~SPEARHEAD~— Ua PY Sa sa i EliteBattle of Crete The Hitler Conspivacies George Sorly ISBN: O7NOZ7SI7 HI 176pp £2499 David Welch ISBNEOrLwABIX HB 1960p £19.99 Battle of the Bulge 1944 Images,df Barbarossa Napier Crookenden ISHN: U7IOOSKSX HS topp £19.99 jeter Ailsiy ISBN: 0711028257 1B 2559p £10.99 Channel Islands at War: A German Perspective It Never Snows in September George Forty ISBN: 0711026785 HB spp L499 Robert Kershaw ISBN: 0711021078 HB 360pp £2499 Collector's Guide to Third Reich Militaria Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster yor Robin Lumsden ISBN: 0711026606 PIE 192pp £12.09 Through Soviet Eyes 3 Caleetoe’s lata bo maken asek MEDIA David M, Glantz ISBN: 0711025622. HB 288pp Detecting the Fakes > ~ Kharkov 1942 Robin Lumsden ISBN: OPUBBEAN PB Hemp £12.99 Dovid M. Glantz ISBN: 0711020067 Pt Collect sitide to the Waffen-SS. Pea Robin ner ISBN: 721022852. PB r4Anp £12.99 Panzers at War 25 Calléctor's Guide to World War 2 German Al barter ISBN: GRID PR setpp £1499 2 Medals Waffes “ssp m on $$ a War Chrbtopher Ailsby ISBN: OTH02465 PB 1609p AAAS ISON: 0711005770 PE Mapp £1499 GEPRINTED - SPRING 2002 n Barbarossa p £29.99 War without Garlands: Operati Robert J. Kershaw ISBN: 071102734 1B ¥ Guile to German World War? Without Enigma: The Ultra & Fellgiebel Riddles Medals & Political Awards: The Satellite States fue njactny isin ortinuss HD Pope Christopher Asby ISBN: 07110 PH Hopp c£12.99 | ‘ NEW SPRING 2002 Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Disaster in Operation Mars 1942 ereing the Atlantic Wall Duvll Glnte ISBN: 07102748% HB 408pp £20.99 Robert J. Kersh ISBN: O7U21767 HIE 256yp £25.00 ‘The Battle of the Hedgerows: Bradley's First Hitleand the Nari Leaders: A Unique Insight army in Normandy June-July 1944 into Evil Leo Doaerty BBN: 07103832 TB Zipp £19.99 ol K; Later ISBN: 071027005 HB 286pp £19.99 > Ordes via post, fax or e-mail: TAN ALLAN PUBLISHING “Tel 01455 2 Email:midl 3747 Fay 01455 23 3737 ndbooks@[Link] Or order on-line from Ian Allan’s: ‘ew and improved website [Link]GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Guderian’s Eastern Front Elite EGS 38,08 aiken: 1 HOARE AB R24 ARMA AE. AREA SEEMS CABARET HOT ARGS. 2, WMREHAABMAAEE, HAWLAB SER. EIS MT ABIAHRS ERASE. 3, AURORE SIRF REIL, EAA GA. CER.- GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Guderian’s Eastern Front Elite ichael Sharpe and Brian L. DavisPrevious page: German grenaiters ring on heir First published 2001 nl penned cares pa during suhance, August 1982 rameariton the __'SBN0 7110 28540 All rights reserved. No pars of this book may be reproduced or ransmitted in any form or by any means, eleceronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and rxrieval systom, without permission from the Publisher in writing © Compendium Publishing 2001 Published by lan Allan Publching ‘an imprint of lan Allan Publishing Ltd!Hersham, Surrey KTI2 4RG, Printed by lan Allan Printing Leg Hersham, Surrey KTI2 4RG. (Coe:011UA2 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data [Link] extalogue record for this book ie avaible from the British Library Glossary eo | Stellung Position/static leFH leichte Abteilung Battalion: »~ Sturmgeschitz Assault Gun Feldhaubitze Armee _ Ary Truppe Troop (light field gun) Artillerie Artillery Versorgungstruppen Service troops Lt Lieutenant; light Auikléruiig” ‘Reece Wache Guard Maint Maintenance Aissbiidung Training Wehrmacht German armed forces | “MC Motorcycle Bataillon Battalion Zug Mor Mortar Beglelt Escort Mot Motorised Einhelten Units Mire! Materiel Ersatz Replacement OKW Oberkommando Feldersatz Field replacement | der Wehrmacht Flak ‘AA gun ADC Aide de camp OKH Oberkommand6 Geschiitz Gun Arty Artillery | des Heres’ Grenadier Rifleman Atk Anti-tank | Pak Panzerabjwehrkanone Heer German Army Bn Battalion (anti-tank gun) Infanterie Infantry BR Brandenburg fd Platoon Kampfaruppé ~~ Battle group Brig Brigade PrBefWag Panzerbefehls- Kavallerie Cavalry By Battery wagen (armd ‘Kompanie Company Col Column comd vehicle) “[ Krafttahrpark Maintenance depot | Coy Company >” PxGr Panzergrenadier Lehr Training Det Detachment Par Panzerfiger Leichte Light Engr Engineer PzKptw Panzerkamptwagen Luftwatte German Air Force | FB ~~ Fihrer Begleit tank Motorisiert Motorised we (escort), Bn (Bn), | QM Quartermaster Nachrichten Signals = R Regt), Recce Reconnaissance Nebelwerfer Grenade launcher B (Brigade), RA (multi-barrel) DOW) RHQ Panzergrenadier Armd infantry FGD Fiber Grenadier | Sect Panzerjiger —_Anti-tank infantry Division Sig Pronier ‘Engineer co Grossdeutschland | SP Sanitit Medical Hy Heavy Tac | Sehitze Rifleman ocd Infantry Division | Tk Lo | Schwer Heavy Grossdeutschland | Veh Stab Staff (HO) IRGD infantry Regiment | WH Wehrmacht Heer Stamm Cadre GrossdeutschlandCONTENTS 1 Origins & History ... 2 Ready 10 Wart ioss:s. + wares wazewie craters owes seers « 10 BV AHO 056698) cereniees oeee eo wens setae wisiaiens 16ORIGINS & HISTORY (12 Janay 1934 Farell para te Bein oabit paragon ky tps of Wachrurpe Bein in honour of te retin be dr erst (Chic oe Any ener Kur Freier won Hanoy Below sigh 3 iain Chie othe German sy Ge lere ershr ach ‘sit 2 “wile (on his ight), rspesting shires daw up one Bain Nob fe rou, 5 December 1935, of opal by General ar Erwin wo “Generaloberst Fritsch, had to be the best drill soldiers of their respective uni Like most elite units, the Grossdeutschland (or GroBdeutschiand as it can be. | written in German) Regiment, Division and later Panzer Corps was born out of other elites, first and foremost the Wachtruppe (guard troop) in Berlin, and the German Army's infantry training unit based at Déberitz The origins of the Wachtruppe can be traced back to 1919 when groups of ex- servicemen known as the Frefkorps had been banded together by senior German Army figures to fight the supposed threat of left wing revolution and possible invasion from Poland. An an armed body'of this type was raised in Berlin and kept in being until the threat of revolution abated. This body was maintained for ceremonial duties and parades and was known as the Wachregiment Berlin until disbanded in 1921. Subsequently, as part of the army permitted to Weimar Germany, 2 néw unit was raised under the title of Kommando der Wachtruppe (Command! of the Guard Troop) and this remained unaltered for the next 13 years. The Wachtruppe’s duties were purely ceremonial. On Sundays, Tuesdays’ and Thursdays, with a full quard and regimental band, it would march from the barracks at Moabit, passing through the Brandenburg Gate, to rally at the Berlin war memorial. On other days simple guard changing ceremonies took place. In 1934, after Hitler had come to power, the Kommando der Wachtruppe went through several name changes to Wachtruppe Berlin (Berlin Guard Troop) and was increased in size from seven to eight companies with a headquarters company. In 10937 the mame was changed ong agnin to Wachreghnent Bern (ern Guard Regiment). The men for this mit were drawn from the neuly expanded Wehrmacht, and later smaller groups were seconded to the guard regiment on half-yearly postings with NCOs Being rotated yearly. These men had to be of above average height (nearly all men were six feet tall or over) and after an order was issued by itioral Each soldier wore a gothic ‘W’ on his epaulettes and received an 1 Groschen (a silver penny) to his daily pay for the duration of his servige. That same year, the infantry training battalion based at) the Wehrmacht Infanterie-Schule at Elsgrund near Déberitz was also expanded to regimental size. This unit, which was responsible for developing many of the infantry tactics of Blitzkrieg, would contributed nearly half of its strength to Grossdeutschland upon its formation in 1939. From 1935 to 1939 the Infantry School was commanded by the outstanding WWI veterait Oberst Hans-Valentin Hube, who was a master of infantry tactics and weote'the standard Wehrmacht infantry training manual Der Infanterist (The ‘nfantryman). German success in the early part of WWII was founded'ga) his mobile infantry tactics, along with those practised at the Infanterie-onicins & wisroaySPCARNEAD: GROSSOEUTSCHLAND Lehr school in Daberitz, and those for armoured warfare developed by Heinz Guderian and Hermann Hoth at Brandenburg. These techniques, as well as parade ‘ground drill, were practised to perfection for visting dignitaries, heads of state and leading members of the Nazi Party. For state visits and conferences the Wachregiment was used as a guard of honour. Their drill was perfected to very high standards and old film footage provides evidence of the precision of the parade ground training that dominated the life of the men of the Wachregiment, Long hours were spent practising arms drill and marching in formation’ and the unit was regularly seen on Saturday mornings parading to the sound of military marching music. During 1938, as relations between German, and Poland, Britain and France began to deteriorate rapidly, the infantry-training regiment continued to perfect its combat techniques and the Wachregiment dutifully kept guard outside the offices wherein plans for Germany's expansion were being hatched. In the spring of 1939 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia, and Hitler's demands for territorial concessions from Poland met with rebuff. France and Britain announced their solidarity with the Poles, and in response Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to flex its muscles. As part of this demonstration on 6 April the Wachregiment Berlin was ordered to reform as a full four-battalion infantry regiment; many of the men came from the guard troop and the others were volunteers from all across Germany. The potential candidate had to be physically as well as mentally and morally fit (according to how these terms were'understood in Nazi Germany). He had to be at least 5 feet 8 inches tall, have no criminal record and, unlike recruits for the Waffen-SS, had to havé'a good standard of education to serve in what was to be the premier unit of the German Army. To reflect the diversity in the ranks, the name Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) was chosen for the regiment, and officially awarded to it by the town commander of Berlin, Generalleutnant Siefert, at’2 ceremony at the regimental barracks at Moabit on 14 June. As Infanterie-Regiment Grossdeutschland (IRGD) the unit embarked on a period of reorganisation and training during the summer, training that was to prove invaluable during the Battle of France. A week before the invasion of Poland, the Fibrer-Begleit-Kommando (Fuhrer Escort Command) was formed from the regiment and was then expanded to battalion strength (Filhrer-Begleit-Battaillon) separate from IRGD. zi ‘At the same time some'98 Wehrmacht divisions were mobilising, in preparation for the coming offensive against Poland. Throughout July and early August 1939 units moved quietly to positions east and west. On 1 September that ‘offensive began, as 37 German divisions blitzed their way into the Polish heartland. IRGD, only recently formed, was still in the process of reorganisation and training and as such was not considered combat ready. Thus, IRGD sat out the frst stage of the war. The Fuhrer Escort Battalion, however, was involved in the 29-day ‘campaign. On 6 September 1939 new orders arrived stating that the IRGD was to prepare with all possible haste for an airborne attack against Poland. However, this operation was cancelled due to the advance of Soviet troops into eastern Poland, which made it unnecessary. On the 17th the unit was re-transferred to Berlin, its period of reorganisation now considered complete. ‘One of the companies (ater exparided to a battalion) was detached and ordered to resume guard duties in thé capital. On 21 October the remainder of the unit was transferred by rail tothe Grafenwhr training area south of Bayreuth, where it underwent further training and more reorganisation. By early December IRGD had been mouldedonicins & misTokY into a _well-disciplined and tightly ‘controlled unit, and one that was ready for combat. However, in Europe the fighting trad met with a lull; after the surrender of Warsaw on 29 September, all German units in Poland had transferred to the west, in| anticipation of an attack by Poland’s allies, France and Britain. Between 6 and 11 November IRGD moved into the defensive line, taking up positions around Montbaur and Westerburg held by the XIX Motorised Army Corps, veterans of the recently concluded Polish campaign. Their commander, General der Panzertruppe Heinz Guderian was a brilliant tank leader and influential with Hitler. Shortly after its transfer IRGD was strengthened by the arrival of two motorised assault engineer battalions, trained and equipped for mine-clearance, demolition and bridging. These, were the 43rd Assault Engineer Battalion, with three companies, and Light Bridging Column B. Thus 1939 ended with Grossdeutschland having expanded from a two-battalion guard regiment to a fully trained four-battalion infantry regiment, by now under the command of Oberst Stockhausen, and actively preparing for the offensive in the west. SPRING, 1940 During the winter full that became known as the ‘Phony War’, German Army units rested and te-equipped. The Panzer units, in particular had been much reduced by thie Polish campaign, and the devastatingly effective new tactics of Blitzktteg ‘Teeded further refinement. In the last week of January, Grassdeutschland marched out ofits Montbaur positions to new positions 100km south-west in the middle Mosel region, overlooking the Ardennes, a heavily wooded and sémi-mountainous area of southern Belgium, north of the French Maginot Line, and considered impassable to ‘tanks by British and French commanders. The regimental staff decamped to Zell, to finalise details of the upcoming campaign. The waiting dragged on and February and March passed without incident, but in early April GD gained a 16th company, Assault Gun Battery 640, whose primary weapon was the Sturmgeschitz (StuG) Ill, one of the early assault guns. In the run-up to the invasion of Norway and Denmark on 9 April the regiment [Link] on standby alert, but again there was no counterpunch by the Allied atmies, swollen to nearly 150 divisions of French (100), British (11), Belgian (22) and Dutch (10) troops. Denmark fell in a day, and although resistance in Norway continued until June, most of the country was in German control by'the middle of April. Grossdeutschland, now under the command of Oberst Graf Schwerin, knew its time was about to come. Ahove: Ml ite from Wachirupe Btn d 1956, inspeeting an Honour Conan p oppaste the Reichs Withelmstrsse, Belin, 10 JaaryREADY FOR WAR Below: Before entering the brea: en of the Great War—o to honour the German aeath, Paul, Prince Regent of Yuga, sles the Honour Company from Wachreghnest Bet me 1939. On the right ofthe Pa the Hopon Sind and 0 his hts (onaande Generales lo oe, Commanding fice of amy Gp By May 1940 the German Army was again ready to assume the offensive, and had 2.5 million men available for campaigning in the west. Hitler had commanded the western campaign to be fought according to a plan devised by General Manstein chief of staff to General Rundstedt, commanding Army Group A. This plan, a revision of the more conventional original plan suggested by the OKH (German ‘Army HQ) placed great emphasis on German armoured forces and their motorised infantry, artillery and support units, and on the tactics of Blitzkrieg. BLITZKRIEG Late in World War I the German Army developed basic tactics that eventually evolved into modern concepts of mobile warfare. Those tactics were created in an attempt to overcome the static trench warfare of the Western Front, Elite ‘Sturmtruppen (Stormtroop) infantry units were created to attack and break through enemy positions using the momentum of speed and surprise. However, in WWI these tactics failed to come to full fruition because of the lack of mobility and support needed in order to continue advancing deep into enemy controlled territory.ee READY FOR WAR The theory of Blitzkrieg rested on the following principles: 1 Concentrated tank units break through main lines of defence and avance deeper into enemy terior, wile fllovng maha s pune ad engi ng ha establishing dese < folie fay ns ema ey and esclishing efectve dence, 2 Infamy ane oh spor units tack enemy ans in onder link up wth he groups to compete the attack and eventually enc he enemy. \ we 3 Nechans goups gerbe deer inthe ena) > Aecritory outlanking the enemy postions an rang the er pesening withing tose defenders from establishing effective defensive positions, 4 Maip forve links up with other units encircling and iting of he ney. During the 1920s British military philosophers Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart General J... Fuller and General G. le [Link] further developed tactics of mobile warfare. They all postulated that tanks could not only seize ground by brute strength, but could also be the central factor in a new strategy of warfare. If moved rapidly a concentrations of tanks could smash through enemy lines and into ‘the enemy's rear, destroying supplies and artillery positions and decreasing the seorpaull waa Al teaind Has ote ultimate weapon able to penetrate deep into enemy territory while followed by infantry and sunpoged by © attilley and air forces. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Charles de Gaulle, Hans vi Sei, Heinz Guderian and many others became interested in the concept of mobile warfare and tried to implement it in the organisational structive oF their respective armies. se sw caHeinz Guderian organised Germany's tanks or Panzers into selt- contained Panzer divisions working with the close support of infantry, motorised infantry, artillery and the air force. From 1933 to 1939 Germany set about mechanising a significant part of its army for the war that Hitler intended to start. In the battle for France, the motorised InfanteriesRegiment Grossdeutschland would play a key role Grossdeutschland ‘was probably (together with the $S Leibstandarte Adaif Hitler) the most powerful motorised infantry unit of the German Army on 10 May 1940. Each infantry platoon had four combat squads and an anti-tank rifle In addition to the three infantry battalions, the IRGD had a heavy weapons battalion instead of a heavy weapons company, as was normal in standard infantry regiments. This fourth battalion had one light infantry gun company (13th company) with six 75mm infantry guns, an anti-tank company (14th company) with twelve 37mm anti-tank guns, a heavy infantry gun company (15th company) with four 150mm infantry guns, one assault gun company (16th company) with six StuG III (in May 1940 the StuG III was still in its development stage and. this company was one of only three German Army units equipped, for combat testing purposes, with this powerful weapon). In addition, the IRGD had received during November. ‘of the previous year 2 motorised assault engineer battalfon, 43rd Sturm-Pionier-Abteilung, with three assault companies and one bridge company. On the eve of the attack, GD was at its start point in the Mosel, and ready for battle.INFANTRY REGIMENT (MOT) GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as at 10 May 1940 Infantry Battalion (mot) 1 wn iQ : Linn ‘A\x Pack Radio Sect 2 x Pack Radio Sect 3 x Infantry Coys Coy HQ and HQ Sect i 3x Inf Platoons. $Sianal Platoon (mot) toon HQ 4 x LtTelephone Sects 4x Lt Radio Sects x Pack Radio Sects RHQ Infantry Battalion (mot) Infantry Battalion (mot) IV Bh na Bng.s> 7 2 x Lt Telephone Sect *f 2 x LtTelephone Sect “4 x Pack Radio Sect [spe ane 2 x Pack Radio Sect 2 x Pack Radio Sect am ) price Coy HQ and HQ Sect sie eae 1 3 x Inf Platoons er HO Section 3x Lt Inf Gum Phatoons 4 x Infantry Squads ‘x Mortar Section ee 1x LtTelephone Sect 1 xMG Cay Mot) 1x Ammo Sect Coy vg 1 x Gun Sect (2x 75mm) 3.x MG Platoons “}-1 x Pig Coy (Mot) HQ Section Coy HO [Link] Sections. rest putts 1 x Mortar PhS vas ean HQ Section bg x Mortar Sections aaa ce 1 x Hy Inf Gun Coy (Mot = pie ii Pe wm Coy Ha) pln HO Section” 2 x LtTelephone Sect ‘2 x Lt Telephone Sections ‘4x Pack Radio Sect 2 x Pack Radio Sections 2x Pack Radio Sect 2x Hy Inf Gun Platoons ‘HQ Section 11x Lt Telephone Section 1 x Ammo Section 1.x Gun Section (@ x 150mm) Pak (orzerabebrenane) 38, manned by tags of Infany Regiment Grosdewshlznd, supporting 1 asault somewhere onthe East Frat Right: German infantry prepare to jn. They are wearing backpack an caring support weapon; the man second from lef scaryng a Sem ight mortarIN ACTION Above right: An MG 54 hey-amacine gun and crew of min eourty Below right: The Geran invasion of 190, Graseetscand ws pa Cons in the offensive jadi XIX 1940: THE WESTERN OFFENSIVE For the offensive, three army groups, A, B and C, under Rundstedt, Bock and Leeb respectively, were created. The key tank units, including the Sth and 7th Panzers of Hoth’s group, the Kleist Armoured Group (with the XIX Corps under Guderian) and the 6th and 8th Panzers under Reinhardt, were attached to Rundstedt's force. It was charged with the most daring element of the plan, a co-ordinated thrust through the ravined and forested Ardennes region behind the main concentration of Allied forces, thus bypassing the formidable French Maginot defensive line. This ‘was to be followed by a race to the undefended Channel coast, before turning to complete the encirclement. In the north, Bock was to make a diversionary attack into Belgium, where the Belgian Army was concentrated on a defensive line on the Albert Canal and Meuse River lines, and seize the strategically important fortress at Eben Emael. Grossdeutschland was to play a major role in the offensive. Attached to Guderian’s XIX Corps, it was to follow close behind the Panzer spearhead and consolidate the German gains. The assault began on 10 May, with extensive air attacks on the Dutch and Belgian airfields and the seizure of vital river crossings by paratroops at Moerdijk. Bock’s Sth Panzer Division then drove into Holland, toward the densely populated ‘Fortress Holland’ region were the Dutch army had concentrated. In response the French Seventh Army and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) moved across Belgium to help the Dutch and Belgians. In Belgium, the allied armies soon ‘ell back on a defensive line based on the Dyle River. Holland fell on the 14th, but although it intially appeared that the Allies had succeeded in their central delaying action, Rundstedt had already sprung the trap. Advancing on the central front were ‘Army Group A was opposed by only four light cavalry divisions, the Chasseurs Ardennais, and ten hurriedly prepared infantry divisions, the main blow. was delivered by Kleist’ two Panzer corps, comprising seven divisions, which pushed ‘through the Ardennes and across the Meuse with almost no losses, The main body of Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland, supported by artillery ‘and engineers from the 10th Panzer Division, attacked through Luxemburg against the southern Belgian fortifications, while simultaneously elements of GD's 3rd Battalion landed as airborne troops. Rundstedt and his subordinate commanders learned that there was some reason for the French theory that the Ardennes was a difficult barrier for major attacks. It took all the fist day to cross the undefended northern portion of Luxemburg, yet on the second day the German forces picked up momentum and neither the Belgian cavalry nor the French Army could do much 16‘th Army assaults ‘on Holland GERMANY XXX Pz Corps XvIPz Corps. Hoopner XV Pz Corps. XLI Pz Corps Rholnhardt Guderian, 2 Albom landings 4th May 1940 oa Bridgehoads ‘4th May 1940Abvne: Srey vee tare. The Geman tops be Idgehends when erasing wide gt 1s asgicant pat of to stay the advance. By nightfall on the 11th Guderian’s tanks had reached Bouillon on the Semois River. It was here on the next day that the regiment. had its first taste of battle, ‘skitmishing with Belgian troops whose lines had been overrun. ‘Although a blown bridge temporarily halted the advance, a crossing was forced the next day. Continuing its advance south through Belgium, the regiment approached the Meuse at Sedan via the Forest of Sedan, Fleigneux, St Megnes and Floing, on the north bank of the river CROSSING THE MEUSE Jn the centre of Army Group A, Guderian and Reinhardt prepared to cross the Meuse on the 13th. Reinhardt’ forces at Monthermé and Mézires, and Guderian at Sedan, where the great loop in the Meuse River formed a weak spot in the French defences, In the event, the honour of forcing the first bridgehead went to Erwin Rompiel’s 7th Panzer Division, which crossed at Dinant at dawn on the 13th. Further south, and despite the fact that neither Guderian nor Reinhardt had built up sizeable forces for an assault crossing, an attack was ordered for’ the afternoon, in the hope of catching the French before they could prepare. Although the attack, supported by hundreds of aircraft, caused some panic in the French lines (manned mainly by reservists), it proved costly for the Germans. Nearly half the ‘men in the first wave were cut down by French artillery and machine-gun fire. GD assaulted in two parts. The 7th Company to the west of the town and the main body to the east, after looping around the town of Sedan itself. ‘As the Germans advanced, tical French commander General Huntziger launched a hasty cavalry counter-attack against the southern flank of Guderian’s thrust, but 2nd Panzer was soon at the Ardennes Canal, where it seized two bridges intact. After ctossing the Meuse, IRGD was placed under the command of the 1st Panzer Division, and advanced south to Cheveuges. South of Cheveuges, the Assault Engineer Battalion split from the main body of the unit and moved west of the © uplands overlooking Chémery and Bulson. Moving along the western road Into CChémery, it was attacked by French tanks. The main force, having advanced through Bulson, met and held a French armoured attack south of that town. By now the breakthrough at Sedan had seriously compromised the position of the main allied force in Belgium and, although attempts were made to eliminate the armoured penetration, none of the counter-attacks ordered over the next four days succeeded. As part of the operations to consolidate the bridgeheads over the Meuse IRGD was heavily involved in fighting with the French 55th and 61st Divisions, and 3rd Division around the Stonne highlands, south-east of Artaise, which continued over the next 48 hours. By the 19th the fighting around Bulson had begun-to abate as the last tenacious defenders withdrew. isDRIVE TO THE CHANNEL Moving with impressive speed, Kleist’s armour captured St Quentin on 18 May, halfway to the Channel from Sedan, and the next day reached Amiens and Doullens, 40 miles from the coast. On May 20th Abbeville fell, and forall practical purposes the Germans now faced the Channel, having cut the BEF's line of communications with ils main base at Cherbourg. On the same day as IRGD began its march towards St Omer, (south of Dunkirk) the British commander, Lord Gort, ordered the BEF to hold a line extending from south of Dunkirk to the vicinity of Arras (the “canal line’), in an attempt to stop this rush northwards by the German forces. He attempted to drive southwards from Arras, but promised French support failed to materialise and the attack failed, in the face of determined resistance by German units, including IRGD. Now trapped in a pocket surrounding Dunkirk, its only remaining port, pressed by Army Group A from the south along the fragile canal line and in the east by ‘Army Group B through Belgium, where the Belgians appeared on the brink of collapse, the BEF seemed doomed. As part of Army Group A, IRGD began attacks on the British line south of Dunkirk on 24 May and by the 26th had established bridgeheads over the canal at St Pierre Brouck. That same day, the British government authorised Lord Gort to begin evacuating the BEF from Dunkirk, and the following night the BEF began withdrawing to a shallow perimeter around the port. On the 27th and 28th Wormhoudt and Herzeele were attacked, and While jejoy: Tefal uf France Girosdewseclanal fighting continued south of Dunkirk, the Belgians surrendered. As has been much= sect lyr or de Astin debated since, Hitler halted the Panzers and entrusted the destruction of the GREAT BRITAIN BEF on the beaches to Goering’s Luftwaffe, a decision that is seen by contemporary historians as crucially flawed. the German Army tured south, where the French held a line stretching along the Somme and Aisne rivers. This hastily constructed Weygand Line was badly. compromised by the fact that daring its advance to the Channel the German forces had captured vital bridgeheads on the Somme. It was to ‘one of these, at Amiens, that the regiment was transferred on 4 June. Here, in the coastal sector, the French had concentrated their main strength, in an effort to prevent the Germans from taking the Channel ports and denying aid from Brit Attacks on the Weygand Line by Bock’s Army Group B from north-west of Paris began on 5 June. Fighting uiider the temporary command of the Kleist's armoured group, IRGD fought alongside 86th and 69th Infantry Regiments on 6 June through theForest, France, 21 June 1940 villages of St Fuscien and Sains-en-Amiénois, to the south of Amiens, and attacked compan by snr Gemancioss French positions west of the Bots de Loziéres on the following day. While the’ Ist (satin) walk past Geran ‘in and 2nd Battalions battled around the Bois de Lozies, the 3rd Battalion advanced Hester caragsinhishths/S SUSI. to Rossignol, where it rejoined the Assault Engineer Company (which had taken Grattenpache the previous day) for a co-ordinated attack on the French defences to the north-east of the town. Thus having helped to achieve a decisive breakthrough of the Weygand Line on 8 June, and turn the left flank of the French armies on the Aisne, the regiment began its pursuit of the French forces-to the Oise River. Along the Aisne, Rundstedt launched the main attack on the 9th, and despite spirited resistance the French were forced to fall hack onthe Marne in deference to their open flank. On the next day Guderian’s tanks broke through the line at Chalons. Subsequently, Paris was declared an-open city and abandoned IRGD was involved in further heavy fighting south of Amiens until the 10th, when Bock reached the Seine below Paris. With the destruction af the Oise Bridge much of Kleist’s group was rushed to the north-east into the area around Guiscard to reinforce Army Group A. Beginning on the 13th, the regiment began’a forced march to the Seine above Paris, via Coucy, Villers and Villeneuve.’On the 15th, it battled for crossings over the Seine, and continued south in pursuit ofthe remnants of the retreating French Second and Fourth Armies. On 17 June Guderian’s tanks reached the Swiss border, effectively cutting off the 500,000 French troops in the Maginot Line, and France sued for peace. While the negotiations weré”underway, IRGD continued to press on south, ‘occupying Lyon in the Rhine valley on the 19th. In and around Lyon the regiment served a month-long tenancy as the occupation force, providing a welcome ‘opportunity. for rest and relaxation. On 5 July the regiment marched to Paris and 20during its brief stay in the capital was reinforced with an additional company, the 17th, equipped as motorcycle ‘troops. On 26 July the regiment embarked for Colmar and Schlettstadt in the Alsace region, and here undertook training for Operation Seeléwe (‘Sealion’, the planned invasion of England) until 26 October when this was postponed indefinitely. During this period the regiment underwent much reorganisation. The Heavy Transport Battalion became the 17th and 20th Companies, and at the beginning of September a motorised artillery unit (400. Artllerie-Abteilung) was attached. The next month, a motorised engineer company was added as the 18th Company. Between the end of October and the new year, the regiment was transferred to a training camp at Le Valdahon, near the Swiss border and here underwent training for Operation Felix—the planned assault on Gibraltar (also cancelled). In November its ranks were further swelled by the addition of a motorised flak company (20th Company) Infanterie-Regiment Grassdeutschland ended 1940 with a reputation hard won on the battlefields of France. It had been involved in many of crucial actions and in them shown the quality of its men and training. The cost was not light. At the start of the western offensive the regiment numbered some show: ii 3,900 men and at its conclusion 1,108 of those had become casualties (221 killed, 830 wounded, 57 missing). ter (prntsons cae ho has ee ral witha 1941: OPERATION BARBAROSSA ‘The losses of men and materiel in France were made good during the summer and winter months of 1940-41, during which time there was ample opportunity for mew recruits to be trained, and new equipment tested. Although costly, the fighting in France had given Grossdeutschland a core of experienced ‘combat veterans whose experience and camaraderie would be vital in the first Year of the Russian campaign. After overwintering at the Le Valdahon training camp on the Swiss border, in the early months of the new year Grossdeutschland rotated between the Le Valdahon and the nearby Belfort training camps for a period of intensive training. Unbeknown to all but a few senior officers, this was in preparation for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia. As early as June 1940, Hitler had become convinced of the strategic value of an attack on the Soviet Union, firstly as a means of denying Britain a potential ally (and persuading her obstinate people to accept a negotiated peace), secondly as a means of acquiring Lebensraum—living space’—which ostensibly was one of the reasons for the war, and lastly because he was convinced of the Soviet Union’s expansionist ambitions in Europe. The OKH began planning for the invasion from that time, and this process gathered increasing impetus as hopes for a switt victory over diminished.SPEARHEAD: GROSSDCUTECHLAND YUGOSLAVIA ‘An the spring of 1941 Hitler decided to invade Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet Union, still Germany's ally at the time, tore up its non-aggression and friendship pacts with those two countries on 5 April and the next day German forces invaded. Beginning on 4 April Grossdeutschland was transported by rail from Belfort to Vienna, and from there advanced via Raab,, Budapest and Szegedin to Romania. Here it was attached to the XLI Panzer-Corps, which was ordered to converge on the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, fron the forth-east. The regiment marched into the country on 11 April, via Arad arid Temesvar, but met with little resistance from the Yugoslav Army, elements of which it pursued to the vicinity of the Danube River near Pancevo. In the early evening of the 11th an SS lieutenant hoisted the Swastika over the German legation in Belgrade and the next day German armoured spearheads entered the city. Following in their wake, 1st Battalion IRGD, took part in the occupation of the city and from then until the middle of July it acted as security troops in the regions east of the Danube—Weilka, Kikinda and Wertschetz RUSSIA The occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece forced Hitler to revise the original start date of the Russian invasion (15 May), instead scheduling it for end of June. In the middle of May, the“regiment received orders to move by rail to the FreudentstadtTroppau area in south-eastern Germany. Here it remained until 15 June, when further orders came to move to the area south-east of Warsaw, around the town of Zelechéw. This would be the start point for the invasion, for which:it was attached as a reserve to the Second Panzer Group. Panzer groups” had succeeded the highly-successful Panzer corps of the French campaign and were in Below: a track 37mm igh lk gun platoon, forcneny sive Inthesumerof 1911,flouing fact mobile armies, but lingering conservatism among the general staff prevented the poplnkactc Lutes therewas ite Sait their being accorded the status of fully-fledged armies. Four of them were available ur acti on the eve of the invasion, for which Germany had some 3,050,000 men, plusanother 750,000 from Finland and Romania, 3,350 tanks, 7,184 artillery pleces, shoe: Psp ls wtf ive wp and 600,000 motor vehicles. These were organised into three Army Groups, North, forte march di Centre and South, with support from over 3,000 aircraft. Though all of the German ‘si leaders agreed that the war hinged on the use of the Panzer groups, acting independently ahead of the infantry, Hitler was’ persuaded for the Russian campaign that though the Panzer corps should remain at the spearhead, they were to be in closer co-operation with the infantry in battles of the classic encirclement pattern that aimed at netting the Soviet forces before they could retreat behind the Dnieper. On 22 June this huge force was unleashed on a 1,800-mile front against the Soviet Union; whose armies were totally unprepared to meet the onslaught. Grossdeutschland, marching from Zelechow as part of Bock's Army Group Centre, cissed the border on the 27th/28th in the wake of the Panzers of the 7th Division, and moved toward the objective, Moscow. Advancing from Bialystock on the 29th, the regiment foughtconsolidating actions at Slonim against Soviet troops that had been encircled during the rapid advance, and launched another major drive from Baranovichi on 3 July over the northern fringes of the impassable Pripet Marshes towards Minsk. Here another large encirclement yielded more than 150,000 Soviet prisoners. Continuing the drive east, IRGD fought a major engagement at Borisov on the Beresina River, where Napoleon had crossed during his disastrous campaign of 1812. Had the men of Grossdeutschland peered down into the water they might have seen the timber supports of the bridges Napoleon’s engineers had built. As the regiment advanced deeper into Russia, fighting became more frequent along the route, which took It up to the Dnieper north of Mogilev. Here IRGD met with the armoured spearhead, and was assigned to the 10th Panzer Division for the assault across the river. After forcing a crossing on 11 July, fighting for the bridgehead continued forthe following five days. Having broken out of the bridgehead on the 16th the regiment continued to advance in support of the XLVI Panzer Corps into the area west of Mstslavl neat Yelnya, where it attacked athe ain 2Bigh The stack on Ruse goed ans, the ungrepannes and inecrty f h: ey and he culture of coy fostered the senses ofthe ath war ea all cab t hat ‘semal lke a pre executed operaton. Hover aon paticulaly to NCOs an hires fatigue and, as Naples th Rosin sim el pth Gans sate fot elena by shrivel. The length of German supply line, esol defence am the quality of Russian annout—ptcularly the T$4—would prove tao much forthe Wehmacht in the end SPEARNEAD: GROSSDEUTSCHLAND rrucano’ 5) ui g a viper | Ladoga) ‘SWEL Fae non hee et a SS rees seustaro CA Mercorcsmrocen, ° UOT PP etre] 2 eae ae A, ‘ack Soe Russian positions on 21 and 22 July. On 30 July the regiment took part in the attack on the road north toward Dorogobuzh, which met with strong resistance at Ustinova. These battles and other actions at the railroad crossing south of Yelyna, at Vaskovo, raged in summer heat for the last week of July and into August. After more than a month in the front line, the regiment was afforded two days rest in the Dankovo-Vaskovo area from 6-to 8 August, and after moved into defensive positions to hold the salient that had been put into the Soviet line west of Yelnya by the 360-mile-wide advance of Army Group Centre. The capture of Smolensk on 7 August: had brought 850,000 Russian captives, and towards the end of the 2‘month the ferocious fighting in the vicinity of Vaskove~Chochlovka—Rudnaya began to slacken of The beginning of the campaign in Russia had been characterised by rapid advances as far as the area south of Smolensk, with the fighting sporadic and small scale, Advances across the flat; empty, coverless terrain of central Russia had to be made with the support of artillery and armour and here the regiment's assault gun and artillery units proved invaluable. On the'southern front the fighting had been more intense, and better-prepared Soviet defences had held up the advance of Rundstedt and Kleist. Against the better judgment of his senior staff, who felt the maximum effort should be directed against Moscow, but encouraged by their confident predictions that the war was already won, Hitler decided to send some of Army Group Centre to the south to assist in the actions against Budyonny's West Front at Kiev. On 25 August, the Second Army and the Second Panzer Group turned southward from the Army Group Centre flank. IRGD marched south on 1 September, travelling via Roslavl, Lukaviza, and Starodub. Crossing the Desna River at Novgorod-Severskiy, it was engaged in battles to the north-east of the city to establish a secure bridgehead and, having done so, advanced further south to Glukhov by 8 September. The next day it assaulted across the Seym River at Putivl, but was checked in the bridgehead by strong resistance until the 13th. Pushing on south, the regiment fought at Schilkova, Konotop and Belopoyle, on the north flank of what was now ‘Timoshenko's West Front. The advance was slowed by rain and mud but by the'16th the lead elements of the Second Army and the First Army, which had moved northward from the Dnieper bend, met 150 miles east of Kiev: Kiev fell on the 19th, and seven Soviet armies inside the pocket were captured. In addition to those lost at Uman in the south, this amounted to nearly 1,500,000 men, or half of the current active strength of the Soviet Army. In the line east of Romny IRGD checked attempts by the Soviets to counter- attack between 26 September and 3 October, and on the 4th began the march back to the Roslav! area, transiting via Konotop and Gomel, and then proceeded on to Karachev, where it bivouacked in positions north of the city on 12 October. OPERATION TAIFUN (TYPHOON) Ordered by Hitler to recommence the attack on Moscow, Bock had’advanced east ‘on 2 October, encircling Bryansk and Vyazma and capturing 663,000 more Soviet prisoners. As the autumn rains set in, slowing the advance to Moscow to a crawl, IRGD was allowed a welcome period of rest and recuperation at Orel on the Oka River. Starting on the 23rd, it marched through the cloying mud to a bivouac area north-east of Mtsensk, in preparation for the following day's attack on strongly fortified Soviet positions in the area. In the last week of October, with temperatures falling ominously, IRGD ground on to Tula, less than 90 miles from Moscow, fighting many actions en route. To the north-west, German forces were within 40 miles of the Russian capital on 20 October, but their advantage was already running out. Georgi Zhukov had amived to take charge of the defence of the city, reinforcements were expected from the Far East, and most of the surviving Soviet warplanes were’ being concentrated around the city. This combination of factors held back the stab at Moscow via Tula on 15 November by Guderian’s tank forces in which IRGD played a major role, fighting around Yefremov and Tula.Above righ: The Arad, ves al racke soiree, pulling trailer in the mad ofa Rusan umn, BGs Panaerfger 38(0),2 "9k 9 ied on a PrKptu 380) chasis Theo right The autumn rains wii ured the summit and dust nto ale cep coping mud making met dit rad los impasse, redoing ‘movement to ‘push and pull spe {At the end of the month, an attempt was made to encircle Tula from the north. The regiment assaulted the Soviet defensive lines at Ryazan and Kashira to the “east, but was repulsed and lost most the 17th Company (Motorcycle) at Kolodesnya. By 5 December most of the German troops had reached the limit of their endurance, and vehicles were almost inoperative in the severe weather conditions. J On 7 December Zhukov chose his moment to launch 2 major counter-attack on 2 65-mile front against Bock’s exhausted Army Group Centre forces. in the lines around Yefremov and Tula, IRGD, now on the defensive, repelled the attacks for two weeks, and then was ordered north again, to the area around Bolkhov north of Orel. Although his troops were unprepared and poorly equipped to fight through a Russian winter, Hitler refused to allow any retreat, calling instead for fanatical resistance from his men. However, under the weight of the Soviet offensive, the German spearheads north and south of Moscow quickly crumbled, and the offensive expanded until nearly the whole of the Army Group Centre front was aflame. Fighting on the defensive on the Oka River and north of Bolkhov during the last week ofthe year, IRGD was called on again to reinforce weak points in the line. The regiment was spit into units and assigned to assist three separate infantry divisions, as Soviet breakthroughs in the north and south threatened the encirclement of the entire Army Group Centre. ‘Although it had survived, the year has-béen hard for IRGD. The regiment had fought, and survived, through the extremes of the Russian summer and autumn, and was enduring its winter, Nine hundred of its men had been killed, including many experienced NCOs and enlisted men, and over 3,000 others wounded 1942: THE FURTHEST EAST The new year promised a different Soviet Army, one with combat expetience, better tanks, guns and planes, and a growing flow of supplies from the US and United Kingdom. Behind the German lines, the partisan forces were becoming a serious threat to the overstretched supply routes, which crossed hundreds of miles of ‘overrun but not conquered territory. During the winter, in Berlin, reriminations for the failure of the Moscow campaign were swift and unflinching, Hitler appointed himself as direct C-in-C of the Army, and 35 leading generals, including all of the ‘Army Group leaders and Guderian and Héppner, were dismissed. Through early1942, with men and machines all but immobilised by the ‘weather, IRGD was engaged in small scale fighting on the Oka River between Orel and, Belev. Around Gorodok, the regiment fought for ten days to contain an attempted enemy breakthrough launched on 20 January, with the added diversion, \-~ of partisan action in the forested areas around the town. Fighting to secure’the area around Gorodok continued into February, but the regiment was by this time seriously depleted. Already, on 2 February, the 3rd Battalion had beén disbanded and its men and equipment used to bolster the remaining battalions. On the 9th, the regiment attacked Verch as part of the operation to clear the Bolkhov-Yagodnaya railroad. Advancing on the north side of the railroad through Novoiginsky, Gorodok, and Fondeyevka, the Ist and 2nd Battalions reached Gorizy fon the 15th. Casualties were again heavy, and on the 19th the two remaining Grenadier battalions were reformed into one unit. Another attack followed, this time on Kosovka ard Chuchlova, and thereafter the regiment fought consolidating actions in the'area while it was reorganised and brought up to strength. 26Abbe: Soldiers from Grasedesclan th ration fr thes a SSDEUTSCHLAND INFANTRY DIVISION GROS ‘Between 1 April and 22 May 1942 IRGD underwent wholesale reorganisation and expansion from a regiment into a motorised infantry division, The current Grossdeutschland regimental commander, Oberst ‘Papa’ Hoernlein was promoted to Generalmajor and given command of the new: Infanterie-Division (mot) Grossdeutschland. ‘As part of the expansion into. a- division, new units were assigned to Grossdeutschland, which were formed at the Infantry Schoo! at Daberitz,Juterborg, and Wandern/Mark Brandenburg during April and May. Underlining its status as an elite unit, new recruits had to conform to exacting physical and mental standards before they could be accepted. The High Command also ordained that Grossdeutschland should receive the latest and the best equipment, as it became available. On 9 April the veterans of the old regiment were relieved and travelled to Orel, and then on the 15th on to Rechitsa on the Dnieper River for a period of rest and refitting. At the beginning of May, the GD Replacement Battalion was reformed as @ regiment and transferred from Neuruppin to Cottbus and the following month was expanded again to brigade size. In the last week of May the fresh units to expand GD to a division arrived by truck and rail. Infanterie-Division Grossdeutschland (IDGD) was then assigned to XLVIIl Panzer Corps, for the summer campaign season. During Jane the division trained as a unit in the Fatesch area and assembled close to-Shchiary for the summer offensive planned for southern Russia. During the, spring Hitler, now in direct and complete control of all operations on the Eastern Front from his headquarters at Rastenburg, outlined his plans for the summer. He ordained that these would be based on a full-scale offensive but only in the south, toward the Don River, Stalingrad and the Caucasus oilfields, the capture of which he saw as the decisive stroke. Hitler's plan was for a series of successive converging attacks; the first phase, in which IDGD would make its combat debut, was to be an enveloping thrust on the Kursk-Voronezh line, whichINFANTRY DIVISION (MOT) GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as at 16 May 1942 ee Regt HQ “1.x Sig Platoon 1 x Engr Platoon 1 x MC Platoon 3 x Battalions Bn HQ 3 x Inf Coys 1x MG Coy 1x Hy Coy 1 x Engr Platoon 1 x Inf Gun Section 1 x Pag Section GD Panzer Troop +———SP Flak Company ries (8 x 20mm, 2 x Quad 205) 3 x Med Armd Coys Heavy Infantry Gu 11x Armd Maint Platoon ens 5 GD Signals Be ———} SP Panzerjiger Coy Eisansttass ffl shoe) 11 x Armd Telephone Coy 1 xLt Sigs Supply Col cee a Bae Torsion (3 x Btys of 7 assault guns HQ a ees 1 €0detey Regiment (mot) 1x AC Coy feat HO ‘1 x Halftrack Coy 1 (mot Stat Coy 2x MC Coys Amiof) Observation Coy 1 xHy Coy JP oth Nebelwerter Bty 1 x Engr Platoon ~~ ba Battalions 1 x Pag Platoon 1 x (mot) Bn HQ Coy 1 x Pag Sect 2 x 105mm Btys 1 x Inf. Gun Sect 1.x 150mm Bty 1 x Battalion x Fak Battal: 2x 150mm Btys (aaa 1 100mm By 8 2x SP Btys Div HQ with Staff and Mapping PI -GD Pioneer Bo 3.x (mot) Pioneer Coys be (mot) It Bridging Col ‘1 x (mot) It Supply Col ‘GD Panzerjager Bn ao ‘1 x SP Coy ‘Supply Train 10 x (mot) t Supply Cols. > 4 x (mot) hy Supply Cols 4x It Fuel Supply Cols 3 x (mol) Maint Coys ‘1 x (mot) It Supply Coy ‘Admin Services 1 x (mol) Diy QM PL 1 x (mot) Butcher Coy -1 x (mot) Bakery Coy 1 x (mob) Fd Post Office 1x MP Coy Medical 3 x Ambulance Cols? -2 x (mot) Med Coys, There were a number of differences between the ‘old Schitzen (rifle) regiments and the new Panzerorenadier Regiment. Fist, It was planned to equip atleast the first two battalions with Sd iz 251s, but due tothe severe shortage of production, only the frst battalion of one regiment was carted by Sd Ktz 2512. The troops ‘of the second battalion had to be transported by trucks and were nicknamed ‘Gurami : Panzergrenadieren' (‘rubber Panzergrenadier. ‘Thus, only the fist battalion was capable of. ~ {following Panzers across country and fighting ‘rom their vehicles. Although the second battalion was stil trained in tank-infanty tactics, its vehicles were not always able to move cross- county, soit was often held in reserve until require.SPEARWEAD: GROSSOEUTSEHLAND sane zany would carry the German front to a ‘sous the Don River. ES Sonnanncon Cab santa The Soviet High Command, “FORMED 9 XAY, FOPWERLY ARMY GRU SOUTH Which had also planned to take the ae a = initiative. when the good weather returned, launched a disastrous |; attack on the Southwest Front ©” toward Kharkov on 12 May. Although initially successful, it met with strong German resistance and ‘on 25 May the Germans sealed off the pocket and netted 240,000 prisoners. The plans for a Soviet summer offensive during 1942 collapsed at a stroke. ‘A month later, on 28 June, the Second and Fourth Panzer Armies opened the German summer offensive. Attached to the Fourth Panzer Army, GD advanced east from positions around Shchigry through Russian positions at IWanovka and moving through Mikhailovka, Paklanovka, and Manssurovo quickly pushed through the inner flanks of the Bryansk and Southwest Fronts. The armoured spearhead reached the upper Don River on the outskirts of Voronezh on 2 July. Grossdeutschland assaulted across on the Sth and took the city the next day. After regrouping on the western bank of the Don, IDGD ine Caveais—canpalgsin in scond marched south-east on the 8th, across the wide arc of the Don west of Kharkov, to half of 1982 Olchovskii on the Olchovaya. Although he had “originally planned to execute a large encirclement inside the Don bend, on’the 13th Hitler ordered Army Group A (to which he attached the Fourth Panzer Army) to turn south, cross the lower Don and force the Soviet forces ononezn vane Trent estan 4 [Southwest Font into a pocket around Rostov. During this advance south encounters with the enemy "~~ were limited to light skirmishing near to Tazinskaya and, after an exhausting five- day forced march in the dust and heat of summer, the division reached and crossed the Donets at Mikhailovskii on the 20th. GD then began a rapid advance south across the complex river system east of Rostov, where the Donets, Don, Sal and Manych Rivers meet. Between 21 and 23 July it fought for control of Razdorskaya on the Don, Rostov fell on the 23rd, but its capture did not produce the expected pF” large number of prisoners. Hitler issued a new directive setting forth new “ objectives, ordering Army Group A’to fan out south of Rostov, secure the Black Sea coast and capture the oilfields at Maikop and Grozny. At the same time the army group would have {o-relinquish all of its artillery and nearly half of the divisions for operations elsewhtere,In the last week of July IDGD. battled to consolidate the bridgehead over the Don, which was secured by taking Susatzki. By the 31st it had advanced to the Manych River, and there was relieved. Reassembling at Raziny in early August, the division began transferred by rail to Smolensk on the 16th. In mid-August the Soviets launched major counter-attacks in the Rzhev area, west of Moscow, and GD was ordered to move north to meet the threat. South of Rzhev the division made ‘amp, detailed as army reserve for Ninth Army, until 9 September. The next day it was plunged into one of the most savage battles yet fought on the Eastern Front, meeting a Soviet advance south of the Rzhev railroad at Ssuchtino, Tschermassovo, Vekschino and Michoyevo, which dragged on into early October at heavy cost. On 1 October the divisional infantry regiments were renamed, in accordance with the restructuring program detailed above. The Ist Regiment became Grenadiet-Regiment Grossdeutschland and the 2nd became Fisilier-Regiment Grossdeutschland, (See organisation table on page 29.) After the bitter fighting south of Rzhev, the division was relieved on 9 October and transferred to the rest area around Olenino. Here it stayed until 25 November, during which time a ski battalion was organised for the division. During the summer of 1942 the Red Army carried through a reorganisation of its command system, and built up overwhelming strength. On 19 November the Russians launched their second winter offensive, which aimed primarily at relieving the siege at Stalingrad. Attacking north and south of the city, they encircled the German Sixth Army and half of the Fourth Panzer Army. While the main actions of the winter were fought in the south, bitter fighting also ensued on the northern sector. Attacks on the German Ninth Army, which was stretched over a 60-mile front from Rzhev to Byeloy west of Moscow, resumed in late November. In the sector held by Grenadier-Regiment GD, in the Lutschessa Valley, the Soviet 185th Division attacked in force south of Griva on 27 November, and made major inroads via Karskaya and Gontscharova. South of Byeloy, the Fisilier-Regiment GD (Kampfgruppe Kassnitz) met and held the left flank of the Soviet 35th Tank Brigade where it broke through the line at Turovo. In the centre and on the right flank the Soviets broke through at Dubrovka arid Demechi, and the regiment suffered heavy casualties trying to contain the advance. In the Lutschessa Valley, fierce fighting continued throughout the first week of December, as the German XXIII Army Corps battled to contain the Soviet drive. By the middle of the month, the battle had begun to-ease and the front stabilised. shove: Panzer and Panzengenadies ho heels of te eteating 94Above right: Westy snow camoutig a nk Seer bse sooner tres ad ‘hone Soviet tank ming inthe mile dan Blow ight: In the mete dap snow which makes the ost inte East almost mentale during the sinter mont, skis and sooashoes were sent ut stort sup Regrouping its scattered units, the GD staff was able to count the very heavy cost of the fighting. Rushed in to stop up the breach by the High Command, which had begun to have unrealistic expectations of Grassdeutschiands capabilities, the division had been almost decimated, The lull in fighting was thus something of a blessing, but it was only a brief respite. On 21 December a counter-attack was mounted with the 12th Panzer, followed by another on the 30th. During 1942 Grossdeutschland lost some 10,000-12,000 of its soldiers, and twice, during February and December, came close to collapse. All that remained of the proud unit was a hard core of veterans, and the knowledge that yet more was to come. 1943: THE LONG RETREAT During the winter of 1942-43 the tide of the war began to turn against Germany, which now found itself contending on all fronts with an enemy better led, well supplied and with a vastly greater capacity to replace losses of men and materiel. Increasingly, the German Army on the Eastern Front was engaged in defensive action, and Grossdeutschland was time and again called on to reinforce weak points in the German lines. Furthermore, by now the best Russian aircraft and ‘tanks had achieved a parity with German equipment, which in the coming battles would test the German forces to the limit. On 14 January, with nearly 300,000 Germans stil trapped in the Stalingrad pocket, the Russians moved up the Don for the second time, this time to strike the Hungarian Second Army. The Hungarians soon collapsed, opening a 200-mile front between Voronezh and Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad). They then turned southwards to the Donets, threatening to envelop the remnants of Army Group B and Army Group Don, which was still battling to keep open Army Group A's lifeline to the west at Rostov. Having stabilised the front at Rzhev, GD marched south to Smolensk, from where, on 17 January, it travelled by rail to the Volchansk area between Byelgorod and Kharkov. At this time the motorcycle units were reorganised as the Aufklarungs-Abteilung (Reconnaissance Group), and IV. Artillerie-Abtellung Grossdeutschland was formed at Guben in Germany. Between 21 January and.8 February, GD fought in the Volchansk battles between the Oskol and the upper Donets River east of Byelgorod. On 25 January the Russians struck northward once more to hit the German Second Army, which was already withdrawing from Voronezh, and in three days encircled two of its three corps. Holding positions to the north and south of Volchansk respectively, the Fiisilier Regiment (Kampfgruppe Kassnitz) and Grenadier-Regiment (Kampfgruppe Paaten) struggled to contain the Soviet advance but were slowly pushed back. On 3 February the lead elements of Kampfgruppe Pohimann of the, Fihrer Escort Battalion were returned to the division, and engaged at Ssurkovo north-east of Volctansk. Stalingrad was taken by the Russians on 2 February, and Byelgorod on the 8th. ‘As the Soviet offensive gathered pace, the right flank of Army Group B was forced to withdraw. Between 9 and 14 February GD was involved in the fighting along the Byelgorod-Kharkov railroad, one of the vital communications links to Army Group Don and Armiy Group A. After the evacuation of Kharkov on the 15th, 2 100-mile gap opened between the right flank of Army Group B and Army Group Don, through which Soviet units struck southward and westward across the Donets, 32moving to cut the remaining communications lines. Between the 16th and 23rd, GD fought to keep the Kharkov-Poltava fine open. However, to the south the ‘Donetsk railroad was cut and on the 19th the Soviets had reached the Sinelnikovo railroad junction 20 miles east-south-east of Dneperopetrovsk. On 24 February GD was relieved and travelled to a rest area some 18 miles west of Poltava. Here it was rested and [Link] newly formed 4th Artillery Battalion arrived, and so, too, the first, detachment of Tiger | tanks. In the meantime, General Manstein had initiated tmoves to close the gap in the German line, and made preparations for counter-attack against Kharkov, despite the inherent risks of advancing nthe spring thaw. GD marched to its starting point for the attack on 5 March; and from the 7th fought through knee-deep cloying mud toward Bogodukov, which fell four days later. The Fourth Panzer Army reached Kharkov on the 11th, trapping several Soviet divisions. After mopping up these sions, the army took its advance 30 miles farther north and took Byelgorod, and thus regained the line of the Donets to that point. GD, which helped capture Tomarovka to the north of Kharkov on the 19th, was relieved on the 23rd and transferred back to the rest area near Poltava, where further reinforcement arrived in the form of new infantry fighting vehicles (which were in constant short supply). From March to June the division was held in reserve. In the past two years, the coming of: spring had heralded new German triumphs, but although the victory on the Donets that had ended the long winter retreat had done much to restore Gérman morale, no German commander believed that the next summer would sé significant gains. The late spring, of 1943 on the Eastern Front was quiet, affording Grossdeutschland time for welcome rest. On 25 April, lements of the division were telow: tn ingenious inpronisabollet cxmplee wid) Wansferred to the Akhtyrka area on the Vorskla River; at the beginning of May Ill sovking chine enblesthecew mentes ofthis Abtellung, Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland was raised at Paderborn in Gerinany ve llliodo aso laundering in borweace and equipped with Tiger tanks.DEVELOPMENT OF THE PANZERGRENADIER From their inception, motorised infantry were a key element in the concept of armoured mobile warfare. They were required not only to accompany the Panzers over difficult terrain into-action, but also provide both supportive fire power and safety against enemy infantry and anti-tank units while moving under the cover of purposed designed Schittzen-Panzerwagen (SPW or rifiemen’s armoured - vehicles). The fist experimental Panzer division was founded in 1934, and ilided a Schtzen-Brigade ‘ile brigade), one leichte Schitzen-Regiment (ight rifle regiment) and one Kradeschitzen-Battaillon (motorcycle rifle battalion) These motorised infantry units were tasked with supporting the two Panzer regiments within the Panzer division. Transportation was by both lorry and motorcycle, partly because the Wehrmacht did not have suitable armoured transport vehicles at that time. Independent motorised infaftry units came into being in 1937, when four Infanterie-Divisions (miot) were reorganised from standard Infanterie-Divisions. The second expansion of motorised infantry divisions took place after the French campaign-AC that time eight motorised infantry divisions were formed, two of them later reorganised as Panzer divisions. Other motorised infantry units came ‘from the elite troops of both Heer and Waffen-SS, namely Infanterie-Division (mot) Grossdeutschland, and SS-Divisions (mot) Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, DAS ey. eryenasen onthe ve The vt Reich, Totenkopf and Wiking during 1941-42, All of these wer€ reorganised 85 — [Link] the hx an! ie dist ae Panzergrenadier divisions in late 1942 and finally became Panzer dvsions FAIRE ducing the somer months kr but 1943. difficult to survive and fight as during the mud-caked The fighting in North Africa and Russia took a heavy toll on the motorised stun an he won wines months infantry divisions and Panzer divisions, and they were rebuilt in 1943. In June most of the motorised infantry divisions were renamed as Panzergrenadier divisions and reorganised as Type 43 Panzergrenadier divisions in September. During 1943-44 several Panzergrenadier divisions were raised by the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe also raised its own Panzergrenadier division. “Pim late 1944 Panzer-Brigades were created to try to stem the “collapse of the Russian Front; these were also occasionally _ known as Panzer-Grenadier-Brigades. In fact they were a:>% ‘combination of both Panzer and Panzergrenadier arms underthe | same command, and became the model of the Type 48 Panzer- Division created (theoretically at least) in the_last period of war. The Panzergrenadier divisions underwent final re~ organisation in 1945 when units of Panzer-Division Grossdeutschland were expanded into four Panzergrenadier divisions. In realty, these were divisions in name only and could be more accurately be described as Kampfgruppen (battle groups). . -° Although it pioneered the concept of infantry mobile “J _itarfare, the German Army was never able to complete fully the formation of Panzergrenadier units, because it was unable to produce enough armoured transport to equip even a proportion of the Panzergrenadier units.SPEARHEAD: GROSSOEUTECHLAND Aone: A pause in the Fighting in the Caveass Pa I cow aks shor break having npensb amnion, fod and wate Belen: The pla for Operation Ztail the chip off esa salient at Kur in a characterise double OPERATION Z/TADELLE (CITADEL) ‘Although the front was now vastly extended and thinly held, Manstein’s new positions offered to the German High Command the opportunity of an attack on the Soviet salient centred on Kursk. Code-named Zitadelfe, the ensuing plan projected converging strikes on the northern and southern flanks of the salient to achieve a double envelopment. However, pre-warned of the German intentions by intelligence sources, General Zhukov was able to fortify the salient heavily. Both sides continued to build up their strength through the late spring and early summer and by the eve of the German attack some 2 million men and over 6,000 tanks were ready to go into action, Grossdeutschland was formally redesignated as a Panzergrenadier division a week prior to the attack, on 23 June, and became almost identical in orgar to one of the:elite SS Panzer divisions. During 1942 all the Army's infantry regiments had been renamed grenadier regiments and in 1943 the Infanterie- Divisions (mot) became Panzer-Grenadier-Divisions. However, the term Panzergrenadier is something of a misnomer, for in fact they were not always ‘armoured’, and would be better described as ‘motorised infantry’. Having been brought up to full strength for Zitadelle, the division began to the ‘march to the staging area north of Tomarovka at the end of June 1943. The attack, launched on 4 July, saw the Ninth Army attack from the north and the Fourth Panzer Army from the south, across the base of the Soviet salient. GD attacked west of Strelazkoye with the 3rd and 11th Panzer Division, and intially made rapid advances. However, in the north the Ninth Army was stopped before a heavily fortified ridgeline on the 9th and the attack broke down, GD having advanced through the heavily deferided Soviet lines as far as Kotschetovka. On 12 July the Russians launched a strong counter-attack against the front north of Orel behind the Ninth Army. In the heavy fighting around Kalinovka, GD 381 x (aot) Bly (6 x Nebelwerfer) Div HQ (mot) Div Mapping Det Lorry Col ey ‘Div Escort Coy GD Panzer Recce Bn MC Platoon 1 Inf Gun Platoon Bn HQ /K/tk Paton 1 x SP Flak Pl “ESP Flak Platoon 1x AC Goy Mixed Palg Platoon 1x thatrack) Reece Coy, [G0 Army Fak Battalion 2 x (wheeled) Recce Coys Bn HQ and Bn Bty 1 xt Panzer Recce Col 3.x GD Hy Flak Coys 2x GD SP med Flak Btys 1 x hy Panzer Recce Coy 1x GD It Fak Bty 1x Pioneer Pt 11 Gnot ft Flak Col A xmeed Fete F 1-60 Feldersatz Bn ; 1 x Palg Ph 6 eal 1 x Inf Support Gun Sect 5 x (mod Coys 1x tent Support PL asc? Passerttoee Ba eer yo) Bn HQ Ho 3rd (mat) Battalions 1x SP Hy Pelg Coy OE ne Woes Cy Saran) ‘1 x (mot) Hy Pzlg Coy ‘1 x (mot) Telephone Coy ee L Lx (mot) Lt Sigs Col 3 x PrGr Coys -GD Sturmgeschitz Bn Sy [GD (mot) Pioneer Bn ‘Lx Hy Coy Bn HQ, HQ Coy and HO-Bty 1 1x Pioneer PI 3 x By af 11 assault guns wee min Piokeer COR eee [—® Araiery Regiment 1 x (mot) Bridging Col 1x Inf Gun Sect Regt HQ 1 x (mot It Pioneer Cot 14 MG Coy 1x HO Bly 1 x armd Proneer Coy.» 4th SP Heavy Battalion 1 x Observation Bty 1 Rieter Boa x SP It Flak PL [supply Troops 1 x SPI Flak Coy Ast Battalion Ho PUK SP nf Gun Coy {iq and HO Bty -st-Sth GD Transport Coys (120t0n) 1x SP Hy Palg Coy [-2 x (mot) 105mm Btys” ~ ‘6th-8th GD Transport Coys (100ton) GD Panzer Regt. {4 x (mot) 150mm Bty GD (mot) Supply Coy RHQ [2nd Battalion” 3 x (mot) Maint Coys ‘st Panzer Battalion PG and SP Ha Bry Ast~dth (mot) GD Maint Coys RHQ and HQ Coy 1-2 x SP It Btys (each 6 x Wespe) | —1 * Maint Supply Sect Flak Tank PI “1x SP hy Bty (6x Hummel) [Admin Services ‘4x Panzer Pls (Panthers) | ra Battalion 1 xDWv Admin Offce \ Hid and (mot) HQ Bty 1 (mot) Butcher Coy? RHO and HO Coy 11 x (mot) 150mm Bty 1x (mot) Bakery Coy [Flak Tank PL L 11x (tot) Fd Post Office i Panzer Pls (PzKpfwiVs) 1 x (mot) 105mm Bty A | 41x (mot) 100mm Bry 1x MP Coy RQ and HO Coy Ath Battalion i Medical 3 x Panzer Pls (Tigers) [aru ena oc RORY 3 x Ambulance Cols 311th (FKL) Panzer Coy (assigned) j-2x (mot) 105mm Btys L x (mot) Med Coys 2 x (mot) Med Coys,Below: Operation Zac was disse forthe German foes in Russa. fer experding men and tanks on the Rusian defences, all svllowed up quickly asthe Russ couertackel SPEARNEAD: GROSSUEUISCHLAND took heavy casualties, countering a series of Soviet armoured attacks in the second week of July. On the 17th, the division was relieved and transferred to Tamnoye to the south of the Kursk battlefield, by which point Hitler had been forced to concede defeat. Four days later GD moved again, by truck and rail, to the vicinity of Karachev, where it had fought the previous year, and was assigned to Army Group Centre. Here it resisted the Russian advance from Bolkhov, until in early August a strong Russian attack in the south caused GD to be rushed south to join Army Group South at Akhtyrka on the Vorskla River, where the newly organised Tiger battalion joined the division..A fighting retreat along the central front continued through mid-August. The Russians had torn a 35-mile gap in the German line at Byelgorod, and through this they poured, heading south-west toward the Dnieper River. In their path, in positions to the east of Akhtyrka at Yankovka, Staraya Ryabina, Novaya Rabina and Yablotschnoye, Panzer-Grenadier-Division Grossdeutschland was slowly pushed back and by the 11th the men were fighting ‘on the outskirts of Akhtyrka. At Akntyrka, and positions to the south-east, GD battled hard, and for days with no rest, to counter the breakthrough. Kharkov fell on 23 August, and in the last week of August the Army Group Centre front was penetrated in three places by Malinovsky's forces and Tolbukhin’s: Southern Front, threatening an envelopment of Army Group South. Against Hitler's orders Manstein ordered Army Group South to ‘withdraw to the Dnieper, and in so doing probably saved it. Reassigned to the XLVII Panzer Corps, GD was tasked in the first two weeks of September with reinforcing the weak points in the German line to the west of Kharkov and north of Poltava. As part of the ‘general withdrawal, the division then began a skillful fighting retreat to Kremenchug, and the vital rail bridge there over the Dnieper. Fighting behind a progressively shorter line, the division had withdrawn into a pocket around the bridge by the 29th, and then began a general withdrawal over the river (among the last German troops to do so). GD was now in a tenuous defensive position behind the Dnieper River, the strongest natural defensive line in western European Russia (but over which the Russian had five bridgeheads). In two and a half months Army Group Centre and South’ fad been forced back for an average of 150 miles on a front 650 miles long. In so doing, the Germans had lost the most valuable territory they had taken in the Soviet Union. In the first week of October, the Eastern Front was relatively quiet as the Russians regrouped and brought up new forces. Their numerical superiority allowed them to rest and refit their units in shifts, and they reached the Dnieper with their offensive capability largely intact.Grossdeutschland, by contrast, had little time for rest. Reforming as separate detachments, the division was engaged in defensive battles for the first two weeks of October around the Russian-held Michurin-Rog bridgehead south of Kremenchung in support of the First and Eighth Panzer Armies. The Russians threw the full weight of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts against these two armies on 15 October, and opened 2 200-mile-wide bridgehead between Cherkassy and Zaporozhe, while to the south the Third Ukrainian Front threatened important iron and manganese mining areas near Krivot Rog and Nikopol. Hitler was determined to hold these at all costs. Inthe first week of November, Kiev was retaken by the First Ukrainian Front, and the Fourth-Panzer Army was pushed back west and south of the city, thweatening to destroy the entire left flank of Army Group South, along which Grossdeutschland was ranged. Beginning in the middle of October, the division ‘arried out a long and difficult retreat south and by the end of November was established on a line that stretched from Sofiyevka to Alexandrovka; to the east of Krivoi Rog. December brought some respite, and the German forces were able to regain some of their balance. The best solution to the German predicament at this stage would have been to order Army Group South to withdraw to the next major line of defence, the Bug River, but this Hitler would not consider. Instead the armies were told to hold their positions for the winter, and informed that they would have to do so without extra resources since these were needed for defence against the expected invasion of north-west Europe. In the third winter of the Russian campaign, the men of Grassdeutschfond could reflect on a year in which they had received little or no rest, and had time and again been used to reinforce weak points in the German lines. Higher than average losses, many of them from the experienced core of veterans, were made good with new recruits, and despite the serious deterioration on all fronts during 1943, the division was able to keep its cohesion at a time when serious manpower shortages were forcing the Germans to field half strength divisions. Above: The orginal capo Thee Gena “Tse ‘err four enemies This These st gms cea th incomparable nay Easier Front around Leni nth batheBelow: Russa advan in the late part 13 sa the Germans Ise round exer inte Utaie 194 would be fon, hard struggle for de men of Groseentchland. 1944: THE BEGINNING OF THE END ‘On Christmas Eve 1943, on the southern flank of the German line, the First Ukrainian Front drove into the southern rim of the Fourth Panzer Army's positions around Kiev, and the next day it developed a second thrust west. Both threatened the envelopment of Army Groups South and A, but Manstein considered the southern thrust the greater danger, and ordered the Fourth Panzer Army to stop the Soviet armies from advancing south, Grossdeutschland was soon in the thick of the action. Relieved at Krivoi Rog on 3 January, the unit was transferred to Kirovgrad in the path of the Soviet forces. Beginning from here it fought a continuing series of retreating defensive engagements until March, The First Ukrainian Front was approaching Uman by mid-January, but Hitler's insistence ‘on holding the mines near Nikopol and Krivoi Rog meant that by the end of the month the Sixth Army had nearly been encircled. Also in mid-January, the Ist Battalion, 26th Panzer Regiment, equipped with Panther tanks, joined Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland. Later in the month, Generalleutnant Hoernlein, known affectionately by his ‘troops as Papa’, ceded command to the experienced Generalleutnant Manteutfel. Between 27 January and 8 February a large part of the newly-reinforced Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland was transferred to the Cherkassy area, where Zhukov’s First and Second Ukrainian Fronts had encircled two German corps. Together with most of Army Group South’s tank strength, the unit succeeded in breaking half the trapped corps out on 17 February. Another element of the division, Kampfgruppe Bohrend, went to the Narva front on 5 February. During early February the right flank of Army Group South was driven behind the 1939 Polish border nearly to Kovel. At the end of the month Army Groups South and A held a weak but almost continuous line about halfway between the Dnieper and the Bug. In mid-February, with Army Group North retiring behind a fortified tine (the Panther Line) and Army Groups South and A in comparatively stable positions, optimists in the German High Aryanak Front SNS 3 Coot SoaksLa Stetfighing jn the Russian winter Command assumed that they had seen another winter through, and that, as in previous years, with the onset of spring, the front would sink into the mud for a month or so. The ter of 1943-44 was unusually warm and wet and therefore muddy, but even this did not prevent the Russians (whose own armour and transport, and that gifted by their Allies, were better able to move in mud) from advancing on all fronts During February the Soviet High Command shifted five of its six tank armies to the area opposite Army Group South, and by the end of the month another had appeared. On 4 March the First, Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts attacked the northern, central and southern flanks of Army Group South. Grossdeutschland, in positions west of Kirovgrad, met the onslaught of the Second Ukrainiaty Front, aimed at the centre of the Eighth Army east of Uman. Again the division was used to reinforce weak areas of the line, but by 15th had retreated south-west to Rovnoye.‘The lack of manpower with which to meet the advance was a telling factor. So it was on all fronts. In Germany, measures were being taken to resolve the manpower crisis, but they were desperate and shortsighted. At the beginning of March, from the reinforcement forces of GD at Cottbus and Guben a Replacement Grenadier Regiment (mot) 1029 GD was raised. On 9 March, as the division withdrew under fire to the bend in the Bug River, Regiment 1029 GD transferred to Zakopane, and ten days later participated ithe occupation of Hungary. n 16 March the main body ofthe division began withdrawing all the way back to the Dniester River, via Pervomaisk, Ananjew,Voljadinka, and Rybniza, By the end of the month it had retreated into Romania, at Chisinau and Regiment 1029 GD was occupying Carpathian Mountain passes on the Hungarian-Romanian border at Kimpolung. The Soviets were now across the Prut River, having gained 165 miles ‘on the three main thrust lines, and the German front was backed up against the Carpathians. During early April, the Fourth Ukrainian Front launched an attack on the Crimea, trapping the German Seventeenth Army and forcing it into a small beachhead around Sevastopol. Despite these reversals, Germany was still far from beaten; Hitler had succeeded in his determination not to weaken the western defences for the sake of the east, German industrial output was still rising and tank and weapon production were sufficient to equip new divisions for the west and replace some of the losses in the east. ‘On the Carpathian front, Grossdeutschland tought detensive battles both east and west of Jassy in early April, during a gradual retreat to Targul Frumos in Bessarabia. The bitter fighting for the town continued for aver a month, after which Below: Tank rane platoon in ain, To the front settled down to a period of relative quiet. During the respite, the ‘Hanornags attempt to pull Hed SP. gun fro Ist Battalion, Panzer-Fiisilier-Regiment Grossdeutschland returned to Germany to weit hone suc in them, 26)use 194, equip with SPWs, and the armoured reconnaissance unit was also re-equipped. At Abe nl Jn vty), Junkesjs2/3m anger itera onthe same time, however, fusilier regiments were reduced to three Battalions instead shove: june 194, «hap of four and each battalion was reduced from five companies to four. 182 Stalin tk the m yy snap in rot ofa baring wo knocked At the beginning of June 1944, the Fihrer Escort Battalion was reinforced to _"lvos inspring M4, reat 400 of thew regimental strength in East Prussia, and the main body of Grossdeutschland '* transferred to an area north of Podul on the Dniester. Here the division, reinforced ‘on the 6th by returning elements of the Fisilier-Regiment, launched a counter- attack against Soviet forces. As it did so, the Allies launched Operation Overlord, the invasion of Northwest Europe. Ist Battalion, Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland, in France converting to Panther tanks, was quickly thrown into the fighting around the Normandy beachhead. After the fighting around Podul, the division moved to a rest area some 60 miles south of Jassy. The Fisiier-Regiment, freshly equipped with SPWs rejoined the division, and the Armoured Assault Engineer Battalion was reformed as an Armoured Assault Regiment. The short-lived Regiment 1029 was broken up and its men used to fill gaps in the ranks of other units of the division. After more than a ‘month in the rear, the division was transferred in fate July from Romania to East Prussia, to the area around Gumbinnen, During the rest period, an attempt was made on Hitler’s life by senior army officers. Seizing control of Berlin and its government quarter remained the pivotal goal of the conspirators and the immediate focal point of Operation Valkyrie. To accomplish the coup in Berlin, the army conspirators planned to use the troops of the Grossdeutschland Guard Battalion in Berlin, commanded by Otto Remer, and the personnel ofthe Infantry School in Daberitz, the Artillery School in Krampnitz, and Potsdam’s 23rd Infantry. All SS and Gestapo offices in central Berlin, and KGinigswusterhausen radio station were top priority targets that were to be seized inthe first hours of the intended coup. However, Remer stayed loyal to Hitler and, when it became known that the Filrer had survived the bomb blast, the coup collapsed. m-armel mont St Wa ve,Right Onginl Gen fies ese eartion The Maser The telephone wis have been dso the di is ing used hy the anil er wg Kportant tthe theft message to the next setoe The ell "Mesen gre” goes ‘out the next monn hes stan company commander to seve the val ane. He ems what sat stake. Iason eins ft ‘Great War the Runner from teal unit splashes through deep mud water athe bacon fa tench Below: Russian advances in summer 194 HUNGARY SPEARHEAD: GHOSSDEUISCHLAND Hitler and his staff fully expected that the Russians would renew their pressure ‘on the southern flank and attempt to smash Army Group North Ukraine against the Carpathians. To meet this expected advance he transferred 80 per cent of Army Group Centre's armour to the south. Instead, the Russians struck north, at Army Group Centre, which held the last major stretch of Soviet territory left in German hands between Vitebsk and Orsha. Between 22 and 25 June they made deep penetrations across the whole front, and in less:than two weeks 25 of the 38 Army Group Centre divisions were lost. In July, the Soviet offensive sptead to the flanks. In the north the First Baltic Front drove into the gap between Army Groups Centre and North toward East Prussia and the Baltic. On 29 July one of the Soviet spearheads reached the Baltic west of Riga and cut off Army Group North. On the southern flank of Army Group Centre, a two-pronged thrust aimed toward Brest-Litovsk carried the Soviets to Lublin and Warsaw. Only in August did the Soviet offensive subside, having outrun its supply lines. In early August GD began an attack east from Gumbinnen toward the vicinity of Wilkowischken (Wolfsburg) and Virballen, to take the initiative while the Soviet forces rested. The attack was a success, and Wilkowischen was taken. Soon, a new crisis arose in Lithuania, and the division marched to the area west of Schaulen (Siaulial) via Tauroggen, Kraziai, Kolainiai, and Luoke, for an attack to the east to Prevent Soviet forces breaking through to the Baltic and cutting off the Kurland Front. On the 18th desperate battles to keep open this narrow land corridor to ‘Army Group North began. Four days later, Grossdeutschland marched north and prepared for an attack towards Tukums, but this was halted on 25 August. on the Lithuanian-Latvian border outside Doblen. After consolidating, the division then constructed defensive positions around Doblen, where it remained for the duration of September and into October. At the beginning of September, Generalleutnant —Manteuffel__ was replaced by Oberst Lorenz, commander of the Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment GD, and a month later the Guard Battalion in Berlin was expanded to regimental size. Already, Army Group North had been forced to retreat to avoid being cut to pieces by an assault by the three Baltic fronts, and at the end of September had barely succeeded in escaping through the corridor south of reve en er Ml, RatRight: Grosedeashled Tigers on the mata is Romania, May 1944, Below: The Rus istice continues ot entra unpe SPCARHEAD: GROSSDEUTECHLAND Riga that GD had fought to keep open. On 3 October parts of the division began transferring to the area west of Schaulen to meet the westward drive by the First Baltic Front. In the hard fought battles around Schaulen and Memel (Klaipeda) on the Baltic coast GD fought hard, but could do nothing to prevent the Russians from breaking through to the Baltic south of Memel on the 10th, cutting Army Group North off again in the Kurland. Around Memel, GD threw up a strong defensive Perimeter that it was ordered to hold for more'than a month, while the rest of the army group was evacuated from the port. Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland, attached to the 6th Panzer Division, was in action during the second week of October in the Rozan area of Poland During the summer and autumn the German position on all fronts had become increasingly desperate. On the Eastern Front, the focus of the Soviet summer offensive had swung back to the Balkans in mid-August, succeeded in retaking the vital Ploesti oilfields at the end of the month, and ended when Romania and Bulgaria capitulated. Finally, in October Belgrade was retaken. At the same time Allied troops were pushing the Germans steadily back through north-west Europe and Italy. Launching his last major offensive of the war against the Ardennes sector ‘on the Western Front in December, Hitler failed in his plan to split the Allied armies and in the west began the retreat to the Fatherland, (For an account of the Fihrer Escort Brigade's participation in the Ardennes (Offensive see below.) ZED tons Poca= PANZER CORPS GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as at December 1944 Corps Staff 500th (mot) Mapping Det 500th (mot) MP Det 500th Recce Coy 500th (mot) Sound Ranging P| 500th Escort Coy 500th Arty Bde Staff 500th (mot) Pioneer Reat Staff Corps Troops Fusiller’ Regt GD (2 x Bns and 1x Inf Gun Coy) Heavy Panzer Bn GD (HQ and HQ Coy, PANZER KORPS GROSSDEU’ In early November 1944 the OKH began reorganising Panzer-Grenadi 1 x SP Flak PL, 3 x Tiger Coys, 1 x Maint Coy, 1 x Supply Coy) 500th Arty Regt (2 x Bns each of HQ and HQ Bly, 3 x (mot) Hy Btys) 500th Pz Pioneer Bn (HQ and HQ Coy, 3 x (mot) Pioneer Coys, 2 x (mot) Pz. Bridging Cols) ‘44th Pz Sigs Bn (1 x Pz radio Coy, 1 x (mot) Sigs Coy, 2 x (mot) Telephone Coys, 1 x (mot) Sigs ‘Supply Coy) Pr Feldersatz Regt GD (2 x Bns-each with 4 x Coys) TSCHLAND vision GD as Panzer-Korps GD by combining the division with the Panzer-Grenadier- Division Brandenburg (BR) and other units. It should be noted, however, that the Panzer-Korps GD never fought as a single unit, and its material strength was never comparable to that of a pre-1943 army corps. In mid-November, the division was still holding its defensive positions around the Memnel bridgehead. Ist Battalion, Panzer Regiment GD rejoined the division and 1st Battalion, Panzer Regiment 26, which had fought with GD while the former was in France, transferred to Hungary to fight attacks by the Second: anid Third Ukrainian Fronts against Budapest. On the 26th, the final evacuation of Memel began and GD was moved via boat through Kénigsberg (Kaliningrad) into the area around Rastenburg-Sensburg, to join the newly organised Panzer-Korps GD. Pz Corps Support Troops (Supply Bn, Ordnance Bn, MotorVehicle Maint Bn, Admin Troops Bn, 500th Med Bn, 500th (mot) Field Post office) Fighting Troops GD Panzergrenadier Division (inc PrRegt 1 of 3 Coys of 17 Panthers, PzReat 2 of 4 Coys of 17 PrKpfwiVs) and Hy Pz Bn with Tigers. BR Panzergrenadier Division 18th Arty DivisionBy the end of 1944, Germany's defeat had become inevitable. Throughout the year German forces had been almost continually on the defensive and now were ‘fighting on home soil. GD had paid heavily in these defensive battles, and shortages in men and equipment were no longer made good. As an armoured corps, the main unit was continually pushed into the worst fighting, resulting in heavy casualties. Furthermore, the Training and Replacement Brigade had been vastly overburdened by the losses, and by the creation of the Fuhirér-Begleit-Brigade and the Fibrer- Grenadier-Brigade, and as a result had virtually collapsed. To allay this crisis, the Training and Replacement, Regiments of the Panzer-Grenadier-Division Brandenburg were attached to GD. At the end of December of the fourth winter on the Eastern Front, Grossdeutschiand was in camp near Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg, resting and re-equipping for the defence of the Fatherland. 1945: THE FINAL ACT In the first week of the new year, the division and the corps staff GD moved to the Willenberg area, where it was assigned as OKH reserve. On the 12th, Panzer- Grenadier Division Brandenburg (commanded by Generalmajor Schulte-Heuthaus) was ordered to transfer to Lodz and along with the Luftwaffe Parachute Panzer Division Hermann Gdring was placed, under the command of the corps staff Grossdeutschland, and Its commayider General der Panzertruppe Saucken. The final Soviet offensive of the war was launched on 12 January, with the bulk of the effort concentrated against the northern front, towards East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania. Soviet leaders hoped that early and deep penetrations could then be exploited by a drive across Poland to the Oder River. From the 15th to the 30th, How: Fatigne apparent on theif tse tnxps GD fought a series of defensive actions in northern Poland, but could not contain ae tated fer phd of susaled fighting the advance of the Second and Third White Russian Fronts, driving west fromWw actiow Ebenrode and north-west of Warsaw, and was forced to retreat north into an area south of Kénigsberg in East Prussia. Above: Troops wal camouflage! sis-burele, Neteverrrack-auncher Orig nbd During the same period, the Brandenburg Division was transferred to the » (isthenave) te [a Melee on Lodz-Piotrkov area in Poland to meet the First White Russian Front advancing ”*!*vls!cuisgenas thea yesion south of Warsaw, but to avoid being encircled by the two arms of the attack, began retreating west Out of its positions to the Neisse River north of Gorlitz. Then began a complex and ultimately fruitless period of reorganisation, as successive Panzer-Korps Grossdeutschland units were expanded. On 20 January the ‘Army Tank Destroyer Force GD was formed by Panzergrenadier Replacement Brigade GD in Cottbus, and went into action on the Oder River at Steinau. The Fiihrer-Grenadier-Brigade was transferred to a rest centre’ south of Arzfeld after months of heavy fighting. On 26 January Panzer-Grenadiet Division Kurmark (KMK) was formed from various Kampfgruppen and extemporised units of the GD Replacement Brigade (for a full account of this unit’s history see below), and on the 30th the OKH ordered the Fihrer-Begleit-Brigade and Fibrer-Grenadier- Brigade expanded to full Panzer divisions, these becoming Fiihret-Begleit-Division (FBD) and Fihrer-Grenadier-Division (FGD) respectively. At the end of January Grossdeutschland was engaged in heavy fighting in East Prussia, where it had retreated in the face of the Russian steamroller to positions around ‘Bischofsburg and Braunswalde. In early May, the Guard Regiment Grossdeutschland became the Field Guard Regiment Grossdeutschiand and went into action near Kustrin, while the FGD (newly refitted at Koblenz) and FBD were transferred to Stargard and Freienwalde respectively for an attack on Stargard. This was launched on 12 February, but lacking the strength that the units’ spurious divisional status suggested, it was only successful in stabilising the front and captured little territory.SPEARHEAD: GROSSDEUISEMLAND On the 12th, in recognition of the growing crisis on the Eastern Front, the ‘Emergency’ Brigade GD was organised at Cottbus from the GD Replacement Brigade. (It subsequently went into action at Forst on the Oder River, and was taken over by the Brandenburg Division on 10 March.) The Oder was the last natural line of defence before Berlin, but by 3 February, the First White Russian Front was on the river only'35 miles east of Germany's ‘pital. To the south, the First Ukrainian Front-began attacking across the Oder north of Breslau (Wrodaw) on 8 February-What was left of the GD replacement units stationed at Guben near Gérlitz were then thrown into the battles between Forst and the Czech borden area, as the Panzer-Korps Grossdeutschland fought to contain the advance of the First Ukrainian Front to the Nelsse River. Through January and February, the Grossdeutschland Grenadier and Fusilier Regiments were slowly pushed back into a defensive pocket on the Fritsches Haff (Bay). By the end of March only 4,000 men remained, and on the 29th the survivors were evacuated from the port of Balga to Pillau by ferry, almost immediately going into combat in the Samland. Further south, inthe last week of February, through March and into the second week of April, desperate defensive battles were fought by the Brandenburg Division on the Neisse River between Muskau and Steinbach, In late March, the GD replacement nits not engaged in combat were transferred to Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. In early March, the action on the Neisse slackened, and the focus of action transferred to the south in front of Hungary. On 10 March both FGD and FBD were again relieved and transferred, to Above Dasigayase in thefighing thecrevota -ANgeTMUinde and Langenoels respectively. On 15 March FGD went back into =i aa combat near Stettin (Szczecin) on the Oder. In a final flurry of reorganisation, the Panzergrenadier Combat Force Grossdeutschiand was formed from the GD replacement forces in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein on 23 March. PGD Kurmark, which had been fighting on the Below ight Tao Tigers peor. Oder north of Frankfurt since the end of February, was relieved and sent to rest stack Ths photo behind the front lines on 28 March. the tut rot and front The Russians regrouped on the Oder-Neisse line in April, the Second White sachin gun, ver ssscinsvewingsit ad ssian Front in the north, the First White Russian in the centre opposite Berlin smoke dsr eter ile fhe ture and the First Ukrainian Front (under Konev) in the south. This last force faced the core of GD and BR across the Neisse on the night of 15 April. The attack fell on the 16th, and in the south the division could not prevent a breakthrough by the vastly ‘numerically superior Soviet armies on the first day. In early April, both the FGD and FBD were transferred to Vienna, Austria. The newly created Panzergrenadier Combat Force GD entered combat at Lingen on the Ems River and was later absorbed by the 15th Panzergrenadier Division, Although it was clear to all by mid-April that the war had now become little more than a pointless personal crusade by the Fiihrer, the divisions continued:to fight on. In the last two weeks of the month Kurmark engaged in, very heavy defensive fighting between the Oder and Halbe, and the few remnants of GD were largely destroyed or dispersed in heavy retreating battles at Pillau. The last survivors of GD were able to cross the Hela peninsula and from there go via Bornholm to Schleswig-Holstein. FBD was destroyed in battles east of, and in the area of Spremberg, although some survivors were able to make It back to Panzer- Korps GD 4 BR and [Link] were engaged in heavy, costly defensive fighting and retreat between the Neisse River and Dresden. On 1 May BR was transferred to the Oimutz area, from where it fought to escape encirclement between the 3rd and 9th Aone right: The Russians surroue Bin, 54Army lair unit—rwin 37 gunsshow: Too croihing in Right 6 to Deutschbrod. In the battle for Berlin between 19 April and 5 May the Guard Regiment GD was all but wiped out. On the 7th Germany signed an unconditional surrender at Reims, repeating the process on the 9th in Berlin. Some 2,000,000 German soldiers passed into Soviet captivity, including most of Panzer-Korps Grossdeutschland and all of FGD (which was turned over under agreement after surrendering to the Americans). Those that survived Soviet captivity only returned years later. THE PANZER DIVISION? KURMARK’ In January 1945 following the massive Soviet offensive on the Vistula, Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps, along with other units from Hungary and the Western Front were ordered to bolster up the section of front in the vicinity of Fourth Panzer Army. The Soviet Army was now advancing on the Oder and such was the speed of the advance that, having raced across the Vistula it had broken the German front line in several places. XI and XXIV Panzer Corps were sent to restore some semblance of order to the German front but the Soviets launched a strong counterattack on the German forces and surrounded XXIV Panzer Corps. cutting it off in a pocket. Grossdeutschland was sent to rescue the trapped units, but the front around them was crumbling. In response, the OKH was prompted to created some large Kampfaruppen to provide greater flexibility in defence. One of these new battle ‘groups, Kampfgruppe Langkeit under the command of Oberst Willi Langkeit, was formed on 3 February’1945 and was made up from the Corps Panzergrenadier Replacement Brigade which was almost at full strength and Alarm Group ‘Schmeltzer. It was organised as a Type 44 Panzergrenadier Division, with its Panzergrenadier battalions organised on the 1945 model, with three self-propelled gun companies equipped with Jagdpanzer 38s and one company with Pz Mk IVs. The artillery battalion was organised from the 3rd Battalion, 184th (mot) Artillery Regiment. The Panzergrenadier regiment apparently had only a staff, a staff company, and two Panzergrenadier battalions. The order of 4 February 1945 gave the division an authorised strength of 4,559 men including 128 Hiwis. They were sent into action on 27 January at Stemberg to free the trapped German units, which included SS-Oberfihrer Wilhelm Bittrich’s SS Panzer Corps. On 30 January Langkeit sent in the 2nd Battalion of his Kampfgruppe which, after some heavy fighting aroufid Pinnow, made contact with the SS troops, joining up with them as they retreated towards Frankfurt. Langkeit’s troops were to defend Reppen which was the position the Soviets were advancing on to outflank the main body of his battle group. When it became evident to Langkeit that the Soviets were about to outflank him and there was no realistic chance of advancing to Sternberg he decided to move towards Reppen in order to reinforce the 2nd Battalion. This journey was hampered by refugees who clogged the roads with carts and other forms of transport and when a Soviet attack met the battle group head on many civilians died in the resulting battle. It was evident that they were almost surrounded and Langkelt ordered a breakout through the nearby woods. Again they met Soviet resistance and even an attack by a squadron of Hans Ulrich Rudel’s tank-busting Stukas did not help matters much. Eventually, on 3 Febrizary, the Soviet line was broken with the aid of tank destroyers of Langkeit’s battle group and men and armour as well as some civilian refugee colurrins poured through the gap, all heading in the direction of Frankfurt. 38PANZERGRENADIER DIVISION KURMARK AS AT 14 FEBRUARY 1945, Div HQ ZA 1 2 |—Kurmark Panzergrenadier Regiment | —KurmariRecce Bn }— Kurmark Panzer Battalion RHQ and HQ Coy L Recce Coy HQ and HQ Coy Sigs PI HQ PL MC PL }—Kurmark Pelr Br | | Pe Flak Pl Palg Pl | Palr Coy | Panzer Platoon Ist (mot) Battalion Bn HQ +—Kurmark Arty Regt |.3 x Panzer Coys (14 StuGs) 1 x (mot) PzGr Supply Coy Ist Battalion [1 x Panzer Coy (10 P2KpfwiVs) [3 x (mot) PzGr Coys | HQ and (mot) HQ Bly [Panzer Maint PI 2x (mot) Heavy Coy “3 x (mot) Btys (mot) Panzer Supply Coy 2nd (mot) Battalion 2nd Battalion — Luftwaffe Flak Br “Bn HQ anid (mot) HQ Bty [<3 -(mnot) Hy Flak Coys “1 (mot) Mixed Flak Bty Bn HQ 1 x (mot) PzGr Supply Coy 3.x (mot) PzGr Coys [2x (mot) Heavy Coy [— Maintenance Platoon. ‘— (mot) Mixed Signals Coy assigned, not present Kurmark Pioneer Bn Bn HQ (mot) Pioneer Supply Coy 2 x (mot) Pioneer CoysSPEARHEAD: GR ossprurach (AND FUHRER BEGLEIT (ESCORT) BRIGADE as at the Battle of the Bulge Expanded to a Brigade in November 1944, the Fiihrer Begleit Brigade’s order of battle was: Bde HQ and HQ:Coy ~ ax Inf PA, 1 x halftrack Flak Pf) Brigade troops (1 x AC Recce Coy, 1 x Sigs Coy, 1 x Flak Coy, 1 x Pioneer Coy, 1 x SP Gun Coy, 1 x SP Pzig Coy) Fibhrer Begleit Panzergrenadier Regiment (HQ Coy, 1 x Pz Fusilier Bn, 1 x (mot) PzGr Bn) 829th Infantry Battalion (B x Rifle Coys, 1 x Hy Coy, 1 x Supply Coy) Fiihrer Begleit Panzer Battalion (HQ 2 x Panther Coys, 1.x Jagdpanther Coy, 1x Paig Coy, 1 x StuG Coy, 1 x Supply Coy, 1 x Maint Coy) 3h Fibrer Begleit Sturmgeschitz Brigade (HQ and HQ Bty, 3 x-StuG Btys of 10 StuGs each) Fibrer Bealeit Regiment (2x Bas‘of Bn HQ and HQ Bty, 3 x halftrack Btys, 1 x/Supply Bty; FB Flak Bn of 3 Btys) Fiiirer Begleit Battle School (HQ and 3 (mot) Coys 2x Ambulance Pls 1 x (mot) Med Coy 1 (mot) Maint Coy 2 xTransport Cols ‘The jaws of the pocket that had been breached were held open by the 2nd Battalion with additional artillery support from artillery units situated in nearby Damm, a suburb of Frankfurt. Part of Kampfgruppe Langkeit remained here while the rest ‘was ordered to cross the River Oder. On 3 February Kampforuppe Langkeit was re- formed with new armoured vehicles including new Panther tanks and was renamed the Panzet-Division Kurmark. The division was deployed on the Oder River where the three advancing Soviet fronts had stalled after over-extending their supply lines and it was Kurmark’s task to deny the Soviets the high ground east of the Oder which they would need to reconnoitre the whole of the Frankfurt sector. This they did and as a result Soviet attacks in this sector were beaten back. It was not until 16 April that the last Soviet AG Fer ahs up pst ready to fe his s¢— Armoured Fis This cose-combat antitank weapon was produce in a numberof Om to 150m andi ‘esiors with rang from massive quantities (around eight million of ll pes from mid-1943 onwards)offensive was launched, and under the massive Soviet onslaught the units protecting Kurmark’s flanks crumbled, resulting in the division being surrounded. All attempts to rescue the trapped division failed. Ninth Army fell back to the River Spree on 21 April with its units dispersed and unable to fight as a cohesive whole. Kurmark was one of these units, by now engaged in heavy combat in the Colpin woods. Halbe was chosen as the point at which a breakout was to be attempted but well positioned pockets of Soviet artillery and armour prevented the planned breakout. The fighting that took place at Halbe was vicious and intense with hand to hand combat as Kurmark desperately tried to break the Soviet ring. The division fought in vain as the Soviets had covered every escape route and at Halbe Kurmark ceased to exist as a fighting unit. Very few survivors made it out and those that did had to battle thelr way to the Elbe where there were American positions near Jerichow. Only 30,000 Germans from an entire army made it to the safety of American captivity. THE FUHRER BEGLEIT DIVISION From 1938 a unit from the Wachregiment Berlin was assigned to guard Hitler and did so untilthe attempt on his life on 20 July 1944. The men for this bodyguard were drawn from the Wachregiment Berlin and then from the Grossdeutschland ii Regiment. They escorted Hitler throughout the Polish campaign and formed the cadre for the Fihrer-Begleit-Battaillon that was created in October 1939. This followed Hitler throughout the campaign in France. In the aftermath a detachment was sent to Hendaye on the Spanish border as a bodyguard for Hitler during his talks with Spain’s General Franco, the remainder staying in Paris to act as official escort for dignitaries. A year later in June 1941, when Hitler moved his HQ to Rastenburg in East Prussia, the Escort Battalion was assigned to guard him there. To gain some: military experience (and credibility) the Kampfgruppe: Nehring was formed, into which men from the Fiihrer Escort Battalion were rotated for three-month periods of front line duty. The crisis that developed on the Eastern Front during the first Russian winter forced the Kampfgruppe to stay at the front, due to the fact it was about the only well equipped reserve available. As a result of this development the Kampfgruppe was increased in size with the addition of a Panzer company, anti-tank company, motor-cycle and flak platoon, as well as signals and other support units. Despite this expansion Kampfaruppe Nehring never fought as, a complete unit under the one command but was split into several small detachments. This resulted in serious losses and it was withdrawn from the front line at the end of March 1942. In the winter offensive of 1942-43 the Soviets drove through Second Army's sector of the front and among the units sent to hold the line were a heavy weapons company, Panzer company and rifle company of the Fihrer Escort Battalion. They performed well, and later at Kharkov nearly the whole of Fuhrer Escort i Battalion was committed to action with the Grassdeutschland Division with a minimal guard being left at the Wolfschanze. The} elon: Sturmschit 40 Aus G asl gun most ith skin fits adic a agp weapons, line-up on 2 dit mad som ser Font awating onder o aha ecerber 1943.Above: The Sun Panaenchinek ecorbatant tank weapan was a copy ofthe Aeica 1 ano, fistscen in Tunisia, Wide range of 150m, as peated by a two-car an proved very fet Right P untion in 1943, rs fom Girasleubsc blend uur dvshon —ave accompany & ler canying an MG during an ation gus 1944 SPLARHEAD: GROSSDCUYSCHLAN! a 1n was finally returned to the Wolfschanze in Rastenburg in April 1943 and ‘rom it the Fihrer-Grenadier Division was later raised. In late 1943 the Soviets opened their third winter offensive. On the Narva Front ‘Army Group North suffered heavy losses and Hitler ordered a Begleit Kampfgruppe to secure the main highway and guard the sea flank from a Soviet seaborne landing. Ths it did successfully, On its return to Rastenburg it was suggested that the battalion be expanded to regimental size and Kept on permanent standby as a type of ‘fire brigade’ to be rushed into, critical spots at the front. The battalion was subsequently sent to Berchtesgaden and expanded to regimental size with additional manpower from Panzergrenadier Replacement Brigade Grossdeutschiand. Following the 20 July ‘Bomb Plot Oberst Remer was appointed field commander of the new regiment with Oberst Streve appointed the HQ commander. On 27 November the Fuhrer Escort Battalion was reinforced t0 armoured brigade status (Fihrer-Beglelt-Brigade—FBB) and transferred from East Prussia into the Eifel, under Oberst Remer and sent west for the Ardennes Offensive. Stationed on the right flank of the Fifth Panzer Army, it was involved in heavy combat with US forces. On 30 January 1945 the regiment was officially upgraded to divisional status and in February was sent to the Oder Front in company with its sister division the Filhrer Grenadier Division. Both were involved in very heavy combat against the Soviet Army and the Fiihrer Escort Division was eventually encircled at Spremburg. After a fierce breakout attempt on 21 April 1945 only a handful of survivors remained. 6INFANTRY DIVISION/PANZER CORPS GROSSDEUTSCHLAND'S RUSSIAN WAR Date 6.42 7A2 8.42 9.42-11.42, 12.42 1.43 2.43 3.43-4.43 5.43 6.43-7.43 8.43 9.43 10.43-12.43 1.44 244 3.44 4.44-5.44 6.44 7.44 8.44-9.44 10.44-12.44 1.45 2.45-3.45 4.45 Corps Reserve NOI Xx Cramer refreshing XXXXVIII Xxill XXXXVIII iil OX ur 1K iil refreshing reserve XXXXIX XXVIIL reorganising Hermann Goring Corps x ‘Army 2nd Army ‘st Pz Army ‘th Army oth Army 9th Army Kempf 4th Pz Army 2nd Pe Army 4th Pz Army Ist Pz Army 6th Army 8th Army 8th Army 8th Army 4th Rumanian Army 3rd Pz Army., 3rd Pz Army OKH 4. Army East Prussia Army Group South South A Centre Centre, 2, Centre “B South South Centre South South South South South South Ukraine South Ukraine ‘South Ukraine Centre Centre North Area Kursk Voronezh ‘Manytsch Rehev Rehev Smolensk Charkow Charkow South Poltava, Karkov Achtyrka, Obojan Bryansk Krementschug Krivoi-Rog Kirovograd Kirovograd Kirovograd Jassy Bacau/Sereth Bacau/Sereth Lithuania Memel Rastenburg Konigsberg, Pillau SamlandSPEARHEAD: GROSSDEUTECH ANDfrom a biming 4 as ase sed on the Pak 3840 pases Hungarian val somevhere in the Upper Opposite page, be enitenching tol ard fk! tlephone— thePANZERGRENADIER DIVISION GROSSDEUTSCHLAND as at December 1944 GD Grenadier Regiment | aeeet nS Aton LMC Platoon st caltrack) Battalion Bn HQ “3 x (halftrack) P2Gr Coys Eee Supply Coy ‘1 x (halftrack) Hy Coy Bo HO 3 x (mot) Coys 2x Hy Coys ‘one with MGs/Flak 20mm, ‘the other mortars wupply Coy. SP Inf Gun Coy (mot) Pioneer Coy HQ (hatttrack) © La x Mattrack Patoons «Sarved with amethrowers, mortars, 20mm and MGs Ist Panzer Battalion Bn HQ and HQ Coy SP Flak Coy (quad 20mm) ‘4 x Panzer Coys (Panthers) mot) Supply Column Hind Panzer Battalion Bn HQ and HQ Coy ‘4 x Panzer Coys (PzKpfwiVs) SP Flak Coy quad 20mm) (mot) Supply Column Pz Maint Coy GD Panzer Recce Bn Bn HQ iz x Sigs Platoon 41x AC Patoon “AC (halftrack) Recce Coy, 2 x (halftrack) Redce’ Coy eer 75mm gun Platoon lortar Platoon loneer Platoon {st Battalion SP Bn HQ and HO Bly 2x SPIt how Biys 6x Wespe 1x P hy how Bty x Hummel => 1x $P Flak Platoon ng Battation (mot) Br HQ and HQ Coy 2x (molt how Biys 1x Flak Platoon rd Battalion (mot) Bn HQ and HO Coy 2x hy how Btys 1x Flak Patoon GD (mot) Mapping Det fo MP Det Div HQ Coy -MC Pratoon MG Platoon ‘Mortar Platoon ‘SP Flak Platoon ao Fusilier Regiment RHQ and HQ Coy ‘Staff Platoon MC Platoon 2 x (mot) Battalions Bn HQ 3 x (mol) Coys. supply Coy 2 x (mol) hy Coys |. one with MGs/Flak 20mm, ~ the other mortars ‘SP Inf Gun Coy (mot) Pioneer Coy armed with flamethrowers, mortars, 20mm and MGs D Supply Troops it Field Post Office (mot) Med Coy (ot) Med Supply Coy [FD Army Flak Battalion Bn HO and Ba Bty 2.x (mot) Flak Btys (mot It Flak Bty mot) 37mm Sect SP Quad 20mm Sect (mot) Searchlight Sect [GD Pioneer Battalion | > HO and ¢halftrack) HO Coy 2 x (mol) Coys halftrack) Coy LE Signats Battalion Bn HQ and HQ Coy Ltn -1 x Panzer Telephone Coy ‘1x (mot) Sigs Supply ColHISTORY OF PANZER GROSSDEUTSCHLAND ERSATZ (REPLACEMENT) BRIGADE 1 June 1942 Formed as GD’s training unit with constituent elements GD (mot) Infantry Ersatz Regt and GD Artery Ersatz Bn, 10 Feb 1943 Fast Troop Training Battalion included (ceases end 1943). Feb 1945 4 Sees action near Forst. 10 Mar 1945)” Used to restore Brandenburg PzGdr Division. Spring 1945 Reformed as PeGdr Ersatz und Ausbildungs Brigade GD. 4 Apr 1945, Reorganised on paper to include: GD Panzer Ausbildungs Battalion, GD Panzerg Ausildungs Regiment (3x Ablellungen), GD Orficer Candidate School, GD Panzer Artillery Ausbildungs Battalion, GD Panzer Pioneer Ausbildungs Battalion (2 x Coys), GD Panzer Signals Ausbildungs Battalion (1 x Coy), 20th Panzer Ausbildungs Battalion. Taken into 15th PeGdr Division, it surrendered to the British atthe end of the war. OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A TYPE 1944 PANZERGRENADIER DIVISION as at T August! 1944 Officers Other Ranks OF Officers Other Ranks Division HQ 2B 168 ‘Artillery Regiment 48 1,522 2 PrGr Regiments total of 150 6,064 _Asiny Flak Battalion 18 6i7 (ine 3 x PrGr Bn each of 20 848) | (mot) Pioneer Battalion 7 al6 Panzer Battalion 21 581) 3!” (mot) Signals Battalion 3 ala ‘SP Panzerjager Battalion 17 458° Replacement Battalion 7 956 Panzer Recce Battalion B 982 Others (Medical, Admin, etc) 23 1,039 TOTAL 370 Equipment MG: LMG: 75mm S0mm 120mm 20mm 150mm amen ge Pakd mortar mortar flak hy gun. thrower Division HQ. 57 iO dees ° 2 Panzergrenadier Regiments total of | 28 6s Jj ah Le 3x PrGr Ba each of 2 ig Panzer Batzalon SP Parzerjger Battalion Panzer Reece Batalion Artilery Regiment Army Flak Bsealion (78) Proneer Batalion (708) Signals Bazaon Replacement Batalion ‘Others (Medical, Admin, etc) TOTAL & eroecosoon gorococoocoye a 1Somm 100mm 88mm SH gun gun Panzer Bacalon oO SP Panaersger Battalion ° ‘Partzer Recce Battalion 0 Krtiery Regiment 6 ‘Army Flak Battalion ° Replacement Batalion ° TOTAL 6 or 20 igh Armament 16 LMG 13 20m 3 75mm guns. eowcooogINSIGNIA & MARKINGS Opposite page: Above: Typical amy shoulders straps wth the Gothic forthe Wach’ in Wechrupe or ent Bein, and he entwined eer 4 for cian, Below lef A soi of te Wache showing oft thie °W insignia on his shoulders sey Below right: The commander cf an announcd ‘engineer atalion pins tank destruction bake Pancervernichtungabceidnn —to he ac Poet Ober Inthe bachgroun isthe Soviet 34 destroyed by this young solder: Noe the (cal ile Grasse Below: The three main rasedemtsd uf ies Like all German units, Grossdeutschland used extensive vehicle markings and uniform insignia to distinguish it on the battlefield. There was, of course, great variety in the type of personal equipment with which the individual soldier might be issued, but lke all armies a large degree of uniformity existed. GROSSDEUTSCHIAND INSIGNIA The German Army had a complex system of uniform colouring that was used to distinguish soldiers from different types of units. This colouring was used as piping and edging or Waffenfarbe (arm of service colours) on the uniform and, as the name suggests, was determined by the soldier's arm of service. Infantrymen wore white Waffenfarbe, and engineers wore black. Various devices were used along with the Waffenfarbe to distinguish the individual unit to which the soldier belonged. Grossdeutschland wore white Waffenfarbe with an entwined ‘GD’. The German Army also had specialist badges, which were worn by soldiers under the rank of Leutnant. The badges were either worn on the lower right, upper left, or lower left sleeve of the tunic. Such badges were awarded for having suffered battle injuries, destroyed enemy tanks or aircraft, siping successes and the like. Because of the great diversity of unis that were attached to GD, itis impossible to describe in detail each one of the uniform styles. However, among the infantrymen there were some standard features. The most distinctive part of Grossdeutschland insignia was a cuff band, worn on the right arm below the elbow, in contrast to the SS formations which wore their cuffbands on the left. Upon its redesignation as a regiment in 1937 the main source unit, the Wachtruppe Berlin, was issued with a Gothic style ‘W’ patch that was worn on the epaulettes and shoulder patches. When the infantry training battalion at Daberitz, the other source unit, was expanded the same year, its members added a Gothic L’ to their epaulettes. In the German Army, the issue of a cuff band traditionally denoted status as an elite unit and in August 1940 a black cuff title bearing the legend ‘Inf.- Reg GroBdeutschland was issued to the unit. Later, in November, the Fuhrer Escort Battalion, which was formed from Grossdeutschiand, received its ‘own cuff band. GD's own cuff band changed on a number of occasionsAbove: An unnamed Oberleutnant show the roseleuseland GD" on bese sand the calla Zatz denoting seat arly wn Figs st Front action frm the pages of lea tne himacht’s magazine that wa published forth fom Ava 1940 wo March 195 SPEARHEAD: GROSSDEUTSCHLAND during the war. Thus, in October 1940 its colour as changed to green, and the legend was simplified to ‘GroBdeutschland. Subsequently, although the legend remained the same, the style and size of the type was changed another four times. The Fihrer-Begleit-Battaillon, formed from the ranks of the regiment, was issued on 15 January with an extra cuffband, inscribed with the legend in Gothic German type ‘Filhrer-Hauptquartier’ (headquarters) to be worn below the GD band. UNIFORMS There now follows a desctiption of what a typical soldier of the Panzer Fisilier Regiment would have worn during the 1944~45 period, and a description of the ‘Sturmartillerie uniform from the same period. The Panzer-Fisilier of 1944~45 would typically be dressed in one of two uniform styles. The first was the standard German Army M43 Tunic with M42 or M43 trousers. The second would be the assault artillery (Sturmartillerie) uniform. This uniform was issued to GD’s SPW mounted battalions in 1944. The M43 Uniform ‘The M43 uniform tunic was a rationalisation of the M36 design, which had a plain collar, flat, unpleated, unpointed chest’ pockets and unpointed bellows skirt pockets. At the beginning of the war this was made predominantly from wool, but cellulose was increasingly used over the war years, and as a result the M43 was more cellulose than wool. The lining was made from rayon. As a result of this degradation in fabric quality the tunic now had to be fastened with six buttons. In addition to displaying the Litzen (the collar patches that identified rank and arm ‘of service), the collar could also display the dull grey non-commissioned officer's Tresse (braid) worn by holders of ranks from Unteroffizier to Hauptieldwebel. The national emblem of an eagle clutching a Swastika was placed above the right breast pocket, and the divisional cuff band sewn 19cm above the cuff on the right sleeve. The field-grey shoulder straps were piped in white, and the shoulder strap was embroidered with the famous entwined GD monogram. Senior NCOs and officers wore metal versions of this emblem in grey and gilt metal respectively. NCOs’ shoulder straps were also edged with the Tresse mentioned earlier. The Sturmartillerie Uniform In 1944 the armoured battalions of the Grossdeutschiand infantry regiments (1. Battaillon’Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment GD and 1. Battaillon, Panzer-Fsiler- Regiment GD) were issued the Sturmartillerie uniform (though only the first battalions of the motorised infantry regiments were equipped with SPWs). The Sturmartlleie uniform was the same as the Army's black Panzer uniform but in a field grey cloth. The blouson-style jacket was cut at the waist and fastened with a row of buttons arranged vertically on the right hand side. The collar was large and worn open but could be fastened at the neck with a hook and eye. The trousers were tapered toward the ankles giving a bloused effect over the top of the boot. The trousers had an integral belt and front pockets with pocket flaps. The standard GD insignia were worn on this uniform, although the collar Litzen was a standard Litzen over a lozenge shaped patch of field grey wool piped in white, the infantry Waffenfarbe. Officers wore their normal collar insignia attached directly to the collar. Standard white piped shoulder boards were worn with this uniform.INSIGNIA: MARKINGSBelow: German infantry move out of thee fied pastons du 1942, Nate a athe fi ing acind Khatkoy | Jure on bors, MG 34 and ther Underclothes Under the tunic the Panzer fusilier would wear a shirt of either a grey jersey material, or a green or grey cotton, with and without pockets, grey woollen socks or the German copy of the Russian footwraps. Those with experience of conditions on the Eastern Front usually wore footwraps, for extra warmth. Footwear Early pictures of Grossdeutschland show the troops shod in the familiar German marching boot, but by 1944-45 leather shortages meant that the boot been much reduced in height, and most new recruits were issued with a new style ankle boot The German Army had trialed the ankle boot in 1935 and re-introduced it in 1942. The style varied according to the manufacturer. Some were all eyeholes, others eyeholes and hooks, some were rough side out on the upper, others were smooth side out all over. In 1944-45 they were supplied in their natural colour, brown. If they were worn with the M42/M43 trousers, the soldier would probably tuck the ends of the trousers into standard issue gaiters. These were made of heavy canvas and had two buckles and straps to fasten them around the ankles. The gaiters provided some ankle support and also prevented stones and twigs getting into the boots. If worn with the Sturmartillerie uniform then the trousers were probably tucked straight into the boots or into rolled over socks. In the bitterly cold Russian winters, other types of lined boots found favour with those that could get them, Headwear Although, the Panzer-Fisilier in 1944~45 was issued with both the M42 pattern Stahlhelm (steel helmet) or the M43 pattern Einheitsteldmiitze (field cap), pictures from this period indicate that the latter was more commonly worn, The M42 helmet was a version of the M35 simplified for quicker production by leaving the rim uncrimped and by casting the ventilation holes directly into theIWsiGNIAS MARKINGS helmet shell itself. The M43 cap was the standardised field head gear for Army troops, and replaced the previous M38, M40 and M42 pattern caps in production. It was made from field grey wool and featured a long peak, over which the national insignia was stitched. Officers’ caps had silver piping to the crown seam, and sometimes this was also placed onto the scallop of the turn up. In addition the extreme cold of the Russian winter led to a profusion of unofficial fur, fur-trimmed or fur-lined, and wool hats, some of which were donated by the German public after a formal request was made by the Propaganda Ministry. Other Clothing Although winter clothing was always in short supply on the Eastern Front, Grossdeutschlandss status as an elite unit meant that it got the best of the equipment. It was one of the first units to receive the mouse grey and white (reversible) winter parka issued in the winter of 1942-43, and its men were also issued with numerous other camouflage smocks and snow suits. Another item that was ‘commonly worn over the battledress was the camouflage shelter quarter (see below). Officers overcoats varied reatly from the standard issue field grey type, to the heavy sheepskin-lined item favoured by Generalleutnant Hoernlein. FIELD EQUIPMENT Karabiner 98 (K-98) Introduced in 1898, this rifle (Gewehr) was the standard infantry weapon of all German forces. The Kar 98k was introduced in 1935. This weapon, despite plans to replace it with weapons of greater firepower and lower production costs, remained the primary infantry weapon for the entire conflict. ‘Gewehr/Karabiner 43 (G-43/K-43) The need for a weapon with greater firepower was recognised early in the war. The unsuccessful G-41, with its complicated muzzle gas cap system was scrapped after delivery of approximately 70,000 rifles, and after examination of captured Russian auto-loaders, the gas system of the Tokarev (SVT40) was incorporated into a new rifle, while retaining the Mauser G- 41 extraction system. The new rifle was introduced into service on 30 April 1943. Approximately 350,000 were delivered by 1945. Maschinen-Pistole 40 (MP-40) ‘The MP-40 was an improved version of the MP-38 sub-machine gun, intended for use by paratroops and by armoured vehicle crews. It was intended for simple mass construction. Total production was more than a million guns in 1940-44, Stick Grenade Model 39 The M39 stick grenade was the standard hand grenade of the German Army throughout the war. The grenade consisted of a thin, metal, explosive filled, Aove: “Only seen before the attack, a smokes already blinds the enemy pocket of estance. An assault ade ganas behind him before launching himself from cower ino the open, August 1983 So reads te original caption, Cetin te soe ready fraction be ef his pack pel get weigh ‘equipment behind, as used some ogg to disguise the outline of shee ul sane wi an MPO machine pitBelow: Asher Infany in 1983, wei na potograph, showing Gera oe colour of urifornard SPEARNEAD: GROSSDEUISCHLAND cylindrical head that was screwed onto a hollow wooden handle. A friction pull igniter activated the timed fuse when a cord (ending in a porcelain ball) was pulled. The grenade was kept in the ‘safe’ position by use of a screw off end cap on the wooden handle, which kept the cord and porcelain ball safely in the wooden handle. The fuse time was 4-5 seconds. Bayonet, Frog and Scabbard The bayonet frog was used to carry the scabbard on the cartridge belt. It was constructed of leather and came in two styles: mounted and dismounted. The mounted version had a leather tab that would secure the grip of the bayonet to the frog. The bayonet was the final pattern 84/98 Mauser bayonet. The handle was constructed either of wood or Bakelite plastic. The scabbard was made of stamped metal and had a ball on the tip to prevent the scabbard from getting caught on dothing. Cartridge Belt and Buckle The leather cartridge belt had a clasp attached to it to be secured at the buckle. The buckle was constructed either of aluminum or steel. The buckle was either unfinished or painted green, with an eagle to denote a Wehrmacht unit. Cartridge Belt Suspenders In 1939 testing began on externally worn cartridge belt suspenders. By taking the straps from the Model 1934 field-pack and replacing the sewn-on leather pack attachment tabs with D-rings, the external cartridge belt suspenders were created. By late 1940 the new suspenders were in use by the infantry. By 1943 the transition from internal to external suspenders was complete. The suspenders wereproduced in’two different styles: the dismounted and the mounted. The foot soldier would normally be issued the heavier, dismounted style. The dismounted is identified by the wider shoulder straps, heavier construction, D-ring attachments fn the rear of the shoulder harness, and attached lower pack straps which were used for securing the bottom of any attached pack. Combat Assault Pack The combat assault pack or A-frame was constructed of a canvas web shaped like an A. This pack was designed to carry essential equipment into action. The A-frame was designed to be used specifically with the dismounted style of leather cartridge belt suspender. When used, the pack provided places for carrying the shelter ‘quarter, the mess kit, the greatcoat and/or blanket. These items were strapped to the pack with black leather straps. Model 1938 Gasmask and Canister The German soldier was issued the Model 1938 gasmask, or [Link] GM38 was ‘made of synthetic rubber and was fitted with either the FE37, FE41,or FE42 filter elements, which screwed into the snout of the mask. The GM38 had two vision ports. Besides the five elastic straps used to secure the mask to the face, there was a long canvas web strap used to suspend the GM38 around the neck. The fluted metal canister, with a spring loaded lid catch, contained the mask when it was not in use, A small box, on the inside of the lid of the canister, contained two pairs of replacement eyelet covers. A cleaning cloth was also housed in the canister. Entrenching Too! The entrenching tool was manufactured in two versions: folding and non-folding, The non-folding type was from a WWI design and had a square blade. The folding tool was designed as a replacement for the older version and began to appear in early 1940. The folding blade was pointed and could be adjusted by means of a Bakelite nut to open at a 90° or 180° angle for digging in. Both versions were stored in carriers suspended from the cartridge belt. The e-tool was also used as a close combat weapon. B Aoves The Geran ro Russ 194] was st ra rate that the infancy wer haps to complete the mas ensteling operations fn spite of the ‘motrise!”nature of Ue Panay, l oo fer he hal oly om his ot eto get i iin an ut of tle, Nok the personal equipment particulary the marching boot: they would hein short supply asthe war prgrslBelow: Geran grenatien, wearing getcous ul caring ef, were cara on the bgck ans and set propelled assault guns wise enemy SPEARNEAD: GROSSOFUTECHLAND Zeltbahn The Zeltbahn (shelter quarter) or rain poncho, was used both for inclement weather protection and/or camouflage. Made in the shape of a triangle, it had 62 buttons. ‘When four were buttoned together, it produced a ‘four-man tent’ in pyramid shape, though four-man’ meant that it was only large enough for three soldiers to squeeze inside; the fourth man was expected to stand sentry duty. The intrepid German soldier found a variety of additional uses for this ifem. It could be used to form a lean-to shelter or carry a wounded comrade to the aid station, or, as mentioned above, could be an item of clothing. The camouflage pattern seen on the poncho was known as ‘splinter’ type. See photograph on page 65 for an example of the use of the Zeltbahn, Breadbag Model 1931 The breadbag was carried by every German foot soldier. This satchel was used for carrying a soldier’s rations and small personal items: butterdish, fork-spoon, tablet-fuel stove, individual weapon cleaning kit, field cap, dust goggles, extra matches, tobacco, playing cards, etc. The outside of the bag flap could be used for securing the mess tin and canteen. Mess Kit Model 1931 ‘A mess. kit was carried by every German foot soldier. The kit was constructed of two pieces of painted aluminum, which were designed to fit tightly together to form a single container. The lower bow! portion was used for soups and stews, while the upper plate portion was for more solid fare. The mess kit sections, when damped together, could be used to transport rations for future consumption. Both pieces could be used for cooking, but this quickly destroyed the flat, field-grey or olive drab painted finish. Ganteen and Cup Model 1931 ‘The canteen Model 1931 carried by every German foot soldier, had a capacity of about one litre. The bottle was carried in a brown felt cover that was snapped around it. The drinking cup was made of pressed aluminum, which was painted black and secured to the canteen by a leather strap. The whole canteen was ‘then secured to the breadbag for carrying in the field. Butterdish The butterdish or fat container was constructed of Bakelite plastic that was made of two pieces and screwed together. Part of a soldier’s daily tation was fat such as butter, margarine or lard. These fats were spread on the bread ration. The butterdish was normally carried in the breadbag.insicMta& WaRKINGS Soldbuch The Soldbuch or soldier’s pay book was his identity package. This book was on his person at all times. Official entries included a photo id. and a record of such things as place of birth, name, equipment numbers, pay records, leave entitlement and so ‘on. Most soldiers also used the Soldbuch to carry money, photos, letters from family, wives, girifriends; etc Meatification Dise ‘As in most armies every foot soldier was issued an i.d. disc, and was requiréd to wear itat all times. The oval zinc id. disc was divided in half by perforated slots, and had holes for a cord so that it could be worn about the neck, The information on the disc consisted of the soldier’s personnel roster number that was also recorded in his Soldbuch, the unit he was assigned to, and his blood type. This was recorded identically on the other half of the disc. In case of death, the disc was broken in half. The portion with the cord stayed on the body for later identification and the other half went to his family with his personal effects. GROSSDEUTSCHLAND VEHICLE MARKINGS In September, 1940, during the unit's organisation as a motorised infantry regiment and at the suggestion of the regimental commander Oberst Stockhausen, the familiar white Stahihelm (steel helmet) symbol was chosen to- Identify regimental vehicles. This remained as the unit insignia for the duration of the war, although it was used in a wide diversity of combinations. Vehicles carried divisional, tactical, unit and individual markings on the rear. In May 1940 vehicles of the four battalions were distinguished by a square, circle, triangle, or rhombus, over which was painted an identical but smaller shape of contrasting colours, and inside that the divisional Stahlhelm insignia. Command hove: The bane olduc of German infaneyman who seed an the Este Front Below: The white helrxt Grossewschland is jus vse onthe bag os ghtvhaed amoured car Note fhe arAbove: Cho of an $d KE carer et from thet mess tins witout ein thle vehicle, Note the dvsional sign of Grasse the white helmet paid om the Font engine cosling: {4 Sepember 198, Below aud Right: Too vse Sa views of Przers {in Russia. From 1982 Grasdetedland lho nfs vision, had tank baa, By 194 Jt asthe Anny mast perf infaty unit SPEARNEAD: GROSSDEUTECHLAND vehicles were distinguished by a three-colour pennant, with the ‘GD’ legend on the white central portion. As additional units were assigned to GD they adopted their ‘own markings. For example, the Kradschiitzen (motorcycle battalion) used a cross bounded by a circle, in addition to the Stahlhelm Vehicles carried further distinguishing insignia on the front mudguard or the front wing, which in mid-1944 were as follows: Headquarters (Stab)—GD Pennant on rhombus: HQ Panzer Regiment—plain square pennant on rhombus. 1st, 2nd, 3rd Battalions Panzer Regiment—plain triangular pennant on rhombus. HQ Armoured Grenadier Infantry—plain square pennant on SPW symbol. 1st, 2nd, 3rd Armoured Grenadier Infantry battalions—triangular pennant flanked by two circles (to represent wheels of a truck). HQ Armoured Fusilier Infantry—dark square pennant on SPW symbol. Ast, 2nd, 3rd Armoured Fusilier Infantry battalions—triangular dark pennant flanked by two circles. Panzer Reconnaissance Detachment (Aufklérungs-Abteilung)—triangular pennant ‘on rhombus masted by smaller pennant. Flak Abteilung—plain triangular pennant on small circle. Upward pointing arrow on pennant shaft HQ Panzer Artillery Regiment—plain square pennant on rhombus. Two vertical lines flank the pennant shaft. Ist Panzer Artillery Regiment—plain triangular pennant on [Link] vertical lines flank the pennant shaft, 2nd, 3rd, Ath Panzer Artillery Regiments—plain triangular pennant on rhombus. Two vertical lines flank the pennant shaft. Sturmgeschiitz Brigade—plain triangular pennant with border on rhombus. Upward pointing arrow on pennant shaft. Panzer Engineer Battalion—plain triangular pennant on rhombus. Two upward Pointing arrows on top of the pennant shaft. Panzer Signals Detachment (Nachrichten Abteilung)—plain triangular pennant on thombus. Single upward pointing arrow on top of the pennant shaft. Divisions Nachstub Truppe—plain triangular pennant flanked by two circles, two small horizontal lines on pennant shaft. Replacement Battalion—plain triangular pennant.nsicIA&: MARKINGSPEOPLE Right: Detachment Commander swank the Knight’ Cros of he fon Ces in Friedrich Anding Hans-Dieter Basse Helmut Beck-Broichitter Heinz Bergmann Martin Bielig Carl-Ludwig Blumenthal Hans Bock Georg Bohnk Max Bohrendt” ~ Heing Wittchow Brese-Winlary ~2wilhelm Czorny ~ Diddens Dido ‘Maxemilian Fabich ‘Gunther Famula Franz Fischer Edmund Francois Adolf Frankl Peter Frantz Eugen Garski ‘Kurt Gehrke Alfred Greim Wilhelm Griesberg Kart Hanert “© Wolfgang Heesemann Willi Heinrich Herbert Hensel Josef Herbst vs Grossdeutschlands performance in combat and its high press profile ensured that many of its soldiers became household names in wartime Germany. The unit also won a significant numbers of the Ritterkreuz (the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross) for gallantry. Below are listed the Ritterkreuztrager of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps, with biographies of some of the most significant personalities. Hans Hindelang ‘Oldwig Natemer Walter Hoerniein | 2°” Werner Neumeyer Max Holm J Heinrich Nubn Emst-Albrecht Huckel 2 Paul Erich Kahsnitz Otto Prau Franz Kapsrelter Fritz Plickat Bernhard Kelmz Withelm Pohimann Wilt Kessel Leopold Poschusta Rud Kirsten Walther Possi Hans Klemm Josef Rampel Heinrich Klemt Hans Friedrich Graf zu Rantzau Ludwig Kohlhaas ‘Adam Reidmuller Gerhard Konopka HansRoger Gerhard Krieg © Emil Rossman Harold Kriegk Hans Siegfried Graf Rotkirch Willi Langkiet |“ und Trach Rudolf Larsen Hans Sachs Emst G. Lehnhoff Kurt Scheumann Hans Lex Hugo Schimmel Siegttied Leyck E. Schmidt Katt Lorenz Georg Schnappaut Heinz Maz Hans-Wolfgang Schone Helmut Mader Erich Schroeder Hanns Magold Rudolf Schwarerock Hasso-Eckard Manteuffel Clemens Soarimer ‘Segmund Matheja Sommer Leonhard Mollendorf .L Melmuth Spaeter y GROSSDEUTSCHIAND RITTERKREUZTRAGER Georg Stork Hyazinth Strachwitz Gross Zauche und Camminetz Hans Hermann Sturm Nepomuk Stuzle Hans Thiessan Gotiried Tornau Horst Usedom Gustav Walle Horst Warschnaur Rudolf Watjen Withelm Wegner Walther Wietersheim‘Bow: (oS 1943 Hapa Mold fro the Sormschitz-Aveihng Grose eee the git’ Crs fhe lr Cras. Dung the pee from 7 wo 18 March 1943, his ater deste! 2 Seve aks al 30 an-ank weapons acand Khar OBERST HEINZ WITTCHOW VON BRESE-WINIARY Born on 13 January 1914 in Dresden, Brese-Winiary won his Knight's Cross and his Oakleaves to the Knight’s Cross while commander of 1./PzGr Regiment 108. He joined GD later in the war, being promoted to Oberst whilst serving with Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps. Brese-Winiary joined the German Army in April 1934 as a member of Infantry Regiment 10 in Dresden and in May 1936 was promoted to the rank of Leutnant. Over the next few years he served 48 @ company officer and battalion signals officer with the 10th Infantry. In May 1939 he was again promoted this time to the rank of Oberleutnant and became a battalion adjutant. On 24 October 1939 he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class. He was awarded the Iron Cross Ist Class on 24 June 1940 whilst serving in France, and on 31 October 1940 he was awarded the Infantry Assault Badge. He then went on to serve in Russia and, as a survivor of the terrible winter of 1941-42, was awarded the Eastern Front Medal. He was also wounded during 1941 while serving in Russia and received the Wound Badge in Black and in December 1941 received the German Cross in Gold. On 1 March 1942 he was promoted to the rank of Hauptmann and became company commander of the 6th Company IR10. He subsequently served as commander of 2nd Battalion, Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 108 and 2nd Battalion, Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 103 and ftom 14 December 1942 through to 22 February 1943 was commander of Kampfgruppe Brese, involved in combat near Stalingrad. During this'timie he was wounded again and awarded the Wound Badge in both Silver and Gold. In April 1943 he was promoted to the rank of Major and on 15 May 1943 he was awarded the Ritterkreuz. He later on became regimental commander of Panzer-Grenadier- Regiment 108 and fought at the Cherkassy Pocket where he earned the Oakleaves to the Ritterkreuz. He was awarded the Close Combat Clasp on 23 March 1944 and on 1 April 1944 he was promoted to the rank of Oberstleutnant. Finally, on 1 September 1944 he was promoted to Oberst. ‘As of 3 September 1944 until the end of the war (he surrendered to the Soviets on 18 February 1945) his assignment was commander of Panzer-Fisilier-Regiment Grossdeutschland in the Grossdeutschland Division. Brese-Winiary died in 1991. HERBERT KARL ‘HANS’ MAGOLD Bor on 16 November 1918, in Unterssfeld, Bad Kénigshofen im Grabfeld, Bavaria, Magold joined the German Army in 1937 and served in the Polish French and Balkans campaigns, He ‘took part in the invasion of Russia and went on to command ‘Sth Battalion Panzer Regiment 74 in 1942. He was wounded in August 1942 and was sent back to Germany. On his return he commanded 1st Sturmgeschiitz Abteilung Grossdeutschland in February-1943 in which role he took part in the battles around Kharkov. A short while afterwards during an ‘engagement with Soviet armour he personally accounted for the destruction of five T-34s for which he was awarded theRitterkreuz, He was killed in action on 15 September 1944, during the defensive battles at Luzagora near the Dukla Pass in Poland. HASSO-ECKARD VON MANTEUFFEL Born on 14 January 1897 in Potsdam, Hasso-Eckard Manteuffel was a career soldier. He joined the Cadet Academy Berlin-Lichterfelde in 1911 at the age of 14 and went on to serve in France with the 3rd Brandenburg Hussar Regiment Ziethen as a Leutnant. In October 1916 he transferred with the 5th Squadron to the 6th (Prussian) Infantry Division and at the end of the war was engaged in protecting the Rhine bridges to safeguard the retreat of the field Army. Post-war he served in Freikorps Oven in Berlin and was subsequently a squadron commander and adjutant in the 3rd Cavalry Regiment in the 100,000 man Reichswehr. In February 1930 he was promoted Oberleutnant and made chief of the technical squadron of his regiment, and in 1932 was appointed a squadron commander in the 17th Cavalry Regiment. Promoted Hauptmann der Kavallerie in April 1934, in October of that year he transferred to the 2nd Motorcycle Rifle Battalion of ‘the rapidly expanding Wehrmacht and became staff major and training officer of all cadet officers of 2nd Panzer Division 1936-37. From 25 February 1937 Manteuffel was official adviser to the Inspectorate of Panzer Troops under Guderian at OKH and, subsequently, head of the directing staff at Panzer Troops School II at Berlin- Krampnitz. He was promoted Major in September 1939, Oberstleutnant in July 1941, and Oberst in October 1941, commanding Schiitzen-Regiment 2 and then 6. On 23 November 1941, during the 7th Panzer Division's final attack towards Moscow Manteutfel’s Schiitzen-Regiment took Klin. By 27 November the area 2 miles north-west of the bridge at Jakhroma over the Moscow-Volga canal was ‘occupied. Early on 28 November Manteuffel’s battle group began an attack in this sector, with the further aim of crossing the canal. They achieved both objectives. On 31 December 1941 Oberst Manteuffel was awarded the Knight’s Cross for this operation, to accompany the Iron Cross Ist Class he had won in May 1917. After being given brief command of Division Manteutiel in North Africa (7 February 1943-31 March 1943) he launched a very successful counter-attack in the Tunis, area cutting Allied lines. He then led the 7th Panzer Division, being promoted Generalmajor in May 1943 and winning Oakleaves to his Knight's Gross in November that year. He became commander of Panzer-Grenadier-Division Grossdeutschland at the end of January 1944, being promoted Generalleutnant. In 1944 he was awarded Oak Leaves with Swords to the Knight's Cross, before being promoted further in September—to the command of the Fifth Panzer Army as a General der Panzertruppen. This unit won impressive victories during the 33 Above: On 8 May 194 comamuniqué fom the German High Command announee! that Genereunant von Manuf, comnander of Panver Division Gaetan, hal en va the addition ofthe Oak Leaves with Swonds his night’ Cs.young meme Cemire right On 12et liSPLARHEAD: GROSSDLUTSEMLAND Battle of Bulge and almost succeeded in breaking the Allied defence lines. After this battle, Manteuffel became the commander of Third Panzer Army, part of Army Group Weichsel (Vistula), which tried to slow down the Soviet advance on Berlin. On 3 May 1945 he surrendered to the Western allies. In 1953-57 Manteuffel was a member of the Bundestag and represented the Free Democratic Party. In 1959 he was charged with ordering a 19-year old to be shot for desertion in 1944 and was sentenced to 18 months in prison but was released after serving four montis. He died on 24 September 1978 in Reith in Alpbachtal, Austria. ERNST-OTTO REMER Born in 1912 Remer was commander of the Grossdeutschland Battalion in Berlin at the time of the 20 July 1944 Bomb: Plot. Initially he carried out the orders of Oberst Claus Stauffenberg to deploy his Grossdeutschland Battalion in and around Berlin's government quarter, but swiftly defected to the side of the regime after speaking to Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and to Hitler personally over the phone who assured him that he had safely survived the plot to assassinate him. Remer was then promoted to the rank of General and given full power to crush the coup and restore order in Berlin. On the evening of the 20th, Remer accordingly moved Above: Geveralmajrtoemlen sandingoolis his battalion from the government district and ordered his troops to storm the onan vehicle aig the fet of Stu Home Army headquarters to arrest the coup plotters. stk aad Sav psn, agus. 12. Later in the war he became the commander of the Fihrer-Begleit Division, and survived the destruction of this unit in 1945. In 1950 he became Deputy Chairman of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party. In this position he delivered scathing attacks on the ‘traitors of July 20th’ and characterised theit legacy as a ‘stain on the shield of honour of the German officer corps’ who had ‘stabbed the German Army in the back. In 1952 he was sentenced to three months in prison for ‘collective libel against the German Resistance’, and fled Germany for Egypt. For the rest of his life he remained a dedicated Nazi, and in October 1992 was arrested in Germany ‘and sentenced to 22 months in prison for publishing neo-Nazi propaganda and denying the existence of the Holocaust. He died in 1997. DIETRICH VON SAUCKEN Born in 1892 von Saucken was Panzer-Corps Grossdeutschland commander in the final stages of the war, prior to his hurried appointment as commanding officer of the Second Army. He had a varied career in the Wehrmacht, typifying those fortunate to survive six years of war. He had been CO of 2nd Reserve Regiment1937-40, commanded 4th Schiitzen-Brigade 1940-41, was general officer commanding 4th Panzer Division 1941-42, commandant Mobile Troops School 1942-43, general officer commanding 4th Panzer Division 1943-44, deputy general officer commanding Ill Panzer Corps 1944, general officer commanding 3. yan fra, com XXXIX Panzer Corps 1944, general officer commanding Panzer Corps jy:cunen'of lay Grossdeutschland 1944-45, and general officer commanding Second Army, Eastern Front 1945. He died in 1980. Commanders of Grossdeutschland Name CO From Generalmajor Wilhelm Stockhausen 1/9/39 Generalleutnant Walter Hoernlein 1/8/41 Generalleutnant Hermann Balk. 3/4/43 Generalleutnant Hasso-Eckard Yon Manteutfel 1/2/44 Generalmajor Karl Lorenz 1/9/44 General Dietrich-Von Saucken 1/12/44 General (P2) Georg Jauer 1/2/45 General Willi Langkeit 3/2/45 Generalmajor Ernst-Otto Remer 20/7/44 Below; Carel sue high wo his asst gu er ofthe Asc Atle ind. ‘ookbrat Crys fone 1983 his Knights wy 31/7/41 31/1/44 30/6/43 31/8/44 30/11/44 31/1/45 5/45 21/4/45 21/4/a5~ ‘Comments GD raised as Inf Regt (mot). Stockhausen promoted from Oberst GD becomes Inf Div (mot) 1/4/42. ‘Papa’ Hoernlein promoted from Oberst Temporary commander Promoted to command Fifth Panzer Army GD becomes Pz Corps Promoted to command Second Army Surrendered in various locations Commanded Kurmark Division; destroyed ~~ by Russians. Langkeit promoted from Oberst Fubhrer-Begleit-Regiment formed; later (27/1/44) becomes a Brigade; later stil 80/1/45) becomes a division. Remer promoted from Oberst, surrendered to RussiansASSESSMENT Right Dr Josep Goebbels, the Releh Propaganda Minster, as cated ‘patron’ of Pana Regient CGrassdentsclanc. Hes show bere tng gre by the Regimental Commander with Pane Use background Belo gh eimai i to one of hig wourded greniadiers. Its dificult to assess the effect of an individual unit on a battle, there being so ‘many factors to take into consideration, and well nigh impossible to judge the effect it has on a war, particularly when that unit was on the losing side. When taking account of Grossdeutschland's combat record it is possible to state that the unit did play a decisive role in many of the actions in which it fought and can thereby justly be considered one of the finest infantry formations of World War Il. At the beginning of the war the unit was four battalions strong, and by the end of the conflict Grossdeutschland members were fighting in four divisions, in several hastily formed combat groups and“other smaller groups. In the early years the process of expanding the urit-was a direct result of the Wehrmacht’s desire to combat the strength: ad prestige of the SS, but by 1945 it was a desperate measure to bolster the flagging strength of the army. In the battle of France, the unit showed for the first time what it was capable of under fire, battling over the Meuse at Sedan to establish a vital bridgehead for the Panzers to sweep through to Channel, and then successfully resisting the Allied counter-attacks on the thin spearhead, despite losing almost a quarter of its strength in the western offensive It was if anything stronger for this experience by the opening of the offensive in the east, where it remained for the rest of the war. In the first weeks of the campaign GD was part of the spearhead that made the lightning advance to Smolensk and in the first year of the-campaign GD was assigned to many units, often to support assaults on major objectives. By the end of the year it was at the gates of Moscow. In 1942 the regiment was expanded to division size and held the Russian advance at Bolkhov. On the first day of the Caucasus offensive, GD was at the spearhead of an advance that broke through on the Tim. Through the summer it fought at points along the whole line from the Manych River to Rzhev, and was instrumental in the capture of Rostov and the Maikop oilfields. As it grew in size and stature, so did the expectations of what it could achieve, ‘and during the defensive battles that followed the victories of 1941-42 GD was constantly on the move, transferred from north to south to shore up the weak points in the German lines or else to hold back the tide of the Soviet advance. At Rzhey, from the middle of August 1942 it fought almost continually to hold the city, By the end of a savage year of fighting and despite losing many men, especialy first in February and then in December, the unit had grown in stature and never lost its cohesion. It soon earned the nickhame The Fre Brigade’ because ofits almost legendary ability to stamp out crises as they flared up. Nonetheless, the dangerous work of the ‘Fire Brigade’ took a heavy toll on its men, and increasingly courage alone couldSPEARHCAD: GROSSDEUTECHLAND hight Thefaceof war fsoonailsammuntin not compensate for the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet forces. Again, ves his young gee, complete with machine yun during 1943, the unit was active across the whole sector of the central and avd dressed in winter clothing, prepares to move aff. southern fronts, fighting heavy defensive battles and launching counter-attacks. In Ap 198. 5 defence the division proved as skillful as in attack, its desperate defence and heroic yy ‘counter-attack around Byelgorod in early 1943 being of particular note. 4 In the thwarted Citadel offensive Grossdeutschland was thrown against one of the heaviest and best defended sectors of the Russian line, yet was able to make ‘some local breakthroughs. Around Karachey, in July and August 1943, it thwarted an attempt to encircle the GermatvEleventh Army with skilful counter-attacks, and at Akhtyrla held up the Soviet steamroller during the retreat, preventing the envelopment of Army Gfoup South. At the Kremenchug bridgehead over the Dnieper in September, it performed heroically again. 1944 was another year of defence, counter-attack and movement, on southern, central and northern fronts. Something of the reputation of the division, and its status among the leadership, can be gleaned from the number of units that carried” its name. In the critical battles on the northern front Grossdeutschland again distinguished itself, fighting to prevent the Soviet breakthrough to the Baltic and ‘waging a desperate battle to cover the retreat of the German armies through the Memel bridgehead In 1945, its ranks severely depleted, the corps fought almost to the last man to save Berlin from capture, and its part in’delaying the Soviet advance is perhaps part of the reason that Germany, was not swamped under the Red tide. The fact that Grossdeutschland was able to survive as a unit during this long period of attrition was in part due to the quality of the officers and men, who were selected from tthe fittest and ablest recruits. As with all German divisions, Grossdeutschland maintained training depots for the reception and integration of. replacements instead of sending them piecemeal into the front lines. As the’war ground on, combat units were reduced in size and veterans were) carefully distributed to form the nucleus for strong primary groups. Strenudus measures were taken to ensure that junior leaders possessed experience and competence; where an American infantry company might boast 150 soldiers and four or five 5 inexperienced lieutenants, a German company might carry 50 or 70 soldiers on its 2 rolls but with a single seasoned officer in command. Importantly, the corps of non- Lb commissioned officers was not diluted to replace officer losses, which might have destroyed the cohesion of the smaller units, and lengthy NCO training courses were continued right up until. the end of the war. Throughout: the war Grossdeutschland was hamstrung by its own success, which often. led to a gross overestimation of its capabilities and propelled it again and,again into the fiercest battles. In the closing actions of the war, fighting in Aisparate units against the Soviet invader, the corps literally fought to the death, ~~ Panzer-Grenadier-Division Grossdeutschland alone suffered nearly 17;000 ‘casualties. In its short history Grossdeutschland tirelessly, professionally and often heroically fought under conditions that would have finished most other military units.REFERENCE INTERNET SITES: hittp://[Link]/Pentagon/3620/ ‘Achtung Panzer! Interesting site with very detailed information on German armour, Great pictures of preserved machines, particularly SPWS. http:/ /[Link] This is probably-the most comprehensive site currently on the Web dealing with the German Army before and during World War Il, Well-written and researched, and an intriguing in- depth interview with a Grossdeutschland veteran, too. [Link] [Link]/gd7silent/ The group re-enact the engagements of the 7th Company of Grossdeutschland. Lots of info, pictures and links'to other re- enactment groups, and still growing. (e-mail: {eldpost@grossdeutschland,com) http: //[Link]/~belauss/[Link] Homepage of a group of 3. Panzer-Grenadier-Diviston re-enactors. ‘Also has links to the 43. Sturm-Pionier re-enactment group. _http’//[Link] /rant/grossdeutschland/home. htm! “Another US re-enactor site. hitp://[Link]/homepages/hallg/[Link] A Living History UK re-enactment site. htp://[Link]/dday44 /uniforme/[Link] French-language site with some interesting pictures of uniforms, including a Grossdeutschland trooper. [Link] [Link]/sign/sign shtml Russian-language site with excellent illustrations of the tactical signs of the German Army.REFERENCE [Link] This is an private project trying to provide biographical data on Jam PA) if Lo ed V7 the army generals of World War Il, including many German Fa @ Faia 1 eC generals. [Link] Useful information on PAGD and associated units [Link] This excellent site provides information for game players but has much for the enthusiast including a full examination of vehicle markings at [Link] BIBLIOGRAPHY Bender, R. & Odegard, W,; Panzertruppe—Uniforms, Organisation and History, Bender, 1980. Panzer formations 1935-45, Panzer uniforms and insignia, Panzer markings afd camouflage are all given in detail Culver, B. & Murphy, B.; Panzer Colours—Vol. 1. 170 illustrations with 69 full-colour plates provide a detailed account of German armour during WWII. Delaney, J.; The Blitzkrieg Campaigns. Germany's’ ‘Lighting War’ Strategy in Action; Arms and Armour, 1996. Describes the origins of the strategy developed during the interwar years — a strong, co-ordinated, mobile land and air offensive to surprise and envelop an unprepared enemy. Studies how this technique was used during the advances into Poland, Belglum and France then Russia Engelmann, Joachim; German Artillery in World War I 1939-1945, Schiffer Publishing, 1995. English translation. This volume of photographs presents a detailed look into the operations, action and everyday life of the Wehrmacht artillery arm, Erickson, John; The Road to Stalingrad & The Road to Berlin; 1983. Weidenfeld and Nicolson/Westview Press, 1983 & 1984 ‘A two-volume definitive study of Stalin's war with Germany. Efomichenko, Major General; The Red Army, Hutchinson, n.d. Studies the development of The Soviet Army and its exploits from June 1941, Analyses how the Red Army foiled Hitler's plans by pushing back the Axis forces ‘rom the Volga and the Caucasus into the Reich itself. Forty, George, & Duncan, John; The Fall of France—Disaster in the West 1939-1940; Guild Publishing, 1990 A pictorial analysis of how the Panzer divisions defeated France ‘within six weeksSPEARHEAD; GROSSDEUTSEHLAND Fuller, LEC.; The Second World War 1939-1945; Meredith, 1968 This was the first comprehensive strategic and tactical history of the war to be -written, and stirred controversy. The book has sixty specially drawn maps and diagrams. Glantz, David; From the Don to the Dnieper, Mlustrations with detailed maps are induded in this analysis of Red Army operation — eight lal months of raga that Sally ended Hers Btzrey against the USSR. Grechko, Andrei; Battle for the Caucasus; ‘A Marshal of the Soviet Union pays tribute to his Red Army troops who withstood and repelled the Nazi advance during the battle for the Caucasus, July 1942 — October 1942, a victory that helped change the course of WWII. Guderian, Heinz; Panzer Leader; Michael Joseph, 1952. The autobiography of the famous German general. Hoffschmidt, E. J. & Tantum, W. H.; Combat Weapons, Volume 1 German; WE Inc, 1968 Aa illustrated encyclopedia ofall German tanks, artilry, small arms, mortars, rockets and grenades Jentz, Thomas L.; PanzertruppenVol 1 1933-42, Vol 2 1943-45; Schiffer, 1996 Volume 1 is, a-complete guide to the creation, organisation and combat employment of Germany's tank force. Volume 2 describes how, when forced on to, the defensive, the Panzer formations became expert at counter attacks. The detall is all drawn from original German records. 3 Kershaw, Robert; War without Garlands—Operation Barbarossa 1941/42; lan Allan Publishing, 2000. Excellent analysis of the early stages of Germany's war with Russia with plenty of ‘eyewitness accounts, Kriegsberichter ap A bi-monthly magazine for students of the German armed forces in World War Il, published in Califorsia by Erich Craciun. Kurowski Franz; Knights of the Wehrmacht; X study of the Knight's Cross holders. Lucas, James; Germany's Elite Panzer Force; Macdonald and Jane's, 1979 A history of the Grossdeuischland formation’s historic rise from an infantry regiment to a Panzer corps in six years. Lucas, James; War on the Eastern Front—The German Soldier in Russia; Jane's, 1979 An account of the war against the Soviet Union from the German angle, Lucas, lames; The Last Yea" of the German Army May 1944—May 1945; BCA, 1994 A complete study of structural changes made to try and overcome the army's depletion and av insight into some of its last battles. 94McLean, Donald B. (Ed); German ‘Infantry Weapons Vol 1; Normount Armament Co, 1967 Originally published in 1943 to assist Allied commanders, detalls the design and construction of weapons and their ammunition, Messenger, Charles; The Art of Blitzkrieg; tan Allan, 1976 Studies Blitzkrieg’s evolution as a technique of war and describes how Hitler used the theory so effectively. Metelmann, Henry; Through Hell for Hitler, Patrick Stephens, 1990 A dramatic account of fighting with the Welirmacht in Russia, Mitcham, S.A. Jnr; Hitler's Legions; Leo Cooper, 1985 The organisation and technical aspects of the German divisions are described. Every part of the army is covered Natziger, George F; The German Order of Battle Panzers and Artillery in World War I; Greenhill Books, 1999. Defeinitive orders of battle. Pallud, Jean Paul; Blitzkrieg in the West - Then and Now, After the Battle, 1991 Above: Te cew of «Horas (Hom) antitank gun Fully illustrated. Then and now photographs show how, Germany, in just sixty days, sal rd. Design cara 8mm PAK Ao caused France to capitulate during 1940. 3 Pane Io V cass, the Homiss as intra Piekalkiewicz, Janusz; Operation Citadel, Presidio, 1987 A complete illustrated analysis of the Battles of Kursk and Orel which shattered Nazi ambitions in Russia. Sajer, Guy; The Forgotten Soldier, Harper and Row, 1971. English translation ‘A German soldier, drafted into Grossdeutschland in 1942 despite being of French/German descent, provides a vivid chronicle of the faceless anonymity of tofal war in the endless bitter wastes of Russia. Scheibert, Horst & Culver, Bruce (Ed); Panzer Grenadier Division Gross Deutschland: Squadron/Signal, 1987 ‘An excellent pictorial reference work on the Grossdeutschland units. 35INDEX Allied units: 3rd (FR) Division, 18; 35th (RUS) Tank Brigade, 31; 55th (FR) Division, 18; 55th (€R Division, 18; 61st (FR) Division, 18; 61st (FR) Division, 18; 185th (RUS) Division, 31; British Expeditionary Force, 16, 19; Chasseurs ‘Ardennais, 16; Fist Baltic Frat, 8 First Usrainian Front, 41, 42, 43, 51, 54; Fist White Russian Front, 53, 54; Fourth Ukranian Front, 44; Second Uiranian Front, 41, 42, 43, 5; Second White Russian Front, 52, 54 ‘Seventh (FR) Army, 16; Third Ukrainian Front, 41, 43,51; Third White Russian Front, 52 Ardennes; 9, 16, 18, 50, 62 Balek, H., 87 Bialystock, 23, 24 Bittrich, W, 58 Blitzkrieg, 10, 11, 17, 18, 92 Bock, F von, 10, 16, 23, 24, 26 Brese-Winiry, H., 82 Brest-Litovsk, 24, 48 Bryansk, 25, 30, 63, Coucasus, 28, 30, 38, 88, 93, 94 Compitgne, 20, Cottbus, 28, 44, 53, 54 Dnieper, R., 23, 25, 28, 40, 42, 91, 92 ‘Doberitz Infantry Traning School, 6,8, 28, 45, 68 Don, R28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 92, Dunkirk, 18, 19 Franz, P, 80, 87 German units: Il Panzer Corps, 87; XI Panzer Comps, 58; XV Panzer Corps, 17; XVI Panzer Corps, 17; XIK Motorised Army Corps, 9; XIk Panzer Corps, 16, 17; XX Army Corps, 31, 63; XXIV Panzer Corp, 58; XXX Corps, 63; XXXIK Panter Corps, 17, 87; XLI Panzer Corps, 17, £22; XLIK Corps, 63; XLMI Panzer Corps. 23; XLll Panzer Corps, 28, 40, 63; Ll Corps, 63; LVI Corps, 63; Ist Battalion, 26th Panzer Regiment, 42, 51; 1st Panzer Division, 17, 18; 2nd Panzer Division, 17, 18, 83; 2nd Reserve Regiment, 86; 3rd Panzer Division, 38; 4th Panzer Division, 87; 4th Schitaen- Brigade, 87; Sth Panzer Divisio, 16; 6th Panzer Division, 50; 7h Panzer Division, 16, 18, 23, 83; 9th Panzer Division, 16; 10th Panzer Division, 16, 19; 11th Panzer Division, 38; 12th Panzer Division, 32; 15th Panzergrenadier Division, 54; 63th Infantry Regiment, 19: 86th Infantry Regiment, 19: ‘Army Group A (Russian campaign, 30, 32, 42, 63; Anny Group A (Western campaign), 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20; Army Group B ‘ussian campaign), 30, 32, 63; Army Group B (Wester campaign), 16, 18, 19; Army Group €, 16; Army Group Cente, 23, 24,25, 26, 40, 48, 63; Army Group Don, 30, 32: ‘Army Group North Ukraine, 48; Army Group North, 23, 24, 42, 48, 50, 62; Army Group South Ukraine, 63; Army Group South, 23, 24, 30, 40, 41, 43, 63: Das Relch, 37; Division Manteutfel, 83; Eighth Army, 43, 63; Eighth Panzer Army, 41; Eleventh Army, 90; Fifth Panzer Army, 62, 83, 87; First Army, 25; First Panzer Army, 41, 63; Fourth Army, 30, 63; Fourth Panzer Army, 31, 36, 38, 41, 42, '58, 63; Hermann Goring Corps. 63; Infantere-Regiment 10, 82; Kampioruppe Brese, 82; Kamptgruppe Langkei, 58, 60; est Armoured Group, 16; Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler, 12, 37; Luftwaffe Parachute Panzer Division Hermann Goring, 52; Ninth ‘Army, 31, 38, 61, 63; Panzer-Grenadier Division Brandenburg, 51, 52, 53, 54; Panzer- Grenadier Regiment 108, 82; Panzer- Grenadier-Regiment, 103; Schtzen-Regiment 2, 83; Schtren-Regiment 6, 83; Second Army, 25, 30, 32, 61, 63, 87; Second Panzer ‘Army, 63; Second Panzer Group, 22, 25; Seventeenth Army, 44; Sith Army, 31,42, 663; SS Panzer Corps, 58; Toteakopt, 37; Wiking, 37 Goebbels, Dr, 84, 8, 88 Grossdeutschiand: Regiment, 6, 8, 9, 12,13, 14, 16-27, 61, 87; Infantry Division (mot) 6, 28-38, 87; Panzerarenadier Division, 38-50, 61, 90; Panzer Corps, 6, 51-58, 82, 86, 87; Individual units—as a regiment: Ist Battalion, 20, 22, 26; 1st Sturmgeschitz. Abteilung, 82; 2nd Battalion, 20, 26; 3rd Battalion, 20, 26; 7th Company, 18; 17th ‘Company, 21, 26: 18th Company, 21; 20th Company, 21; 400th Arilrie-Abteiung, 2 Assault Engineer Battalion, 9, 14, 17, 18,20, 45; Assault Engineer Regiment, 45; Assault Gun Battery 640, 9, 14; Heavy Transport Battalion, 21; Light Bridging Column B, 9; Individual units—as a division and corps: (N. Artlerie-Abtellng, 32, 36; 3rd Batali, LBtth (mot) Artillery Regiment, 58; Alarm Group Schmelzer, 58; Army Tank Destroyer Force GD, 53: Assault Artillery Detachment, 87; Aularungs-Abtellung, 32; ‘Emergency? Brigade GD, 54; Feld Guard Regiment GD, '53; Fuhrer Escort Beglet) Battalion, 32, 45, 50, 52, 61-68, 70, 87; Fulwer Escort ‘eglet) Brigade, 52, 53, 62; Fuhrer Escort (eglet) Division, 53, 62, 86, 87; Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade, $2.53, 62: Fuhrer- Grenadier Division, 53, 58, 62; Fisler- Regiment GO, 29, 31, 32, 44, 45, 54; Replacement Battalion GO, 28; Grenadier- Regiment GD, 29, 31, 32, 54; Guard Battalion GD, 45; Guard Regiment GD, 53, 56; Kampfgruppe Bohrend, 42; Kampfgruppe ‘assntz, 31, 32; Kamplgrupoe Nehring, 61; Kampfgruppe Plate, 32; Kamplgruppe Pohlmann, 32; Panzer-Fisiit-Regiment GD, 70, 82: Panzer-Grenadier Combat Force GD, 54; Panzer Grenadier Division Kurrnark, 53, 58-61, 67; Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment GD, ‘48, 70, 84, 85; Panzer-Grenacler Replacement Brigade GD, 53, 54, 58, 62; Panzer-Regiment GD, 36, 42, 45, 51,84, 88; Replacement Grenadier Regiment (mot) 1029 GD, 44-45; Training and Replacerent Brigade, 52 Guderian,H,-8, 9/14, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, 83, 94 Hitler, A. 8, 9, 10, 12, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50,52, 61, 62, 85, 93, 94, 95, Hoernein, W, 28, 42, 73, 80, 85, 87 Hoth, H., 8, 16 Hungary, 44, 51, 54, 58 July bomb plot, 48, 61, 62, 86 Kharkov, 30, 32, 36, 40,61, 63, 72, 82 ‘Kiev, 25, 41, 42 lest, E. von, 16, 19, 20, 25 Kénigsberg (Kaliningrad), 51, $3, 63 Konopka, C., 80, 84, 85 rico, H.. 80, 84 krivol Rog, 41, 42, 63 Kursk, 28, 38-40, 63, 95 Langkeit, W, 58, 60, 87 Leb, W. von, 16, 24 Lex, H., 80, 84 Lorenz, K, 48, 80, 85, 87 lyon, 19, 20, Maginot Line, 9, 16, 20, Magold H. K, 80, 82-83 Manstein, E von, 10, 36, 38, 40, 42 Manteutfel, HE, 42,48, 80, 83-86, 87 Memel, 80, 51, 63, 90 Meuse, R., 16,18, 88 Moscow, 23, 25, 26, 31, 83, 88 Operations: Barbarossa, 21; Felix, 21; Overlord, 45; Seelne, 21; Taifun, 25; Zitadelle, 38, 90; Poland, 6, 8, 9, 50, 52 Poltava, 36, 40, 63, Poss), W, 80, 81 Pripet Marshes, 23, 24, 56 Reinhardt, H., 17, 18 Remer, 0. 45, 62, 86-87 Rostov, 30, 32, 88 Rundstedt, G. von, 10, 16, 20, 24, 25, Rehev, 31, 32, 63, 88 Saucken,D. von, 52, 86-87 ‘Smolensk, 24, 25, 31, 32, 63, 88 Stalingrad, 28, 31, 32, 82, 93 ‘Stockrausen, W., 9, 77, 87 ‘Strachwitz, H. Gat, 80, 85 Tula, 25, 26 Uniform and equipment, 70-77 Vehicle markings, 77-78 Voronezh, 28, 30, 32, 63, Waciregiment Beri, 6, 8,10, 61, 68, Wachtruppe Berin, 6, 9, 13, 68 Warsaw, 9, 22, 48, 50, 53 Wehrmacht, 6,8, 24, 36, 70, 74, 82, 86, 8, 93, 94, 95, Weygand Line, 19, 20, Yugosiavia, 10, 22 Thukov, G., 25, 26, 38, 42rary Va (hrs Elis ISBN: 0711028532 248mm : Formed in north Africa in August 1941 from the Sth Leche io, 21st Panzer fought in all the mojor battles ofthe desert wor, including the Afrika Korps’ advance to El Alamein until it was destroyed around Tunis in 1943. Reconstituted in France, Ist Panzer went onto fight aftr D-Day uni it was again almost completely cnniilated in the bate ofthe Falaise Gap. Again relormed, 21st Ponzer would end its days on the Estern Front where it surrendered tothe Russians __ ot Cotts, southeast of Berlin, in April 1945, 3 - 7th FLIEGER DIVISION STUDENT’S FALLSCHIRMJAGER ELITE Bra Quoi ISB: 711020559 248mm x 1See-PB £129 Formed in July 1998 under Kurt Sud 7t Flieger division wos first used ino minor, rconnessone role inthe attack ‘on Plond it then saw heavier action in the Wet in 1940 and took pat in andings in Norway, Denmark, Belgium ond Holl fer involvement inthe invasion of Greece, the Flshrmjager’s finest hour care in Crete wth the epic bat to west he island from British defenders. Vicoriows, bt heavily blooded, the Fallchimjager would henceforth be wed ‘only infantry ond 7th Fieger Division became the Ist Fallschimiager, fighting bravely in Sly ond aly 4 - US 82d AIRBORNE DIVISION ‘ALL AMERICAN’ ye M Yori ISBN: 0711028567 248m x 185mm pp 2B°21299 Formed in August 1942, the 82nd Airborne Division frst saw ection during Operation ‘Husky’, the invasion of Sicily, ond ‘0 ground troops in ltaly at Soleraa, fis" mejor use as poratroops was in operation ‘Market Garden’ when the unit wos ropped into Nijmegen and fought bility sucesso action. Subsequenlyinvohved in he desperate fighting ogonst Hitlers las throw, th Ardennes offensive, 82nd Airborne would end the ‘Airborne is th ist Americon unit fo be covered in lan Allon Publishing's new Spearhead eres. MAIL ORDER DEPT, 4 WATLING DRIVE, HINCKLEY, LEICS LE10 3EY Tel: 01455 233747 Fax: 01455 233737 Email:midlandbooks@[Link] 3 Or order on- [Link] occupying Berlin ond Franifur. The US 82d} 5~SPEARHEAD~=} GROSSDEUTSCHLAND Guderian’s Eastern Front Elite Formed in 1939 as a motorised infantry regiment, Grossdeutschland ended World War 2 as a panzer corps having fought in France and the Balkans, and from 1941 as an elite unit exclusively on the Eastern Front—at first under Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Army and latterly, combined with the Brandenburg Division, defending Fast Prussia as the Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland. Its key battles included the great encircling operations in the early days of Opera ‘Barbarossa’, the final thrust to Moscow as part of Operation ‘Typhoon’, Kharkov and Kursk. Grossdeutschland was one of the most important units in the German order of battle and was involved in some of the fiercest fighting of World War 2. Along with Spearhead 1 - 21st Panzer Division it makes an ideal subject to start lan Allan Publishing’s new Spearhead series. About the authors Michael Sharpe has written and contributed ~SPEARHEAD~— to many aviation and military titles since Spearhead looks at the cutting edge of war, units capable of operating completely independently in the forefront of battle, The series examines the unit becoming a freelance writer, including articles for encyclopaedias on The ‘American Civil War and World War | © Origins and history Brian Davis is a uniform and insignia © Organisation, order of battle and how this changed specialist and produced his first title, under © Battle history, by theatre a pseudonym, for Almark. Since then he © Insignia and Markings has written extensively on uniforms © Top people — biographies of commanders and including substantial books on the British (eek tl Amy and on the Wehrmacht. Each book ends with an assessment of unit effectiveness — as seen by itself, its opponents and the wider viewpoint of history ~ and a full reference section including: © Critical bibliograp! ISBN 0-7110-2854-0 . Paiogeay ® Relevant museums or exhibits | © Website inks || | © Re-enactment groups | Shwe : 780711"028548) ited in England _ £12.99 Pr