Institute of Governance

Public Policy and

Social Research

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION?
GOVERNANCE, GOVERNANCE EVERYWHERE
H. George Frederickson

Working Paper QU/GOV/3/2004

2004

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 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

GOVERNANCE, GOVERNANCE EVERYWHERE1

H. George Frederickson

For at least the last 15 years governance has been a prominent subject in

public administration. Governance, defined by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill as the

“regimes, laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain,

prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services,” holds

strong interest for public administration scholars (2001, p.7). This chapter reviews

and evaluates the evolution and development of the concept of governance in public

administration; then, using regime theory from the study of international relations, the

concept of governance as applied in public administration is analyzed, parsed, and

framed.

The present scholarly and conceptual use of the concept of governance in the

field tends to take one or more of the following forms: (1) It is substantively the same

as already established perspectives in public administration, although in a different

language, (2) It is essentially the study of the contextual influences that shape the

practices of public administration, rather than the study of public administration, (3) It

is the study of interjurisdictional relations and third party policy implementation in

public administration, (4) It is the study of the influence or power of nonstate and

nonjurisdictional public collectives. Of these approaches to public administration as

governance, it is the third and fourth--governance as the public administration of

interjurisdiction relations and third party policy implementation, and the governance

1
The phrase "public administration" is used here only as a convention. The phrase "public
management" could have been used, and would have had the same meaning.

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of nonstate and nonjurisdictional public collectives -- that form the basis of a usable

theory of governance for public administration.

It was Harlan Cleveland who first used the word “governance” as an

alternative to the phrase public administration. In the mid-1970s, one of the themes in

Cleveland's particularly thoughtful and provocative speeches, papers, and books went

something like this: “What the people want is less government and more governance”

(1972). What he meant by governance was the following cluster of concepts.

“The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical

pyramids with most of the real control at the top. They will be systems—interlaced

webs of tension in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision

plural. “Decision-making” will become an increasingly intricate process of

multilateral brokerage both inside and outside the organization which thinks it has the

responsibility for making, or at least announcing, the decision. Because organizations

will be horizontal, the way they are governed is likely to be more collegial,

consensual, and consultative. The bigger the problems to be tackled, the more real

power is diffused and the larger the number of persons who can exercise it—if they

work at it” (p. 13).

Like many, Cleveland saw the blurring of the distinctions between public and

private organizations, and he associated this blurring with his conception of

governance. He reasoned through what it meant as follows: “These new style public-

private horizontal systems will be led by a new breed of man and women. I call them

Public Executives, people who manage public responsibilities whether in ‘public’ or

‘private’ organizations” (p. 14).

Cleveland clearly understood the challenges of individual accountability

associated with horizontal multi-organizational systems. Who, exactly, do these

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modern public executives work for and to whom are they accountable? Consider this

remarkably bold argument: “Public ethics are in the hearts and minds of individual

Public Executives, and the ultimate court of appeals from their judgments is some

surrogate for people-in-general” (p.117). Note, that he does not argue that

accountability is ultimately to the people or to the elected officials of one’s

jurisdiction. Cleveland’s idea of public responsibility is much bigger than that. The

moral responsibility of public executives includes basic considerations of four

fundamental principles: “a sense of welfare; a sense of equity; a sense of

achievement; and a sense of participating” (pp. 126-27).

What would be the results of such a grand conception of the moral

responsibility of the public administrator? “In a society characterized by bigness and

complexity it is those individuals who learn to get things done in organizational

systems who will have a rational basis for feeling free” (p. 135). “By the

development of their administrative skills, and by coming squarely to terms with the

moral requirements of executive leadership, individual men and women can preserve

and extend their freedom. Freedom is the power to choose, and the future executive

will be making the most choices—whom to bring together in which organizations, to

make what happen, in whose interpretation of the public interest. Those who relish

that role will have every reason to feel free, not in the interstices but right in the

middle of things” (p. 140).

Governance is an especially important word/concept because of the mismatch

or disconnect between jurisdictions on one hand and social, technological, political,

and economic problems on the other hand. Cleveland understood this, too: “One of

the striking ironies of our time is that, just when we have to build bigger, more

complicated “bundles of relations” to deal comprehensively with the human

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consequences of science and technology, many people are seized with the idea that

large-scale organization is itself a Bad Thing. My thesis is the reverse. . .” (pp. 139-

40). Big problems, Cleveland believes, require big responses. Those responses will,

however, be multi-organizational and will involve both public and private

organizations. These responses will, pace Cleveland, be led by not one, but many,

leaders.

In the thirty years since Cleveland's initial conception, it would be only a

slight exaggeration to say governance has become the subject formerly known as

public administration. A leading academic journal, now in its 16th year, carries the

title Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration. A careful

examination indicates that its contents have mostly to do with what was once called

public administration. The most popular and widely read magazine for American

state and local governments is Governing: The Magazine of States and Localities,

now in its 15th year. The Brookings Institution recently changed the name of its

highly regarded "Governmental Studies" program to "Governance Studies” and

launched a series of studies of governance (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2003;

Birdsall 2003; Groham and Litan 2003; Woods 2003). Scholars at the Kennedy

School of Government at Harvard are midway through a large project that has the

title, "Visions of Governance in the 21st Century." Schools of governance, teaching

graduate curricula not unlike public administration graduate curricula in both Europe

and the United States, are now found at several important European universities. In

the early 1990s the National Academy of Public Administration essentially dropped

the phrase “public administration” in favor of the word “governance,” although the

work of the Academy continues to be primarily public administration consulting

(Fossler 1998). “In much of the modern literature in the field, governance has become

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a virtual synonym for public management and public administration" (Frederickson

and Smith 2003, p. 225). The problem is that governance has dozens of meanings.

Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill say it best:

“The term ‘governance’ is widespread in both public and private sectors, in

characterizing both global and local arrangements, and in reference to both formal and

informal norms and understandings. Because the term has strong intuitive appeal,

precise definitions are seldom thought to be necessary by those who use it. As a

result, when authors identify ‘governance’ as important to achieving policy or

organizational objectives, it may be unclear whether the reference is to organizational

structure, administrative processes, managerial judgment, systems of incentives and

rules, administrative philosophies, or a combination of these elements.”

From Cleveland's tightly defined presentation of what governance was

understood to be, and from his carefully set out descriptions of the implications of that

understanding, governance is now everywhere and appears to mean anything and

everything (Rhodes 2000). Because governance is a power word, a dominant

descriptor, and the current preference of academic tastemakers, there has been a rush

to affix to it all of the other fashions of the day. Governance is the structure of

political institutions (National Research Council 1999). Governance is the shift from

the bureaucratic state to the hollow state or to third-party government (Milward and

Provan 2000; Salamon 2002; Frederickson 1997; Rhodes 1997). Governance is

market-based approaches to government (Kettle 1993; Donahue and Nye 2002).

Governance is the development of social capital, civil society, and high levels of

citizen participation ( Hirst 2000; Kooiman 2001; Sorensen 2003). Governance is the

work of empowered, muscular, risk-taking public entrepreneurs (Osborne and

Gaebler 1992). In the United Kingdom governance is Tony Blair’s “third way,” a

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political packaging of the latest ideas in new public management, expanded forms of

political participation, and attempts to renew civil society (Newman 2001).

Governance is the new public management or managerialism (Kernaghan, Marson,

and Borins 2000; Considine and Painter 1997). Governance is public-sector

performance (Heinrich and Lynn 2000). Governance is interjurisdictional cooperation

and network management (Frederickson 1999; O'Toole 2003; Peters and Pierre 1998).

Governance is globalization and rationalization (Pierre 2000). Governance is

corporate oversight, transparency, and accounting standards (Monks and Minow

2004: Jensen 2000; Blair and MacLaury 1995).

In all, Rhodes (2000, pp. 55-60) found seven applications of governance in the

field of public administration: the new public management or managerialism; good

governance, as in efficiency, transparency, meritocracy, and equity; international and

interjurisdictional interdependence; non-government driven forms of socio-cybernetic

systems of governance; the new political economy, including shifting from state

service provision to the state as regulator; and networks. There are many more

applications of governance to the subject once known as public administration, but

these few illustrate the capacious range of concepts, ideas, and theories associated

with it.

There are as many definitions of the concept of governance as a synonym for

public administration as there are applications. Kettl claims an emerging gap between

government and governance. "Government refers to the structure and function of

public institutions. Governance is the way government gets its job done.

Traditionally, government itself managed most service delivery. Toward the end of

the twentieth century, however, government relied increasingly on non-governmental

partners to do its work, through processes that relied less on authority for control"

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(2002, xi). To Kettl, governance, as an approach to public administration, has

primarily to do with contracting-out and grants to sub-governments.

As was noted at the outset, Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001 p. 15) use a much

bigger approach to governance as an analytic framework. Their model, intended to be

a starting point for research, is:

O = f [E, C, T, S, M]

Where:

O = Outputs/outcomes. The end product of a governance regime.

E = Environmental factors. These can include political structures, levels of authority,

economic performance, the presence or absence of competition among suppliers,

resource levels and dependencies, legal framework, and the characteristics of a

target population.

C = Client characteristics. The attributes, characteristics, and behavior of clients.

T = Treatments. These are the primary work or core processes of the organizations

within the governance regime. They include organizational missions and

objectives, recruitment and eligibility criteria, methods fro determining eligibility,

and program treatments or technologies.

S = Structures. These include organizational type, level of coordination and

integration among the organizations in the governance regime, relative degree of

centralized control, functional differentiation, administrative rules or incentives,

budgetary allocations, contractual arrangements or relationships, and institutional

culture and values.

M = Managerial roles and actions. This includes leadership characteristics, staff-

management relations, communications, methods of decision-making,

professional/career concerns, and mechanisms of monitoring, control, and

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 accountability.

The problem is that it is difficult, following Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, to

conceive of anything involving government, politics, or administration that is not

governance. That being the case, there appears to be little difference between

studying the whole of government and politics and studying public administration.

Put another way, public administration is ordinarily thought to have to do with

“treatments,” “structures,” and “management” in the Lynn, et al. governance formula.

They tuck the centerpieces of public administration into the broader context of

governance. This chapter will later return to these distinctions and to a large-scale

synthesis of governance research by Lynn, Heinrich and Hill.

Peters uses an equally big definition of governance as "institutions designed to

exercise collective control and influence" (1995, p. 3). Peters, and Peters with Pierre

(2000), settles on the "steering" characteristics of governance as distinct from

government. ". . . Public institutions continue to bear the primary responsibility for

steering the economy and society. Government may, however, be able to discharge

that fundamental responsibility through means other than direct imposition of

authority, or use other instruments not requiring directly government involvement in

the social processes being influenced. Governance, in the words of Walter Kikert

(1997), is “steering at a distance.” “This style of steering is more palatable politically

in an era in which there is significant public resistance to the state and its more

intrusive forms of intervention" (Peters 1995, p. 86).

Doubtless the most comprehensive synthesis of governance as public

administration is found in B. Guy Peters’ The Future of Governing (2001). Like

many approaches to governance that use a narrow reading of public administration as

a straw man, Peters “sets up” public administration as the old-time religion, riddled

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with identity crises. Traditional public administration is “five old chestnuts,” modeled

on an institutionalized and apolitical civil service, organizational hierarchy and rules,

a preoccupation with permanence and stability, and reams of internal regulations

(Peters 2001, pp.4-13). These elements of the old-time public administration religion

would be recognized by any of the members of that church, all of them having been

part of the internal critique of the field long before governance ever appeared

(Frederickson and Smith 2003). Traditional public administration, following Peters,

floundered because of disappointments in governmental performance, changing

demographics, overly large and cumbersome governments, and several other deficits.

Governance reform, particularly as seen in Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and

the United States is modeled on various contributions of four different approaches to

public administration – markets and competition, participative administration, greater

flexibility, and deregulation. In Table 1, Peters provides an excellent summation of

the characteristics of these four governance models. Each of these models would be

instantly recognized by any senior student of public administration as a part of the

literature and theory of the field, entirely independent of applications of the models to

governance. Public administration scholars have also long recognized the normative

content of each of the models, as does Peters. The question is, does the application of

governance as either a theory or an analytic framework add value to broader long-

standing approaches to public administration? (see particularly Wilson 1989 and

Frederickson and Smith 2003)

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 Table 1

Major Features of Four Models of Governance as Public Administration*

Market Participative Flexible Deregulated

Government Government Government Government
Principal Monopoly Hierarchy Permanence Internal
diagnosis regulation
Structure Decentralization Flatter “Virtual No particular
organizations organizations” recommendation
Management Pay for TQM; teams Managing Greater
performance; temporary managerial
other private- personnel freedom
sector
techniques
Policymaking Internal Consultation; Experimentation Entrepreneurial
markets; market negotiation government
incentives
Public Low cost Involvement; Low cost; Creativity;
Interest consultation coordination activism
* From Peters 2001, p.21

Are these so-called governance concepts, with their attendant possible

meanings, really useful to students of public administration and public management?

Do they add anything of consequence to our understanding of the field? Do they

merely repackage public administration in a newer and rather fuzzy language? Could

the use of the governance concept have a negative influence on our theory building

and research scholarship, obfuscating and confusing rather than clarifying and

illuminating, and distorting by concealing bias rather than revealing and removing it?

The validity and usefulness of the governance concept can be challenged on at least

five rather fundamental grounds. These five points lead, in turn, to two implications

or indirect criticisms that question whether further use of the concept of governance

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as an organizing concept for public administration and management has the potential

to contribute substantially to our understanding of the field and ought to be

encouraged by leading scholars in the field.

First, the concept of governance is fashionable, the favorite of academic

tastemakers, the flavor not only of the month but also of the year and the decade.

Does the governance concept bring anything particularly new to the public

administration table? Much of the governance literature is "a rehash of old academic

debates under a new and jazzier name--a sort of intellectual mutton dressed up as

lamb--so that pushy new professors. . . can have the same old arguments as their

elders but can flatter themselves that they are breaking new ground by using new

jargon" (Strange 1983, p. 341). Fashions change, and we may already have reached

the half-life of the hegemony of governance as an organizing concept for the field. In

the same way that miniskirts come and go, so too could governance.

Second, the concept is imprecise, wooly, and, when applied, so broad that

virtually any meaning can be attached to it. As described earlier in this chapter,

governance, at least at this point, does not have an agreed-upon meaning. Fortunatly,

some who use the term are serious about the matter of definition and precision; others

however are not. Still, there is little doubt that the word governance is useful as a way

to describe, as Cleveland does, patterns of interjusridictional and interorganizational

relations. The matter of precision in definition is considered again at the close of this

chapter.

Third, the concept of governance is freighted with values, values often stated

in ways that imply that certain things are understood and agreed-upon when, in fact,

they are not. Some approaches to governance as public administration tends to wrap

together anti-bureaucratic and anti-governmental sentiments, preferences for markets

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over governments, and preferences for limited government--all points-of-view

masked as given, understood, and agreed-upon (Kernaghan, Marson, and Borins

2000; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Not the least of the value problems generally

associated with some uses of the concept of governance, are its democratic deficits.

Standard models of democratic government involve a limited state that is controlled

by representative government bound by the rule of law, and also a largely self-

organizing civil society independent of the state but protected by the state's laws and

administrative procedures. Some models of governance, however, either discount the

significance of jurisdictionally based democratic traditions or fail to take them into

account, most notably the Osborn and Gaebler reinventing government model (1992;

see also Hirst 2000; Sorensen 2002). Other models are deeply contextual, based on

constitutional, legal, organizational, and political influences and imperatives (Lynn,

Heinrich, and Hill, 2001). These models are state and jurisdiction-centered

understandings of governance in which public administration is contingent on artifacts

of constitutions, rules, laws, and politics. This perspective on governance in public

administration makes the subject both bigger and grander, a kind of un-public

administration.

Fourth, scholars who use the word governance, particularly in Europe, claim

that governance is primarily about change, about reform, about getting things right.

In addition to the scholars there are policy entrepreneaurs using the word governance

to lend importance to their policy projects. Such perspective almost always begin

with the notion that things are broken and need to be fixed. Investments in our

prevailing institutions, our cities, states, and nations and their established

governments are devalued, as are the accomplishments of those institutions. Order,

stability, and predictability are likewise undervalued. Governance, it is claimed, is

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about dynamic change about reform. It is interesting to remember that the origins of

American public administration were closely associated with reform and with the

progressive project of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In most of the more precise scholarly literature, despite the rhetoric of reform,

governance is mostly about order and about how politicians and bureaucrats adapt in

orderly ways to changing circumstances and values. There is a surface dynamic to

governance as a form of orderly adaption using the logic of the diffusion of

innovation, and so-called best practices borrowed from other organizations or

jurisdictions. But the underlying values of governance are not primarily about

change, they are about order. Most descriptions of elements of governance—

networks, interorganizational and interjurisdictional cooperation, power-sharing

federations, public-private partnerships, and contracting-out—are forms of

institutional adaption in the face of increasing interdependence.

Fifth, governance is often centered on non-state institutions--both nonprofit

and for-profit contractors, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental

organizations, parastatals, and third parties generally. State-and jurisdiction-centered

theory and research is, from some governance perspectives, passé. In the name of the

“hollowed-out” thesis, many have criticized that part of the governance perspective

that emphasize privatization, contracting-out, and public-private partnerships (Rhodes

1997; Newman 2001; Milward and Provan 2000). In their convictions regarding the

superiority of the market over the polity, advocates for this governance perspective

appear to somehow imagine that there can be governance without government (Peters

and Pierre 1998). At a minimum, when this perspective is implemented it seriously

diminishes the capacity of the core state executive to steer (Rhodes 2000). Indeed, it

can be argued that under hollow-state conditions steering is reversed, the state being

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steered by its governance partners (Kettl 1993; Frederickson 1999). It is the states

and their subjurisdictions that deal with the vexing problems of race, poverty, and

justice. In the words of Janet Newman, “It is noticeable that theories of governance

fail to deal adequately with the issues of diversity and patterns of inclusion on which

it is based” (2001, p. 171).

From this sketchy critique of governance, two important implications arise.

One is that the governance approach to the study of public management and

administration emphasizes theory and research, explaining change and reform rather

than the functioning of jurisdictions--cities, states, nations, and certain regional or

global institutions—which are, after all, the dominant and preferred way to practice

governance. Public administration, in practice, is about organization, bureaucracy,

and management and the context in which they happen. What people often value

about the jurisdictions in which they live and, by implication, the bureaucracies

working for those jurisdictions, is the order, predictability, stability, and permanence

they provide. National and local identity is important to the people. When will

people sing an anthem to a contractor, wear the uniform of a network, or pledge

allegiance to nonjurisdictional forms of governance? Probably not soon. Governance

scholarship tends to ignore or at least de-emphasize the vast world of nongovernance

that lies deep in the folds of jurisdiction, organization, and bureaucracy. Are we

better off as theorists who focus on governance and not on government organization,

bureaucracy, and management?

Concepts of governance as public administration reflect a long-standing

theoretical debate in the field, the matter of distinctions between politics, and policy

on one hand and policy implementation or administration on the other. Easy

dismissal of the politics-administration dichotomy serves to focus the study of public

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administration, particularly by some governance theorist, on the constitutional and

political context of the organization and management of the territorial state or

jurisdiction. From this perspective governance becomes steering and public

administration becomes rowing, a lesser phenomenon in the scholarly pecking order,

not to mention a lesser subject in governance. Public administration, thus understood,

is the work that governments contract-out, leaving governance as the subject of our

study. Although the lines between politics, policy, and administration are often fuzzy

and changing, and although we know, strictly speaking, there is not a politics-

administration dichotomy, is nevertheless important to understand the empirical

distinctions between political and administrative phenomena. Concepts of

governance that advance our understanding of public-sector administration and

organization are helpful. Concepts of governance that simply change the subject of

public administration to politics and policy making are not. In democratic

government it is, after all, elected officials who govern. Bureaucrats have roles and

responsibilities for governing or governance, but in democratic polities these roles and

responsibilities are different than the roles and responsibilities of elected officials.

Janet Newman says it well: “Neither ‘good governance’ nor ‘well-managed

government’ could resolve the contradictions around the popular role of government

and the appropriate boundaries of governance” (2001 p. 170). In the name of

stamping out bureaucracy and replacing it with what they describe as good

governance, Osborne and Gaebler advocate a range of managerial prerogatives that

would significantly intrude on the political and policy-making prerogatives generally

assumed to belong to elected officials, and particularly elected legislators, in a

democratic polity (1992).

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 The second implication of the critique is that governance theorists persist in

looking for an all-pervasive pattern of organizational and administrative behavior, a

"general theory" that will provide an explanation for the past and a means to predict

the future. Despite the accumulated evidence based on decades of work on theory and

the empirical testing of theory in public administration, no such pattern has been

found (Frederickson and Smith 2003). Does the governance concept beguile a

generation of scholars to set off in the vain search for a metatheoretical El Dorado

(Olsen 2003)?

Constructing a Viable Concept of Governance for Public Administration

Although the critique of governance is a serious challenge, does it render the

concept useless? The answer is no. There are powerful forces at work in the world,

forces that the traditional study of politics, government, and public administration do

not explain. The state and its sub-jurisdictions are losing important elements of their

sovereignty; borders have less and less meaning. Social and economic problems and

challenges are seldom contained within jurisdictional boundaries, and systems of

communication pay little attention to them. Business is increasingly regional or

global. Business elites have multiple residences and operate extended networks that

are highly multi-jurisdictional. States and jurisdictions are hollowing-out their

organization and administrative capacities, exporting to contractors much of the work

of public administration.

Governance, even with its weakness, is the most useful available concept for

describing and explaining these forces. But for governance to become anything more

than passing fashion or a dismissive un-public administration, it must respond to the

critique of governance. To do this, governance scholars must settle on an agreed-

upon definition, a definition broad enough to comprehend the forces it presumes to

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explain but not so broad as to claim to explain everything. Governance theorists must

be ready to explain not only what governance is, but also what it is not. Governance

theorist must be up-front about the biases in the concept and the implications of those

biases.

The lessons learned in the evolution of regime theory in international relations

are relevant here because regime theory predates governance theory and because the

two are very nearly the same thing.2

To construct a practical and usable concept of governance for public

administration, the field would profit by narrowing the subject to its most common

usage and returning to Cleveland’s original conception. In addition, the field would

benefit by using regime theory from international relations to inform the development

of governance theory. This would bring some precision to the concept and facilitate

theoretical discourse around governance in public administration. In precise terms,

then, governance in public administration should be defined as “sets of principles,

norms, roles, and decision making procedures around which actors (managers)

converge in a given public policy arena (Krasner 1983; March and Olsen 1997;

Keohane 2002). It is important to note here that this definition includes many of the

elements in the Lynn et al. definition of governance set out on page 1, and does not

include others (eg, outcomes as the dependent variable, environmental characteristics,

client characteristics, regimes, judicial decisions, and the phrase “administrative

practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of public services”).

2
There is a second and less useful body of regime theory found in urban studies. Urban regime
theorists tends to emphasize the role of business leaders in urban economic development and to
deemphasize the roles of elected and appointed government officials (Elkins 1987; Stone XXXX). The
work of Royce Hansen is a welcome exception to this generalization, and his work is rather similar to
the use of regime theory in international relations and as it is used here (XXXX; see also Frederickson
1999).

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Obviously, the definition of governance borrowed from regime theory and applied to

public administration significantly narrows the Lynn et al. definition.

The evolution of regime theory in international relations is guiding this insistence that

to be useful, governance theory must be both narrowed and precise,.

For a longer time than the concept of governance has claimed to be an

organizing concept for public administration, the concept of regimes has informed

research and theory in international relations (Krasner 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer, and

Rittberger 2000). The basic elements of the concept of governance in public

administration are similar to the theory of international regimes, and international

regime theorists are well ahead of governance theorists. The path that international

relations scholars have taken in the development of regime theory serves as a useful

guide for the development of governance theory in public administration.

Descriptions of international regimes are very close to the narrower

description of governance being presented here. “Regimes are deliberately

constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or global scale, which are

intended to remove specific issue areas of international politics from the sphere of

self-help behavior. By creating shared expectations about appropriate behavior and

by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue area, regimes help states (and other

actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional

welfare or security. If we classify international issue-areas by the dominant value

being at issue, we find that regimes exist in all domains of contemporary world

politics: there are security regimes such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

economic regimes such as the international trade regime; environmental regimes such

as the international regime for the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer; and,

finally, human rights regimes such as the one based on the European Convention on

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Human Rights” (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000, pp. 3-4). One might add

to this list bureaucratic regimes, patterns of cooperation between jurisdictions

conducted by appointed officials, almost always in specific policy domains (Haas

1990; 1992).

International relations theory went through a period not unlike the present

period in public administration – anything and everything was claimed to be regime

theory (Strange 1983; Rosenau 2003). In recent years the subject has returned to its

original and narrower definition (Krasner 1983)

Adapting a theory of governance in public administration from international

regime theory, suggests a governance theory in three parts: (1) vertical and horizontal

injurisdictional and interorganizational cooperation; (2) extension of the state or

jurisdiction by contracts or grants to third parties, including sub-governments; and (3)

forms of public nonjurisdictional or nongovernmental policy making and

implementation.

The first of these, vertical and horizontal interjurisdictional and

interorganizational cooperation, will be called interjurisdictional governance.

Interjurisdictional governance in public administration is:

1. actors in systems of governance either based in jurisdictions representing

jurisdictional interests or in nongovernmental profit and nonprofit

organizations, representing their interests;

2. participation in such systems of governance as a voluntary form of

cooperation;

3. almost always policy-area specific; for example environmental

interjurisdictional governance, economic development interjurisdictional

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 governance, public safety interjurisdictional governance, national defense

interjurisdictional governance.

The second form will be known as third-party governance. Third party

governance has the following characteristics:

1. it extends the functioning of the state or the jurisdiction by exporting to

third parties (the first party is the elected basis of democratic legislative

authority, the second party is executive administration or public

administration) jurisdictional tasks and responsibilities for policy

implementation.

2. its precise governance roles and responsibilities are based upon formal

contractual or grant documents upon which the contractor (the jurisdiction)

and the contractee (the profit or non-profit organization or subgovernment)

agree;

3. its contracts and grants are time specific;

4. its contract and grants are policy-area specific, as in health research grants

or road construction contracts.

The third form will be known as public nongovernmental governance.

Public nongovernmental governance has the following characteristics:

1. policy making and implementation by nongovernmental institutions or

actors that bear on the interests or well being of citizens in the same way

and with the same consequences in state or jurisdictional outcomes;

2. jurisdictional systems of jurisdictional regulation, oversight or

accountability have limited affect.

Governance in public administration may take these forms either singularly or

in combination.

21
 Interjurisdictional, third-party contract and public nongovernmental

governance comprehend those aspects of governance most relevant to public

administration and the largest and most common forms of governance. While other

models of governance are interesting and may be relevant, it is interjurisdictional,

third-party and nongovernmental governance that come closest to comprehending the

traditional practices of public administration, theories of public administration and the

modern practices of governance. The critical point here is that instead of governance

replacing public administration, governance is a kind of public administration. In

simple terms, it could be said that in the day-to-day, internal management of a

government agency a person practices public administration. It could also be said that

in the management of the extended state or jurisdiction, a person practices the public

administration of governance. And it could be said that nongovernmental

institutions or organizations making and implementing policies that affect citizens in

the same way as the policies or actions of the state are practicing the public

administration of governance (Frederickson 1997, p. 224). Therefore governance, as

a distinct form of public administration, has to do with the extension of the state or

jurisdiction either beyond its boundaries, through third parties, or by nongovernmental

institutions.

Three schools of thought have evolved in international regime theory, schools

of thought that are particularly useful as a basis of comparison with the narrower

description of governance theory in public administration – the neoliberal school, the

realist school, and the cognitive school.

Neoliberals emphasize the role of international regimes in helping states and

jurisdictions achieve common interests. In the neoliberal schema, states and

jurisdictions are rational egoists that care only for their own interests. Neoliberals

22
draw heavily on economic theories of institutions, focusing on the role of information

and transaction costs. Regimes are likened to investments by the territorial state,

investments determined by issue density. Game theoretic models such as the

Prisoner’s Dilemma are used by neoliberal regime scholars to estimate the probability

that, under conditions of mixed motives and in particular situations, a regime might

emerge and institutionalize. Thus the “structure of the situation” is central to the logic

of the neoliberal school of international regime theory (Hasenclever, Mayer, and

Rittberger 2000, pp. 5-9).

The neoliberal school of international regime theory is very nearly the same as

the public choice or rational choice school in public administration and policy studies.

Consider, for example, studies of the commons (Ostrom 1998); the self-maximizing

bureaucrat or bureaucracy (Tullock 1965; Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971); the self

maximizing citizen (Tiebout 1956; Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992); the conditions

of both individual and jurisdictional cooperation (Axelrod 1984); and formal models

or organizational or bureaucratic behavior (Moe 1984; Knott 1993) as illustrative of

the similarities between international regime theory and the governance perspective in

that part of public administration having to do with public choice theory and the

empirical work supporting it.

International regime theorists of the realism school emphasize political power

and its exercise in the territorial state and argue that power is as important to

interjurisdictional cooperation as it is to conflict. “The overall result for realist

students of international institutions is that international regimes are more difficult to

create and harder to maintain than neoliberals would have us believe. The likelihood

for a regime to be put in place and to be stable is greatest when the expected gains are

23
balanced (at least for the most powerful members) such that relative losses do not

accrue” (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000 pp. 9-10),

The realist school of international regime theory is not unlike a similar school

in public administration. In the public administration version the focus is on

constitutions, laws. the separation of powers, formal structures and rules, and on the

exercise of political and bureaucratic power in the context of such structures. The

leaders in the study of the constitutional and legal foundation of public administration

(Rohr 1986; Rosenbloom 2003; Cooper 2002; Gilmore and Jensen 1998) tend to focus

on elements of third party governance, (see especially, Cooper 2002) as well as

interjurisdictional governance (see especially the federalism and intergovernmental

relations scholars such as Wright 1997; Agranoff 1985; 2003).

Cognitivists (sometimes in regime theory called strong cognitivists) are

critical of both neoliberal and realist approaches to international regimes, “for treating

actors’ preferences and (perceived) options as exogenous ‘givens’, i.e. as facts which

are assumed or observed, but not theorized about …..(and) reject the conception of

states as rational actors, who are atomistic in the sense that their identities, power and

fundamental interests are prior to international society and its institutions. States are

as much shaped by international institutions as they shape them” (Hasenclever,

Mayer, and Rittberger 2000, pp.10-11)

Doubtless the most influential argument in the cognitive school of

international regime theory is made by two political scientists primarily associated

with public administration, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1998, p. 949). They

apply institutional theory to international relations, insisting that “on the one side are

those who see action as driven by the logic of anticipated consequences and prior

preferences. On the other side are those who see action as driven by the logic of

24
appropriateness and senses of identity. Within the tradition of logic of

appropriateness, actions are seen as rule based. Human actors are imagined to follow

the rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching

individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities

and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action

involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligation of that identity or

role to a specific situation. The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more

than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational

expectations” (p. 951; see also March and Olsen 1984, 1995; Olsen 2003;

Frederickson and Smith 2003).

The cognitive institutional perspective in both international regime theory and

in public administration work from the premise that it is not possible to describe

international political order, or organizational order or interorganizational order in

terms of the simple notion of rational intention and design. “History is created by

complicated ecology of local events and locally adaptive actions. As individuals,

groups, organizations, and institutions seek to act intelligently and learn in a changing

world involving others similarly trying to adapt, they create connections that

subordinate individual intentions to their interactions… They coevolve with the

actions they produce” (March and Olsen, 1998 p. 968).

From this review of regime theory and its similarity to concepts of governance

it is evident that international relations scholars have about the same "sharp

disagreements with regard to both epistemology and ontology" (Hasenclever, Mayer

and Rittberger 2000, p. 33). The neoliberalists and realists (sometimes together called

the rationalists) can by synthesized with softer versions of cognitive regime theory in

a form of "contextualized theory" that rests positivist tests of truth in the folds of

25
culture, history, demographics, and the general endogeneity of complex regime and

governance forces. However, there does not appear to be enough common ground to

hold both the strong cognitivists and their logic of appropriateness and the rationalists

with their positivist truth tests.

The study of governance and public management is advanced considerably by

a recent large scale synthesis of the literature (70 journals, and 800 articles over a 12

year period) by Lawrence E. Lynn and Carolyn J. Hill (forthcoming). They used a

state-centric definition of governance adapted from their earlier work, a definition not

unlike the standard Krasner definition of international regime theory (1983, p.6). They

found that the governance research scholarship broke down about like the regime

theorists--(1) studies that are historical, descriptive, and institutional in the cognitive

tradition; (2) studies of examples and "best practices," mostly in the institutional

tradition; and (3) studies following the positivist social science canon. Their synthesis

focused on studies of the third type. To operationalize the synthesis they used an

adaption of their formula presented on p.7 of this chapter, a process hierarchical

model from political power at the top to consequences, outputs, outcomes, results, and

stakeholder assessments at the bottom.

In the order of their presentation, Lynn and Hill found that: (1) there is notably

more research that explains frontline work than research on higher levels of

governance; (2) the majority of studies adopt a top-down perspective on governance

with little emphasis on outcomes, results, or stakeholders' assessments-- studies of

street-level bureaucracy and bureaucrat-client interactions are the exception; (3)

structures of authority are used to explain, they are not explained; (4) governance

matters or, put another way, there is a demonstrable hierarchy of influence from

politics clear to the stakeholders, and at each step of the way structure, process, and

26
management matter; (5) in governance studies results are most often described as

institutional outputs and not social outcomes; (6) organizational structures and levels

of management discretion influence organizational effectiveness; (7) effectiveness

and cost-savings associated with third-party governance are influenced by incentives

and contract review standards and processes.

Lynn and Hill's most important finding is that hierarchy and, as they put it,

hierarchical governance, is alive and well and the primary means by which we

govern. It appears that the networked, associational, horizontal, and conjuncted forms

of governance are less important than governance scholars might think. "[T]he

American political scheme remains hierarchical and jurisdictional" and jurisdictional

hierarchy is the predicate to networked governance (p. 34). And they identify the

likely reasons: "The seemingly 'paradigmatic' shift away from hierarchical

government toward horizontal governing (hence increasing the preference for

'governance' as an organizing concept) is less fundamental than it is tactical: the

addition of new tools or administrative technologies that facilitate public governance

within hierarchical systems" (p. 33). For this reason, it is argued here that the study

of governance focus on interjurisdicational, third-party, and nongovernmental

governance as a way to narrow the grandness of the governance project.

To return to the three categories of governance set out on pages 19 and 20, in

the cases of both interjurisdictional and third-party governance it is important to get

past the idea that there can somehow be a governance tree floating in space without

governmental or bureaucratic roots. Peters and Pierre asked whether there can be, as

Cleveland seemed to imply, governance without government (1998). The answer is

no, at least following the narrower definition of governance argued here. This

suggests a state or jurisdiction-centered approach to governance, an approach ready to

27
accept the importance of hierarchy, order, predictability, stability, and permanence.

Despite all the scholarly focus on governance, it appears, even from the synthesized

research of governance scholars, that the old-time religion, traditional public

administration, is the basis of policy implementation in government, and government

is an essential precondition of governance.

It follows from this reasoning that one of the best hopes for an empirically

robust theory of governance might be to turn somewhat in the direction of the

cognitive and institutional research perspective. Lynn and Hill, in their justification

for studying primarily the positivist-rationalist literature, acknowledge that their

approach "sacrifices verisimilitude and nuance but gains in transparency and

replicability" (p. 5). But they found "the fact that relatively few studies examined

more complex patterns of causality may reflect the paucity of data, but it may also

reflect something more significant: conjunctions by hundreds of specialized

investigators that the world of practice remains more hierarchical than many of us

want to concede. When it comes to answering multi-level 'why' questions, the

evidence suggests that hierarchy 'still' matters" (pp.33-34)

It may be that causality is more likely to be found in the cognitive and

institutional literature. March and Olsen’s overarching descriptive synthesis is an

insightful understanding of democratic governance from the perspective of

institutional theory, with an emphasis on the logic of appropriateness as an

explanatory variable (1995; see also Wilson 1989). Keohane’s application of the

institutional perspective to international governance, particularly the formal

intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade

Organization and the European Union illustrates a conceptual approach that could be

useful in the search for causality in public administration as governance (2002).

28
Summing-Up

From its prominence in the 1980s, regime theory would now be described as

one of many important theories of international relations. International relations is,

of course, the study of relations between nation-states whereas public administration

is the study of the management of the state and its subgovernments. It could be said

that regime theory accounts for the role of non-state actors and policy entrepreneurs in

the context of the modern transformation of the nation-state. In public administration

it could be said that the modern transformation of states and their subgovernments

explains the contemporary salience of theories of governance. Both regime theory

and governance theory are scholarly responses to the transformation of states.

Government in the postmodern state involves multiple levels of interlocked

and overlapping arenas of collective policy implementation. Governments now

operate in the context of supranational, international, transgovernmental and

transnational relations in elaborate patterns of federated power sharing and

interdependence. Therefore, it is now understood that public administration as

governance is the best description of the management of the transformed or

postmodern state (Sorensen 2004) Nationhood and community are transformed as

collective loyalties are increasingly projected away from the state. Major portions of

economic activity are now embedded in cross-border networks and national and local

economies are less self-sustaining that they once were (Sorensen 2004, p. 162)

Harlan Cleveland understood very early how governments, economies and

communities were changing and how rapidly they were changing. His initial

description of public administration as governance was designed to square the theory

and practices of the field with the realities of a changing world. His governance

model still serves as a compelling argument for plural, interjurisdictional, and

29
interorganizational mediated decision-making networks of public executives

operating in the context of blurred distinctions between public and private

organizations. Following Cleveland’s treatise, the popularity of the word governance

soared and while gaining altitude evidently lost oxygen. In an oxygen deprived state

many scholars engaged in excesses and failures in their considerations of governance.

Some engaged in fuzzy definitions of governance and others simply didn’t bother

with definitions. Others freighted-up governance with anti-bureaucratic, anti-

governmental and pro-market values, often without acknowledging the added weight.

Still others made of public administration straw men and then, with exaggerated

claims, demonstrated how easily governance could tip them over. And, as is often the

case with concept entrepreneurs, governance was seen as the answer, the grand theory

to replace public administration.

Lynn, Heinrich and Hill brought governance back down to earth and

oxygenated it with their analytic framework. And, more recently, they filled in much

of their framework with a synthesis of empirical research literature. Many other

leading scholars in public administration use the Lynn, et al. framework, together

building an impressive body of research.

Taking a page from the evolution of regime theory in international relations, it

is here suggested that the longer range prospects for the application of governance to

public administration would be improved by narrowing the scope of the subject. It is

suggested that there be a fundamental distinction between public administration as the

internal day-to-day management of an agency or organization on one hand, and public

administration as governance, the management of the extended state, on the other. It

is further suggested that the public administration of governance include the

management of nongovernmental institutions and organizations insofar as their

30
policies or actions affect citizens in the same way as state agencies. Once established,

these distinctions lead to a three part definition of governance in public

administration. First, interjurisdictional governance is policy-area specific

formalized or voluntary patterns of interorganizational or interjurisdictional

cooperation. Second, third-party governance extends the functions of the state by

exporting them by contract to policy-area specific nonprofit, for-profit or

subgovernmental third parties. Third, public nongovernmental governance accounts

for those activities of nongovernmental organizations that bear on the interests of

citizens in the same way as governmental agencies. These three forms of governance

are, after all, what is ordinarily meant when the word/concept governance is used in

public administration.

The rapid transformation of the state and its subgovernments has profound

implications for the practices of public administration. Governance theory,

accounting as it does for most of the effects of state transformation, promises to

contribute importantly to the development of public administration scholarship.

31
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