bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5 the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties sign a bond in
or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did favor of plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of
seem very remote. P 3,305.76 at three months from date, with interest at
P 1.00 per month. April 5, 1909 – The plaintiff
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of sued the debtors regarding the bond sign and
the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. was summoned, the record showing that summons
died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA was served on Villanueva; May 12, 1909 -
said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in
breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, default. On process: Wife of Villanueva appeared
it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to when judgment was about to be executed and asked
warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when that he be relieved from the bond and the
her son expired. The CA mentioned several causes, judgment because he was insane (declared July 24,
besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have 1909) with his wife as his guardian. ' Case was
been killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx reopened and tried and the evidence showed that
Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling Villanueva executed the bond with full
beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its understanding of the nature and consequences of
collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to the act performed by him although he was suffering
from monomania of great wealth. ' He was, therefore, presented themselves that they were of legal age
held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the based on the manifestation that they have made in
Supreme Court. front of the Notary Public?.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not monomania of wealth HELD: The courts laid down that such sale of
necessarily warrants that the person does not have real estate was still valid since it was executed
capacity to act. by minors, when in fact they are not, and they
2. Whether or not Villanueva was actually incapable are not permitted to excuse themselves from the
of entering into contract at the time the bond was fulfillment of their obligations contracted by them, or
executed. to have them annulled. Their contention of being
minor that time when they contracted their
RULING: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. it obligations, their allegations will be negated by the
would have been necessary to show that: fact that, they have passed the ages of puberty and
1. Such monomania was habitual and constituted a adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the
veritable mental perturbation in the patient; minors pretended that they had already reached their
2. That the bond executed was the result of such majority. Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility,
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-
that is, that there were not, or could there have been interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to
any other cause for the contract than the ostentation act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
of wealth and this was purely an effect of such certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his
monomania of wealth. acts or from property relations, such as easements.
3. That the monomania existed on the date the Also, these minors cannot be permitted
bond in question was executed. Monomania of afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance
wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is with the obligation assumed by them or seek
incapable of executing a bond such as that in question. their annulment.
4. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a
person who has not previously been declared This is in accordance with the provisions of the law
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue on estoppels Book IV, Title IV of the NCC. Art
for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
has not been proved in this case. as against the person relying thereon.

Mercado & Mercado vs. Espiritu; 37 Phil 215

Balamban vs. Maramba, 51 Phil 417
FACTS: The plaintiffs alleged that they and
their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed FACTS: Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned
Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of a piece of land. Isidro was forced by his mother,
Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Paula Prado, to sell the land to Genovena Muerong,
Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, since the latter was threatening Paula of
leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of imprisonment due to loan Genovena gave Paula.
48 hectares. The defendant (Luis Espiritu) was To have the document of the sale acknowledged,
accused to have induced, and fraudulently the respondent even purchased the cedula of the
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land petitioner. Isidro didn’t try to conceal his age and in
for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. fact the respondent was well aware that Isidro was a
The annulment of a deed of sale was sought by minor. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot
the plaintiffs. They asserted that two of the four be used since the petitioner didn’t try to hide his age.
parties were minors. These two minors (Domingo & The land in question wasn’t even registered in the
Josefa Mercado) presented themselves to be of Register of Deeds, thus, the sale of land cannot
legal age upon signing it and they made a be executed without registration as provided in
manifestation in front of the notary public. section 50 of Act 496.

ISSUE: In light with the well-settled rule of Legal ISSUE: Was the sale of the land valid or void, since
Capacity under Article 38 of The New Civil Code, Isidro was a minor at the execution of the alleged sale?
will the minority of the contracting parties affect the
validity of the deed of sale when the minors
HELD: The sale of the land is void because of the similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their
following reasons: minority. The SC sustained previous sources in
• Isidro is incapacitated to enter into such contracts, Jurisprudence – “in order to hold the infant liable, the
• Because the land wasn‘t even registered and hence, fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been
cannot be sold. held that his mere silence when making a contract as
to his age does not constitute a fraud which can
Ratio: Art. 1390 NCC: The following contracts are be made the basis of an action of deceit.” The
voidable or annullable, even though there may have boys, though not bound by the provisions of the
been no damage to the contracting parties: contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340
of giving consent to a contract... Art. 38 NCC: states that even if the written contract is
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction make restitution to the extent that they may have
are mere restrictions on capacity to act (aptitude for profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3
the exercise of rights), and do not exempt the of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as converted to Philippine money is equivalent to
when the latter arise from his acts or from property P1,166.67.
relations, such as easements.
Art. 1397 NCC: The action for the annulment of
contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby Carillo vs Jaojoco , 46 Phil. 957
obliged principally or subsidiarily. However,
persons who are capable cannot allege the Art. 39. The following circumstances, among
incapacity of those with whom they contracted; others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
mistake base their action upon these flaws of the alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
contract. (1302a) consequences of these circumstances are governed in
this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in
special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account
BRAGANZA vs. VILLA ABRILLE of religious belief or political opinion.

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned Facts:

from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war • Adriana Carillo, nine days afterwards was declared
notes and in consideration thereof, promised in mentally incapacitated by the Court of first Instance
writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal (CFI) which later on died.
currency of the Philippines 2 years after the • Miguela Carrillo, sister of Adrianna Carrillo
cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, and was appointed judicial administratrix of the
Abrille sued them in March 1949. The Manila court said estate brought action to the CFI for the
of first instance and CA held the family solidarily annulment of the said contract of sale.
liable to pay according to the contract they signed. • The defendants were absolved from the
The family petitioned to review the decision of the complaint and from this judgment the plaintiff
CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay appealed. Nov. 13, 1918
De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying • On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo was
for consideration of the minority of the Braganza confined in “Hosppital de San Juan de Dios by
sons when they signed the contract. reason of having a cerebral hemorrhage with
hemiplegia (Paralysis affecting only one side of
ISSUE: Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 the body.), and there she was attended by Doctor
respectively, are to be bound by the contract of Ocampo until she left on December 18, 1918.
loan they have signed. According to Dr. Ocampo, the hemiplegia did not
affect Adrianna’s head but only one-half of her body.
RATIO: The SC found that Rosario will still be • Marcos Jaojoco and his father Justiniano,
liable to pay her share in the contract because the defendant-appellees, nephew and brother-in-law,
minority of her sons does not release her from respectively to the deceased, were the ones who
liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% took her to the hospital and cared for her.
interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed • Om December 18, 1918, Adrianna called a notary
the decision of the CA which found them public to execute the contract of sale of land
(eleven parcels of land, situated in the barrio of person has committed an act which the law defines as
Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona Province a felony (delito), the court shall order his
of Cavite) containing an area of 330,409 square confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
meters, for the price of P4,000. established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
• Nine days later, she dies and Miguela is appointed not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
judicial administratrix of said estate. (It is interesting permission of the same court.
to note that Miguela was the surety of her sister when
the latter acquired it from her husband in January Facts: The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar was proven
1917.) to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner
charged and to have wounded other persons with a
Issue: Whether or not Adriana was mentally bolo. His commission of these crimes is not denied.
incapacitated at the time the document of sale was The defendant did not testify but several witnesses
executed. were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the
defendant appeared to them to be insane at and
Held: No. The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that subsequent to the commission of the crimes. They
Adriana was mentally deranged was insufficient. also testified that he had been complaining of pains
Being confined in a hospital does not prove in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
insanity. Her doctor testified that her sickness did
not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Issue: Whether or not Vaquilar who murder his wife
Documents produced before the Court before the and daughter with a bolo is liable for the crime with
execution of the document of sale, shows the allegation of being insane.
complex tasks done by Adriana which couldn’t be
done by a mentally incapacitated person It must Ruling: The appellant's conduct, as appears from the
likewise be noted that the other witnesses of the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged
plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown
Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely that he was of unsound mind at the time he
at the time, when according to them, she was committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each
mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is information having been proven, and the penalty
proven by documents and the testimonies of imposed being in accordance with the law, the
witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs
cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when against the appellant. Related Cases: People vs.
Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776) - passion vs.
mentally incapacitated. The fact that nine days insanity The supreme court explain: But passion
after the execution of the contract, Adriana and insanity are very different things, and whatever
Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by indulgence the law may extend to persons under
the trial court does not prove that she was so when provocation, it does not treat them as freed from
she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost
be explained by saying that her disease became control of their reason by mental unsoundness are
aggravated subsequently. Our conclusion is that bound to control their tempers and restrain their
prior to the execution of the document in persons, and are liable to the law if they do not.
question the usual state of Adriana Carrillo was Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far
that of being mentally capable, and consequently the as to make them reckless, the fact that they have
burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated become at last too infuriated to keep them from
at a specified time is upon him who affirms said mischief is merely the result of not applying
incapacity. If no sufficient proof to this effect is restraint in season. In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664)
presented, her capacity must be presumed. – Motive of crime The court said: "The court very
properly continued with an explanation to the jury
that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by
US v. Vaquilar 27 Phil 88 motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity.
The law holds the doer of the act, under such
Topic: Insanity Effect on Crimes – Article 12 Revise conditions, responsible for the crime, because a
Penal Code Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt large share of homicides committed are
from criminal liability. — the following are exempt occasioned by just such motives as these.' " People
from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986) –
insane person, unless the latter has acted during Schizophrenia is covered by the term insanity
a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane Schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between defendants. Two appeals were made on Nov. 3,
fantasy and reality and often accompanied by 1941 and December 31, 1941 agains tReynolds and
hallucinations and delusions, formerly called Harrison and Big Wedge Mining Co.,
dementia pracecox. People v. Lacera, 69 Phil. 350 – respectively. The CA found that the amount
Malignant malaria is covered by the term insanity involved was beyond its jurisdiction and so certified
One who is suffering from malignant malaria when the case to the SC. It was assumed that Reynolds and
she wounded her husband who died as a consequence Harrison had died after/during Japanese occupation
is not criminally liable, because such illness affects since they never answered the appeals leaving Big
the nervous system and causes among other such Wedge Mining Co., the only defendant.
complication as acute melancholia and insanity at
times. Issue Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the plaintiff and his brother were
working as employees and agents of the defendants
Dumaguin v. Reynolds Sept. 30, 1952 G.R. No. L- when the mining locations were claimed.
3572
Yes. All profits made, and advantages gained, by
Nature: Paulino Dumaguin, plaintiff-appellee, agent in the execution of the agency belongs to the
invokes insanity to declare transfer of mining principal. The fact that the plaintiffs found the
claims to his employers invalid. claims merely means that that they were fulfilling an
obligation and complying with a trust.
Facts: May 21, 1929 - Dumaguin was admitted
to the Insular Psychopathic Hospital at San Felipe, (2) WON the plaintiff’s alleged insanity nullifies
Neri, Mandaluyong, Rizal due to paranoia but the deeds of transfer originally made to his
was discharged a few months later (Nov. 11, 1929). employers and subsequently, the end-buyers.
Sept. 16, 1930 - His wife, in order to withdraw
his retirement gratuity from the government, filed No. The presumption of insanity is only juris
for and was appointed guardianship of her husband. tantum, subject to rebuttal. In the absence of a
During 1930-1931, Fructuoso, Paulino’s brother, statute to the contrary, the presumption of mental
helped the plaintiff get a job with Reynolds and incapacity (and insanity) is only prima facie and
Harrisonto relocate mining claims and locate new may be rebutted by evidence; and that a person
ones. Plaintiff, however, claimed that he was only under guardianship for insanity may still enter into a
employed to relocate. From May to July of 1931, the valid contract and even convey property, provided it
brothers staked and located ten new mining is proven that at the time if entering into said contract,
claims and registered Paulino as the locator. Sept. he was not insane or that his mental defect did not
10, 1931 – Paulino transferred the claims via “Deeds interfere with his capacity to appreciate the meaning
of Transfer” to Reynolds and Harrison in two and significance of the transaction entered by him.
separate actions (the first contained the first nine
deeds, while the second, the last one). On Nov. 2,
Reynolds via “Deed of Sale” sold eight of the claims People v. Sasota
to Big Wedge Mining Co. June 4, 1940 – After
re-amending his original complaint on Nov. 5 Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of rape
1934(without the “under guardianship” plea), he of a deaf and dumb girl. Sasota, found guilty of the
asked the court to nullify the deeds of transfer/sale crime because of the victim’s testimony, now
and be declared owner of the mining claims. He posits that the testimony of the deaf and dumb
also sought any profit made by the end-buyer, should not have been accepted by the court at its full
Big Wedge Mining. Co, while of the plaintiff’s value.
alleged property. Feb. 5, 1940 – The reply from
the defendants, Reynolds and Harrison(after the Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is
re-amended complaint),entailed that the brothers considered a competent witness by the court.
Dumaguin were expressly employed to locate
mineral claims with the understanding that these Held: There is no merit in the contention of the
be transferred to the defendants; that they were not defendant that deaf and dumb persons are to be
aware of any alleged mental incapacities and bought considered incompetent witnesses. Though formerly,
the claims in good faith. The case was heard by deaf and dump persons were considered incompetent,
CFI Baguio on July31, 1940 and was dismissed experience and observation have shown conclusively
on Jan. 16the following year in favor of the that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is
not sufficient to justify the finding that he is (2) the action for filing a claim regarding the partition
incompetent as a witness. When such a witness of the estate has already prescribed. Being a deaf-
is produced, the court may ascertain whether he mute is not by itself alone, without the
has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized
the witness to adopt such mode of communicating by law, considered included among the
his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he exceptions which in matters of prescription, are
deems most satisfactory. granted to incapacitated persons, in connection
with the running of the prescriptive period. And we
An excerpt from the opinion of Justice Moreland, arrive at this conclusion, inasmuch as, even
United States v. Estrada, lends further support to supposing that the evidence of the appellees in
the conclusion reached by us: "The commission of regard to the ownership of the lands did not
the crime at the place, at the time, and in the manner preponderate (we believe it does), there is still the
charged is not impossible and, although the charge prescription in their favor inasmuch as the continued
that it was so committed may be unreasonable, possession by the appellees of the land in question,
still such unreasonableness may be overcome by which is exclusive as has been seen, not only because
the direct and positive testimony of it so appears from the evidence of the appellees, but
unimpeachable witnesses. From the evidence also because the appellants' own witness, Julian
before him the learned trial court found that the Ignacio, testified to that effect, operates as an
witnesses for the prosecution were telling the truth in extinguishment of any right which the appellants
their relation of the story of the case and that the facts may have had to said lands, unless there is
occurred substantially as they stated them. We have another legal reason to prevent this conclusion.
held on many occasions that 'this court will not And this possible reason is merely the alleged
interfere with the intelligent conclusion of a trial incapacity of the appellants, due to their being deaf-
court concerning the credibility of witnesses, the mutes. Such a physical condition is no obstacle
court having seen the witnesses in the act of to the running of the prescriptive period; since it
testifying and having carefully observed their has been proved in this case that it was not
manner and demeanor as witnesses, unless the record accompanied by mental deficiency or any other legal
discloses that some fact or circumstance of weight incapacity.
and influence has either been overlooked by the
court or has been misapprehended or misinterpreted." Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the
There is no such showing in this case, concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized
notwithstanding the valiant efforts of counsel for by law, considered included among the exceptions
appellant to create such an impression. which in matters of prescription, are granted to
incapacitated persons, in connection with the running
of the prescriptive periods. The old doctrine that a
Director of Lands v. Abelardo deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot no longer
prevails, and such persons are now held capable of
Facts: The case revolves around proving the entering into contracts if shown to have sufficient
ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were mental capacity. (Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich., 36.)
properties subject in a successional litigation. chanrobles virtual law library Where one was born
Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are contesting deaf and dumb, but had his intellectual faculties,
the ownership of subject properties in Manuel though these were not improved by the modern
Libunao’s possession. They further claim that as system of education for persons of that class: Held,
deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription that he was not within the exception of the statute of
in filing the case. limitations, which only exception of is non compos
mentis.
Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing
the case should be relaxed due to their being deaf- Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902
mutes.
Facts: This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez
Held: No, they are not. The SC ruled that the subject Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against
lands are still and should still be owned by Manuel Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of
Libuano and family due to the following reasons prodigality against the father. The son claimed that
(1) the preponderance of evidence as to the the father is dissipating and squandering his
ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, estate by making donations to his second wife
and to her parents of properties amounting to
over $200,000; that he has given over the her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to
administration of this estate to the management of his show that there has been any perceptible
wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation diminution of the defendant’s property. This can be
and has instituted groundless actions against the accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so
plaintiff in order to take possession of the property far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise
held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his of his faculties and still possesses the industry,
wife and her relatives. The defendant alleged that he thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation
has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with
of attorney under which the plaintiff has the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate
administered the community estate for several the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother. A
years, that the plaintiff has caused the ships careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to
Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses
to the estate, to be registered in his own name that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he
without the consent of the father and is otherwise unjustly attributes to his father.
mismanaging and misappropriating the property of
the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the Silverio vs. Republic G.R. No. 174689, October 19,
power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit 2007
brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due
to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the FACTS: On December 26, 2002, petitioner
fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, Rommel Jascinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
refused to render an account of his administration. for the change of his first name to and sex his birth
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No.
him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court. 105207, impleaded the Civil Registrar of Manila as
respondent. The petitioner alleged that he is a
Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby male transsexual, that is “anatomically male but
injuring the estate of his son? feels, thinks, and acts as a female and that he
had always identified himself with girls since
Held: No. Petition dismissed. The acts which childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil transform himself to a woman on January 27, 2001
Code owing to the difficulty of applying general when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
rules to the varying circumstances of the case and Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by
the different situations of persons. Under our law it Dr. Marcelino Reysio – Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
may inferred that the acts of prodigality must reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued
show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had
spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent in fact undergone the procedure. On June 4 2003,
as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part petitioner. Its relevant portions read: “Petitioner
of the estate. filed the present petition not to evade any law
or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
Donations are considered as acts of liberality unlawful motive…” The court rules in the
dictated by generosity and affection. All persons affirmative. Firstly, the court is of the opinion
who can contract and dispose of property may make that granting the petition would be more in
donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.) Public consonance with the principles of justice and
policy requires that limitations of the character equity. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in
but a law which would impose restrictions any way taken against him. Likewise, the court
further than such as are required by public policy believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be
may well be regarded unjust and tending in a caused to anybody or the community in granting the
contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to petition. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of
acquire property, and as subduing the generous the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
impulse of the heart. petition for certiorari in the court of appeals. It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
While some of the witnesses state that the alteration.
possessions of the wife have greatly increased since
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes
relief (changing his first name and sex on his birth sought by the petitioner will have serious and wide-
certificate) asked for. ranging legal and public policy consequences. First,
the trial court itself found that the petition was
RULING: On February 23, 2006, the Court of but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage,
It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal one of the most sacred social institutions, is a
basis. special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman. To grant the petition will substantially
1. There is no law allowing the change of either reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
name or sex in the certificate of birth on the and family relations. Second, there are various
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. laws (Labor Code on employment of women, etc.)
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of which apply particularly to women which could be
his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. mandates that “No judge or court shall decline to
Under RA 9048, it intent to exclude the change of render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
first name from the coverage of Rule 103 (Change of insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty
in the Civil Registry) of the rules of the court unless of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
an administrative petition for change of name is first make or amend it. Therefore, the petition is hereby
filed and subsequently denied. RA 9048 likewise DENIED.
provides the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed: 1. The petitioner finds the
first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN JOY PALMA
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the
2. The new first name or nickname has been Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in
and he has been publicly known by that first name or Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
nickname in the community 3. The change will Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from
avoid confusion. RA 9048 does not sanction a female to male. It appearing that Jennifer
change of first name on the ground of sex Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
reassignment. The petition in trial court in so far as it Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where
prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was afflicted persons possess both male and female
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
petition should have been filed with the local civil secondary male characteristics. To further her
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
done. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
substantial changes and corrections in entries in Department of Psychiatry, University of the
the civil register. Under section 2 of RA 9048 Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
which defines what a “clerical or typographical addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically
error” is, a correction in the civil registry involving is female but because her body secretes male
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or hormones, her female organs did not develop
typographical error. To correct simply means “to normally, thus has organs of both male and
make or set aright; to remove the faults or error female.” The lower court decided in her favor but
from” while to change means “to replace the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
something with something else of the same kind or the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
with something that serves as substitute. The birth violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
certificate of the petitioner contained no error. No because the said petition did not implead the local
correction is necessary. The trial court opined that civil registrar.
its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that
allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
change of sex or gender and name of respondent as such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court
ruled by the lower court. will not consider respondent as having erred in
not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor become or remain as a female. Neither will the
General that the petition is fatally defective because it Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to
failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all take medication in order to fit the mold of a
persons who have or claim any interest therein is female, as society commonly currently knows this
not without merit. However, it must be stressed gender of the human species. Respondent is the
that private respondent furnished the local civil one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To
registrar a copy of the petition, the order to him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
orders or processes in the course of the the primordial choice of what courses of action to
proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court take along the path of his sexual development and
ruled that there is substantial compliance of the maturation. In the absence of evidence that
provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of
Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
the determination of a person’s sex appearing in male will harm other members of society who
his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case are equally entitled to protection under the law,
should be dealt with utmost care in view of the the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified
delicate facts present in this case. In deciding the the respondent’s position and his personal judgment
case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to of being a male.
elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the
condition or let us say a disorder that respondent
is undergoing.

INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings

who cannot be classified as either male or female.
It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an
organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes. In
view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the
land consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. That is, Philippine courts must
render judgment based on law and the evidence
presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that
evidence points that respondent is male. In
determining respondent to be a female, there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. The Supreme Court held that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at