MN AG v. SANOFI - 3:18-cv-14999 - Defendants' Joint Motion To Dismiss - 2019-08-12
MN AG v. SANOFI - 3:18-cv-14999 - Defendants' Joint Motion To Dismiss - 2019-08-12
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT
v. NOTICE OF MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC, NOVO AMENDED COMPLAINT
NORDISK, INC., AND ELI LILLY ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
AND CO.,
Defendants.
COUNSEL:
Aventis U.S. LLC, and Eli Lilly and Company (collectively, “Defendants”), by and
through their respective undersigned counsel, shall move before the Honorable Brian
Clarkson S. Fisher Building & U.S. Courthouse, 402 East State Street, Trenton, New
Jersey 08608, for an Order, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Geist, Esq. with exhibits, and all other pleadings and proceedings on file.
submitted herewith.
argument.
Michael R. Shumaker
(pro hac vice forthcoming)
Julie E. McEvoy
(pro hac vice forthcoming)
William D. Coglianese
(pro hac vice forthcoming)
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Tel.: (202) 879-3939
Attorneys for Defendant
Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC
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Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 18-14999
v. (BRM)(LHG)
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC, NOVO
NORDISK, INC., AND ELI LILLY
AND CO.,
Defendants.
ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .............................................................................. 1
BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 9
i
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CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 35
ii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Adams v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.,
493 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 25
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................8, 32
In re Baldwin-United Corp.,
770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985) ............................................................................... 26
Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007) ................................................................................. 8
California v. IntelliGender,
771 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) ......................................................................25, 26
iii
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Dillon v. Combs,
895 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................ 15
Finkelman v. NFL,
810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................................................................. 9
Futterknecht v. Thurber,
No. 14-7395, 2015 WL 4603010 (D.N.J. July 30, 2015) ................................... 13
iv
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Luckey v. Alside,
245 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (D. Minn. 2017)............................................................... 30
Merck & Co., Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
No. 19-cv-01738, 2019 WL 2931591 (D.D.C. July 8, 2019) ............................. 23
MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, et al. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC,
et al.,
No. 18-cv-2211, 2019 WL 1418129 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2019) ......................passim
v
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Schumacher v. Schumacher,
627 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)............................................................. 29
vi
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Wilson v. Bernstock,
195 F. Supp. 2d 619 (D.N.J. 2002) ....................................................................... 6
Statutes
15 U.S.C.
§ 15c .................................................................................................................... 15
42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B) ........................................................................................... 17
§ 1396r–8(c)(1) ................................................................................................... 19
MINN. STAT.
Other Authorities
42 C.F.R.
vii
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§ 447.502............................................................................................................. 18
§ 447.512............................................................................................................. 18
9(b) ........................................................................................................................ 8
12(b)(1) ...........................................................................................................1, 32
12(b)(6) ................................................................................................................. 1
viii
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Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc., Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, and Eli Lilly and
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
defendants of reporting false and misleading list prices for insulin. According to the
Complaint, there are two different “prices” for prescription drugs: (i) a “list” price
distributors, and (ii) a “net” price that reflects the amount manufacturers ultimately
realize for their drugs after paying rebates to pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”).
Minnesota contends that the reported list prices for insulin are false and misleading
because they do not accurately represent the net prices defendants receive for insulin
after paying PBM rebates. On that basis, Minnesota seeks relief on behalf of
lawsuits filed against defendants in this District,1 the State is differently situated
1
See In re Insulin Pricing Litig. (“Insulin Pricing”), No. 17-cv-699 (D.N.J.), and
MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, et al. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC, et al. (“MSP
Recovery”), No. 18-cv-2211 (D.N.J.).
1
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from the plaintiffs in those actions. Specifically, Minnesota alleges that it is illegal
WACs—that do not reflect PBM rebates. But that allegation cannot be squared with
§ 256B.0625, Subd. 13e(a). And Minnesota cannot contend that there is anything
unlawful about a difference between defendants’ list and net prices caused by PBM
rebates when Minnesota itself has hired a PBM (CVS Caremark) to aggressively
negotiate rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers. This is the same CVS that
defendant and receives illegal profits from the purported fraudulent conduct. For
identical to the RICO claims this Court has already dismissed against defendants in
the other insulin-pricing lawsuits. Just as in those lawsuits, the Court should dismiss
Minnesota’s RICO claim under the indirect purchaser rule, because neither
from defendants. The Court should also dismiss Minnesota’s claim for an injunction
under RICO because the statute does not permit states to seek such relief. And even
if Minnesota could overcome these threshold defects, its RICO claims on behalf of
2
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consumers should still be dismissed, because the statute does not allow states to
dismiss Minnesota’s claims under the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, and False Statement in Advertising Act. Minnesota cannot
list prices that exclude PBM rebates, when that is precisely what another Minnesota
law requires defendants to do. Nor can Minnesota claim that defendants misled
defendants charge to wholesalers for insulin. This is especially true for the false
(i) monetary relief that is wholly duplicative of the relief sought by the plaintiffs in
Insulin Pricing, and (ii) damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
consumer protection claims. The unjust enrichment claim should also be dismissed
because Minnesota does not allege that defendants received and retained anything
prerequisite to such a claim. To the contrary, Minnesota alleges that the difference
3
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between the list price and net price for defendants’ insulins—the amount of their
alleged loss—is paid to PBMs in the form of rebates, and that those rebates are then
shared between PBMs and their health plan clients (including Minnesota itself).
For these reasons and the additional reasons set forth below, defendants
respectfully request that the Court dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
between defendants and four PBMs to publish deceptive and misleading “list” prices
for insulin products. FAC ¶¶ 3, 71.2 According to the Complaint, defendants’ list
prices are misleading because they “are no longer accurate representations of the
actual price Defendants receive for analog insulin” after paying rebates to PBMs.
Id. ¶ 3. These allegations generally track the allegations in the other lawsuits
challenging insulin pricing that are pending before this Court. Compare id. ¶¶ 94,
148, 310 (alleging “deceptively inflated benchmark prices . . . that were not
reasonably reflective of the secret, undisclosed net prices . . . due to rebates and other
concessions to [PBMs]”), with Insulin Pricing, No. 17-cv-699, Dkt No. 255, ¶ 387
(D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2019) (alleging that defendants’ list prices “are no longer a
2
The four PBMs identified in the Complaint are CVS, Express Scripts, OptumRx,
and Prime Therapeutics. See FAC ¶ 38.
4
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cases, there are meaningful differences between Minnesota and the plaintiffs in those
cases. Most significantly, Minnesota cannot plausibly allege that there is something
unlawful about publishing list prices—i.e., WACs—that do not reflect PBM rebates.
MINN. STAT. 256B.0625, Subd. 13e(a) (emphasis added). Minnesota law thus
requires that defendants undertake the very conduct that the State now alleges to be
fraudulent: submitting list prices to price reporting services that do not include PBM
rebates.
about the payment of rebates to PBMs for prescription drugs. To the contrary,
5
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that its employee health plan receives “the lowest prices available” and that “all
rebates from drug manufacturers are passed on to the state.” Id., Ex. B, Our Mission,
its contract with CVS, Minnesota “receives 100% of the rebates associated with its
members,” an amount that exceeded $38 million in 2018 alone. Id., Ex. C,
significant rebates” from defendants. See FAC ¶¶ 97(a), 205(a), 313(a). Minnesota
also asserts that “CVS’s conduct and participation is essential to the success of”
separate racketeering enterprises with each defendant. Id. ¶¶ 98, 206, 314. These
allegations are irreconcilable with the fact that Minnesota has hired CVS precisely
to obtain negotiated rebates for its benefit—i.e., the alleged proceeds of the alleged
3
The Court may take judicial notice of this information because it has been made
publicly available by the State of Minnesota. See Vandervolk v. United States, 868
F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017) (courts may “take judicial notice of . . . information
. . . made publicly available by government entities”); Wilson v. Bernstock, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 619, 623 (D.N.J. 2002) (on a motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial
notice of matters of public record).
6
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fraud and racketeering. Minnesota should not be permitted to laud the benefits of
the rebates that CVS obtains for the State through hard, arms-length negotiations, on
one hand, and then claim that the same activity constitutes systemic fraud on the
other.4
While Minnesota’s own law and conduct should preclude it from bringing this
lawsuit, Minnesota nevertheless seeks to hold defendants liable for reporting insulin
list prices that “do not reasonably approximate the actual price they receive for their
insulin products after taking into account all rebates, discounts, and any other
pricing-related concessions.” FAC ¶ 437. The State brings this action on behalf of
Complaint asserts claims under RICO, the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(MINN. STAT. § 325D.44), the Minnesota False Statement in Advertising Act (“False
Fraud Act (“Consumer Fraud Act”) (MINN. STAT. § 325F.69), and for unjust
enrichment.
4
Indeed, if Minnesota’s allegations were plausible, it is unclear how Minnesota
could contract with CVS consistent with the state’s debarment regulations, which
define a “responsible vendor” as “a vendor who . . . has not engaged in unlawful
practices [or] associated with organized crime.” MINN. R. 1230.0150 subp. 20(G).
7
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LEGAL STANDARDS
are true, it fails to plausibly show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See, e.g.,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Legal conclusions, “labels,” and
other conclusory allegations are not assumed to be true and cannot establish
entitlement to relief. Id. at 678. Rather, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual
matter” that, taken as true, allows the court “to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Baraka v.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (courts “are not compelled to accept
sounding in fraud must be pleaded with the particularity required by Rule 9(b),
misrepresentations.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cephalon, Inc., 620 F. App’x 82, 85–
To establish Article III standing to sue, the plaintiff must “‘clearly . . . allege
facts demonstrating’” that plaintiff has suffered an injury that is (1) “concrete and
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016). “Where . . . a
8
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case is at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege facts
also Finkelman v. NFL, 810 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]o survive a motion to
dismiss for lack of standing, a plaintiff ‘must allege facts that affirmatively and
ARGUMENT
Minnesota attempts to plead RICO claims that are virtually identical to the
ones this Court has previously dismissed against defendants in the other insulin-
pricing lawsuits pending in this District. The Court should reach the same result
here and dismiss Minnesota’s RICO claims. First, Minnesota’s RICO claims for
damages are barred by the indirect purchaser rule because Minnesota is asserting
claims on behalf of consumers and a state agency that do not purchase insulin
directly from defendants. Second, Minnesota’s claim for injunctive relief under
RICO should be dismissed because the statute does not permit such a claim. Third,
RICO statute does not authorize state governments to assert representative claims on
9
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This Court has already held that RICO claims indistinguishable from those
asserted here are barred by the indirect purchaser rule. In Insulin Pricing, numerous
Feb. 2, 2019). The Court concluded that the consumers lack standing to assert RICO
claims because “they failed to allege that they directly purchased the analog insulin
from Defendants.” Id. at *14. As the Court explained, “controlling caselaw” from
the Third Circuit establishes a bright-line rule that only a direct purchaser has
standing to sue a pharmaceutical manufacturer for RICO violations. Id. at *8; see
also MSP Recovery, No. 18-cv-2211, 2019 WL 1418129, at *13–16 (D.N.J. Mar.
29, 2019) (dismissing RICO claims brought by health plan assignors because they
“failed to allege that they directly purchased the analog insulin from Defendants”).
Minnesota cannot distinguish this Court’s prior holding on this issue in Insulin
Pricing and MSP Recovery. As in Insulin Pricing, Minnesota asserts RICO claims
on behalf of consumers who allegedly pay for insulin based on the list prices set by
dismissed in Insulin Pricing. See FAC ¶¶ 5, 73–74, 82, 438. Those consumers are
not the first in the distribution chain to pay based on defendants’ list prices. Rather,
10
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charge pharmacies more for insulin, and pharmacies to charge patients more for
insulin.” Id. ¶ 78; see also id. ¶¶ 31, 36, 47, 74. These allegations confirm that
Minnesota consumers are “multiple purchasers down the distribution chain from
Defendants and are quintessential indirect purchasers for the purposes of the indirect
this action. The Supreme Court has applied the indirect purchaser rule equally to
residents.” McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 849 (3d Cir. 1996); see
also Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 204 (1990) (holding that the
indirect purchaser rule barred Kansas and Missouri from asserting antitrust claims
on behalf of their residents to recover inflated prices for natural gas). The rationale
for applying the rule to state governments is straightforward: when a state seeks
relief for its residents, it stands in the shoes of the individuals whose rights it seeks
to vindicate. See, Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995
F.2d 425, 439 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “the [Supreme] Court refused to create an
exception to Illinois Brick for states suing in a parens patriae capacity to redress
economic harms to their citizens”); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 494–
11
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97 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that government agency is in privity with individuals
likewise barred by the indirect purchaser rule. See FAC ¶ 82. As Minnesota
acknowledges in the Complaint, the Department does not purchase insulin directly
from defendants. Rather, the Department “has purchased insulin from a wholesaler
whose price, like those of other wholesalers, is based on the benchmark price that
added). Those allegations make clear that the Department does not “directly
purchase[] the analog insulin from Defendants, but instead claim[s] injury by virtue
at *16. As a result, the Department’s claims are barred by the indirect purchaser
rule. Id.; see also Insulin Pricing, 2019 WL 643709, at *13 (“Allowing Plaintiffs’
MSP Recovery, other judges in this District have held that RICO limits the
12
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Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1137 (D.N.J. 1989);
July 30, 2015); Johnston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 728
F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting in dicta that RICO “makes no provision
for private equitable relief”). These decisions rely foremost on the text and
legislative history of the RICO statute, which indicate that injunctive relief can be
only the “Attorney General” to bring claims for injunctive relief); id. § 1961(10)
(defining “Attorney General” to mean the Attorney General of the United States,
other high-ranking DOJ officials and any federal government employee designated
by the Attorney General); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil RICO: A Manual for
“legislative history confirms that it vests the Attorney General of the United States
5
To avoid burdening the Court with duplicative briefing, defendants incorporate by
reference the arguments made in their pending motions to dismiss in Insulin Pricing
and MSP Recovery. See Insulin Pricing, No. 17-cv-699, Dkt. 263-1, at 4–11 (D.N.J.
filed May 17, 2019); MSP Recovery, 18-cv-2211, Dkt. 97-1, at 12–18 (D.N.J. filed
June 28, 2019). Those arguments apply equally here because they make clear that
injunctive relief is available only to the federal government, and because Minnesota
asserts RICO claims as a private plaintiff. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 440 (asserting claims
under RICO’s private cause of action, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
13
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For those reasons, Minnesota’s claim for injunctive relief under RICO should
Minnesota’s parens patriae RICO claims should be dismissed for another reason:
the statute does not authorize state governments to bring representative claims on
behalf of their residents. “When a state sues in parens patriae to enforce a federal
statute, it must demonstrate that, in enacting the statute, Congress clearly intended
that the states be able to bring actions in that capacity.” Connecticut v. Health Net,
Inc., 383 F.3d 1258, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 260–66 (1972)). Applying that principle, federal courts have
uniformly held that Congress did not authorize state governments “to bring a RICO
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS ED. § 10:205 (June 2019) (citing Dillon v. Combs, 895 F.2d
1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990), Abrams v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987),
and Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766–67 (7th Cir. 1986)).
These decisions follow straightforwardly from the text of the RICO statute,
which allows a plaintiff to sue only for his own injuries. Section 1964(c) of the
14
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allows plaintiffs to bring RICO claims for their own injuries, but does not “authorize
a state to obtain relief on account of a fraud practiced against its residents.” Dillon,
claims in which individual consumers seek to recover for the very same injuries to
their “business or property” as state governments suing on their behalf. Life of Mid-
Am. Ins. Co., 805 F.2d at 764; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 496
(1985) (“[T]he plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that,
he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the
violation.”).
This conclusion is confirmed by the Supreme Court’s holding that the antitrust
laws did not authorize state governments to assert representative antitrust claims on
behalf of their citizens. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 264 (holding that under the
Clayton Act, a State may “see[k] damages for injuries to its commercial interests,”
but not “for other injuries”). The Supreme Court’s holding in Standard Oil applies
equally to RICO because “Congress modeled § 1964(c) [of RICO] on the civil-
action provision of the federal antitrust laws.” Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503
U.S. 258, 267 (1992). Further, in response to Standard Oil, Congress amended the
action, 15 U.S.C. § 15c, but did not similarly amend the RICO statute. The absence
15
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claims further demonstrates that Congress did not intend to authorize such claims.
Life of Mid-Am. Ins. Co., 805 F.2d at 767 (“In the face of such congressional action,
we must conclude that the maintenance of [a parens patriae RICO claim] was not
intended by Congress.”).
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (MINN. STAT. § 325D.44), False Advertising Act
(MINN. STAT. § 325F.67), and Consumer Fraud Act (MINN. STAT. § 325F.69). See
FAC ¶¶ 412–35. In all three cases, Minnesota alleges little more than a list of the
elements of the statutes that defendants allegedly violated. Those claims should be
marketing of” their products. Yarrington v. Solvay Pharm., No. A05-2288, 2006
WL 2729463, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006); Semanko v. Minn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000 (D. Minn. 2000) (dismissing Minnesota
16
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Here, Minnesota’s consumer protection claims are based on the contention that
defendants “publish and disseminate” misleading list prices (i.e., WACs) for insulin
because those prices “are no longer accurate representations of the actual price
Defendants receive for analog insulin” after paying rebates to PBMs. FAC ¶ 3; see
also id. ¶¶ 415, 420, 425, 431, 437. These claims fail as a matter of law because
Minnesota law defines WAC to mean the “list price” that manufacturers
charge to “wholesalers and other direct purchasers,” “not including prompt pay or
6
To state a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act, a plaintiff must allege “an
intentional misrepresentation relating to the sale of merchandise.” Wiegand v.
Walser Auto. Grps., Inc., 670 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds, 683 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2004). Similarly, the False Advertising Act
requires the intent to publish a false or misleading advertisement to consumers.
MINN. STAT. § 325F.67. Finally, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act requires either
(i) “false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of,
or amounts of price reductions,” or (ii) “conduct which similarly creates a likelihood
of confusion or of misunderstanding.” Id. § 325D.44, Subd. 1(11), 1(13).
7
Federal law defines WAC in a similar fashion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(c)(6)(B)
(“The term ‘wholesale acquisition cost’ means, with respect to a drug or biological,
the manufacturer’s list price for the drug or biological to wholesalers or direct
purchasers in the United States, not including prompt pay or other discounts, rebates
or reductions in price, . . . as reported in wholesale price guides or other publications
of drug or biological pricing data.”).
17
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law dictates that reported list prices for insulin should exclude rebates and discounts.
Second, defendants’ list prices must reflect the actual price charged to wholesalers,
which is unaffected by any rebates subsequently paid to PBMs. See FAC ¶¶ 31, 78
defendants to report list prices that exclude PBM rebates, when that is precisely what
Minnesota law requires. See, e.g., Package Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No.
85-513, 1984 WL 6618, at *23 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 1984) (“[L]iability cannot be based
on compliance with a state law.”); Berg v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-cv-01289,
forecloses the consumer protection claims asserted here. Suppose that a defendant
sells an insulin product to a wholesaler at a list price of $100. If the defendant agrees
8
Indeed, reporting list prices that account for PBM rebates would undermine
Minnesota’s own use of those list prices. The state’s Medicaid program uses WAC
to estimate the actual prices that pharmacies pay wholesalers to acquire prescription
drugs for purposes of reimbursing pharmacies. See MINN. STAT. 256B.0625, Subd.
13e(a). The prices pharmacies pay are not affected by any rebates that manufacturers
may subsequently pay to PBMs. Thus, if defendants reported list prices that
reflected PBM rebates, Minnesota’s reimbursements to pharmacies would not reflect
the actual prices paid by pharmacies to acquire prescription drugs—and the State
would be out of compliance with federal law. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.502, 447.512
(requiring state Medicaid agencies to reimburse pharmacies based on “pharmacy
providers’ actual prices paid to acquire drug products”).
18
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to pay a PBM a 40% rebate every time an insured consumer receives insulin from a
pharmacy, the $40 rebate would reduce the amount the defendant received on that
transaction to $60. But the rebate is paid long after the purchase by the wholesaler
and does not affect the $100 charged to the wholesaler. Minnesota contends that the
defendant violated the law by reporting that its list price to the wholesaler is $100
instead of the $60 the defendant received for insulin after the payment of PBM
rebates. FAC ¶ 3. Yet that is precisely what Minnesota law requires. See MINN.
Even aside from the statutory definition, Minnesota cannot credibly assert that
defendants’ reported list prices are misleading when the State actively negotiates
thus creates a difference between list prices and “the net price that the manufacturer
receives for” prescription drugs after the payment of those rebates. FAC ¶ 3.
Moreover, Minnesota receives significant rebates under the Medicaid program. See
companies to provide a minimum rebate payment of 23.1% off the price charged to
9
Furthermore, it is logically impossible to report a list price that accounts for rebates
because those rebates are calculated as a percentage of the list price (40% in the
above example).
19
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on the State’s preferred drug list). As a result of these negotiated and statutorily
prices for a drug that reflect the net amount that it receives.
This Court’s recent decision in Insulin Pricing does not lead to a different
publication of average wholesale prices (“AWPs”) for insulin. Insulin Pricing, 2019
WL 643709, at *1 n.2. The Court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded
that defendants “[held] out their artificially increased AWPs as benchmark prices”
that “intended to approximate the true cost of a drug.” Id. at *5. Here, by contrast,
are materially different from Insulin Pricing in two key respects. First, unlike the
consumer plaintiffs in Insulin Pricing, Minnesota concedes that AWPs are not used
paying PBM rebates. Instead, the Complaint alleges that AWP “is used as a
benchmark for calculating the price at which health plans . . . reimburse pharmacies
for prescriptions that they fill for plan members.” FAC ¶ 33 (emphasis added); see
20
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also id. ¶ 33 (“AWP was intended to represent the average price at which drug
based on AWP. Id. ¶ 32. If Minnesota law specifies that WACs must exclude
rebates to PBMs, then simple math means that AWPs must likewise exclude rebates
to PBMs.
their list prices for insulin by reporting those prices in compliance with Minnesota
basis.
Complaint does not allege that defendants directed any deceptive or misleading
10
It may be the case that Minnesota does not advance a theory based on AWPs
because the Minnesota Attorney General previously sued drug manufacturers
claiming that reported AWPs should reflect prices paid by providers to
wholesalers—not the net amount received by manufacturers after paying PBM
rebates. See Certification of Melissa Geist, Ex. D, Minnesota’s Mem. in Opp’n to
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 15, State v. Pharmacia Corp., No. 27-CV-02-009660 (Dist.
Ct. Minn. Aug. 2, 2004) (“Pharmacia’s argument that the Court must dismiss the
State’s Complaint because of some alleged ambiguity regarding AWP’s meaning is
also meritless. AWP means exactly what the plain language dictates – the average
price wholesalers sell a drug to providers.”).
21
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conduct to consumers. To state a claim under the three Minnesota statutes asserted
Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 12 (Minn. 2001) (“[The False
Barry Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D. Minn. 1991) (“It is unlikely that the
Legislature intended the Consumer Fraud Act to have such broad application” as to
at *10 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2010) (the Deceptive Trade Practices Act “prohibits
businesses from passing off goods or services as those of another and causing the
likelihood of confusion”).
much less any such representations stating that list prices reflect PBM rebates. As
“reporting services,” not consumers. FAC ¶ 34. Minnesota has not alleged that any
advertised their list prices to the public. And as noted above, Minnesota law defines
list prices to mean the prices charged to “wholesalers and other direct purchasers”
22
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that are “reported in wholesale price guides or other publications.” MINN. STAT.
256B.0625, Subd. 13e(a). That statutory definition makes clear that “list prices” are
not prices for consumers. Minnesota has not offered any theory to explain how
Even if defendants had advertised their list prices for insulin in some public
representations. Indeed, the federal government has now explicitly rejected the
notion that reporting such list prices could be misleading because they do not
account for rebates to PBMs. On May 10, 2019, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) published a rule that would require drug manufacturers
Transparency, 84 Fed. Reg. 20,732 (May 10, 2019).11 In promulgating the Rule,
CMS rejected a proposal that the prices communicated directly to consumers should
11
A federal district court recently vacated the rule on the grounds that the statutory
basis for the rule invoked by the agency did not authorize the rulemaking. See Merck
& Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 19-cv-01738, 2019 WL
2931591 (D.D.C. July 8, 2019). Although the rule is no longer in effect, it
nonetheless refutes any suggestion that the WACs for defendants’ insulin products
could be misleading or deceptive to consumers because they do not account for
rebates to PBMs.
23
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“include rebate, discount and formulary information.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 20,739. The
fact that CMS would have required defendants to display list prices without rebates
in television advertisements confirms that those prices are not rendered inherently
false or misleading by virtue of the fact that they do not reflect rebates paid to PBMs.
See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 672 (2003) (Breyer,
J., concurring in part) (“Institutionally speaking, [HHS] is better able than a court to
assemble relevant facts . . . [a]nd the law grants significant weight to any legal
dismissed as wholly duplicative of the claims brought by the putative class in Insulin
litigation.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976). Courts thus dismiss or stay lawsuits “involving the same subject matter
at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Walton v. Eaton
In this action, Minnesota attempts to seek monetary relief for the very same
Minnesota consumers who are named plaintiffs and members of the putative class
24
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brings claims under two of the same statutes (Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Act and
Minnesota brings an additional claim under the False Advertising Act, that claim is
based on the same legal theories and seeks the same monetary relief as the other
claims. See Adams v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 1276, 1289–90
(11th Cir. 2007) (noting that, for a claim to be deemed identical, the causes of action
need not be identical, as long as the claims arise from the “‘same operative nucleus
This Court should decline to permit the claims for monetary relief in both suits
consumers when it seeks monetary relief on their behalf. See U.S. Steel Corp., 921
F.2d at 496–97 (holding that a government agency is in privity with individuals when
771 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To the extent that the State seeks restitution
12
Compare FAC ¶ 4 (seeking to represent “Minnesota residents without insurance,
Minnesota residents with high-deductible health plans, Minnesota residents who pay
coinsurance, [and] Minnesota Medicare beneficiaries”), with Insulin Pricing, No.
17-cv-699, Dkt. No. 255, ¶¶ 127–32, 366, 684–96 (putative class seeking to
represent Minnesota residents who paid any portion of the purchase price for analog
insulins, including the uninsured, underinsured, and residents with Medicare
coverage).
25
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Accordingly, the Court should prohibit “concurrent litigation over the same subject
matter” and dismiss Minnesota’s monetary relief claims as duplicative of the class
action claims in Insulin Pricing. Unitronics, Inc. v. Robotic Parking Sys. Inc., No.
09-3493, 2010 WL 2545169, at *3–4 (D.N.J. June 18, 2010) (dismissing duplicative
lawsuit where “the parties are the same . . . , the subject matter is the same . . . , []
they are at the same time in the same court”); see also IntelliGender, 771 F.3d at
1179.
purpose of inducing, or which are likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase
of a product.’” Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1526 (D. Minn.
1989); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“advertisement” means
13
See also In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 341–42 (2d Cir. 1985)
(enjoining state attorney general action seeking monetary relief for citizens that had
been released by a class action); New Mexico v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 980
F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1351 (D.N.M. 2013) (“Courts have repeatedly recognized a
distinction for res judicata purposes between an instance where a state agency is
seeking to vindicate public interests and when the state agency is seeking restitution
on behalf of consumers.” (collecting cases)); In re Am. Inv’rs Life Ins. Co. Annuity
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2013 WL 3463503, at *5–8 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2013)
(enjoining Pennsylvania attorney general’s claims for restitution on behalf of
consumer class members).
26
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the False Advertising Act to apply to “public announcement[s]” that “call the
rel. Swanson, No. A06-2013, 2007 WL 4234545, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4,
2007).14
Minnesota does not allege that defendants made any such “advertisements”
promotional and marketing materials.” FAC ¶ 425. But the list price of a
sells a drug to a wholesale drug distributor.” FAC ¶ 31; supra at 17–19. Defendants
report the list price to third-party price reporting services; health plans and PBMs
then obtain and use that pricing information “as the basis for drug reimbursement”
to pharmacies and providers. FAC ¶¶ 33–34. As one federal district court has
14
This straightforward definition is recognized in a variety of analogous contexts.
For instance, under the federal Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.), “commercial
advertising or promotion” means (i) “commercial speech,” (ii) “made for the purpose
of influencing customers to buy the defendant’s goods or services,” and (iii)
“disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute
‘advertising’ or ‘promotion’ within that industry.” Grp. Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (D. Minn. 1999).
27
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explained, “manufacturers are not advertising prices to the consuming public” and
“are not involved in the offering of discounts off of those prices to consumers.” In
re Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d 20, 84 (D. Mass. 2007) (emphasis
added).15
Act (FAC ¶ 422) should be dismissed because “the DTPA disallows the recovery of
monetary damages,” as this Court already has held. MSP Recovery, 2019 WL
1418129, at *19.
To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must
allege that the defendant “knowingly received something of value” from the plaintiff
15
In an apparent recognition that list prices are not themselves “advertisements,”
Minnesota also vaguely refers to “promotional and marketing materials.” FAC ¶ 35.
The Court need not credit those conclusory allegations because Minnesota fails to
identify any such promotional and marketing materials in the Complaint. See Russo
v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1003 (D. Minn. 2006) (dismissing
Minnesota false advertising claim when plaintiffs “failed to identify a single
advertisement disseminated to the public in Minnesota”).
28
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and that “it would be unjust for [defendants] to retain the benefit.” Schumacher v.
Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). This Court has already
dismissed a claim for unjust enrichment alleging nearly identical facts under New
Jersey law, see MSP Recovery, 2019 WL 1418129, at *20, and Minnesota law does
First, Minnesota’s unjust enrichment claim is based “on the deceptively and
misleading inflated benchmark prices that Defendants published for the products.”
FAC ¶ 431. As explained above, however, Minnesota has failed to allege any
consistent with Minnesota law and could not have been deceptive to consumers. See
Second, Minnesota does not allege that defendants received anything of value
enrichment claim is the allegation that a defendant received some benefit from the
plaintiff.” Janssen v. Lommen, Abdo, Cole, King & Stageberg, P.A., No. A14-0452,
2014 WL 7237121, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014) (emphasis added). Here,
intermediaries in the distribution chain, not to defendants. See Insulin Pricing, 2019
29
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under New Jersey law on that basis, see MSP Recovery, 2019 WL 1418129, at *20,
and the Court should reach the same conclusion under Minnesota law. See Janssen,
defendant received something of value from a third party, not from plaintiff); Luckey
v. Alside, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1099 (D. Minn. 2017) (rejecting Minnesota unjust
does not allege that defendants retained the amount Minnesota seeks to recover
pursuant to the unjust enrichment claim. A claim for unjust enrichment is limited to
“what the person allegedly enriched has received” and does not include “what the
opposing party has lost.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 554
(8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Minnesota contends that it is entitled to recover
the “inequitable” difference between the list prices for insulin and “the actual net
defendants only receive the net price. See, e.g., id. ¶ 3 (alleging that the “net price”
is “the actual price Defendants receive for analog insulin”). Accordingly, defendants
cannot be required to return any money pursuant to an unjust enrichment claim above
the amount they receive for their insulin products. See also Gen. Mktg. Servs., Inc.
30
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v. Am. Motorsports, 393 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (D. Minn. 2005) (“the remedy [for
Fourth, “[i]t is well settled in Minnesota that one may not seek a remedy in
equity when there is an adequate remedy at law.” Southtown Plumbing, Inc. v. Har-
Ned Lumber Co., 493 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Unjust enrichment
is unavailable where “statutory standards for recovery are set by the legislature.” Id.
Where, as here, a plaintiff asserts a variety of claims under federal and state statutes,
“the availability of those statutory claims (whether state or federal) will preclude the
Graphic Printing Co. Ltd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2011) (collecting cases);
see also ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. Gab Business Services, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302,
305 (Minn. 1996) (noting that a party may not have equitable relief under unjust
For these reasons, the Court should dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.
Minnesota also fails to allege sufficient facts to support its claims relating to
Fiasp, and Basaglar). For both sets of claims, the allegations are confined to a single
vaguely worded paragraph in the Complaint. Those lone paragraphs fail to provide
31
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“sufficient factual matter” to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
paragraph 82 of the Complaint. There, Minnesota asserts that “[t]he inflated prices
at which the department has purchased insulin through [a] wholesaler has either
applicable, under the governing contracts.” FAC ¶ 82. That barebones allegation is
against Lilly because the Department has not purchased Lilly’s insulins. As the
attached declaration establishes, the Department made no purchases of the two Lilly
August 2019. See Certification of Melissa Geist, Ex. E, Decl. of Cynthia Ransom
¶¶ 5–6.16 Accordingly, as the Court previously held in the Insulin Pricing action,
Minnesota lacks standing to bring those claims against Lilly. See Insulin Pricing,
16
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1), the
Court is free to “consult materials outside the pleadings, and the burden of proving
jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff.” Med. Soc’y of New Jersey v. Herr, 191 F. Supp.
2d 574, 578 (D.N.J. 2002).
32
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2019 WL 643709, at *18 (dismissing claims for lack of standing where the “plaintiff
neither purchased nor used” the specific defendant’s insulin); Lieberson v. Johnson
& Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 529, 537 (D.N.J. 2011) (“Because
Plaintiff has not alleged that she purchased or used two of the four [] products at
products.”).
woefully deficient. The Complaint fails to allege which insulins the Department
purchased, when it purchased those insulins, what price it paid, and how it was
limits its allegations to the assertion that its insulin purchases “either reduced the
has increased its obligation to pay excess claims-related spend, as applicable, under
the governing contracts.” FAC ¶ 82 (emphasis added). Nothing on the face of these
prices, and the Court is not required to credit such ambiguous allegations that are
within Minnesota’s power to clarify. See Dessources v. Am. Conference Inst., No.
33
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The Complaint also asserts claims relating to three insulin products that were
insulin products . . . all of which have seen similar increases in their benchmark price
and/or reflect significant spreads between these products’ respective benchmark and
actual price, and all of which are the subject of this complaint.”
certain insulins to create a “spread” between their list and net prices. See FAC ¶¶
47–48; see also id. ¶¶ 19, 56–59. But Minnesota alleges no actual facts indicating
that defendants “dramatically increased” the list prices of Tresiba, Fiasp, and
Basaglar; nor does it allege facts suggesting that there was a spread between the list
and net prices for those products. Because Minnesota fails to allege facts connecting
Tresiba, Fiasp, and Basaglar to the purported “scheme,” all claims relating to those
products should be dismissed. See Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F.
App’x 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he pleading’s factual content must
34
Case 3:18-cv-14999-BRM-LHG Document 47-1 Filed 08/12/19 Page 45 of 48 PageID: 722
independently ‘permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
at *14 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (dismissing claims relating to certain products where
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request that the Court
35
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36
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37
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38
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Defendants.
1. I am an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey, partner with the law
firm of Reed Smith LLP, and attorney of record for Defendant Eli Lilly and
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint submitted by Defendants Eli Lilly and
“Defendants”).
Note, Minnesota Health & Human Services Finance Division (Mar. 25, 2019).
12, 2019, and signed under penalty of perjury in further support of Defendants’ Joint
I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true and correct to the
nformation echnolog
-
ES
Local Fiscal m act
his ta le sho s direct im act to state government onl Local government im act if an is discussed in the narrative
Reductions sho n in the arentheses
a Revenue
nformation echnolog
-
his ta le sho s direct im act to state government onl Local government im act if an is discussed in the narrative
Reductions sho n in the arentheses
Bill Description
Senate File 278-2E esta lishes licensing re uirements for harmac enefit managers (PBMs) doing usiness in the state
of Minnesota his ill re eals sections of Minnesota Pharmac Practice la s in Minn Stat 151 and creates regulator
oversight and rulema ing authorit related to PBMs for ommerce
he ill esta lishes informational and financial re uirements that must e su mitted PBMs during the initial a lication
rocess and hat information is needed for annual PBM licensure rene als Licensure fees are set at 8 500 er initial
a lication and for rene als and are to e de osited in the general fund he ommissioner ma re uest additional
information of the PBM ithin 30 da s of receiving a license a lication or ithin 90 da s of recei t of a com leted
a lication f all standards are met the a lication is deemed a roved nonrefunda le fee of 500 is re uired for late
rene al a lications
he ill esta lishes ommerce s authorit to sus end or revo e a PBM s license in cases of fraudulence sufficient
consumer com laints or failure to meet re uirements esta lished in the ill ommerce ma revo e a PBM s license or
decide not to rene ith evidence of the PBM s financiall ha ardous condition noncom liance ith state la and failure
to su mit a timel rene al a lication n lieu of a denial the ommissioner ma also su mit a corrective action lan to the
PBM to correct deficiencies
he ill s re uirements for continued licensure of the PBM include having an ade uate net or of contracted harmacies
under the PBM consistent ith M Statute 62 10 he second engrossment removes the re uirement that a PBM su mit
a net or ade uac re ort to the commissioner re lacing it ith language indicating that a PBM must not re uire
harmac accreditation standards that are more stringent than state and federal re uirements
he PBM must rovide trans arenc to oth lan s onsors and ommerce PBMs are re uired to annuall re ort to
ommerce on costs from manufacturers for drugs amounts of re ates for rescri tion drugs and overall utili ation of lan
enrollees and de-identified claim data he PBM must include data regarding costs from manufacturers for drugs amounts
of re ates for rescri tion drugs and overall utili ation of lan enrollees he second engrossment added re uirements of
roviding de-identified claim data he ill states that the ommissioner ma im ose enalties u to 1 000 er da for
violations noted in a trans arenc re ort
he ill also includes a gag clause rovision hich rohi its PBMs from limiting a harmacist s a ilit to disclosing the
availa ilit of alternative lo er cost medications to enrollees
he ill also esta lishes re uirements that rohi it PBMs from having o nershi interests in affiliate or su sidiar
harmacies if it does not disclose this information to lan s onsors Section 7 removes s ecialt under harmac
services and notes that PBMs and health carriers must not a l financial incentives to enrollees to use harmacies ith
hich the PBM has an o nershi interest
PBMs using a referred net or of harmacies must at the re uest of an enrollee disclose out-of- oc et costs for
rescri tion drugs
he ill a ro riates 378 000 in fiscal ear 2020 378 000 in fiscal ear 2021 from the general fund to the commissioner
of commerce for licensing activities ase a ro riate of 365 000 is esta lished for fiscal ear 2022 and 365 000 in
fiscal ear 2023 246 000 shall e made availa le for each ear for the staff costs of t o enforcement investigators
Assumptions
Pharmac Benefit Managers see ing to o erate in Minnesota are currentl re uired to register as hird Part
dministrators ( P s) ut of 375 P s currentl registered 308 are registered ith the
ccident ealth Medical os ital are Sic ness isa ilit ental Pharmac line of authorit his line of authorit is road
and does not indicate that all 308 entities are engaged in harmac enefit management activities
ccording to information rovided the Minnesota Board of Pharmac 34 entities u licl identified as PBMs are
registered to do usiness in Minnesota ith the Secretar of State
n 2017 the e ras a e artment of nsurance assumed 38 PBMs ould e licensed in that state under a similar
ro osal to SF278 n 2015 the ashington e artment of Revenue assumed 50 PBMs ould e licensed in that state
2017 under a similar ro osal to SF278
For ur oses of this note ommerce assumes 40 entities ill e licensed as PBMs in the first ear of o eration
ommerce assumes these 40 entities ill rene licenses ever ear ommerce assumes five or fe er additional PBM s
ill see licensure in F 21 and F 22
ommerce assumes 1 F E ill e needed ongoing to revie a lications and issue licenses
hile the second engrossment eliminated language s ecificall authori ing rulema ing for ur oses of this cha ter of la
from the ill ommerce assumes the agenc ill still need to engage in rulema ing in order to romulgate detailed
regulations and instructions including a lication forms for PBM licensure a licants
ommerce assumes rulema ing ill also e re uired in order to set s ecific definitions and standards in order to clarif
ho PBMs are to com l ith section 5 of the ill regarding net or ade uac ommerce continues to assume the
agenc ill utili e its e isting interagenc agreement ith the e artment of ealth (M ) to erform harmac net or
ade uac revie re uired in Section 5 of the ill Based on M s e eriences conducting net or ade uac revie s for
other rovider t es ommerce assumes 80 037 in F 20 and F 21 and 66 671 in each fiscal ear thereafter
ommerce assumes it ill use general rulema ing authorit to romulgate rules and incur one-time costs of 130 000
associated ith romulgating a medium rule as defined in the 2018 edition of the Minnesota Rulema ing Manual
ommerce assumes the agenc ill receive and res ond to com laints from consumers and harmacies regarding this
ne cha ter of la ommerce also assumes enforcement staff ill need to revie com liance ith re orting and
licensing a lication re uirements Both e ras a and ashington assumed t o enforcement-related F E ere re uired
to erform similar functions
Revenue
ommerce e enditures
F 20 F 21 F 22 F 23
Salar
2 Senior nvest 130 668 130 668 130 668 130 668
SP ntermediate 25 610 25 610 25 610 25 610
Fringe 46 883 46 883 46 883 46 883
ther Personnel Related osts 74 135 71 262 71 262 71 262
otal Em lo ee osts 277 296 274 423 274 423 274 423
References/Sources
r ansas PBM Licensure ct htt ar leg state ar us assem l 2017 2018S2 cts ct3 df
Agency Contact:
Agency Fiscal Note Coordinator Signature: m rum er Date: 3 26 2019 4 37 02 PM
Phone: 651 539-1517 Email: am trum er state mn us
a Revenue
nformation echnolog
-
ES
Local Fiscal m act
his ta le sho s direct im act to state government onl Local government im act if an is discussed in the narrative
Reductions sho n in the arentheses
Bill Description
SF278-2E esta lishes licensure and regulations for a harmac enefit manager (PBM) ho contracts ith a lan s onsor
to rovide harmac enefits management services
Assumptions
MMB administers the State Em lo ee rou nsurance Program (SE P) hich rovides health dental life and other
enefits to eligi le State em lo ees and their de endents and other grou s including uasi-state agencies under the
legislative authorit rovided in Minnesota Statutes 43 ealth enefits are rovided through the self-funded Minnesota
dvantage ealth Plan he Minnesota dvantage ealth Plan aid for over 1 1 million rescri tion drug claims in 2018
at a cost of a ro imatel 163 890 000
SE P has a contract ith a harmac enefit manager (PBM) to administer its rescri tion drug enefit MMB currentl
utili es services through this contract hich are the su ect of this ill and ma need to ma e modifications to meet the
re uirements of this ill
Provisions of this ill hich might affect the current PBM arrangement are
-Section 3 su d 4 Lists circumstances during hich the state ma sus end a PBM from servicing a rescri tion drug
rogram n the event of a sus ension of its PBM SE P mem ers ould e erience ma or disru tions hen attem ting
to fill a rescri tion unless an alternative PBM could rovide services SE P antici ates that if a PBM s services ere
oor enough to re uire sus ension that it ould alread e involved in discussions concerning erformance issues and
ould have an alternative in lace or ould e close to having one m lementing the services of a ne PBM is costl and
ould ta e a minimum of si months ithout a PBM in lace the rogram ould virtuall e una le to fill rescri tions
-Section 6 descri es the re uirement for a PBM to disclose its holesale ac uisition costs from a drug manufacturer he
e anded availa ilit of this information might im act the a ilit of a PBM to negotiate lo er drug costs for the dvantage
lan MMB recogni es this otential cost im act ut ith limited data availa le no fiscal im act is reflected in this note
Language in this section also ma im act the amount of re ates the PBM is a le to negotiate ith drug manufacturers
nder its contract ith its PBM SE P receives 100 of the re ates associated ith its mem ers and those re ates are
used to lo er remiums for all mem ers n 2018 negotiated re ates are estimated to have reduced the dvantage lan s
rescri tion drug costs a ro imatel 38 510 000 he ill ma es it conceiva le that a PBM ma no longer have the
a ilit to secure the current level of re ates from a given manufacturer hile the amount of re ates SE P receives might
e im acted ithout s ecific data on the amount MMB is una le to determine the e act cost to SE P MMB assumed the
amount of re ates received ould e unchanged
-Section 7 ould rohi it roviding financial incentives including co a ments to an enrollee to use a retail harmac mail
order harmac s ecialt harmac or other net or harmac rovider in hich a PBM has o nershi interest SE P
mem ers currentl enefit from a rogram hen the choose to fill 90-da su lies of medications for chronic conditions
either using a mail service harmac o ned the PBM or hen choosing to fill a rescri tion at a PBM s o ned
harmac n these instances the rogram reduces the num er of co a s a mem er a s from three to t o hen
selecting these distri ution o tions o continue offering SE P mem ers 90 da s su l for t o co a ments ould
re uire develo ing and im lementing an alternative ntil that alternative is secured mem ers ould a three
co a ments for their 90-da s su l he intent of these rograms is to im rove mem er adherence to im ortant
medications and e are concerned that modif ing the rograms could result in lo ered adherence and otentiall higher
costs on the medical side o ever e are una le to uantif an ossi le costs or savings due to the limited data on the
cost to develo and im lement other o tions or to administer the rogram ithout this feature
ot a lica le
ot a lica le
MMB e ects local units of government to also incur added e enses MMB cannot estimate the im act to local
governments ith reasona le certaint
References/Sources
a Revenue
nformation echnolog
-
his ta le sho s direct im act to state government onl Local government im act if an is discussed in the narrative
Reductions sho n in the arentheses
Bill Description
he ill creates a ne ha ter (62 ) in Minnesota Statutes that s ecifies re uirements for the licensure and regulation of
harmac enefit managers hat ne ha ter ould e under the urisdiction of the e artment of ommerce and the
Board defers to that de artment for the descri tion of those rovisions he onl rovisions that a ear to e of ossi le
relevance to the Board are
Section 14 of the ill hich is a gag clause rohi ition that states that no contract et een a PBM or health
carrier and a harmac or harmacist shall rohi it restrict or enali e a harmac or harmacist from
disclosing to an enrollee an health care information that the harmac or harmacist deems a ro riate
regarding the nature of treatment the ris s or alternatives etc hat section of the ill also reiterates an
e isting re uirement under Minn Stats 151 214 for a harmac or harmacist to rovide certain cost
information to atients ote that ongress also recentl assed a federal rohi ition against gag clauses
Section 16 of the ill e ands the authorit of harmacists to ma e drug su stitutions hen dis ensing
rescri tions urrentl harmacists can ma e su stitutions ithout o taining the ermission of the
rescri er onl hen a genericall e uivalent drug is availa le and the rescri er has not indicated that the
rescri tion is to e dis ensed as ritten his section of the ill ould allo harmacists to ma e thera eutic
su stitutions (i e su stitute ver similar drugs that are not genericall e uivalent) o ever harmacists
could onl do so if the had a ritten rotocol in lace ith a otentiall large num er of rescri ers ho
rites rescri tions for the atients of that harmac he language in the ill does not a ear to allo a
harmacist to have a rotocol ith ust one rescri er that ould cover an atient that resented a
rescri tion to the harmac to e filled (For immuni ations and nalo one the statutes currentl do allo a
single rescri er to enter into a rotocol ith a harmacist that ould allo the harmacist to dis ense
nalo one or rovide an immuni ation to an atient of the harmac not ust atients of that rescri er)
lso e isting rovisions in Minn Stats 151 01 and 151 37 alread allo for thera eutic su stitution
rotocols Some hos itals and health s stems ro a l alread have thera eutic su stitution rotocols in
lace et een the rescri ers and the harmacists or ing ithin the hos ital or health s stem
Section 19 of the ill re eals a num er of sections of ha ter 151 ecause the language in those sections is
included in the ne ha ter 62
Assumptions
iolation of rovisions of the gag clause section on the art of a harmacist or harmac ould e grounds for the Board
to ta e disci linar action against the license of the harmacist or harmac Pharmacies have een vocal o onents of
such gag clauses therefore the Board assumes there ill not e an harmacies that ould sign a contract containing a
gag clause that ould violate oth federal and state la lso the Board has received no com laints alleging that
harmacists or harmacies have not rovided re uired cost information to atients he Board assumes e ould not
need to investigate an significant num er of com laints alleging violations of the rovisions of section 11 of the ill So
the Board ould assign no cost to those rovisions
he Board might receive a com laint alleging that a harmacist had used oor clinical udgment hen ma ing a
thera eutic su stitution ursuant to the rovisions of section 14 of the ill o ever the Board assumes such thera eutic
su stitution ill not occur e ce t for hat ma alread e occurring ithin hos itals and health s stems as the ill has a
re uirement to have a rotocol in lace ith a otential multitude of individual rescri ers he Board assumes e ill not
have to investigate an significant num er of com laints alleging violations of the rovisions of section 14 of the ill So
the Board ould assign no cost to those rovisions
lthough a num er of sections in ha ter 151 ould re ealed and the language ould e moved into the ne ha ter
62 there ill e not fiscal im act to the Board as the Board currentl does not have urisdiction over harmac enefit
managers (PBMs) he re ealed sections in ha ter 151 created a asis for harmacies to ursue litigation for PBMs in
violation of these sections Re ealing these sections and including them in the ne ha ter 62 ould result in no ne
revenue or cost for the Board and therefore no there is no fiscal im act to the Board
o fiscal im act
one
one no n
References/Sources
v.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC, NOVO
NORDISK, INC., AND ELI LILLY
AND CO.,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER having been brought before the Court on the motion of
Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc., Eli Lilly and Company, and Sanofi-Aventis U.S.
with prejudice; and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties, and
the arguments of the counsel, if any; and for good cause shown,
is further
Case 3:18-cv-14999-BRM-LHG Document 47-8 Filed 08/12/19 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 794
___________________________________
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, U.S.D.J.
Case 3:18-cv-14999-BRM-LHG Document 47-9 Filed 08/12/19 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 795
v.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC, NOVO
NORDISK, INC., AND ELI LILLY Electronically Filed
AND CO.,
Defendants.
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of August, 2019, I caused copies of
Defendants Novo Nordisk Inc.’s, Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC’s, and Eli Lilly and
of Melissa Geist, Esq., with exhibits; a Proposed Order; and this Certificate of
Support of their Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint; the
Certification of Melissa Geist, Esq., with exhibits; a Proposed Order; and this
Case 3:18-cv-14999-BRM-LHG Document 47-9 Filed 08/12/19 Page 3 of 3 PageID: 797
Certificate of Service to be sent via overnight mail to the Honorable Brian Martinotti,
U.S.D.J., Clarkson S. Fisher Building & U.S. Courthouse, 402 East State Street