FM 11.14.18 - ANGELINA County - State Court Complaint - FINAL
FM 11.14.18 - ANGELINA County - State Court Complaint - FINAL
Plaintiff, the County of Angelina, Texas, by and through the undersigned attorneys,
(hereinafter “Angelina County” or “County”) against Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue
Pharma Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company, Johnson & Johnson, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Pharmaceutica Inc. n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo
I. INTRODUCTION
fraudulent marketing, sales, and distribution of prescription opioids (“opioids”) that has resulted
world” and are “the most medicated country in the world . . . .”2 The opioid crisis has been
described as “the AIDS epidemic of our generation, but even worse.”3 On October 26, 2017,
President Donald Trump “declared a nationwide public health emergency to combat the opioid
crisis.”4
equivalents. In 2010 that number increased to 710 mg per person.5 This amount has been estimated
as the equivalent to 7.1 kg of opioids per 10,000 people – or enough to supply each American with
3. It’s no surprise that in 2016 alone, health care providers wrote more than 289
million prescriptions for opioids, enough for every adult in the United States to have more than
one bottle of pills.7 The prescription rate in Angelina County is substantially higher than the
national average.8
4. Unfortunately, using opioids too often leads to addiction and overdose from
opioids. It was estimated as early as 2001 that up to 40% of chronic pain patients were addicted to
opioid pain medication. 9 Almost 2 million Americans were addicted to opioids in 2014.10 To put
1
L. Manchikanti, Opioid Epidemic in the United States, Pain Physician, Jul. 2012, at 1,
www.painphysicianjournal.org, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2
David Wright, Christie on Opioids: “This is the AIDS Epidemic of Our Generation, but even Worse,” CNN, Oct.
27, 2017, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/27/politics/chris-christie-opioid-commission-aids-
cnntv/index.html; Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 16 (“Gram for gram, people in the United States consume more narcotic
medication than any other nation worldwide.”).
3
Wright, supra.
4
Dan Merica, What Trump’s Opioid Announcement Means – and Doesn’t Mean, CNN, Oct. 26, 2017, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/national-health-emergency-national-disaster/index.html.
5
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 14.
6
Id.
7
Prevalence of Opioid Misuse, BupPractice, Sept. 7, 2017, available at https://www.buppractice.com/node/15576.
8
Center for Disease Control, available at https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html.
9
Prescription Drugs: Abuse and Addiction, National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIH Publication), Jul. 2001, at 13.
10
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014.
· About 80 percent of people who use heroin first misused prescription opioids.11
5. In 2014, more people died from drug overdoses than in any other year. Currently
more than 90 Americans die every day after overdosing on opioids.12 The Texas Legislature has
found “that deaths resulting from the use of opioids and other controlled substances constitute a
6. In fact, accidental drug overdose deaths, of which reportedly at least two-thirds are
opioid overdoses, are the leading cause of death for Americans under the age of 50. And these
accidental opioid drug overdose deaths exceed the number of deaths caused by cars or guns. A
report from the CDC found that from July 2016 to September 2017, emergency visits due to
suspected opioid overdoses continued to climb approximately 30% across the nation.14 The
increase was seen in adults of all age groups and in men and women in all geographic areas.15
7. Over the next decade, the average number of deaths due to opioids is expected to
be 500,000.16 Proof that the opioid epidemic is far from slowing is the latest statistic that
11
Opioid Overdose Crisis, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Jan. 2018, available at
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis.
12
Id.
13
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0168 (2017), citing Act of May 26, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 534, § 3, 2017 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 1467, 1468.
14
Jacqueline Howard, ER Visits for Opioid Overdose up 30%, CDC Study Finds, CNN, Mar. 6, 2018.
15
Id.
16
Max Blau, STAT forecast: Opioids Could Kill Nearly 500,000 American in the next Decade, STAT, June 27,
2017, available at https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/27/opioid-deaths-forecast/; see also Wes Rapaport,
Advocates for Painkiller Advocates Wants Society to Meet Them Halfway, Big Country, Feb. 18, 2018 (stating the
number of opioid overdose deaths is going to go up for at least several more years and explaining how Operation
Naloxone has administered more than $1 million of the powerful antidote).
due to a growing number of Americans using opioids and the opioids themselves are becoming
more deadly.18 The economic burden caused by opioid abuse in the United States is at least $78.5
billion,19 including lost productivity and increased social services, health insurance costs,
increased criminal justice presence and strain on judicial resources, and substance abuse treatment
and rehabilitation.20 In 2015, Texas “had the second highest total healthcare costs from opioid
8. This epidemic did not occur by chance. Defendants manufacture, market, distribute,
and sell prescription opioids, including, but not limited to, brand-name drugs like OxyContin,
Opana, Percocet, Percodan, Duragesic, Ultram, Ultracet, and generics like oxycodone,
narcotics.
9. Historically, opioids were considered too addictive and debilitating for treating non-
cancer chronic pain,22 such as back pain, migraines, and arthritis, and were used only to treat short-
10. By the late 1990s or early 2000s, however, each Defendant began a marketing
scheme to persuade doctors and patients that opioids were not addictive and should be used
17
Margot Sanger-Katz, Bleak New Estimates in Drug Epidemic: A Record 72,000 Overdose Deaths in 2017, The
New York Times, Aug. 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/upshot/opioids-overdose-deaths-rising-
fentanyl.html (representing a 9.5 percent increase from 2016).
18
Id.
19
CDC Foundation’s New Business Pulse Focuses on Opioid Overdose Epidemic, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Mar. 15, 2017, available at https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2017/a0315-business-pulse-
opioids.html.
20
Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra.
21
Kerry Craig, Opioid Addiction Results in one Woman’s Daily Struggle, Sulphur Springs News-Telegram, Oct. 7,
2017, available at https://www.ssnewstelegram.com/news/opioid-addiction-results-in-one-woman-s-daily-
struggle/article_bded4eoa-ab80-11e7-a252-d3f304e26628.html.
22
“Chronic pain” means non-cancer pain lasting three months or longer.
“increase opioid use” and their campaign emphasizing “the alleged undertreatment of pain
continue to be significant factors of the [opioid] escalation.”24 Defendants reassured the medical
community that opioids were not addictive and doctors prescribed them at a higher rate.25
Consequently, the National Institute of Drug Abuse attributes the opioid crises to Defendants’
successful marketing campaign.26 Each Defendant spent, and continues to spend large sums of
money to promote the benefits of opioids for non-cancer moderate pain while trivializing or even
11. The Defendants’ promotional messages deviated substantially from any approved
labeling of the drugs and caused prescribing physicians and consuming patients to underappreciate
12. Contrary to the language of their drugs’ labels, Defendants falsely and misleadingly,
in their marketing: (1) downplayed the serious risk of addiction; (2) promoted and exaggerated the
concept of “pseudoaddiction” thereby advocating that the signs of addiction should be treated with
more opioids; (3) exaggerated the effectiveness of screening tools in preventing addiction; (4)
claimed that opioid dependence and withdrawal are easily managed; (5) denied the risks of higher
opioid dosages; and (6) exaggerated the effectiveness of “abuse-deterrent” opioid formulations to
23
See e.g., Opioid Overdose Crisis, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Jan. 2018, available at
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (explaining the greater rate of prescribing
opioids due to misinformation to physicians, which led to a diversion and misuse of opioids before anyone knew
opioids were highly addictive).
24
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 1.
25
CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System, Mortality, CDC Wonder, Atlanta, Ga: US Department of Health
and Human Services, 2017, available at https://wonder.cdc.gov.
26
See id.
Defendants’ behest, promoted highly addictive opioids through souvenirs and toys including, but
not limited to, opioid brand-bearing stuffed plush toys, dolls, coffee cups, fanny packs, water
bottles, notepads, pens, refrigerator magnets, clocks, letter openers, rulers, daytime planners, bags,
puzzles, posters, hand-held calculators, clipboards, highlighters, flashlights, key chains, clothing,
14. Defendants also used third parties they controlled by: (a) funding, assisting,
encouraging, and directing doctors, known as “key opinion leaders” (“KOLs”) and (b) funding,
assisting, directing, and encouraging seemingly neutral and credible professional societies and
15. Defendants worked with KOLs and Front Groups to taint the sources that doctors
and patients relied on for ostensibly “neutral” guidance, such as treatment guidelines, Continuing
Medical Education (“CME”) programs, medical conferences and seminars, and scientific articles.
Through their individual and concerted efforts, Defendants convinced doctors that instead of being
addictive and unsafe for long-term use in most circumstances, opioids were required in the
16. Defendants’ aggressive marketing of opioids for chronic pain is “based on unsound
science and blatant misinformation, and accompanied by the dangerous assumptions that opioids
are highly effective and safe, and devoid of adverse events when prescribed by physicians.”27
Nevertheless, Defendants’ marketing was effective and, by 2011 there were 136.7 million
prescriptions for hydrocodone alone, with all opioids exceeding 238 million.28 Data demonstrates
27
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 1-4.
28
Id.
17. Essentially each Defendant ignored science and consumer health for profits.
Defendants’ efforts were so successful that opioids are now the most prescribed class of drugs
generating $11 billion in revenue for drug companies in 2014 alone. Sales for Purdue’s OxyContin
grew from $48 million in 1996 to $1.1 billion in 2000 after it successfully and aggressively
marketed and promoted its opioid.30 In fact, OxyContin was a “leading drug of abuse” by 2004
through its availability.31 Even after Purdue reached a $600 million federal settlement in 2007, the
misleading marketing campaign to Angelina County physicians and residents regarding the safety
and efficacy of using opioids for chronic non-cancer pain that resulted in an oversupply of opioids,
Angelina County has spent and continues to spend large sums of money combatting the public
health crisis.
19. The money Angelina County has spent comes directly from its taxpayers. These
taxpayers include Angelina County physicians, who passed on Defendants’ misleading safety and
efficacy information and prescribed more opioids to taxpaying residents in Angelina County.
These taxpayers also included Angelina County residents who either suffered the addictive effects
of consuming opioids or overdosed using Defendants’ opioids that had been over-prescribed and
over-supplied to Angelina County as intended by Defendants herein. Thus, this group of Angelina
County residents has suffered not only injury to property, but also bodily injury, as a result of
29
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 1-4.
30
Art Van Zee, M.D., The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy,
99 Am. J. Public Health 221, Feb. 2009, at 1, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
31
Zee, supra.
32
Rebecca L. Haffajee, J.D., Ph.D., M.P.H. and Michelle M. Mello, J.D., Ph.D., Drug Companies’ Liability for the
Opioid Epidemic, N. Engl. J. Med., Dec. 14, 2017, at 2305.
20. Angelina County has spent and continues to spend large sums of money combatting
the opioid crisis created by Defendants’ negligent and fraudulent marketing campaign. Across the
country, including Texas, increased opioid prescribing has caused and continues to cause an
increase in overdoses and death. Defendants tracked the CDC data and knew that the more they
promoted opioid prescribing and distributed more opioids that non-therapeutic outcomes, such as
overdose, addiction, and criminality would occur. By 2010, enough opioids had been sold to
medicate every American adult with a typical dose of 5 mg of hydrocodone every 4 hours for 1
month.33 The increased use of opioids has contributed to the increased rate of overdose deaths and
nonmedical use with the varying rates of sales in each state impacting the outcomes in each state.34
“Given that 3% of physicians accounted for 62% of the [opioids] prescribed in one study, the
proliferation of high-volume prescribers can have a large impact on state use of [opioids] and
overdose death rates.”35 Not surprisingly, “[l]arge increases in overdoses involving the types of
drugs sold by illegitimate pain clinics (i.e., ‘pill mills’) have been reported in Florida and Texas.”36
In Angelina County, the prescription rate per 100 people in 2015 was 105.4, which means that
every man, woman, and child in Angelina County could have had at least one bottle of opioids.37
From 2015 - 2016, there were 10 – 11.9 deaths per 100,000 people reported from drug overdoses.38
A substantial number of those overdose deaths were a result, in whole or in part, of opioid
prescription opioids than can be consumed therapeutically, were natural and foreseeable causes of
33
Center for Disease Control, Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers – United States, 1999-
2008, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), Nov. 4, 2011.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Center for Disease Control, available at https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html.
38
Center for Disease Control, available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data-visualization/drug-poisoning-mortality.
regarding prescription opioids, Angelina County has committed and continues to commit resources
to provide and pay additional health care, law enforcement, social services, public assistance,
22. Per Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the County states that although the
full measure of its damages is still being calculated, its damages caused by Defendants’ acts and
omissions exceed $1,000,000 but are believed to be less than $100,000,000. Accordingly, at this time
in the litigation, Angelina County states that it is seeking monetary relief for an amount greater than
$1,000,000 and less than $100,000,000, the rightful and just amount to be determined by the jury.
III. STANDING
23. Angelina County has standing to bring this lawsuit because it has suffered an injury-
in-fact caused by Defendants’ misconduct, and that harm can be redressed through this action.
Having decided that it was necessary to pursue these claims to protect the County’s interests, the
County hired outside counsel to handle the litigation.39 The contract governing the County’s
representation in this litigation was approved by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
resources and ability to provide the public services and employee benefits it is obligated to and/or
39
See Resolution for approval of bringing suit on behalf of Angelina County, Texas, vs. various drug manufacturers,
developers, suppliers and others of a class of pharmaceutical class of drugs commonly referred to as opioids and
approval of Professional Services Agreement for Special Counsel attached hereto as Exhibit G and Executed and
Approved Retention Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit H.
40
See Exhibit H.
and/or authority to provide public safety and health services, including, but not limited to, the
following:
· Supporting paupers;41
· Paying county and precinct officers and employee compensation, office and
travel expenses, and any other allowances.48
of misinformation to physicians and patients − caused the damages to the County. They misled
physicians into overprescribing opioids, which directly created the need for dramatically increased
public services. The County relied on these misrepresentations in paying for its employees’
healthcare costs causing the County to incur increased healthcare costs for its own employees.
26. The harm caused by Defendants’ misconduct can be redressed by the Court in this
action. Defendants should be enjoined from continuing to manufacture, distribute, and sell opioids
in Angelina County without educating physicians and patients about the actual risks and benefits
41
Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 81.027.
42
Id. at § 351.001.
43
Id. at § 351.045.
44
Id. at § 352.001.
45
Id. at § 370.003.
46
Tex. Health & Safety Code at § 464.032.
47
Id. at § 465.001
48
Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 152.011.
expended and continues to expend for medical insurance claims for opioids that were not medically
necessary, as well as increased costs of social services, health systems, law enforcement, the
27. Venue is proper in Angelina County because all or a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in Angelina County. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§15.002(a)(2). This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff’s damages
are in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limits of this Court. TEX. GOVT. CODE §24.007(b).
28. This Court has specific jurisdiction over all Defendants as their activities were
directed toward Texas, and injuries complained of herein resulted from their activities. Guardian
Royal Exchange Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991).
Each Defendant has a substantial connection with Texas and the requisite minimum contacts with
Texas necessary to constitutionally permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 226.
V. PARTIES
A. Plaintiff
29. This action is brought for and on behalf of Angelina County, which provides a
wide range of services on behalf of its residents, including services for families and children,
B. Defendants
30. PURDUE PHARMA L.P. is a limited partnership organized under the laws of
Delaware with its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut, and has at all times relevant
to this litigation, conducted business in this State. Said limited partnership is required to maintain
limited partnership may be served with process through the Secretary of State for the State of
Texas at its registered agent in Delaware, The Prentice-Hall Corporation System, Inc., 251 Little
Falls Drive, Wilmington, DE 19808, pursuant to the Texas Long-Arm Statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code §§ 17.041-.045. PURDUE PHARMA L.P. is, through its ownership structure, a Texas
resident. PURDUE PHARMA INC. is a New York corporation with its principal place of business
in Stamford, Connecticut, and has at all times relevant to this litigation, conducted business in this
State. Said corporation is required to maintain a registered agent for service of process but has not
designated such an agent. Therefore, said corporation may be served with process through the
Secretary of State for the State of Texas at its registered agent in Delaware, Corporation Service
Company, 80 State Street, Albany, NY 12207, pursuant to the Texas Long-Arm Statute, Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 17.041-.045. THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut, and has at all times
relevant to this litigation, conducted business in this State. Said corporation is required to maintain
a registered agent for service of process but has not designated such an agent. Therefore, said
corporation may be served with process through the Secretary of State for the State of Texas at its
registered agent in Delaware, The Prentice-Hall Corporation System, Inc., 251 Little Falls Drive,
Wilmington, DE 19808, pursuant to the Texas Long-Arm Statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§§ 17.041-.045 (Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., and The Purdue Frederick Company are
31. Purdue manufactures, promotes, sells, and distributes opioids in the U.S. and
Angelina County. Purdue’s opioid drug, OxyContin, is one of the most addictive and abused
prescription drugs in American history. Purdue promotes opioids throughout the United States and
principal place of business in Titusville, New Jersey, and may be served through its registered
agent for service of process, CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, TX
JOHNSON. JOHNSON & JOHNSON (“J&J”) is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place
of business in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and has at all times relevant to this litigation conducted
business in this State. Said corporation is required to maintain a registered agent for service of
process but has not designated such an agent. Therefore, said corporation may be served with
process through the Secretary of State for the State of Texas at its corporate headquarters,
Attention: Legal Department, One Johnson & Johnson Plaza, New Brunswick, NJ 08933, pursuant
to the Texas Long-Arm Statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 17.041-.045. ORTHO-MCNEIL-
INC., is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Titusville, New Jersey,
and may be served through its registered agent for service of process, CT Corporation System,
1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, TX 75201. JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA INC., now
principal place of business in Titusville, New Jersey, and may be served through its registered
agent for service of process, CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, TX
75201. J&J is the only company that owns more than 10% of Janssen Pharmaceuticals’ stock, and
corresponds with the FDA regarding Janssen’s products. Upon information and belief, J&J
controls the sale and development of Janssen Pharmaceuticals’ drugs and Janssen’s profits inure
33. Janssen manufactures, promotes, sells, and distributes opioids in the U.S. and in
Angelina County.
34. ENDO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC. is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Malvern, Pennsylvania, and has at all times relevant to this litigation conducted
business in this State. Said corporation is required to maintain a registered agent for service of
process but has not designated such an agent. Therefore, said corporation may be served with
process through the Secretary of State for the State of Texas at its registered agent in Delaware,
The Corporation Trust Company, Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange St., Wilmington, DE
19801, pursuant to the Texas Long-Arm Statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 17.041-.045.
SOLUTIONS INC., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Malvern,
Pennsylvania, and may be served through its registered agent for service of process, CT
Corporation System, 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, TX 75201 (Endo Health Solutions Inc.
35. Endo develops, markets, and sells opioid drugs in the U.S. and in Angelina County.
Endo also manufactures and sells generic opioids in the U.S. and Angelina County, by itself and
36. The County lacks information sufficient to specifically identify the true names or
capacities, whether individual, corporate or otherwise, of Defendants sued herein under the
fictitious names DOES 1 through 100 inclusive. The County will amend this Petition to show their
true names and capacities if and when they are ascertained. Angelina County is informed and
believes, and on such information and belief alleges, that each of the Defendants named as a DOE
and, as such, shares liability for at least some part of the relief sought herein.
37. Before the 1990s, generally accepted standards of medical practice dictated that
opioids should be used only for short-term acute pain – pain relating to recovery from surgery or
for cancer or palliative (end-of-life) care. Using opioids for chronic pain was discouraged or even
prohibited because there was a lack of evidence that opioids improved patients’ ability to
overcome pain and function. Instead the evidence demonstrated that patients developed tolerance
to opioids over time, which increased the risk of addiction and other side effects.
38. After the 1990s, Defendants dramatically changed doctors’ views regarding
opioids through a well-funded deceptive marketing scheme. Defendants were so successful that,
according to the National Safety Council, 74% of all doctors prescribe opioids for chronic back
pain and 55% prescribe opioids for dental pain, “neither of which is appropriate in most cases.”49
And 99% of doctors are prescribing them for longer than the three-day recommended period as
recommended by the CDC.50 Twenty-three percent prescribe at least a month’s worth of opioids
and evidence shows that just 30 days of usage can cause brain damage.51
39. Each Defendant used direct marketing and unbranded advertising (i.e., advertising
that promotes opioid use generally but does not name a specific opioid) disseminated by seemingly
independent third parties to spread false and deceptive statements about the risks and benefits of
long-term opioid use. Defendants advocated the widespread use of opioids for chronic pain even
49
National Safety Council, NSC Poll: 99% of Doctors Prescribe Highly-Addictive Opioids Longer than CDC
Recommends, 2017 (The NSC was founded in 1913 and chartered by Congress and is a non-profit organization
whose mission is to save lives by preventing injuries and deaths at work, in homes, and in the communities through
leadership, research, education, and advocacy).
50
National Safety Council, NSC Poll, supra.
51
National Safety Council, NSC Poll, supra.
40. Defendants spread their false and deceptive statements by (1) marketing their
branded opioids directly to doctors treating patients residing in Angelina County and the Angelina
County patients themselves and (2) deploying so-called unbiased and independent third parties to
Angelina County.
41. Defendants’ direct marketing of opioids generally proceeded on two tracks. First,
each Defendant conducted advertising campaigns touting the purported benefits of their branded
drugs. For example, Purdue spent $200 million promoting and marketing OxyContin in various
forms.53 Defendants spent more than $14 million on medical journal advertising of opioids in 2011,
nearly triple what they spent in 2001, including $8.3 million by Purdue, $4.9 million by Janssen,
42. A number of Defendants’ branded ads deceptively portrayed the benefits of opioids
for chronic pain. For example, Endo distributed and made available on its website,
physically demanding jobs like a construction worker and chef, implying that the drug would
43. Purdue also ran a series of ads, called “pain vignettes,” for OxyContin in 2012 in
medical journals. These ads featured chronic pain patients and recommended OxyContin for each.
52
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 2.
53
Zee, Ex. B, at 2.
OxyContin would help the writer work more effectively. Second, each Defendant promoted the
use of opioids for chronic pain through “detailers” – sales representatives who visited individual
doctors and medical staff in their offices – and small-group speaker programs.
44. Defendants devoted massive resources to direct sales contacts with doctors. In 2014
alone, Defendants spent $154 million on detailing branded opioids to doctors, including $108
45. Defendants sent their sales representatives to prescribers based on their specialties
and prescribing habits obtained from sales data through IMS Health. Defendants used this data to
monitor, and thereby target, specific physicians through the initial and renewal prescribing rates.
To ensure that their sales representatives were properly incentivized, Defendants motivated them
through bonuses. In 2001, Purdue paid $20 million in “sales incentive bonuses” to its sales
representatives.54
46. Defendants also utilized “influence mapping” to use decile rankings or similar
breakdowns to identify high-volume prescribers. The underlying strategy was that detailers would
have the biggest sales impact on high-volume prescribers. For example, Endo identified
prescribers representing 30% of its nationwide sales volume and planned sales visits three times
per month to these physicians. These detailers visited physicians across the nation, including
physicians in Angelina County. Defendants also had access to data from IMS Health, which
provides Defendants specific details about which medications physicians prescribe and how
frequently they do so. This data was collected from more than 50% of the pharmacies in the United
States, which would inform Defendants which doctors to target to convince them to prescribe more
54
Zee, Ex. B, at 2.
47. Another manner in which Defendants expanded their sales was to target prescribers
in individual zip codes and local boundaries. Defendants would send a detailer based on ease of
in-person access and the likelihood of convincing the physician to prescribe a higher number of
48. As part and parcel of their detailing of opioids to physicians, Purdue trained its sales
representatives to inform physicians that the risk of addiction was “less than one percent” even
though studies demonstrated that there was a high incidence of drug abuse associated with
49. As Defendants’ marketing efforts grew, they targeted nurse practitioners and
physician assistants who, a 2012 Endo business plan noted, were “share acquisition” opportunities
because they were more responsive than physicians to details and wrote most of their prescriptions
50. Studies demonstrate that visits from sales representatives influence the prescribing
practices of residents and physicians by curtailing the prescription of generic drugs and rapidly
expanding the prescription of new drugs, such as opioids for chronic pain.56
51. Defendants also paid doctors to serve on speakers’ bureaus, to attend programs, and
for meals.57 In 2017, Dr. Hadland identified some of these payments from pharmaceutical
companies to physicians prescribing opioids.58 It was the first time “industry payments to
physicians related to opioid marketing” could be collated because of the “Open Payments program
55
Zee, Ex. B, at 3.
56
Zee, Ex. B, at 6.
57
See Scott E. Hadland, M.D., M.P.H, M.S., Industry Payments to Physicians for Opioid Products, 2013-2015, 107
Am. J of Pub. Health 9, Sept. 2017, attached hereto as Exhibit C.
58
Exhibit C at 1493.
52. One statistic Dr. Hadland gleaned from the data is that nearly 1 in 5 family
physicians in 2013, out of 108,971 active family physicians, received an opioid-related payment.61
After culling through the Open Payments program database, Dr. Hadland concluded that
53. Some of the financial transfers most likely involved speaker programs, which
provided: (1) an incentive for doctors to prescribe a particular opioid (so they might be selected to
promote the drug); (2) recognition and compensation for the doctors selected as speakers; and (3)
an opportunity to promote the drug through the speaker to his or her peers. These speakers gave
the false impression that they were providing unbiased and medically accurate presentations when
they were, in fact, presenting a script prepared by Defendants. On information and belief, these
presentations conveyed misleading information, omitted material information, and failed to correct
54. Defendants employed the same marketing plans, strategies, and messages in and
around Angelina County, Texas as they did nationwide. Across the pharmaceutical industry, “core
message” development is funded and overseen on a national basis by corporate headquarters. This
comprehensive approach ensures that Defendants’ messages are accurately and consistently
delivered across marketing channels and in each sales territory. Defendants consider this high level
59
Exhibit C.
60
Id. at 1495.
61
Hadland, Ex. C, at 1494.
62
Id. at 1495.
55. Defendants also deceptively marketed opioids in and around Angelina County
through unbranded advertising. This advertising was ostensibly created and disseminated by
independent third parties. But by funding, directing, reviewing, editing, and distributing this
unbranded advertising, Defendants controlled the deceptive messages disseminated by these third
parties and acted in concert with them to falsely and misleadingly promote opioids for treating
chronic pain. Unbranded advertising also avoided regulatory scrutiny because Defendants did not
have to submit it to the FDA, and therefore it was not reviewed by the FDA. But it is illegal for a
drug company to distribute materials that exclude contrary evidence or information about the
drug’s safety or efficacy that “clearly cannot be supported by the results of the study.”63 Moreover,
a drug company cannot compare or suggest that its “drug is safer or more effective than another
drug…when it has not been demonstrated to be safer or more effective in such particular by
to ensure that not only is its label accurate and complete, but that any and all materials they
materials. For example, Endo’s unbranded advertising contradicted its concurrent, branded
63
21 C.F.R. § 99.101(a)(4).
64
21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(6)(ii).
65
See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (providing general requirements for prescription drug labeling); 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A-C) (providing for changes to labels that strengthen precautions, warnings, or adverse reactions,
as well as statements about drug abuse, dependence, or overdosage); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)
(holding that a drug company bears responsibility for the content of its drug label at all times).
57. Drug companies that make, market, and distribute opioids are generally subject to
rules requiring truthful marketing of prescription drugs. A drug company’s branded marketing,
which identifies and promotes a specific drug, must: (a) be consistent with its label and supported
by substantial scientific evidence; (b) not include false or misleading statements or material
omissions; and (c) fairly balance the drug’s benefits and risks.66
58. This framework ensures that drug companies, which are best suited to understand
the properties and effect of their drugs, bear the responsibility of providing accurate information
so that prescribers and users can assess the risks and benefits of the drugs.
59. Defendants did not follow this framework in assisting, creating, and/or distributing
third-party publications that included warnings and instructions either mandated by the FDA-
required drug labels or that described the risks and benefits known to Defendants. The publications
either failed to disclose the risk of addiction and misuse or affirmatively denied the risk of
addiction. The publications also “appeared” to be independent third-party materials that had the
effect of carrying more weight and credibility to convince physicians that opioids were safe for
chronic pain.
60. Defendants used treatment guidelines to normalize the use of opioids for chronic
66
21 U.S.C. § 352(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.21(a); 202.1(e)(3); 202.1(e)(6).
when faced with patients complaining of chronic pain. Scientific literature references treatment
guidelines in making its conclusions and third-party payers use treatment guidelines to determine
coverage. Even Endo’s internal documents indicate that sales representatives discussed treatment
61. Headquartered in Euless, Texas, the Federation of State Medical Boards (“FSMB”)
is a trade organization representing the various state medical boards in the United States. The state
boards that comprise the FSMB membership have the power to license doctors, investigate
complaints, and discipline doctors. The FSMB finances opioid and pain-specific programs through
62. In 1998, the FSMB developed Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled
Substances for the Treatment of Pain (“FSMB Guidelines”), which was produced in collaboration
with pharmaceutical companies. The FSMB guidelines instructed that opioids were “essential” for
63. A book adapted from the 2007 FSMB guidelines, Responsible Opioid Prescribing:
A Physician’s Guide (“Opioid Prescribing”), released March 1, 2009 makes these same claims.
Opioid Prescribing was supported by a consortium of pharmaceutical companies and Front Groups
with an interest in ensuring that “effective” pain management included the use of opioids.
64. The author of Opioid Prescribing, Scott Fishman, M.D., chaired the board and was
past president of the American Pain Foundation and served as president of the American Academy
of Pain Medicine and served on the board of directors. Opioid Prescribing was sponsored by the
Alliance of State Pain Initiatives, Federation of State Medical Boards, and the University of
65. Dr. Fishman was a paid consultant to Cephalon and Eli Lilly. Dr. Fishman was also
a paid consultant, on the Speakers’ Bureau, and part of the research support for Endo, Merck,
66. Opioid Prescribing was designed for continued medical education (“CME”) in
which a physician had to read the book, complete questions, and fulfill administrative steps to
receive 7.5 hours of credit. The first page of Opioid Prescribing specifically states that opioids
are the “drugs of choice” and “essential in the treatment of persons with chronic non-cancer pain”
and that the CME will inform physicians about the laws and regulations governing the prescribing
of opioids for pain control.69 It also specifically teaches physicians how to protect their practices
67. Opioid Prescribing marketed “[o]pioid analgesics” as the “drugs of choice for the
management of moderate to severe pain . . . [which] may be essential in the treatment of persons
with chronic non-cancer pain.”71 The goal was to “change patient care, medical knowledge,
practice-based learning, interpersonal and communication skills, and professionalism . . . .”72 The
argument was that opioids were “underutilized” despite their “effectiveness.”73 The truth, known
to Dr. Fishman and Defendants herein, was that using opioids “for other than legitimate medical
purposes pose[d] a threat to the individual and society,” posed high risks for overdose and
addiction, and remained unproven as safe and effective for the long-term treatment of non-cancer
67
Scott M. Fishman, M.D., Responsible Opioid Prescribing, A Physician’s Guide, FSMB Foundation, Waterford
Life Sciences, 2009.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Fishman supra, at i.
72
Id.
73
Fishman supra.
68. It was even conveyed to doctors that undertreating pain would be officially
disciplined whereas doctors prescribing opioids for chronic pain would not be disciplined. Opioid
Prescribing described a case in which a physician was sued for “elder abuse” and the jury awarded
$1.5 million to the plaintiff as an example of a physician that had been “successfully sued for not
treating pain aggressively.”75 Opioid Prescribing cautioned that “these legal precedents sound a
warning that there are risks associated with under-treating.”76 In actuality, it was a threat that
doctors would be punished if they failed to prescribe opioids to patients who complained about
pain. That teaching has held true given that according to the National Safety Council, 67% of
74% of doctors incorrectly believe morphine and oxycodone are the most effective ways to treat
pain even though research shows that over-the-counter medications such as ibuprofen and
acetaminophen are the most effective pain relief for acute pain.78
69. Defendants also allayed any concerns doctors may have about patients exhibiting
addictive behavior by highlighting the now debunked myth of “pseudoaddiction.” Dr. Fishman
described pseudoaddiction as a sign that patients were receiving an inadequate dose to obtain pain
relief, not as a sign that the patient was exhibiting drug-seeking or addictive behavior.79
70. Prescribing Opioids taught physicians that the following signs were evidence of
“pseudoaddiction” and not drug seeking behavior or signs of addiction so long as prescribing
74
Fishman supra. at 6, 9.
75
Id. at 28.
76
Fishman, supra.
77
National Safety Council, supra.
78
National Safety Council, supra.
79
Fishman, supra, at 62.
· Clock watching;
· Hoarding opioids.80
71. Indeed, the types of behaviors that Dr. Fishman posed as “MORE indicative of
addiction” included:
72. Certainly by the time a patient is performing sex for drugs, the patient has long been
addicted and exhibited addictive behavior that was ignored by physicians at the explicit direction
73. In the DSM-IV, addiction is “manifested” by three (or more) of the following in a
or
80
Fishman supra.
81
Fishman supra, at 63.
or
signs of addiction as defined by the American Psychiatric Association are not signs of addiction,
but of pseudoaddiction that justifies taking more opioids for a longer period of time.
75. The reason not to discontinue the use of opioids – indeed, the foundation upon
which Defendants built its opioid empire – was “the undertreatment of pain.”83 Opioid Prescribing
claimed the undertreatment of pain has “been recognized as a public health crisis for decades. The
cost of human suffering is immeasurable. Turning away patients in pain simply is not an option.”84
However, according to Dr. Donald Treater, medical advisor at The National Safety Council:
76. Prescribing Opioids acknowledged that by 2005, more than 10 million Americans
were abusing prescription drugs, which is more than the combined number of people abusing
82
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Ed.,
Washington, D.C., American Psychiatric Assoc., 2000.
83
Fishman, supra, at 105.
84
Fishman, supra; see also id. at 80 (stating that efforts have been made to reduce the undertreatment or non-
treatment of pain in children, the elderly, and in other vulnerable patient populations).
85
National Safety Council, supra.
opioids are associated with more overdose deaths than cocaine and heroin combined.87 Yet the
book then cautioned that the “undertreatment” of non-cancer pain was a public health crisis of
77. Under the guise of addressing “legitimate cause of undertreated pain” that “patients
and advocates have been pushing to address,”88 Defendants tailored opioid marketing campaigns
to affect children and the elderly. The Defendants made significant efforts to promote more opioid
prescribing for “untreated or undertreated pain in children, older patients, and in all other
78. Defendants also taught physicians that “[p]ain is what the patient says it is” and that
a physician “cannot measure or even confirm the pain that a patient is experiencing.”90 As such,
“pain remains an untestable hypothesis.”91 Furthermore, “[p]atients should not be denied opioid
medications except in light of clear evidence that such medications are harmful to the patient.”92
All in all, opioids would cure the “pain epidemic” facing Americans. And yet, chronic pain
continues to be a problem facing Americans, as well as an opioid epidemic of addiction and death.
79. A total of 200,000 copies of Opioid Prescribing, which Dr. Fishman wrote for the
FSMB, has been delivered to U.S. prescribers through 20 state medical boards, including Texas.93
The FSMB earned approximately $250,000 from the sale. The FSMB website describes the book
as the “leading continuing medication education (CME) activity for prescribers of opioid
86
Responsible Opioid Prescribing, supra, at 6.
87
Id.; Prescribing Opioids even recognized that “[b]ehind these figures lie millions of individual stories of personal
tragedy: untimely death, fractures families, shattered dreams and wasted lives.” Id. at 7.
88
Id. at 8.
89
Fishman, supra, at 8.
90
Fishman supra, at 14.
91
Id. at 13.
92
Id. at 9.
93
Scott M. Fishman, M.D., Listening to Pain, Oxford Univ. Press, 2012, at 135.
80. The guidelines for Opioid Prescribing were posted online for use and reliance by
physicians throughout America, including but not limited to, those servicing patients in Angelina
County. State medical boards even encouraged physicians to buy the book and participate in the
CME. The North Carolina Medical Board stated on its website that Prescribing Opioids “has been
widely used and supported in the medical and regulatory communities as the leading continuing
medical education (CME) activity for prescribers of opioid medications.”94 The website then
informs physicians that a CME accompanies the book and directs them to the book and how to
claim the CME. The FSMB also hosted free CMEs in Texas, including Houston, Dallas, and
Austin, related to extended-release and long-acting opioids.95 The CME taught physicians the “safe
and responsible prescribing of opioid medications and [was] aimed at improving prescriber
training and counseling for patients while providing more thorough information on extended-
81. The impact of Opioid Prescribing was even studied through a survey sent to 12,666
licensed Georgia physicians six weeks after receiving the book.97 The lead author was a member
of FSMB.98 A total of 508 physicians completed the online survey and of those, 82.1% rated the
book either “very good” or “good” for improving care for their patients in pain.99 Almost one-third
94
North Carolina Medical Board, FSMB Foundation Publishes Second Edition of Prescribing Book, Forum
Newsletter, July 31, 2012; see also University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, Federation of
State Medical Boards, Responsible Opioid Prescribing – Book Helps Physicians Reduce Risk of Opioid Diversion
and Abuse, April 1, 2009 (describing the book and CME activity).
95
Texas Medical Board, Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid Analgesics Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy, www.tmb.state.tx.us.
96
Id.
97
A. Young, Physician Survey Examining the Impact of an Educational Tool for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, J.
Opioid Management, Mar-Apr. 2012.
98
Id.
99
Id.
note, 42.8% of solo practitioners and 41.6% of primary care providers were more likely to make
changes to their practice than doctors in other areas.101 Of the respondents, 57.7% said that the
book was better than others with regard to prescribing opioids and on pain management.102
82. Opioid Prescribing was therefore an effective tool that impacted specific doctors
and their prescribing practices, as concluded by the study. Specifically, the study provided “insight
into which physician population would be the most receptive to the type of information presented
in Dr. Fishman’s book” and that population was to “first target[] solo and primary care
physicians.”103 Defendants found out that their educational efforts “significantly altered
prescription practices.”104
is a United States-based non-profit, tax-exempt organization that “accredits and certifies nearly
21,000 health care organizations and programs in the United States.”105 A majority of state
governments recognize accreditation from the Joint Commission as a condition of licensure and
for receiving Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements.106 CHI St. Luke’s Health Memorial System
in Lufkin, Texas, which is one of the main hospitals that feeds into Angelina County, is accredited
100
A. Young, supra.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
A. Young, supra.
105
www.jointcommission.org.
106
Anthony Anonimo, Poppy Seed. Revealing the Roots of the Opioid Epidemic, Trinity Mother Frances Health
System, 2017, at 65.
107
www.jointcommission.org.
and inspires health care organizations “to excel in providing safe and effective care of the highest
quality and value.”108 The JCAHO is not independent, but has been influenced by Defendants and
those Defendants used the JCAHO as a marketing shill to spread the misleading message that
opioids are non-addictive and safe as a first-line analgesic to treat any complaint of pain.
Organizational Approach (“Pain Assessment”), which was paid for by Purdue and reviewed by
June L. Dahl, Ph.D., who has worked for Abbott, Endo, and Purdue.109
86. The JCAHO mission statement on the inside cover page of the book explains that
it aspires “to continuously improve the safety and quality of care provided to the public through
the provision of health care accreditation and related services that support the performance
improvement in health care organizations.”110 One of its big achievements, however, is its
message.
87. JCAHO, with the help of the American Pain Society (“APS”), a Front Group,
loosened pain management standards thereby allowing doctors to prescribe opioids for any
complaint of pain. To that end, “[t]he Joint Commission recognize[d] pain as a major, yet largely
avoidable, problem . . . .[and] has expanded the scope of its pain management standards, which
have been endorsed by the American Pain Society (APS), to cover all pain scenarios in accredited
health care organizations rather than limiting the scope to end-of-life care.”111 (Emphasis
added.) On January 1, 2001, Texas incorporated JCAHO pain management standards for hospital
108
www.jointcommission.org.
109
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Pain Assessment and Management, 2000.
110
Pain Assessment, supra.
111
Pain Assessment, supra.
Assessment “provides practical help in integrating pain assessment and management into
88. Pain Assessment established the cornerstone of Defendants’ message that “all pain
scenarios” should be included in pain management practices.114 It explained that “[p]ain is the
most common reason individuals seek medical attention. According to the American Pain Society
(APS), 50 million Americans are partially or totally disabled by pain.”115 “The conclusion? Pain
therapies. Why?”116
89. The answer is on the first page of Pain Assessment. There is a chronic pain
epidemic. Chronic pain is undertreated. Chronic pain can be managed and even cured with opioids,
which are safe and effective, according to Pain Assessment. And the JCAHO encouraged
organizations to establish standards for recording and responding to patient pain reports and
monitoring staff performance and compliance with those standards, so that a physician who did
not agree with the JCAHO standards faced the specter of poor performance evaluations.117
90. According to Pain Assessment, the reasons healthcare professionals had not used
opioids previously included: (1) inadequate knowledge of opioids pharmacology and pain therapy,
(2) poor pain assessment practices, (3) unfounded concerns about regulatory oversight, and (4)
112
Texas Medical Association, JCAHO Pain Management Services, available at
https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=2389&terms=The%20war%20on%20pain.
113
Pain Assessment, supra.
114
Pain Assessment, supra, at p. 1.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Pain Assessment, supra, at 41-42.
118
Pain Assessment, supra.
management in medical school or during their residency resulting in the failure to prescribe opioids
or nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS) on a regular basis leaving patients without pain
relief.119 “[Many] health care professionals lack the knowledge and skills to manage pain
effectively, and they fear the effects of treatment.”120 Too few health care systems make pain
management a priority.121 Some clinicians had “inaccurate and exaggerated concerns about
addiction, tolerance, respiratory depression, and other opioid side effects, which lead them to be
extremely cautious about the use of drugs.”122 Instead of expanding upon and explaining the risks
of opioids, Pain Assessment states: “This attitude prevails despite the fact there is no evidence
that addiction is a signification issue when persons are given opioids for pain control.”123
(Emphasis added). That claim of insignificant addiction risk was false when made and remains
false today. Yet it worked as intended to mislead treating doctors, medical staff, and patients into
believing opioids could and should be utilized more often. Indeed, 74% of doctors “incorrectly
believe morphine and oxycodone” are the “most effective ways to treat pain” even though research
shows that over-the-counter pain relievers are the most effective for acute pain.124 Even worse,
20% of doctors prescribing opioids prescribed at least a month’s worth, even though the evidence
92. Patients also contributed to the pain epidemic by their reluctance to report their pain
and to take medications,126 according to Pain Assessment. Doctors were instructed to engage
119
Pain Assessment, supra.
120
Id. at 3.
121
Id. at 1.
122
Pain Assessment, supra, at 4.
123
Id.
124
National Safety Council, supra.
125
Pain Assessment, supra.
126
Pain Assessment, supra, at 4.
when the pain begins; (2) helping the doctor or nurse assess the pain; and (3) telling the doctor or
nurse if the pain is not relieved.127 Doctors were taught that “[t]he single most reliable indicator of
the existence and intensity of pain is the individual’s self-report.”128 Indeed, the individual’s self-
report was to be the primary source of information for the doctor and deemed more reliable than
93. The bombardment of information, instruction, books, pamphlets, seminars, ads, and
marketing regarding this “pain epidemic” was so successful that pain has been included as the
“fifth vital sign” to be recorded along with the individual’s temperature, pulse, respiration, and
blood pressure.130 This strategy was first pitched by the APS to ensure that pain management
94. Beginning in 1999, the Veteran’s Health Administration began routinely assessing
pain as the fifth vital sign in every individual.132 And according to Pain Assessment, the research
showed that “when pain assessment information is included in clinical charts, those individuals’
analgesics [meaning opioids] are more likely to be increased.”133 In other words, including pain as
a fifth element results in not only the prescribing of more opioids, it results in the prescribing of
95. Pain Assessment also framed the role of key opinion leaders (“KOL”) as
trustworthy people “to evaluate new clinical information, assess new practices, and then determine
127
Pain Assessment, supra at 8.
128
Id. at 13.
129
Id.
130
Pain Assessment, supra, at 20.
131
Pain Assessment, supra at 20-21.
132
Id. at 21.
133
Pain Assessment, supra.
opinions even though KOLs are not “necessarily innovators or authority figures.”135 KOLs
convinced practitioners that their current chronic pain treatment was “outdated, inappropriate,
96. Expert leaders, on the other hand, influenced and implemented protocols with
determine baseline knowledge, stimulating active participation during educational sessions, using
Academic detailing was modeled after pharmaceutical detailing practices in which representatives
visited physicians to talk about specific medicines, just as Defendants’ representatives met with
physicians to about opioids.139 Simply put, Pain Assessment was a part of a marketing campaign
to plow ground for Defendants to sell more opioids, and the book set forth sophisticated, multi-
layered marketing strategies that were most effective in executing the campaign.
97. If a doctor was not available to prescribe opioids, a nurse would suffice. A nurse
pharmacist, can “serv[e] as role models, provid[e] pain management education and consultation,
and act[s] as agents of change.”140 These educational efforts “significantly altered prescription
practices.”141
134
Pain Assessment, supra, at 24.
135
Id.
136
See id. at 25.
137
Id.
138
Pain Assessment, supra, at 25.
139
Pain Assessment, supra.
140
Pain Assessment, supra.
141
Id.
market for chronic pain. To do so, Defendants literally encouraged patients not to tolerate pain and
to fear pain more than opioid addiction.142 Physicians and their staff were encouraged to educate
their patients about “effective pain management,” which included the use of opioids.143 Pain
Assessment explained research that showed Americans would rather bear pain because they were
afraid of “addiction, dependence on drugs, and tolerance to medications,” which affected not only
the patient’s willingness to report pain, but to use adequate amount of opioids to control the pain.144
A patient’s reluctance to take opioids out of fear they would not function normally meant that the
99. Consequently, the answer was to inform and educate the patient that unrelieved
pain is harmful and that he or she should communicate pain.146 Pain Assessment instructed the use
of pain assessment instruments, including pain intensity scales, to describe the nature of the pain
and stressed that the “most reliable indicator of pain” was the individual’s self-report.147 Once the
patient reported the pain, the physicians and staff were taught to tell the patient about opioids,
explain that opioids were safe and effective, describe the name, dosage, and duration of the opioid
therapy, and explain the risk of pain versus the importance of pain management.148
100. To ensure that patients self-reported pain prior to hospital visits, Pain Assessment
encouraged health care systems to provide individuals and families with pain management
information prior to being admitted.149 And health care systems were told to leave individuals and
142
Pain Assessment, supra at 33.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Pain Assessment, supra, at 33.
146
Id. at 35.
147
Pain Assessment, supra.
148
Id.
149
Pain Assessment, supra at 36.
relief” so that they truly understood the message – that is, if you have “pain,” tell us and we will
provide opioids.
101. The JCAHO was not independent and did not improve the safety or quality of
healthcare. Instead it was hijacked by Defendants to standardize pain management criteria that
required the use of opioids for chronic pain. The JCAHO was merely a pawn in the Defendants’
larger game.
102. Like other books and pamphlets used by Defendants to spread their “message,”
Pain Assessment was distributed throughout the nation and in Texas. As of today, anyone can buy
a used copy of Pain Assessment on Amazon.com for $26.48 plus $5.99 in shipping costs from a
seller in Texas.
103. Defendants also sponsored KOLs, a small circle of doctors who, upon information
and belief, were selected, funded, and elevated by Defendants because they publicly supported
104. Defendants paid KOLs to serve as consultants or to appear on their advisory boards
and to give talks or present CMEs, and Defendants’ support helped these KOLs become respected
industry experts. As they rose to prominence, these KOLs promoted the benefits of opioids to treat
105. KOLs wrote articles and books, gave speeches, and taught CMEs to promote the
utilization of opioids to treat moderate non-cancer pain. Defendants created opportunities for
KOLs to participate in “studies” and write papers for the purpose of advancing Defendants’
marketing theme: opioids should be dispensed regularly and perpetually to treat a broad array of
106. Defendants’ KOLs also served on committees that developed treatment guidelines
that strongly encourage using opioids to treat chronic pain, and on the boards of pro-opioid
advocacy groups and professional societies that develop, select, and present CMEs. Defendants
were able to direct and exert control over each of these activities through their KOLs.
107. Pro-opioid doctors are one of the most important avenues that Defendants use to
spread their false and deceptive statements about the risks and benefits of long-term opioid use.
Defendants know that doctors rely heavily and less critically on their peers for guidance, and KOLs
provide the false appearance of unbiased and reliable support for using opioids for chronic pain.
108. Different Defendants utilized many of the same KOLs. Two of the most prominent
1. Russell Portenoy
109. Dr. Russell Portenoy, former Chairman of the Department of Pain Medicine and
Palliative Care at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York, is one example of a KOL who
Defendants identified and promoted to further their marketing campaign. Dr. Portenoy received
research support, consulting fees, and honoraria from Endo, Janssen, and Purdue (among others),
110. Dr. Portenoy was instrumental in opening the door for the regular use of opioids to
treat chronic pain. He served on the American Pain Society (“APS”)/American Academy of Pain
Medicine (“AAPM”) Guidelines Committees, which endorsed the use of opioids to treat chronic
pain, first in 1997 and again in 2009. He was also a member of the board of the American Pain
appeared on Good Morning America in 2010 to discuss using opioids long-term to treat chronic
pain. On this widely-watched program, broadcast in Texas and across the country, Dr. Portenoy
claimed: “Addiction, when treating pain, is distinctly uncommon. If a person does not have a
history, a personal history, of substance abuse, and does not have a history in the family of
substance abuse, and does not have a very major psychiatric disorder, most doctors can feel very
112. Perhaps realizing that “[m]ore than 16,000 people die from opioid overdoses every
year,” Dr. Portenoy is now having “second thoughts” about the “wider prescription” of drugs like
Vicodin, OxyContin, and Percocet.151 Dr. Portenoy later admitted in a 2010 videotaped interview
that he “gave innumerable lectures in the late 1980s and ‘90s about addiction that weren’t true.”152
According to Dr. Portenoy, because the primary goal was to “destigmatize” opioids, he and other
doctors promoting them overstated their benefits and glossed over their risks.
113. Dr. Portenoy put doctors’ fear that opioids were dangerous and addictive, and
meant only for cancer patients, to rest by arguing that they could be taken safely for months, even
years, by patients with chronic pain.153 Dr. Portenoy, as well as other doctors making the speaker
rounds, asserted that “[l]ess than 1% of opioid users became addicted, the drugs were easy to
114. Dr. Portenoy also conceded that “[d]ata about the effectiveness of opioids does not
exist.”155 Dr. Portenoy candidly stated: “Did I teach about pain management, specifically about
150
Good Morning America television broadcast, ABC News, Aug. 30, 2010.
151
Thomas Catan & Evan Perez, A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts, WALL ST. J., Dec.
17, 2012, attached hereto as Exhibit D.
152
Id.
153
Catan, supra.
154
Catan, supra.
155
Catan, supra.
115. Before his moment of clarity, Dr. Portenoy co-authored a guide to publicize the
benefits of opioids for chronic pain, which was paid for by an unrestricted education grant from
Endo, titled A Clinical Guide to Opioid Analgesia (“Opioid Analgesia”).157 Opioid Analgesia
116. Although Opioid Analgesia claimed “to help clinicians make practical sense of the
varied and often conflicting pharmacologic, clinical and regulatory issues to promote the most
healthful outcomes possible for patients in pain,”159 the reality was that it expressed regret that
federal and state governments had passed controlled substances acts to stem addiction, which had
curtailed the prescription of opioids.160 This regulation, explained Opioid Analgesia, “contributed
117. As with all other books, guidelines, and CMEs promoted by Front Groups and
KOLs, Opioid Analgesia establishes the absolute need for opioids in light of the chronic pain
epidemic. “Because pain is inherently subjective, patient self-report is the ‘gold standard’ for
assessment.”162 If there’s no discernible reason for the pain, then it should be characterized as
“idiopathic.”163 Regardless of how the pain is characterized, the solution, per Opioid Analgesia, is
opioids.
118. “While opioid analgesics are controlled substances, they are also essential
medication and are absolutely necessary for relief of pain.”164 “Opioid analgesics should be
156
Catan, supra.
157
Perry G. Fine, M.D. and Russell K. Portenoy, M.D., A Clinical Guide to Opioid Analgesia, McGraw-Hill, 2004.
158
Id. at 2.
159
Id. at 3.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 6.
162
Fine, supra, at 34.
163
Fine, supra, at 35.
164
Id. at Table 1.
addiction, Opioid Analgesia posits that “[a] patient who has reached middle age without
developing compulsive use behaviors to potentially abusable drugs, including alcohol and nicotine,
addiction.”166
119. Underplaying the risks of addiction, Opioid Analgesia falsely claimed that
“[o]verall, the literature provides evidence that the outcomes of the drug abuse and addiction are
rare among patients who receive opioids for a short period (i.e., for acute pain) and among those
with no history of abuse who receive long-term therapy for medical indications.”167 Even while
admitting there is “very little information about the risks of misuse, abuse, or addiction among
different opioid-treated populations” and even admitting the “[w]hen misused, opioids pose a
threat to society,”168 Defendants’ intentionally marketed opioids as effective and safe for treatment
of chronic pain and summed up the risk of addiction for short-term therapy as “rare.”169
120. Of course when addiction is as narrowly defined as it is in the books, CMEs, and
guidelines that Defendants publishes, the risk of addiction would be termed as “rare.” The
· Forging prescriptions;
165
Fine, supra.
166
Id. at 21.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 31, 2.
169
Fine, supra, at 34.
121. Whereas the following behaviors are “probably less suggestive” of addiction:
122. Instead of these behaviors being symptoms of possible addiction, Dr. Portenoy
physicians to discount these behaviors because “they are driven by desperation surrounding
unrelieved pain” and are “eliminated by measures that relieve the pain, such as an increase in
medication.”173 Instead of treating the “less suggestive” symptoms for what they are – signs of
addiction.
123. Opioid Analgesic was a success for Defendants in that it has been and continues to
be used extensively in CMEs, pamphlets, and reading lists for physicians looking for information
regarding opioids. For example, Opioid Analgesia was cited just last year in a presentation at the
University of North Texas College of Pharmacy on April 28, 2017, entitled Adverse Drug Events
Associated with Opiate-Based Pain Management (Emphasis added). It has also been listed as a
reference for a CME entitled The Management of Opioid-Induced Constipation published by the
University of North Texas Health Science Center, which was valid for CME from May 2009 to
May 2010. Finally, the book was included in the suggested reading list for a seminar entitled When
Opioids Are Indicated for Chronic Pain presented on March 26, 2011, in Houston, Texas.
170
Fine, supra, at 85.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 35.
173
Id.
124. Another KOL, Dr. Lynn Webster, was the co-founder and Chief Medical Director
of Lifetree Clinical Research, an otherwise-unknown pain clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr.
Webster was President in 2013 and is a current board member of AAPM, a Front Group that
ardently supports using opioids for chronic pain. He is a Senior Editor of Pain Medicine, the same
journal that published Endo special advertising supplements recommending Opana ER. Dr.
Webster authored numerous CMEs sponsored by Endo and Purdue while he was receiving
125. In 2011, Dr. Webster presented a program via webinar sponsored by Purdue titled
Managing Patient’s Opioid Use: Balancing the Need and the Risk. Dr. Webster recommended
using risk screening tools, such as urine testing and patient agreements as a way to prevent “overuse
of prescriptions” and “overdose deaths,” which was available to and was intended to reach doctors
126. Dr. Webster also was a leading proponent of the concept of “pseudoaddiction,” the
notion that addictive behaviors should be seen not as warnings, but as indications of undertreated
pain. In Dr. Webster’s description, the only way to differentiate the two was to increase a patient’s
dose of opioids. As he and his co-author wrote in a book entitled Avoiding Opioid Abuse While
Managing Pain (2007), a book that is still available online, when faced with signs of aberrant
behavior, increasing the dose “in most cases . . . should be the clinician’s first response.” Endo
127. Years later, Dr. Webster reversed himself, acknowledging that “[pseudoaddiction]
obviously became too much of an excuse to give patients more medication.”174 Dr. Webster also
174
John Fauber & Ellen Gabler, Networking Fuels Painkiller Boom, MILWAUKEE WISC. J. SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 2012.
addiction.”175
128. Defendants entered into arrangements with seemingly unbiased and independent
patient and professional organizations to promote opioids for treating chronic pain. Under
Defendants’ direction and control, these “Front Groups” generated treatment guidelines, unbranded
materials, and programs that favored using opioids for chronic non-cancer pain. They also assisted
would limit prescribing opioids in accordance with the scientific evidence, and by conducting
129. These Front Groups depended on Defendants for funding and, in some cases, for
survival. Defendants also exercised control over programs and materials created by these groups
by collaborating on, editing, and approving their content, and by funding their dissemination. In
doing so, Defendants made sure these Front Groups would generate only the messages Defendants
wanted to distribute. Even so, the Front Groups held themselves out as independent and as serving
the needs of their members – whether patients suffering from pain or doctors treating those patients.
130. Defendants Endo, Janssen, and Purdue utilized many Front Groups, including many
of the same ones. Several of the most prominent are described below, but there are many others,
including the American Pain Society (“APS”), American Geriatrics Society (“AGS”), the
Federation of State Medical Boards (“FSMB”), American Chronic Pain Association (“ACPA”),
American Society of Pain Education (“ASPE”), National Pain Foundation (“NPF”) and Pain &
175
Thomas Catan & Evan Perez, A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts, WALL ST. J., Dec.17, 2012.
131. APF was founded in 1997 and professed to be an independent non-profit 501(c)3
organization “serving people with pain through information, advocacy and support.”176 It had a
membership of “close to 100,000 and growing” in 2010 and claimed to be the “largest advocacy
group for people with pain.”177 The APF lauded its participation in “close to 100 policy activities,”
which included testifying at legislative hearings to securing state and local proclamations for Pain
Awareness Month.178
132. APF, however, as the most prominent of Defendants’ Front Groups, received more
than $10 million in funding from opioid manufacturers from 2007 until it closed its doors in May
2012. Endo alone provided more than half that funding; Purdue was next at $1.7 million. Despite
the influx of funds from pharmaceutical companies, APF claimed to be an independent patient
advocacy group.
133. In 2009 and 2010, more than 80% of APF’s operating budget came from
pharmaceutical industry sources. Including industry grants for specific projects, APF received
about $2.3 million from industry sources out of total income of about $2.85 million in 2009. In
2010, Endo paid APF more than $1 million and Purdue paid APF between $1 million and 4.9
million.179 By 2011, APF was entirely dependent on incoming grants from Purdue, Endo, and
others to avoid using its line of credit. One of its board members, Russell Portenoy, explained the
176
American Pain Foundation, Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain, www.painfoundation.org;
see also 2010 Annual Report, American Pain Foundation.
177
2010 Annual Report, supra.
178
Id.
179
2010 Annual Report, supra.
recommended opioids for chronic pain while trivializing their risks, particularly the risk of
addiction. Its Pain Community News, an “esteemed” quarterly newsletter, had a print circulation
of more than 68,000 plus additional online readers.180 Its monthly electronic newsletter, Pain
Monitor, was a monthly newsletter that provided links to pain-related news and research.181 The
APF also provided “patient representatives” for Defendants’ promotional activities, including
135. In one of its publications, Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain,
(“Treatment Options”), APF recognized contributions from Cephalon and Purdue.184 Treatment
Options was reviewed by Scott Fishman, M.D., Vice Chairman of the APF Board of Directors, and
Russell Portenoy, M.D., a Member of the APF Board of Directors and also a KOL.185 Treatment
Options set the stage for prescribing opioids by explaining their underuse despite their benefits.186
It dismissed the risk of addiction with the rhetoric that physical dependence was nothing more than
symptoms or signs of withdrawal that occurred when opioids were stopped suddenly or the dose
136. Responsible Opioid Prescribing and The War on Pain both had a tremendous
impact on doctors’ prescribing habits. In 2000, Scott Fishman, M.D., who served on APF’s board,
co-authored The War on Pain (“Pain War”) as general authoritative information about pain
180
2010 Annual Report, supra at 2.
181
Id. at 2.
182
In its “Partner against Pain” website, Purdue claimed that the risk of addiction from the use of OxyContin in
treating “chronic non-cancer pain” was “extremely small”; see also Zee, Ex. B, at 3.
183
Let’s Talk Pain was a “coalition effort that focus[ed] on supporting positive patient-provided communications”
regarding pain.
184
Treatment Options, supra, at ii.
185
Id. at iv.
186
Treatment Options, supra, at 11.
187
Id. at 14 (referring to symptoms such as sweating, rapid heart rate, nausea, diarrhea, goosebumps, and anxiety).
137. Pain War seeks new specialties in which opioids can be prescribed for chronic pain.
Rheumatologists treating arthritis have been overlooked because they were more prone to
prescribe NSAIDS instead of opioids, such as morphine.189 But such “outdated ideas about
addiction and concerns about social stigmas” need to evolve because opioids offer “substantial
relief” with “less severe long-term side effects than chronic anti-inflammatories.”190
138. Pain War advocates for physical dependence to opioids, and equates withdrawal
symptoms from opioid drugs to that of cessation of coffee drinking. A “pain patient who is
dependent on opioids finds life restored,” the book advises, and then explains that removing a
patient from opioids causes physical, not psychological, consequences, like quitting coffee.191
Addiction to opioids is treated as a “phobia” or “notion” that “using opioids” are “always
addictive.”192
139. Pain War censures the failure to prescribe opioids and even suggests that such
Doses tend to be too low, the right narcotic preparation tends to be avoided, and the
prescribing period is often too short. Medicine’s reluctance to use appropriate doses
of opioid drugs gives patients the wrong message – their pain isn’t that important,
they are not trustworthy, they may be addicts, they are bad people if they take drugs
even if they are prescribed.193
140. Pain War was distributed across the nation, and sold in Texas, as evidence by a
seller from Texas offering the used book for $9.56 plus $5.99 in shipping costs on Amazon.com.
188
Scott Fishman, M.D., with Lisa Berger, The War on Pain, First Quill, 1st ed., 2000.
189
Id. at 154.
190
Fishman, War on Pain, supra, at 155.
191
Id. at 187.
192
Id. at 185.
193
Fishman, War on Pain, supra.
Guide: Covering Pain and Its Management (“Reporter’s Guide”), the APF extolled that “[t]he
person with pain is the authority on the existence and severity of his/her pain. The self-report is
[the] most reliable indicator.”194 The Reporter’s Guide referred to pain as a health crisis and
concluded that it affected more Americans than “diabetes, heart disease and cancer combined.”195
· 71% of people abusing prescription pain relievers received them from a friend
or family member without a prescription;
· Approximately 2.2 million Americans abused pain medication for the first time
in 2006; and
143. Even though Defendants knew about the risks involved in prescribing opioids or
ingesting opioids, they continued to disseminate a story about a “pain epidemic” that could be
treated only through the use of opioids. Even a 542% increase in abuse by teenagers in the United
States in the span of ten years did not make Defendants change their marketing strategy or otherwise
modify their educational or promotional materials concerning the risks associated with the use of
opioids.
campaign – through radio, television, and the internet – to educate patients about their “right” to
pain treatment, namely opioids. APF’s local and national media efforts resulted in 1,600 media
stories on pain in 2010, which was an increase of 1,255% from 2009.197 APF surmised that it
194
American Pain Foundation, A Reporter’s Guide: Covering Pain and Its Management, Oct. 2008, at 1, attached
hereto as Exhibit E.
195
Id. at 29.
196
Reporter’s Guide, Ex. E, at 29.
197
Reporter’s Guide, supra, at 15.
programs and materials were available nationally and were intended to reach patients and
145. APF’s website was visited by nearly 275,000 people in 2010 and a National Pain
Foundation was expected to be complete in 2011.199 In May 2012, the U.S. Senate Finance
Committee began investigating the financial ties between Front Groups and trade organizations,
such as APF and the FSMB, and the opioid manufacturers. This investigation not only caused
companies were responsible for the opioid epidemic by “promoting misleading information about
the drugs’ safety and effectiveness.”200 The Senate Finance Committee was concerned that a
“network of national organizations and researchers with financial connections to the makers of
narcotic painkillers . . . helped create a body of dubious information ‘favoring opioids’ that can be
found in prescribing guidelines, patient literature, position statements, books and doctor education
courses.”201
147. The Senate Finance Committee was especially concerned that “[a]mong the FSMB’s
educational initiatives has been the development and distribution of a guidebook intended to help
physicians recognize the risk of opioids and follow responsible and safe prescribing standards.”202
(Emphasis in original.) Hence, Dr. Fishman and his book Opioid Prescribing: A Physician’s Guide,
the first edition of which was released in 2007 and later accredited by the University of Wisconsin
198
Reporter’s Guide, supra.
199
2010 Annual Budget, supra, at 6
200
See Letter to Dr. Humayun J. Chaudhy dated May 8, 2012 from Charles E. Grassley and Max Baucus, at p. 2.
201
Id. quoting Milwaukee Journal Sentinel/MedPage Today, Follow the Money: Pain, Policy, and Profit, Feb. 19,
2012, available at at http://medpagetoday.com/Neurology/PainManagement/31256.
202
Chaudhy Letter, supra, at 5.
148. The Senate Finance Committee asked for any grants or financial transfers used to
produce the book, the revenue generated from the sale of the book, each state that distributed the
book, and the names of any people or organization involved in writing or editing the book.204
149. Within days, APF’s board voted to dissolve the organization and it ceased to exist.
The FSMB responded to the Senate Finance Committee’s inquiry, however, and agreed that “the
abuse and misuse of opioids is a serious national problem.”205 Dr. Chaudhy, speaking on behalf of
the FSMB, acknowledged that “prescription drug abuse and related deaths has grown at an alarming
pace in the United States.”206 Dr. Chaudhy described Dr. Fishman, the author of Opioid Prescribing,
150. Opioid Prescribing was released from 2007 through January 2012, was distributed
in each of the 50 states, including Texas, and supported in the medical community as an educational
resource for doctors.208 The book is still being sold today. For example, a used copy of the book is
being sold on Amazon.com by Delta River Books, located in Texas, for $51.49 plus $3.99 in
shipping. Dr. Fishman also toured and gave keynote speeches about Opioid Prescribing. For
example, Dr. Fishman presented the keynote at the Federation of State Medical Board Meeting in
Fort Worth, Texas on April 28, 2012, which lasted three days.209 The book was also used
extensively by state regulators to make safe and responsible decisions about prescribing opioids.210
203
Chaudhy Letter, supra.
204
Id. at 3.
205
Letter to Max Baucus and Charles Grassley dated June 8, 2012 from Humayun J. Chaudhy, DO, FACP, at 1.
206
Chaudhy Letter, supra, at 1.
207
Id. at 5.
208
Id.
209
U.C. Davis, Fishman Gives Keynote at Federation of State Medical Boards Meeting, May 1, 2012, available at
https://ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/publish/news/newsroom/6523.
210
Chaudhy, supra, at 5, 17.
and Abbott among others as evidenced in the response. In 2004, Purdue paid $87,895 in the form
of a grant to the FSMB to update the FSMB Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances
in the Treatment of Pain, along with other objectives related to opioids.211 In 2005, Purdue paid
$244,000 to FSMB and in 2006, Purdue paid $207,000 to FSMB for the continuation of the same
project.212 In 2008, Endo and Purdue each paid $100,000 in the form of a grant for the distribution
of Responsible Opioid Prescribing.213 Thus, from 2000-2012, Purdue paid $734,505.06 and Endo
152. Dr. Chaudhy’s response merely underscored Defendants’ role, through KOLs and
Front Groups, in controlling the message these groups conveyed about opioids.
153. The American Academy of Pain Medicine, with Defendants’ assistance, prompting,
involvement, and funding, issued treatment guidelines and sponsored and hosted medical
154. AAPM received over $2.2 million in funding since 2009 from opioid
manufacturers. AAPM maintained a corporate relations council, whose members paid $25,000 per
year (on top of other funding) to participate. The benefits included allowing members to present
educational programs at off-site dinner symposia in connection with AAPM’s marquee event – its
annual meeting held in Palm Springs, California, or other resort locations. AAPM describes the
annual event as an “exclusive venue” for offering education programs to doctors. Membership in
the corporate relations council also allows drug company executives and marketing staff to meet
211
Chaudhy Letter, supra, at 11.
212
Id. at 11-12.
213
Id. at 12.
members of the council and presented deceptive programs to doctors who attended this annual
event.
155. AAPM is viewed internally by Endo as “industry friendly,” with Endo advisors and
speakers among its active members. Endo attended AAPM conferences, funded its CMEs, and
distributed its publications. The conferences sponsored by AAPM heavily emphasized sessions
on opioids – 37 out of roughly 40 at one conference alone. AAPM’s presidents have included top
industry-supported KOLs Perry Fine, Russell Portenoy, and Lynn Webster. Dr. Webster was even
elected president of AAPM while under a DEA investigation. Another past AAPM president, Dr.
Scott Fishman, stated that he would place the organization “at the forefront” of teaching that “the
156. Defendants influenced AAPM through both their significant and regular funding
and the leadership of pro-opioid KOLs within the organization. AAPM’s staff understood they and
their industry funders were engaged in a common task – propagate a “pain epidemic” and solve it
by teaching that opioids were safe and effective for treating chronic pain.
157. In 1997, AAPM and the American Pain Society jointly issued a consensus
statement, The Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Pain, which endorsed opioids to treat
chronic pain and claimed there was a low risk that patients would become addicted to opioids. The
co-author of the statement, Dr. Haddox, was a paid speaker for Purdue at the time. Dr. Portenoy,
Defendants’ KOL, was the sole consultant. The consensus statement remained on AAPM’s
214
Interview by Paula Moyer with Scott M. Fishman, M.D., Professor of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Chief
of the Division of Pain Medicine, Univ. of Cal., Davis (2005), available at
http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/500829.
and continued to recommend using opioids to treat chronic pain. Fourteen of the 21 panel members
who drafted the AAPM/APS Guidelines, including KOLs Dr. Portenoy and Dr. Perry Fine of the
159. The 2009 Guidelines promote opioids as “safe and effective” for treating chronic
pain, despite acknowledging limited evidence, and conclude that the risk of addiction is
manageable for patients regardless of past abuse histories. One panel member, Dr. Joel Saper,
Clinical Professor of Neurology at Michigan State University and founder of the Michigan
Headache & Neurological Institute, resigned from the panel because he was concerned the 2009
Guidelines were influenced by contributions that drug companies, including Defendants, made to
the sponsoring organizations and committee members. These AAPM/APS Guidelines have been
a particularly effective channel of deception and have influenced not only treating physicians, but
also the body of scientific evidence on opioids. The Guidelines have been cited 732 times in
academic literature, were disseminated in and around Angelina County during the relevant time
period, are still available online, and were reprinted in the Journal of Pain.
160. To convince doctors and patients in Angelina County that opioids can and should
be used to treat chronic pain, Defendants had to convince them that long-term opioid use is non-
addictive, safe, and effective. Knowing they could do so only by deceiving those doctors and
patients about the risks and benefits of long-term opioid use, Defendants made claims that were
not supported by, and were contrary to, the scientific evidence. Defendants have not corrected
their misrepresentations.
opioid use, particularly the risks of addiction and overdose, through a series of misrepresentations
that have since been conclusively debunked by numerous published studies and the magnitude of
human misery caused by Defendants’ deceptions. These misrepresentations – which are described
below – reinforced each other and created the dangerously misleading impression that opioids are
the best treatment option for any recurrent moderate pain because: (1) only a miniscule number of
patients, if any, would become addicted; (2) all patients with a substantial risk of becoming
addicted to opioids could be readily identified; (3) patients who displayed signs of addiction
probably were not addicted and, in any event, could easily be weaned from the drugs; (4) the use
of higher opioid doses do not escalate risk of addiction or overdose; and (5) “abuse-deterrent”
opioids are reliably safe and effective for perpetual use. Defendants still espouse these
misrepresentations today.
162. First, Defendants falsely claimed the risk of addiction is low and unlikely to
develop when opioids are prescribed, as opposed to those obtained illicitly; and failed to disclose
the greater risk of addiction with prolonged use of opioids.215 For example:
c) Endo distributed a pamphlet with the Endo logo entitled Living with
Someone with Chronic Pain, which stated that: “Most health care providers
See, e.g., Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 22 (blaming adverse consequences on abuses and overuses instead of
215
g) Detailers for Purdue, Endo, and Janssen in and around Angelina County
minimized or omitted any discussion with doctors of the risk of addiction;
misrepresented the potential for opioid abuse with purportedly abuse-
deterrent formulations; and routinely did not correct the misrepresentations
noted above.
163. These claims contradict empirical evidence. As noted by the CDC, there is
“extensive evidence” of the “possible harms of opioids (including opioid use disorder [an
alternative term for opioid addiction]).”216 The CDC has explained that “[o]pioid pain medication
use presents serious risks, including…opioid use disorder” and that “continuing opioid therapy for
3 months substantially increases risk for opioid use disorder.”217 In fact, as many as “1 in 4 patients
receiving long-term opioid therapy in primary care settings struggle with opioid use disorder.”218
Among the 12 recommendations by the new CDC guidelines to improve patient care and safety is
that non-opioid therapy is preferred for chronic pain unless there is active cancer or it is for palliative
216
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain – United
States 2016, Mar. 18, 2016.
217
Id.
218
Id.
164. Defendants’ long-standing claims that opioid addiction and overdose are anomalies
largely attributable to patient abuse of the drug, are demonstrably false. Indeed, the majority of
cases “involving injury and death occur in people using opioids exactly as prescribed . . .”220
165. In 2010, a study addressed the rates of opioid overdose with patients receiving
average prescribed daily opioids versus patients receiving medically prescribed chronic opioid
therapy.221 The patients included those receiving three-plus opioid prescriptions within 90-days
for chronic non-cancer pain between 1997 and 2005.222 Patients who received 50-99 mg had a 3.7-
fold increase in overdose risk (95% C.I. 1.5, 9.5) and a 0.7 annual overdose rate.223
166. The authors determined that even though opioids provide some pain relief for
chronic pain, balancing the long-term risks with the benefits was still “poorly understood.”224
Those patients who had not received opioids lately had a lower risk of overdose, however, than
167. The authors pointed to previous studies that indicated a rise in opioid-related
overdoses with an increase in prescribing opioids for non-cancer pain, but the belief that such
phenomenon was caused by patients obtaining opioids from non-medical sources.226 This study,
proves for the first time, however, that the risk of overdose is directly linked to the prescription
219
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
220
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 22.
221
Kate M. Dunn, Ph.D., Kathleen W. Saunders, J.D., Overdose and Prescribed Opioids: Association among
Chronic Non-Cancer Pain Patients, Ann. Intern. Med., Dec. 10, 2010, at 2.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Dunn, supra, at 6.
226
Id. at 7.
227
Id.
Medicaid data from the Washington Heath Care Authority reached a similar conclusion.228 The
opioid prescription claim history was examined for each “opioid poisoning” for the months that
enrollees received Medicaid FFS prescription benefits.229 The authors concluded that a large
percentage of opioid poisonings happened at lower prescribed doses and in individuals who were
169. The authors noted that previous opioid guidelines focused on opioid doses above
80-120 mg/d MED even though previous studies showed risk of opioid deaths and poisonings at
much lower doses and that most non-methadone opioid poisonings had been prescribed below
these guidelines levels.231 The authors concluded that only a small percentage of patients are
prescribed opioids at a dosage greater than 120 mg/d MED, but that a large percentage of the
opioids poisonings have been occurring in patients taking lower doses and in patients not
considered chronic users.232 Overdoses were therefore occurring in patients prescribed opioids for
chronic non-cancer pain at increased rates and the overdose risk increased with an average
prescription dose.233 The guidelines and other educational material regarding opioids need to be
170. In fact, “[t]he majority of deaths (60%) occur in patients when they are given
prescriptions based on prescribing guidelines by medical boards with 20% of deaths in low dose
opioid therapy . . . .”235 The way to cure the “crisis of opioid use in the United States” is to change
228
Deborah Fulton-Kehoe, Ph.D., Opioid Poisonings in Washington State Medicaid: Trends, Dosing, and
Guidelines, 53 Medical Care 8, Aug. 2015, at 680.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 683.
232
Id. at 684.
233
Fulton-Kehoe, supra.
234
Id.
235
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 1.
171. Another study found that approximately 60% of overdoses occur in medical users
of opioids prescribed by a single physician to manage chronic pain.237 Non-medical users comprise
172. Scientific evidence underscores the conclusion that low-dose opioid therapy for
chronic pain, opioids taken as prescribed, opioids obtained from a single doctor, and opioids
disseminated contrary messaging throughout their marketing campaigns to sell more opioids.
173. Second, Defendants falsely instructed doctors and patients that signs of addiction
are actually signs of undertreated pain and should be treated by prescribing more opioids.
Defendants called this phenomenon “pseudoaddiction” – a term coined by Dr. David Haddox, who
went to work for Purdue, and popularized by Dr. Russell Portenoy, a KOL for Endo, Janssen, and
Purdue – and claimed that pseudoaddiction is substantiated by scientific evidence. For example:
b) Janssen sponsored, funded, and edited the Let’s Talk Pain website, which
in 2009 stated: “pseudoaddiction . . . refers to patient behaviors that may
occur when pain is under-treated . . . . Pseudoaddiction is different from
true addiction because such behaviors can be resolved with effective pain
management.”;
236
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 1.
237
Barbara Zedler, M.D., Risk Factors for Serious Prescription Opioid-Related Toxicity or Overdose Among
Veterans Health Administration Patients, Pain Medicine, 2014, at 1912, attached hereto as Exhibit F.
238
Id.
174. The 2016 CDC Guideline rejects the concept of pseudoaddiction. The CDC
Guideline nowhere recommends that opioid dosages be increased if a patient is not experiencing
pain relief. To the contrary, the Guideline explains that “[p]atients who do not experience
clinically meaningful pain relief early in treatment…are unlikely to experience pain relief with
longer-term use,”239 and that physicians should “reassess[] pain and function within 1 month”240
175. Third, Defendants falsely instructed doctors and patients that addiction risk
screening tools, patient contracts, urine drug screens, and similar strategies allowed them to
239
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
240
Id.
241
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
242
Id.
practitioners and family doctors who lack the time and expertise to closely manage higher-risk
patients. Defendants’ misrepresentations made these doctors feel more comfortable prescribing
opioids to their patients, and patients more comfortable starting opioid therapy for chronic pain.
For example:
a) Endo paid for a 2007 supplement in the Journal of Family Practice written
by a doctor who became a member of Endo’s speakers’ bureau in 2010. The
supplement, entitled Pain Management Dilemmas in Primary Care: Use of
Opioids, emphasized the effectiveness of screening tools, claiming that
patients at high risk of addiction could safely receive chronic opioid therapy
using a “maximally structured approach” involving toxicology screens and
pill counts;
176. Once again, the 2016 CDC Guideline confirms these representations are false. The
Guideline notes that there are no studies assessing the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies –
such as screening tools, patient contracts, urine drug testing, or pill counts – widely believed by
doctors to detect and deter outcomes related to addiction and overdose.243 As a result, the Guideline
recognizes that doctors should not overestimate the risk screening tools for classifying patients as
high or low risk for opioid addiction because they are insufficient to rule out the risks of long-term
opioid therapy.244
243
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
244
Id.
comfortable starting patients on opioids, Defendants falsely claimed that opioid dependence can
easily be addressed by tapering and that opioid withdrawal is not a problem thereby failing to
178. For example, a CME sponsored by Endo, entitled Persistent Pain in the Older
Adult, claimed that withdrawal symptoms can be avoided by tapering a patient’s opioid dose by
10%-20% for 10 days. And Purdue sponsored APF’s A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding
Pain & Its Management, which claimed that “[s]ymptoms of physical dependence can often be
which, as explained in the 2016 CDC Guideline, include drug cravings, anxiety, insomnia,
abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea, sweating, tremor, tachycardia (rapid heartbeat), spontaneous
abortion and premature labor in pregnant women, and the unmasking of anxiety, depression, and
addiction – and grossly understated the difficulty of tapering, particularly after long-term opioid
use.
180. Yet the 2016 CDC Guideline recognizes that the duration of opioid use and the
dosage of opioids prescribed should be limited to “minimize the need to taper opioids to prevent
an expected physiologic response in patients exposed to opioids for more than a few days.”246
(Emphasis Added.) The Guideline further states that “tapering opioids can be especially
challenging after years on high dosages because of physical and psychological dependence”247 and
245
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
246
Id.
247
Id.
symptoms and signs of opioid withdrawal”248 and pausing and restarting tapers depending on the
patient’s response.
181. The CDC also acknowledges the lack of any “high-quality studies comparing the
effectiveness of different tapering protocols for use when opioid dosage is reduced or opioids are
discontinued.”249 Contrary to the Treatment Options distributed by the APF, withdrawal from
opioids involves much more than mere “physical” dependence occurring only when opioids are
182. Fifth, Defendants falsely claimed that doctors and patients could increase opioid
dosages indefinitely without added risk and failed to disclose the greater risks to patients at higher
dosages. The ability to escalate dosages was critical to Defendants’ efforts to market opioids for
long-term use to treat chronic pain because, absent this misrepresentation, doctors would have
abandoned treatment when patients built up tolerance and lower dosages did not provide pain
248
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
249
Id.
e) Purdue’s In the Face of Pain website promotes the notion that if a patient’s
doctor does not prescribe what, in the patient’s view, is a sufficient dosage
of opioids, he or she should find another doctor who will;
183. These claims conflict with the scientific evidence, as confirmed by the FDA and
CDC. As the CDC explains in its 2016 Guideline, the “[b]enefits of high-dose opioids for chronic
pain are not established”250 while the “risks for serious harms related to opioid therapy increase at
184. More specifically, the CDC explains, “there is now an established body of scientific
evidence showing that overdose risk is increased at higher opioid dosages.”252 Similarly, there is
an “increased risk for opioid use disorder, respiratory depression, and death at higher dosages.”253
That is why the CDC advises doctors to avoid increasing dosages above 90 morphine milligram
250
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
properties of some of their opioids has created false impressions that these opioids reliably curb
186. More specifically, Defendants have made misleading claims about the ability of
their so-called abuse-deterrent opioid formulations to deter use. For example, Endo’s
advertisements for the 2012 reformulation of Opana ER claimed that it was designed to be crush
resistant in a way that suggested it was more difficult to misuse the product. This claim was false.
187. The FDA warned in a 2013 letter that there was no evidence Endo’s design would
provide a reduction in oral, intranasal or intravenous use.254 Moreover, Endo’s own studies, which
it failed to disclose, showed that Opana ER could still be ground and chewed.
188. In a 2016 settlement with the State of New York, Endo agreed not to make
statements in New York that Opana ER was designed to be or is crush-resistant. The State found
those statements false and deceptive because there was no difference in the ability to extract the
189. Similarly, the 2016 CDC Guideline states that no studies support the notion that
“abuse-deterrent technologies [are] a risk mitigation strategy for deterring or preventing abuse,”255
noting that the technologies – even when they work – “do not prevent opioid abuse through oral
intake, the most common route of opioid abuse, and can still be abused by non-oral routes.”256
use spread by Defendants successfully convinced doctors and patients to underestimate those risks.
254
See FDA Statement: Original Opana ER Relisting Determination, May 10, 2013.
255
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
256
Id.
191. To convince doctors and patients that opioids should be used to treat chronic pain,
Defendants had to persuade them that there was a significant benefit to long-term opioid use. But
as the 2016 CDC Guideline makes clear, there is “insufficient evidence to determine the long-term
192. In fact, the CDC found no evidence showing “a long-term benefit of opioids in pain
and function versus no opioids for chronic pain with outcomes examined at least 1 year later (with
most placebo-controlled randomized trials ≤ 6 weeks in duration)”258 and that other treatments
were more or equally beneficial and less harmful than long-term opioid use.
193. Nonetheless, Defendants were legion in their misrepresentations that opioid drugs
a) Endo distributed advertisements that claimed that the use of Opana ER for
chronic pain would allow patients to perform demanding tasks like
construction work or work as a chef and portrayed seemingly healthy,
unimpaired subjects;
257
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
258
Id.
g) Endo was the sole sponsor, through NIPC, of a series of CMEs titled
Persistent Pain in the Older Patient, which claimed that chronic opioid
therapy has been “shown to reduce pain and improve depressive symptoms
and cognitive functioning.” The CME was disseminated via webcast;
h) Janssen sponsored, funded, and edited a website, Let’s Talk Pain, in 2009,
which featured an interview edited by Janssen claiming that opioids allowed
a patient to “continue to function.” This video is still available today on
YouTube;
194. These claims are unsupported by the scientific literature. The 2016 CDC Guideline
explained, “There is no good evidence that opioids improve pain or function with long-term use”259
and “complete relief of pain is unlikely.”260 The CDC reinforced this conclusion throughout its
2016 Guideline:
259
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
260
Id. (emphasis added).
b) “Although opioids can reduce pain during short-term use, the clinical
evidence review found insufficient evidence to determine whether pain
relief is sustained and whether function or quality of life improves with
long-term opioid therapy.”;262 and
195. The CDC also noted that the risks of addiction and death “can cause distress and
196. Defendants also falsely emphasized or exaggerated the risks of competing products
like NSAIDs so that doctors and patients would look to opioids first for treating chronic pain.
providing 12 continuous hours of pain relief with one dose. In fact, OxyContin does not last for
12 hours – a fact that Purdue has known at all times relevant to this action.
197. According to Purdue’s own research, OxyContin wears off in under six hours in one
quarter of patients and in under 10 hours in more than half. The reason is that OxyContin tablets
release approximately 40% of their active medicine immediately, after which release tapers.
Although the patient experiences a powerful initial response, there is little or no pain relief at the
198. This phenomenon is known as “end of dose” failure, and the FDA found in 2008
that a substantial number of chronic pain patients taking OxyContin experience it.
261
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
Id.
false and deceptive, it also makes OxyContin more dangerous because the declining pain relief
patients experience toward the end of each dosing period drives them to take more OxyContin
before the next dosing period begins, quickly increasing the amount of drug they are taking and
200. Purdue’s competitors were aware of this problem. For example, Endo ran
advertisements for Opana ER referring to “real” 12-hour dosing. Nevertheless, Purdue falsely
promoted OxyContin as if it were effective for a full 12 hours. Indeed, Purdue’s sales
representatives continue to tell doctors in and around Angelina County that OxyContin lasts a full
12 hours.
201. Other Defendants herein participated in illicit and unlawful prescribing of its drugs.
For example, Purdue did not report illegal prescribing of OxyContin until years after law
enforcement shut down a Los Angeles clinic that prescribed more than 1.1 million OxyContin
tablets. In doing so, Purdue protected its own profits at the expense of public health and safety.
202. The State of New York also found that Endo failed to require sales representatives
to report signs of addiction, diversion, and inappropriate prescribing; paid bonuses to sales
representatives for detailing prescribers who were subsequently arrested or convicted for illegal
prescribing; and failed to prevent sales representatives from visiting prescribers whose suspicious
203. As part of their deceptive marketing scheme, Defendants identified and targeted
susceptible prescribers and vulnerable patient populations in the U.S. and in and around Angelina
were more likely to treat chronic pain patients and prescribe opioids, but were less likely to be
educated about treating pain and the risks and benefits of opioids.
204. Defendants also targeted vulnerable patient populations like the elderly and
veterans, who tend to suffer from chronic pain. Defendants targeted these vulnerable patients even
though the risks of long-term opioid use were significantly greater for them.
205. For example, the 2016 CDC Guideline observes that existing evidence shows that
elderly patients taking opioids suffer from elevated fall and fracture risks, greater risk of
hospitalization, and increased vulnerability to adverse drug effects and interactions. The Guideline
therefore concludes that there are “special risks of long-term opioid use for elderly patients” and
recommends that doctors use “additional caution and increased monitoring” to minimize the risks
206. The same is true for veterans, who are more likely to use anti-anxiety drugs
(benzodiazepines) for post-traumatic stress disorder, which interact dangerously with opioids.
207. Defendants achieved their goal in targeting these vulnerable populations when the
Arthritis Foundation published its Guide to Pain Management in 2003 (“Pain Management
Guide”).265 The Pain Management Guide was published by a neutral third-party that not only
believed the message Defendants had been selling for years, but it continued to relay that message
208. The Pain Management Guide was intended for a population of “70 million
Americans who have arthritis or other related diseases.”267 It parroted falsities, such as the low risk
265
Susan Bernstein, The Arthritis Foundation’s Guide to Pain Management, Arthritis Foundation, 2003.
266
Id.
267
Id.
209. The Arthritis Foundation even accepted and repeated Defendants’ distinction
between dependence and addiction. A person with dependence suggests he or she would
experience withdrawal symptoms upon stopping opioids while addiction “is a self-destructive,
habitual use” of opioids.269 The Pain Management Guide brushes aside concerns about addiction
and recommends higher doses of opioids for patients who develop a dependence on opioids270 –
the exact message that Defendants had been spouting for years.
210. The fact that neutral third parties were relying on and buying Defendants’ false
propositions only verifies Defendants’ successful fraud on the medical and non-medical
community at large.
F. Although Defendants knew that their Marketing of Opioids was False and Deceptive,
they Fraudulently Concealed their Misconduct.
211. Defendants, both individually and collectively, made, promoted, and profited from
their misrepresentations about the risks and benefits of opioids for chronic pain even though they
knew their misrepresentations were false and deceptive. Defendants knew that the marketing
scheme being promoted by Defendants was misleading, inaccurate, and simply false. The history
of opioids, as well as research and clinical experience over the last 20 years, established that
opioids were highly addictive and responsible for a long list of very serious adverse outcomes.
212. In The Journal of the American Medical Association November 2002 edition,
which Defendants meant to reach physicians throughout the nation, Purdue advertised OxyContin
268
Bernstein, supra, at 70-71.
269
Id. at 70.
270
Id.
large white letters exclaiming that “THERE CAN BE LIFE WITH RELIEF” with “LIFE WITH
RELIEF” as the largest words in the advertisement.272 Purdue then informs physicians that “[t]he
most serious risk associated with opioids, including OxyContin, is respiratory depression.”273
213. Purdue fraudulently represented that respiratory depression was not only the most
serious risk for its own drug OxyContin, but for opioids in general, even though it knew that
214. The ad continues with benign side effects that may occur with the use of
OxyContin, such as “constipation, nausea, sedation, dizziness, vomiting, pruritus, headache, dry
mouth, sweating, and weakness.”274 These side effects are certainly a far cry from addiction or
death. Of course this ad also claims that OxyContin is a “continuous around-the-clock analgesic,”
215. Because of the bold misrepresentations and omissions in its ads occurring in the
October 2, 2002 JAMA issue, and one occurring in the November 13, 2002 issue, the FDA wrote
a warning letter to Michael Friedman, the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
of Purdue.276 Mr. Abrams explained that “[y]our journal advertisements omit and minimize the
serious safety risks associated with OxyContin, and promote it for uses beyond which have been
proven safe and effective.”277 Mr. Abrams reprimanded Purdue for failing to present “any
information” in the advertisement about the “potentially fatal risks” or the potential for abuse
271
The Journal of American Medical Association, Nov. 13, 2002.
272
Id. at 1, 3.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
JAMA, supra, at 1, 3.
276
Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., FDA Div. of Mktg., Adver., & Commc’ns, to Michael Friedman, Exec.
Vice Pres. and COO, Purdue Pharma L.P.
277
Id. at 1.
216. Mr. Abrams was concerned that these advertisements suggested such a “broad use
of [OxyContin] to treat pain without disclosing the potential for abuse with the drug and the
serious, potentially fatal risks associated with its use. . . .”279 Purdue’s actions were “especially
egregious and alarming” given “its potential impact on the public health.”280 Mr. Abrams pointed
out to Purdue the reality that “[i]t is particularly disturbing that your November Ad would tout
‘Life with Relief,’ yet fail to warn that patients can die from taking OxyContin.”281
217. Purdue Pharma has consistently disregarded serious harm that it knew Oxycontin
caused. For example, in Kentucky in 2001, three people and one estate sued Purdue for becoming
addicted to OxyContin even though they were taking the drug as prescribed.282 Several similar
lawsuits were filed against Purdue by individuals.283 Dr. J. David Haddox, an executive at Purdue,
responded to these claims: “A lot of these people say, ‘Well, I was taking the medicine like my
doctor told me to,’ and then they start taking more and more and more . . . I don’t see where that’s
my problem.”284
218. Not surprisingly, three current and former executives from Purdue plead guilty in
2007 to criminal charges that they misled regulators, doctors, and patients about OxyContin’s risk
marketed OxyContin as a drug less prone to addiction and as having fewer side effects than other
278
Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, supra.
279
Id. at 2.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 4.
282
Chris Kahn, Maker of OxyContin Faces at least 13 Lawsuits,” July 27, 2001, Port Arthur News.
283
Kahn, supra.
284
Id.
285
See Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, May 10, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html; see also Zee, Ex. B, at 3-4.
other ingredients, which made it a higher-dose narcotic despite its time-release design that Purdue
219. Defendants avoided detection of their fraudulent conduct by disguising their role
in the deceptive marketing through funding and using third parties, such as Front Groups and
KOLs. Doctors and patients trusted these third parties and did not realize that it was the
pharmaceutical companies that were actually feeding them false and misleading information.
220. Defendants also manipulated their promotional materials and the scientific
literature to make it appear that the information promoted was accurate, truthful, and supported by
221. Thus, Defendants successfully concealed from the medical community and patients
facts sufficient to arouse suspicion of the claims Angelina County now asserts. Angelina County
did not know of the existence or scope of Defendants’ industry-wide fraud and could not have
222. Defendants’ misrepresentations deceived doctors and patients about the risks and
benefits of long-term opioid use. Studies reveal that many doctors and patients are unaware of or
do not understand the risks or benefits of opioids. Indeed, patients often report that they were not
warned they might become addicted to opioids prescribed to them. As reported in January 2016,
a 2015 survey of more than 1,000 opioid patients found that 4 out of 10 were not told opioids were
286
Meier, supra.
287
Id.
223. Defendants’ deceptive marketing scheme caused, and continues to cause, doctors
in and around Angelina County to prescribe opioids for chronic pain conditions such as back pain,
headaches, arthritis, and fibromyalgia. Absent Defendants’ fraud, these doctors would not have
224. Defendants’ deceptive marketing scheme also caused, and continues to cause,
patients to purchase and use opioids for their chronic pain believing they are safe and effective.
Absent Defendants’ deceptive marketing scheme, fewer patients would be using opioids long-term
to treat chronic pain, and those patients using opioids would be using less of them.
225. Defendants’ deceptive marketing has caused and continues to cause the prescription
and use of opioids to explode. Indeed, this dramatic increase in opioid prescriptions and use
corresponds with the dramatic increase in Defendants’ spending on their deceptive marketing
scheme. Defendants’ spending on opioid marketing totaled approximately $91 million in 2000. By
226. The escalating number of opioid prescriptions written by doctors who were
increase in opioid addiction, overdose, and death throughout the U.S. and Angelina County. The
and addiction to opioids. In a 2016 report, the CDC explained that prescribing opioids has
288
Hazelden Betty Ford Foundation, Missed Questions, Missed Opportunities, Jan. 27, 2016, available at
http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/about-us/news-and-media/pressrelease/doctors-missing-questions-that-could-
prevent-opioid-addiction.
289
Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 23.
there has been a two-third increase in overdose deaths from using opioids since 2000.291 For these
reasons, the CDC concluded that efforts to rein in the prescribing of opioids for chronic pain are
critical “to reverse the cycle of opioid pain medication misuse that contributes to the opioid
overdose epidemic.”292
228. Due to the increase in opioid overdoses, first responders, such as police officers,
have been and will continue to be in the position to assist people experiencing opioid-related
overdoses.293 In 2016, “over 1,200 law enforcement departments nationwide carried naloxone in
229. Defendants’ deceptive marketing scheme has also detrimentally impacted children
in Angelina County. Overprescribing opioids for chronic pain has made the drugs more accessible
to school-aged children, who come into contact with opioids after they have been prescribed to
230. Defendants’ conduct has adversely affected Angelina County’s child protection
agencies in the number of children in foster care driven by parental drug addiction. Children with
parents addicted to drugs tend to stay in foster care longer, and they often enter the system having
experienced significant trauma, which makes these cases more expensive for counties like
Angelina County.
290
CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System, Mortality, CDC Wonder, Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health
and Human Services, 2016, available at https://wonder.cdc.gov/; Rudd RA, Seth P, David F, Scholl L, Increases in
Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths — United States, 2010–2015, Morb Mortal Wkly Rep., Dec. 16, 2016.
291
CDC, National Vital Statistics System, Mortality, Morb Mortal Wkly Rep., Jan. 1, 2006, at 1378-82, Increases in
Drug and Opioid Deaths – United States, 2000-2014.
292
CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, supra; see also Rudd, supra.
293
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0168 (2017).
294
Id. citing http://www.nchrc.org/law-enforcement/us-law-enforcement-who-carry-naloxone/.
treatment for substance dependence. A significant number of admissions for drug addiction were
232. Defendants’ creation, through false and deceptive advertising and other unlawful
and unfair conduct, of a virtually limitless opioid market has significantly harmed Angelina County
communities. Defendants’ success in extending the market for opioids to new patients and chronic
pain conditions has created an abundance of drugs available for non-medical and criminal use and
fueled a new wave of addiction and injury. It has been estimated that 60% of the opioids to which
233. Law enforcement agencies have increasingly associated prescription drug addiction
with violent and property crimes. Despite strict federal regulation of prescription drugs, local law
enforcement agencies are faced with increasing diversion from legitimate sources for illicit
purposes, including doctor shopping, forged prescriptions, falsified pharmacy records, and
employees who steal from their place of employment. The opioid epidemic has prompted a
growing trend of crimes against pharmacies including robbery and burglary. This ongoing
234. The rise in opioid addiction caused by Defendants’ deceptive marketing scheme
has also resulted in an explosion in heroin use. For example, heroin use has more than doubled in
the past decade among adults aged 18 to 25 years.296 Moreover, heroin-related overdoses in the
295
Nathaniel P. Katz, Prescription Opioid Abuse: Challenges and Opportunities for Payers, Am. J. Managed Care,
Apr. 19 2013, at 5 (“The most common source of abused [opioids] is, directly or indirectly, by prescription.”),
available at http://www.ajmc.com/publications/issue/2013/2013-1-vol19-n4/Prescription-Opioid-Abuse-Challenges-
and-Opportunities-for-Payers.
296
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital Signs: Today’s Heroin Epidemic – More People at Risk,
Multiple Drugs Abused, MMWR 2015, available at https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/heroin/index.html.
297
Id.
2007, the cost of healthcare due to opioid addiction and dependence was estimated at 25 billion,
the cost of criminal justice was estimated at 5.1 billion, and the cost of lost workplace productivity
236. Texas had the second highest healthcare costs in 2015 from opioid abuse in the
nation totaling $1.96 billion.298 One in five Texas high school students has taken prescription drugs
without a valid prescription.299 And four of the top 25 cities for abuse in the United States – two
237. Prescription opioid addiction and overdose have an enormous impact on the health
and safety of individuals, as well as communities at large, because the consequences of this
238. Angelina County has also expended funds for false claims submitted on the
County’s health plans that were paid as medically necessary when they were not and prescriptions
239. The repercussions for residents of Angelina County therefore include job loss, loss
of custody of children, physical and mental health problems, homelessness and incarceration,
which results in instability in communities often already in economic crisis and contributes to
increased demand on community services such as hospitals, courts, child services, treatment
centers, and law enforcement. Defendants knew, and should have known, about the harms that
their deceptive marketing has caused, and continues to cause, and will cause in the future.
Defendants closely monitored their sales and the habits of prescribing doctors. Their sales
298
Craig, Pandemic, supra.
299
Id.
300
Id.
240. Defendants also had access to and carefully watched government and other data
that tracked the explosive rise in opioid use, addiction, injury, and death. Defendants not only
knew, but intended that their misrepresentations would persuade doctors to prescribe and
241. Defendants’ actions are neither permitted nor excused by the fact that their drug
labels may have allowed, or did not exclude, the use of opioids for chronic pain. FDA approval
of opioids for certain uses did not give Defendants license to misrepresent the risks and benefits of
opioids. Indeed, Defendants’ misrepresentations were directly contrary to pronouncements by, and
guidance from, the FDA based on the medical evidence and their own labels.
242. Nor is Defendants’ causal role broken by the involvement of doctors. Defendants’
marketing efforts were ubiquitous and highly persuasive. Their deceptive messages tainted
virtually every source doctors could rely on for information and prevented them from making
informed decisions. And both doctors and patients in Angelina County relied on information
Defendants distributed whether it was through ads, magazines, trade journals, websites, CMEs,
KOLs, and/or front groups. Defendants also hijacked what doctors wanted to believe – namely,
that opioids represented a means of relieving their patients’ suffering and of practicing medicine
more compassionately.
243. The funds that Angelina County has used and will continue to use for all the costs
associated with Defendants’ false, misleading, and fraudulent marketing are taxpayer funds.
Defendants specifically targeted physicians in Angelina County with fraudulent claims concerning
the benefits of opioids for chronic pain while omitting the lack of efficacy.
though they knew, or should have known, that physicians in Angelina County would either use the
give this information to Angelina County residents, resulting in the over-prescribing and/or
245. Defendants’ actions and omissions were each a cause-in-fact of Angelina County’s
past and future damages. Defendants’ wrongful conduct caused injuries to Angelina County in the
past, continues to cause injuries to Angelina County, and will continue to cause injuries to
Angelina County in the future. Future damages include, but are not limited to, additional resources
for counseling and medication assisted treatment of addicts, medical treatment for overdoses, life
skills training for adolescents, increased law enforcement, and additional resources to treat the
psychological effects of opioids and the underlying conditions that make people susceptible to
246. Angelina County re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations
contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Petition as though fully alleged herein.
prescribe, and residents to use, highly addictive opioids for chronic pain even though Defendants
knew using opioids had a high risk of addiction and reduced quality of life.
248. By doing so, Defendants purposefully interfered with Angelina County’s public
health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public convenience.
assisted in creating and maintaining a condition that is harmful to the health and safety of Angelina
County residents, and/or unreasonably interferes with the peace and comfortable enjoyment of life
250. The public nuisance created by Defendants’ actions is substantial and unreasonable
– it has caused and continues to cause significant harm to the community – and the harm inflicted
251. The staggering rates of opioid use resulting from Defendants’ marketing efforts
have caused, and continues to cause, harm to the community including, but not limited to:
a) Upwards of 30% of all adults use opioids. These high rates of use have led
t o unnecessary opioid addiction, overdose, injuries, and deaths;
c) Residents of Angelina County, who have never taken opioids, have endured
both the emotional and financial costs of caring for loved ones addicted to
or injured by opioids and the loss of companionship, wages, or other support
from family members who have used, become addicted to, overdosed on, or
been killed by opioids;
d) More broadly, opioid use and addiction have driven Angelina County
residents’ health care costs higher301;
e) Employers have lost the value of productive and healthy employees who
have suffered from adverse consequences from opioid use;
f) Defendants’ success in extending the market for opioids to new patients and
chronic conditions has created an abundance of drugs available for criminal
301
See, e.g., Manchikanti, Ex. A, at 14 (stating that the escalating use of opioids in high doses over long periods of
time, lifetime use of long-acting drugs, or the combination has serious consequences for the costs of health care and
economic stability).
j) These harms have taxed the human, medical, public health, law
enforcement, and financial resources of Angelina County; and
252. Defendants knew, or should have known, that promoting opioid use would create a
d) Defendants knew, or should have known, that their promotion would lead
to addiction and other adverse consequences that the larger community
would suffer as a result.
not accurately assessing and weighing the risks and benefits of opioids for chronic pain thereby
254. Without Defendants’ actions, opioid use would not have become so widespread and
the enormous public health hazard of opioid addiction would not have existed and could have been
averted.
255. The health and safety of the citizens of Angelina County, including those who use,
have used, or will use opioids, as well as those affected by opioid users, is a matter of great public
interest and legitimate concern to Angelina County’s citizens and residents. It was foreseeable to
all Defendants that the burden of the opioid crisis would fall to counties like Angelina County in
the form of social and economic costs. Specifically it was foreseeable that Angelina County would
sustain damages as an employer obligated to provide healthcare coverage to its employees and as
256. The public nuisance created, perpetuated, and maintained by Defendants can be
abated and further reoccurrence of such harm and inconvenience can be prevented.
257. Defendants’ conduct has affected and continues to affect a considerable number of
people within Angelina County and is likely to continue to cause significant harm to patients who
258. Each Defendant created or assisted in creating the opioid epidemic, and each
Defendant is jointly and severally liable for its abatement. Furthermore, each Defendant should be
enjoined from continuing to create, perpetuate, or maintain said public nuisance in Angelina
County. Furthermore, Defendants should compensate Angelina County for the funds it has
expended and continues to expend for medical insurance claims for opioids that were not medically
259. Angelina County re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations
contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Petition as though fully alleged herein.
260. At all relevant and material times, Defendants expressly and/or impliedly warranted
that opioids were safe, of merchantable quality, and fit for use.
261. Defendants’ superior knowledge and expertise, its relationship of trust and
confidence with doctors and the public, its specific knowledge regarding the risks and dangers of
opioids, and its intentional dissemination of promotional and marketing information about opioids
for the purpose of maximizing sales, each gave rise to the affirmative duty to meaningfully disclose
and provide all material information about the risks and harms associated with opioids.
262. At all relevant and material times, Defendants, individually and acting through their
employees and agents, and in concert with each other, fraudulently represented to physicians, who
Defendants knew would justifiably rely on Defendants’ representations, that opioids were safe and
263. Defendants’ false representations were fraudulently made, with the intent or
purpose that healthcare providers and patients would justifiably rely upon them, leading to the
omission of material facts as alleged herein include, but are not limited to:
a) Making false and misleading claims regarding the known risks of the
addictive nature of opioids and suppressing, failing to disclose, and
mischaracterizing the addictive nature of opioids and in concomitant costs,
b) Making false and misleading written and oral statements that opioids are
more effective than traditional pain killers for chronic pain, or effective at
all and/or omitting material information showing that opioids are no more
effective than other non-addictive drugs for chronic pain;
265. Defendants willfully, wantonly, and recklessly disregarded their duty to provide
truthful representations regarding the safety and risk of opioids, including the fact that upon
266. Defendants made these misrepresentations with the intent that the healthcare
267. Defendants’ misrepresentations were made with the intent of defrauding and
deceiving the medical community and consumers to induce and encourage the sale of opioids.
268. Defendants’ fraudulent representations evidence their callous, reckless, willful, and
depraved indifference to the health, safety, and welfare of consumers living in Angelina County.
concerning the dangers and risk of injuries associated with the use of opioids, as well as the fact
270. Defendants’ purpose was willfully blind to, ignored, downplayed, avoided, and/or
otherwise understated the serious nature of the risks associated with the use of opioids.
encourage the sale of opioids, even if the circumstances provided suspicion for diversionary
purposes.
272. The treating medical community and consumers in Angelina County did not know
that Defendants’ representations were false and/or misleading and justifiably relied on them.
273. Defendants had sole access to material facts concerning the dangers and
intentional concealment of facts, upon which the medical community and consumers in Angelina
County reasonably relied, Angelina County suffered actual and punitive damages.
275. Angelina County re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations
contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Petition as though fully alleged herein.
276. Defendants have a duty to exercise reasonable care in marketing its opioids to
physicians treating residents of Angelina County and Angelina County residents. Defendants have
breached their duty by knowingly and fraudulently misrepresenting the benefits of, and
277. Defendants have used deceitful marketing ploys, KOLs, Front Groups, and other
schemes to increase profits at the cost of public health causing an opioid epidemic. Defendants
278. As a proximate result, Defendants and its agents have caused Angelina County to
incur excessive costs to treat the opioid epidemic in its county including, but not limited to,
increased costs of social services, health systems, law enforcement, judicial system, and treatment
counties like Angelina County in the form of social and economic costs. Specifically it was
foreseeable that Angelina County would sustain damages as an employer obligated to provide
healthcare coverage to its employees and as a local government obligated to provide public
279. Angelina County and its residents are therefore entitled to actual and punitive
damages.
280. Angelina County re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations
contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Petition as though fully alleged herein.
282. Defendants’ hiring of KOLs, Front Groups, and others to spread its fraudulent
message that opioids were useful and beneficial for chronic pain was grossly negligent and done with
combination with each other, were malicious resulting in damages and injuries to Angelina County
284. At every stage, Defendants knew, or should have known, that their conduct would
create an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others, including Angelina County and its residents,
and should be held liable in punitive and exemplary damages to Angelina County.
285. Angelina County re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations
contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Petition as though fully alleged herein.
286. As an expected and intended result of their conscious wrongdoing as set forth in
this Petition, Defendants have profited and benefited from opioid purchases made by Angelina
287. When Angelina County and its residents purchased opioids, they expected that
Defendants had provided necessary and accurate information regarding those risks. Instead,
Defendants had misrepresented the material facts regarding the risks and benefits of opioids and
distributed or disbursed opioids even though, upon information and belief, there was suspicion for
diversionary purposes.
288. Defendants took undue advantage and received a benefit because the County bore
the cost of the externalities of Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Moreover, the County had no choice
289. Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of Angelina County, and
a. That the acts alleged herein be adjudged and decreed to be unlawful and that
the Court enter a judgment declaring them to be so;
e. That Plaintiff recover the costs and expenses of suit, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by law; and
f. That Defendants be ordered to abate the public nuisance that they created in
in violation of Texas common law.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/Jeffrey B. Simon
Jeffrey B. Simon
TX State Bar No. 00788420
Amy M. Carter
TX State Bar No. 24004580
1201 Elm Street, Suite 3400
Dallas, Texas 75270
Tel: (214) 276-7680
Fax: (214) 276-7699
[email protected]
[email protected]
Health Policy
Laxmaiah Manchikanti, MD1, Standiford Helm II, MD2, Bert Fellows, MA3, Jeffrey W. Janata,
PhD4, Vidyasagar Pampati, MSc5, Jay S. Grider, DO, PhD6, and Mark V. Boswell, MD, PhD7
From: 1,3,5Pain Management Center of Over the past two decades, as the prevalence of chronic pain and health care costs have
Paducah, Paducah, KY, and 1,7University exploded, an opioid epidemic with adverse consequences has escalated. Efforts to increase
of Louisville, Louisville, KY; 2Pacific Coast
opioid use and a campaign touting the alleged undertreatment of pain continue to be
Pain Management Center, Laguna Hills,
CA; 4University Hospitals of Cleveland, significant factors in the escalation. Many arguments in favor of opioids are based solely on
Cleveland, OH; and 6University of traditions, expert opinion, practical experience and uncontrolled anecdotal observations.
Kentucky, Lexington, KY. Over the past 20 years, the liberalization of laws governing the prescribing of opioids for
the treatment of chronic non-cancer pain by the state medical boards has led to dramatic
Dr. Manchikanti is Medical Director
of the Pain Management Center of increases in opioid use. This has evolved into the present stage, with the introduction
Paducah, Paducah, KY, and Clinical of new pain management standards by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Professor, Anesthesiology and Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) in 2000, an increased awareness of the right to pain
Perioperative Medicine, University of relief, the support of various organizations supporting the use of opioids in large doses,
Louisville, Louisville, KY.
Dr. Helm is Medical Director, Pacific and finally, aggressive marketing by the pharmaceutical industry. These positions are based
Coast Pain Management Center, Laguna on unsound science and blatant misinformation, and accompanied by the dangerous
Hills, CA. assumptions that opioids are highly effective and safe, and devoid of adverse events when
Bert Fellows is Director Emeritus of prescribed by physicians.
Psychological Services at the Pain
Management Center of Paducah,
Paducah, KY. Results of the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) showed that an
Dr. Janata is Division Chief, Psychology, estimated 22.6 million, or 8.9% of Americans, aged 12 or older, were current or past
University Hospitals of Cleveland, Case month illicit drug users, The survey showed that just behind the 7 million people who had
School of Medicine, Cleveland, OH.
used marijuana, 5.1 million had used pain relievers. It has also been shown that only one
Vidyasagar Pampati is a Statistician
at the Pain Management Center of in 6 or 17.3% of users of non-therapeutic opioids indicated that they received the drugs
Paducah, Paducah, KY. through a prescription from one doctor.
Dr. Grider is Associate Professor,
Department of Anesthesiology, The escalating use of therapeutic opioids shows hydrocodone topping all prescriptions
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.
Dr. Boswell is Chairman, Department with 136.7 million prescriptions in 2011, with all narcotic analgesics exceeding 238 million
of Anesthesiology and Perioperative prescriptions. It has also been illustrated that opioid analgesics are now responsible for
Medicine, University of Louisville, more deaths than the number of deaths from both suicide and motor vehicle crashes, or
Louisville, KY deaths from cocaine and heroin combined. A significant relationship exists between sales
Address correspondence: of opioid pain relievers and deaths. The majority of deaths (60%) occur in patients when
Laxmaiah Manchikanti, M.D. they are given prescriptions based on prescribing guidelines by medical boards, with 20%
2831 Lone Oak Road of deaths in low dose opioid therapy of 100 mg of morphine equivalent dose or less per
Paducah, Kentucky 42003 day and 40% in those receiving morphine of over 100 mg per day. In comparison, 40%
E-mail: [email protected]
of deaths occur in individuals abusing the drugs obtained through multiple prescriptions,
Disclaimer: There was no external doctor shopping, and drug diversion.
funding in the preparation of this
manuscript. The purpose of this comprehensive review is to describe various aspects of crisis of opioid
Conflict of interest: None.
use in the United States. The obstacles that must be surmounted are primarily inappropriate
Manuscript received: 03/28/2012 prescribing patterns, which are largely based on a lack of knowledge, perceived safety, and
Accepted for publication: 04/09/2012 inaccurate belief of undertreatment of pain.
Free full manuscript: Key words: Opioid abuse, opioid misuse, nonmedical use of psychotherapeutic drugs,
www.painphysicianjournal.com
nonmedical use of opioids, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, opioid guidelines.
www.painphysicianjournal.com
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
ES10 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
manuscript is undertaken to evaluate the escalating population. Cocaine was used by 1.5 million, whereas
opioid crisis which although heavily regulated, contin- hallucinogens were used in the past month by 1.2 mil-
ues to be uncontrolled. lion persons (Fig. 1 and Table 1). Next to marijuana, 7.0
million (27%) persons age 12 or older had used pre-
1.0 Non-Medical Use of scription-type psychotherapeutic drugs non-medically
Psychotherapeutic Drugs
in the past month (current use). Of these, 5.1 million
had used pain relievers. The category of psychother-
1.1 Current Non-Medical Use apeutics used in the tables and figures includes the
Results of the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use nonmedical use of any prescription-type pain relievers,
and Health (NSDUH) (170), an annual survey sponsored tranquilizers, stimulants, or sedatives. However, over-
by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Ad- the-counter substances are not included in these stud-
ministration (SAMHSA), showed that an estimated 22.6 ies. The categories of nonmedical use of psychothera-
million, or 8.9% of Americans, age 12 or older, were cur- peutics and pain relievers were well ahead of the illicit
rent (past month) illicit drug users. Illicit drugs include use of cocaine, hallucinogens, inhalants, methamphet-
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or amine, heroin, and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).
prescription-type psychotherapeutics (defined in this Overall, there has been an increase in the cur-
survey as prescription-type pain relievers, tranquilizers, rent use of all illicit drugs and marijuana, without any
stimulants, and sedatives) used non-medically. Marijua- change for psychotherapeutics and hallucinogens and
na was the most commonly used illicit drug with 17.4 a decrease for cocaine from 2002 to 2010, as shown in
million current (past month) users, or 6.9% of the US Fig. 2.
Fig. 1. Past month illicit drug use among persons aged 12 or older: 2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Sum-
mary of National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012.
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES11
Table 1. Types of illicit drug use in the past month among persons aged 12 or older: Numbers in thousands, from 1998 to 2010.
ES12
12-Year %
Drugs 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 change from
1998 to 2010
Nonmedical Use of 2,477 3,952 3,849 4,811 6,287 6,451 6,110 6,491 7,095b 6,895a 6,224 6,953 6,967
181%
Psychotherapeutics2,3 (1.1%) (1.8%) (1.7%) (2.1%) (2.7%) (2.7%) (2.5% ) (2.7%) (2.9%b) (2.8%a) (2.5%) (2.8%) (2.7%)
3,497
2,621 2,782 4,377 4,693 4,404 4,658 5,220 5,174 4,747 5,257 5,100
Pain Relievers -- NA
(1.2%) (1.2%) (1.9%) (2.0%) (1.8%) (1.9%) (2.1%) (2.1%) (1.9%) (2.1%) (2.0%)
(1.6%)
325 334 276 369 435 510 564
OxyContin® -- -- -- -- -- -- NA
(0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%a) (0.1%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.2%)
655 1,097 1,000 1,358 1,804 1,830 1,616 1,817 1,766 1,835 1,800 2,010 2,160
Tranquilizers 230%
(0.3%) (0.5%) (0.4%) (0.6%) (0.8%) (0.8%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.8%) (0.9%)
1,312b 1,188b
633 950 788 1,018 1,303b 1,310b 1,385b 1,053 904 1,290 1,077
Stimulants 70%
(0.3%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.5%) (0.6%b) (0.6%b) (0.6%b) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.5%) (0.4%)
(0.5%b) (0.5%b)
175
210 229 306 436b 294 265 272 385 346 234 370 374
Sedatives3 78%
(0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.2%b) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.2%a) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%)
(0.1%)
Marijuana and 11,016 10,458 10,714 12,122 14,584 14,638 14,576 14,626 14,813 14,448 15,203 16,718 17,373
58%
Hashish (5.0%) (4.7%) (4.8) (5.4%) (6.2%) (6.2%) (6.1%) (6.0%) (6.0%) (5.8%) (6.1%) (6.6%) (6.9%)
1,667
1,750 1,552 1,213 2,020 2,281 2,021 2,397 2,421 2,075 1,855 1,637 1,466
Cocaine -16%
(0.8%) (0.7%) (0.5%) (0.9%) (1.0%) (0.8%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (0.7%) (0.6%)
(0.7%)
TOTAL ILLICIT 13,615 13,829 14,027 15,910 19,522 19,470 19,071 19,720 20,357 19,857 20,077 21,813 22,622
66%
DRUGS1 (6.2%) (6.3%) (6.3%) (7.1%) (8.3%) (8.2%) (7.9%) (8.1%) (8.3%) (8.0%) (8.0%) (8.7%) (8.9%)
-- Not available.
Note: 2002 to 2008 data is based on 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health Survey Report.
a Difference between estimate and 2008 estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. b Difference between estimate and 2008 estimate is statistically signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level.
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
1 Illicit Drugs include marijuana/hashish, cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychotherapeutics used nonmedi-
cally. Illicit Drugs Other
Than Marijuana include cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychotherapeutics used nonmedically. The estimates
for Nonmedical Use of Psychotherapeutics, Stimulants, and Methamphetamine incorporated in these summary estimates do not include data from the metham-
phetamine items added in 2005 and 2006.
2 Nonmedical use of prescription-type psychotherapeutics includes the nonmedical use of pain relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, or sedatives and does not
include over-the counter drugs.
3 Estimates of Nonmedical Use of Psychotherapeutics, Stimulants, and Methamphetamine in the designated rows include data from methamphetamine items added
in 2005 and 2006 and are not comparable with estimates presented in NSDUH reports prior to the 2007 National Findings report. For the 2002 through 2005 survey
years, a Bernoulli stochastic imputation procedure was used to generate adjusted estimates comparable with estimates for survey years 2006 and later.
Source: SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 1998 - 2010.
www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
Fig. 2. Past month use of selected illicit drugs among persons aged 12 or older: 2002-2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Summary of National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES13
Table 2. Past year initiates for illicit drugs from 1998 to 2010 (numbers in thousands) for 12 years.
ES14
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 12-Year
% change
Drugs
from 1998
to 2010
Pain 1,548 1,810 2,268 2,400 2,320 2,456 2,422 2,193 2,150 2,147 2,176 2,179 2,004 29%
Relievers2
Tranquilizers 860 916 1,298 1,212 1,184 1,071 1,180 1,286 1,112 1,232 1,127 1,226 1,238 44%
Stimulants2 648 706 808 853 783 715 793a 647 845b 642 599 702 624 -4%
Sedatives 147 164 191 225 209 194 240 247 267 198 181 186 252 71%
Marijuana 2,498 2,640 2,746 2,793 2,196 1,973 2,142 2,114 2,063 2,090 2,208 2,361 2,426 -3%
Cocaine 868 917 1,002 1,140 1,032b 986b 998b 872a 977b 906b 722 617 637 -27%
Note: 2002 to 2008 data is based on 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health Survey Report.
-- Not available.
a Difference between estimate and 2008 estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
b Difference between estimate and 2008 estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
1 Illicit Drugs include marijuana/hashish, cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychotherapeutics used
nonmedically. Illicit Drugs Other Than Marijuana include cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychothera-
peutics used nonmedically. The estimates for Nonmedical Use of Psychotherapeutics, Stimulants, and Methamphetamine incorporated in these summary
estimates do not include data from the methamphetamine items added in 2005 and 2006. See Section B.4.8 in Appendix B of the Results from the 2008
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings.
2 Nonmedical use of prescription-type psychotherapeutics includes the nonmedical use of pain relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, or sedatives and does
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
www.painphysicianjournal.com
to 2.4% in 2010 (171). Lifetime use of illicit drugs in per-
to 6.1 million in 2010, or 0.8% of the population in 2005
million using prescription psychotherapeutic drugs for
same from 2009 with 20.4% in 2010, or almost 51.6
Fig. 3. Past year initiates for specific illicit drugs among persons aged 12 or older: 2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Summary of National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
sons age 12 or older was topped by marijuana (41.9% est rate among 21 to 25 year olds 20.5% (Fig. 6) (144).
of the population) followed by nonmedical use of psy- In 2010, adults age 26 or older were less likely to be
chotherapeutics (20.4% of the population). current drug users than youths age 12 to 17 or young
adults age 18 to 25 (6.6 versus 10.1 and 21.5%, respec-
1.5 Abuse Based on Age tively). However, there were more drug users age 26 or
In 2010, young adults age 18 to 25 demonstrated older (12.8 million) than users in the 12-to-17-year age
rates of current use of illicit drugs to be higher (21.5%) group (2.5 million) and 18-to-25-year age group (7.3
than for youths age 12 to 17 (10.1%) and adults age 26 million) combined.
or older (6.6%), with 6.9% using marijuana, 2.7% using
psychotherapeutics non-medically, 0.6% using cocaine, 1.6 Abuse Based on Gender
and 0.5% using hallucinogens among young adults 18- In 2010, the survey results were similar to prior
25 (Fig. 4). Past month nonmedical use of prescription- years with males being more likely than females to be
type drugs among young adults increased from 20.2% current illicit drug users (11.2% versus 6.8%). Males
in 2002 to 21.5% in 2010. This was primarily due to an were more likely than females to be past month users
increase in the rate of pain reliever use which was 4.1% of marijuana (9.1% versus 4.7%). Rates of past month
in 2002 and 4.9% in 2006 (170). As illustrated in Figure nonmedical use of psychotherapeutic drugs among
5, overall illicit drug use increased from 8.3% to 8.9% in males and females was 3% and 2.5%, pain relievers was
2010 in the age group from 18 to 25. 2.3% and 1.7%, cocaine was 0.8% and 0.4% and hal-
Rates of past month illicit drug use varied with age. lucinogens was 0.6% and 0.3% (170).
Through the adolescent years from 12 to 17, the rates
of current illicit drug use in 2010 increased from 4.0% 1.7 Abuse During Pregnancy
at ages 12 or 13, to 9.3% at ages 14 or 15, to 16.6% Among pregnant woman age 15 to 44 years, a sig-
at ages 16 or 17 (170). The highest rate of 23.1% was nificantly lower proportion of women used illicit drugs
noted among persons age 18 to 20, with the next high- in the past month (4.4%) compared to 10.9% of their
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES15
Table 3. Types of illicit drug use in the past year among persons aged 12 or older: numbers in thousands from 1998 to 2010 (12 years).
12-year
ES16
% change
Drugs 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
from 1998
to 2010
Nonmedical Use of 5,759 9,220 8,761 11,102 14,795 15,163 14,849 15,346 16,482 b 16,280a 15,166 16,006 16,031
178%
Psychotherapeutics2, 3 (2.6%) (4.2%) (3.9%) (4.9%) (6.3%) (6.4%) (6.2%) (6.3%) (6.7% b) (6.6%a) (6.1%) (6.4%) (6.3%)
6,582 6,466 8,353 10,992a 11,671 11,256 11,815 12,649 12,466 11,885 12,405 12,213 85%
Pain Relievers --
(3.0%) (2.9%) (3.7%) (4.7%) (4.9%) (4.7%) (4.9%) (5.1% a) (5.0%) (4.8%) (4.9%) (4.8%) From 1999
1,213a 1,226 1,323 1,422 1,459 1,677 1,869 54%
OxyContin® -- -- -- -- -- --
(0.5%) (0.5%) (0.5%) (0.6%) (0.6%) (0.7%) (0.7%) From 2004
1,940 2,728 2,731 3,673 4,849 5,051 5,068 5,249 5,058 5,282 5,103 5,460 5,581
Tranquilizers 188%
(0.9%) (1.2%) (1.2%) (1.6%) (2.1%) (2.1%) (2.1%) (2.2%) (2.1%) (2.1%) (2.0%) (2.2%) (2.2%)
1,489 2,291 2,112 2,486 3,380b 3,031a 3,254b 3,088a 3,791b 2,998 2,639 3,060 2,887
Stimulants3 94%
(0.7%) (1.0%) (0.9%) (1.1%) (1.4%b) (1.3%b) (1.4%b) (1.3%b) (1.5%b) (1.2%) (1.1%) (1.2%) (1.1%)
522 631 611 806 981b 831 a 737 750 926 b 864 a 621 811 907
Sedatives 56%
(0.2%) (0.3%) (0.3%) (0.4%) (0.4%b) (0.3%a) (0.3%) (0.3%) (0.4%b) (0.3%a) (0.2%) (0.3%) (0.4%)
Marijuana and 18,710 19,102 18,589 21,086 25,755 25,231 25,451 25,375 25,378 25,085 25,768 28,521 29,206
56%
Hashish (8.6%) (8.6%) (8.3%) (9.3%c) (11.0%a) (10.6%) (10.6%) (10.4%) (10.3%) (10.1%) (10.3%) (11.3%) (11.5%)
5,658
3,811 3,742 3,328 4,186 5,902a 5,908a 5,523 6,069b 5,738 5,255 4,797 4,449
Cocaine (2.4% 17%
(1.7%) (1.7%) (1.5%) (1.9%c) (2.5%b) (2.5%b) (2.3%) (2.5%b) (2.3%) (2.1%) (1.9%) (1.8%)
a)
TOTAL ILLICIT 23,115 25,402 24,535 28,409 35,132 34,993 34,807 35,041 35,775 35,692 35,525 37,957 38,806
68%
DRUGS1 (10.6%) (11.5%) (11.0%) (12.6%c) (14.9%a) (14.7%) (14.5%) (14.4%) (14.5%) (14.4%) (14.2%) (15.1%) (15.3%)
-- Not available.
Note: 2002 to 2010 data is based on 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health Survey Report. a Difference between estimate and 2010 estimate is sta-
tistically significant at the 0.05 level. b Difference between estimate and 2010 estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
1 Illicit Drugs include marijuana/hashish, cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychotherapeutics used non-
medically. Illicit drugs other than marijuana include cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychotherapeutics
used non-medically. The estimates for nonmedical use of psychotherapeutics, stimulants, and methamphetamine incorporated in these summary estimates
do not include data from the methamphetamine items added in 2005 and 2006.
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
2 Nonmedical use of prescription-type psychotherapeutics includes the nonmedical use of pain relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, or sedatives and does
not include over-the counter drugs.
3 Estimates of nonmedical use of psychotherapeutics, stimulants, and methamphetamine in the designated rows include data from methamphetamine
items added in 2005 and 2006 and are not comparable with estimates presented in NSDUH reports prior to the 2007 National Findings report. For the 2002
through 2005 survey years, a Bernoulli stochastic imputation procedure was used to generate adjusted estimates comparable with estimates for survey years
2006 and later.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of Na-
tional Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170). Access date 2/22/2012
www.painphysicianjournal.com
Table 4. Types of illicit drugs of lifetime use among persons aged 12 or older: numbers in thousands, 1998 – 2010.
12-Year
% change
Drug 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
from 1998
to 2010
Nonmedical Use of 20,193 34,076 32,443 36,028 47,958 b 49,001b 49,157 49,571 a 50,965 50,415 51,970 51,771 51,641
156%
www.painphysicianjournal.com
Psychotherapeutics2 (9.2%) (15.4%) (14.5%) (16.0%) (20.4%) (20.6%) (20.4%) (20.4%) (20.7%) (20.3%) (20.8%) (20.6%) (20.4%)
19,888 19,210 22,133 29,611 b 31,207 b 31,768 b 32,692 b 33,472 33,060 a 34,861 35,046 34,776 75%
Pain Relievers --
(9.0%) (8.6%) (9.8%) (12.6% b) (13.1% a) (13.2% a) (13.4%) (13.6%) (13.3%) (14.0%) (13.9%) (13.7%) From 1999
1,924 b 2,832 b 3,072 b 3,481 b 4,098 b 4,354 4,842 5,829 6,121 218%
OxyContin® -- -- -- --
(0.8% b) (1.2% b) (1.3% b) (1.4% b) (1.7% b) (1.8%) (1.9%) (2.3%) (2.4%) From 2002
7,726 13,860 13,007 13,945 19,267 b 20,220 19,852 a 21,041 21,303 20,208 21,476 21,755 22,103
Tranquilizers 186%
(3.5%) (6.3%) (5.8%) (6.2%) (8.2%) (8.5%) (8.3%) (8.7%) (8.7%) (8.2%) (8.6%) 8.6%) (8.7%)
9,614 15,922 14,661 16,007 23,496 b 23,004 a 22,297 20,983 22,468 21,654 21,206 21,930 21,660
Stimulants 125%
(4.4%) (7.2%) (6.6%) (7.1%) (10.0% b) (9.7% b) (9.3% b) (8.6%) (9.1% a) (8.7%) (8.5%) (8.7%) (8.5%)
4,640 7,747 7,142 7,477 9,960 a 9,510 9,891 8,982 8,822 8,396 8,882 8,605 7,631
Sedatives 64%
(2.1%) (3.5%) (3.2%) (3.3%) (4.2% b) (4.0% a) (4.1% a) (3.7%) (3.6%) (3.4%) (3.6%) (3.4%a) (3.2%)
Marijuana and 72,070 76,428 76,321 83,272 94,946 b 96,611 b 96,772 b 97,545 b 97,825 b 100,518 102,404 104,446 106,232
47%
Hashish (33.0%) (34.6%) (34.2%) (36.9%c) (40.4%) (40.6%) (40.2%) (40.1%) (39.8% a) (40.6%) (41.0%) (41.5%) (41.9%)
b a b
23,089 25,406 24,896 27,788 33,910 34,891 34,153 b 33,673 35,298 35,882 36,773 36,599 37,210
Cocaine 61%
(10.6%) (11.5%) (11.2%) (12.3%) (14.4%) (14.7%) (14.2%) (13.8%) (14.3%) (14.5%) (14.7%) (14.5%) (14.7%)
108,255
TOTAL ILLICIT 78,123 87,734 86,931 94,140 110,205 b 110,057 b 112,085 b 111,774 b 114,275a 117,325 118,705 119,508
b 53%
DRUGS1 (35.8%) (39.7%) (38.9%) (41.7%c) (46.4%) (45.8% a) (46.1%) (45.4% b) (46.1%) (47.0%) (47.1%) (47.1%)
(46.0%)
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
-- Not available.
Note: 2002 to 2010 data is based on 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health Survey Report.
a Difference between estimate and 2010 estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
b Difference between estimate and 2010 estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
1 Illicit Drugs include marijuana/hashish, cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psychotherapeutics used
non-medically. Illicit drugs other than marijuana include cocaine (including crack), heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or prescription-type psycho-
therapeutics used non-medically. The estimates for nonmedical use of psychotherapeutics, stimulants, and methamphetamine incorporated in these
summary estimates do not include data from the methamphetamine items added in 2005 and 2006.
2 Nonmedical use of prescription-type psychotherapeutics includes the nonmedical use of pain relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, or sedatives and
does not include over-the counter drugs.
3 Estimates of nonmedical use of psychotherapeutics, stimulants, and methamphetamine in the designated rows include data from methamphet-
amine items added in 2005 and 2006 and are not comparable with estimates presented in NSDUH reports prior to the 2007 National Findings re-
port. For the 2002 through 2005 survey years, a Bernoulli stochastic imputation procedure was used to generate adjusted estimates comparable with
estimates for survey years 2006 and later.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of
National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
ES17
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
Fig. 4. Comparative analysis of past month use of illicit drugs among various age groups.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Sum-
mary of National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
Fig. 5. Past month use of selected illicit drugs among young adults aged 18 to 25: 2002-2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Sum-
mary of National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
ES18 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
Fig. 6. Past month illicit drug use among persons aged 12 or older, by age: 2009 and 2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Sum-
mary of National Findings. http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf (170) Access date 2/22/2012
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES19
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
Fig. 7. Serious mental illness, psychological distress, and nontherapeutic drug use, among persons age 18 and older, by age, 2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Men-
tal Health Findings. www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10MH_Findings/2k10MHResults.pdf (171) Access date 2/23/2012
ES20 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
prevalence of MDE in 2010 was lower for those age 50 abuse in the past year was more likely than those with
or older (5.6%) compared with rates among persons MDE to have used an illicit drug in the past year (22.0%
age 18 to 25 (8.2%) and those age 26 to 49 (7.5%). versus 7.9%) (171). A similar pattern was observed for
However, the past year prevalence of MDE was higher specific types of past year illicit drug use, such as mari-
among adult females than among adult males, 8.4% juana and the nonmedical use of prescription-type psy-
versus 5.1%. In addition, among women, past year chotherapeutics. Figure 8 illustrates substance abuse in
MDE rates were higher with 11.3% for 18 to 25 year adults by MDE.
olds, 9.2 for 26 to 49 year olds compared with those of The prevalence of a MDE in youths age 12 to 17 in
50 or older with only 6.7%. Further, the prevalence of 2010 showed that 1.9 million (8.9%) reported at least
MDE also varied by race and ethnicity with the highest one MDE during the past year. Among youths age 12 to
rate among persons reporting 2 or more races (10.8%), 17, the past year prevalence of MDE ranged from 3.3%
while rates for single race groups were 7.3% among among 12-year-olds to 10.9% among those age 16, and
whites, 5.6% among Hispanics, 7.7% among Ameri- 10.3% among those age 17 (171).
can Indians or Alaska Natives, 5.8% among blacks, and Among youths with MDE age 12 to 17, 37.2%
3.8% among Asians. had used illicit drugs in 2010, in contrast to 37.4% in
In addition, in 2010 the past prevalence of MDE 2008. This was higher than the 17.8% of youths in the
with severe impairment for adults age 18 or older was past year that did not have a MDE but had used illicit
higher among unemployed persons (9.3%) than among drugs. This pattern, however, was similar to specific
persons employed full time (5.4%). types of illicit drug use including marijuana and the
In 2010, an adult age 18 or older with a combina- nonmedical use of prescription-type psychotherapeu-
tion of a MDE and substance use and dependence or tics (171).
Fig. 8. Substance dependence or abuse among adults age 18 or older, by major depressive episode in the past years, 2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Mental Health Findings. www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10MH_Findings/2k10MHResults.pdf (171) Access date 2/23/2012
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES21
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
Fig. 9. Source where pain relievers were obtained for most recent nonmedical use among past year users age 12 or older: 2009-2010.
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Mental
Health Findings. www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10MH_Findings/2k10MHResults.pdf (171) Access date 2/23/2012
ES22 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
drocodone have increased by 280% from 1997 to 2007, oids exceeded 256 million in the United States in 2009,
whereas methadone usage has increased 1,293% and with 234 million prescriptions for immediate-release
oxycodone usage by 866%, as illustrated in Table 5 (32). (IR) opioids and 22.9 million for extended-release (ER)
The estimated number of prescriptions filled for opi- opioids with significant increases from 21.3 million for
Table 5. Retail sales of opioid medications (grams of medication) from 1997 to 2007.
% of
Change
Drug 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 from
1997
692,675 964,982 1,428,840* 1,892,691 2,649,559 3,683,881 4,730,157 5,362,815 6,621,687 7,228,219
Methadone 518,737 1293%
(34%) (39%) (48%) (32%) (40%) (39%) (28%) (13%) (23%) (9%)
6,579,719 9,717,600 15,305,913 19,927,286 22,376,892 26,655,152 29,177,530 30,628,973 37,034,220 42,977,043
Oxycodone 4,449,562 866%
(48%) (48%) (58%) (30%) (12%) (19%) (9%) (5%) (21%) (16%)
90,618 107,141 146,612* 186,083 242,027 317,200 370,739 387,928 428,668 463,340
Fentanyl Base 74,086 525%
(22%) (18%) (37%) (27%) (30%) (31%) (17%) (5%) (11%) (8%)
260,009 292,506 346,574* 400,642 473,362 579,372 655,395 781,287 901,663 1,011,028
Hydromorphone 241,078 319%
(8%) (12%) (18%) (16%) (18%) (22%) (13%) (19%) (15% (12%)
10,389,503 12,101,621 14,118,637 15,594,692 18,822,619 22,342,174 24,081,900 25,803,543 29,856,368 32,969,527
Hydrocodone 8,669,311 280%
(20%) (16%) (17%) (10%) (21%) (19%) (8%) (7%) (16%) (10%)
6,408,322 6,804,935 7,807,511 8,810,700 10,264,264 12,303,956 14,319,243 15,054,846 17,507,148 19,051,426
Morphine 5,922,872 222%
(8%) (6%) (15%) (13%) (16%) (20%) (16%) (5%) (16%) (9%)
26,018,054 23,917,088 23,474,865* 23,032,641 22,633,733 21,865,409 20,264,555 18,960,038 18,762,919 18,840,329
Codeine 25,071,410 -25%
(4%) (-8%) (-2%) (-2%) (-2%) (-3%) (-7%) (-6%) (-1%) (0.4%)
Meperidine 5,834,294 5,539,592 5,494,898* 5,450,204 5,412,389 5,239,932 4,856,644 4,272,520 4,160,033 3,936,179
5,765,954 -32%
(Pethidine) (1%) (-5%) (-1%) (-1%) (-1%) (-3%) (-7%) (-12%) (-3%) (-5%)
56,273,194 59,445,465 35,962,089.84 75,294,939 82,874,845 92,987,076 98,456,163 101,251,950 115,272,706 126,477,091
Total 50,713,010 149%
(11%) (6%) (15%) (11%) (10%) (12%) (6%) (6%) (14%) (10%)
ER Opioids IR Opioids
150
100
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Fig. 10. Total number of prescriptions dispensed for ER/LA and IR opioids from U. S. outpatient retail pharmacies, year 2000
– 2009 (173).
Source: SDI, Vector One ®: National (174).
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES23
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
ER opioids and from 223.9 million for IR opioids from of the global consumption of morphine, fentanyl, and
2007 as illustrated in Figure 10 (172-174). The data are oxycodone registered in 2009 occurring in Australia,
even more compelling when compared from 2002 to Canada, New Zealand, the United States and several
2009 with an increase from 9.3 million for ER opioids to European countries (60,85).
22.9 million, a 146% increase, and from 164.8 million Another World Health Organization (WHO) report
to 234 million for IR opioids, a 42% increase with an (87) showed that based on the statistics from the In-
annual increase of 21% for ER opioids and 6% for IR ternational Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in 2003,
opioids. Most prescriptions were for hydrocodone and 6 developed countries accounted for 79% of global
oxycodone-containing products (84.9%) and issued for morphine consumption, whereas developing countries
short treatment courses, 19.1% for less than 2 weeks, which represent 80% of the world population account-
65.4% for 2-3 weeks. Of these, however, approximately ed for only about 6% of global morphine consumption.
12% of the prescriptions were issued to those aged 10 In addition, the most recent data showed that in 2007,
to 29 years. This may signal a potential problem for this 6 developed countries reported the highest level of
population, as this is also the population most likely to morphine consumption and 132 of the 160 signatory
abuse drugs and develop addictions (172). In addition, countries that require reporting of consumption were
the data also illustrates an 8-fold increase in stimulant below the global mean as illustrated in Fig. 13. This sim-
prescriptions from 1991 to 2009 as illustrated in Fig. 11. ply illustrates that millions of patients with moderate to
Table 6 illustrates hydrocodone with acetamino- severe pain caused by different diseases and conditions
phen being the number one prescription from 2006 may not be getting treatment to alleviate their suffer-
through 2011 (175). However, narcotic analgesics con- ing in some countries, while more of them are receiving
stitute number 4 in the proportion of patients treated it in other countries such as the United States, which
in selected therapies with hypertension, topping at 42.4 uses 99% of the world’s supply of hydrocodone and
million and narcotic analgesics at 15.6 million, consti- 83% of the world’s oxycodone (176-178).
tuting number 10 in spending in leading therapy areas Gram for gram, people in the United States con-
with oncologicals constituting 23.2 billion and narcotic sume more narcotic medication than any other nation
analgesics constituting 8.3 billion in 2011 as illustrated worldwide. The International Narcotic Control Board,
in Tables 7 and 8 and Fig. 12 (175). a division of the United States, estimates global phar-
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in maceutical companies produce more than 75 tons a
an evaluation of the world supply of opioid, shows 90% year of oxycodone, compared with 11.5 tons in 1999,
Fig. 11. Projected number of prescriptions for stimulants* dispensed by U.S. retail pharmacies, 1991-2009.
Source: SDI, Vector One ®: National (174).
ES24 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
of which more than 80% of is consumed in the United trates that from 1999 to 2002, 4.2% of U.S. adults re-
States. The International Narcotics Board also reports ported the use of opioid analgesics for pain within the
that U.S. demand for hydrocodone, the most commonly past month (179). In a report of opioid use in one of
prescribed opioid, is about 27.4 million grams annually the states in the United States (Utah) (180), the data
compared to 3,237 grams for Britain, France, Germany, showed that 20.8% of adults had been prescribed an
and Italy combined (61,177,178). opioid in the last year and that 29.1% of these prescrip-
Caudill-Slosberg et al (165) in one of the earliest tions were for long-term pain. Sullivan et al (181) also
evaluations demonstrated that opioid use doubled showed over a 6 year period that the proportion of
from 8% in 1980 to 16% in 2000. The data also illus- enrollees receiving opioids with a diagnosis of chronic
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES25
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
Notes:
Therapy areas are based on proprietary IMS Health definitions. Report reflects prescription-bound products including insulins and excluding
other products such as OTC. Includes all prescriptions dispensed through retail pharmacies - including independent and chain drug stores, food
store pharmacies and mail order as well as long-term care facilities. Prescription counts are not adjusted for length of therapy. 90-day and 30-day
prescriptions are both counted as one prescription.
ES26 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
non-cancer pain and opioid prescriptions increase. Opi- management settings. Volkow et al (172) showed that
oids are also used commonly in combination with seda- only a small proportion of prescriptions were from
tive hypnotics. Vogt et al (182) in an evaluation of anal- pain clinics or specialists from anesthesiology in 2009.
gesic usage for low back pain and its impact on health Moreover, Deyo et al (31) illustrated that approxi-
care costs and service use showed that in 2001, a total mately 20% of patients in primary care settings were
of $1.4 million was spent on opioids, which constituted long-time opioid users with 61% receiving a course
68% of prescriptions for analgesics. of opioids. In young veterans, Wu et al (189) showed
The data from reports and pain management set- that prevalence of chronic opioid use increased from
tings is disconcerting. Over 90% of patients received 3% in 2003 to 4.5% in 2007. Patients on average were
opioids for chronic pain management (32,169,172,183- exposed to 2 different opioids and had 3 different
188). Even more alarming, however, is the fact that opioid prescribers. Not surprisingly, 80% of the opioid
the majority of the prescriptions are from outside pain prescriptions during the study were prescribed by pri-
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES27
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
Fig. 14. Total number of prescriptions dispensed in the U.S. by top 10 prescribing specialties for IR and ER/ LA opioids, year
2009 (173). Source: SDI, Vector One ®: National (174).
mary care providers, and less than 1% was from pain cialists constituting 2.7% (173,174). In contrast, for ER or
specialists. long-acting opioids in 2009, anesthesiologists constituted
In fact, the data illustrates that in 2009 (Fig. 14). among 13.8% and physical medicine and rehabilitation constitut-
the top 10 specialties of those prescribing immediate re- ed 9.3%, with general practitioners, family medical doctors,
lease opioids were general practitioners/family medicine osteopaths, and internal medicine specialists still dominat-
26.7%, internal medicine 15.4%, anesthesiologists consti- ing the field with 27% and 16.8%, in essence exceeding
tuting 3.2%, and physical medicine and rehabilitation spe- their prescriptions of immediate release opioids (173,174).
ES28 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
Fig. 15. Deaths from unintentional drug overdoses in the United States according to major type of drug, 1999-2007.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Unintentional Drug Poisoning in the United States. July 2010. http://www.cdc.gov/Home-
andRecreationalSafety/pdf/poison-issue-brief.pdf (190).
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES29
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
else (152,192,196).
The responsible opioid prescription community
considers that the adverse consequences of appropri-
ately prescribed and used opioids are least considered,
as the blame is placed predominantly on abuses and
overuses (49,71,116-119). Consequently, it is coupled
with a lack of evidence regarding long-term benefits
and ample evidence that the increased prescription of
opioids is fueling an epidemic of addiction and over-
dose deaths. This crisis is rooted in a lack of education
and misinformation, leading to overprescribing and a
tendency to focus on ineffective strategies (49,71,197-
199). In fact, the majority of cases involving injury and
death occur in people using opioids exactly as pre-
scribed, not just those misusing or abusing them (71).
Even more importantly, most studies indicate that pa-
tients on long-term opioid therapy are unlikely to stop
even if analgesia and function are poor and safety is-
sues arise. Frequently, despite good relief and improve-
ment in function with modalities other than opioids in-
cluding interventional techniques and surgery, patients
* Age-adjusted rates per 100,000 population for OPR deaths, crude continue on opioids (200-215).
rates per 10,000 population for OPR abuse treatment admissions,
and crude rates per 10,000 population for kilograms of OPR sold.
Even though there is no evidence to support the
previous teaching that long-acting opioids can provide
Fig. 16. Rates of opioid pain reliever overdose death, opioid better analgesia, and less risk for abuse than immediate
pain relief treatment admissions, and kilograms of opioid release products (32,71,96,100,103,107,116-119,216),
pain relievers sold – United States, 1999-2010. the use of higher doses, with a combination of short-
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital signs:
Overdoses of prescription opioid pain relievers – United States, acting and long-acting opioids, continues to escalate.
1999-2008. MMWR. Morb. Mortal Wkly. Rep. 60, 1487-1492 Thus, it is believed that commencing long-acting opioid
(2011) (160). therapy is often the starting point for high dose opi-
100%
10%
10% Patients seeing multiple
80% 40% doctors and typically
involved in drug diversion
60% Patients seeing one doctor,
high dose
40% 80% 40%
Patients seeing one doctor,
20% low dose
20%
0%
Patients Overdoses
Fig. 17. Percentage of patients and prescription drug overdoses, by risk group – United States.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC grand rounds: Prescription drug overdoses – a U.S. epidemic. MMWR. Morb. Mor-
tal Wkly. Rep. 61, 10-13 (2012) (34).
ES30 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
oid therapy, a practice that growing evidence suggests opioid abuse in chronic pain has been highly prevalent,
is harmful to patients and increases the black market along with illicit drug usage in addition to misuse or
availability of opioids through diversion (71,217-222). abuse of therapeutic opioids (32,143-152,183-188).
Multiple studies in the literature (23,32,37,46-
49,223-236) have reported an association between opi-
Conclusion
oid prescribing and overall health status, with increased What emerges from the available data utilized
disability, medical costs, subsequent surgery, and con- in this review is the conclusion that over the past 20
tinued or late opioid use. Overall, the epidemiologic years there has been an escalation of the therapeutic
studies are less positive with regards to improvement use of opioids and other psychotherapeutics as well as
in function and quality of life with opioids in chronic their abuse and nonmedical use. As a consequence of
pain patients (110,116-119,170,232,237). In fact, in an the fact that hydrocodone has become the number one
epidemiologic study from Denmark (23) where opioids prescribed medication in America, it is not difficult to
are prescribed liberally for chronic pain, it was dem- see the significant impact that this has had on the over-
onstrated that in patients receiving opioids, pain was all patterns of abuse and nonmedical use, particularly
worse, health care utilization was higher, and activ- since the illicit use of prescribed psychotherapeutics (in-
ity levels were lower compared to a matched cohort cluding opioids, which are currently at the top of that
of chronic pain patients not using opioids. This study list) now overshadows the use of nonprescription illicit
suggested that when opioids are prescribed liberally, drugs. Drug dealers are no longer the primary source
even if some patients benefit, the overall population of illicit drugs. Our greatest enemy is now inappropri-
does not. Another study (33) also reported worse pain, ate prescribing patterns, based on a lack of knowledge,
higher health care utilization, and lower activity levels perceived safety, and undertreatment of pain.
in opioid-treated patients compared to matched cohort
of chronic pain patients not using opioids. Sjøgren et al
Acknowledgments
(49) in a population-based cohort study on chronic pain The authors wish to thank Sekar Edem for assis-
and the role of opioids, showed that the odds of recov- tance in the search of the literature, Tom Prigge, MA,
ery from chronic pain were almost 4 times higher among and Alvaro Gómez, MA, for manuscript review, and
individuals not using opioids compared with individuals Tonie M. Hatton and Diane E. Neihoff, transcription-
using opioids. In addition, they also showed that use of ists, for their assistance in preparation of this manu-
strong opioids was associated with poor health-related script. We would like to thank the editorial board of
quality of life, and higher risk of death. In addition, Pain Physician for review and criticism in improving the
manuscript
References
1. Institute of Medicine (IOM). Relieving pain. Arch Intern Med 2009; 169:251-258. 792.
Pain in America: A Blueprint for Trans- 5. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Datta S, Cohen 9. Reid KJ, Harker J, Bala MM, Truyers C,
forming Prevention, Care, Education, and SP, Hirsch JA. Comprehensive review of Kellen E, Bekkering GE, Kleijnen J. Ep-
Research. The National Academies Press, epidemiology, scope, and impact of spi- idemiology of chronic non-cancer pain
Washington, DC, June 29, 2011. nal pain. Pain Physician 2009; 12:E35-E70. in Europe: Narrative review of preva-
2. Pizzo PA, Clark NM. Alleviating suffer- 6. Hoy DG, Bain C, Williams G, March L, lence, pain treatments and pain impact.
ing 101 – Pain relief in the United States. Brooks P, Blyth F, Woolf A, Vos T, Bu- Curr Med Res Opin 2011; 27:449-462.
N Engl J Med 2012; 367:197-198. chbinder R. A systematic review of the 10. Bekkering GE, Bala MM, Reid K, Kel-
3. Harkness EF, Macfarlane GJ, Silman AJ, global prevalence of low back pain. Ar- len E, Harker J, Riemsma R, Huygen FJ,
McBeth J. Is musculoskeletal pain more thritis Rheum. 2012 Jan 9. [Epub ahead of Kleijnen J. Epidemiology of chronic pain
common now than 40 years ago?: Two print]. and its treatment in The Netherlands.
population-based cross-sectional stud- 7. Hoy D, Brooks P, Blyth F, Buchbinder R. Neth J Med 2011; 69:141-153.
ies. Rheumatology (Oxford. 2005; 44:890- The epidemiology of low back pain. Best 11. Langley PC. The prevalence, correlates
895. Pract Res Clin Rheumatol 2010; 24:769- and treatment of pain in the European
4. Freburger JK, Holmes GM, Agans RP, 781. Union. Curr Med Res Opin 2011; 27:463-
Jackman AM, Darter JD, Wallace AS, 8. Hoy DG, Protani M, De R, Buchbinder 480.
Castel LD, Kalsbeek WD, Carey TS. The R. The epidemiology of neck pain. Best 12. Tosato M, Lukas A, van der Roest HG,
rising prevalence of chronic low back Pract Res Clin Rheumatol 2010; 24:783- Danese P, Antocicco M, Finne-Soveri H,
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES31
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
Nikolaus T, Landi F, Bernabei R, Onder bel MJ, Waite LM. Pain, frailty and co- 125:172-179.
G. Association of pain with behavioral morbidity on older men: the CHAMP 34. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
and psychiatric symptoms among nurs- study. Pain 2008; 140:224-230. vention. CDC grand rounds: Prescrip-
ing home residents with cognitive im- 25. Cassidy JD, Carroll LJ, Côté P. The Sas- tion drug overdoses – a U.S. epidem-
pairment: Results from the SHELTER katchewan Health and Back Pain Survey. ic. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2012;
study. Pain 2012; 153:305-310. The prevalence of low back pain and re- 61:10-13.
13. Clark JD. Chronic pain prevalence and lated disability in Saskatchewan adults. 35. Manchikanti L, Benyamin R, Datta S,
analgesic prescribing in a general medi- Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 1998; 23:1860-1867. Vallejo R, Smith HS. Opioids in chron-
cal population. J Pain Symptom Manage 26. Côté P, Cassidy JD, Carroll L. The Sas- ic noncancer pain. Expert Rev Neurother
2002; 23:131-137. katchewan Health and Back Pain Survey. 2010; 10:775-789.
14. Eriksen J. Epidemiology of chronic non- The prevalence of neck pain and related 36. Ballantyne J, LaForge K. Opioid de-
malignant pain in Denmark. Pain 2003; disability in Saskatchewan adults. Spine pendence and addiction during opioid
106:221-228. (Phila Pa 1976) 1998; 23:1689-1698. treatment of chronic pain. Pain 2007;
15. Gureje O, Von Korff M, Simon GE, Gater 27. Leboeuf-Yde C, Nielsen J, Kyvik KO, Fe- 129:235-255.
R. Persistent pain and well-being: a jer R, Hartvigsen J. Pain in the lumbar, 37. US Government Accountability Of-
World Health Organization study in pri- thoracic or cervical regions: Do age or fice: Report to Congressional Request-
mary care. JAMA 1998; 280:147-151. gender matter? A population-based ers. Prescription Pain Reliever Abuse,
16. Moulin DE, Clark AJ, Speechley M, Mor- study of 34,902 Danish twins 20-71 years December 2011. www.gao.gov/as-
ley-Forster PK. Chronic pain in Canada of age. BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders sets/590/587301.pdf
– prevalence, treatment, impact and the 2009; 39. 38. Toblin RL, Mack KA, Perveen G, Paulozzi
role of opioid analgesia. Pain Res Manag 28. Carroll LJ, Cassidy JD, Peloso PM, Giles- LJ. A population-based survey of chronic
2002; 7:179-184. Smith L, Cheng CS, Greenhalgh SW, pain and its treatment with prescription
17. Sjøgren P, Ekholm O, Peuckmann V, Haldeman S, van der Velde G, Hurwitz drugs. Pain 2011; 152:1249-1255.
Grønbæk M. Epidemiology of chronic EL, Côté P, Nordin M, Hogg-Johnson S, 39. Okie S. A flood of opioids, a rising tide
pain in Denmark: an update. Eur J Pain Holm LW, Guzman J, Carragee EJ. Bone of deaths. N Engl J Med 2010; 363:1981-
2009; 13:287-292. and Joint Decade 2000–2010 Task Force 1985.
on Neck Pain and Its Associated Disor-
18. Elliott AM, Smith BH, Penny KI, Smith 40. Martin BI, Turner JA, Mirza SK, Lee
ders. The burden and determinants of
WC, Chambers WA. The epidemiology MJ, Comstock BA, Deyo RA. Trends in
neck pain in the general population:
of chronic pain in the community. Lan- health care expenditures, utilization,
Results of the Bone and Joint Decade
cet 1999; 354:1248-1252. and health status among US adults with
2000–2010 Task Force on Neck Pain and
19. Eriksen J, Ekholm O, Sjøgren P, Ras- its associated disorders. Spine (Phila Pa spine problems, 1997-2006. Spine (Phila
mussen NK. Development of and recov- 1976) 2008; 33:S39-S51. Pa 1976) 2009 34:2077-2084.
ery from long-term pain. A 6-year fol- 41. Webster LR. Ending unnecessary opi-
low-up study of a cross-section of the 29. Côté P, Kristman V, Vidmar M, Van Eerd
D, Hogg-Johnson S, Beaton D, Smith oid-related deaths: A national priority.
adult Danish population. Pain 2004; Pain Med 2011; 12:S13-S15.
PM. The prevalence and incidence of
108:154-162. 42. Collen M. Profit-Driven Drug Testing.
work absenteeism involving neck pain:
20. Lawrence RC, Helmick CG, Arnett FC. a cohort of Ontario lost-time claimants. J Pain Palliat Care Pharmacother 2012;
Estimates of the prevalence of arthritis Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 2008; 33:S192-S198. 26:13-17.
and selected musculoskeletal disorders
30. Côté P, Cassidy JD, Carroll L. The factors 43. Braden JB, Russo J, Fan MY, Edlund
in the United States. Arthritis Rheum MJ, Martin BC, DeVries A, Sullivan MD.
associated with neck pain and its related
1998; 41:778-799. Emergency department visits among
disability in the Saskatchewan popula-
21. Verhaak PF, Kerssens JJ, Dekker J, Sor- tion. Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 2000; 25:1109- recipients of chronic opioid therapy.
bi MJ, Bensing JM. Prevalence of chron- 1117. Arch Intern Med 2010; 170:1425-1432.
ic benign pain disorder among adults:
31. Deyo RA, Smith DH, Johnson ES, Don- 44. Volkow ND, McLellan TA. Curtailing di-
a review of the literature. Pain 1998; version and abuse of opioid analgesics
ovan M, Tillotson CJ, Yang X, Petrik AF,
77:231-239.
Dobscha SK. Opioids for back pain pa- without jeopardizing pain treatment.
22. Torrance N, Smith BH, Bennett MI, Lee tients: Primary care prescribing patterns JAMA 2011; 305:1346-1347.
AJ. The epidemiology of chronic pain of and use of services. J Am Board Fam Med 45. Paulozzi LJ, Kilbourne EM, Shah NG,
predominantly neuropathic origin. Re- 2011; 24:717-727. Nolte KB, Desai HA, Landen MG, Har-
sults from a general population survey. J
32. Manchikanti L, Fellows B, Ailinani H, vey W, Loring LD. A history of being pre-
Pain 2006; 7:281-289. scribed controlled substances and risk
Pampati V. Therapeutic use, abuse, and
23. Breivik H, Collett B, Ventafridda V, Co- nonmedical use of opioids: A ten-year of drug overdose death. Pain Med 2012;
hen R, Gallacher D. Survey of chronic perspective. Pain Physician 2010; 13:401- 13:87-95.
pain in Europe: Prevalence, impact on 435. 46. Cicero TJ, Wong G, Tian Y, Lynskey M,
daily life, and treatment. Eur J Pain 2006;
33. Eriksen J, Sjøgren P, Bruera E, Ekholm Todorov A, Isenberg K. Co-morbidi-
10:287-333.
O, Rasmussen NK. Critical issues on ty and utilization of medical services by
24. Blyth FM, Rochat S, Cumming RG, opioids in chronic non-cancer pain: pain patients receiving opioid medica-
Creasey H, Handelsman DJ, Le Couteur An epidemiological study. Pain 2006; tions: Data from an insurance claims
DG, Naganathan V, Sambrook PN, Sei- database. Pain 2009; 144:20-27.
ES32 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
47. Lavin R, Park J. Depressive symptoms venting diversion and abuse: Striking 72. Nickerson JW, Attaran A. The inadequate
in community-dwelling older adults re- the right balance to achieve the optimal treatment of pain: collateral damage
ceiving opioid therapy for chronic pain. public health outcome. Discussion pa- from the war on drugs. PLoS Med 2012;
J Opioid Manag 2011; 7:309-319. per based on a scientific workshop, Jan- 9:e1001153.
48. Kidner CL, Mayer TG, Gatchel RJ. High- uary 18-19, 2011, UNODC, Vienna. 73. Small D, Drucker E. Return to Gali-
er opioid doses predict poorer func- 61. International Narcotics Control Board, leo? The Inquisition of the Internation-
tional outcome in patients with chron- Report of the International Narcotics al Narcotic Control Board. Harm Reduct
ic disabling occupational musculoskele- Control Board on the availability of in- J 2008; 5:16.
tal disorders. J Bone Joint Surg Am 2009; ternationally controlled drugs: Ensuring 74. Gilson AM, Joranson DE, Maurer MA.
91:919-927. adequate access for medical and scien- Improving state pain policies: recent
49. Sjøgren P, Grønbæk M, Peuckmann V, tific purposes. New York 2011. progress and continuing opportunities.
Ekholm O. A population-based cohort 62. Nicholson BD. Panel Discussion. Pain CA Cancer J Clin 2007; 57:341-353.
study on chronic pain: the role of opi- Med 2012; 13:S21-S22. 75. Gilson AM, Maurer MA, Joranson DE.
oids. Clin J Pain 2010; 26:763-769. 63. Nicholson BD. Introduction. Pain Med State medical board members’ beliefs
50. Fauber J. Painkiller boom fueled by net- 2012; 13:S1-S3. about pain, addiction, and diversion
working. Journal Sentinel, Feb. 18, 2012. 64. A fresh view of opioids. The BackLetter and abuse: A changing regulatory envi-
51. Murnion BP, Gnjidic D, Hilmer SN. Pre- 2011; 26:4, 37. ronment. J Pain 2007; 8:682-691.
scription and administration of opioids 65. Federation of State Medical Boards of 76. Taylor AL. Addressing the global tragedy
to hospital in-patients, and barriers to the US. Model guidelines for the use of of needless pain: Rethinking the Unit-
effective use. Pain Med 2010; 11:58-66. controlled substances for the treatment ed Nations single convention on narcot-
52. Apfelbaum JL, Chen C, Mehta SS, Gan of pain: A policy document of the Fed- ic drugs. J Law Med Ethics 2007; 35:556-
TJ. Postoperative pain experience: Re- eration of State Medical Boards of the 570, 511.
sults from a national survey suggest United States, Inc. Dallas, TX, 1998. 77. Lipman AG. Pain as a human right: The
postoperative pain continues to be un- 66. Phillips DM. JCAHO pain management 2004 Global Day Against Pain. J Pain
dermanaged. Anesth Analg 2003; 97:534- standards are unveiled. Joint Commis- Palliat Care Pharmacother 2005; 19:85-
540. sion on Accreditation of Healthcare Or- 100.
53. Dix P, Sandhar B, Murdoch J, MacIntyre ganizations. JAMA 2000; 284:428-429. 78. Dilcher AJ. Damned if they do, damned
PA. Pain on medical wards in a district 67. Cohen MZ, Easley MK, Ellis C, Hughes if they don’t: The need for a comprehen-
general hospital. Br J Anaesth 2004; B, Ownby K, Rashad BG, Rude M, Taft sive public policy to address the inade-
92:235-237. E, Westbrooks JB. JCAHO cancer pain quate management of pain. Ann Health
54. Brown D, McCormack B. Determining management and the JCAHO’s pain Law 2004; 13:81-144, table of contents.
factors that have an impact upon effec- standards: An institutional challenge. J 79. Ghodse H. Pain, anxiety and insomnia-
tive evidence-based pain management Pain Symptom Manage 2003; 25:519-527. -a global perspective on the relief of suf-
with older people, following colorectal 68. Frasco PE, Sprung J, Trentman TL. The fering: Comparative review. Br J Psychia-
surgery: An ethnographic study. J Clin impact of the Joint Commission for Ac- try 2003; 183:15-21.
Nurs 2006; 15:1287-1298. creditation of Healthcare Organizations 80. Gostomzyk JG, Heller WD. Prescribing
55. Ljungberg C, Lindblad AK, Tully MP. pain initiative on perioperative opiate strong opioids for pain therapy and for
Hospital doctors’ views of factors influ- consumption and recovery room length substitution therapy by established phy-
encing their prescribing. J Eval Clin Pract of stay. Anesth Analg 2005; 100:162-168. sicians. Schmerz 1996; 10:292-298.
2007; 13:765-771. 69. Tormoehlen LM, Mowry JB, Bodle JD, 81. Lohman D, Schleifer R, Amon JJ. Ac-
56. Auret K, Schug SA. Underutilisation of Rusyniak DE. Increased adolescent opi- cess to pain treatment as a human right.
opioids in elderly patients with chron- oid use and complications reported to BMC Med 2010; 8:8.
ic pain: Approaches to correcting the a poison control center following the 82. Inadequate pain treatment is a public
problem. Drugs Aging 2005; 22:641-654. 2000 JCAHO pain initiative. Clin Toxicol health crisis. Drug war shouldn’t claim
57. McCarberg BH, Barkin RL. Long-acting (Phila) 2011; 49:492-498. new victims. StarTribune, April 21, 2011.
opioids for chronic pain: Pharmacother- 70. Mularski RA, White-Chu F, Overbay D, www.startribune.com/opinion/editori-
apeutic opportunities to enhance com- Miller L, Asch SM, Ganzini L. Measur- als/120420264.html
pliance, quality of life, and analgesia. Am ing pain as the 5th vital sign does not 83. Canadian groups welcome internation-
J Ther 2001; 8:181-186. improve quality of pain management. J al report condemning failed “War On
58. McErlean M, Triner W. Young A. Impact Gen Intern Med 2006; 21:607-612. Drugs.” June 2, 2011. www.aidslaw.ca/
of outside regulatory investigation on 71. Letter to Janet Woodcock, MD, Direc- publications/interfaces/downloadFile.
opiate administration in the emergency tor, Center for Drug Evaluation and Re- php?ref=1886
department. J Pain 2006; 7:947-950. search, U.S Food and Drug Administra- 84. [No authors listed]. Pain management
59. Gnjidic D, Murnion BP, Hilmer SN. tion, from Physicians for Responsible failing as fears of prescription drug
Age and opioid analgesia in an acute Opioid Prescribing RE Docket No. FDA- abuse rise. J Pain Palliat Care Pharmaco-
hospital population. Age Ageing 2008; 2011-D-0771, Draft Blueprint for Pre- ther 2010; 24:182-183.
37(6):699-702. scriber Education for Long-Acting/Ex- 85. Varrassi G, Müller-Schwefe GH. The in-
60. Ensuring availability of controlled med- tended Release Opioid Class-Wide Risk ternational CHANGE PAIN Physician
ications for the relief of pain and pre- Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies. 2 Survey: Does specialism influence the
December, 2011.
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES33
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
perception of pain and its treatment? the American Academy of Pain Medi- ic non-cancer pain: An update of Ameri-
Curr Med Res Opin 2012; Mar 28 [Epub cine and the American Pain Society. Clin can Society of Interventional Pain Physi-
ahead of print]. J Pain 1997; 13:6-8. cians’ (ASIPP) guidelines. Pain Physician
86. War on Drugs. Report of the Global 99. Turk DC, Swanson KS, Gatchel RJ. Pre- 2008; 11:S5-S62.
Commission on Drug Policy. June 2011. dicting opioid misuse by chronic pain 111. Stein C, Reinecke H, Sorgatz H. Opioid
www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/re- patients: a systematic review and litera- use in chronic noncancer pain: Guide-
ports/ ture synthesis. Clin J Pain 2008; 24:497- lines revisited. Curr Opin Anaesthesiol
87. Milani B, Scholten W. World Health Or- 508. 2010; 23:598-601.
ganization. The World Medicines Situ- 100. Manchikanti L, Ailinani H, Koyyalagunta 112. von Korff M, Kolodny A, Deyo R, Chou
ation 2011: Access to Controlled Medi- D, Datta S, Singh V, Eriator I, Sehgal N, R. Long-term opioid therapy reconsid-
cines. http://apps.who.int/medicined- Shah RV, Benyamin RM, Vallejo R, Fel- ered. Ann Intern Med 2011; 155:325-328.
ocs/documents/s18062en/s18062en.pdf lows B, Christo PJ. A systematic review 113. Grady D, Berkowitz SA, Katz MH. Opi-
88. Dasgupta N, Mandl K, Brownstein J. of randomized trials of long-term opi- oids for chronic pain. Arch Intern Med
Breaking the news or fueling the epi- oid management for chronic non-can- 2011; 171:1426-1427.
demic? Temporal association between cer pain. Pain Physician 2011; 14:91-121. 114. Dhalla IA, Persaud N, Juurlink DN. Fac-
news media report volume and opi- 101. Noble M, Treadwell JR, Tregear SJ, ing up to the prescription opioid crisis.
oid-related mortality. PLoS ONE 2009; Coates VH, Wiffen PJ, Akafomo C, BMJ 2011; 343:d5142.
4:e7758. Schoelles KM. Long-term opioid man- 115. Martell BA, O’Connor PG, Kerns RD,
89. Are we winning the war on drugs? Is agement for chronic noncancer pain.
Becker WC, Morales KH, Kosten TR,
it worth the cost? MD Health Network. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2010; Fiellin DA. Systematic review: Opioid
www.mdhealthnetwork.org/prescrip- 1:CD006605. treatment for chronic back pain: Preva-
tion-drugs/war_on_drugs.html 102. Kalso E, Edwards JE, Moore RA, McQuay lence, efficacy, and association with ad-
90. Painful drug war victory. The Washington HJ. Opioids in chronic non-cancer pain: diction. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146:116-
Times. August 16, 2007. www.washing- Systematic review of efficacy and safety. 127.
tontimes.com/news/2007/aug/16/pain- Pain 2004; 112:372-380. 116. Who bears responsibility for the prema-
ful-drug-war-victory/?page=all 103. Furlan AD, Sandoval JA, Mailis-Gagnon ture adoption of opioids as a treatment
91. Fauber J. UW a force in pain drug A, Tunks E. Opioids for chronic noncan- standard? The Back Letter 2011; 26:46
growth. JSOnline. 2 April, 2011. cer pain: A meta-analysis of effective- 117. Chou R, Huffman LH; American Pain
ness and side effects. Can Med Assoc J
92. Fauber J. Academics profit by making Society; American College of Physicians.
the case for opioid painkillers. MedPage 2006; 174:1589-1594. Medications for acute and chronic low
Today. 3 April, 2011. 104. Eisenberg E, McNicol E, Carr DB. Opi- back pain: A review of the evidence for
oids for neuropathic pain (review). an American Pain Society/American
93. Manchikanti L, Benyamin RM, Fal-
Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2006, College of Physicians clinical practice
co FJE, Caraway DL, Datta S, Hirsch JA.
3:CD006146. guideline. Ann Intern Med 2007; 147:505-
Guidelines warfare over interventional
techniques: Is there a lack of discourse 105. Deshpande A, Furlan A, Mailis-Gagnon 514.
or straw man? Pain Physician 2012; 15:E1- A, Atlas S, Turk D. Opioids for chronic 118. Reinecke H, Sorgatz H; German Society
E26. low back pain (review). Cochrane Data- for the Study of Pain (DGSS). S3 guide-
base Syst Rev 2007; 3:CD004959. line LONTS. Long-term administration
94. Portenoy RK, Foley KM. Chronic use
of opioid analgesics in non-malignant 106. Devulder J, Richarz U, Nataraja SH. Im- of opioids for non-tumor pain. Schmerz
pain: Report of 38 cases. Pain 1986; pact of long-term use of opioids on 2009; 23:440-447.
25:171-186. quality of life in patients with chronic, 119. Sorgatz H, Maier C. Nothing is more
non-malignant pain. Curr Med Res Opin damaging to a new truth than an old
95. Ballantyne JC. Opioid analgesia: Per-
2005; 21:1555-1568. error: Conformity of new guidelines on
spectives on right use and utility. Pain
Physician 2007; 10:479-491. 107. Manchikanti L, Vallejo R, Manchikanti opioid administration for chronic pain
KN, Benyamin RM, Datta S, Christo PJ. with the effect prognosis of the DGSS S3
96. Chou R, Huffman L. Use of Chronic Opi-
oid Therapy in Chronic Noncancer Pain: Effectiveness of long-term opioid ther- guidelines LONTS (long-term adminis-
Evidence Review. American Pain Society; apy for chronic non-cancer pain. Pain tration of opioids for non-tumor pain).
Glenview, IL: 2009. Physician 2011; 14:E133-E156. Schmerz 2010; 24:309-312.
www.ampainsoc.org/pub/pdf/Opioid_Final_ 108. Colson J, Koyyalagunta D, Falco FJE, 120. Angst MS, Clark JD. Opioid-induced hy-
Evidence_Report.pdf Manchikanti L. A systematic review of peralgesia: a qualitative systematic re-
observational studies on the effective- view. Anesthesiology 2006; 104:570-587.
97. Hill CS. Government regulatory influ-
ness of opioid therapy for cancer pain. 121. Lee M, Silverman SM, Hansen H, Pa-
ences on opioid prescribing and their
Pain Physician 2011; 14:E85-E102. tel VB, Manchikanti L. A comprehensive
impact on the treatment of pain of non-
malignant origin. J Pain Symptom Man- 109. Vallejo R, Barkin RL, Wang VC. Phar- review of opioid-induced hyperalgesia.
age 1996; 11:287-298. macology of opioids in the treatment of Pain Physician 2011; 14:145-161.
chronic pain syndromes. Pain Physician 122. Cohen SP, Christo PJ, Wang S, Chen L,
98. The American Academy of Pain Medi-
2011; 14:E343-E360. Stojanovic MP, Shields CH, Brummett
cine, the American Pain Society. The use
of opioids for the treatment of chron- 110. Trescot AM, Helm S, Hansen H, Benya- C, Mao J. The effect of opioid dose and
ic pain. A consensus statement from min R, Adlaka R, Patel S, Manchikanti L. treatment duration on the perception of
Opioids in the management of chron-
ES34 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
a painful standardized clinical stimulus. Sullivan M, Weisner C, Braden JB, Psa- Kenney CM, Siddiqi M, Broughton PG.
Reg Anesth Pain Med 2008; 33:199-206. ty BM, Von Korff M. Relationship of opi- Importance of urine drug testing in the
123. Raffaelli W, Salmosky-Dekel BG. Biolog- oid use and dosage levels to fractures in treatment of chronic noncancer pain:
ical consequences of long-term intra- older chronic pain patients. J Gen Intern Implications of recent medicare poli-
thecal administration of opioids. Miner- Med 2010; 25:310-315. cy changes in Kentucky. Pain Physician
va Anestesiol 2005; 71:475-478. 134. Walker JM, Farney RJ, Rhondeau SM, 2010; 13:167-186.
124. Deer TR, Smith HS, Burton AW, Pope Boyle KM, Valentine K, Cloward TV, Shil- 144. Gilbert JW, Wheeler GR, Mick GE, Storey
JE, Doleys DM, Levy RM, Staats PS, Wal- ling KC. Chronic opioid use is a risk fac- BB, Herder SL, Richardson GB, Watts E,
lace MS, Webster LR, Rauck RL, Cous- tor for the development of central sleep Gyarteng-Dakwa K, Marino BS, Kenney
ins M. Comprehensive consensus based apnea and ataxic breathing. J Clin Sleep CM, Siddiqi M, Broughton PG. Urine
guidelines on intrathecal drug delivery Med 2007; 3:455-461. drug testing in the treatment of chron-
systems in the treatment of pain caused 135. Solomon DH, Rassen JA, Glynn RJ, Lee ic noncancer pain in a Kentucky private
by cancer pain. Pain Physician 2011; J, Levin R, Schneeweiss S. The compar- neuroscience practice: The potential ef-
14:E283-E312. ative safety of analgesics in older adults fect of Medicare benefit changes in Ken-
with arthritis. Arch Intern Med 2010; tucky. Pain Physician 2010; 13:187-194.
125. Edlund MJ, Martin BC, Devries A, Fan
M-Y, Braden JB, Sullivan MD. Trends 170:1968-1976. 145. Manchikanti L, Malla Y, Wargo BW, Fel-
in use of opioids for chronic noncan- 136. Martin BC, Fan MY, Edlund MJ, Devries lows B. Comparative evaluation of the
cer pain among individuals with mental A, Braden JB, Sullivan MD. Long-term accuracy of immunoassay with liquid
health and substance use disorders: the chronic opioid therapy discontinuation chromatography tandem mass spec-
TROUP Study. Clin J Pain 2010; 26:1-8. rates from the TROUP study. J Gen Intern trometry (LC/MS/MS) of urine drug
Med 2011; 26:1450-1457. testing (UDT) opioids and illicit drugs
126. Sullivan MD, Edlund MJ, Fan MY,
in chronic pain patients. Pain Physician
Devries A, Brennan Braden J, Martin 137. Pletcher MJ, Kertesz SG, Kohn MA, Gon-
2011; 14:175-187.
BC. Risks for possible and probable opi- zales. R. Trends in opioid prescribing by
oid misuse among recipients of chronic race/ethnicity for patients seeking care 146. Manchikanti L, Malla Y, Wargo BW, Fel-
opioid therapy in commercial and med- in US emergency departments. JAMA lows B. Comparative evaluation of the
icaid insurance plans: the TROUP Study. 2008; 299:70-78. accuracy of benzodiazepine testing in
Pain 2010; 150:332-339. 138. American Society for Pain Management chronic pain patients utilizing immuno-
assay with liquid chromatography tan-
127. Fleming MF, Balousek SL, Klessig CL, Nursing (ASPMN); Emergency Nurs-
dem mass spectrometry (LC/MS/MS) of
Mundt MP, Brown DD. Substance use es Association (ENA); American College
urine drug testing. Pain Physician 2011;
disorders in a primary care sample re- of Emergency Physicians (ACEP); Ameri-
14:259-270.
ceiving daily opioid therapy. J Pain 2007; can Pain Society (APS). Policy statement.
8:573-582. Optimizing the treatment of pain in 147. Pesce A, West C, West R, Crews B, Mikel
patients with acute presentations. Ann C, Almazan P, Latyshev S, Rosenthal M,
128. Sullivan MD. Limiting the potential
harms of high-dose opioid therapy: Emerg Med 2010; 56:77-79. Horn P. Reference intervals: a novel ap-
Comment on “Opioid dose and drug- proach to detect drug abuse in a pain
139. American College of Emergency Physi-
related mortality in patients with non- cians. Policy statement. Electronic pre- patient population. J Opioid Manage
malignant pain.” Arch Intern Med 2011; scription monitoring. Approved by the 2010; 6:341-350.
171:691-693. ACEP Board of Directors, October 2011. 148. Pesce A, Rosenthal M, West R, West C,
Ann. Emerg. Med. Pending publication, Mikel C, Almazan P, Latyshev S. An eval-
129. Katz MH. Long-term opioid treatment
of nonmalignant pain: a believer loses March 2012. uation of the diagnostic accuracy of
his faith. Arch Intern Med 2010; 170:1422- liquid chromatography-tandem mass
140. Department of Health and Human Ser-
1424. vices, Food and Drug Administration. spectrometry versus immunoassay drug
testing in pain patients. Pain Physician
130. McLellan AT, Turner BJ. Chronic non- Draft blueprint for prescriber education
for long-acting/extended-release opioid 2010; 13:273-281.
cancer pain management and opioid
class-wide risk evaluation and mitiga- 149. Manchikanti L, Malla Y, Wargo BW, Cash
overdose: Time to change prescribing
tion strategy. Fed. Reg. 76, 68766-68767 KA, Pampati V, Damron KS, McManus
practices. Ann Intern Med 2010; 152:123-
(November 7, 2011). CD, Brandon DE. Protocol for accuracy
124.
of point of care (POC) or in-office urine
131. Dunn KM, Saunders KW, Rutter CM, 141. Solanki DR, Koyyalagunta D, Shah RV,
Silverman SM, Manchikanti L. Mon- drug testing (immunoassay) in chronic
Banta-Green CJ, Merrill JO, Sullivan pain patients: A prospective analysis of
MD, Weisner CM, Silverberg MJ, Camp- itoring opioid adherence in chron-
ic pain patients: Assessment of risk of immunoassay and liquid chromatogra-
bell CI, Psaty BM, Von Korff M. Opioid phy tandem mass spectometry (LC/MS/
prescriptions for chronic pain and over- substance misuse. Pain Physician 2011;
14:E119-E131. MS). Pain Physician 2010; 13:E1-E22.
dose: a cohort study. Ann Intern Med
2010; 152:85-92. 142. Christo PJ, Manchikanti L, Ruan X, Bot- 150. McCarberg BH. A critical assessment of
opioid treatment adherence using urine
132. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Caraway DL, tros M, Hansen H, Solanki D, Jordan AE,
drug testing in chronic pain manage-
Benyamin RM. Breakthrough pain in Colson J. Urine drug testing in chronic
ment. Postgrad Med 2011; 123:124-131.
chronic non-cancer pain: Fact, fiction, pain. Pain Physician 2011; 14:123-143.
151. Ling W, Mooney L, Hillhouse M. Pre-
or abuse. Pain Physician 2011; 14:E103- 143. Gilbert JW, Wheeler GR, Mick GE, Sto-
scription opioid abuse, pain and addic-
E117. rey BB, Herder SL, Richardson GB,
tion: Clinical issues and implications.
133. Saunders KW, Dunn KM, Merrill JO, Watts E, Gyarteng-Dakwa K, Marino BS,
Drug Alcohol Rev 2011; 30:300-305.
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES35
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
152. Hall AJ, Logan JE, Toblin RL, Kaplan JA, al Treatment Agency for Substance Mis- the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use
Kraner JC, Bixler D, Crosby AE, Paulozzi use. Addiction to Medicine. An investi- and Health: Mental Health Findings.
LJ. Patterns of abuse among uninten- gation into the configuration and com- NSDUH Series H-42, HHS Publica-
tional pharmaceutical overdose fatali- missioning of treatment services to sup- tion No. (SMA) 11-4667. Rockville, MD:
ties. JAMA 2008; 300:2613-2620. port those who develop problems with Substance Abuse and Mental Health
153. United States Department of Justice, prescription-only or over-the-coun- Services Administration, 2012. www.
Drug Enforcement Administration. Au- ter medicine. May 2011. www.nta.nhs. samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10MH_
tomation of Reports and Consolidated uk/uploads/addictiontomedicinesma- Findings/2k10MHResults.pdf
Orders System (ARCOS). Springfield, y2011a.pdf 172. Volkow ND, McLellan TA, Cotto JH.
VA, 2011. 163. Wunsch MJ, Nakamoto K, Behonick G, Characteristics of opioid prescriptions
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/in- Massello W. Opioid deaths in rural Vir- in 2009. JAMA 2011; 305:1299-1301.
dex.html. ginia: A description of the high preva- 173. Governale L. Outpatient prescription
lence of accidental fatalities involving opioid utilization in the U.S., years 2000
154. Paulozzi LJ, Logan JE, Hall AJ, McKin-
prescribed medications. Am J Addict – 2009. Drug Utilization Data Analysis
stry E, Kaplan JA, Crosby AE. A compar-
2009; 18:5-14. Team Leader, Division of Epidemiology,
ison of drug overdose deaths involv-
ing methadone and other opioid anal- 164. Hudson TJ, Edlund MJ, Steffick DE, Office of Surveillance and Epidemiolo-
gesics in West Virginia. Addiction 2009; Tripathi SP, Sullivan MD. Epidemiolo- gy. Presentation for U.S. Food and Drug
104:1541-1548. gy of regular prescribed opioid use: Re- Administration, July 22, 2010.
sults from a national, population-based www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCom-
155. Dhalla IA, Mamdani MM, Sivilotti ML,
survey. J Pain Sympt Mgmt 2008; 36:280- mittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/
Kopp A, Qureshi O, Juurlink DN. Pre-
288. Drugs/AnestheticAndLifeSupportDrug-
scribing of opioid analgesics and related
mortality before and after the introduc- 165. Caudill-Slosberg MA, Schwartz LM, Wo- sAdvisoryCommittee/UCM220950.pdf
tion of long-acting oxycodone. CMAJ loshin S. Office visits and analgesic pre- 174. Source: SDI, Vector One ®: National.
2009; 181:891-896. scriptions for musculoskeletal pain in 175. IMS Institute for Healthcare Informat-
US: 1980 vs. 2000. Pain 2004; 109:514-
156. Toblin RL, Paulozzi LJ, Logan JE, Hall ics. The use of medicines in the United
519.
AJ, Kaplan JA. Mental illness and psy- States: Review of 2011. April 2012.
chotropic drug use among prescription 166. Franklin GM, Mai J, Wickizer T, Turn-
www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Con-
drug overdose deaths: A medical exam- er JA, Fulton-Kehoe D, Grant L. Opioid tent/Insights/IMS%20Institute%20
iner chart review. J Clin Psychiatry 2010; dosing trends and mortality in Wash- for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/
71:491-496. ington State workers’ compensation, IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.
1996–2002. Am J Ind Med 2005; 48:91-99.
157. Methadone Mortality Working Group pdf
Drug Enforcement Administration, Of- 167. Luo X, Pietrobon R, Hey L. Patterns and 176. Ricks D. UN: US consumes 80% of
fice of Diversion Control, April 2007. trends in opioid use among individu- world’s oxycodone. Newsday, January 21,
als with back pain in the United States.
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_ 2012.
concern/methadone/methadone_pre- Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 2004; 29:884-891.
177. Report of the International Narcotics
sentation0407_revised.pdf 168. Zerzan JT, Morden NE, Soumerai S, Control Board for 2004. New York, Unit-
Ross-Degnan D, Roughead E, Zhang F,
158. Xu J, Kochanek KD, Murphy SL, Tejada- ed Nations, 2005.
Simoni-Wastila L, Sullivan SD. Trends
Vera B. Deaths: Final data for 2007. Na- www.incb.org/pdf/e/ar/2004/incb_re-
and geographic variation of opiate
tional vital statistics reports; Vol. 58 No. port_2004_full.pdf
medication use in state Medicaid fee-
19. National Center for Health Statistics, 178. Report of the International Narcotics
for-service programs, 1996 to 2002. Med
Hyattsville, MD, 2010. Control Board 2008. New York, United
Care 2006; 44:1005-1010.
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/ Nations, 2009.
nvsr58/nvsr58_01.pdf. 169. Manchikanti L, Pampati S, Damron
KS, Cash KA, McManus CD, Fellows B. www.incb.org/pdf/annual-report/2008/
159. Warner M, Chen LH, Makuc DM, An- Identification of doctor shoppers with en/AR_08_English.pdf
derson RN, Miniño AM. Drug poisoning KASPER: A comparative evaluation over 179. National Center for Health Statistics.
deaths in the United States, 1980-2008. a decade in western Kentucky. J Ky Med Health, United States, 2008 with chart-
NCHS data brief, no. 81. National Cen- Assoc 2012; in press. book. National Center for Health Statis-
ter for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, MD,
170. Substance Abuse and Mental Health tics, Hyattsville, MD, 2009.
2011.
Services Administration. Results from 180. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
160. Centers for Disease Control and Pre- the 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and vention. Adult use of prescription opioid
vention. Vital signs: Overdoses of pre- Health: Summary of National Findings. pain medications – Utah, 2008. MMWR
scription opioid pain relievers – United NSDUH Series H-41, HHS Publication Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2010; 59:153-157.
States, 1999-2008. MMWR. Morb Mortal No. (SMA) 11-4658. Substance Abuse and
Wkly Rep 2011; 60:1487-1492. 181. Sullivan MD, Edlund MJ, Fan MY,
Mental Health Services Administration, Devries A, Brennan Braden J, Martin BC.
161. Degenhardt L, Hall W. Extent of illic- Rockville, MD, 2011. Trends in use of opioids for non-cancer
it drug use and dependence, and their www.samhsa.gov/data/ pain conditions 2000-2005 in commer-
contribution to the global burden of NSDUH/2k10NSDUH/2k10Results.pdf. cial and Medicaid insurance plans: the
disease. Lancet 2012; 379:55-70.
171. Substance Abuse and Mental Health TROUP study. Pain 2008; 138:440-449.
162. National Health Services, The Nation- Services Administration. Results from 182. Vogt MT, Kwoh CK, Cope DK, Osial TA,
ES36 www.painphysicianjournal.com
Opioid Epidemic in the United States
Culyba M, Starz TW. Analgesic usage for ic noncancer pain in the TROUP study. J interlaminar epidural injections in man-
low back pain: Impact on health care Pain Symptom Manage 2010; 40:279-289. aging chronic lumbar discogenic pain
costs and service use. Spine (Phila Pa 194. Katz N, Panas L, Kim M, Audet AD, Bi- without disc herniation or radiculitis.
1976) 2005; 30:1075-1081. lansky A, Eadie J, Kreiner P, Paillard FC, Pain Physician 2010; 13:E279-E292.
183. Manchikanti L, Damron KS, McManus Thomas C, Carrow G. Usefulness of pre- 204. Manchikanti L, Cash KA, McManus CD,
CD, Barnhill RC. Patterns of illicit drug scription monitoring programs for sur- Damron KS, Pampati V, Falco FJE. Lum-
use and opioid abuse in patients with veillance--analysis of Schedule II opi- bar interlaminar epidural injections in
chronic pain at initial evaluation: a pro- oid prescription data in Massachusetts, central spinal stenosis: Preliminary re-
spective, observational study. Pain Physi- 1996-2006. Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Saf sults of a randomized, double-blind,
cian 2004; 7:431-437. 2010; 19:115-123. active control trial. Pain Physician 2012;
184. Manchikanti L, Pampati V, Damron KS, 195. Bohnert AS, Valenstein M, Bair MJ, 15:51-64.
Beyer CD, Barnhill RC, Fellows B. Prev- Ganoczy D, McCarthy JF, Ilgen MA, Blow 205. Manchikanti L, Malla Y, Cash KA, McM-
alence of prescription drug abuse and FC. Association between opioid pre- anus CD, Pampati V. Fluoroscopic epi-
dependency in patients with chronic scribing patterns and opioid overdose- dural injections in cervical spinal steno-
pain in western Kentucky. J KY Med As- related deaths. JAMA 2011; 305:1315-1321. sis: Preliminary results of a randomized,
soc 2003; 101:511-517. 196. Lanier WA. Prescription drug overdose double-blind, active control trial. Pain
185. Manchikanti L, Damron KS, Pampati V, deaths – Utah, 2008-2009. In Proceed- Physician 2012; 15:E59-E70.
McManus CD. Prevalence of illicit drug ings at the 59th Annual Epidemic Intelli- 206. Manchikanti L, Malla Y, Cash KA, McM-
use among individuals with chronic gence Service Conference. Atlanta, GA, anus CD, Pampati V. Fluoroscopic cer-
pain in the Commonwealth of Kentucky: April 23, 2010. vical interlaminar epidural injections in
an evaluation of patterns and trends. J 197. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Boswell MV. In- managing chronic pain of cervical post-
KY Med Assoc 2005; 103:55-62. terventional pain management at cross- surgery syndrome: Preliminary results
186. Vaglienti RM, Huber SJ, Noel KR, John- roads: The perfect storm brewing for a of a randomized, double-blind active
stone RE. Misuse of prescribed con- new decade of challenges. Pain Physician control trial. Pain Physician 2012; 15:13-
trolled substances defined by urinalysis. 2010; 13:E111-E140. 26.
WV Med J 2003; 99:67-70. 198. Benyamin RM, Datta S, Falco FJE. A per- 207. Manchikanti L, Cash KA, McManus CD,
187. Michna E, Jamison RN, Pham LD, Ross fect storm in interventional pain man- Pampati V, Benyamin RM. A preliminary
EL, Janfaza D, Nedeljkovic SS, Narang S, agement: Regulated, but unbalanced. report of a randomized double-blind,
Palombi D, Wasan AD. Urine toxicology Pain Physician 2010; 13:109-116. active controlled trial of fluoroscopic
screening among chronic pain patients 199. Office of National Drug Control Poli- thoracic interlaminar epidural injections
on opioid therapy: Frequency and pre- cy. 2011 National Drug Control Strat- in managing chronic thoracic pain. Pain
dictability of abnormal findings. Clin J egy. http://www.whitehouse.gov/ Physician 2010; 13:E357-E369.
Pain 2007; 23:173-179. ondcp/2011-national-drug-control- 208. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Falco FJE, Cash
188. Manchikanti L, Manchukonda R, Pam- strategy KA, Pampati V. Evaluation of lumbar fac-
pati V, Damron KS, Brandon DE, Cash 200. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Cash KA, Pam- et joint nerve blocks in managing chron-
KA, McManus CD. Does random urine pati V, Damron KS, Boswell MV. A ran- ic low back pain: a randomized, double-
drug testing reduce illicit drug use in domized, controlled, double-blind tri- blind, controlled trial with a 2-year fol-
chronic pain patients receiving opioids? al of fluoroscopic caudal epidural injec- low-up. Int J Med Sci 2010; 7:124-135.
Pain Physician 2006; 9:123-129. tions in the treatment of lumbar disc 209. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Falco FJE, Cash
189. Wu PC, Lang C, Hasson NK, Linder SH, herniation and radiculitis. Spine (Phila KA, Fellows B. Comparative outcomes
Clark DJ. Opioid use in young veterans. Pa 1976) 2011; 36:1897-1905. of a 2-year follow-up of cervical me-
J Opioid Manag 2010; 6:133-139. 201. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Cash KA, Pam- dial branch blocks in management of
pati V, Datta S. Management of pain of chronic neck pain: a randomized, dou-
190. Unintentional Drug Poisoning in the
United States. Centers for Disease Con- post lumbar surgery syndrome: One- ble-blind controlled trial. Pain Physician
year results of a randomized, double 2010; 13:437-450.
trol and Prevention. July 2010. http://
www.cdc.gov/HomeandRecreational- double-blind, active controlled trial of 210. Chou R, Huffman L. Guideline for the
Safety/pdf/poison-issue-brief.pdf fluoroscopic caudal epidural injections. Evaluation and Management of Low Back
Pain Physician 2010; 13:509-521. Pain: Evidence Review. American Pain So-
191. Paulozzi LJ, Weisler RH, Patkar AA. A na-
ciety, Glenview, IL, 2009.
tional epidemic of unintentional pre- 202. Manchikanti L, Cash RA, McManus CD,
scription opioid overdose deaths: how Pampati V, Fellows B. Fluoroscopic cau- www.ampainsoc.org/pub/pdf/LBPEvi-
physicians can help control it. J Clin Psy- dal epidural injections with or with- dRev.pdf.
chiatry 2011; 72:589-592. out steroids in managing pain of lum- 211. Manchikanti L, Singh V, Falco FJE, Cash
192. Ohio Department of Health. Epidemic bar spinal stenosis: One year results of KA, Pampati V, Fellows B. Comparative
of prescription drug overdose in Ohio. randomized, double-blind, active-con- effectiveness of a one-year follow-up of
2010. trolled trial. J Spinal Disord 2011; April 5 thoracic medial branch blocks in man-
[Epub ahead of print]. agement of chronic thoracic pain: a ran-
www.healthyohioprogram.org/dis-
203. Manchikanti L, Cash KA, McManus CD, domized, double-blind active controlled
easeprevention/dpoison/drugdata.aspx.
Pampati V, Benyamin RM. Preliminary trial. Pain Physician 2010; 13:535-548.
193. Edlund MJ, Martin BC, Fan MY, Braden
results of a randomized, double-blind, 212. Staal JB, de Bie RA, de Vet HC, Hildeb-
JB, Devries A, Sullivan MD. An analysis
controlled trial of fluoroscopic lumbar randt J, Nelemans P. Injection therapy
of heavy utilizers of opioids for chron-
www.painphysicianjournal.com ES37
Pain Physician: Opioid Special Issue July 2012; 15:ES9-ES38
for subacute and chronic low back pain: 220. Anchersen K, Hansteen V, Gossop M, 229. Gross DP, Stephens B, Bhambhani Y,
an updated Cochrane review. Spine (Phi- Clausen T, Waal H. Opioid maintenance Haykowsky M, Bostick GP, Rashiq S.
la Pa 1976) 2009; 34:49-59. patients with QTc prolongation: Con- Opioid prescriptions in canadian work-
213. American College of Occupational and genital long QT syndrome mutation ers’ compensation claimants: Prescrip-
Environmental Medicine (ACOEM) Low may be a contributing risk factor. Drug tion trends and associations between
back Disorders. In: Occupational Medi- Alcohol Depend 2010; 112:216-219. early prescription and future recovery.
cine Practice Guidelines: Evaluation and 221. Modesto-Lowe V, Brooks D, Petry N. Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 2009; 34:525-531.
Management of Common Health Prob- Methadone deaths: Risk factors in pain 230. Volinn E, Fargo JD, Fine PG. Opioid
lems and Functional Recovery of Workers, and addicted populations. J Gen Intern therapy for nonspecific low back pain
Second Edition. American College of Oc- Med 2010; 25:305-309. and the outcome of chronic work loss.
cupational and Environmental Medicine 222. Mayet S, Gossop M, Lintzeris N, Pain 2009; 142:194-201.
Press, Elk Grove Village, 2007. Markides V, Strang J. Methadone main- 231. Cifuentes M, Webster B, Genevay S,
214. Manchikanti L, Datta S, Derby R, Wolfer tenance, QTc and torsade de pointes: Pransky G. The course of opioid pre-
LR, Benyamin RM, Hirsch JA. A critical Who needs an electrocardiogram and scribing for a new episode of disabling
review of the American Pain Society clin- what is the prevalence of QTc prolonga- low back pain: Opioid features and dose
ical practice guidelines for intervention- tion? Drug Alcohol Rev 2011; 30:388-396. escalation. Pain 2010; 151:22-29.
al techniques: Part 1. Diagnostic inter- 223. Manchikanti L, Damron KS, Beyer CD, 232. Becker N, Sjogren P, Bech P, Olsen AK,
ventions. Pain Physician 2010; 13:E141- Pampati V. A comparative evaluation of Eriksen J. Treatment outcome of chron-
E174. illicit drug use in patients with or with- ic non-malignant pain patients man-
215. Manchikanti L, Datta S, Gupta S, Mung- out controlled substance abuse in inter- aged in a Danish multidisciplinary pain
lani R, Bryce DA, Ward SP, Benyamin ventional pain management. Pain Physi- centre compared to general practice: a
RM, Sharma ML, Helm II S, Fellows B, cian 2003; 6:281-285. randomised controlled trial. Pain 2000;
Hirsch JA. A critical review of the Ameri- 224. Fillingim RB, Doleys DM, Edwards RR, 84:203-211.
can Pain Society clinical practice guide- Lowery D. Clinical characteristics of 233. Webster BS, Cifuentes M, Verma S,
lines for interventional techniques: Part chronic back pain as a function of gen- Pransky G. Geographic variation in opi-
2. Therapeutic interventions. Pain Physi- der and oral opioid use. Spine (Phila Pa oid prescribing for acute, work-related,
cian 2010; 13:E215-E264. 1976) 2003; 28:143-150. low back pain and associated factors: A
216. Manchikanti L, Manchukonda R, Pam- 225. Webster BS, Verma SK, Gatchel RJ. Rela- multilevel analysis. Am J Ind Med 2009;
pati V, Damron KS. Evaluation of abuse tionship between early opioid prescrib- 52:162-171.
of prescription and illicit drugs in ing for acute occupational low back pain 234. Franklin GM, Rahman EA, Turner JA,
chronic pain patients receiving short- and disability duration, medical costs, Daniell WE, Fulton-Kehoe D. Opioid use
acting (hydrocodone) or long-acting subsequent surgery, and late opioid use. for chronic low back pain: a prospective,
(methadone) opioids. Pain Physician Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 2007; 32:2127-2132. population-based study among injured
2005; 8:257-261. workers in Washington state, 2002-
226. Mahmud MA, Webster BS, Courtney TK,
217. Macintyre PE, Loadsman JA, Scott DA. Matz S, Tacci JA, Christiani DC. Clinical 2005. Clin J Pain 2009; 25:743-751.
Opioids, ventilation and acute pain management and the duration of dis- 235. Stover BD, Turner JA, Franklin G, Gluck
management. Anaesth Intensive Care ability for work-related low back pain. J JV, Fulton-Kehoe D, Sheppard L, Wick-
2011; 39:545-558. Occup Environ Med 2000; 42:1178-1187. izer TM, Kaufman J, Egan K. Factors as-
218. Webster LR, Cochella S, Dasgupta N, 227. Franklin GM, Stover BD, Turner JA, Ful- sociated with early opioid prescription
Fakata KL, Fine PG, Fishman SM, Grey ton- Kehoe D, Wickizer TM; Disability among workers with low back injuries.
T, Johnson EM, Lee LK, Passik SD, Pep- Risk Identification Study Cohort. Ear- J Pain 2006; 7:718-725.
pin J, Porucznik CA, Ray A, Schnoll SH, ly opioid prescription and subsequent 236. White AG, Birnbaum HG, Mareva MN,
Stieg RL, Wakeland W. An analysis of the disability among workers with back in- Daher M, Vallow S, Schein J, Katz N. Di-
root causes for opioid-related overdose juries: The Disability Risk Identification rect costs of opioid abuse in an insured
deaths in the United States. Pain Med Study Cohort. Spine (Phila Pa 1976) 2008; population in the United States. J Manag
2011; 12:S26-S35. 33:199-204. Care Pharm 2005; 11:469-479.
219. Perrin-Terrin A, Pathak A, Lapeyre-Mes- 228. Rhee Y, Taitel MS, Walker DR, Lau DT. 237. Fishbain DA, Rosomoff HL, Rosomoff
tre M. QT interval prolongation: Prev- Narcotic drug use among patients with RS. Drug abuse, dependence, and ad-
alence, risk factors and pharmacovigi- lower back pain in employer health diction in chronic pain patients. Clin J
lance data among methadone-treated plans: a retrospective analysis of risk Pain 1992; 8:77-85.
patients in France. Fundam Clin Pharma- factors and health care services. Clin
col 2011; 25:503-510. Ther 2007; 29:2603-2612.
ES38 www.painphysicianjournal.com
EXHIBIT B
Am J Public Health. 2009 February; 99(2): 221–227.
doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2007.131714
PMCID: PMC2622774
Abstract
I focus on issues surrounding the promotion and marketing of controlled drugs and their regulatory
oversight. Compared with noncontrolled drugs, controlled drugs, with their potential for abuse and
diversion, pose different public health risks when they are overpromoted and highly prescribed. An in-
depth analysis of the promotion and marketing of OxyContin illustrates some of the associated issues.
Modifications of the promotion and marketing of controlled drugs by the pharmaceutical industry and an
enhanced capacity of the Food and Drug Administration to regulate and monitor such promotion can have a
positive impact on the public health.
CONTROLLED DRUGS, WITH their potential for abuse and diversion, can pose public health risks that
are different from—and more problematic than—those of uncontrolled drugs when they are overpromoted
and highly prescribed. An in-depth analysis of the promotion and marketing of OxyContin (Purdue Pharma,
Stamford, CT), a sustained-release oxycodone preparation, illustrates some of the key issues. When Purdue
Pharma introduced OxyContin in 1996, it was aggressively marketed and highly promoted. Sales grew
from $48 million in 1996 to almost $1.1 billion in 2000.1 The high availability of OxyContin correlated
with increased abuse, diversion, and addiction, and by 2004 OxyContin had become a leading drug of
abuse in the United States.2
Under current regulations, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is limited in its oversight of the
marketing and promotion of controlled drugs. However, fundamental changes in the promotion and
marketing of controlled drugs by the pharmaceutical industry, and an enhanced capacity of the FDA to
regulate and monitor such promotion, can positively affect public health.
OxyContin's commercial success did not depend on the merits of the drug compared with other available
opioid preparations. The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics concluded in 2001 that oxycodone
offered no advantage over appropriate doses of other potent opioids.3 Randomized double-blind studies
comparing OxyContin given every 12 hours with immediate-release oxycodone given 4 times daily showed
comparable efficacy and safety for use with chronic back pain4 and cancer-related pain.5,6 Randomized
double-blind studies that compared OxyContin with controlled-release morphine for cancer-related pain
also found comparable efficacy and safety.7–9 The FDA's medical review officer, in evaluating the efficacy
of OxyContin in Purdue's 1995 new drug application, concluded that OxyContin had not been shown to
have a significant advantage over conventional, immediate-release oxycodone taken 4 times daily other
than a reduction in frequency of dosing.10 In a review of the medical literature, Chou et al. made similar
conclusions.11
The promotion and marketing of OxyContin occurred during a recent trend in the liberalization of the use
of opioids in the treatment of pain, particularly for chronic non–cancer-related pain. Purdue pursued an
“aggressive” campaign to promote the use of opioids in general and OxyContin in particular.1,12–17 In 2001
alone, the company spent $200 million18 in an array of approaches to market and promote OxyContin.
Go to:
PROMOTION OF OXYCONTIN
From 1996 to 2001, Purdue conducted more than 40 national pain-management and speaker-training
conferences at resorts in Florida, Arizona, and California. More than 5000 physicians, pharmacists, and
nurses attended these all-expenses-paid symposia, where they were recruited and trained for Purdue's
national speaker bureau.19(p22) It is well documented that this type of pharmaceutical company symposium
influences physicians’ prescribing, even though the physicians who attend such symposia believe that such
enticements do not alter their prescribing patterns.20
One of the cornerstones of Purdue's marketing plan was the use of sophisticated marketing data to influence
physicians’ prescribing. Drug companies compile prescriber profiles on individual physicians—detailing
the prescribing patterns of physicians nationwide—in an effort to influence doctors’ prescribing habits.
Through these profiles, a drug company can identify the highest and lowest prescribers of particular drugs
in a single zip code, county, state, or the entire country.21 One of the critical foundations of Purdue's
marketing plan for OxyContin was to target the physicians who were the highest prescribers for opioids
across the country.1,12–17,22 The resulting database would help identify physicians with large numbers of
chronic-pain patients. Unfortunately, this same database would also identify which physicians were simply
the most frequent prescribers of opioids and, in some cases, the least discriminate prescribers.
A lucrative bonus system encouraged sales representatives to increase sales of OxyContin in their
territories, resulting in a large number of visits to physicians with high rates of opioid prescriptions, as well
as a multifaceted information campaign aimed at them. In 2001, in addition to the average sales
representative's annual salary of $55 000, annual bonuses averaged $71 500, with a range of $15 000 to
nearly $240 000. Purdue paid $40 million in sales incentive bonuses to its sales representatives that year.19
From 1996 to 2000, Purdue increased its internal sales force from 318 sales representatives to 671, and its
total physician call list from approximately 33 400 to 44 500 to approximately 70 500 to 94 000
physicians.19 Through the sales representatives, Purdue used a patient starter coupon program for
OxyContin that provided patients with a free limited-time prescription for a 7- to 30-day supply. By 2001,
when the program was ended, approximately 34 000 coupons had been redeemed nationally.19
The distribution to health care professionals of branded promotional items such as OxyContin fishing hats,
stuffed plush toys, and music compact discs (“Get in the Swing With OxyContin”) was unprecedented for a
schedule II opioid, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration.19
Purdue promoted among primary care physicians a more liberal use of opioids, particularly sustained-
release opioids. Primary care physicians began to use more of the increasingly popular OxyContin; by
2003, nearly half of all physicians prescribing OxyContin were primary care physicians.19 Some experts
were concerned that primary care physicians were not sufficiently trained in pain management or addiction
issues.23 Primary care physicians, particularly in a managed care environment of time constraints, also had
the least amount of time for evaluation and follow-up of patients with complicated chronic pain.
Purdue “aggressively” promoted the use of opioids for use in the “non-malignant pain market.”15(p187) A
much larger market than that for cancer-related pain, the non–cancer-related pain market constituted 86%
of the total opioid market in 1999.17 Purdue's promotion of OxyContin for the treatment of non–cancer-
related pain contributed to a nearly tenfold increase in OxyContin prescriptions for this type of pain, from
about 670 000 in 1997 to about 6.2 million in 2002, whereas prescriptions for cancer-related pain increased
about fourfold during that same period.19 Although the science and consensus for the use of opioids in the
treatment of acute pain or pain associated with cancer are robust, there is still much controversy in
medicine about the use of opioids for chronic non–cancer-related pain, where their risks and benefits are
much less clear. Prospective, randomized, controlled trials lasting at least 4 weeks that evaluated the use of
opioids for chronic, non–cancer-related pain showed statistically significant but small to modest
improvement in pain relief, with no consistent improvement in physical functioning.24–38 A recent review of
the use of opioids in chronic back pain concluded that opioids may be efficacious for short-term pain relief,
but longer-term efficacy ( > 16 weeks) is unclear.39
In the long-term use of opioids for chronic non–cancer-related pain, the proven analgesic efficacy must be
weighed against the following potential problems and risks: well-known opioid side effects, including
respiratory depression, sedation, constipation, and nausea; inconsistent improvement in functioning; opioid-
induced hyperalgesia; adverse hormonal and immune effects of long-term opioid treatment; a high
incidence of prescription opioid abuse behaviors; and an ill-defined and unclarified risk of iatrogenic
addiction.40
In much of its promotional campaign—in literature and audiotapes for physicians, brochures and
videotapes for patients, and its “Partners Against Pain” Web site—Purdue claimed that the risk of addiction
from OxyContin was extremely small.43–49
Purdue trained its sales representatives to carry the message that the risk of addiction was “less than one
percent.”50(p99) The company cited studies by Porter and Jick,51 who found iatrogenic addiction in only 4 of
11 882 patients using opioids and by Perry and Heidrich,52 who found no addiction among 10 000 burn
patients treated with opioids. Both of these studies, although shedding some light on the risk of addiction
for acute pain, do not help establish the risk of iatrogenic addiction when opioids are used daily for a
prolonged time in treating chronic pain. There are a number of studies, however, that demonstrate that in
the treatment of chronic non–cancer-related pain with opioids, there is a high incidence of prescription drug
abuse. Prescription drug abuse in a substantial minority of chronic-pain patients has been demonstrated in
studies by Fishbain et al. (3%–18% of patients),53 Hoffman et al. (23%),54 Kouyanou et al. (12%),55 Chabal
et al. (34%),56 Katz et al. (43%),57 Reid et al. (24%–31%),58 and Michna et al. (45%).59 A recent literature
review showed that the prevalence of addiction in patients with long-term opioid treatment for chronic
non–cancer-related pain varied from 0% to 50%, depending on the criteria used and the subpopulation
studied.60
Misrepresenting the risk of addiction proved costly for Purdue. On May 10, 2007, Purdue Frederick
Company Inc, an affiliate of Purdue Pharma, along with 3 company executives, pled guilty to criminal
charges of misbranding OxyContin by claiming that it was less addictive and less subject to abuse and
diversion than other opioids, and will pay $634 million in fines.61
Although research demonstrated that OxyContin was comparable in efficacy and safety to other available
opioids,11,63 marketing catapulted OxyContin to blockbuster drug status. Sales escalated from $44 million
(316 000 prescriptions dispensed) in 1996 to a 2001 and 2002 combined sales of nearly $3 billion (over 14
million prescriptions).19
The remarkable commercial success of OxyContin, however, was stained by increasing rates of abuse and
addiction. Drug abusers learned how to simply crush the controlled-release tablet and swallow, inhale, or
inject the high-potency opioid for an intense morphinelike high.64 There had been some precedence for the
diversion and abuse of controlled-release opioid preparations. Purdue's own MS Contin had been abused in
the late 1980s in a fashion similar to how OxyContin was later to be; by 1990, MS Contin had become the
most abused prescription opioid in one major metropolitan area.65 Purdue's own testing in 1995 had
demonstrated that 68% of the oxycodone could be extracted from an OxyContin tablet when crushed.66
Opioid prescribing has had significant geographical variations. In some areas, such as Maine, West
Virginia, eastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, and Alabama, from 1998 through 2000, hydrocodone
and (non-OxyContin) oxycodone were being prescribed 2.5 to 5.0 times more than the national average. By
2000, these same areas had become high OxyContin-prescribing areas—up to 5 to 6 times higher than the
national average in some counties (Table 1).67 These areas, in which OxyContin was highly available, were
the first in the nation to witness increasing OxyContin abuse and diversion, which began surfacing in 1999
and 2000.23 From 1995 to 2001, the number of patients treated for opioid abuse in Maine increased 460%,
and from 1997 to 1999 the state had a 400% increase in the number of chronic hepatitis C cases reported.68
In eastern Kentucky from 1995 to 2001, there was a 500% increase in the number of patients entering
methadone maintenance treatment programs, about 75% of whom were OxyContin dependent (Mac Bell,
administrator, Narcotics Treatment Programs, Kentucky Division of Substance Abuse, written
communication, March 2002). In West Virginia, the first methadone maintenance treatment program
opened in August 2000, largely in response to the increasing number of people with OxyContin
dependence. By October 2003, West Virginia had 7 methadone maintenance treatment clinics with 3040
patients in treatment (M. Moore, Office of Behavioral Health Services, Office of Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse, West Virginia, written communication, March 16, 2004). In southwestern Virginia, the first
methadone maintenance treatment program opened in March 2000, and within 3 years it had 1400
admissions (E. Jennings, Life Center of Galax, Galax, Virginia, written communication, March 12, 2004).
TABLE 1
Distribution of OxyContin, Oxycodone (Excluding OxyContin), and Hydrocodone per 100 000
Population: Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky, 2000
With increasing diversion and abuse, opioid-related overdoses escalated. In southwest Virginia, the number
of deaths related to opioid prescriptions increased 830%, from 23 in 1997 to 215 in 2003 (William
Massello III, MD, assistant chief medical examiner, Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Western District,
Virginia Department of Health, written communication, January 12, 2007). The high availability of
OxyContin in these 5 regions seemed to be a simple correlate of its abuse, diversion, and addiction.
With the growing availability of OxyContin prescriptions, the once-regional problem began to spread
nationally. By 2002, OxyContin accounted for 68% of oxycodone sales.69 Lifetime nonmedical use of
OxyContin increased from 1.9 million to 3.1 million people between 2002 and 2004, and in 2004 there
were 615 000 new nonmedical users of OxyContin.70 By 2004, OxyContin had become the most prevalent
prescription opioid abused in the United States.2
The increasing OxyContin abuse problem was an integral part of the escalating national prescription opioid
abuse problem. Liberalization of the use of opioids, particularly for the treatment of chronic non–cancer-
related pain, increased the availability of all opioids as well as their abuse. Nationwide, from 1997 to 2002,
there was a 226%, 73%, and 402% increase in fentanyl, morphine, and oxycodone prescribing, respectively
(in grams per 100 000 population). During that same period, the Drug Abuse Warning Network reported
that hospital emergency department mentions for fentanyl, morphine, and oxycodone increased 641%,
113%, and 346%, respectively.71 Among new initiates to illicit drug use in 2005, a total of 2.1 million
reported prescription opioids as the first drug they had tried, more than for marijuana and almost equal to
the number of new cigarette smokers (2.3 million).72 Most abusers of prescription opioids get their diverted
drugs directly from a doctor's prescription or from the prescriptions of friends and family.73
In terms of illicit drug abuse, prescription opioids are now ahead of cocaine and heroin and second only to
marijuana.72 Mortality rates from drug overdose have climbed dramatically; by 2002, unintentional
overdose deaths from prescription opioids surpassed those from heroin and cocaine nationwide.74
Nationally, as well as regionally, the high availability of OxyContin and all prescription opioids was
correlated with high rates of abuse and diversion.
In 1998, Purdue distributed 15 000 copies of an OxyContin video to physicians without submitting it to the
FDA for review, an oversight later acknowledged by Purdue. In 2001, Purdue submitted to the FDA a
second version of the video, which the FDA did not review until October 2002—after the General
Accounting Office inquired about its content. After its review, the FDA concluded that the video
minimized the risks from OxyContin and made unsubstantiated claims regarding its benefits to patients.19
When OxyContin entered the market in 1996, the FDA approved its original label, which stated that
iatrogenic addiction was “very rare” if opioids were legitimately used in the management of pain. In July
2001, to reflect the available scientific evidence, the label was modified to state that data were not available
for establishing the true incidence of addiction in chronic-pain patients. The 2001 labeling also deleted the
original statement that the delayed absorption of OxyContin was believed to reduce the abuse liability of
the drug.19 A more thorough review of the available scientific evidence prior to the original labeling might
have prevented some of the need for the 2001 label revision.
CONCLUSIONS
OxyContin appears to be as efficacious and safe as other available opioids and as oxycodone taken 4 times
daily.11,63 Its commercial success, fueled by an unprecedented promotion and marketing campaign, was
stained by escalating OxyContin abuse and diversion that spread throughout the country.2,75 The regions of
the country that had the earliest and highest availability of prescribed OxyContin had the greatest initial
abuse and diversion.23,67 Nationally, the increasing availability of OxyContin was associated with higher
rates of abuse, and it became the most prevalent abused prescription opioid by 2004.2
Compared with noncontrolled drugs, controlled drugs, with their potential for abuse and diversion, pose
different public health risks when overpromoted and highly prescribed. Several marketing practices appear
to be especially questionable.
The extraordinary amount of money spent in promoting a sustained-release opioid was unprecedented.
During OxyContin's first 6 years on the market, Purdue spent approximately 6 to 12 times more on
promoting it than the company had spent on promoting MS Contin, or than Janssen Pharmaceutical
Products LP had spent on Duragesic, one of OxyContin's competitors.19 Although OxyContin has not been
shown to be superior to other available potent opioid preparations,11,63 by 2001 it had become the most
frequently prescribed brand-name opioid in the United States for treating moderate to severe pain.19
Carefully crafted limits on the marketing and promotion of controlled drugs would help to realign their
actual use with the principles of evidence-based medicine.
Physicians’ interactions with pharmaceutical sales representatives have been found to influence the
prescribing practices of residents and physicians in terms of decreased prescribing of generic drugs,
prescribing cost, nonrational prescribing, and rapid prescribing of new drugs.76 Carefully crafted limits on
the promotion of controlled drugs by the pharmaceutical sales force and enhanced FDA oversight of the
training and performance of sales representatives would also reduce over- and misprescribing.
Although there are no available data for evaluating the promotional effect of free starter coupons for
controlled drugs, it seems likely that the over- and misprescribing of a controlled drug are encouraged by
such promotional programs and the public health would be well served by eliminating them.
The use of prescriber profiling data to influence prescribing and improve sales is imbedded in
pharmaceutical detailing. Very little data are publicly available for understanding to what extent this
marketing practice boosts sales. One market research report indicated that profiling improved profit
margins by as much as 3 percentage points and the initial uptake of new drugs by 30%.77 The use of
prescriber profiling data to target high-opioid prescribers—coupled with very lucrative incentives for sales
representatives—would seem to fuel increased prescribing by some physicians—perhaps the most liberal
prescribers of opioids and, in some cases, the least discriminate. Regulations eliminating this marketing
tool might decrease some potential overprescribing of controlled drugs.
The public health would be better protected if the FDA reviewed all advertising and promotional materials
as well as associated educational materials—for their truthfulness, accuracy, balance, and scientific
validity—before dissemination. Such a change would require a considerable increase in FDA support,
staffing, and funding from what is currently available. Public monies spent on the front end of the problem
could prevent another such tragedy.
The pharmaceutical industry's role and influence in medical education is problematic. From 1996 through
July 2002, Purdue funded more than 20 000 pain-related educational programs through direct sponsorship
or financial grants,19 providing a venue that had enormous influence on physicians’ prescribing throughout
the country. Particularly with controlled drugs, the potential for blurring marketing and education carries a
much higher public health risk than with uncontrolled drugs. At least in the area of controlled drugs, with
their high potential for abuse and diversion, public health would best be served by severing the
pharmaceutical industry's direct role and influence in medical education.
Marketing and promotion by the pharmaceutical industry have considerably amplified the prescription sales
and availability of opioids. A number of factors have contributed to the marked growth of opioid abuse in
the United States, but one factor is certainly the much increased availability of prescription opioids.78 The
public interest and public health would be better served by a redefinition of acceptable and allowable
marketing practices for opioids and other controlled drugs.
Acknowledgments
I thank Michael McNeer, MD, for his thoughtful review of the essay and helpful suggestions.
References
1. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 2002.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN, 2002
2. Cicero T, Inciardi J, Munoz A. Trends in abuse of OxyContin and other opioid analgesics in the United
States: 2002–2004. J Pain 2005;6:662–672 [PubMed]
3. Oxycodone and OxyContin. Med Lett Drugs Ther 2001;43:80–81 [PubMed]
4. Hale ME, Fleischmann R, Salzman R, et al. Efficacy and safety of controlled-release versus immediate-
release oxycodone: randomized, double-blind evaluation in chronic back pain. Clin J Pain 1999;15:179–
183 [PubMed]
5. Kaplan R, Parris WC, Citron MI, et al. Comparison of controlled-release and immediate-release
oxycodone in cancer pain. J Clin Oncol 1998;16:3230–3237 [PubMed]
6. Staumbaugh JE, Reder RF, Stambaugh MD, et al. Double-blind, randomized comparison of the analgesic
and pharmacokinetic profiles of controlled- and immediate-release oral oxycodone in cancer pain patients.
J Clin Pharmacol 2001;41:500–506 [PubMed]
7. Heiskanen T, Kalso E. Controlled-release oxycodone and morphine in cancer related pain. Pain
1997;73:37–45 [PubMed]
8. Mucci-LoRusso P, Berman BS, Silberstein PT, et al. Controlled-release oxycodone compared with
controlled-release morphine in treatment of cancer pain: a randomized, double-blind, parallel-group study.
Eur J Pain 1998;2:239–249 [PubMed]
9. Bruera E, Belzile M, Pituskin E, et al. Randomized, double-blind, cross-over trial comparing safety and
efficacy of oral controlled-release oxycodone with controlled-release morphine in patients with cancer pain.
J Clin Oncol 1998;16:3222–3229 [PubMed]
10. “New Drug Application for OxyContin.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN December 1995.
11. Chou R, Clark E, Helfand M. Comparative efficacy and safety of long-acting oral opioids for chronic
non-cancer pain. J Pain Symptom Manage 2003;26(5):1026–1048 [PubMed]
12. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 1996.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN.
13. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 1997.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN.
14. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 1998.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN.
15. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 1999.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN.
16. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 1996.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN.
17. “OxyContin Marketing Plan, 2001.” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN.
18. “OxyContin: balancing risks and benefits,” in Hearing of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions, United States Senate, February 12, 2002, p 87 (testimony of Paul Goldenheim, Purdue
Pharma)
19. Prescription Drugs: OxyContin Abuse and Diversion and Efforts to Address the Problem. Washington,
DC: General Accounting Office; December 2003. Publication GAO-04-110
20. Orlowski JP, Wateska L. The effect of pharmaceutical firm enticements on physician prescribing
patterns. There's no such thing as a free lunch. Chest 1992;102:270–273 [PubMed]
21. Stolberg SG, Gerth J. High-tech stealth being used to sway doctor prescriptions. New York Times
November 16, 2000. Available at:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9502EEDF153BF935A25752C1A9669C8B63&sec=&spo
n=&pagewanted=1. Accessed September 11, 2008 [PubMed]
22. Adams C. Painkiller's sales far exceeded levels anticipated by maker. Wall Street Journal May 16, 2002
23. Tough P. The alchemy of OxyContin: from pain relief to drug addiction. New York Times Magazine
July 29, 2001:37
24. Moulin DE, Iezzi A, Amireh R, et al. Randomized trial of oral morphine for chronic non-cancer pain.
Lancet 1996;346:143–147 [PubMed]
25. Watson CP, Babul N. Efficacy of oxycodone in neuropathic pain: a randomized trial in postherpetic
pain. Neurology 1998;50:1837–1841 [PubMed]
26. Caldwell JR, Rapoport RJ, Davis JC, et al. Efficacy and safety of a once-daily morphine formulation in
chronic, moderate-to-severe osteoarthritis pain: results from a randomized, placebo-controlled, double-
blind trial and an open-label extension trial. J Pain Symptom Manage 2002;23:178–291 [PubMed]
27. Gimbel J, Richards P, Portenoy R. Controlled-release oxycodone for pain in diabetic neuropathy: a
randomized controlled trial. Neurology 2003;60:927–934 [PubMed]
28. Peloso P, Bellamy N, Bensen W, et al. Double blind randomized placebo controlled trial of controlled
release codeine in the treatment of osteoarthritis of the hip or knee. J Rheumatol 2000;27:764–771
[PubMed]
29. Roth SH, Fleischmann RM, Burch FX, et al. Around-the-clock controlled-release oxycodone therapy
for osteoarthritis-related pain. Arch Intern Med 2000;160:853–860 [PubMed]
30. Caldwell JR, Hale ME, Boyd RE, et al. Treatment of osteoarthritis pain with controlled release
oxycodone or fixed combination oxycodone plus acetaminophen added to nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drugs: a double blind, randomized, multicenter, placebo controlled trial. J Rheumatol 1999;26:862–869
[PubMed]
31. Rowbotham MD, Twilling LO, Davies PS, et al. Oral opioid therapy for chronic peripheral and central
neuropathic pain. N Engl J Med 2003;348:1223–1232 [PubMed]
32. Kjaersgaard-Andersen P, Nafei A, Skov O, et al. Codeine plus paracetamol versus paracetamol in
longer-term treatment of chronic pain due to osteoarthritis of the hip: a randomized, double-blind multi-
centre study. Pain 1990;43:309–318 [PubMed]
33. Raja SN, Haythornthwaite JA, Pappagallo M, et al. A placebo-controlled trial comparing the analgesic
and cognitive effects of opioids and tricyclic antidepressants in postherpetic neuralgia. Neurology
2002;59:1015–1021 [PubMed]
34. Huse E, Larbig W, Flor H, et al. The effect of opioids on phantom limb pain and cortical
reorganization. Pain 2001;90:47–55 [PubMed]
35. Moran C. MS continuous tablets and pain control in severe rheumatoid arthritis. Br J Clin Res
1991;2:1–12
36. Jamison RN, Raymond SA, Slawsby EA, et al. Opioid therapy for chronic noncancer back pain: a
randomized prospective study. Spine 1998;23:2591–2600 [PubMed]
37. Arkinstall W, Sandler A, Groghnour B, et al. Efficacy of controlled-release codeine in chronic non-
malignant pain: a randomized placebo-controlled trial. Pain 1995;62:168–178 [PubMed]
38. Sheather-Reid RB, Cohen ML. Efficacy of analgesics in chronic pain: a series of N-of-1 studies. J Pain
Symptom Manage 1998;15:244–252 [PubMed]
39. Martell BA, O'Connor PG, Kerns RD, et al. Systematic review: opioid treatment for chronic back pain:
prevalence, efficacy, and association with addiction. Ann Intern Med 2007;146:116–127 [PubMed]
40. Ballantyne JC. Opioids for chronic nonterminal pain. South Med J 2006;99:1245–1255 [PubMed]
41. Regier DA, Myers JK, Kramer M, et al. The NIMH epidemiological catchment area program. Historical
context, major objectives, and study population characteristics. Arch Gen Psychiatry 1984;41:934–941
[PubMed]
42. Katz N. Opioids: after thousands of years, still getting to know you. Clin J Pain 2007;23:303–306
[PubMed]
43. Irick N, Lipman A, Gitlin M. Overcoming Barriers to Effective Pain Management [audiotape].
Rochester, NY: Solutions Unlimited; March 2000
44. Carr B, Kulich R, Sukiennik A, et al. The Impact of Chronic Pain—An Interdisciplinary Perspective.
Continuing Medical Education program. New York, NY: Power-Pak Communications; 2000:925 Program
424-000-99-010-H01
45. Lipman A, Jackson K., II Use of Opioids in Chronic Noncancer Pain. Continuing Medical Education
program. New York, NY: Power-Pak Communications; April 2000:6
46. How You Can Be a Partner Against Pain and Gain Control Over Your Own Pain [patient brochure].
Stamford, CN: Purdue Pharma; 1998
47. “Partners Against Pain” Web site, under “Professional Education” menu and “Opioids and back pain:
the last taboo”—2000. Available at: http://www.partnersagainstpain.com/html/proofed/pmc/pe_pmc6.htm.
Accessed March 19, 2001.
48. Pain Management [CD and slide instructional program for physicians]. Stamford, CN: Purdue Pharma;
2002
49. Dispelling the Myths About Opioids [brochure for physicians]. Stamford, CN: Purdue Pharma; 1998
50. Meier B. Pain Killer Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press; 2003:99
51. Porter J, Jick H. Addiction rare in patients treated with narcotics. N Engl J Med 1980;302:123.
[PubMed]
52. Perry S, Heidrich G. Management of pain during debridement: a survey of US burn units. Pain
1982;13:267–280 [PubMed]
53. Fishbain DA, Rosomoff HL, Rosomoff RS. Drug abuse, dependence, and addiction in chronic pain
patients. Clin J Pain 1992;8:77–85 [PubMed]
54. Hoffmann NG, Olofsson S, Salen B, Wickstrom L. Prevalence of abuse and dependence in chronic pain
patients. Int J Addict 1995;30:919–927 [PubMed]
55. Kouyanou K, Pither CE, Wessely S. Medication misuse, abuse, and chronic dependence in chronic pain
patients. J Psychosom Res 1997;43:497–504 [PubMed]
56. Chabal C, Erjaved MK, Jacobson L, et al. Prescription opiate abuse in chronic pain patients: clinical
criteria, incidence, and predictors. Clin J Pain 13;150–155 [PubMed]
57. Katz NP, Sherburne S, Beach M, et al. Behavioral monitoring and urine toxicology testing in patients
receiving long-term opioid therapy. Anesth Analg 2003;97:1097–1102 [PubMed]
58. Reid M, Engles-Horton L, Weber M, et al. Use of opioid medications for chronic non-cancer pain. J
Gen Intern Med 2002;17:173–179 [PMC free article] [PubMed]
59. Michna E, Jamison RN, Pham LD, et al. Urine toxicology screening among chronic pain patients on
opioid therapy: frequency and predictability of abnormal findings. Clin J Pain 2007;23:173–179 [PubMed]
60. Hojsted J, Sjogren P. Addiction to opioids in chronic pain patients: a literature review. Eur J Pain
2007;11:490–518 [PubMed]
61. United States Attorney's Office Western District of Virginia [news release]. Available at:
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/prudue_frederick_1.pdf. Accessed
September 11, 2008
62. United States of America v The Purdue Frederick Company Inc et al., (WD Va, May 10, 2007), Case
1:07CR00029.
63. Rischitelli DG, Karbowicz SH. Safety and efficacy of controlled-release oxycodone: a systematic
literature review. Pharmacotherapy 2002;22:898–904 [PubMed]
64. Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control Action plan to prevent the diversion
and abuse of OxyContin. Available at:
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/oxycodone/abuse_oxy.htm. Accessed March 12, 2008
65. Crews JC, Denson DD. Recovery of morphine from a controlled-release preparation: a source of opioid
abuse. Cancer 1990;66:2642–2644 [PubMed]
66. “New Drug Application to FDA for OxyContin, Pharmacology Review: ‘Abuse Liability of
Oxycodone.’ ” Purdue Pharma, Stamford, CN, 1995
67. States of Alabama, Maine, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia Drug Profile by County—
OxyContin, Oxycodone (Excluding OxyContin), and Hydrocodone—2000. Washington, DC: Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration; 2002
68. OxyContin Abuse: Maine's Newest Epidemic. Augusta: Maine Office of Substance Abuse; January
2002
69. Paulozzi LJ. Opioid analgesic involvement in drug abuse deaths in American metropolitan areas. Am J
Public Health 2006;96:1755–1757 [PMC free article] [PubMed]
70. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. National Survey on Drug Use and
Health. Available at: http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k4nsduh/2k4Results/2k4Results.pdf. Accessed
March 12, 2008
71. Gilson AM, Ryan KM, Joranson DE, et al. A reassessment of trends in the medical use and abuse of
opioid analgesics and implications for diversion control: 1997–2002. J Pain Symptom Manage
2004;28:176–188 [PubMed]
72. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Results from the 2005 National Survey on
Drug Use and Health: national findings. Available at:
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k5nsduh/2k5Results.pdf. Accessed March 12, 2008
73. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration Results from the 2006 National Survey on
Drug Use and Health. Available at: http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k6nsduh/2k6Results.pdf. Accessed
March 12, 2008
74. Paulozzi LJ, Budnitz DS, Yongli X. Increasing deaths from opioid analgesics in the United States.
Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Saf 2006;15:618–627 [PubMed]
75. Pulse Check: Trends in Drub Abuse. Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy,
Executive Office of the President; November 2002
76. Wazana A. Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a gift? JAMA 2000;283:373–
380 [PubMed]
77. Grande D. Prescribing profiling: time to call it quits. Ann Intern Med 2007;146:751–752 [PubMed]
78. Compton W, Volkow N. Major increases in opioid analgesic abuse in the United States: concerns and
strategies. Drug Alcohol Depend 2006;81:103–107 [PubMed]
Articles from American Journal of Public Health are provided here courtesy of American Public Health
Association
Formats:
Article
PubReader
ePub (beta)
PDF (539K)
Citation
Share
Google+
Save items
View more options
See all...
Links
Compound
MedGen
PubMed
Substance
Taxonomy
Recent Activity
ClearTurn Off
The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Trag...
The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy
The danger of imperfect regulation: OxyContin use in the United States and Canad...
The danger of imperfect regulation: OxyContin use in the United States and Canada.
PubMed
The effects of pharmaceutical firm enticements on physician prescribing patterns. There's no such
thing as a free lunch.[Chest. 1992]
High-tech stealth being used to sway doctor prescriptions.[N Y Times Web. 2000]
The NIMH Epidemiologic Catchment Area program. Historical context, major objectives, and
study population characteristics.[Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1984]
Review Opioids: after thousands of years, still getting to know you.[Clin J Pain. 2007]
Review Comparative efficacy and safety of long-acting oral opioids for chronic non-cancer pain: a
systematic review.[J Pain Symptom Manage. 2003]
Review Safety and efficacy of controlled-release oxycodone: a systematic literature
review.[Pharmacotherapy. 2002]
Opioid analgesic involvement in drug abuse deaths in American metropolitan areas.[Am J Public
Health. 2006]
Trends in abuse of Oxycontin and other opioid analgesics in the United States: 2002-2004.[J Pain.
2005]
A reassessment of trends in the medical use and abuse of opioid analgesics and implications for
diversion control: 1997-2002.[J Pain Symptom Manage. 2004]
Increasing deaths from opioid analgesics in the United States.[Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Saf.
2006]
Review Comparative efficacy and safety of long-acting oral opioids for chronic non-cancer pain: a
systematic review.[J Pain Symptom Manage. 2003]
Review Safety and efficacy of controlled-release oxycodone: a systematic literature
review.[Pharmacotherapy. 2002]
Trends in abuse of Oxycontin and other opioid analgesics in the United States: 2002-2004.[J Pain.
2005]
Review Comparative efficacy and safety of long-acting oral opioids for chronic non-cancer pain: a
systematic review.[J Pain Symptom Manage. 2003]
Review Safety and efficacy of controlled-release oxycodone: a systematic literature
review.[Pharmacotherapy. 2002]
Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a gift?[JAMA. 2000]
Review Major increases in opioid analgesic abuse in the United States: concerns and
strategies.[Drug Alcohol Depend. 2006]
Objectives. To identify payments that involved opioid products from the pharma- database implemented under the Physician
ceutical industry to physicians. Payments Sunshine Act.5,7 We used this
Methods. We used the Open Payments program database from the Centers for novel data set to characterize industry pay-
Medicare and Medicaid Services to identify payments involving an opioid to physicians ments to physicians related to opioid
marketing.
between August 2013 and December 2015. We used medians, interquartile ranges, and
ranges as a result of heavily skewed distributions to examine payments according to
opioid product, abuse-deterrent formulation, nature of payment, state, and physician
specialty.
Results. During the study, 375 266 nonresearch opioid-related payments were made METHODS
to 68 177 physicians, totaling $46 158 388. The top 1% of physicians received 82.5% of We extracted all payments between Au-
gust 1, 2013 (when mandated reporting
total payments in dollars. Abuse-deterrent formulations constituted 20.3% of total
began), and December 31, 2015, that listed
payments, and buprenorphine marketed for addiction treatment constituted 9.9%. Most
a US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)–
payments were for speaking fees or honoraria (63.2% of all dollars), whereas food and
approved opioid product. We included
beverage payments were the most frequent (93.9% of all payments). Physicians spe- buprenorphine but examined buprenorphine
cializing in anesthesiology received the most in total annual payments (median = $50; and buprenorphine/naloxone marketed for
interquartile range = $16–$151). addiction treatment separately from the
Conclusions. Approximately 1 in 12 US physicians received a payment involving an buprenorphine transdermal patch marketed
opioid during the 29-month study. These findings should prompt an examination of for pain control. We excluded remifentanil
industry influences on opioid prescribing. (Am J Public Health. 2017;107:1493–1495. doi: (which is marketed exclusively for anesthesia)
10.2105/AJPH.2017.303982) and 2 fentanyl products (1 marketed exclu-
sively for anesthesia, and 1 marketed exclu-
sively for in-hospital pain).
T
We also identified payments involving
he nonmedical use of opioids and when payments are of low monetary value
FDA-recognized abuse-deterrent opioid
overdose mortality have reached un- (e.g., industry-sponsored meals).6 To date,
formulations.8 For comparison with a non-
precedented levels in the United States.1 industry payments to physicians involving
opioid class of pain medications, we quanti-
To respond to concerns about over- opioids have not been studied and de-
fied payments for all actively marketed
prescribing of opioids, the Centers for Disease serve further examination because they nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
Control and Prevention recently released may impede national efforts to reduce (NSAIDs) in the database. We chose NSAIDs
chronic pain management guidelines that overprescribing. for this comparison because unlike other
call on physicians to consider nonopioid It is currently unclear which opioids are medication classes used for pain that have
pain medications as an alternative to opioids.2 most heavily marketed, to whom, and in additional indications (e.g., medications
Additionally, some physicians and pharma- exchange for which physician activities. The marketed not only for pain but also for de-
ceutical industry representatives have suggested extent to which abuse-deterrent formulations pression or neuralgia), NSAIDs are almost
that abuse-deterrent formulations—newly and nonopioid alternatives are marketed is exclusively used for pain control.
marketed brand-name opioids with pill prop- also poorly understood. For the first time, We limited the current analysis to non-
erties that render misuse more difficult—offer exhaustive data on payments are now avail- research payments to physicians; we excluded
a safer option for prescribers.3,4 able through the Open Payments program research payments, which are made in
Under the recently implemented Physi-
cian Payments Sunshine Act, drug companies
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
are now required to report all transfers of Scott E. Hadland is with Boston Medical Center and Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, MA. Maxwell S. Krieger
value (“payments”) to US physicians.5 and Brandon D. L. Marshall are with Brown University School of Public Health, Providence, RI.
Research suggests that pharmaceutical com- Correspondence should be sent to Scott E. Hadland, MD, MPH, MS, 88 E Newton St, Vose Hall, Room 322, Boston, MA
02118 (e-mail: [email protected]). Reprints can be ordered at http://www.ajph.org by clicking the “Reprints” link.
pany payments promote increased prescribing This article was accepted June 14, 2017.
for marketed brand-name medications, even doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2017.303982
September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9 AJPH Hadland et al. Peer Reviewed Research 1493
AJPH RESEARCH
association with established research pro- TABLE 1—Characteristics of Payments Involving Opioid Products to Physicians: Open
tocols, do not explicitly target prescribing Payments Program Database, United States, August 1, 2013–December 31, 2015
behaviors, and may be provided to physicians
not actively practicing medicine. We sum- Nature of Payment Total Payment Amount, $ (%) Median Payment, $ (IQR) No. of Payments (%)
marized payments in terms of total dollars
Speaking fees or honoraria 29 190 854 (63.2) 2 010 (1 000–3 750) 9 161 (2.4)
and number of payments made and identified
Food and beverages 7 872 581 (17.1) 14 (11–18) 352 298 (93.9)
changes from 2014 to 2015 (the 2 years for
which all 12 months of data were available). Consulting fees 5 886 461 (12.8) 1 000 (500–2 500) 2 145 (0.6)
We used medians, interquartile ranges Travel and lodging 2 904 940 (6.3) 537 (100–1 131) 4 048 (1.1)
(IQRs), and ranges as a result of heavily Education 222 869 (0.5) 14 (5–25) 7 422 (2.0)
skewed distributions to examine payments
Othera 80 683 (0.2) 100 (14–500) 192 (0.1)
according to opioid product, abuse-deterrent
formulation, nature of payment (i.e., physi- Note. IQR = interquartile ranges.
a
cian activity leading to the payment), state, Includes gifts, entertainment, and space rental or facility fees.
and physician specialty. We also assessed
payments to physicians receiving the top 1% with physicians receiving a median of 1 pay- are. Additionally, despite Centers for Disease
of payments for opioids. We used Stata ver- ment annually (IQR = 1–2; maximum = 157). Control and Prevention recommendations to
sion 13.1 (StataCorp LP, College Station, Payments were positively skewed, with the consider use of nonopioid medications for
TX) for analyses. top 1% of physicians (n = 681) receiving pain, NSAIDs, a prominent family of non-
$2639 or more annually (Table A, available as opioid pain medications, were not as heavily
a supplement to the online version of this marketed as opioids were.2
article at http://www.ajph.org). These phy- Fentanyl was the most common opioid
RESULTS sicians collectively received $38 073 796 involved in payments to physicians. National
Over the study period, 375 266 non- (82.5% of total payments) during the study data implicate fentanyl in a rapidly increasing
research payments involving a marketed period. number of overdose deaths, although most
opioid were made to 68 177 physicians, to- Physicians specializing in anesthesiology are caused by illicitly manufactured fen-
taling $46 158 388. Total payments increased received the most in total annual payments tanyl.10 Further studies should clarify the
from $18 958 125 in 2014 to $20 996 858 in (median = $50; IQR = $16–$151; n = 4339), extent to which industry payments contribute
2015, an increase of 10.7%. The number followed by physical medicine and rehabili- to prescribing patterns and overdose rates
of payments increased from 145 715 in 2014 tation (median = $48; IQR = $14–$145; across geographic regions, particularly given
to 184 237 in 2015, an increase of 26.4%. n = 3502) and pain medicine (median = $43; the heterogeneity we observed in payments
The 5 opioid products constituting the IQR = $12–$125; n = 3090). Physicians among states. Although payment amounts
greatest proportion of payments were fentanyl specializing in family medicine received in dollar terms were greatest to physicians
($21 240 794; 46.0% of total dollars), hydro- the largest total number of payments specializing in anesthesiology, physical
codone ($7 123 421; 15.4%), buprenorphine (n = 20 592). medicine and rehabilitation, and pain
transdermal patch ($5 141 808; 11.1%), oxy- medicine—specialists with expertise in pain
codone ($4 487 978; 9.7%), and tapentadol management—family medicine physicians
($4 296 130; 9.3%). Overall, payments for received the largest number of payments,
FDA-approved abuse-deterrent formulations DISCUSSION indicating extensive marketing of opioid
totaled $9 352 959 (20.3%), and payments for According to the Association of American products to primary care physicians. Because
buprenorphine or buprenorphine/naloxone Medical Colleges, there were 829 962 active there were 108 917 active family physicians
marketed for addiction treatment totaled physicians in the United States at the be- in the United States in 2013,9 our data
$4 561 729 (9.9%). By comparison, payments ginning of the study period in 20139; thus, our highlight that nearly 1 in 5 received an
for NSAIDs amounted to $13 758 385 (not results suggest that 1 in 12 physicians received opioid-related payment.
included in previous totals). an industry payment involving an opioid A limitation of this study was the absence
Speaking fees or honoraria constituted the during the 29-month study period. Although of further details about industry-physician
largest proportion of payments in dollars, half of all the annual payments were $15 or interactions; some payments may have sup-
whereas payments involving food and bev- less, even small payments (including meals) ported education on appropriate prescribing
erage were the most common (Table 1). are associated with increased prescribing of behaviors.11 One tenth of the payments in-
Payments varied widely according to marketed products.6 FDA-approved abuse- volved buprenorphine marketed for addic-
US state (Figure A, available as a supple- deterrent formulations, which have proper- tion treatment, which may have resulted
ment to the online version of this article ties expected to render misuse less likely, in improved education on addiction care.
at http://www.ajph.org). The median constituted only one fifth of the total pay- Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
paid per physician annually was $15 ments, suggesting that such medications may programs imposed by the FDA require
(IQR = $7–$42; maximum = $1 539 471), not be as heavily marketed as other opioids education on extended-release/long-acting
1494 Research Peer Reviewed Hadland et al. AJPH September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9
AJPH RESEARCH
opioids and on transmucosal fentanyl prod- 4. Alexander L, Mannion RO, Weingarten B, Fanelli RJ,
Stiles GL. Development and impact of prescription opioid
ucts, and some industry payments to physi- abuse deterrent formulation technologies. Drug Alcohol
cians may have been related to this regulation. Depend. 2014;138:1–6.
Another limitation was that some abuse- 5. Agrawal S, Brown D. The Physician Payments Sun-
deterrent formulations were approved part- shine Act — two years of the open payments program.
N Engl J Med. 2016;374(10):906–909.
way through the study period; in future years,
such medications might be associated with 6. DeJong C, Aguilar T, Tseng C-W, Lin GA, Boscardin
WJ, Dudley RA. Pharmaceutical industry-sponsored
a greater portion of industry payments. meals and physician prescribing patterns for Medicare
beneficiaries. JAMA Intern Med. 2016;176(8):1114–1122.
7. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Open
Payments. 2016. Available at: https://www.cms.gov/
openpayments. Accessed February 12, 2017.
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS 8. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA facts:
To our knowledge, this was the first abuse-deterrent opioid medications. April 2017. Available
large-scale examination of industry payments at: http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
FactSheets/ucm514939.htm. Accessed July 3, 2017.
involving opioids. Financial transfers were
substantial and widespread and may be in- 9. Association of American Medical Colleges. 2014
Physician Specialty Data Book. November 2014. Available
creasing in number and value. Although at: https://members.aamc.org/eweb/upload/
opioid prescribing declined nationally during PhysicianSpecialtyDatabook2014.pdf. Accessed February
the study period,12 these results should 12, 2017.
prompt an examination of industry influences 10. Gladden RM, Martinez P, Seth P. Fentanyl law
enforcement submissions and increases in synthetic opi-
on prescribing amid an ongoing opioid crisis. oid–involved overdose deaths — 27 states, 2013–2014.
Further research should examine whether MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2016;65(33):837–843.
payments are related to opioid misuse and 11. Sismondo S. Key opinion leaders and the corruption
overdose, and policymakers might consider of medical knowledge: what the Sunshine Act will and
won’t cast light on. J Law Med Ethics. 2013;41(3):635–643.
whether caps should be imposed on certain
12. Goodnough A, Tavernise S. Opioid prescriptions
payments. drop for first time in two decades. New York Times. May
20, 2016:A1.
CONTRIBUTORS
S. E. Hadland and B. D. L. Marshall designed the study
and wrote the protocol. S. E. Hadland conducted the
literature review and wrote the first draft of the article.
M. S. Krieger undertook data management and statistical
analyses with additional input from S. E. Hadland and
B. D. L. Marshall. All authors contributed to and approved
the final article.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
S. E. Hadland is supported by the National Institutes
of Health/National Institute on Drug Abuse (Loan
Repayment Program Award L40 DA042434). B. D. L.
Marshall is supported by the Henry Merrit Wriston
Fellowship at Brown University.
We would like to thank Jesse Yedinak, MPA, for her
research and administrative assistance and David Fiellin,
MD, and Jason Vassy, MD, MPH, SM, for their review of
the article.
REFERENCES
1. Rudd RA, Aleshire N, Zibbell JE, Gladden RM.
Increases in drug and opioid overdose deaths - United
States, 2000-2014. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2016;
64(50-51):1378–1382.
2. Dowell D, Haegerich TM, Chou R. CDC guideline
for prescribing opioids for chronic pain–United States,
2016. JAMA. 2016;315(15):1624–1645.
3. Webster LR, Markman J, Cone EJ, Niebler G. Current
and future development of extended-release, abuse-
deterrent opioid formulations in the United States.
Postgrad Med. 2017;129(1):102–110.
September 2017, Vol 107, No. 9 AJPH Hadland et al. Peer Reviewed Research 1495
EXHIBIT D
REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers visit
http://www.djreprints.com.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324478304578173342657044604
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED
REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED
REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED
A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts - WSJ https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732447830457817334...
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED
REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED
REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED REDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTEDREDACTED
Copyright ©2017 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
REDACTEDREDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTED
EXHIBIT E
A Reporter’s Guide:
Covering Pain and Its Management
A Reporter’s Guide: Covering Pain and Its Management 1
Pain is a complex perception that differs
enormously from one person to another, even those
with seemingly identical injuries or illnesses.
Introduction
Everyone has experienced pain—whether it’s a pounding headache at the end of a
long day, a throbbing toothache warning of a cavity or infection, an open wound
or sprained ankle from a fall, or a stinging burn from touching a hot pan.
There are hundreds of pain syndromes, and pain is often a chief symptom of most
chronic conditions, including cancer, diabetes, arthritis, fibromyalgia and a host of
neurological disorders. For millions of Americans, pain persists, interfering with
everyday activities and enjoyment of life. People living with chronic pain will often
avoid certain movements or activities, fearful they will cause more injury or to
avoid the anxiety of anticipated pain.
Pain is complex and frequently misunderstood by the public. The issue of pain is riddled
with myths and misperceptions, which makes the task of informing and educating people
about pain and its management that much more challenging.
Sources: The American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Arthritis Foundation, Mayday Fund, National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Cancer Institute.
The American Pain Foundation (APF) has developed this Guide as a primer on
pain and pain management to help meet the informational needs of busy reporters,
editors and producers covering the pain story. We know it's a complex topic, and
hope you will find this to be a useful resource.
Be sure to visit the Newsroom section of the American Pain Foundation’s web site at
www.painfoundation.org to download additional copies and to check for posted updates and new
Topic Briefs as they are added. Here you will also find recent news releases, press statements and
background information on a wide variety of issues related to pain care.
ABOUT THE AMERICAN PAIN FOUNDATION providers and advocates, who are working hard to call
APF’s mission is to improve the quality of life for attention to the urgent need for positive changes in
people with pain by: pain policy, practice and research investment.
• Raising public awareness;
EXPERTS AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW
• Providing practical information, education and
support; APF can connect reporters with a wide array of leading
pain experts, as well as people living with pain
• Advocating to remove barriers and increase access
and their caregivers. Whether you are working on
to effective pain management; and,
a national or local story, we can help coordinate
• Promoting research. interviews about pain-specific conditions and
Since its founding in 1997, the American Pain other important issues related to pain (e.g., depression,
Foundation (APF) has been at the forefront of coping skills, financial matters, disparities, treatment
advocating for people living with a wide variety of options).
pain conditions and their caregivers.
If you are interested in interviewing someone at
Our grassroots effort, Power Over Pain Action Network, APF or need additional resources, please contact
is now active in nearly 40 states and is comprised Tina Regester, APF’s communications manager, at
of people living with pain, caregivers, healthcare (443) 690-4707 or [email protected].
BURDEN OF PAIN IN
AMERICA: AN EVOLVING
PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS
Pain is a serious and costly
public health issue. It affects PAIN IS WOEFULLY UNDERTREATED FOR A
more Americans than VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING:
diabetes, heart disease and
n Misconceptions about opioid addiction
cancer combined, and is a
n Lack of access to care
leading cause of disability in
n Cultural norms and the stigma associated with admitting
the United States. Even though pain
pain is one of the most n Limited or no professional training in pain management,
common reasons patients which leaves healthcare providers ill-equipped to effectively
consult a healthcare provider, respond to patients’ reports of pain
it is often inadequately n Concerns among physicians about prescribing pain
medications for chronic pain, and fears of scrutiny by
assessed and treated, resulting
regulators or law enforcement
in needless suffering and poor
n Inadequate funding for pain research (less than 2% of
patient outcomes. NIH research budget was dedicated to pain studies)
AC U T E PA I N C H R O N I C PA I N
Adapted from: McCance K, Huether SE, eds. Pathophysiology: the biologic basis for disease in adults and children. 5th ed. New York, NY: Elsevier,
2006:447-489.
Acute Pain occurs suddenly due to illness, inflammation, injury or surgery. It has a short
duration that subsides when the injured tissue heals. The cause of the pain can usually be
diagnosed and treated.
Chronic Pain is pain that lasts long enough (after normal healing or for at least three
months), or is intense enough, to affect a person’s normal activities and well-being.
Failure to treat acute pain promptly and appropriately at the time of injury, during initial
medical and surgical care or at the time of transition to community-based care,
contributes to the development of chronic pain syndromes.
With chronic pain, pain signals may remain active in the nervous system for weeks,
months or even years. Unlike acute pain, chronic pain has no value or benefit; it is a
disease in its own right. It can also be especially challenging to treat.
Most hospitals, nursing homes and other healthcare facilities are now required to
assess and treat pain. To correctly diagnose pain, healthcare professional will:
• Perform a thorough physical exam
• Complete a pain assessment
• Ask detailed questions about the patient’s medical history and lifestyle
• Order blood work, X-rays, electrical tests to detect nerve damage, or
other diagnostic and laboratory tests
The type of pain someone is experiencing is often a clue to its cause; for
example, chronic pain that is burning or tingling is often the result of nerve
disease (neuropathy).
n Limit the ability to work, sleep, exercise or n Aggravate other health problems
perform everyday tasks (for example, dressing, n Lead to depression and/or anxiety, which often
going to the grocery store)
worsen pain sensations
n Reduce mobility
n Make it difficult to concentrate or reason
n Impair strength
n Place added strain on relationships and interfere
n Diminish appetite with intimacy
n
n
Make it difficult to recover from an injury or fight Result in a loss of self-esteem and independence
infection by weakening the immune system
With numerical scales, patients use numbers from 0-10 (0 being no pain and 10 being the worst pain ever) to
rate the intensity of the pain.
Verbal scales contain commonly used words such as “mild,” “moderate” and “severe” to help patient’s describe
the severity of the pain.
Visual scales use aids like pictures of facial expressions, colors or gaming objects, such as poker chips, to help
explain the severity of pain. One type, the Wong Baker Faces Pain Rating Scale, shows six different facial
expressions from happy (no hurt) to agony (hurts the worst) to help show healthcare professionals how much
pain a patient feels. Body diagrams may also be used to help pinpoint where the pain occurs.
Multidimensional pain assessment tools, such as the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ) and the Brief Pain
Inventory (BPI), have been developed to quantify different aspects of pain, including location and quality of pain
and its effect on mood and function. However, these take longer to administer than the simpler scales and some
patients who are cognitively impaired or poorly educated may find them difficult to complete. They are generally
used in pain research, but can be adapted for clinical use if appropriate and valuable.
Our processing of pain is complex. A basic explanation is that the pain signals of acute pain are initiated when receptors on the
skin, within an organ, tissue or nerve are triggered by injury or disease, known or unknown. A series of events follow: an
electrical impulse, or pain message, is generated that is then carried on nerve fibers to the spinal cord. The spinal cord transmits
the pain signal to various levels of the brain for interpretation and response. At any time during the transport of pain messaging,
these noxious signals can be blocked, enhanced or modified. Signaling associated with chronic pain is much more complicated
than acute pain as science is beginning to show.
n A hallmark of many chronic conditions, pain affects more Americans than diabetes, heart disease and cancer
combined.
ESTIMATED INCIDENCE*
80
26%
70
60
50
40
*Sources:
30 Pain – 76.2 million people, National Centers for Health Statistics
Diabetes – 20.8 million people (diagnosed and estimated
20 7% 6%
undiagnosed), American Diabetes Association
Coronary Heart Disease, including heart attack and chest pain, and
10 1.4% Stroke – 18.7 million people, American Heart Association
Cancer – 1.4 million people, American Cancer Society
0
n More than one-quarter of Americans (26%) age 20 years and over—or, an estimated 76.5 million Americans—
reported that they have had a problem with pain of any sort that persisted for more than 24 hours in
duration. This number does not account for acute pain.1
n About one-third of people who report pain indicate that their pain is “disabling,” defined as both severe
and having a high impact on functions of daily life.2
n More women (27.1%) than men (24.4%) report that they are in pain.1
n Non-Hispanic white adults reported pain more often than adults of other races and ethnicities
(27.8% vs. 22.1% Black only or 15.3% Mexican).1
n Adults living in families with income less than twice the poverty level reported pain more often than higher
income adult.1
n When asked about four common types of
pain, respondents of a National Institute of FOUR COMMON TYPES OF PAIN
Health Statistics survey indicated that low
back pain was the most common (27%), Low Back Pain 27%
followed by severe headache or migraine
pain (15%), neck pain (15%) and facial ache Migraine Pain 15%
or pain (4%).1
Neck Pain 15%
Facial Pain 4%
0 10 20 30 40 50
3 months – 1 year
ECONOMIC AND WORKPLACE BURDEN OF PAIN
n The annual cost of chronic pain in the United States, including healthcare
expenses, lost income, and lost productivity, is estimated to be $100 MUCH WORK REMAINS
billion.3 However, more recent studies have indicated that costs associated • Currently, less than 2%
with low back pain alone are an estimated $85.9 billion.4 The total cost of the NIH research
of arthritis—the nation’s leading cause of disability—is estimated at $128 budget is dedicated to
billion.5
pain.
n Undertreated pain drives up the cost of healthcare because it extends
• More than half of all
lengths of stay in hospitals, increases emergency room visits and results in
unplanned clinic visits. hospitalized patients
experienced pain in the
n Pain is the second leading cause of medically related work absenteeism, last days of their lives
resulting in more than 50 million lost workdays each year.6 and although therapies
n Lost productive time due to headache, arthritis, back pain and other are present to alleviate
musculoskeletal conditions is estimated to cost $61.2 billion per year.7 most pain for those
• Headache was the most common (5.4%) pain condition resulting in dying of cancer, research
lost productive time. It was followed by back pain (3.2%), arthritis shows that 50-75% of
pain (2.0%), and other musculoskeletal pain (2.0%). patients die in moderate
• Most (76%) of the pain-related lost productive time was in the form of to severe pain.8
reduced performance occurring while the employees were at work,
rather than absenteeism.
• Workers who experienced lost productive time from a pain condition
lost an average of 4.6 hours per week.
For more statistics and research findings, see our Topic Briefs on: Be sure to visit the
n Special Considerations: Pain in Specific Populations American Pain Foundation at
n Disparities and Pain Management www.painfoundation.org for
n Integrative Medicine: Non-Drug Treatment Options for posted updates and additional
Pain Management Topic Briefs.
n Chronic Pain and Opioid Treatment
• The myth that children, especially infants, do not feel pain the WEB RESOURCES
way adults do; American Pain Society
www.ampainsoc.org
• Lack of routine assessment for the presence of pain in children;
National Children’s Pain Center
• The idea that treating pediatric pain takes too much time and www.pediatricpain.org/ncpc.php
effort;
Pediatric Pain Sourcebook
• Fears of adverse effects of analgesic medications, including http://painsourcebook.ca/
respiratory depression and addiction; UCLA Pediatric Pain Program
• Differing personal values and beliefs of healthcare professionals www.mattel.ucla.edu/pedspain/home.php
about the meaning and value of pain in the development of the American Academy of Pediatrics
child (e.g., the belief that pain builds character). http://www.aap.org
• Irritable bowel syndrome • Autoimmune disorders (e.g. Lupus National Institutes of Health: Gender & Pain
http://painconsortium.nih.gov/genderandpain/
• Fibromyalgia and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome) summary.htm
• Chronic pelvic pain • Rheumatoid arthritis National Women’s Health Resource Center
• Interstitial cystitis • Osteoarthritis www.healthywomen.org/
Society for Neuroscience: Gender & Pain
• Temporomandibular joint disorder
www.sfn.org/index.cfm?pagename=brainBriefing
(TMJ) s_gender_and_pain
WEB RESOURCES
Handbook of Pain Relief in Older Adults —
An Evidence-Based Approach
By Gloth III, F. Michael
http://www.humanapress.com/Product.pasp?txt
Catalog=HumanaBooks&txtProductID=1-58829-
217-7
American Medical Association
Assessing and Treating Pain in Older Adults
http://www.ama-cmeonline.com/
pain_mgmt/module05/index.htm
Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Amputations have long been a tragic, A traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a blow
commonly affects soldiers returning from unavoidable consequence of combat or jolt to the head or a penetrating head
war, and is triggered by exposure to a injury—“one of the most visible and injury that disrupts the function of the
situation or event that is or could be enduring reminders of the cost of war,” brain and is a major cause of life long
perceived as highly threatening to a according to the Amputee Coalition of disability and death. Managing pain in
person’s life or those around him/her. America. While there have been major veterans with TBIs may be complicated
PTSD may not emerge for years after the advances in medicine, prosthetics and by memory lapses affecting medication
initial trauma. Chronic pain symptoms technologies that allow amputees to management, difficulty organizing and
and PTSD frequently co-occur and may lead more independent lives, most of following complicated and sometimes
intensify an individual’s experience of these patients continue to need even simple pain management regimens,
both conditions. Together, they result in specialized long-term or lifelong support. and difficulty learning new coping skills.
fear, avoidance behaviors, anxiety and Managing wound, post-operative, Rehabilitation should incorporate efforts
feelings of isolation. phantom and stump pain is important to to relieve associated pain.
reduce suffering and improve quality
of life.
Veterans have significantly worse pain than the general public, and while military medical care is among the best in the
world, there are still long-term problems and challenges with managing disability and chronic pain.
Military culture may also present a significant barrier to appropriate patient care. The persisting stigma around pain
and pain treatment is particularly pronounced in the military, and pain is often perceived as a sign of weakness
leading many individuals to choose to suffer in silence. Seeking mental health care for PTSD and depression, which
so often accompany pain is important; pain is best managed when depression and PTSD are treated simultaneously.
A recent analysis found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is already overwhelmed by the sheer number
of returning veterans and the seriousness of their health care needs. Without increased staffing and funding for
veterans medical care, it will not be able to provide quality care in a timely fashion.
WEB RESOURCES
American Pain Foundation:
Military/Veterans and Pain
T he U.S. Veterans Health Administration is instructing www.painfoundation.org/
page.asp?file=Veterans/Intro.htm
physicians and nurses who treat veterans to regard pain as
Amputee Coalition of America
a “fifth vital sign,” to be routinely assessed along with www.amputee-coalition.org
blood pressure, pulse, temperature and respiration. Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center
www.dvbic.org
Disabled American Veterans (DAV)
www.dav.org
Military Pain Care Act of 2008
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h110-5465
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
www.va.gov
HOT TOPICS
Patient sources of racial and ethnic Minorities lack access to Americans, including 9 million
disparities:3 effective pain care children, are living without health
• Low socioeconomic status Limited access to pain care services care coverage. More than eight out
• Patients’ attitudes or beliefs is a key contributor to poorer pain of 10 are from working families.
regarding pain and patient-level treatment among minorities. The consequences of being
decision making and preferences uninsured are widely recognized
• Overall, minorities tend to be and include: lack of access to
– Stoicism and the belief that financially poorer than non-
pain is an inevitable part of health care, poor quality care, lost
Hispanic whites. economic productivity, as well as
disease
• Socioeconomic factors can financial burdens on individuals
• Minority patients more likely to:
impede access to health and society overall. As the minority
– Refuse recommended pain insurance and primary health population in the U.S. continues to
therapies care services, and minorities are grow, it becomes increasingly
– Poorly adhere to treatment less likely to have access to pain important to address the numbers
regimens treatment services than the of uninsured and underinsured
– Delay seeking medical care general population.3,4,7,16,17 among racial and ethnic groups.
• Mistrust of physicians or • Racial and ethnic minorities are Barriers also exist in patient access
previous negative experiences at increased risk of having their to pain medications. Research
with health care system pain complaints ignored by shows that physicians may be less
• Limited health literacy healthcare providers, thereby likely to prescribe pain
• Language barriers that hinder limiting their options for medications for minority
communication with providers accessing appropriate pain populations 6,7,16,18 and pharmacies
treatment.3,4,6,7 in neighborhoods with large
Physician sources of racial and
According to the Robert Wood minority populations often do not
ethnic disparities:3
Johnson Foundation, 46 million carry opioid medications.3,4,12
• Perceptions of race and ethnicity
• Racism or bias
PERCENTAGE UNINSURED AMONG THE NONELDERLY POPULATION
• Poor cross cultural BY RACE AND ETHNIC ORIGIN, 2006
communication skills/cultural
insensitivity
• Underrepresentation of 35.7%
physicians from
racially/ethnically diverse
backgrounds/lack of cultural
sensitivity 21.8%
17.8%
disease burden if pain remains Sources: Employee Benefit Research Institute estimates from the March Current
Population Survey, 2007 Supplement. Cover the Uninsured, www.covertheuninsured.org.
untreated
• Undertreatment of minorities in
emergency departments
“Inequities in access can contribute to and exacerbate
• Minority pain complaints receive less
attention than others existing disparities in health and quality of life, creating
• Impact of pain on productivity and barriers to a strong and productive life.”
quality of life among minority patients
—The Commonwealth Fund
• Pain relief as a human right
Currently, the social impact of pain assessment tools Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality:
Addressing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
on patients, their families and • Raise consciousness about Health Care
communities is largely absent in disparities in pain management http://www.ahrq.gov/research/disparit.htm
most federal research plans.3,4 and barriers to effective http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr03/
nhdrsum03.htm
healthcare overall
REFERENCES
1. About Minority Health. Retrieved October 12, 2008 from CDC Office of Minority Health. Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/omhd/AMH/AMH.htm
2. Bonham VL. (2001). Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand the Causes and Solutions to the Disparities in Pain
Treatment. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 129:52.
3. Green CR. (2003). The Unequal Burden of Pain: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain. Pain Medicine, 4(3):277-294.
4. Green C. (2006). Disparities in Pain: Ethical Issues. Pain Medicine, 7(6):530-533.
5. Todd KH, Ducharme J, Choiniere M, Crandall CS, Fosnocht D, Homel P, et al. (2007). Pain in the Emergency Department: Results of the Pain
and Emergency Medicine Initiative (PEMI) Multicenter Study. The Journal of Pain, 8(6):460-466.
6. Todd KH, et al. (1994) The effect of ethnicity on physician estimates of pain severity in patients with isolated extremity trauma. JAMA,
271(12):925-28.
7. Todd, Samaroo, Hoffman, et al. (1993) Ethnicity as a risk factor for inadequate emergency department analgesia. JAMA, 269(12):1537-39.
8. Paulson MR, Dekker AH, Aguilar-Gaxiola S. (2007). Eliminating Disparities in Pain Management. J Am Osteopath Assoc, 107(suppl_5), ES17-20.
9. Freeman HP, Payne R. (2000) Racial injustices in health care. New Engl J Med, 342(14):1045-1047.
10. Todd KH, Deaton C, D’Adamo AP, Goe L. (2000) Ethnicity and analgesic practice. Ann Emerg Med, 35(1):11-16.
11. Karpman, et al. (1997) Analgesia for emergency centers’ orthopaedic patients: does an ethnic bias exist?, Clinical Orthopaedics and Related
Research, 334:270-5.
12. Morrison R, et al. (2000) “We don't carry that” -- Failure of pharmacies in predominantly nonwhite neighborhoods to stock opioid analgesics.
N Engl J Med, 342:1023-1026.
13. Cleeland CS, Gonin, R, Baez, L, Loehrer, P, & Pandya, KJ. (1997). Pain and Treatment of Pain in Minority Patients with Cancer: The Eastern
Cooperative Oncology Group Minority Outpatient Pain Study. Ann Intern Med, 127(9):813-816.
14. Pain: Hope through Research. Retrieved October 12, 2008 from National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS). Web site:
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/chronic_pain/detail_chronic_pain.htm
15. Dalton J. (1998). A call for standardizing the clinical rating of pain intensity using a 0 to 10 rating scale. Cancer Nursing, 21(11):46–49.
16. Lebovits A. (2005) The ethical implications of racial disparities in pain: Are some of us more equal? Pain Med; 6:3-4.
17. Payne R, et al. (2002) Quality of Life Concerns in Patients with Breast Cancer. Cancer, 97:311-317.
18. Ng, Dimsdale, Shragg, et al. (1996) Ethnic differences in analgesic consumption for postoperative pain. Psychosomatic Medicine, 58:125-9.
19. Racial and Ethnic Identifiers in Pain Management: The Importance to Research, Clinical Practice, and Public Health Policy: A Position
Statement from the American Pain Society. Approved by the APS Board of Directors, October 22, 2004. Retrieved October 12, 2008 from
American Pain Society. Web site: http://www.ampainsoc.org/advocacy/ethnoracial.htm
20. Unequal Treatment - Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare (2002). Retrieved October 10, 2008 from Institute of Medicine.
Web site: http://www.iom.edu/?id=16740
Key Issues
• More than 76.5 million Americans suffer with pain.1 The consequences of unmanaged chronic pain are devastating for
patients. It is not uncommon for patients with intractable, debilitating pain—many of whom are often made to feel that the
pain is “just in their heads”—to want to give up rather than living one more day in excruciating pain.
• For many patients, opioids are an integral part of a comprehensive pain management plan to help relieve pain, restore
functioning and improve quality of life.2,3
• Unfortunately, patient access to these medications may be hindered by unbalanced state policies, persisting social stigma
surrounding their use, as well as therapeutic switching and/or step therapies imposed by insurance companies.
• Unless a patient has a past or current personal or family history of substance abuse, the likelihood of addiction is low when
opioids are taken as prescribed and under the guidance of a physician; however, they have the potential for misuse, abuse
and diversion.
• Rising rates of prescription drug abuse and emergency room admissions related to prescription drug abuse, as well as an
increase in the theft and illegal resale of prescription drugs, indicate that drug diversion is a growing problem nationwide.4
The main source of drug diversion is unlikely the prescriber as was once assumed, but rather from theft by family, friends and
workers in the home or from the sharing and selling of medications though often with good intentions.5
• Diverse players (e.g., lawmakers, educators, healthcare providers, the pharmaceutical industry, caregivers) must come
together to address the dual public health crises of the undertreatment of pain and rising prescription drug abuse.6
• Alleviating pain remains a medical imperative—one that must be balanced with measures to address rising non-medical
use of prescription drugs and to protect the public health.6
Opioids 101
Opioids include morphine, oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, methadone, codeine
and fentanyl. Opioids are classified in several ways, most commonly based on their origin and duration of
effects.7
Analgesia – Is the pain relief clinically significant? Is there a reduction in the pain
score (0-10)?
Activity levels – What is the patient’s level of physical and psychosocial functioning?
The Has treatment made an improvement?
Adverse effects – Is the patient experiencing side effects from pain relievers? If so,
Four are they tolerable?
“A’s” Aberrant behaviors – Are there any behaviors of concern such as early refills or lost
medication? Does the patient show signs of misuse, abuse or addiction? What is the plan
of action?
Source: Passik & Weinreb, 1998; Passik & Portenoy, 1998
The American Pain Foundation’s Target Chronic Pain materials help facilitate open dialogue between patients
and their healthcare team, and give prescribers tools for selecting, monitoring and following patients. To access
these resources, visit www.painfoundation.org and click on the Publications tab.
These approaches can generally be plan (e.g., treatment agreements, For additional recommendations,
categorized as follows: urine testing and monitoring, see the American Pain
• Legislative strategies to create transition planning, collaborative Foundation’s report outlining
balanced and consistent practice with addiction medicine critical barriers to appropriate
regulation and improve state- and behavioral health opioid prescribing for pain
based prescription drug specialists). management, Provider Prescribing
monitoring programs. • Pharmaceutical industry Patterns and Perceptions:
• Educational efforts to raise strategies to help prevent misuse, Identifying Solutions to Build
awareness about prescription abuse and diversion by Consensus on Opioid Use in Pain
drug abuse and its dangers developing new tamper resistant Management. This 16-page report
among schools, families, packaging and/or formulations calls for a more balanced
healthcare providers, patients (e.g., tamper-resistant bottles, perspective of the risks and
and potential abusers. electromagnetic chips to track benefits of these medications in
medication, new formulations practice and policy and
• Medical strategies to help
that could resist or deter summarizes key challenges and
identify and monitor patients
common methods of opioid actionable solutions discussed by
who require opioid
abuse). leading pain experts at a
management, to include the
roundtable meeting hosted by APF.
incorporation of risk
management into the treatment
Risk factors for opioid misuse include, but are not limited to:2,3,19
• Personal or family history of prescription drug or alcohol abuse
• Cigarette smoking
• History of motor vehicle accidents
• Substance use disorder
• Major psychiatric disorder (e.g., bipolar disorder, major depression,
personality disorder)
• Poor family support
• History of preadolescent sexual abuse
REFERENCES
1. National Center for Health Statistics. Health, United States, 2006 With Chartbook on Trends in the Health of Americans. Hyattsville, MD.
Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf.
2. Fine, PG. Opioid Therapy as a Component of Chronic Pain Management: Pain Experts Weigh In on Key Principles to Optimize Treatment.
Topics in Pain Management. May 2008;23(10):1-8.
3. Katz NP, Adams EF, Chilcoat H, Colucci RD, et al. Challenges in the development of prescription opioid abuse-deterrent formulations. Clin J
Pain. 2007;23:648-660.
4. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies. Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2005: National
Estimates of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits. DAWN Series D-29, DHHS Publication No. (SMA) 07-4256, Rockville, MD, 2007.
Available at http://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/files/DAWN-ED-2005-Web.pdf.
5. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2008). Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National
Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series H-34, DHHS Publication No. SMA 08-4343). Rockville, MD. See
http://oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k7nsduh/2k7Results.pdf.
6. American Pain Foundation. Provider Prescribing Patterns and Perceptions: Identifying Solutions to Build Consensus on Opioid Use in Pain
Management—A Roundtable Discussion. April 2008. Available at www.painfoundation.org.
7. Schumacher MA, Basbaum AI, Way WL. Opioid analgesics & antagonists. In: Katzung, ed. Basic and clinical pharmacology. 10th ed. New
York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2007;489-502.
8. McQuay H. Opioids in pain management. The Lancet. 1999;353:2229-2232.
9. American Pain Foundation. Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain. 2007. Available at www.painfoundation.org.
10. Furlan AD, Sandoval JA, Mailis-Gagnon AM, Tunks E. Opioids for chronic noncancer pain: a meta-analysis of effectiveness and side effects.
CMAJ. 2006;11:1589-1594.
11. Kuehn BM. Opioid prescriptions soar: increase in legitimate use as well as abuse. JAMA. 2007;297:249-250.
12. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. (2007). Results from the 2006 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National
Findings (Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series H-32, DHHS Publication No. SMA 07-4293). Rockville, MD.
13. Bollinger LC, Bush C, Califano JA, et al. Under the counter: the diversion and abuse of controlled prescription drugs in the U.S. The National
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA), July 2005.
14. Centers for Disease Control. Unintentional poisoning deaths – United States, 1999-2004. MMWR. February 9, 2007;56(05):93-96.
15. Lin JJ, Afandre D, Moore C. Physician attitudes toward opioid prescribing for patients with persistent noncancer pain. Clin J Pain.
2007;23:799-803.
16. Fine PG, Portenoy RK: Clinical Guide to Opioid Analgesia, 2nd Edition. New York: Vendome, 2007
17. Sinatra R. Opioid analgesics in primary care: challenges and new advances in the management 0f noncancer pain. J Am Board Fam Med.
2006;19:165-77.
18. Boyd C. Presentation at the NIDA/AMA Joint Meeting, Pain, Opioids, and Addiction: An Urgent Problem for Doctors and Patients, NIH,
Bethesda, Maryland, March 5, 2007.
Pharmacotherapy
(NSAIDs, opioids,
adjuvant analgesics)
Interventional Physical Medicine and
Approaches Rehabilitation
(injections, (assistive devices,
neurostimulation) conditioning)
EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT FOR
PERSISTENT PAIN
Complementary and Lifestyle Changes
Alternative Medicine (weight loss, exercise,
(massage, acupuncture) nutrition)
Psychosocial Support
(counseling,
support groups)
Integrative medicine combines treatments from conventional medicine and complementary and alternative
therapies for which there is some high-quality evidence of safety and effectiveness.1 Being able to deliver
integrated medicine, which incorporates proven CAM therapies into “mainstream” care, is increasingly
important to consumers and healthcare providers.4
Back pain Head cold Neck pain Joint pain Arthritis Anxiety/ Stomach Headache Recurring Insomnia
depression upset pain
What is CAM?
CAM includes a diverse group of healing systems, practices and products that are not part of conventional
medicine. Examples of CAM therapies include acupuncture, massage, meditation, hypnosis, yoga and herbal
therapies. These approaches are increasingly used to help manage pain and related issues (e.g., depression,
anxiety, fatigue) and enhance patients’ quality of life. NCCAM, one of 27 institutes and centers designated by
the National Institutes of Health, is the lead agency for scientific research on CAM and groups these therapies
into four areas.
Many CAM practices are gentle methods that tend to have fewer side effects, which is part of their appeal to
patients. Patients also use these therapies to help alleviate the associated stress, depression and insomnia that
can accompany and worsen pain sensations.
Some CAM practices, such as acupuncture, massage and chiropractic care require the practitioner to be
licensed. It’s important for patients to research and find a CAM practitioner who is certified, willing and
equipped to coordinate with other members of the patient’s health team, and has experience working with
patients with chronic pain.
• An estimated 36% of American adults use some form of CAM, and this percentage jumps to 62% if prayer
for health reasons and megavitamin therapy are included.3
• Americans spend at least $34-47 billion on CAM therapies, exceeding out of pocket expenses for all U.S.
hospitalizations. CAM is expected to grow by 15% each year.3
• People report using CAM because these methods mirror their personal beliefs, values and philosophical
orientations toward life.4
• Many people use CAM to help relieve back pain, joint pain, severe headache and pain associated with
migraines, dental and jaw pain and for a variety of other reasons.4
CAM and integrative medicine Prayer/ Prayer/ Natural Deep Prayer Meditation Chiropractic Yoga Massage Diets
and limited resources to self others products breathing group
coordinate services. 0
Source: Barnes P, Powell-Griner E, McFann K, Nahin R, CDC Advance Data Report
• Restricted health insurance #343, Complemenary and Alternative Medicine Use Among Adults; United States,
2002. May 27, 2004.
coverage. Many CAM therapies
are not yet covered by health
insurance carriers and are,
therefore, only available to
patients on an outpatient fee-for- • Lack of education (on the part • Misperceptions about CAM
service basis. Insurers tend to of consumers and providers) therapies as “elusive,
restrict reimbursement to about the appropriate use of nonsensical options.”
“medically necessary” therapies CAM therapies and how best to Source: American Pain Foundation, Pain
and without the data to back up integrate them with standard Community News, Spring 2008.
their effectiveness, these pain treatments.
practices are not covered.
Paying for non-drug therapies have access to low cost, at-home therapies that
The majority of CAM treatments are not currently provide effective pain relief. These may include heat
covered by traditional insurance plans, largely due to and cold therapies, relaxation techniques and
the absence of scientific evidence proving the exercise.
effectiveness of some CAM therapies. When coverage People living with chronic pain are increasingly
for CAM is offered, it is generally limited to more turning to CAM to help alleviate their suffering and
common therapies such as acupuncture and improve their quality of life. The addition of these
massage. Most people must pay for CAM services therapies often results in better pain relief and fewer
out-of-pocket; however, consumer interest has side effects. However, more research is needed to
prompted more insurance companies to consider prove the effectiveness of certain therapies and
CAM coverage. increase the likelihood that they will be covered by
A study in Washington State, where private health conventional insurance providers and offered as an
insurers are legally required to cover licensed CAM option to all patients living with pain.
providers, found that a significant number of people With nearly half of all consumers concerned about
were utilizing CAM insurance benefits with only a the safety of their health care, 6 the use of CAM and
modest effect on insurance expenditures.5 other non-drug treatments for pain management is
Given the high cost and low insurance coverage of expected to grow as non-drug therapies are proven
many CAM therapies, it is important that patients, safe and effective and adopted into routine health
especially those that are no longer able to work, care.7
REFERENCES
1. What is CAM? Retrieved October 10, 2008 from National Center for
Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM). Web site:
http://nccam.nih.gov/health/whatiscam/
2. Ahmad, M, Goucke, C.R. (2002) Management strategies for the treatment of
neuropathic pain in the elderly. Drugs Aging, 19(12):929-4.
3. Barnes, P., Powell-Griner, E., McFann, K., Nahin, R. CDC Advance Data Report
#343. Complementary and Alternative Medicine Use Among Adults: United States,
2002. May 27, 2004.
WEB RESOURCES
4. Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain. Retrieved October 10,
2008 from American Pain Foundation. American Academy of Pain Management
Web site: http://www.painfoundation.org/Publications/TreatmentOptions2006.pdf www.aapainmanage.org
5. Lafferty, W.E., Tyree, P.T., et al. (2006) Insurance Coverage and Subsequent American Pain Foundation Treatment Options
Utilization of Complementary and Alternative Medical (CAM) Providers. Am J www.painfoundation.org/Publications/
Manag Care, 12(7):397–404. TreatmentOptions2006.pdf
6. Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (November 17, 2004). “Five years after IOM
National Center for Complementary and
report on medical errors, nearly half of all consumers worry about the safety of
Alternative Medicine (NCCAM)
their health care” Press release. Retrieved October 12, 2008 from
www.nccam.nih.gov
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/pomr111704nr.cfm
7. The Pain Community News: Spring 2008, 8(2). Retrieved October 10, 2008 from The Office of Cancer Complementary and
American Pain Foundation. Web site: Alternative Medicine
http://www.painfoundation.org/Publications/PCN08spring.pdf www.cancer.gov/cam
Acute Pain occurs suddenly due to illness, injury or surgery. It Breakthrough Pain is intermittent worsening of pain that occurs
has a short duration that subsides when the injured tissue heals. spontaneously or in relation to a specific activity. The pain
increases above the level of pain being treated with ongoing
Arachnoiditis is a condition in which one of the three analgesics (pain medications).
membranes covering the brain and spinal cord, called the
arachnoid membrane, becomes inflamed. A number of causes, Burn pain can be profound and poses an extreme challenge to
including infection or trauma, can result in inflammation of this the medical community. First-degree burns are the least severe;
membrane. Arachnoiditis can produce disabling, progressive, and with third-degree burns, the skin is lost. Depending on the injury,
even permanent pain. pain accompanying burns can be excruciating, and even after the
wound has healed patients may have chronic pain at the burn
Arthritis is the most prevalent cause of chronic disability in the site.
United States. Millions of Americans suffer from arthritic
conditions such as osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing Cancer pain can accompany the growth of a tumor, the
spondylitis, and gout. These disorders are characterized by joint treatment of cancer, or chronic problems related to cancer’s
pain in the extremities. Many other inflammatory diseases affect permanent effects on the body. Fortunately, most cancer pain can
the body’s soft tissues, including tendonitis and bursitis. be treated to help minimize discomfort and stress to the patient.
Back pain has become the high price paid by our modern Central pain syndrome — see Traumatic Pain below.
lifestyle and is a startlingly common cause of disability for many
Americans, including both active and inactive people. Common Chronic Pain is pain that persists for long periods of time
types of back pain include: (usually >3 months). Failure to treat acute pain promptly and
appropriately at the time of injury, during initial medical and
• Sciatica — back pain that spreads to the leg (see below). surgical care, and at the time of transition to community-based
care, contributes to the development of chronic pain syndromes.
• Degenerative or ruptured disc — type of back pain
In chronic pain, pain signals may remain active in the nervous
associated with the discs of the spine, the soft, spongy
system for weeks, months or even years. Chronic pain has no
padding between the vertebrae (bones) that form the spine.
value or benefit; it is a disease of the nervous system.
Discs protect the spine by absorbing shock, but they tend to
degenerate over time and may sometimes rupture. Types of Chronic Pain:
• Spondylolisthesis — back condition that occurs when one • Intermittent Pain - episodic and may occur in waves or
vertebra extends over another, causing pressure on nerves patterns.
and therefore pain.
• Persistent Pain - lasts 12 or more hours every day for more
• Radiculopathy — damage to nerve roots is a serious than three months.
condition that can be extremely painful.
Complex Regional Pain Syndrome, or CRPS, is a chronic pain
Treatment for a damaged disc includes drugs such as condition that typically affects one or more limbs. It is
painkillers, muscle relaxants, and steroids; exercise or rest, accompanied by burning pain and hypersensitivity to
depending on the patient’s condition; adequate support, such temperature. Often triggered by trauma or nerve damage, CRPS
as a brace or better mattress and physical therapy. In some causes the skin of the affected area to become characteristically
cases, surgery may be required to remove the damaged shiny.
portion of the disc and return it to its previous condition, There are two types of CRPS:
especially when it is pressing a nerve root. Surgical procedures
include discectomy, laminectomy, or spinal fusion. Minimally • CRPS I (formerly known as Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy
invasive procedures (vertebroplasty), certain complementary Syndrome, or RSDS) is frequently triggered by tissue injury,
and alternative therapies and implantable devices may also but with no underlying or identifiable nerve injury.
help certain patients.
• Migraines are characterized by throbbing pain and • Somatic Pain - caused by injury to skin, muscles, bone,
sometimes by other symptoms, such as nausea and visual joint, and connective tissues. Deep somatic pain is usually
disturbances. Migraines are more frequent in women than described as dull or aching, and localized in one area.
men. Stress can trigger a migraine headache, and migraines Somatic pain from injury to the skin or the tissues just below
can also put the sufferer at risk for stroke. it often is sharper and may have a burning or pricking
quality.
• Cluster headaches are characterized by excruciating,
piercing pain on one side of the head; they occur more • Visceral Pain - originates from ongoing injury to the internal
frequently in men than women. organs or the tissues that support them. When the injured
tissue is a hollow structure, like the intestine or the gall
• Tension headaches are often described as a tight band bladder, the pain often is poorly localized and feels like
around the head. cramping. When the injured structure is not a hollow organ,
the pain may be pressure-like, deep, and stabbing.
Head and facial pain can be agonizing, whether it results from
dental problems or from disorders such as cranial neuralgia, in Pain flares. Pain that suddenly erupts or emerges with or
which one of the nerves in the face, head, or neck is inflamed. without an aggravating event or activity.
Another condition, trigeminal neuralgia (also called tic
douloureux), affects the largest of the cranial nerves and is Peripheral Neuropathic Pain due to vascular disease or injury-
characterized by a stabbing, shooting pain. such as vasculitis or inflammation of blood vessels, coronary
artery disease, and circulatory problems-all have the potential to
Muscle pain can range from an aching muscle, spasm, or strain, cause pain. Vascular pain affects millions of Americans and occurs
to the severe spasticity that accompanies paralysis. Another when communication between blood vessels and nerves is
disabling syndrome is fibromyalgia, a disorder characterized by interrupted. Ruptures, spasms, constriction, or obstruction of
fatigue, stiffness, joint tenderness, and widespread muscle pain. blood vessels, as well as a condition called ischemia in which
Polymyositis, dermatomyositis, and inclusion body myositis blood supply to organs, tissues, or limbs is cut off, can also result
are painful disorders characterized by muscle inflammation. They in pain.
may be caused by infection or autoimmune dysfunction and are
sometimes associated with connective tissue disorders, such as Reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome — see Complex
lupus and rheumatoid arthritis. Regional Pain Syndrome.
Myofascial pain syndromes affect sensitive areas known as Repetitive stress injuries are muscular conditions that result
trigger points, located within the body’s muscles. Myofascial pain from repeated motions performed in the course of normal work
syndromes are sometimes misdiagnosed and can be debilitating. or other daily activities. They include:
Neuropathic Pain – is a type of pain that results from damage to • writer’s cramp, which affects musicians and writers and
or dysfunction of the nerves in either the peripheral or central others,
nervous system, rather than stimulation of pain receptors (as is • compression or entrapment neuropathies, including carpal
the case of somatic and visceral pain). Neuropathic pain can tunnel syndrome, caused by chronic overextension of the
occur in any part of the body and is frequently described as a wrist and
hot, burning sensation, which can be devastating to the affected
• tendonitis or tenosynovitis, affecting one or more tendons.
• Vasculitis, or inflammation of blood vessels; Traumatic pain can occur after injuries in the home, at the
workplace, during sports activities, or on the road. Any of these
• Other infections, including herpes simplex;
injuries can result in severe disability and pain. Some patients
• Skin tumors and cysts, and who have had an injury to the spinal cord experience intense
Tumors associated with neurofibromatosis, a neurogenetic pain ranging from tingling to burning and, commonly, both. Such
disorder. patients are sensitive to hot and cold temperatures and touch. For
these individuals, a touch can be perceived as intense burning,
Somatic pain—see Nociceptive Pain. indicating abnormal signals relayed to and from the brain. This
condition is called central pain syndrome or, if the damage is
Sports injuries are common. Sprains, strains, bruises, in the thalamus (the brain’s center for processing bodily
dislocations, and fractures are all well-known words in the sensations), thalamic pain syndrome. It affects as many as
language of sports. Pain is another. In extreme cases, sports 100,000 Americans with multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease,
injuries can take the form of costly and painful spinal cord and amputated limbs, spinal cord injuries, and stroke. Their pain is
head injuries, which cause severe suffering and disability. severe and is extremely difficult to treat effectively. A variety
Spinal stenosis refers to a narrowing of the canal surrounding of medications, including analgesics, antidepressants,
the spinal cord. The condition occurs naturally with aging. Spinal anticonvulsants, and electrical stimulation, are options available
stenosis causes weakness in the legs and leg pain usually felt to central pain patients.
while the person is standing up and often relieved by sitting Visceral pain – see Nociceptive Pain.
down.
Sources:
The American Pain Foundation is solely responsible for the content and maintains editorial control of all materials and publications we produce.
We gratefully acknowledge those who support our work. This publication was underwritten by support from Alpharma Pharmaceuticals LLC.
Publication date: October 2008
EXHIBIT F
bs_bs_banner
Barbara Zedler, MD,* Lin Xie, MS,† Li Wang, PhD,† Design. Retrospective, nested, case-control ana-
Andrew Joyce, PhD,* Catherine Vick, MS,* lysis of Veterans Health Administration (VHA)
Furaha Kariburyo, MPH,† Pradeep Rajan, ScD,* medical, pharmacy, and health care resource utiliza-
Onur Baser, PhD,† and Lenn Murrelle, PhD, MSPH* tion administrative data.
*Venebio Group, Richmond, Virginia; †STATinMED Subjects. Patients dispensed an opioid by VHA
Research, Dallas, Texas, USA between October 1, 2010 and September 30, 2012
(N = 8,987).
Reprint requests to: Barbara K. Zedler, MD, Venebio
Group, LLC, 7400 Beaufont Springs Drive, Methods. Cases (N = 817) experienced life-
Suite 300, Richmond, VA 23225, USA. threatening opioid-related respiratory/CNS depres-
Tel: 877-344-4347, ext. 507; Fax: 804-272-3497; sion or overdose. Ten controls were randomly
E-mail: [email protected]. assigned to each case (N = 8,170). Logistic regres-
sion was used to examine associations with the
Disclosure: This research was funded by kaléo, Inc. outcome.
The study was conceived, designed, executed, and
reported by the authors who had sole control over the Results. The strongest associations were maxi-
data and the decision to publish. Kaléo, Inc. reviewed mum prescribed daily morphine equivalent dose
and commented on the methods developed by the (MED) ≥ 100 mg (odds ratio [OR] = 4.1, 95% con-
authors and reviewed the final manuscript for fidence interval [CI], 2.6–6.5), history of opioid
proprietary information. Drs. Murrelle, Zedler, Joyce, dependence (OR = 3.9, 95% CI, 2.6–5.8), and hospi-
and Rajan are Principals of Venebio Group, LLC, talization during the 6 months before the serious
which has research and consulting agreements with toxicity or overdose event (OR = 2.9, 95% CI,
kaléo, Inc. and Reckitt-Benckiser Pharmaceuticals, 2.3–3.6). Liver disease, extended-release or long-
Inc. and reports no additional conflicts of interest. acting opioids, and daily MED of 20 mg or more were
The other coauthors report no conflicts of also significantly associated.
interest.
Conclusions. Substantial risk for serious opioid-
related toxicity and overdose exists at even relatively
low maximum prescribed daily MED, especially in
Abstract patients already vulnerable due to underlying demo-
graphic factors, comorbid conditions, and concomi-
Objective. Prescription opioid use and deaths tant use of CNS depressant medications or
related to serious toxicity, including overdose, have substances. Screening patients for risk, providing
increased dramatically in the United States since education, and coprescribing naloxone for those at
1999. However, factors associated with serious elevated risk may be effective at reducing serious
opioid-related respiratory or central nervous system opioid-related respiratory/CNS depression and over-
(CNS) depression or overdose in medical users are dose in medical users of prescription opioids.
not well characterized. The objective of this study
was to examine the factors associated with serious Key Words. Prescription; Opioid; Toxicity;
toxicity in medical users of prescription opioids. Overdose; Risk; Predictors
1911
1912
ICD-9-CM Diagnosis
Codes Description
Poisoning codes
965.00 Poisoning by opium (alkaloids), unspecified
965.01 Poisoning by heroin
965.02 Poisoning by methadone
965.09 Poisoning by other opiates and related narcotic
Adverse effect codes
518.81 Acute respiratory failure
518.82 Other pulmonary insufficiency, not elsewhere classified
780.0 Alteration of consciousness
786.03 Apnea
799.0 Asphyxia and hypoxemia
CPT codes for mechanical ventilation or critical care
31500 Intubation, endotracheal, emergency procedure
94002 Ventilation assist and management, initiation of pressure, or volume preset ventilators for assisted
or controlled breathing; hospital inpatient/observation, each subsequent day
94660 CPAP ventilation; initiation and management
94662 CNAP ventilation; initiation and management
99291 Critical care, evaluation, and management of the critically ill or critically injured patient, first 30–74
minutes
External cause codes
E850.0 Accidental poisoning by heroin
E850.1 Accidental poisoning by methadone
E850.2 Accidental poisoning by other opiates and related narcotics
E935.0 Adverse effects of heroin
E935.1 Adverse effects of methadone
E935.2 Adverse effects of other opioids and related narcotics
CNAP = continuous negative airway pressure; CPAP = continuous positive airway pressure; ICD-9-CM, International Classification
of Disease, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification.
1913
disease, herpes simplex infection, skin infections/ Table 2 Prescription opioids and morphine
abscesses, sleep apnea, and obesity. equivalent conversion factors
Additional baseline variables included the number of
Morphine
opioid prescriptions dispensed by VHA, opioid used
Equivalent
(categorized by active ingredient, formulation [extended-
Conversion
release/long-acting vs short-acting], and route [oral, par-
Factor†,‡ (per
enteral, transdermal, other]), and the maximum prescribed
Opioid* mg of Opioid)
daily MED. For each opioid prescription dispensed during
the baseline period, the product of the number of units Short acting
dispensed and the opioid strength per unit (milligrams) Meperidine hydrochloride 0.1
was divided by the number of days supplied. The resulting Codeine 0.15
opioid daily dose dispensed (milligrams per day) was then Tramadol 0.2
multiplied by a conversion factor derived from published Hydrocodone 1.0
sources to estimate the daily dose in morphine equivalents Morphine sulfate 1.0
(MED) (see Table 2) [37–42]. The maximum prescribed Oxycodone 1.5
daily MED during the baseline period was calculated for Oxymorphone 3.0
each patient by summing the daily MED for all opioid Hydromorphone 4.0
prescriptions dispensed to the patient during those 6 Fentanyl citrate (transmucosal) 0.13§
months. It reflects the maximum prescribed daily dose Extended release/long-acting
and not necessarily the actual amount consumed. Morphine sulfate extended-release 1.0
Nonopioid medications also dispensed by VHA which can Oxycodone hydrochloride 1.5
potentiate opioid-associated serious adverse effects, controlled-release
such as psychoactive drugs and nonopioid analgesics, Methadone 3.0
were included as baseline variables [1,28]. Baseline health Fentanyl (transdermal) 2.4¶, **
care utilization measures included the number of inpatient
admissions and outpatient emergency department (ED), * Some drug products contained an opioid in combination with
office, and pharmacy visits (Table 6). a nonopioid (e.g., acetaminophen, aspirin) (Appendix II). No
MED was calculated for the two controls who used sublingual
Outcome Variable buprenorphine.
†
Sources of morphine equivalent conversion factors: Von Korff
The occurrence of serious opioid-related toxicity or over- [37] and Leppert and Luczak [69].
‡
dose as defined by listed ICD-9-CM and CPT codes was For each opioid dispensed, the daily MED (mg per day) was
the primary outcome variable (Table 1). All analyses were calculated as follows (see text): (number of units dis-
conducted at the patient level. For patients who experi- pensed × strength of unit [mg] × MED conversion factor)/
enced more than one episode of serious opioid-related number of days supply.
§
Converting transmucosal fentanyl to morphine equivalents
respiratory/CNS depression or overdose during the study
assumes 50% bioavailability of transmucosal fentanyl and that
period, only the index event was evaluated.
100 μg of transmucosal fentanyl is equivalent to 12.5–15 mg of
morphine.
Statistical Analysis ¶
Converting transdermal fentanyl to morphine equivalents
assumes that each patch has a conversion factor of 2.4 and
Baseline covariates and the outcome measure were sum- remains in place for 3 days. The daily MED (mg per day) was
marized descriptively. Tests for normality were conducted, calculated as follows:
and medians and interquartile ranges (IQRs) were calcu- (number of patches dispensed × 3 days per patch × strength of
lated for continuous variables that were not normally dis- patch [μg/h] × MED conversion factor)/number of days supply.
tributed. Frequencies and percentages were calculated ** Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Techni-
for categorical variables. Student’s t-tests or Wilcoxon cal Assistance Center (no specific author) [41].
Rank Sum tests were used, as appropriate, to examine MED = morphine equivalent dose.
differences in continuous variables of interest between
cases and controls. Chi-squared tests of proportion were care resource utilization. Odds ratios (ORs) and corre-
used to examine bivariate associations for categorical sponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and P values
variables. were calculated. P values less than 0.05 were considered
statistically significant. One full, main effects, logistic
Multivariable analysis was performed using conditional regression model was run. Model discrimination was
logistic regression to examine factors potentially associ- evaluated by the c-statistic which reflects the area under
ated with the index event of serious opioid-related toxicity the receiver operating characteristic curve and ranges
or overdose. The covariates included in the regression from 0.5 (no discrimination between cases and controls)
model were age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, US to 1.0 (perfect discrimination) [41]. [43] Only the first
Census region, comorbidities, prescription opioid charac- (index) event of serious opioid-related toxicity or overdose
teristics, the maximum prescribed daily MED, selected was modeled for case patients who experienced more
nonopioid prescription medications, and baseline health than one episode during the study period.
1914
All analyses were conducted using SAS version 9.3 asthma, pneumoconiosis, asbestosis); depression; skin
[44]. ulcers; hypertension; malignancy; opioid dependence,
substance abuse, nonopioid substance dependence, and
Results tobacco use disorder; viral hepatitis; mental health disor-
ders including anxiety, post traumatic stress, and bipolar
Sixteen patients were excluded from the analysis due to disorders; cardiovascular disease; sleep apnea; back and
missing age, sex, or race data. We identified 921 patients neck disorders; neuropathic disorders; and traumatic injury
with a claim of life-threatening opioid-related respiratory/ (e.g., fracture, dislocation, contusion, laceration, wound).
CNS depression or overdose and at least 6 months of
continuous medical and pharmacy benefits before the VHA prescription drug dispensing data during the
event, 817 of whom were also dispensed an opioid by 6-month baseline period indicated that, overall, cases
VHA. Among these 817 cases, 16 experienced more than were prescribed opioids significantly more often than
one episode during the study period. Among those who controls, in larger variety, with a higher proportion of
received an opioid prescription from VHA during the study extended-release or long-acting (ER/LA) formulations
period, 8,170 control patients without overdose were and with a higher mean maximum prescribed daily MED
identified who met selection criteria (Figure 1). (Table 5). The mean number of opioid prescriptions dis-
pensed in the baseline period was 6.8 among cases,
Descriptive Analysis compared with 2.5 among controls (P < 0.0001). Pre-
scription opioid active ingredients varied significantly
The median age was 62 years for both cases and controls between cases and controls, with more hydroco-
(IQR, 10 and 16, respectively). As shown in Table 3, cases done, methadone, oxycodone, and morphine, but less
were more likely than controls to be non-Hispanic white, tramadol, dispensed to cases than controls. Both ER/LA
divorced, separated or widowed, and to reside in the and short-acting formulations as well as oral opioids
western US Census region. were prescribed to cases more often than to controls.
The mean maximum prescribed MED was 122 mg per
Compared with controls, patients with serious opioid- day in cases and 48 mg per day in controls, with sig-
related toxicity or overdose were more likely to be diag- nificantly more cases receiving prescriptions for MED
nosed with other diseases and health conditions. The ≥50 mg per day and ≥100 mg per day. All selected
mean CCI score, which reflects general health status, was nonopioid drugs were also prescribed to cases signifi-
higher for cases than for controls (3.9 vs 1.7, P < 0.0001), cantly more often than to controls (Table 5).
indicating poorer overall health in the cases. As shown in
Table 4, cases reported particularly significantly higher fre- As shown in Table 6, cases had significantly greater health
quency during the 6-month baseline period of chronic care resource utilization than controls during the baseline
pulmonary disease (e.g., emphysema, chronic bronchitis, period, including outpatient office and ED visits, hospital-
No Opioid-Related Serious Toxicity or Overdose (Controls) Opioid-Related Serious Toxicity or Overdose (Cases)
Paents not diagnosed with opioid-related serious Paents diagnosed with opioid-related serious
toxicity or overdose toxicity or overdose
October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2012 October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2012
(N = 1,876,765) (N = 1,076)
1) Paents with connuous medical and pharmacy Paents with connuous medical and pharmacy
benefits for at least 6 months before the index date benefits for at least 6 months before the index date
(N = 16,062) from whom 2) 10 were randomly (N = 817)
assigned to each case (N = 8170)
1915
izations, and pharmacy visits. An ED visit occurred during were combined into one category. Endocarditis was not
the baseline period in 65% of cases compared with 21% included in the final logistic regression as it was reported in
of controls. Nearly half of the cases were hospitalized only one case patient. The final model yielded a c-statistic
during the baseline period at least once compared with of 0.89. As displayed in Figure 2, significant independent
9% of controls. demographic predictors of serious opioid toxicity included
ages 55–64 years and 65 and above, non-Hispanic white
During the 2-year study period, 159/817 case patients race, never married, widowed, and those receiving care in
died (19.5%) compared with 282/8,170 controls (3.5%). the western region of the United States.
Twenty of the deaths in the case patients occurred during
a VHA-treated episode of serious toxicity or overdose for Concomitant health conditions that were most strongly
an index event fatality rate of 2.4% (20/817). associated with the occurrence of serious opioid-related
toxicity or overdose were opioid dependence, moderate
Multivariable Analysis or severe liver disease, skin ulcers, metastatic solid tumor,
and pancreatitis. Other comorbidities significantly associ-
The logistic regression model for the dichotomous ated with the outcome included renal disease, bipolar
outcome of serious opioid-related respiratory/CNS disorder, traumatic injury chronic pulmonary disease, war-
depression or overdose resulted in multiple, independent, farin use, substance abuse, and sleep apnea (Figure 3).
statistically significant associations. To improve the esti-
mate stability, the marital status categories “separated” Prescription opioids containing hydromorphone or
(N = 20/817 cases) and “divorced” (N = 285/817 cases) oxycodone and those with ER/LA formulations were
1916
ADHD = attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; AIDS = acquired immunodeficiency syndrome; CCI = Charlson Comorbidity Index, 2008
updated (score); OCD = obsessive–compulsive disorder; PTSD = post-traumatic stress disorder; SD = standard deviation.
1917
significantly associated with increased risk of serious MED were 1.5 times as likely to experience life-threatening
opioid-related toxicity or overdose. The likelihood of expe- opioid-related respiratory/CNS depression or overdose
riencing the outcome was related monotonically to increas- (Figure 4). Coprescription of benzodiazepines, antidepres-
ing maximum prescribed daily MED of 20 mg or higher. sants, and antipsychotics in opioid users was significantly
Patients prescribed a maximum daily MED ≥100 mg during associated with experiencing serious toxicity or overdose.
the baseline period were more than four times as likely to
experience serious opioid-related toxicity or overdose Patients hospitalized for one or more days for any reason
compared with those prescribed MED of 1–<20 mg/day, during the baseline period were nearly three times as likely
whereas patients prescribed 50–<100 mg/day MED were to experience serious opioid-related toxicity compared
2.2 times as likely, and those prescribed 20–49 mg/day with those who were not hospitalized.
1918
Full regression results, including factors that were not dominantly US veterans. Consistent with published find-
statistically significantly related to the outcome in the logis- ings on prescription opioid overdose deaths, we found
tic model are provided in Appendix II. that certain demographic characteristics, comorbid con-
ditions, and medication-related factors were associated
Discussion with non-fatal prescription opioid-related serious toxicity
or overdose as well [16,21,45]. Demographic variables
Our study produced a robust multivariable model that previously identified as risk factors, and confirmed in the
characterized the risk of life-threatening opioid-related present study, included non-Hispanic white race, never
respiratory/CNS depression or overdose in medical users married and widowed marital status, and residence in the
of prescription opioids. Higher maximum prescribed daily Western United States [2,12,16,21,24,45,46]. These
MED, a history of opioid dependence, and hospitalization factors are likely to be proxies for underlying patient-
during the 6 months before the overdose or serious tox- related constructs, including genetic influences on drug
icity event were the factors most strongly associated with metabolism; the social environment, such as isolation; the
this outcome among an opioid-exposed cohort of pre- prescriber, including opioid-prescribing patterns; and the
1919
Figure 3 Logistic regression results: significant comorbid conditions and health care utilization factors.
health care system, such as access to emergency care population or chronic pain patients not treated with
and other medical services [24,47–52]. opioids [11,33,56]. We observed that polypharmacy with
psychoactive drugs commonly prescribed for mental
Some of our findings differed from those of studies of fatal health disorders, such as benzodiazepines, antidepres-
opioid overdose. In contrast to the typical occurrence of sants, and antipsychotics, as well as mental illness itself,
opioid overdose death in middle age (peaking at 45–54 was involved in approximately one-half of overdose events
years), most case patients in our study were aged 55 [1,13,56,57]. The association between serious toxicity
years or older [8,12]. This discrepancy likely reflects the events among opioid users in this study and pharmaco-
older VHA population. The older age predominance also therapy for mental health disorders such as depression
affected the pattern of comorbidity in our study popula- and anxiety may be partially mediated by the substantially
tion, with chronic diseases and cancer being prevalent. higher prevalence of substance use disorders [56].
Physiologically older individuals have age-related impair-
ment in the hepatic and renal ability to metabolize and We found certain opioid characteristics to be highly asso-
excrete certain drugs and other substances and have a ciated with the likelihood of experiencing opioid-related
greater burden of disease and associated potentially inter- toxicity or overdose. Use of extended-release formulations
acting concomitant medications. Such individuals are bio- and long-acting opioids was strongly associated with an
logically vulnerable to opioid accumulation and to increased likelihood of overdose events, as reported pre-
experiencing toxicity even when using an opioid well within viously [27,30,58]. Methadone, a long-acting opioid, was
its recommended dosing range. The safe use of opioids also examined as an independent determinant due to its
long-term to manage chronic pain in elderly patients is long half-life, variable pharmacokinetics, and dispropor-
particularly challenging [39,53–55]. tionate involvement in 30–40% of all opioid-related deaths
despite accounting for only 5–19% of US opioids pre-
Another reported treatment challenge observed in our scribed [7,12,18,27,59]. In contrast to other studies
study population was the strong association of serious that focused exclusively on fatal overdose, methadone
respiratory/CNS depression or overdose with substance alone was not independently associated with serious
use disorders (dependence and abuse) and mental health respiratory/CNS depression or overdose events treated at
disorders (bipolar disorder). Abuse of alcohol, illicit VHA facilities, falling just short of the statistical significance
opioids, and other substances is more frequent among threshold (P = 0.08). It is unclear whether this difference is
medical users of prescription opioids than in the general due to the study sample’s relatively low prevalence of
1920
methadone dispensed and fatal outcomes or to organ impairment (liver, kidney, adrenal), potential interac-
other characteristic(s) of the study sample or model tions with concomitant nonopioid medications and sub-
specification. stances (e.g., benzodiazepines, alcohol), the direction of
the opioid switch, and incomplete cross tolerance
Our study confirmed the known dose-related toxicity of between opioids, as well as differences in the likelihood of
opioids. Importantly, maximum prescribed daily MED of as opioid-induced hyperalgesia and physical dependence.
little as 20 mg was associated with serious fatal and non- Some differences may be due to significant genetic vari-
fatal overdose and toxicity in opioid consumers overall. ants in opioid receptors, metabolism, and transport in the
Previous research identified a significant risk of overdose nervous system [65,66]. The current guidelines are based
death for daily MED of ≥20 or 50 mg in patients with on expert opinion and have not been validated for safety
chronic noncancer pain [21,25,60]. An increasing body of or efficacy [55,61,64,67].
scientific evidence suggests that prescriber overreliance
on, and inadequate proficiency using, opioid dose con- Of note, medical use of tramadol in our study appeared to
version factors or ratios in published equianalgesic dose be protective against serious opioid-related overdose (OR
tables to calculate MED is an important contributor in fatal 0.7, 95% CI, 0.5–1.0). Tramadol, a novel synthetic opioid
or near-fatal opioid-related CNS/respiratory depression analgesic with monamine reuptake inhibition contributing
[27,38,61–64]. The numerous published equianalgesic to its analgesic effect, has low mu opioid receptor binding
tables that are widely available contain inconsistent and affinity and is not currently regulated as a controlled sub-
variable conversion ratios. To reduce the risk of uninten- stance at the federal level in the United States [68–71].
tional serious toxicity when rotating or switching opioids, However, its US prescribing information contains warnings
updated guidelines for the safe use of equianalgesic dose similar to all prescription opioids regarding the risk of CNS
tables emphasize the need to consider the opioid conver- and respiratory depression, overdose, and death. This
sion ratio or calculated equianalgesic dose in morphine interesting study finding warrants further investigation.
equivalents as only an approximate starting point. The
calculated MED must then be adjusted for each individual Pain is a complex, multidimensional condition with a mul-
patient and clinical scenario by accounting for tiplicity of interacting and contributing influences [72].
interindividual sources of variation that can alter opioid Factors involved in the likelihood of serious opioid-related
potency. Such sources of individual variation include toxicity or overdose in individuals treated for painful con-
demographic differences (age, sex, race, ethnicity), major ditions relate to the patient and their social environment,
1921
prescriber or other source of opioids, health care system, stances from unreported non-VHA sources, particularly in
and the specific opioid and other exposures. Although the case cohort which had a significantly higher preva-
pain is the most common reason a patient seeks medical lence of substance use disorders. In addition, the serious
care, current US data on the incidence, prevalence, and respiratory/CNS depression and overdose rate in this
treatment of pain are not complete or consistent, partly sample is likely an underestimate as we evaluated only
because it is considered a symptom. Recent evidence cases that fulfilled a stringent case definition and came to
indicates that approximately 80% of episodes of pain medical attention within VHA.
treated with opioids are short term [37]. However, an
estimated 100–116 million US adults suffer chronic pain Implications for Future Research
[53,72], and 3–4% of the adult population (9 million)
are prescribed opioids each year to manage chronic Future studies should assess the generalizability of these
noncancer pain [6–9,11]. Thus, the total population at risk findings to populations more representative of US medical
of life-threatening opioid-related respiratory/CNS depres- users of prescription opioids, including wider age ranges
sion or overdose is substantial. and more women. With a larger dataset, selected interac-
tions among risk factors should be evaluated, as well as
Our study confirms and extends findings from prior the predictive utility of behavioral and other factors not
research that focused on fatal overdoses but did not dif- routinely captured in administrative health care data (e.g.,
ferentiate between medical and nonmedical opioid users use of alcohol and other substances, other sources of
[13,16–18,21,60]. The relatively low frequency of fatal out- opioids, therapeutic indication, social conditions, setting
comes of serious opioid-related events in our VHA-treated of the overdose or serious toxicity event, family history).
cohort (2.4% over 2 years) suggests that the majority of Potential differences in risk factor profiles for overdose or
such events in medical users is not fatal. However, non- life-threatening respiratory/CNS depression among those
fatal events do place a substantial burden on the health treated with opioids for acute vs chronic conditions,
care system and patients [73,74]. chronic noncancer pain vs chronic cancer pain, and short
term vs long term should also be explored.
Strengths and Limitations
Conclusions
Major strengths of this study include the large, national
patient population as well as the rich detail of VHA admin- The risk of life-threatening toxicity, including overdose, in
istrative data. The robust statistical model included vari- medical users of prescription opioids is an alarming, esca-
ables that are readily available from medical and pharmacy lating public health problem. Substantial risk exists when
claims data. In contrast to most previous research, we even relatively low daily MED of opioids is used in patients
examined in a comprehensive and systematic fashion the who are vulnerable due to sociodemographic factors,
determinants associated with nonfatal as well as fatal concomitant medical and psychiatric conditions, and
serious toxicity and overdose related to the medical use of simultaneous use of other medications or substances.
prescription opioids. However, the study sample included Expert guidelines recommend screening all patients
all opioid-exposed patients and was stratified by neither before initiating opioids for pain management to identify
therapeutic indication or acuity (e.g., acute vs chronic pain those at elevated risk for serious adverse outcomes
conditions; chronic pain related to cancer vs noncancer) [26,55,75]. An extensive literature review revealed several
nor by the duration of opioid treatment (short term vs long available instruments to screen for aberrant drug-related
term), partly to avoid potential statistical challenges with behaviors (abuse, addiction, diversion) [55,76], but no
the limited number of cases available. Our study was instruments that provide useful, real-time, evidence-based
subject to many of the limitations commonly associated information to the prescriber regarding the risk of over-
with observational studies using administrative data dose or serious respiratory/CNS depression currently exist
(e.g., limited ability to infer causality and limited access to [55]. A public health imperative is the identification of
information regarding actual medication consumption/ medical users of prescription opioids who are at highest
adherence, other behavioral/social elements, and thera- risk of life-threatening toxicity for whom additional precau-
peutic indication, with the potential for residual tions should be considered. These precautions include
confounding). In addition, while VHA provides a large, education of the patient and caregivers, increased caution
national population from which to sample, generalizability in opioid selection and dose escalation, consultation with
is limited as the population comprises primarily older, pain management specialists, and close monitoring for the
white men who receive most of their health care within a emergence of opioid-related toxicity or known risk factors
single, closed system. for this outcome [28,55,75]. Additional measures to
reduce opioid-related morbidity and mortality may include
Limitations in accuracy and completeness are inherent in enhanced training and compliance of health care provid-
administrative data and include missing data, coding ers with evidence-based best practices for prescribing
errors, misclassification, and undiagnosed or undocu- opioids, such as considering coprescribing naloxone, par-
mented comorbidities such as substance use disorders. ticularly if delivery systems can be developed that are safe
While prescriptions dispensed within the VHA system are and more user friendly for nonmedical first responders
well documented, it is possible that patients in the study than the current syringe or nasal atomizer-based systems.
also consumed opioids and other medications or sub- Naloxone is a rescue medication with more than three
1922
decades of proven effectiveness and safety in reversing 8 Manchikanti L, Fellows B, Ailinani H, Pampati V.
life-threatening opioid-related respiratory/CNS depression Therapeutic use, abuse, and nonmedical use of
or overdose [3,7,74,77–80]. opioids: A ten-year perspective. Pain Physician
2010;13(5):401–35.
The results of our study indicate that a statistically robust
model based on administrative medical, pharmacy, and 9 Parsells Kelly J, Cook SF, Kaufman DW, et al. Preva-
health care resource utilization data may help identify the lence and characteristics of opioid use in the US adult
demographic characteristics, comorbid conditions, con- population. Pain 2008;138(3):507–13.
comitant medications, and opioid-related factors associ-
ated with increased risk of life-threatening toxicity and 10 Sullivan MD, Edlund MJ, Fan MY, et al. Trends in use
overdose. These factors help to identify the individuals of opioids for non-cancer pain conditions 2000–2005
most likely to benefit from preventive interventions. The in commercial and Medicaid insurance plans: The
development and widespread use of a risk profiling TROUP study. Pain 2008;138(2):440–9.
questionnaire based on these factors to guide patient
treatment decisions would have the potential to signifi- 11 Sullivan MD, Edlund MJ, Steffick D, Unutzer J. Regular
cantly improve the balance between the analgesic use of prescribed opioids: Association with com-
benefit of opioid therapy and the risks of serious toxicity mon psychiatric disorders. Pain 2005;119(1–3):95–
or overdose and other adverse outcomes, including 103.
abuse, diversion for nonmedical use, and iatrogenic
addiction. 12 Warner M, Chen LH, Makuc DM, Anderson RN,
Minino AM. Drug poisoning deaths in the United
Acknowledgments States, 1980–2008. NCHS Data Brief 2011;(81):
1–8.
The authors of the study would like to acknowledge Juan
Du, MS, of STATinMED, Inc. for statistical programming 13 Paulozzi LJ, Kilbourne EM, Shah NG, et al. A history of
support and Elizabeth Moran of STATinMED, Inc. for being prescribed controlled substances and risk of
medical writing support on this project. drug overdose death. Pain Med 2012;13(1):87–95.
1923
20 Hall AJ, Logan JE, Toblin RL, et al. Patterns of abuse 32 Charlson ME, Charlson RE, Peterson JC, et al. The
among unintentional pharmaceutical overdose fatali- Charlson comorbidity index is adapted to predict
ties. JAMA 2008;300(22):2613–20. costs of chronic disease in primary care patients.
J Clin Epidemiol 2008;61(12):1234–40.
21 Bohnert AS, Valenstein M, Bair MJ, et al. Association
between opioid prescribing patterns and opioid 33 Baser O, Xie L, Mardekian J, et al. Prevalence of
overdose-related deaths. JAMA 2011;305(13):1315– Diagnosed Opioid Abuse and its Economic Burden
21. in the Veterans Health Administration. Pain Pract
2013.
22 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admin-
istration. Results from the 2009 National Survey on 34 Fleming MF, Balousek SL, Klessig CL, Mundt MP,
Drug Use and Health: volume 1: summary of national Brown DD. Substance use disorders in a primary care
findings. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental sample receiving daily opioid therapy. J Pain 2007;
Health Services Administration, 2010. 8(7):573–82.
23 Coolen P, Best S. Overdose Deaths Involving Pre- 35 Walker JM, Farney RJ, Rhondeau SM, et al. Chronic
scription Opioids Among Medicaid Enrollees— opioid use is a risk factor for the development of
Washington, 2004–2007. Atlanta, Ga: Centers for central sleep apnea and ataxic breathing. J Clin Sleep
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 Contract No.: Med 2007;3(5):455–61.
42.
36 Xie L, Joshi AV, Schaaf D, et al. Differences in Health-
24 McDonald DC, Carlson K, Izrael D. Geographic varia- care Utilization and Associated Costs Between
tion in opioid prescribing in the U.S. J Pain 2012; Patients Prescribed vs. Nonprescribed Opioids During
13(10):988–96. an Inpatient or Emergency Department Visit. Pain
Pract 2013.
25 Dunn KM, Saunders KW, Rutter CM, et al. Opioid
prescriptions for chronic pain and overdose: A cohort 37 Von Korff M, Saunders K, Ray GT, Boudreau D,
study. Ann Intern Med 2010;152(2):85–92. Campbell D, Merrill J, et al. Defacto long-term opioid
therapy for non-cancer pain. Clin J Pain 2008;
26 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care 24(6):521–7.
Organizations. Safe use of opioids in hospitals:
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care 38 Vieweg WV, Lipps WF, Fernandez A. Opioids and
Organizations. 2012. Available at: http://www methadone equivalents for clinicians. Prim Care Com-
.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_49_opioids panion J Clin Psychiatry 2005;7(3):86–8.
_8_2_12_final.pdf (accessed December 2013).
39 Miaskowski C, Bair M, Chou R, D’Arcy Y, Hartwick C,
27 Webster LR, Cochella S, Dasgupta N, et al. An analy- Huffman L, et al., Principles of Analgesic Use in the
sis of the root causes for opioid-related overdose Treatment of Acute Pain and Cancer Pain. Sixth ed.
deaths in the United States. Pain Med 2011;12(suppl Glenview, IL: American Pain Society; 2008. p. 19–
2):S26–35. 38.
28 Nuckols TK, Anderson L, Popescu I, et al. Opioid pre- 40 Fine PG, Portenoy RK. A Clinical Guide to Opioid
scribing: A systematic review and critical appraisal of Analgesia. Minneapolis: McGraw Hill; 2004.
guidelines for chronic pain. Ann Intern Med 2013;
160(1):38–47. 41 Technical Assistance Guide No. 01-13: Calculating
Daily Morphine Milligram Equivalents: Prescription
29 Braden JB, Russo J, Fan MY, et al. Emergency Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical
department visits among recipients of chronic opioid Assistance Center. 2013. Available at: http://www
therapy. Arch Intern Med 2010;170(16):1425– .pdmpassist.org/pdf/BJA_performance_measure
32. _aid_MME_conversion.pdf (accessed March 2014).
updated Feb 28 2013.
30 Morasco BJ, Duckart JP, Carr TP, Deyo RA, Dobscha
SK. Clinical characteristics of veterans prescribed high 42 Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and
doses of opioid medications for chronic non-cancer Technical Assistance Center. Technical Assistance
pain. Pain 2010;151(3):625–32. Guide No. 02-13: Daily Morphine Milligram Equiva-
lents Calculator and Guide.: Prescription Drug Moni-
31 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. ICD- toring Program Training and Technical Assistance
9-CM Official Guidelines for Coding and Reporting: Center. 2013. Available at: http://www.pdmpassist
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Available .org/pdf/bja_performance_measure_aid_mme
at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd9/icd9cm _conversion_tool.pdf (accessed March 2014).
_guidelines_2011.pdf (accessed November 2013). updated May 1 2013.
1924
43 Cook NR. Use and misuse of the receiver operating higher rates of substance use problems than nonus-
characteristic curve in risk prediction. Circulation ers? Pain Med 2007;8(8):647–56.
2007;115(7):928–35.
57 Seal KH, Shi Y, Cohen G, et al. Association of mental
44 SAS. 9.3. SAS Institute. Cary, NC. 2013. health disorders with prescription opioids and high-
risk opioid use in US veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan.
45 Cerda M, Ransome Y, Keyes KM, et al. Prescription JAMA 2012;307(9):940–7.
opioid mortality trends in New York City, 1990–2006:
Examining the emergence of an epidemic. Drug 58 Food and Drug Administration. FDA Blueprint
Alcohol Depend 2013;132(1–2):53–62. for Prescriber Education for Extended-Release and
Long-Acting Opioid Analgesics. US Food and Drug
46 Johnson EM, Lanier WA, Merrill RM, et al. Uninten- Administration. 2013.
tional prescription opioid-related overdose deaths:
Description of decedents by next of kin or best 59 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vital
contact, Utah, 2008–2009. J Gen Intern Med Signs: Risk for overdose from methadone used for
2013;28(4):522–9. pain relief—United States, 1999–2010. MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep 2012;61(26):493–7.
47 Johnson JA. Ethnic differences in cardiovascular drug
response: Potential contribution of pharmacogenetics. 60 Gomes T, Juurlink DN, Dhalla IA, et al. Trends in
Circulation 2008;118(13):1383–93. opioid use and dosing among socio-economically
disadvantaged patients. Open Med 2011;5(1):
48 Joung IM, van de Mheen H, Stronks K, van Poppel e13–22.
FW, Mackenbach JP. Differences in self-reported mor-
bidity by marital status and by living arrangement. Int J 61 Fine PG, Portenoy RK, Ad Hoc Expert Panel on
Epidemiol 1994;23(1):91–7. Evidence R, Guidelines for Opioid R. Establishing
“best practices” for opioid rotation: Conclusions of an
49 Joung IM, van der Meer JB, Mackenbach JP. Marital expert panel. J Pain Symptom Manage 2009;
status and health care utilization. Int J Epidemiol 38(3):418–25.
1995;24(3):569–75.
62 McNicol E. Opioid equianalgesic conversions.
50 Mor A, Ulrichsen SP, Svensson E, Berencsi K, J Pain Palliat Care Pharmacother 2009;23(4):
Thomsen RW. Does marriage protect against hospi- 459.
talization with pneumonia? A population-based case-
control study. Clin Epidemiol 2013;5:397–405. 63 Shaheen PE, Walsh D, Lasheen W, Davis MP, Lagman
RL. Opioid equianalgesic tables: Are they all equally
51 Aizer AA, Chen MH, McCarthy EP, et al. Marital status dangerous? J Pain Symptom Manage 2009;38(3):
and survival in patients with cancer. J Clin Oncol 409–17.
2013;31(31):3869–76.
64 Webster LR, Fine PG. Review and critique of opioid
52 Sammon JD, Morgan M, Djahangirian O, et al. Marital rotation practices and associated risks of toxicity. Pain
status: A gender-independent risk factor for poorer Med 2012;13(4):562–70.
survival after radical cystectomy. BJU Int 2012;110(9):
1301–9. 65 Kalvass JC, Olson ER, Cassidy MP, Selley DE,
Pollack GM. Pharmacokinetics and pharmaco-
53 National Institute on Drug Abuse. Prescription Drugs: dynamics of seven opioids in P-glycoprotein-
Abuse and Addiction. Older Adults. Available at: competent mice: Assessment of unbound brain
www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/ EC50,u and correlation of in vitro, preclinical, and clini-
prescription-drugs/trends-in-prescription-drug cal data. J Pharmacol Exp Ther 2007;323(1):346–
-abuse/older-adults (accessed October 2013). 55.
54 American Geriatrics Society Panel on Pharmacological 66 Liang DY, Liao G, Lighthall GK, Peltz G, Clark DJ.
Management of Persistent Pain in Older P. Pharma- Genetic variants of the P-glycoprotein gene Abcb1b
cological management of persistent pain in older modulate opioid-induced hyperalgesia, tolerance and
persons. J Am Geriatr Soc 2009;57(8):1331–46. dependence. Pharmacogenet Genomics 2006;16(11):
825–35.
55 Chou R, Fanciullo GJ, Fine PG, et al. Clinical guide-
lines for the use of chronic opioid therapy in chronic 67 Pereira J, Lawlor P, Vigano A, Dorgan M,
noncancer pain. J Pain 2009;10(2):113–30. Bruera E. Equianalgesic dose ratios for opioids.
a critical review and proposals for long-term
56 Edlund MJ, Sullivan M, Steffick D, Harris KM, Wells dosing. J Pain Symptom Manage 2001;22(2):672–
KB. Do users of regularly prescribed opioids have 87.
1925
68 US Veterans’ Health Affairs Administration. Veterans rural North Carolina. Pain Med 2011;12(suppl 2):S77–
Administration/Department of Defense Clinical Prac- 85.
tice Guideline for Management of Opioid Therapy for
Chronic Pain. 2010. Available at: http://www.va.gov/ 75 Furlan AD, Reardon R, Weppler C. Opioids for chronic
painmanagement/docs/cpg_opioidtherapy_fulltext noncancer pain: A new Canadian practice guideline.
.pdf (accessed March 2014). CMAJ 2010;182(9):923–30.
69 Leppert W, Luczak J. The role of tramadol in cancer 76 Passik SD, Kirsh KL, Casper D. Addiction-
pain treatment—A review. Support Care Cancer related assessment tools and pain management:
2005;13(1):5–17. Instruments for Screening, treatment planning, and
monitoring compliance. Pain Med 2008;9:S145–
70 Drug Enforcement Administration. Tramadol, Drug and 66.
Chemical Evaluation. US Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration, Office of Diversion Control. August 29 2013. 77 Beletsky L, Rich JD, Walley AY. Prevention of
Available at: http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug fatal opioid overdose. JAMA 2012;308(18):1863–
_chem_info/tramadol.pdf (accessed March 2014). 4.
71 Tramadol Label. Daily Med: Current Medication Infor- 78 Wheeler E, Davidson PJ, Jones TS, Irwin KS.
mation. National Library of Medicine. Available at: Community-Based Opioid Overdose Prevention Pro-
http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/lookup.cfm? grams Providing Naloxone—United States, 2010.
setid=45f59e6f-1794-40a4-8f8b-3a9415924468 Atlanta, Ga: Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
(accessed March 2014). tion; 2012.
72 Institute of Medicine. Relieving Pain in America: A 79 Kim D, Irwin KS, Khoshnood K. Expanded access to
Blueprint for Transforming Prevention, Care, Educa- naloxone: Options for critical response to the epidemic
tion, and Research. Washington, DC: The National of opioid overdose mortality. Am J Public Health
Academies Press; 2011. 2009;99(3):402–7.
73 Inocencio TJ, Carroll NV, Read EJ, Holdford DA. The 80 American Medical Association. AMA Adopts
economic burden of opioid-related poisoning in the New Policies at Annual Meeting: American Medical
United States. Pain Med 2013;14(10):1534–1547. Association. 2012. Available at: https://www.ama
-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2012-06-19-ama
74 Albert S, Brason FW, Sanford CK, et al. Project -adopts-new-policies.page (accessed December
Lazarus: Community-based overdose prevention in 2013).
Appendices
Appendix I
Alfentanil hydrochloride
Buprenorphine
Butorphanol tartrate
Codeine, acetaminophen
Codeine base
Codeine phosphate
Codeine phosphate, triprolidine, pseudoephedrine hydrochloride
Codeine phosphate, chlorpheniramine maleate
Codeine phosphate, guaifenesin, pseudophedrine
Codeine phosphate, pyrilamine maleate
Codeine phosphate, acetaminophen, gamma-aminobutyric acid
Codeine phosphate, brompheniramine maleate, pseudoephedrine hydrochloride
Codeine phosphate, brompheniramine maleate, phenylephrine hydrochloride
Codeine phosphate, butalbital, acetaminophen, caffeine
Codeine phosphate, butalbital, aspirin, caffeine
Codeine phosphate, carisoprodol, aspirin
1926
Appendix I Continued
1927
Appendix II
1928
Appendix II Continued
Covariate† Odds Ratio 95% CI P
1929