Template modified: 27 May 1997 14:30

BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14-210

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 1 FEBRUARY 1998

Intelligence

USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE

NOTICE: This publication is available digitally on the SAF/AAD WWW site at: http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
If you lack access, contact your Publishing Distribution Office (PDO).

OPR: HQ 497IG/INOT (Mr Larry Ekberg) Certified by: HQ USAF/XOI

(Maj Gen John P. Casciano)
Supersedes AFP 200-17, 23 June 1989 and AFP Pages: 189
200-18 Volumes I and II, 1 October Distribution: F
1990

This pamphlet explains the principles and concepts of targeting. The data included pertains to tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of operations. It begins with a discussion of a target and target systems,
then describes the information and intelligence required for targeting, the scope and functions of target-
ing, analytical techniques, battlefield targeting, and legal aspects of targeting. This pamphlet was pre-
pared by the Targeting Division, HQ 497 Intelligence Group, Air Intelligence Agency. To improve future
editions of this publication, users are encouraged to submit comments, suggestions, and pertinent material
for additions, changes, and deletions. Forward AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publica-
tion, to: HQ 497IG/INOT, 5113 Leesburg Pike, Suite 600, Falls Church VA 22041-3230. The use of
names of any specific commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply
endorsement by the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This pamphlet is a revision to AFP 200-17, AFP 200-18 Volumes I and II, and updates target intelligence
concepts. Time tested target intelligence techniques and procedures have been
reincorporated, updated information on doctrinal issues in the intelligence and operations
arena has been included, migration automated systems are described where they pertain to
targeting, existing chapters were reordered, and two sections added; a chapter on targeting and
information warfare and an attachment on the evolution of targeting.

Chapter 1—TARGETING AND THE TARGET 6

Section 1A Foreword 6
1.1. Foreword .................................................................................................................... 6
Section 1B Preface 6
1.2. Preface. ...................................................................................................................... 6

Section 1C Fundamentals of Targeting 7

1.3. Overview .................................................................................................................... 7
1.4. Targeting .................................................................................................................... 7
1.5. The Targeting Process. .............................................................................................. 7
Figure 1.1. Targeting--The Intersection of Operations and Intelligence. ................................... 8
Figure 1.2. The Targeting Process. ............................................................................................ 9
1.6. Strike or Attack Mission Cycle Functions and Targeting. ......................................... 10
Figure 1.3. Attack or Mission Cycle Functions. The six mission funchtions of the cycle interact
continuously at the decision stage where target analysis. ......................................... 11
1.7. The Target. ................................................................................................................. 12
Table 1.1. Target Characteristics. ............................................................................................... 17
1.8. The Target System Concept. ...................................................................................... 18

Chapter 2—INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE 20

2.1. Information as a Resource. ........................................................................................ 20
Figure 2.1. Information Accumulation. The combination of several sources of information enables an
analyst to make a valid decisions with reasonable certainty. Information collected beyond
the point of dimishing returns is excessive, costing more to collect than it is worth. 21
2.2. The Fusion Principle. ................................................................................................. 22
2.3. Hierarchy of Intelligence Products. ........................................................................... 22
2.4. Prerequisite Information and Intelligence for Targeting. .......................................... 23
2.5. Intelligence Collection. .............................................................................................. 25
Figure 2.2. The Collection Management Process. ..................................................................... 26

Chapter 3—THE TARGETING PROCESS 29

3.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 29
3.2. Phases of the Targeting Process. ................................................................................ 29

Chapter 4—OBJECTIVES AND GUIDANCE DERIVATION 32

4.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 32
4.2. Objectives and Guidance. .......................................................................................... 32
4.3. Levels of Objectives. ................................................................................................. 32

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Table 4.1. Persian Gulf War Objectives. .................................................................................... 33
4.4. Defining Objectives. .................................................................................................. 33
Figure 4.1. Planning Performance Measurements. .................................................................... 35
Figure 4.2. Worksheet for Understanding Objectives. ................................................................ 37
4.5. Types of Guidance. .................................................................................................... 38
Table 4.2. Principles of War. ...................................................................................................... 38
4.6. Conclusion. ................................................................................................................ 40

Chapter 5—TARGET DEVELOPMENT 41

5.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 41
5.2. Target Analysis. ......................................................................................................... 41
Table 5.1. Example of Target System - Control. ........................................................................ 43
Table 5.2. Example of Target System - Strike. ........................................................................... 44
5.3. Target Validation. ...................................................................................................... 51
Figure 5.1. Gulf War Joint No-Fire Target List. ......................................................................... 52
5.4. Documentation. .......................................................................................................... 52
Figure 5.2. Example Targeting Worksheet. ............................................................................... 53
5.5. Target Nomination. .................................................................................................... 54
Table 5.3. Validation Versus Nomination. ................................................................................. 55
5.6. Establishing Collection and Exploitation Requirements. .......................................... 55

Chapter 6—WEAPONEERING 56
6.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 56
6.2. Weapon Allocation. ................................................................................................... 56
6.3. Weapon Effectiveness. ............................................................................................... 56
6.4. Combat Weapon Effectiveness Data. ........................................................................ 56
6.5. Steps in Weaponeering. ............................................................................................. 57
Figure 6.1. Example Damage Criteria for Aircraft. ................................................................... 59

Chapter 7—FORCE APPLICATION 61

7.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 61
7.2. Force Application Levels/Timelines. ......................................................................... 61
7.3. Force Application Process. ........................................................................................ 62

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Figure 7.1. Damage Expectancy Formula. .................................................................................. 64

Chapter 8—EXECUTION PLANNING 66

8.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 66
8.2. Execution Planning at the Component Level. ........................................................... 66
8.3. Execution Planning at the Unit Level. ....................................................................... 68

Chapter 9—COMBAT ASSESSMENT 69

9.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 69
9.2. Who Is It For. ............................................................................................................. 69
9.3. Where Is It Done. ....................................................................................................... 69
Figure 9.1. Levels of Combat Assessment. ................................................................................ 70
9.4. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). ........................................................................... 71
Figure 9.2. Battle Damage Assessment Example. ...................................................................... 72
Table 9.1. Air-Surface Damage Assessment Matrix. ................................................................. 72
Figure 9.3. Target and Time Arrow. ......................................................................................... 73
9.5. Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA). ........................................................... 73
9.6. Mission Assessment (MA). ........................................................................................ 74
9.7. How It Is Done. .......................................................................................................... 76

Chapter 10—TARGETING FUNCTIONS AT THE COMBAT UNIT LEVEL 78

10.1. Combat Intelligence Functions at the Unit Level. ..................................................... 78
10.2. Unit Level Targeting Functions. ................................................................................ 78
10.3. Mission Planning. ...................................................................................................... 78
10.4. Mission Folder Construction. .................................................................................... 80
10.5. Aircrew Target Study and Certification. .................................................................... 80
10.6. Debriefing and Battle Damage Assessment. .............................................................. 80
10.7. Ensuring Mission Support. ........................................................................................ 81
10.8. Developments in Unit Level Targeting. .................................................................... 81
10.9. Conclusion. ................................................................................................................ 81

Chapter 11—TARGETING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 82

11.1. Information Operations (IO) and Information Warfare ............................................. 82
11.2. Objectives. ................................................................................................................. 82

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 11.3. Challenges. ................................................................................................................. 83
11.4. Information Warfare and the Targeting Process. ....................................................... 83
Figure 11.1. Sample IW EEIs. ....................................................................................................... 84
Figure 11.2. Notional Critical Target Sets -- Strategic Information Warfare. .............................. 86
Table 11.1. Disabling Technologies and Kill Mechanisms. ......................................................... 89
Figure 11.3. USCENTAF IW Cell. .............................................................................................. 91

Chapter 12—TARGET MATERIALS 93

12.1. Overview. ................................................................................................................... 93
12.2. Air Target Materials (ATM) Program (ATMP). ....................................................... 93
12.3. Target Materials (TM) Program (TMP). .................................................................... 93
12.4. Targeting Tools. ......................................................................................................... 95
12.5. Target Materials Users Group/Target Materials Producers Group ............................ 97

Chapter 13—THE TARGET LOCATION 98

13.1. Target Location. ......................................................................................................... 98
13.2. Datums. ...................................................................................................................... 98
13.3. Measures of Accuracy. .............................................................................................. 99

Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND

TERMS 102

Attachment 2—THE EVOLUTION OF TARGETING

(ADAPTED FROM THE ARTICLE......, JOHN GLOCK) 130

Attachment 3—SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE 141

Attachment 4—TARGETING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147

Attachment 5—TARGET ANALYSIS 153

Attachment 6—NONNUCLEAR AND NUCLEAR DAMAGE MECHANISMS 174

Attachment 7—COLLATERAL DAMAGE 180

Attachment 8—GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND PRODUCTS 184

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 Chapter 1

TARGETING AND THE TARGET

Section 1A—Foreword

1.1. Foreword . Targeting continues to be a core Air Force Intelligence discipline. Air Force targeting
is in evolutionary transition to support Global Engagement and the Core Competencies of Information
Superiority and Precision Engagement. This means we can no longer think of targeting as just the bridge
between operations and intelligence, but instead visualize full interoperability between Information Oper-
ators and Combat (flight) Operators. Targeting continues to be the process of recommending to a com-
mander the targets that support the commander’s objectives and the best weapons, which can include
lethal and non lethal means, to achieve a desired level of damage and effects to those targets. Although
often confused with just weaponeering (one of its functions), targeting looks across a range of military
capabilities. NOTE: Due to the present transition in Air Force Doctrine, especially in terminology, the
terms Operations (Ops) and Intelligence have been used to eliminate any confusion.
1.1.1. Air Force targeteers are experienced intelligence personnel trained in the specifics of targeting
and knowledgeable about operations. Targeting professionals do not produce intelligence, but instead
apply intelligence. In the same vein, they do not direct operations, but provide expertise to the staff to
nominate and suggest targeting options for planning and implementation.
1.1.2. This pamphlet is based on concepts in the application of airpower, from an intelligence and
operational point of view. In many cases there is no one "best" way to perform targeting. Often the
particular process used to arrive at a solution is not as important as the solution itself. Targeting
includes more than operations and intelligence--it includes the whole spectrum of military techniques
that are used to make the enemy perform our will. It is not a newly discovered concept, but a synthesis
of thinking and airpower application over the decades. Attachment 2 includes a summary of that his-
tory..

Section 1B—Preface

1.2. Preface. This pamphlet is intended to be an aid to targeteers from the combat unit to the force man-
agement level. It is designed to be the primary source of basic information on Air Force targeting. It
describes the principles and some of the techniques of targeting. It is, however, intended to be the USAF’s
“how-to” manual for targeting.
1.2.1. This pamphlet presents three types of information: basic concepts and definitions, fundamen-
tal procedures and techniques, and reference information. Use of this pamphlet may not be in thor-
ough cover-to-cover reading, but in a review, dependent on your experience. The first two chapters
are an introduction to targeting and intelligence in general. The first chapter is “must reading” for
everyone. The second chapter could be used by experienced intelligence personnel as a refresher. The
pamphlet then progresses to more complicated concepts and techniques. Major topics addressed
include the targeting process; combat unit level functions; target value analysis and assignment of pri-
orities; analysis, both quantitative and qualitative; target materials and target location; special target-
ing problems, such as information warfare; and international law as applied to targeting.

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 1.2.2. This pamphlet is the result of work by many people and is an evolutionary product of much
effort, past and present. Since it is a “how-to” document we have included some “Foot Stompers” that
are intended to illustrate real experiences distilled to short narratives. Such illustrative narratives may
not always represent current official policy or views. The project has drawn from many sources for
examples of quantitative analysis. With their targeting expertise, continuity, and their long-term
view, Air Force Reserve personnel have made outstanding contributions to this pamphlet. Future
revisions of this document will depend on similar support by all targeting personnel.

Section 1C—Fundamentals of Targeting

1.3. Overview . This chapter outlines some fundamentals of targeting and the target intelligence process.
It also examines the strike or attack mission cycle, with emphasis on targeting activities. It examines tar-
gets as independent entities and as components of target systems. It discusses target system characteris-
tics and describes the scope and position of the targeting function at the crossroads of intelligence and
operations (figure 1.1).

1.4. Targeting . Targeting recommends the best means to attain a goal. It integrates intelligence infor-
mation about the threat, the target system, and target characteristics with operations data on friendly force
posture, capabilities, weapons effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine. Targeting matches
objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations to identify the forces necessary to
achieve the objectives. It spans not only nuclear, conventional, chemical, and non lethal force applica-
tion, but can also include information warfare, space, and special operations in joint and combined opera-
tions. From this integration, targeting makes recommendations for the use of aerospace forces. Joint Pub
(JP) 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines targeting as “(1) The process of
selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational require-
ments and capabilities; (2) The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objec-
tives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that,
if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or
destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy.” The exploitation of information, although
not mentioned in the joint definition, is also of great importance.

1.5. The Targeting Process. The Air Force targeting function cuts across traditional functional and
organizational boundaries. Operations and intelligence are the primary active participants, but other
functional areas such as logistics and communications also support the targeting process. Close coordina-
tion, cooperation, and communication among the participants are essential for the best use of resources.

7
Figure 1.1. Targeting--The Intersection of Operations and Intelligence.

1.5.1. The targeting process is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on
supporting operational planning and facilitates force employment. A model has been constructed that
centers around six phases considered the framework for the targeting process (figure 1.2). This chap-
ter will briefly describe each step in this theoretical construct; later chapters will describe the specifics
involved in each step. The six steps of the targeting process are:
• Objectives and guidance derivation
• Target development
• Weaponeering
• Force application
• Execution planning
• Combat assessment

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Figure 1.2. The Targeting Process.

1.5.2. Although the Targeting Process shows the phases to be sequential, in reality, the process is
bi-directional and iterative. Additionally, targeteers often perform several of the phases simulta-
neously. Successful accomplishment of the targeting process requires diverse informational inputs.
These inputs include intelligence on the enemy’s defensive and offensive posture, capabilities, and
intentions; intelligence on enemy targets and target system characteristics; friendly force posture and
capabilities; concepts of operations; mission objectives; rules of engagement; and time and perishabil-
ity constraints. In general, there are four end products of this process:
• Target nomination lists
• Weapon and weapon system recommendations
• Supporting target materials
• Assessment criteria for evaluating the operation
1.5.3. Targeting Process Phases.
1.5.3.1. Objectives and Guidance Derivation . Objectives and guidance are the foundation of
the targeting process. In this phase, the objectives and guidance are developed and disseminated
to the targeteer. Objectives are developed at the national, theater, and component levels. Guid-
ance is generally provided at the National and war fighting CINC-level. Both objectives and guid-
ance must be quantifiable and unambiguous in order to be effective.
1.5.3.2. Target Development. This is the examination of potential target systems and their com-
ponents to determine change to system criticality and vulnerability to attack. This phase distills
the commander's objectives into lists of targets. The product of this phase is a suggested target list
with recommended priorities assigned and extent of desired damage.
1.5.3.3. Weaponeering Assessment. In this part of the process, planners assess the types and
quantity of weapons estimated to achieve a desired level of damage to the individual targets. The
product of this phase is a list of recommended weapons and aircraft for each target and a validated
list of weapon impact points for each target. Weaponeering takes into account target vulnerabili-

9
 ties, weapons effects and reliability, delivery accuracy, delivery conditions, as well as damage cri-
teria.
1.5.3.4. Force Application. The force application phase uses the information generated in the
target development and weaponeering assessment phases to determine the best force necessary to
meet operational objectives. At this point, the decision maker is provided with fused intelligence
on the target and weapon systems recommendations. It is here that operations and intelligence
merge their planning efforts to meet the CINC’s guidance.
1.5.3.5. Execution Planning. Execution planning prepares input for and supports the actual task-
ing, construction, and subsequent execution by weapon systems. Input includes data concerning
the target, weaponeering calculations, employment parameters, and tactics. The operational com-
mand is responsible for monitoring the ATO/ITO, making any changes necessary and providing
support to the units. Under Air Force doctrine of centralized control, decentralized execution, unit
commanders are given the freedom and flexibility to execute the plan, as they see fit.
1.5.3.6. Combat Assessment. After mission execution, the quality of the whole process is
assessed. Improvements in force employment, munitions design and situation assessments
emerge from this appraisal of post-strike data. The results of this effort affect future combat oper-
ations and can change theater objectives. The product of this phase is tailored to the decision mak-
ers.

1.6. Strike or Attack Mission Cycle Functions and Targeting.

1.6.1. Targeting plays a key role in the commander’s decision to employ attack forces; this decision
making process in the operations community is frequently referred to as the attack mission cycle or
the strike/attack cycle. JP 1-02 defines mission cycle “as it pertains to targeting, is a decision making
process used by commanders to employ forces.” This cycle is similar to the targeting process and is
sometimes confused with the targeting or ATO cycle.
1.6.2. Within the attack mission cycle, there are six general steps: detection, location, identification,
decision, execution, and assessment (figure 1.3). For the initial attack, the outer cycle (detection,
location, identification, decision, and execution) is used. After the initial attack, both cycles run at the
same time and interact through analysis at the decision step.

10
Figure 1.3. Attack or Mission Cycle Functions. The six mission funchtions of the cycle interact con-
tinuously at the decision stage where target analysis.

1.6.3. The attack cycle works on four assumptions.

• There must be direction and guidance provided for each of the six steps.
• There must be a collection program and data base construction and maintenance before target
detection.
• The cycles do not occur in isolation; the situation greatly affects the cycles.
• The time to complete one entire cycle may vary from minutes to weeks, and any function in a
cycle may be performed by a combination of human and/or machine.
1.6.4. While the point of understanding the cycle is not to see how fast the functions can be per-
formed, the functions must be performed quickly enough to use the information developed, that is, the
intelligence developed during the attack cycle must arrive in time to influence the decision and execu-
tion, either in a positive or negative sense. This concept, “fast enough for the intended purpose, "is
termed “in time” in this handbook.

11
 1.6.5. Relatively short cycles must be accommodated by the functions. The time span between the
detection of a potential target and the execution is termed the attack cycle time budget.

1.7. The Target. The term target has several meanings and is used in various contexts. Joint Publication
(JP)
1-02 defines a target as: “a geographic area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by
military forces." The intelligence community definition is “a country, area, installation, agency, or person
against which intelligence operations are directed.” For targeting purposes, this definition must be
expanded to include the contents of the area, complex, or installation (e.g., people, equipment, and,
resources). Furthermore, capture or destruction must be expanded to include disruption, degradation,
neutralization, and exploitation, commensurate with objectives and guidance.
1.7.1. Relationship to the Objective. A target must qualify as a military objective before it can
become a legitimate object of military attack. In this context, military objectives include those objects
that by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action, or
whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage. The
key factor is whether the object contributes to the enemy's war fighting or war sustaining capability.
Consequently, an identifiable military benefit or advantage should derive from the degradation, neu-
tralization, destruction, capture, or disruption of the object. Not only does this concept preclude vio-
lations of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), but it also supports the principles of war by employing
economy of force against valid military objectives.
1.7.2. Target Types. Targets may be classified in many fashions, but usually are grouped by the
broad mission assigned or their target system. Generally, missions follow doctrine in areas such as
Interdiction, Counterair, Strategic Attack, or Maritime Control. Some targets can impact two or more
areas. Targets can affect the spectrum of military operations and, in any set of scenarios, the same tar-
get could be tactical, operational, or strategic. Whether a target is classified as operational or strategic
is not always as important as the results attained. The difficulty of classification flows from the defi-
nitions of the terms and relevance of the target to the war fighting effort. According to AFDD 1-1, the
strategic level of war incorporates the broadest concerns of national policy. Operational level focuses
on campaigns and major operations that guide tactical events. Tactical level focuses on battles and
engagements. Geographical areas, operating environments, delivery vehicles, and munitions DO
NOT dictate the classification of a target as strategic, operational, or tactical.
1.7.3. Fixed Target Identification Data. Because of the great amount of intelligence available,
large numbers of potential targets, and a variety of data bases, it is essential to have a standard refer-
ence system. Fixed targets are listed, described, and indexed through five basic elements of informa-
tion, they are: the basic encyclopedia (BE) number, the functional classification code, the target name,
the geographic coordinate, and a two-character geopolitical (or country) code. (Refer to the Target
Intelligence Handbook [TIHB] [DDB-2600-312-YR]).
1.7.3.1. Basic Encyclopedia (BE) Numbers (BEN). The ten-character BE number has two
parts: the World Aeronautical Chart (WAC) number, which consists of four characters; and the
installation number, which consists of either six numeric characters, one alpha and five numeric
characters, or two alpha and four numeric characters. A BE number may be used as follows:

12
 1.7.3.1.1. Standard BE numbers. Most installations in the Automated Installation Intelli-
gence File have a BE number with a zero in the fifth character-position. Standard BE numbers
are assigned sequentially by the producer. The exceptions are airfields and electronic sites.
1.7.3.1.2. Non-DIA Produced BE Numbers. An installation discovered by non-DIA ele-
ments and reported for inclusion in the Modernized Integrated Data Base (MIDB) is identified
by a BE number that carries alpha characters in the fifth and sixth character positions. These
characters represent the exploitation element that assigned the number and controls it.
1.7.3.1.3. Electronic BE Numbers. The BE numbers for a non-communication electronic
installation consists of the WAC number, with an “E” in the fifth character position, and a
five-digit EOB site number.
1.7.3.1.4. Fictitious BE Numbers. The BE number for a fictitious (projected) installation has
an “F” in the fifth character position. This is useful for exercise databases or for unclassified
exercise scenarios.
1.7.3.2. Functional Classification Codes. Each installation is classified or categorized to reflect
products and military activity supported, etc. They are categorized by a five-digit code, as fol-
lows:
1.7.3.2.1. The first digit gives the function in nine major categories. The other four digits
show functions within the group. From left to right, each one describes the function or capa-
bility of the installation more specifically. A code is assigned to each fixed facility that has
some significance. The functional code for a mobile system (e.g., SAM, AAA, GCI, etc.) is
assigned to the specific area that the system supports or where the activity is located (rather
than the equipment itself). See DIAM 65-3-1 for these functional classification codes, com-
monly known as category codes.
EXAMPLE: 80052 Airfield, fighter base, primary mission is support of ground attack aircraft.
1.7.3.3. Installation Names. Because of the many types of installations, coupled with the various
name forms and component parts, a specific procedure is used to select and apply installation
names. There are seven name components used to identify installations. These components
appear in the following order: place name, functional name, distinguishing descriptive terms,
proper name, honorary name, underground designation, and installation alpha or numerical desig-
nators. However, not all of these names may appear on one installation. (For standard abbrevia-
tions and procedures used, see the Target Intelligence Handbook.) CIA and some other sources of
installation name do not always use the standard DoD naming scheme; be careful in trying to cor-
relate installations based only on the name. The same applies to place names
1.7.3.4. Installation Coordinates. Latitude and longitude coordinates represent the fourth stan-
dard element for installation identification. They are reference coordinates only and they are
selected by approximating the center of mass for an installation. For airfields, the center of the
runway or intersection of major runways is selected. Fields in the MIDB will indicate the source
of coordinates (See DDB-2600-725-XX, Point Reference Guide Book).
EXAMPLE: 265134N0932402E
1.7.3.5. Geopolitical codes. Geopolitical or country codes are composed of two alpha characters
listed in the Target Intelligence Handbook. These codes are used in every installation record as
one of the basic identification elements.

13
 1.7.3.6. Installation Reference Numbers And Target Complexing. These target complexing
methodologies are further explained in the Target Intelligence Handbook.
1.7.4. Target Characteristics. Every target has distinct inherent, acquired, functional, physical,
environmental and mobility characteristics (Table 1.1.). The target characteristics form the basis for
target detection, location, identification, and classification for future surveillance, analysis, and strike.
1.7.4.1. Inherent Characteristics. Inherent characteristics are the initial, original, designed, or
essential characteristics of an object or area. Generally, these are immediately obvious features
and are used to detect, identify, and categorize an object or area. Inherent target characteristics
include, for example, the expansive and relatively level area that is free from surrounding vertical
obstructions at airfields; barracks, tents, administration buildings, service buildings, and perimeter
fences at military installations; and the spans, piers, abutments, and superstructures of bridges.
Generally, these characteristics consist of those gross and usually obvious features that are used
(either consciously or unconsciously) in detecting, identifying, and categorizing an object or area.
1.7.4.2. Acquired Characteristics . Characteristics that modify, enhance, or augment the inher-
ent characteristics of an object or area are acquired characteristics. Examples include: replacing a
sod runway with a concrete runway; building a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site within the perim-
eter of a previously undefended troop concentration area; and widening the deck of a one-lane
highway bridge to two lanes. Acquired characteristics can change a target’s function without nec-
essarily modifying its observable characteristics. For example, a fertilizer plant might be con-
verted to an explosives production facility without changing the outside appearance of the plant.
Because the characteristics of all objects and areas are changeable, each target must be routinely
monitored to ensure that any status related changes are brought to the attention of target analysts.
1.7.4.3. Functional Characteristics . These characteristics describe operations and activity lev-
els of an actual or potential target and are extremely important in determining target value. Func-
tional characteristics are often hard to determine because of difficulties in directly observing or
investigating the target. In these cases, analysts must use other data collection activities to supply
the necessary information. Reaching a plausible conclusion can involve considerable speculation
and deductive or inductive reasoning. Functional characteristics include target function, status,
level of activity, functional complexity, importance, reconstitution potential, and position. Func-
tional characteristics contain the following:
• Function (target's normal or reported activity)
• Status (state or condition at a given point in time)
Operational (producing or capable of action, i.e., is manned, has equipment, and is mission ready,
even if damaged to some extent)
• Occupied (has equipment, but cannot be determined if manned or operational)
• Transitional (passing from one condition, form, stage, or place, to another)
• Nonoperational (not producing or inactive)
• Dormant (inoperative or inactive)
• Damaged
• Dismantled
• Level of activity

14
 • High
• Normal
• Low
• Functional complexity (the number and complexity of separate activities)
• Material and psychological importance (actual or perceived value or significance)
• Horizontal (within a given level or echelon)
• Vertical (up or down the organizational hierarchy)
• Reconstitution potential (capable of recovering from damage so as to perform its func-
tions)
1.7.4.3.1. Level of activity is an important functional characteristic when considered in rela-
tion to the entire scenario and when compared to other similar targets. Functional complexity
is the number of separate activities that make up a target and the complexity of each. Impor-
tance is the value or significance of a target in either a material or psychological sense as it
relates to other similar targets, to the organizational hierarchy, and to the current scenario.
Reconstitution potential is a target's capability to recover from damage to perform its original
function. Position is a target's relational location within the military or governmental organi-
zational structure.
1.7.4.4. Physical Characteristics . Physical characteristics are the visually discernible features
or the target's sensor derived signatures (detected, identified, and categorized displays registered
in one or more portions of the electromagnetic spectrum). The target shape, size, composition,
reflectivity and radiation propagation, determine to a large extent, the type and number of weap-
ons, weapon systems, or sensors needed to accomplish the attack or intelligence objective. Phys-
ical characteristics of the target are described using words, abbreviations, acronyms, or numbers
(for example, shape, dimensions, type of construction, etc.). They include the following:
• Size and shape
• Point target (the target equals the aimpoint; it is encompassed in a small area with respect
to the attacking or
striking systems, delivery accuracy, and munitions effects)
• Area target (a large area usually composed of multiple elements or components)
• Linear target (long and narrow)
• Appearance (outward form and features)
• Physical complexity
• Dispersion and concentration of elements
• Number of components
• Personnel
• Redundancy
• Substance (construction materials or matter used in structures in any object or area)
• Reflectivity potential (the ability to reflect light, heat, or sound)

15
 • Electromagnetic radiation propagation (the emission or transmission of wave energy;
gamma radiation; x-rays;
visible, infrared, and ultra-violet radiation; and radar and radio transmissions)
• Active (intentional emission propagation)
• Passive (unintentional emission propagation)
• Vulnerability (susceptibility to damage, destruction, or functional disruption as a result of
military action)
• Hard (low sensitivity to damage or disruption)
• Soft (high sensitivity to damage or disruption)
• Reconstitution potential (capable of recovery from damage so as to perform its original
functions)
1.7.4.5. Mobility Characteristics . Mobility characteristics are a target's ability to move or be
moved. A target's mobility is closely related to its functional and physical characteristics and is
influenced by prevailing doctrines or strategies governing its use. Mobility characteristics include
whether a target is moving or nonmoving. A nonmoving target is one that is either temporarily or
permanently stationary. These can be classified further as being:
• Fixed. Immovable objects (e.g., an airfield)
• Mobile. Targets capable of moving under their own power
• Transportable. Targets capable of being transported or relocated
1.7.4.6. Environmental Characteristics . These are relatively constant or manmade conditions
and circumstances within which the target exists. These characteristics affect decisions concern-
ing reconnaissance and weapon system selection and employment. They include:
• Atmospheric characteristics, such as the current and forecasted weather conditions
• Temperature
• Weather (light, moderate, or heavy thunderstorms, rain, drizzle, hail, snow, ice, etc.)
• Visibility (clear, obscured by smoke/fog/haze/blowing dust/blowing sand/blowing snow/
blowing spray)
• Cloud cover (percentage of ground obscured by clouds at various altitudes above the tar-
get)
• Winds (direction and intensity at various altitudes)
• Atmospheric pressure
• Light
• Physical relationships
• Target density (number of elements per unit of area; target compactness; proximity to
other targets)
• Relation to allies, friendlies, or enemy civilians (distance and direction). Forward Line
Own Troops (FLOT)
• Geographic characteristics:

16
 • Terrain (type or description of land forms; that is, plains, hills, plateaus, or mountains)
• Vegetation (density and heights of tree coverage, undergrowth, and grass)
• Geology (composition, water content, and density)
• Elevation (above mean sea level)
• Waterways (rivers, streams, canals)
• Cultural features (cities, roads, rail lines, power lines, etc.)
• Economic characteristics, including the availability of raw materials, personnel, energy,
water, and transportation
• Raw materials
• Personnel support (shelter, life support)
• Energy (sources)
• Water (potable or nonpotable)
• Command, control, and communications
• Transportation support
• Enemy countermeasures
• Electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)
• Defenses (AAA, SAMs, aircraft, etc.)
• Concealment (caves, trees, etc.)
• Deception efforts (dummy SAM sites, dummy aircraft, etc.)
• Camouflage (nets, paint, etc.)

NOTE:
The characteristics of all objects and areas are changeable. Each target must be monitored routinely to
ensure any status related change is brought to the attention of target analysts.

Table 1.1. Target Characteristics.

Functional Characteristics Environmental Characteristics
• Function • Atmospheric conditions
• Status • Temperature
• Operational • Weather
• Occupied • Visibility
• Transitional • Cloud cover
• Nonoperational • Winds
• Dormant • Atmospheric pressure
• Damaged • Light
• Dismantled • Physical relationships
• Level of activity • Target density

17
 • High • Relation to allies, friendlies, or enemy
civilians
• Normal • Geographic characteristics:
• Low • Terrain
• Functional complexity • Vegetation
• Material and psychological importance • Geology
• Horizontal • Elevation
• Vertical • Waterways
• Reconstitution potential • Cultural features
• Economic characteristics
Physical Characteristics • Raw materials
• Size and shape • Personnel support
• Point target • Energy
• Area target • Water
• Linear target • Command, control, and communica-
tions
• Appearance • Transportation support
• Physical complexity • Enemy countermeasures
• Dispersion and concentration of ele- • ECM and ECCM
ments
• Number of components • Defenses
• Personnel • Concealment
• Redundancy • Deception efforts
• Substance • Camouflage
• Reflectivity potential
• Electromagnetic radiation propagation Mobility Characteristics
• Active • Fixed
• Passive • Mobile
• Vulnerability • Transportable
• Hard
• Soft
• Reconstitution potential

1.8. The Target System Concept. The target system concept is important because almost all targeting is
based on targeting systems. A target is composed of components, and components are composed of ele-
ments. A single target may be significant because of its own characteristics, but often its importance lies
in its relationship to other targets. Usually the effect of a strike or attack mission upon an enemy can be
determined only by analyzing the target in the overall enemy's target system. JP 1-02 states that a “target
system” includes “(1) All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related; (2)
A group of targets which are so related that their destruction will produce some particular effect desired

18
by the attacker". Targeteers normally focus on functionality. “Functionally related” means that all targets
in the system have the same activity, or that each makes one or more parts of a particular product or type
of product. Usually the effect of an attack upon an enemy can be determined only by analyzing the
enemy's target systems and their relationship(s) with the enemy’s warmaking or warfighting capability.
1.8.1. Target System Characteristics. All target systems have certain general characteristics:
• Survival is fundamental for all systems.
• All systems adapt to survive.
• Systems are goal, objective, or purpose oriented.
• Systems are composed of individual parts called components.
• Each system is a component of a larger, more inclusive system.
• Through its components, the system performs activities to achieve its goals.
• Systems are complex. System components are interdependent, so that a change in one com-
ponent causes change in or to other components.
1.8.2. Target System Components . JP 1-02 defines “target system components” as “a set of targets
belonging to one or more groups of industries and basic utilities required to produce component parts
of an end product.” This definition covers the basic concept of the relationship between a target sys-
tem and its component parts. It does not, however, define the whole series of target components. A
target system is divided into components, each of which may be a target. A system component is an
entity supporting a functional process to produce an end product or service. For example, an air
defense system may include command and control, early warning and target acquisition radars, anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, SAM support facilities, and other
components that are neither industries nor utilities.
1.8.3. Target System Activity . The targeting process should not focus on the system or its compo-
nents, per se, but on the activity of the system or its components. By determining which activity is to
be modified or affected by friendly forces, key target systems and target system components can be
identified and nominated for strike. On a lesser scale, this same analysis can be performed for individ-
ual targets. Key and vulnerable elements of each target can be identified for attack. A comprehensive
analysis of the system and its component parts is essential to understand the activities of the entire sys-
tem.
1.8.4. Target System Elements . Target system elements are smaller, more intricate parts of the tar-
get system than component and are necessary to the operation of the component as a whole.

19
 Chapter 2

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

2.1. Information as a Resource. Information is one of the most precious resources available to any
decision maker. By nature, humans are information processors who seek knowledge of the past, present,
and prospects for the future. Without valid information, decision makers have no logical basis for choos-
ing one course of action over another. Increasing information generally decreases uncertainty in decision
making, up to a point of diminishing returns, where too much information can confuse a situation. In a
sense, information is like fire insurance. It has little value until it is needed, but then it is invaluable.
2.1.1. Sources of Information. Information can take many forms and be derived from many sources.
Information can result from observing or reporting an event. It can be derived from the manipulation
of facts through computation. It can also result from professional opinions, judgments, and interpre-
tations by participants. Information may be objective or subjective. Usually, it comes from a combi-
nation of sources and is a presentation of both fact and insight.
2.1.2. Characteristics of Information. Information has many characteristics and does not come
without cost. Acquiring sufficient, accurate, and timely information can be very expensive. It can be
perishable and is generally imperfect. Consequently, information from one source should be verified
with another source whenever possible. Frequently, information derived from one source can be used
as a cue in researching other sources or in collecting additional or different information. Information
can be acquired through various methods. Each has advantages, and all have inherent and environ-
mental limitations and constraints. The observer, as a source of information, is often biased. Observ-
ers are also limited by what can be seen. Since it is difficult to observe an elaborate and dynamic
system, the tendency is to “freeze” the situation and examine individual system parts in a static state.
In doing so, essential ingredients are frequently lost. There is often the danger of attributing a great
degree of precision to imperfect assessments or measurements. Because of these many limitations,
information varies in validity and reliability.
2.1.3. Information Threshold. The information threshold is that point in time when one has accu-
mulated enough information to make a valid decision. In theory, one should keep collecting informa-
tion until the information threshold or the point of adequacy is reached. As figure 2.1 suggests,
independent information sources 1, 2, and 3 do not provide sufficient information to reach the thresh-
old. But when information from all three sources is combined, the threshold is reached and the point
of diminishing returns (that is, when the additional information costs more to collect than the value
gained from having it) is reached. Keep in mind that the point of adequacy for information is adjust-
able depending on the fidelity of information needed. If the various portions are viewed as an “infor-
mation budget”, the information threshold and collection resources can be managed accordingly.

20
Figure 2.1. Information Accumulation. The combination of several sources of information enables
an analyst to make a valid decisions with reasonable certainty. Information collected beyond the point of
dimishing returns is excessive, costing more to collect than it is worth.

2.1.4. Intelligence Processing. Since information does not present itself for exploitation, it must be
sought, gathered, assembled, and processed into usable form. The outcome is the transformation of
raw information into intelligence suitable for making valid decisions. There are three levels of intel-
ligence support: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic intelligence is required for the formula-
tion of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Operational
intelligence is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish
objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Tactical intelligence is required for planning and
conducting tactical operations. Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense
and record, or convey information. There are seven primary intelligence source types: imagery,
human, signals, measurement and signature, open source, technical, and counterintelligence.
2.1.5. The Intelligence Cycle. As stated in JP 1-02, the intelligence cycle is defined as “the steps by
which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users”. The five steps in the
cycle are:
• Planning and direction--determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collec-
tion plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continu-
ous check on the productivity of collection agencies.
• Collection--acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/
or production elements.

21
 • Processing--conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of
intelligence.
• Production--conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis,
evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in
support of known or anticipated user requirements.
• Dissemination--conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. A more complete
description and further explanations can be found in JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence
Support to Operations.

2.2. The Fusion Principle.

2.2.1. Fusion. The process of combining multisource data into intelligence necessary for decision
making is called fusion. Due to the limitations inherent in any collection system, and because other
countries strive to misinform or deny information to intelligence gathering agencies, intelligence nor-
mally should not be based on single source data. Intelligence becomes more useful and more reliable
when information from all possible sources is collected, combined, evaluated, and analyzed in a
timely manner.
2.2.2. Accuracy and Timeliness. Fusion of multisource data adds credibility to intelligence esti-
mates. Given the vast quantity of material collected and the rapid pace of modern warfare, the fusion
process should be automated whenever possible and its products made readily available to all levels of
command. Fusion facilitates accuracy. Accuracy and timeliness should be a constant goal of all tar-
geting personnel.
2.2.3. Application of Fusion. Fusion is not always possible, but the principle should be used when-
ever possible to enhance intelligence support without degrading the timeliness of that support. There
are times when information from one source cannot be confirmed by others or is highly perishable.
Factual and important single source information should be disseminated immediately. Follow-on data
should be presented when it becomes available.
2.2.4. Organizational Structure. Organizational structure can aid both the fusion process and the
flow of useful intelligence. Effective staff structuring, coordination, and cooperation are imperative if
the commander's intelligence needs are to be met.

2.3. Hierarchy of Intelligence Products. Intelligence production and fusion can also be viewed through
a hierarchy of products. There are five categories in intelligence production, with each one a building
block. They are: raw or unevaluated data; processed data; analyzed basic data reports; integrated intelli-
gence; and intelligence end products. Through fusion, improved products are built from those lower in
the hierarchy.
2.3.1. Raw or Unevaluated Data. This is the basic building block from which all intelligence prod-
ucts are derived. It includes unexploited film from reconnaissance missions, untranslated messages
from intercepted communications, recordings of foreign radar signals, and all other types of raw data.
2.3.2. Processed Data. The second level in the hierarchy is made up of materials that have been
refined to a stage where they can be analyzed. This can include initial imagery interpretation reports,
translation of captured documents, and preliminary reports based on intercepts of foreign radar sig-
nals. This data is produced by agencies such as imagery interpretation facilities, human intelligence
(HUMINT) detachments, and electronic reconnaissance processing elements. The Contingency Air-

22
 borne Reconnaissance System (CARS) is one example where two “Ints” from a single platform are
processed, and the synergistic effect enhances the processing.
2.3.3. Analyzed Basic Data Reports. At this level of the hierarchy, intelligence products from simi-
lar sources are compared and collated, but there is no attempt to fuse intelligence from these sources.
For example, all imagery interpretation reports on a single installation may be collated, or translated
message traffic from two foreign army units may be compared. Basic data reports are used to form a
data base and result from a collation process oriented toward individual weapon systems, installations,
or types of material.
2.3.4. Integrated Intelligence. These products result from detailed analysis and fusion of multiple
intelligence sources. Examples include orders of battle, scientific and technical reports, intelligence
estimates of foreign power capabilities and intentions, and the installation and orders of battle data in
the MIDB. Integrated intelligence is usually produced at Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) and by the
national intelligence community. DIA, Unified Commands, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and the National Security Agency (NSA) are all major producers. Integrated intelligence products
are, in turn, used to produce other intelligence products.
2.3.5. Intelligence Products. This category includes materials intended for dissemination to users.
End products result from additional analysis, evaluation, and fusion of materials produced at lower
levels in the hierarchy. These products are probably the most important, and when available are the
best source on which to base force employment decisions. Electronic versions are available through
INTELINK and SIPRNET. Newer information technology now allows links between intelligence
producers. The Air Force Information Warfare Center’s (AFIWC) SENSOR HARVEST is an exam-
ple.

2.4. Prerequisite Information and Intelligence for Targeting. To begin target planning the following
information requirements should be addressed to prevent waste of resources.
2.4.1. Intelligence on Enemy Defensive and Offensive Posture, Capabilities, and I n t e n t i o n s .
The targeteer must have current, accurate intelligence on the enemy's status and predisposition.
2.4.2. Target System, Component, and Element Characteristics. Targeteers must have current,
accurate intelligence on the physical, functional, mobility, and environmental characteristics of poten-
tial enemy targets.
2.4.3. Friendly Force Posture and Capabilities. The targeteer should know what forces will be
available for offensive operations and the capabilities of these forces. Care must be taken to prevent
potential options from being overlooked because a capability is assumed not to be available. If a force
capability not available at the beginning of an analysis can be demonstrated to be clearly superior, it
may be possible to obtain the capability. In any event, targeting personnel should be aware of current
and potential force capabilities and consider them during their analysis.
2.4.4. Concept of Operations, Mission Objectives, and Rules of Engagement. T h e t a r g e t e e r
must understand the concept of operations and mission objectives in order to conduct an analysis that
results in target recommendations to achieve those objectives. They should remember that most
offensive operations take place in a joint service environment. Consequently, the scheme of maneu-
ver of other component forces should be known to make all systems effective, and the operation of the
USAF component should be integrated as much as possible with them. Even though the Unified com-

23
 mander is responsible for integrating operations by the various service components, this can only hap-
pen in fact if the effort is made at the working level, during the basic planning.
2.4.4.1. For targeteers to function effectively, they must understand Air Force and Joint doctrine.
Doctrine is important because it is based on the capabilities of the US military and states funda-
mental concepts upon which planning should be based.

Foot Stomper Box

Doctrine is even more important than a planner might initially think. JCS and the Commands use a com-
plex, but well documented, Deliberate Planning Process to construct and update Operations and Concept
Plans. In the fast breaking crisis environment of world media attention, these procedures are pared down
to Crisis Action Planning. The deliberate and iterative process of what the nation needs to effect and what
it wants the new enemy to do is often lost to what the various agencies, services, and commands can do.
Doctrine is still more important when faced with unclear, or still forming, objectives and guidance. The
targeteer must help formulate objectives and guidance. Knowledge of interdiction (JP 3-03) or C3CM (JP
3-13) provides a solid basis for good planning.
2.4.4.2. Another prerequisite for target analysis is a general knowledge and understanding of the
tactics that will probably be employed during actual operations. Specific operational restrictions
must also be considered. These may consist of international law limitations, rules of engagement
(ROE), area closures because of operations, or restrictions laid down by commanders or foreign
governments.
2.4.4.3. Targeteers must also be able to perform analysis that could lead to policy changes, such
as a lifting of certain ROEs. The ROE can be changed, but this rarely occurs unless higher author-
ities are made aware of a requirement for a change. The effects of such restrictions can and must
be clearly stated to the commander so action can be taken to change them.
2.4.5. Time Constraints. Time is a critical commodity and must be managed skillfully. The targe-
teer must have the right information in time to assist the decision maker.
2.4.5.1. The response time for providing support varies with each of the categories of missions
identified in ACCI 13, Air Operations Center, Volume 3. Preplanned missions are those for which
a requirement can be foreseen, permitting detailed planning and coordination. Immediate mis-
sions are those for which specific target makeup and location cannot be determined in advance.
2.4.5.2. The six functions of the strike or attack mission cycle are performed for both preplanned
and immediate missions. The entire cycle may take from seconds to weeks, and targeteers must be
responsive to the time requirements of this cycle. Rapid decision making is essential for immedi-
ate mission support. If targeteers cannot provide timely support to the commander, they are likely
to be ignored in future decision making. Locating those analysts close to the decision makers can
increase responsiveness. The targeting process must be made to fit within the decision cycle
where appropriate. For instance, not all immediate attack cycles need targeting support, if that
support is not value added to the decision.

24
Foot Stomper Box
There was argument during and after the Gulf War about Intelligence support to the “Black Hole” at CEN-
TAF. Part of the problem evolved from space constraints, which kept targeteers away from the decision
makers. Also, the split of the planning functions into two different offices ("Black Hole" and TACC’s
Combat Plans) led to lack of timely support because of scarce resources. However, the Summary Report
of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, (p. 128), states “Various planning documents written before the war
outlined the organizational relationships that would exist between intelligence analysts, targeteers, and op-
erations planners. Those that developed during Desert Shield and Desert Storm differed considerably from
what had been envisioned.” In short, we didn’t follow our own doctrine.

2.5. Intelligence Collection.

2.5.1. Collection Management. Collection management (CM) is defined as “In intelligence usage,
the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing, tasking
or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as
required.” The CM process is a staff activity that is focused on decisions and choices that concern col-
lection requests (CRs) and requests for information (RFI). Such requests may originate from the unit
commander, the operations staff, or the intelligence staff. They may also be levied by external orga-
nizations, such as theater headquarters, a joint task force headquarters, as well as lateral and subordi-
nate units. The source and scope of levied requirements are typically related to the collection
capabilities or tasking/requesting authority of a given unit. There are a variety of ways to task the
intelligence system to gain needed information for operational use. A myriad of collectors, ranging
from humans to airborne collectors that are controlled manually or are software-driven, are tasked to
fulfill intelligence requirements. It is the responsibility of intelligence support personnel at the unit
level to accurately determine the direction and flow of intelligence information. Intelligence needs,
referred to as requirements, are registered based on time sensitivity. Requirements definitions, as they
apply to the air operation, are as follows:
• Time Critical Requirements - Requester needs in less than 24 hours, tactical in nature. Mis-
sions already employed or alert assets will usually be tasked (e.g., request for the location of a
SCUD TEL that has recently launched a missile is a fleeting requirement).
• Routine Requirements - Requester needs in 24 hours or more, supports routine combat opera-
tions. Will be addressed through the collections process (e.g., creation of collection targets to
search for specific enemy units that have not yet been located in the AOR).
• Standing Requirements - Established before a contingency arises and provides a baseline for
the intelligence problem set (i.e., request to monitor airfields for operational activity).
2.5.1.1. The objective of the CM process is to satisfy the commander's essential elements of infor-
mation (EEIs). These are necessary to accomplish the given mission and assigned operational
tasks. The collection manager is a central figure of the process, serving to coordinate and facilitate
the activities of two cyclic, mutually supporting functions: the translation and development of
taskings, referred to as Collection Requirement Management (CRM), and the employment of
intelligence collection resources, known as Collection Operations Management (COM). The two
functions are structured to support the operational commander's mission statement in a responsive
manner (figure 2.2).

25
Figure 2.2. The Collection Management Process.

2.5.1.2. CRM is primarily a function of the intelligence staff and accomplished in conjunction
with an all-source intelligence production organization. The process begins with a collection plan
and continues through the following tasks: receipt, analysis, and validation of requirements;
determination of asset or resource availability/capability; request tasking of resources; evaluation
of reporting feedback/user satisfaction; and update of the collection plan. In performing CRM, the
collection manager delegates the functional responsibility to one or more collection requirements
managers. In some instances, depending upon the size and mission of the given unit or organiza-
tion, the collection manager actually performs the CRM function.
2.5.1.3. COM facilitates the execution of the collection tasking and mission guidance that was
developed to satisfy the validated collection requirements and RFIs. It is dependent upon those
supporting organizations and other units or agencies that own and operate the collection assets.
COM consists of the following tasks: planning and scheduling of collection operations; execution
and control of collection operations; exploitation and dissemination of the resultant intelligence
products. With respect to COM, the collection manager is usually supported by one or more col-
lection operations managers. They are members of the unit’s operations staff or who reside with
other units or agencies that actually own and operate the collection assets. Although it is possible
for a collection manager to be responsible for performing COM, the function is usually executed

26
by collection operations managers as a result of tasking received from the collection managers
assigned staff of collection managers.
2.5.1.4. Collection Requirements . Always state intelligence requests clearly and include pre-
cise parameters (desired and minimum required) and a written statement of justification. Parame-
ters should include suspense dates, frequency of coverage, resolution/level of information, and
specific viewing angles/direction (IMINT).
2.5.1.4.1. Requirement Identification . Targeteers must ensure collection operations man-
agers are aware of targeting objectives, information needs (quality, quantity, frequency, etc.),
and the constraints and limitations imposed on the targeting process. This includes informing
the collection manager as soon as possible of tasked targets. The information must include the
type and number of desired munitions, in addition to the desired effect.
2.5.1.4.2. Collection Priorities . The value of targets may change during crisis or conflict,
and the targeteer must update the collection manager so collection priorities can be adjusted, if
needed. Requirements and their associated priorities need to be established for peacetime tar-
get surveillance, crisis monitoring, and combat support (in support of targeting, threat assess-
ment, database maintenance, and damage assessment). All targets should be prioritized and
monitored on a routine basis. In most cases, higher priority targets are collected with greater
expediency and frequency than targets with a lower priority. Mobile targets present a specific
collection problem because their data is extremely perishable and current data is essential to
target analysis.
2.5.1.5. Collection Operations (Systems) . It is the collection manager’s responsibility to make
decisions on sensor choice, since they are responsible for managing the assets and choosing the
most efficient methods and sensors to satisfy requirements. On the whole, theater sensors are
more flexible and have a faster reaction time to collection requirements. National collection plat-
forms are not as flexible and have set times and locations where they will be collecting on a target
area. The choice of which targets will be collected by these assets, must be coincident with spe-
cific national system collection ground tracks. Dissemination of national system products relies
on primary and secondary dissemination methods and equipment in theater. If communication
lines are insufficient enough to handle dissemination of imagery, the product will not be reactive
to theater needs.
2.5.1.6. Exploitation Requirements . Targeting must also identify the essential elements of
information (EEI) required from imagery and all-source analysts. There are two types of EEI -
generic and specific. If generic EEIs are requested, the imagery analyst will report all activity and
identify all structures on or in the target area. Generic EEIs are listed as part of the overall com-
mand objectives and may vary in different commands. Specific EEIs are instructions the cus-
tomer/targeteer provides with the RFI to report specific activity/observations (e.g., general BDA
of the entire facility or a specific assessment of a critical target within the facility).

27
Foot Stomper Box
Imagery interpreters were often unaware of several factors critical to Gulf War Battle Damage Assessment.
Time-on-target, number and type of munitions, intended effects, and campaign target significance were not
passed in the vast majority of cases to the widely dispersed intelligence production organizations. Assess-
ments of BDA were quickly dismissed by operational planners early in the Gulf War. Credibility was nev-
er fully restored, and many false lessons learned and negative impressions were created. The targeteer
must do everything possible to point the collection managers to the best source for the intelligence they
need. Operational planners should remember that in war an action not assessed is still a task and will have
to be planned again.
2.5.1.7. Establishing Collection Requirements. Collection requirements may be established
with any desired frequency; as a rule, they are established for these periods: daily, twice weekly,
weekly, every two weeks, monthly, every two months, quarterly, semiannually, annually, or until
satisfactorily acquired. The specific time of collection may also be requested.

28
 Chapter 3

THE TARGETING PROCESS

3.1. Overview. The targeting process is a conceptual construct used to explain how targeting is per-
formed. The process is performed at various levels of command and execution. Though driven by intel-
ligence, it is not the purview of any one community. Community boundaries are beginning to blur
between operations and intelligence. This should help consolidate targeting functions. The targeting pro-
cess includes actions that produce target intelligence and target materials (through analysis and fusion of
multi-source intelligence) and applied in support of operational decision making and force employment.
This process includes the steps by which targets are recommended and is comprised of six phases:
• Objectives and guidance derivation
• Target development
• Weaponeering
• Force application
• Execution planning
• Combat assessment
3.1.1. These phases are bi-directional and iterative. Often, they overlap and targeteers perform sev-
eral of them simultaneously.

3.2. Phases of the Targeting Process.

3.2.1. Objectives and Guidance Derivation . Objectives and guidance derivation comprise the
foundation of the targeting process, originating at the national level and becoming more specific and
dynamic at progressively lower echelons of command. Unified command objectives establish priori-
ties for targeting, damage criteria, and restrictions on force employment. Guidance includes princi-
ples of war, the international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and established rules of engagement.
Objective and guidance should be clear and unambiguous so as to be interpretable at the lowest level
of command. The necessary first step as a targeteer is to understand objectives and guidance to pro-
vide correct targeting advice to commanders. (Within an Air Force AOC, objectives and guidance
will normally come from the Strategy Division.)
3.2.2. Target Development . During target development, a planner analyzes a potential target sys-
tem and its components to estimate the commander’s best course of action to achieve a given objec-
tive. All-source intelligence data bases are reviewed and potential target systems and targets are
selected for consideration. A subset of target development is target analysis, which examines poten-
tial targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapon feasibility to obtain a
desired level of damage, casualties or to achieve the desired effect. The selected target systems are
then further analyzed to determine their components and critical elements. A priority listing of these
critical elements is used for weaponeering assessment. Target development includes validation of the
target and nomination to the appropriate authority.
3.2.3. Weaponeering . The output of weaponeering is a recommendation of the quantity, type, and
mix of lethal and non lethal weapons needed to achieve a probable level of target damage or effects
while avoiding unacceptable collateral damage. It is important to note weaponeering results are prob-
abilistic and not predictive. Considerations are:
29
 • Target vulnerability
• Weapon effects
• Munitions delivery errors
• Delivery tactics
• Damage criteria
• Probability of kill
• Weapon reliability
3.2.4. Force Application. Force application planning is the fusion of target nominations with the
optimum available lethal and non lethal force. In this phase, forces are analyzed to determine likely
results to be achieved against target systems and their activities. For lethal force, this is based on
probabilities of damage and arrival for a weapon system. For non lethal force this is based on the
expected outcome (consequences). The result of force application is a strike package nomination for
the commander's approval that has coordinated recommendations from operations, plans, and intelli-
gence. This includes actions in preparation for attack once force selection recommendations are
approved. Targeteers prepare the target intelligence portion of plans and assist in air tasking order
(ATO) preparation.
3.2.4.1. During force selection, targeting analysts work closely with operators and planners to
match targets with available weapon systems, munitions, and possible non lethal force options.
Force sizing is then optimized in light of available resources and other constraints.
3.2.4.2. Targeteers also assist in attrition analysis or calculations for potential friendly force
losses to enemy defenses. Attrition analysis bears on both delivery tactics and optimal force siz-
ing.
3.2.5. Execution Planning . Execution planning is the more detailed planning required to actually
fly the mission and employ weapons. It is both a component and unit function. At the air operations
center (AOC), preparation for the execution of the ATO entails review of plans, weather, logistics,
and current situation. At the unit level, it involves mission planning. Unit functions for targeteers
have evolved with the automation of mission planning tools, and the laborious work of hand drawn
radar predictions, old mensuration tools, and slide rule weaponeering is approaching an end. With a
single Air Force-wide intelligence tool (Combat Intelligence System) and a single mission planning
tool (Air Force Mission Support System), we have begun to standardize targeting tasks and ease train-
ing problems.
3.2.5.1. Targeteers provide the approved targets list, weaponeering, and target materials, such as
maps, charts, mensurated coordinates, and imagery. They assist operators in selecting mission
routing, axis of attack, aimpoints, and fuze settings.
3.2.5.2. Targeting planners also prepare mission folders containing charts (annotated with ingress
and egress routing, and aimpoints), strip charts, threat data, and battle damage assessment (BDA)
reporting guidelines.
3.2.6. Combat Assessment . Effective campaign planning and execution require a continuing evalu-
ation of the impact of joint force combat operations on the overall campaign. Combat assessment
(CA) evaluates combat operations effectiveness in achieving command objectives and recommends
changes to tactics, strategies, objectives, and guidance. It has several sub-assessments including mis-

30
sion assessment (MA), battle damage assessment (BDA), and munitions effectiveness assessment
(MEA). The military end state, as written in the campaign estimate and modified during an operation,
is directly linked with CA. CA compares the results of the operation to the objectives to determine
mission success or failure within the guidance parameters. More important than a review, it looks for-
ward to determine if additional missions are needed and/or if modification to the objectives is neces-
sary. Combat assessment is one concept with many implementations.

31
 Chapter 4

OBJECTIVES AND GUIDANCE DERIVATION

4.1. Overview. The development of objectives and guidance is the first and the most critical step in the
targeting cycle. Objectives and guidance identify what is to be achieved and under what conditions and
parameters. This is the most important stage in the targeting cycle. Without clear understanding of what
is to be achieved, it is impossible for efficient targeting strategies to be devised. An objective must be
understandable, attainable, measurable, and allow room for a solution. Objectives and guidance begin at
the national level as broad concepts and should end as short-term, well-defined mission objectives at the
appropriate command level.

4.2. Objectives and Guidance. In this first phase of the process, objectives are determined and defined
and guidance is explored for operational and targeting limitations. Specific guidance is essential for
determining the best targeting alternative for a given situation. The term “objectives” and “guidance” are
often viewed as synonymous, but they are not. Objectives are the goals calculated to serve national inter-
ests which we want to attain. They provide targeteers a means to determine targeting priorities and they
set the criteria for measuring mission success. Guidance sets the limits or boundaries on objectives and
how we attain them. It provides the framework to achieve the objectives and establishes force employ-
ment scope and restrictions. Inherent in the concept of objectives is that they are hierarchical. Objective
definition, and therefore specificity, is most often greater at each layer of C2 down the chain from
national, to theater, to component, to wing, to flight package.

4.3. Levels of Objectives. Objectives can be broadly classified to three areas: national, theater, and
component. Each level down normally becomes more specific.
4.3.1. National Objectives. The National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for setting
national objectives. These objectives are usually very broad and generally outline the overall desired
outcome of the campaign. It is vital that these objectives be defined before any military activity
occurs because they will determine the course of action. The National Military Strategy (NMS) pro-
vides strategic guidance for the employment of military forces, and required force structure to attain
the national security objectives (see Joint Pub 3-0).
4.3.2. Theater Objectives . The theater Commander in Chief (CINC) is responsible for objectives
for the theater of operations. These objectives often involve all forces in the theater and are therefore
broad in scope. They frequently are embedded in operations plans or contingency plans. These plans
normally specify the threat, forces available, commander's concept of operations, and specific com-
mand objectives. These objectives may be, individually or together, rolled into Courses of Action
(see Joint Pub 3-0).
4.3.3. Component Objectives. To accomplish the objectives of theater CINC, component com-
manders develop plans for the employment of forces. Commanders base the objectives on the overall
role of the command, the assigned mission (s), the resources available, the characteristics of the
enemy, and the military characteristics of the operational area. Components normally supplement
operation and contingency plans.
4.3.4. Relationship of Objectives . The different levels of objectives are all intertwined. The com-
ponent’s objectives are based on the objectives set by the theater CINC which are contingent upon the

32
 national objectives. There should be no conflicting objectives among the components. Targeteers
must be cognizant of all objectives. Table 4.1. illustrates the relationship of three levels of objectives
during the Persian Gulf War.

Table 4.1. Persian Gulf War Objectives.

National objectives Theater objectives Component objectives
Achieve the immediate, Neutralize Iraqi leadership Destroy leadership’s mili-
complete, and uncondi- and command and control tary command and control.
tional withdrawal of Iraq Disrupt leadership’s ability
forces from Kuwait to communicate with popu-
lace.
Gain and maintain air supe- Destroy all radar controlled
riority surface-to-air threats.
Establish Air supremacy in
the Kuwait Theater of Op-
erations.
Sever Iraqi supply lines Prevent the resupply of Ira-
qi ground forces.
Destroy key electrical grids
and oil storage.
Limit military resupply ca-
pability.
Remain committed to the Destroy Republican Guards Disrupt and attrit Republi-
restoration of security and can Guard forces
stability of the Arabian
Gulf
Destroy Iraq’s chemical, bi- Destroy Iraq’s chemical, bi-
ological, and nuclear capa- ological, and nuclear capa-
bility bility
Restore Kuwait’s legiti- Liberate Kuwait City with Provide close air support to
mate government. Arab forces ground troops as needed
4.3.5. An objective defines the specific targeting problems to be solved. Measurable, definitive
objectives must be given or derived from the guidance provided. A good objective must be under-
standable, require action, be attainable, allow some room to reach the solution, and provide criteria for
use in measuring both progress and effectiveness.

4.4. Defining Objectives. Eight questions should be answered when defining an objective.
• What do we want to make the enemy do?
• Against whom?
• How do we want to reach the objective?
• Why do we want to reach the objective?
• How much (to what degree) do we want to affect enemy activity?

33
• When and for how long do we want to reach the objective?
• Where do we want to affect enemy activity?
• How much will it cost to achieve the objective and is it worth the cost?
4.4.1. What Do We Want To Make the Enemy Do? Identify the enemy activity to be affected,
changed, or modified. Normally, only a few enemy activities are encountered: offensive and defen-
sive air operations, ground activity, naval activity, logistic activity, and economic activity.
4.4.2. Against Whom? The specific goal (rather than a generalized or national goal) must be identi-
fied. For example, do we wish to modify the behavior of political leader, military forces, the civilian
population, or a combination of these three?
4.4.3. How Do We Want To Reach the Objectives? A variety of means toward an end generally
suggest themselves. Bombing strikes or attacks, display of intent or demonstration of force, airborne
or missile attack, psychological operations, etc., are some choices available. There is also a wide
choice of weapon systems available. In most cases, they will be combined. The systems available, or
the situation, may dictate the use of a specific vehicle to achieve a desired targeting objective. For
example, a B-2 may be the only delivery vehicle able to reach a particular location in time to act. No
decision should be arbitrary. Decisions on objectives should recognize external factors which may
compel analysts to limit their investigation.
4.4.4. Why Do We Want To Reach the Objective? There is always a “why.” Frequently, the
“why” has not been thought out, is poorly stated, or is misunderstood. Not understanding “why” may
result in analysis and recommendations which neither meet the commander's needs nor are as effec-
tive as they could or should be.
4.4.5. How Much (To What Degree) Do We Want To Affect Enemy Activity? State the criteria
against which progress and success will be measured. Criteria must use quantifiable terms and be
realistic. Criteria should assist in understanding objectives by providing a performance measure. For
example, an objective such as “gain air superiority” is not specific enough; it has no measurable crite-
ria. It might be stated better as “gain air superiority by degrading enemy operational capability to
inflict damage on friendly forces by reducing the enemy's strike sorties to less than 10 per day,” or
“gain air superiority by reducing friendly attrition to less than two percent of sorties flown per day.”
4.4.5.1. Establishing Measures of Performance . Avoid the use of absolutes in establishing
measures of performance, because they are neither realistic nor achievable. As a rule, reduction in
enemy activity rates is a nonlinear curve that flattens out as it progresses towards a high probabil-
ity of affecting overall enemy activity. It is almost impossible to eliminate all enemy activity. For
example, in a given case, 100 friendly strike sorties may reduce enemy sortie rates by 50 percent;
but 200 friendly sorties may only reduce enemy sorties by 75 percent; and 300 sorties may reduce
enemy sorties by 82 percent; etc. Another example involves the interdiction of enemy supply
activity. It is possible to hinder, impede, or slow down, and destroy part of the enemy's supplies.
That is, it is possible to severely hamper that resupply effort, but it may prove nearly impossible to
stop it entirely. Figure 4.1 illustrates performance measurement during World War II.

34
Figure 4.1. Planning Performance Measurements.

This is key to combat assessment and future objective development. Performance measurement must be
common in all levels of planning to ensure that each objective achieved helps to reach the overall objective.
World War II provides a good illustration.

One national objective of the United States was to secure peace in Europe through the defeat of the Axis
powers. American leaders decided that force was necessary to achieve this objective. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff prescribed the way in which force was to be used in the form of a military strategy--in this case, the
liberation of occupied Europe and the occupation of Axis territory. The measure of performance for mil-
itary strategy was its effect on the enemy--whether the strategy would cause the enemy to modify its be-
havior in the manner the United States wanted. The goals of the military strategy were to be met by a
number of campaigns, such as the bombing offensive against German industry and the invasions of France.
These campaigns in turn entailed day-to-day operations and their specific objectives. Subsequently, the
results of each day’s operations contributed to the results of the campaign. The results of the campaign in
turn contributed to the military strategy. The success of the strategies (military, political, and economic)
contributed to attaining the national objective. The common measure of performance was how the friendly
operations affected Axis behavior. It still is.
4.4.6. When and For How Long Do We Want To Reach the Objective? Four principle timing
factors must be considered in formulating an objective:
• Timing of the attack.
• Timing of strike impact on enemy operations.
• Synchronization of Attacks.
• Recuperation or reconstitution time.
4.4.6.1. Timing of the Attack . Determining the most opportune time to attack to gain maxi-
mum benefit while minimizing cost is a key to targeting. The inherent speed and flexibility of air-
power can best be exploited through synchronized, parallel attacks on the enemy’s centers of
gravity. When properly timed, parallel attacks can overwhelm the enemy’s command and control
and defensive systems, creating strategic paralysis. This principle was brilliantly applied on the
opening night of Desert Storm, as the Iraqi air defense network was struck with precisely timed
parallel attacks and quickly rendered ineffective. The Iraqi defenses were first blinded by nearly
simultaneous attacks on early warning radars, then paralyzed by successive attacks on key com-
mand and control nodes.
4.4.6.2. Timing of Strike Impact on Enemy Operations . The timing of attacks should be
based on enemy time-table or “time critical” parameters. “Time critical” parameters are time-sen-
sitive tasks or activities that must be effectively and efficiently performed by the enemy for his
plans to succeed. To target the enemy effectively, his goals and tasks (particularly those which are
time sensitive) must be identified. “Time critical” periods must be determined. This involves
maintaining an intelligence posture capable of detecting, reporting, and assessing the conduct of

35
 enemy tasks prior to and during friendly operations. During offensive operations the general
attack is followed by resupply or the introduction of follow-on forces. The interdiction of these
can severely hamper an attack.
4.4.6.2.1. The time from the attack until its impact is felt is very important. For example,
striking or attacking enemy supplies stored near the battle lines will have a more immediate
effect on the battle than striking or attacking supplies stored in rear area warehouses or striking
enemy factories. If the effects of friendly strikes or attacks are to be felt immediately, different
targets may have to be selected than if immediate impact on the enemy is not required.
Attempts to have an immediate impact may delay the achievement of longer range goals.
Such trade-offs must be considered in establishing the timing criteria in objectives. Factors
such as enemy supply cushion and reserves are also important considerations in selecting tar-
gets for attack for immediate or long term impact.
4.4.6.3. Synchronization of Attacks. Individual attacks should be timed for maximum synergy
in achieving the overall objective. The inherent speed and flexibility of airpower can be exploited
through synchronized, parallel attacks on the enemy’s centers of gravity. When properly timed,
parallel attacks can overwhelm the enemy’s command and control and defensive systems, creating
strategic paralysis. This principle was brilliantly applied on the opening night of Desert Storm, as
key air defense nodes were struck in precisely timed parallel attacks and quickly rendered ineffec-
tive.
4.4.6.4. Recuperation and Reconstitution Time . Recuperation and reconstitution times are
also critical in targeting. The period during which the target is to be neutralized will influence the
type and amount of force to be used. For example, a few aircraft could attack local defenses and
achieve local air superiority for a limited time, but it would take many more aircraft to gain air
superiority or supremacy over a long period. Recuperation time should always be considered
when formulating combat assessment (CA) criteria.
4.4.7. Where Do We Want To Affect the Enemy Activity? The specific location where activity
should be modified is a significant part of the objective. By stating “where," the workload of the tar-
get analyst can be greatly simplified. For example, if only local air superiority is required, there is no
need to prepare an analysis to support attaining air superiority for the entire country. Time constraints
limit analysis.
4.4.8. How Much Will It Cost To Achieve the Objective and Is It Worth the Cost? A s s u m i n g
the objective is attainable, make an estimate of the cost (time, resources, manpower, etc.) and the
potential benefit to be derived from a successful operation. We must weigh carefully the cost and ben-
efit of different alternatives. The decision maker should be informed where cost can be lowered by
modifying the objective. The decision maker must also be told, if the cost seems too great for the ben-
efits gained. This question supports the military principle of Economy of Force.

NOTE: Figure 4.2 provides a worksheet for understanding objectives.

36
Figure 4.2. Worksheet for Understanding Objectives.

#_______Objective:
_______________________________________________________________________________

Identify the enemy activity to be affected. (i.e., WHAT do we want to do?)

_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

Identify the target system(s) performing the activity. (i.e., Against WHOM?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

Identify logical, available assets that can reach the objective target(s) in the time constraints noted in
guidance.
(i.e., HOW do we want to reach the objective?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

State attainable, quantifiable criteria against which effectiveness/success will be measured.

(i.e., TO WHAT DEGREE do we want to reach the objective?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

Determine the most opportune time and duration to impact the enemy.
(i.e., WHEN and for HOW LONG do we want to impact the objective?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

37
Identify the specific location where enemy activity should be modified.
(i.e., WHERE do we want to affect the enemy activity?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

Perform cost analysis to estimate the cost versus potential benefit.

(i.e., HOW MUCH will it cost to reach the objective, and is it WORTH it?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

Check the draft objective against U.S. policy, U.S. military strategy, and all known guidance.
(i.e., WHY do we want to reach the objectives?)
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________

4.5. Types of Guidance. Given that objectives are the goals we want to attain, then guidance sets the
limits or boundaries on objectives and how we attain these goals. There are two different types of guid-
ance, general and self-imposed. General guidance is the international unwritten and written rules of war
(e.g., Principles of War). Self-imposed guidance is made up of LOAC, Rules of Engagement and Com-
mand Guidance (the latter two can change with each conflict and command).
4.5.1. Principles of War . Primarily following Sun Tzu (500 BC) and Clausewitz (1800 AD), Colo-
nel J.F.C. Fuller is recognized as the author of the modern principles of war. In 1921, the US Army
listed Fuller’s eight strategic principles, plus the principle of simplicity, in War Department Training
Regulation 10-5, "Doctrine, Principles, and Methods." The principles we use today are essentially the
same. Table 4.2 lists these modern principles of war.

Table 4.2. Principles of War.

Principle Discussion
Objective Direct military operations toward a defined and attainable objective
Offensive Act rather than react and dictate the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity,
and pace of operations
Mass Concentrate power at the decisive time and place
Economy of Force Create useable mass by using minimum power on secondary objectives

38
Maneuver Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible appli-
cation of power
Unity of Command Ensure unity of effort under one commander
Security Protect friendly forces from enemy actions
Surprise Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner for which he is unpre-
pared
Simplicity Avoid unnecessary complexity in military operations
4.5.1.1. The two most important principles to the targeteer are objective and economy of force.
As stated earlier, a well-defined and measurable objective will result in effective force employ-
ment. In addition, the targeteer needs to apply the principle of economy of force and determine
when military action is inappropriate. This occurs when the potential for losses to friendly forces
outweighs the advantage of achieving the objective or when the amount of force required becomes
so high that the objective is not worth the effort.
4.5.2. Law of Armed Conflict . The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) constitutes that part of inter-
national law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (see attachment 4). LOAC imposes restric-
tions on the types of weapons that may be employed and the targets against which weapons may be
applied. The primary purpose of LOAC is to protect civilian populations as well as prisoners of war,
the wounded and sick, and shipwrecked. Two principles that form the foundation of LOAC are mili-
tary necessity and proportionality. Military necessity requires combat forces to engage in only those
acts necessary to accomplish a military objective. The principle of proportionality serves as the ful-
crum for balancing military necessity and unnecessary suffering to the civilian population. Therefore,
combat forces must attempt to minimize collateral damage. These two principles are woven through-
out almost the entire LOAC and understanding these will enable personnel to understand what is and
is not lawful.
4.5.3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) . ROEs, as defined by JP 1-02, are "directives...which delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue com-
bat engagement with other forces encountered." In other words, ROEs are guidelines that we impose
upon ourselves. For example, during the Korean war theater commanders placed a five mile no-strike
target area below the North Korean and Chinese border. The reason for this was to try to prevent
drawing China into the war. During the Gulf War, one restriction was that damage to the Iraqi econ-
omy and its capacity for postwar recovery would be limited. This rule was put into effect to keep Iraq
as a viable nation, thus furthering the national objective of promoting regional stability. It is the tar-
geteer’s responsibility to weigh target nominations against the ROEs and to request exemptions if cer-
tain targets are deemed vital enough to the campaign.
Due to all of the possible interpretations of LOAC and ROE, it is essential that targeteers involve the
Judge Advocate General (JAG) office early in the targeting process. Early involvement by the JAG
can prevent any possible violations of international law or other guidance.
4.5.4. Command Guidance. Theater, major command, unified, and specified commanders provide
more specific guidance for the employment of forces to meet objectives. Command guidance comes
in many forms and can entail a very broad area of subjects, from approved tactics for aircraft, to
proper behavior in local establishments by service members.

39
4.6. Conclusion. Objectives and guidance are the cornerstones of the targeting process. They guide the
later phases of the targeting process and should be clear and well defined. Once developed, theater and
command objectives need to be constantly reviewed to assure they accurately reflect the national objec-
tives and any political and international constraints. Because of their role, everyone involved in the tar-
geting process must fully understand the objectives and guidance given by their commanders. If there is
any doubt about the meaning of a commander’s objective or guidance, it is the targeteer’s duty to request
further clarification before continuing the targeting process.

40
 Chapter 5

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

5.1. Overview. Target development entails the systematic examination of potential target systems, their
components and the elements which make up each component in order to determine the importance, pri-
ority, weight of effort, and appropriate weapons selection for specific target systems. It identifies the crit-
ical components of a target system and their vulnerabilities to attack or other action. It includes five
functions:
• Target analysis
• Target validation
• Documentation
• Nomination
• Collection and exploitation requirements
5.1.1. There are no absolutes to conducting target development. The six targeting functions identi-
fied as separate entities in a graphical representation are in fact intertwined. This is never more evi-
dent than in target development where the targeteer goes “back” to help refine objectives and
guidance and “forward” to weaponeering feasibility, force application, and combat assessment.
5.1.2. Evolution of the Target Development Concept . Targeteers have continually refined the
concept of target development. There have been some fundamental problems that may seem obscure
to the novice targeteer, but are important to our place in warfighting. Since Intelligence producers
have “analyzed” the enemy, what then did targeteers do? Clarification came with the term “target
development”. We develop targets and inherent to this process is the analysis of targets, the analysis
of target systems, and associated activities; but with an operational underpinning. This is the true art
of the targeteer--developing targets and bridging the areas (not gaps) of planners and operators.

Foot Stomper Box

If targeteers don’t provide full targeting service, then other well meaning but under trained and ill-experi-
enced groups will step in and attempt to provide that which is perceived to be missing.

5.2. Target Analysis. This is an examination of potential targets to determine military importance, prior-
ity, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. It is an open ended analysis
of potential enemies. This pamphlet does not attempt to teach analysis, but gives some methods (see
Attachment 5) proven useful for target intelligence in the past. They are useful for the real world only if
they are appropriate to the environment in which they are used. The best analysis is reasoned thought
with facts and conclusions, not a checklist. Target analysis is not the sole responsibility of targeteers.
Most analysis is produced through the normal intelligence production process based on national and the-
ater validated requirements. Targeteers concentrate on turning those products into target sets. Target
analysis can be an iterative process with planners since objectives and guidance will never be finalized
before the start of target analysis. Two broad approaches, critical node analysis and target system analysis
are described below.

41
 5.2.1. Critical Node Analysis . Nodal analysis focuses on the interaction and interrelationships
among multiple target systems to determine the degree and points of their interdependence, as well as
the linkage of their activities. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the enemy activities to be
affected, not on the characteristics of individual targets. The objective is to determine the most effec-
tive way to influence or affect the enemy systems.
5.2.2. Target System Analysis . Target system analysis is a systematic approach to determine
enemy vulnerabilities and exploitable weaknesses. It determines what effects will likely be achieved
against target systems and their associated activities. A targeteer must review the functions and inter-
actions between components and elements of a target system to determine how the system works. The
analysis provides the understanding for determining what effects are likely to be achieved by attack-
ing the system, where the system must be attacked, and how long the attack will disrupt enemy plans
or operations. By reviewing probabilities of damage and arrival for a weapon system, targeteers can
evaluate the effects of attacks on different components and isolate relevant elements to plan the dis-
ruption or neutralization of an entire target system.

Foot Stomper Box Target analysis is a core competency within the targeting process. Don’t just think
about target systems, but think through the analysis. DIA has produced a solid document in Critical Ele-
ments of Selected Generic Installations. Just remember it is generic and not every power plant, etc., is built
the same. Not every objective has a corresponding set of critical elements. Doctrine has generally accept-
ed a common term for the product of target analysis, “center(s) of gravity”. These concepts need to be fur-
ther developed from the analysis of the enemy in their geo-political situation. The use of “centers of
gravity” allow discussions on broad goals when specifics are not required.
5.2.3. There are three broad steps to target analysis.
• Identify the target system supporting the activity to be affected.
• Identify target system components.
• Select a method of analysis appropriate to the target system.
5.2.3.1. Target System Identification. The first step is to identify the target system(s) that sup-
port the enemy activity to be affected. Air Force doctrine is a good guide for this task. We stress
the following target sets are not the only answer nor are we suggesting these are the best answers.
They are a good place to begin. Therefore, the best place to start is looking at the roles and mis-
sions assigned. Table 5.1. and Table 5.2. show some generic representative target systems for
various roles and missions of the Air Force for use by targeteers. Again, we stress this is not a
checklist but a good example of where airpower was used to advantage in many past conflicts and
with a view to the future.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Generic Target Sets by Mission. The first step is to identify the target sys-
tems supporting the enemy activity to be affected. There are several general categories of enemy
target systems. Each is often associated with executing a standard Air Force strike or attack mis-
sion:

42
Table 5.1. Example of Target System - Control.
Roles Missions Sub Missions or Target Sets or Tactic Target & Aimpoint
Target System Examples
Control
Counterair Defensive CA Combat Air Patrol
(Our side of the border)
AD-Surface to Air
(Army owned-JAADC
controlled)
Offensive CA Sweep Aircraft
Airfields; AD & Sortie generation-T/O
Multi-role surfaces
Ammo-warhead mating
Maintenance
Logistical storage-Am-
mo, POL
Aircraft revetments,
hangerettes
Aircraft
Other-Pilots, barracks,
etc.
Power Projection Offensive missiles *
Air Command and EW/GCI *
Control
AD HQ-region, sector,
FACP *
ATC/Nav aids *
Air Logistics Maintenance & repair
bases
Air depots
SAMs SAM sites
SAM maintenance &
depots
Counterspace Space Control Facs Trackers
Space Launch Facs Launcher
Counter Infor- Offensive CI/ Telecommunication Switching centers *
mation C2W
Computer Manufactur- Chip storage area
ing
Information Process- Computers
ing

43
Table 5.2. Example of Target System - Strike.
Roles Missions Sub Missions or Tar- Target Sets or Tactic Target & Aimpoint
get System Examples
Strike
Strategic At-
tack (Ability to
wage war)

Command, Control & HQs-Nat/Thtr/Re- Ops center bunker

Comms gional Gov administrative,
Government Control ministries
Tele-communication Phones, radio/TV
Intel collection activi- SIGINT site, Intel
ties processing facility
War sustaining indus- Armaments produc- Rolling Mill, chemi-
tries tion POL cal handling area
Cracking tower
War supporting indus- Electricity Production and dis-
tries Equipment produc- semination
tion Truck plant, comput-
Basic industrial pro- er plant *
cessing Cement plant, steel
Research and devel- mill
opment Laboratories, test fa-
Ports cilities
Cranes
Weapons of mass de- Research & develop- Laboratories, test fa-
struction ment Production cilities Plutonium
Storage separators Bunkers
Interdiction Lines of communica- Road transportation Bridges, convoys,
tions Railroad transporta- truck parks
tion Bridges, yards, sid-
Water transportation ings, trains
Locks, terminals,
boats
Storage depots Warehouses
Maritime operations Infrastructure Naval facilities
Order of battle Ships
Sea Control Coastal defense sites
Air lines of communi- Heliborne resupply Fuel bladders
cations

44
 Close Air Sup- Ground order of battle Artillery, tanks,
port trucks, defenses

NOTE: * Target systems and categories are not exclusive. Asterisk items can fall in more than one
group to a significant degree
5.2.3.1.1. Control. Control includes counterair, counterspace, and counter information opera-
tions. Targeteers are especially involved in offensive counterair and offensive counter infor-
mation operations. Offensive counterair targets include aircraft, SAM and antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) sites, air bases, air control systems, aviation POL stores, and other elements. Counter
information targets include information via attack on facilities, hardware, software, or data.
5.2.3.1.1.1. Counterair Operations. Counterair operations aim to defeat or neutralize the
enemy’s air and missile forces.
5.2.3.1.1.2. Counterspace. Counterspace objectives include gaining and maintaining
control of activities conducted in or through the space environment.
5.2.3.1.1.3. Counter Information. Counter information seeks to establish information
superiority through control.
5.2.3.1.2. Strike. Strike includes strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support opera-
tions.
5.2.3.1.2.1. Strategic Attack. This system includes the vital military and economic tar-
gets that constitute a nation's war making capability and those targets essential to postwar
recovery. Targets in this system include nuclear and conventional military capabilities, as
well as political and economic resources.
5.2.3.1.2.2. Interdiction. Air interdiction (AI) operations are conducted to destroy, neu-
tralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively
against friendly forces. Interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not
required. Some examples of target system components include: bridges, roads, railroads
and classification yards, supply depots, maintenance and port facilities, waterways, petro-
leum storage areas, petroleum pipelines and logistics facilities, aircraft, ships, and vehi-
cles.
5.2.3.1.2.3. Close Air Support. Air support by fixed or rotary wing aircraft against hos-
tile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces, with deconfliction of each air mis-
sion with the fire and movement of the friendly forces. Components of this type of target
system include enemy troops, armor, artillery, and support elements.
5.2.3.1.3. Exceptions to the Rule. There are many examples of targets not apparently con-
nected to the objective. The destruction of electric power generation normally is associated
with the strategic attack mission but, if a country has electrified rail, it could also be consid-
ered an interdiction mission. The destruction of an Iraqi railroad repair factory (strategic
attack) during the Gulf War might have prevented the Iraqis from quickly moving two Repub-
lican Guards divisions on railcars south (interdiction) toward Kuwait in October of 1994.
Keep in mind each enemy’s infrastructure is different.

45
 5.2.3.2. Identify System Components and Specific Activities of Each Component. T h e s e c -
ond step is to examine major target systems and determine functionally related activities. By
detailing the target system components and mapping out the activities’ (functions’) input and out-
put you will have a good idea of which components may be impacted. Examples of major groups
of target categories from the Modernized Integrated Data Base (MIDB) to consider include:
• Raw materials
• Basic processing
• Basic equipment production or manufacture
• Basic services, research, and utilities
• End products (chiefly civilian)
• Materiel (chiefly military)
• Places, population, and government leadership
• Air and missile facilities and joint commands
• Military troop facilities

Foot Stomper Box Although many targeteers began their careers as imagery interpreters or in SIGINT,
it is not necessary to be an expert in those skills to be effective in target system analysis. First, much work
has already been published on generic industries and utilities. These generic critical components, such as
those found in DIA’s Critical Elements of Selected Generic Installations, are also documented in other,
more specific Intelligence publication. But don’t stop there. On the Air Force Targeting Homepage on
INTELINK you will find links to many potential sources.
5.2.3.2.1. Potential targets may be located in various installation lists by category. An instal-
lation list is a compendium of objects or areas used primarily for reference purposes. An
example is the MIDB, which contains worldwide installation lists related to orders of battle.
MIDB has been designated the migration system for the production and use of general military
intelligence data. It is being designed to incorporate several programs into a single set of com-
mon core database structures and analytical applications. MIDB will refocus the Integrated
Data Base (IDB) toward the intelligence data user through a series of user interface upgrades
that allow a friendlier operating environment. It will also improve the "tools" available to the
user and include: look-up tables, help features, standard query tables, a graphical display capa-
bility, and improved data output through a broader reports capability.
5.2.3.2.2. It is important to include all potential targets in the analysis. Although intuition,
past experience, rules of engagement, and judgment may favor the exclusion of a given target,
complete analysis may yield unanticipated results. All analysis should be as thorough as cir-
cumstances, time, and resources allow.
5.2.3.2.3. After the target system is understood and individual targets identified for analysis,
the target analyst should gather intelligence describing the characteristics of each one. Collec-
tion requirements, RFIs, and production requests (PR) are input during system analysis. This
is normally where collection managers are brought in to help refine requirements for intelli-
gence production. Products such as intelligence dossiers, folders, and/or automated files have
been produced for many installations and target systems. These files provide historical infor-

46
 mation as well as target descriptions. The National Target Base (NTB) maintained by
STRATCOM/J5 to support development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) rep-
resents one example.
5.2.3.3. Selection of Analysis Method . The analysis method selected should be appropriate not
only to the target system but also understood by the people doing the analysis. All analysis tools
have their strengths and weaknesses. If the targeteer does not understand the meaning behind the
final answer then they do not have a good answer. Several methods of analysis follow, beginning
with a traditional method of building a target system model and developing utility measurements.
5.2.3.3.1. Traditional target system analysis consisted of building a model. In broad terms, a
model is a representation of a complex system (usually smaller than the system). By building
a model, the relationship between components of the system can be portrayed using textual
descriptions, flow charts, graphical depiction’s, or mathematical models.
5.2.3.3.2. An element in modeling is the establishment of utility measures, which are numeri-
cal ratings or weights assigned to system components to help the analyst compare targets and
determine which has a higher importance than another. The numbers do not have to be real or
represent any specific characteristics but are used only to show relationships between compo-
nents. Promising potential targets can be determined and a measure of worth or value attached
to each, reflecting its importance or contribution to the system to be affected or modified. Val-
ues may be based on a purely functional determination or based on value to the enemy.
5.2.3.3.3. Target Value Analysis. Any target evaluation system must simplify a complex
environment into a relatively small number of measurements that can be used to determine
whether a proposed attack plan will have significant impact in terms of a specified goal. To be
worthwhile, the system must be broad enough to include all relevant types of measurements
and indicators. It must be structured into an orderly and systematic framework that will enable
replication from situation to situation. It must also be flexible enough to be useful in a wide
range of situations. In short, the system must strike a balance between too little and too much
analysis.
5.2.3.3.3.1. Target value analysis uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis. While
the basis of target value analysis is qualitative decision-making (choosing among values),
the techniques are quantitative. People and computers are both necessary for high quality
target value analysis. In deciding the best way to attack a target system, the best decision
shaping computer is an experienced targeteer. The problem is not merely one of develop-
ing a computational process for decision shaping, but of making effective use of knowl-
edge, training, and experience in the process. Some tasks are best accomplished by
humans and others by machines, and the best qualities of each must be used in the deci-
sion-shaping process. The machine can call forth and structure the information stored and
available to targeting personnel, presenting accurate and complete data rapidly. The
human participant can provide initial data, assign values to materials, and make decisions
based on the data presentations. One of the most difficult and most important input is the
measure of target value or utility.
5.2.3.3.3.2. The key concept in target value analysis is the need to analyze targets in terms
of their comparative or relative worth. Central to this effort is the concept of “measurabil-
ity.” If a target cannot be measured in terms of its worth relative to another, then no

47
premise exists for analytical reasoning. Certainly, it is much easier to measure factors
such as relative worth in a micro sense; that is, to look at the small picture. It is much more
difficult to determine such characteristics in a more complex problem. For example, it is
easier to determine a relative ranking of targets within a given category than it is to rank
targets of different categories. There are several useful approaches for determining rela-
tive rankings or value assignments in solving complex problems. Some of the relevant
aspects of these approaches are discussed below.
5.2.3.3.3.3. Certain considerations are important for all targets systems when determining
which elements are appropriate for attack. Though many are not specifically quantifiable,
the targeting planner should think about the following characteristics when attempting to
assign a rank order to the various components of a system:
5.2.3.3.3.3.1. Importance and Significance . Importance is a rough classification of
the value to enemy military operations derived from all types of equipment, supplies,
installations, and personnel used by enemy forces. Significance is the measure of con-
cern for an activity or resources in excess of the value which would be assigned
because of its normal performance (its importance). The measure may reflect military,
economic, political, psychosocial, or geographic significance. Special significance
assigned to a system may not reflect rational thought processes by the enemy and may
be very difficult to assess. It is important to note that the concept of Importance and
Significance is more than a semantic argument. It shapes decision making and adds
validity to the targeting decision. An example of the difference follows. Tikrit, Iraq, is
a medium size town with few war supporting and war sustaining functions. It is of
medium-to-low importance to Iraqi war making capabilities. Tikrit is significant as the
home of Saddam Hussein’s family and personal power base.
5.2.3.3.3.3.2. Depth . Depth is a measure of the time required before disruption of a
component's activity affects the system output. Average depth is a time concept
designed to measure the average interval between the time the production of an item
begins and the time the finished product appears in use by a tactical unit. If dispersion
is ignored and the average depth is considered an actual constant depth, then the depth
of item X is the interval between the time production of X stops and the time the short-
ages of X (or of times requiring X for their production) appear in tactical units in com-
bat. In general, depth computation is important to measure the time available to the
enemy to organize substitute consumption, alternate production, or alternate procure-
ment before he suffers military damage.
5.2.3.3.3.3.3. Reserves . Reserves are the quantity of stored resources the enemy may
use when the normal supply of the resource is disrupted or when an excess demand is
made on a component for its products or services. Assessment of reserves depends
upon the estimation of the system use or flow rate. The measure of reserves is the per-
centage of the products used versus the total products available. To guard against any
loss of war-making ability, reserves must be readily available for use, and the quantity
must be enough to last until normal supplies again become available. In an ideal situ-
ation, the enemy should be forced to consume more of its reserves than it can replace.
5.2.3.3.3.3.4. Cushion . Cushion is a quantity that prevents sudden shocks by absorb-
ing impact. It is a measure of the extent to which a single target component or system

48
can absorb a disruptive influence and continue to produce or provide the required prod-
uct or service. Viewed from another aspect, cushion is that portion of the enemy’s tar-
get system that must be destroyed before its military activities are affected. An enemy
can usually suffer loss of goods and services up to a point without critical conse-
quences to his military forces. However, once this buffer is destroyed, any further
destruction denies the military forces full operational capability. Determining this
point for an industry or a military activity requires detailed analysis of a system’s oper-
ation, including idle plant capacity, replacement and expansion capacity, civilian pro-
duction use, the production of nonessential military items or services, or production or
provision of substitute materials or services. In other words, if a country’s military
only uses ten percent of the nation’s POL refinery capability, then 90 percent of the
capacity must be negated to affect the military.
5.2.3.3.3.3.4.1. Process and Equipment Substitutes . Unused capacity in a spe-
cific industry can often be modified for use elsewhere in the economy, to replace
destroyed capacity. Thus, the kilns used in annealing grinding wheels might be
destroyed, yet similar kilns used for producing various kinds of ceramic wares
could be adapted to the grinding wheel industry.
5.2.3.3.3.3.4.2. Product or Service Substitutes . This includes saving remaining
production of the attacked industry for the most vital military uses and using sub-
stitute products for less important purposes. Thus, aluminum can be used for cop-
per in high tension wires to save copper for signal equipment. There is a time
dimension that is critical in the substitution process. That is, how rapidly and for
how long can the substitute be produced or provided? The impact of costs of sub-
stitution (in resources and in inferior performance) in military worth must also be
considered.
5.2.3.3.3.3.4.3. Availability of Substitute Supplies and Services from Others
. Even if the product has great military importance and there are no acceptable sub-
stitutes, the industry or activity producing or providing it may be rejected as a tar-
get if the enemy can obtain adequate supplies from sources other than domestic
production such as from imports, reserves, repair, salvage, etc.
5.2.3.3.3.3.5. Capacity . Capacity may be evaluated as either current output or maxi-
mum output. Current output represents plant production based on the present labor
force, economy of the country, current demand for the product, and demonstrated pro-
duction over the past two or three years. Maximum output represents full capacity pro-
duction based upon existing equipment and continuous operation over a 24-hour day.
5.2.3.3.3.3.6. Product or Service Economic Value . This is the estimated cost to the
enemy of producing or providing a product or service based on the cost of skilled
workers, production plant, support facilities, equipment, supplies, etc. Target systems
are grouped into one of three broad categories: sophisticated, costly (expensive) prod-
uct; mechanized, moderately costly product; and nonmechanized, inexpensive product.
5.2.3.3.3.3.7. Vulnerability . Vulnerability refers to the physical vulnerability of an
installation or facility. Size, shape, and hardness all determine how susceptible a target
is to damage. Vulnerability affects the size of force required to damage a target, as

49
well as munitions and fuzing requirements. In a systems approach, the most vulnera-
ble and critical portion of a system may be the most lucrative target. Vulnerability can
also be measured in informational terms.
5.2.3.3.3.3.8. Reconstitution or Recuperability . This is a measurement of the time
and cost required for a system to regain the ability to function after being disrupted.
By assigning each type of target a reconstitution or recuperation time factor, such as
days required to rebuild the facility or perform the original function again, the amount
of target value that can be restored each day can be estimated using the reciprocal of
the time factor. The target analyst can then forecast the stages of repair and replace-
ment and determine the timing or necessity for a restrike. These factors depend on the
type of installation, availability of repair materials, similarity and interchangeability of
the damaged parts, and the importance of the installation to the enemy.
5.2.3.3.3.3.8.1. Type of Installation . Both the function and complexity of instal-
lation construction bear heavily on the time and capital required for replacement.
5.2.3.3.3.3.8.2. Availability of Repair Materials . Depending on the installation,
repair materials may or may not be stockpiled or even available within the country.
5.2.3.3.3.3.8.3. Similarity and Interchangeability of Parts . This is allied to the
availability of repair materials. Special parts can sometimes be obtained from a
less important facility. However, often similar facilities by function cannot inter-
change parts. Such situations are lucrative for exploitation, but require in-depth
target analysis.
5.2.3.3.3.3.8.4. Importance and Significance to the Enemy . Iraq chose not to
rebuild some of its infrastructure after the Gulf War. The propaganda significance
of these damaged functions to the Iraqi leadership outweighed the importance to
the Iraqi people. Given this hindsight, was the military effort worth the results?
5.2.3.3.3.3.9. Geographic Location . Targets may be selected or rejected based on
their location. Before weapon systems attained global capability, range was the pri-
mary targeting consideration in relation to location, and the capability of tactical forces
to reach a target still remains an important factor. However, for systems analysts, the
location of an installation in relation to the target system may be a valuable clue to the
significance of the installation. For example, if a power plant is located near key mili-
tary and industrial facilities, it is probably more important than a similar one located to
serve only consumer needs. Also, if the target is too far removed from the battlefield,
it may not have a direct impact on the battle.
5.2.3.3.3.3.9.1. Target location in relation to cultural features is also important
since political factors influence target selection. If an attack on a target is consid-
ered politically unfeasible because of possible damage to a nearby installation or
population center, the target may not receive strike approval.
5.2.3.3.3.3.10. Concentration or Dispersal. This is the geographic distribution of the
installations in a target system or of target elements within a target complex. The types
of weapons and forces required to neutralize the objective depend on the distribution of
elements. Dispersal has a direct bearing on target vulnerability, and an installation
with a large number of dispersed elements presents a more difficult targeting problem
50
 than does a tightly concentrated installation. Dispersal may also be viewed as a mea-
surement of the time and movement required for the component to meet its demands.
5.2.3.3.3.3.11. Mobility . This is a measure of the time required to shift a component
activity from one location to another. Mobility affects both the perishability of the
information about the location of the enemy system and friendly systems’ ability to
detect, locate, identify, and strike the target component.
5.2.3.3.3.3.12. Countermeasures . This is a measure of enemy ability to counteract
the potential disruptive activity of the friendly system through active and passive
means. Effective use of terrain, camouflage, emission controls, passive defenses
(caves, hangarettes, etc. ), and active defenses could negate the ability of the friendly
system to exert an influence upon enemy component activity. This constitutes another
aspect of target vulnerability.

5.3. Target Validation. Target validation ensures all nominated targets meet the objectives and criteria
outlined in the expanded guidance. Targets are validated by evaluating and approving recommended tar-
gets; validation should occur as early in the strike or attack cycle as appropriate. Certain questions should
be considered during this portion of the target development process:
• Do the targets meet Joint Force Commander (JFC) objectives and guidance?
• Does the target contribute to the adversary's capability and will to wage war?
• Is the target operational?
• Is the target significant?
• Is the target politically sensitive?
• What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the adversary?
• What are LOAC and ROE considerations?
• What is the impact of not conducting operations against the target?
5.3.1. No-Fire Lists/Prohibited Target Lists/ Protect Lists. In some situations, the highest-level
decision making authorities may require that each potential target be evaluated in light of the rules of
engagement, LOAC, or other restrictions and limitations. Potential targets may be withheld and
approved for inclusion on a list of targets which may not be struck or attacked. Targets may be sub-
mitted for no-hit protection based on their intelligence, operational, or political value, or deconfliction
with other ongoing operations such as special operations, deception, or PSYOP. Targets may also be
protected based on cultural, religious, or historic value (figure 5.1).

51
Figure 5.1. Gulf War Joint No-Fire Target List.

"To help strike planners, CENTCOM target intelligence analysts, in close coordination with the national
intelligence agencies and the State Department, produced a joint no-fire target list. This list was a com-
pilation of historical, archeological, economic, religious and politically sensitive installations in Iraq and
Kuwait that could not be targeted. Additionally, target intelligence analysts were tasked to look in a
six-mile area around each master attack target for schools, hospitals, and mosques to identify targets
where extreme care was required in planning."
Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Title V Report

5.3.2. Desired Damage and Level of Effort Required. The desired level of damage against specific
targets influences options and priorities. Guidance may specify guidelines for levels of damage, but
the weaponeering assessment may show that some critical targets are not susceptible to significant
damage by available weapons or non lethal force application.
5.3.3. Risk of Collateral Damage. Collateral damage is generally defined as unintentional or inci-
dental damage that occurs as a result of an attack but affects facilities, equipment, or personnel that are
not militarily acceptable targets. Since this kind of damage is often the focal point for national and
international scrutiny, the type and level of force applied against a target must be carefully selected to
avoid excessive collateral damage. International law does not prohibit attacks against military objec-
tives even though they may cause collateral damage since incidental damage is inevitable during
armed conflict; but this damage should not be excessive in relation to the military advantage antici-
pated.
5.3.4. Deconfliction. Proposed targets must be coordinated with appropriate agencies in a process
called "deconfliction". Deconfliction is a checklist function. This checklist should be developed in
the planning process and be appropriate to the organization. The many offices involved must be coor-
dinated with to prevent incidents of friendly fire or propaganda for the enemy. Some examples where
deconfliction take place are:
• Special Operations Forces (SOF). The Joint Force Special Operations Component Com-
mander (JFSOCC) must deconflict Special Operations (SO) activities with the JFC and other
joint force component commanders to avoid fratricide. This process may be difficult.
• Search and Rescue (SAR)
• ROE monitoring
• Strike histories. Previous BDA and its importance
• Intelligence monitoring/Situational awareness
• Information operations

5.4. Documentation. Though administrative in nature, this fifth step is important. Documentation
includes preparing a list of potential targets, dossiers of information on each potential target, and a file of
validation request and approval messages. Figure 5.2 is one example of a format and content useful for
collecting, organizing, and recording data for target analysis.

52
 5.4.1. A target list, which is different from an installation list, is a list of specifically designated and
militarily significant objects or areas against which future intelligence collection, or attack operations
are to be, or may be, directed. It is developed in response to a specific directive or contingency, and
thus is shorter than an installation list. However, at this point in the targeting process, the target list is
a working list that requires more evaluation before specific execution planning can begin.
5.4.2. The target dossier on each potential target should include the following: at least six elements of
target identification (BE number or unit ID, functional classification code, name, country code, coor-
dinates with reference datum, and significance statement); available images, target materials, and
amplifying text.
5.4.3. Target imagery research through local files is now supplemented through INTELINK and other
electronic means including the Image Product Archives (IPA). This is a standardized library function
supporting the retrieval of unexploited (raw) and exploited (finished) imagery derived products.
These products are available to users at the national, theater, component and unit levels throughout the
world. Users have two methods of accessing IPA, either through INTELINK, using network informa-
tion discovery and retrieval tools (browsers) such as Mosaic or Netscape, or with the IPA-client tool.
5.4.4. Units may be required to produce target folders. The format of Combat Mission Folders can be
found in MCR 55-125, Preparation of Mission Planning Materials.

Figure 5.2. Example Targeting Worksheet.

DPI/DGZ/DMPI DATA (Use a separate sheet for each DPI/DGZ/DMPI)

a. BE NUMBER
b. CATEGORY CODE
c. INSTALLATION NAME
d. INSTALLATION COORDINATES (UTM AND GEOGRAPHIC)
e. COUNTRY CODE
f. GRAPHIC REFERENCE
g. GRAPHIC DATE
h. DPI/DGZ/DMPI DESIGNATION/LOCATION (ACCURACY)
i. DPI/DGZ/DMPI DESCRIPTION/SIZE/ORIENTATION/AXIS OF ATTACK
j. FUZING/HEIGHT OF BURST
k. CRITICALITY STATEMENT

PLANNING DATA
a. DAMAGE CRITERIA (K-KILL, PTO, etc.) & LEVEL OF DAMAGE
b. ACFT/WPN/MUNITIONS CEP
c. SSPD/FC
d. PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL
e. DAMAGE EXPECTANCY/COMPOUND DE

53
 f. UTILITY VALUE
g. MARGINAL OUTPUT
h. MARGINAL PRODUCT

5.5. Target Nomination. The products of the previous phases of the targeting process are used to
develop responsive target sets. Nominations should show how target recommendations satisfy command
objectives and priorities. Additionally, planners should establish and justify options and priorities, and
document these efforts before nominating target taskings to the commander. There are different nomina-
tion processes between the surface forces and the air forces. Surface forces usually nominate specific tar-
gets from the bottom up and air forces normally nominate specific targets at the force level. In any case,
Joint Force components nominate requirements outside their own boundaries or exceed the capabilities of
organic and support assets within their boundaries.
5.5.1. Responsive Target Set. Target sets are built to respond specifically to objectives and guid-
ance, assigned missions, options, and priorities. Such guidance may dictate that target sets be grouped
geographically or be based on specific functional categories. Targets also may be grouped according
to unique weapon system requirements. Another grouping may include restricted targets. Specialty
target sets may include those selected for the employment of information operations or special opera-
tions forces. During the objectives and guidance stage, predetermined percentages for destruction for
each target set may have been laid out by the commander.
5.5.2. Target Lists. The recommended target list supports the target nomination briefing to the JFC.
Target recommendations may be phased and grouped by mission, operation plan, option, or priority
depending on the purpose and audience. They also may be grouped according to recommended weap-
ons, e.g., mines or precision-guided munitions. Furthermore, they may be grouped according to
weapon system recommendations, e.g., B-52s or Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). Target-
ing personnel should be prepared to provide the full range of information to the operations staff in
support of force application. Targeteers and operations planners continue to work together to adjust
the recommendations.
5.5.2.1. The targeteer provides the commander or his designated target approval representative
with a prioritized list of specific validated targets. This list provides planners with the name, BE
number(s), coordinates, function, description, possible aimpoints, effects desired on the target,
and tentative weaponeering solutions. The targeteer includes a statement on the significance of
the target in light of the commander’s objectives. Often, other analyst comments are includes, par-
ticularly if the target can be affected through non lethal means. The list may also include addi-
tional information such as the requesting service and even a recommendation as to which service
should be responsible for attacking that target. A word of caution at this point, the target list has
not been finalized--it is a working list that requires more evaluation before specific tasking can
begin.
5.5.2.2. Target List Approval Importance . Target lists are important because they drive force
employment, as well as production of intelligence for aircrews and missileers. Production of tar-
get materials in sufficient quantities and detail for all possible users is a complex and time con-
suming process that imposes severe demands on scarce resources. Also, the production cannot be
quickly expanded in quantity, only focused on subject. This is the reason operations plans’

54
 (OPlan) and a few concept plans’ (ConPlan) target lists normally have target materials produced
for them. DIA is the manager for production of target planning materials under the Target Mate-
rials Program. The theater’s tactical target materials catalogs (TTMC) are a compilation of only
the formal, regulated target material production. They do not include the thousands of target
images, “select prints” etc, generated by organic, theater, and national level intelligence produc-
ers.
5.5.2.2.1. The newer targeting tools (i.e., Rapid Application of Airpower) should assist in this
process by checking such database items as the category code of the target nomination or its
location. Also, a new graphical presentation application on RAAP can help the approval pro-
cess.
5.5.2.2.2. The target list is then sent up the chain of command to, eventually, the theater
CINC. This is most often done via briefing at each level. A Joint Target Coordination Board
(JTCB) often is designated to formalize the nomination process.
5.5.3. Where Validation and Nomination Occur. While validation or nomination will occur in all
phases of the target process, there are certain characteristics that tend to make the majority of nomina-
tions fall within force selection/application or within the target development phase. Table 5.3. lists
their characteristics to distinguish the functions.

Table 5.3. Validation Versus Nomination.

VALIDATION NOMINATION
Internal External
Check list function Formal (but flexible)
Micro Macro
ROE/LOAC Decision making
Deconfliction TARBUL
Desired Pd Needs acceptance
Continuous/ongoing Aggregations of nominations
All levels Between components
Collateral damage All levels
Documentation Feedback required
No Fire Lists Sometimes up channel/sometimes down
Objectives/ CONOPS
Feasibility

5.6. Establishing Collection and Exploitation Requirements. The last step in target development is to
establish collection and exploitation requirements for each potential target. These requirements must be
articulated early in the targeting process to support target development and eventually combat assessment.
A good knowledge of the types and sources of intelligence as related in Chapter 2 and Attachment 3 will
help the targeteer write better Requests for Information (RFI) and Production Requests (PR). One natural
area for consolidation of AOC Target Branch collection management inputs is the Combat Assessment
Cell where a single POC (per shift) can interface with the Collection Management Branch.

55
 Chapter 6

WEAPONEERING

6.1. Overview. Weaponeering is the process of estimating the quantity of a specific type weapon
required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon
effects, munition delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability, etc. It is the third
phase in the conceptual targeting process, but it is embedded into target development, force selection, and
execution planning. Weaponeering is a core competency of targeting, although many confuse all target-
ing with weaponeering. Weaponeers quantify the expected results of lethal and non lethal weapons
employment against targets. The recommended target list provides the basis for weaponeering assess-
ment activities. Since time constraints may preclude calculations of potential effects against all targets,
calculations should proceed in a prioritized fashion that mirrors the target list. Nonnuclear weaponeering
is normally done using methodologies prepared by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munition
Effectiveness (JTCG/ME).

Foot Stomper Box. Weaponeering results in probable outcomes given many replications of an event. It
does not predict the outcome of every munition delivery. It is a statistical average based on modeling,
weapons tests, and real-world deliveries.

6.2. Weapon Allocation. Weapon allocation is the designation of specific numbers and types of weap-
ons for use during a specified time period or for carrying out an assigned task.

6.3. Weapon Effectiveness. Weapon effectiveness is a statistical estimate of the results expected from
specific munitions effects, target environment, damage criteria, delivery accuracy, munitions reliability,
and ballistics. This should be closely tied to munitions effectiveness assessment in combat assessment.

6.4. Combat Weapon Effectiveness Data. It is difficult to assemble data on the combat effectiveness of
a weapon system. Weapons are not operated by laboratory experts methodically following test plans, but
by aircrews acting under combat tensions and pressure. Data used in predicting weapon effectiveness
must be a valid representation of how both human and machines perform in combat. Very little of this
type of information can be recovered from combat experience. Some data can be gained from test firings,
if the tests are carefully controlled to allow for the realities of combat, but other data simply is not avail-
able and must be extrapolated.
6.4.1. Several complicating factors must be fully considered before the combat effectiveness of muni-
tions can be realistically estimated. Weaponeers and operational planners must consider all of these
factors so as not to provide overly optimistic predictions of combat effectiveness:
• Enemy Actions--The effects of enemy actions and countermeasures.
• Delivery Accuracy--The measurement of how closely a system can deliver its weapons or
warheads to the target. Delivery accuracy’s in JMEM are determined from data gathered in
weapons tests and operational aircrew experiences, as well as programs to gather data (e.g.,
Weapons System Evaluation Program). JMEM data is not the best accuracy ever achieved on
the range in noncombat situations, but rather an estimate of real-world expected accuracy.

56
 • Damage Mechanisms--Warhead characteristics producing damage effects, including blast,
fragmentation, incendiary, overpressure, dynamic pressure, etc.
• Target Vulnerability--The susceptibility of a target to terminal effects or specific damage
mechanisms of a munition.
• Weapon Reliability--Warhead functioning dependability.
• Trajectory--Ballistics and/or weapon or warhead flight characteristics.
6.4.2. The Services, as well as the JTCG/ME, DIA, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (for-
merly Defense Nuclear Agency) have developed a number of quantitative techniques used to estimate
weapon effectiveness, taking many of these factors into account. The JTCG/ME, for example, devel-
ops analytical methods for measuring and predicting munitions effectiveness. It has also produced a
large body of scientifically valid data related to specific weapons, munitions, and appropriate targets.
The group devised mathematical models which enable weaponeers to predict the effectiveness of
weapons against most militarily significant targets. Inputs to these methodologies include factors
such as aircraft capabilities and configurations; target characteristics, such as size, shape, and hard-
ness, and delivery parameters (altitudes, speeds, dive angles, etc.). Model outputs include numbers of
sorties or passes required to achieve specified damage levels in terms of stated damage criteria. These
outputs allow weapons effectiveness comparisons.

6.5. Steps in Weaponeering. There are multiple steps in weaponeering.

• Set collection requirements
• Obtain information on friendly aircraft, weapons, fuzes, and delivery tactics
• Determine target elements to be analyzed
• Determine damage criteria, if analysis of individual targets is to be accomplished
• Determine weapons effectiveness index
• Determine aimpoints and desired impact points
• Evaluate weapon effectiveness
• Prepare preliminary documentation
• Review collection requirements
6.5.1. Set Collection Requirements. The weaponeer can generally obtain most necessary data from
the target developer, if the functions are separate, but there are times when special information is
needed to perform a weaponeering task. The weaponeer must establish collection and exploitation
requirements as soon as they are identified. Requirements for both target development and weap-
oneering should be coordinated and submitted as a single set.
6.5.2. Obtain Information on Friendly Forces. The weaponeer must know the aircraft, weapons,
and fuzes available for use, as well as probable munitions delivery tactics. Moreover, weaponeering
results will only be useful to an operational planner if the employment parameters used in the process
represent the ones used in combat. In combat planning, where a large number of targets must be
weaponeered very quickly, it is advisable to agree upon standard planning factors. Some additional
information helpful in making intelligent weaponeering recommendations include: weather, training/
readiness posture, target acquisition probability, collateral damage potential, and ROEs. Targeteers
should work closely with the operations and logistics staff to obtain this information and keep them up

57
to date. As a rule of thumb, theater component targeting branches should request from their OPlan/
Checkered Flag Time-Phased Force and Deployment Listing (TPFDL) units’ expected input options
for the Automated Weaponeering Optimization Program (AWOP) to provide realistic planning data.
For remote tour areas such as Korea, this data should be requested every six months.
6.5.3. Determine Target Elements To Be Analyzed . The third step in weaponeering is to examine
the data provided by target developers or imagery interpreters and decide which elements to analyze
for vulnerability. Where is the target most vulnerable and to what weapon effect?
6.5.3.1. Some targets are hardened or designed to withstand specific weapon effects, so it may be
difficult to damage or destroy them. Experiences in recent conflicts and use of JMEM approved
Munitions Effectiveness Assessment computer programs will help with these difficult weaponeer-
ing cases. A hardened structure may often be penetrated and the content damaged or destroyed
with little or no damage to the structure itself. Therefore, the basic question which must be
answered is “What type of damage must be inflicted on the target to reach the stated objective?”
6.5.3.2. Determining which target elements should be analyzed can be broken down into two
activities: first, performing a functional analysis, and second, performing a structural analysis. In
preparing a functional analysis, targeting personnel identify the functions of all parts of a target,
determine the relative importance of each part, and designate those parts which are vital to target
operation. A structural analysis provides much of the information necessary for determining over-
all target vulnerability. It includes construction types, dimensions of structures, equipment, etc.
The results of this analysis will normally determine the components to be struck or attacked.
Good resources for analysis include DIA’s Critical Elements of Selected Generic Installations and
USAF’s Conventional Weaponeering Proficiency Refresher.
6.5.4. Determine Damage Criteria. Target vulnerability data must be expressed in terms of the
results desired when a target is struck or attacked. Specifically, a desired level of destruction, damage,
or performance degradation is sought to produce a significant military advantage for friendly forces.
The desired goal of the attacker is called “damage criteria” or “kill criteria.” Damage criteria can be
referred to as a quantitative measure of target susceptibility to a given amount of damage.
6.5.4.1. Measurement methods vary considerably with target type, basic input data, and the for-
mat of the desired results. Generally, the format of the output data includes: vulnerable areas for
penetrating damage mechanisms such as fragments and projectiles; conditional kill probabilities
of shaped charges; charge weights and distances; and lethal envelopes for flames. Damage criteria
should include time parameters. Tactical plans may require, for example, rendering an enemy
vehicle incapable of moving within five minutes after it is hit. A truck farther to the rear of a col-
umn may require “20 minutes to stop after it is hit” criterion. Because some weapons may be effi-
cient at achieving the first type of damage and others may more easily achieve the second type, it
is necessary to consider differences in damage required for target defeat.
6.5.4.2. There are a large number of different damage criteria for nonnuclear weapons. These
include F-Kill (Fire-power kill), M-Kill (Mobility kill), K-Kill (Catastrophic Kill), FC-Kill (Fire
Control Kill), PTO-Kill (Prevent Takeoff Kill), I-Kill (Interdiction Kill), SW-Kill (Seaworthiness
Kill), Cut, and Block. Some of these criteria are broken into subcategories to reflect different
effectiveness levels. The sample damage criteria set below from the JMEM is for aircraft (figure
6.1).

58
 Figure 6.1. Example Damage Criteria for Aircraft.

The target aircraft is to be attacked while parked. Two damage categories are applicable to this target: PTO
and K-Kill. Detailed descriptions of specific target damage criteria are provided in the JMEM Target Vul-
nerability Manual (USAF TH61A1-3-1). PTO damage occurs when, for example, as a consequence of the
attack, the aircraft cannot generate enough power for takeoff or the pilot cannot control the aircraft. This
damage criterion is presented as PTO 4 or PTO 24, which reflect the minimum number of hours (4 or 24) the
aircraft will be inoperable. K damage constitutes basic, irreparable damage to the aircraft. An aircraft suf-
fering K damage is good only for cannibalization and scrap.

6.5.5. Determine Weapons Effectiveness Index. The JMEM have established the effectiveness
indexes for nonnuclear weapons. Weapons effectiveness varies according to the weapon, target, dam-
age criteria, delivery conditions, and target environment. There are different ways of stating weapon
effectiveness according to the target/weapon combination. The weapon effectiveness and lethality
indexes used by JMEM are Mean Area of Effectiveness (MAE), Vulnerable Area (VA), Crater Diam-
eter (DC), Effective Miss Distance (EMD), Bridge Effectiveness Index (BEI), Number of Hits (NH),
Probability of Damage (Pd), and Probability of Damage Given a Hit (Pdh). These indexes account for
the primary damage mechanisms of nonnuclear weapons.
6.5.6. Determine Aimpoints and Impact Points. The sixth step in the weaponeering phase is to
determine the desired point of impact (DPI) or desired mean point of impact (DMPI). In choosing a
point of attack, it is usually best, time permitting, to select more than one target element and weapon
combination. This allows planners who may be resource or weather constrained to have greater flex-
ibility.
6.5.6.1. For conventional weapons, targets may be unitary targets, area targets, or linear targets.
A unitary target may be a point (essentially without dimensions) or a geometric target (with
dimensions). An area target consists of multiple unitary target elements. Buildings are treated as
area targets unless a single building is considered the primary target. The target area is usually
large with respect to the unitary elements assumed to be uniformly distributed in the target area.
Area targets may be treated as unitary targets if weapons effects are considerably larger than that
target area, or the circular error probable (CEP) is close to the target size, or a combination of the
two. A linear target is a long, narrow target such as a road, rail line, or an airfield runway.
6.5.6.2. Multiple DPIs or DMPIs should be used whenever the effective damage area (resulting
from the combination of the weapon effective area and the CEP) is considerably less than the area
of the target. In all other cases a single point of impact is sufficient. Runway interdiction is a spe-
cial case, since the runway may have to be cut in more than one spot to prevent aircraft from tak-
ing off.
6.5.7. Evaluate Weapon Effectiveness . During this step, various aircraft, missiles, weapons,
yields, heights of burst, fuzes, and delivery tactics are evaluated to determine the best combination to
use against each individual target. In this step, the weaponeer uses appropriate methodology to deter-
mine the solution to the problem. This solution is expressed as the probability of damage (Pd). Pd is
used to express the statistical probability that a specified damage criteria can be met assuming the

59
probability of arrival. In a few cases, specific probabilities of damage to individual targets may be
indicated by combatant or component command headquarters. Despite this fact, Pd is typically deter-
mined by the target analyst. Specific recommendations for probabilities of damage for individual tar-
gets are provided in various JMEMs.
6.5.7.1. The data developed by the weaponeer are then given to target selection planners. This
data should include the recommended weapons, fuzing, height of burst, as well as the computed
damage level. Pd is not an end in itself and does not provide an adequate comparison between tar-
gets. Pd must be used in conjunction with such factors as damage criteria and Pa. Damage criteria
is a descriptive term (i.e., drop a bridge span, neutralize telecommunications function in HQ build-
ing) depicting how you want to affect the target.
6.5.7.1.1. Damage criteria can be incorporated with other factors. For example, the targeteer
may find the available force could achieve a Pd of .70 against an aircraft parking area contain-
ing 10 aircraft, or a Pd of .40 against an area containing 30 aircraft. Which target should be
attacked? On the basis of Pd alone the target with a .70 Pd would be selected. If damage cri-
teria is considered (for this example, the criteria equals the maximum number of aircraft), on
the average, only seven aircraft would be killed in the first target area, while 12 would be
killed in the second. Therefore, the second target area in the example above should be
attacked if all other factors are equal.
6.5.7.2. Although the weaponeer searches for the best combination of weapon and delivery sys-
tem to recommend for use against a target, they must recognize that their first choice may not
always be available due to logistical or operational considerations. Time permitting, the weap-
oneer should develop an array of probabilities, using different combinations of systems, weapons,
fuzes, etc to provide force application planners flexibility. Normally weaponeering is done with
more generalized parameters at the force level and unit specific factors are taken into account by
the executing unit.
6.5.8. Prepare Preliminary Documentation . The targeteer must provide recommended options
and supporting rationale to planners for use in force application planning decisions. Use of a work-
sheet to collect and organize data for future use or reference is essential. Space should be available for
target development, weaponeering, and force application data. The information should include the
specific element or point of attack. This point may be specified in a simple textual description, by ref-
erence to areas annotated on standard target materials, by reference to the grid provided on a Basic
Target Graphic (BTG) or similar product, or by other agreed upon techniques. Precise target coordi-
nates for the point of attack should also be provided. Use of precise coordinates can significantly
improve delivery accuracy for nonvisual weapons employment.
6.5.8.1. Target analysts should also recommend fuzes or fuze settings whenever unit level exper-
tise or materials available are limited. When specific effects are required (i.e., arming and
self-destruct times for mines), it is essential to provide such information to operational combat
units preparing ordnance for the mission.
6.5.9. Review Collection Requirements . After the development, weaponeering, and force selec-
tion information is accumulated, gaps in the weaponeer’s database can be identified. Collection
requirements should be reviewed to determine if they will fill the gaps or will need modification, or
whether new requirements should be established.

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 Chapter 7

FORCE APPLICATION

7.1. Overview. Force application planning is the fusion of target nominations with the optimum avail-
able lethal and non lethal force into an operationally sound package. It translates the commander’s objec-
tives into a list of candidate targets (target development) and estimates the effectiveness of various fires
(weaponeering). In this phase, forces are analyzed to determine likely results against target systems and
their activities. For lethal force, this is based on probabilities of damage (Pd) and arrival (Pa) for a
weapon system. For non-lethal force, this is based on the expected consequences of the attack. The result
of force selection is a strike package nomination or tasking with coordinated recommendations from oper-
ations, plans, and intelligence. Of note, when providing support to force applications, targeteers must be
cognizant of the need to eliminate bias for a particular weapon, weapon system, or even component force.
Likewise, recommendations should reflect an objective assessment of the most appropriate capability to
achieve the objective.

7.2. Force Application Levels/Timelines. Force application may be conducted at different levels for
different purposes.
7.2.1. Theater . At the theater or joint task force level, commands use force application techniques
to conduct Deliberate or Crisis Action Planning. A theater commander often uses deliberate planning
to determine if he has sufficient forces to conduct a campaign and evaluate "what if" warfighting
options. This evaluation is often called “wargaming.” Another important area where force applica-
tion supports deliberate planning is in determining target material (TM) production requirements. By
knowing the types of targets and weapons systems used against those targets, TM production agencies
can tailor their products towards supporting the warfighters.
7.2.2. Component . The force application process is at the heart of component level planning. That
is, it's the "Operational Art of Warfighting." At this level, almost all of the daily decisions an air com-
mander makes are influenced by the force application process. At times, scarce resources may dictate
the commander determine which trade-offs to make when employing his forces--an important force
application function. Force application is also used extensively to develop longer range plans, outline
the time to complete a particular phase of an operation, depict how some targets may be attacked, or
provide a picture of the best ways to integrate and use various weapons.
7.2.2.1. In the Air Force, operational level planning occurs at the Air Operations Center (AOC).
Targeteers prepare the target intelligence portion of plans and are instrumental in air tasking order
(ATO) preparation. They work closely with operations and logistics planners to match targets
with available weapon systems, munitions, or possible non lethal force options. Force sizing is
then optimized in light of operational realities. Targeteers also assist in attrition analysis or calcu-
lations for possible friendly force losses to enemy defenses; attrition analysis impacts delivery tac-
tics and force sizing.
7.2.2.2. As the focal point of the air component commander's control system, the AOC is con-
nected to operations centers of higher and lateral commands, subordinate units, and subordinate
Theater Air Control System (TACS) agencies. The AOC provides centralized control with decen-
tralized execution through its subordinate agencies (i.e., Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)
and the Control and Reporting Center (CRC)). The AOC prepares and issues orders for force

61
 employment and monitors their execution. To do this, the AOC is organized into two functional
divisions: the Combat Plans Division and the Combat Operations Division.
7.2.2.3. The Combat Plans Division oversees the evaluation of the overall air plan. They also
consolidate requests for air missions (not targets). This results in an apportionment recommenda-
tion to commit available air resources, which is sent to the CINC for approval. Based on this com-
mitment an ATO is prepared and issued.
7.2.2.3.1. In making this recommendation, operations and targeting personnel must work
together. Considerations for the apportionment recommendation include enemy intentions
and reactions to our operations, threat, and objective achievement. The sub assessments of
combat assessment are very important to the force application process once operations start.
Munitions effectiveness assessments (MEA) drive weapon and tactics selection. Battle dam-
age assessments (BDA) provide indicators of the enemy’s capabilities. Mission assessments
(MA) detail how well the assigned missions are being performed.
7.2.2.3.2. Targeteers also work closely with the Combat Operations planners on weaponeer-
ing and weapon selection. Additionally, they furnish targeting data for reconnaissance and
surveillance plans along with ensuring the BDA is efficiently collected.
7.2.2.4. The Combat Operations Division supervises the detailed execution of the ATOs.
Through the use of the TACS, it coordinates and integrates all air operations and provides for cen-
tralized control in response to designated objectives and the current tactical situation. Targeteers
are an integral part of the Combat Operations Division. They monitor ATO execution and recom-
mend alternate targets when necessary. Normally target changes are due to bad weather, BDA, or
the discovery of a higher priority target. The ability to quickly recommend good alternate targets
is very important to the flexibility of airpower. Combat Operations Division targeteers should
have all the significance statements for the targets on the current ATO, the theater and air compo-
nent objectives, all guidance, ROEs, and weaponeering lookup tables as appropriate.
7.2.3. Unit . Targeteers at the wing are responsible for doing specific weaponeering for their tasked
missions. They should tailor this to the capabilities and tactics of their aircrews. Targeteers at the unit
should be familiar with their unit’s weapons and tactics to include which delivery conditions they nor-
mally use and which are not in their units playbooks. The weaponeering planning factor should be
published by the AOC so units can ensure they comply with guidance. Wing and squadron command-
ers are often called upon to make force application assessments for missions that are tasked to the unit
level. The mission planning cell reviews the changing threat, weather, munitions effectiveness assess-
ments and can modify munitions load or even the number of sorties tasked against a target to maxi-
mize their combat effectiveness. They can also request changes to aimpoints. If unit adjustments can
reduce sortie requirements and extend munitions stocks by judicious planning, the benefit is obvious.
When a unit wants to make changes to the plans, they must notify the AOC. This minimizes the effect
on future planning. For example, if planners assume a unit attacked a particular aimpoint, when in
fact they did not, the objective of the attack may not be met.

7.3. Force Application Process. The process of force application reviewed below is traditionally used at
the operational (AOC) level to build the ATO. However, force application tasks are universal and are not
tied exclusively to the ATO cycle or ATO production. This section is designed to provide a generic look
at the flow and thought processes inherent in force application; it is not intended to dictate a particular
way to conduct planning. There are five general steps in force selection planning:

62
• Compile information (results from target development and weaponeering phases)
• Prepare tentative force assignment and assessment criteria
• Recommend targets, forces, weapons, fuzing, and assessment criteria to operations
• Adjust recommendations in coordination with operations
• Present joint intelligence and operations recommendations to the commander
7.3.1. Compile Information. The first step is to gather the data needed for the selection process. The
key to successfully conducting force application analysis is organizing pertinent data and information
in a coherent format to guide planners towards logical and economic employment options. Experi-
enced planners gather the data they will need well ahead of time and continually update and refine it.
They do not allow the sheer volume of information coming into the AOC to overwhelm them. This
should not be difficult if a worksheet has been prepared and pertinent intelligence collected on each
potential target. The types of information needed include: target development results; weaponeering
calculations; forces and operational constraints; and damage expectancy calculations. This data
should be in RAAP if the documentation part of target development was done properly.
7.3.1.1. Target Development Results . This can be found in RAAP with information on target
significance, contribution to the target system, and its relationship to other system components.
7.3.1.2. Weaponeering Calculations . Includes weapon effects estimates and damage criteria.
An array of possible aircraft/weapon combinations should also be included to allow flexibility for
the planners. Calculations for nonlethal applications must also be factored.
7.3.1.3. Forces and Operational Constraints . Provided by operations, logistics, weather and
legal personnel includes: data on aircraft, weapons and fuzing availability; tactics and employ-
ment; objectives, guidance apportionment, ROE, LOAC; weather; and other operational con-
straints and considerations (e.g., threat picture).
7.3.1.3.1. Aircraft/Weapons Availability . Operations planners maintain this information,
provided by logisticians in the Resource Management Center. Restrictions such as the number
of precision-guided munition (PGM) qualified aircrews, maximum sortie generation rates,
munitions buildup times, and crew rest all impact the number and type of weapons systems
available for execution. Planners try to account for all of these considerations in their recom-
mendations.
7.3.1.3.2. Friendly Tactics and Employment Procedures . A thorough understanding of
unit tactics, capabilities, unique weapons characteristics, and requirements are essential to
effectively plan for weapons employment. Planners must consider all factors in using a partic-
ular weapons system or building a package, not just asset availability.
7.3.1.3.3. Apportionment Guidance . This guidance sets forth the JTF commanders' desired
weight of effort, expressed as a percentage of the total sorties which will be assigned to a par-
ticular mission type (CA, AI, CAS) or geographic area (II Corps, X Corridor) for a defined
period of time. Combat Plans "allocates" assets as part of the force application process. The
JTF commander must approve any large deviations from the guidance in the apportionment
decision, although the JFACC staff is usually allowed some discretion.
7.3.1.3.4. Battle Damage Assessment . Intelligence planners track and monitor previous tar-
geting efforts and update accordingly. Based on incoming BDA, targeteers working in Com-

63
 bat Operations may select new aimpoints, halt restrikes being planned against targets, divert
aircraft from low to high priority targets, and develop alternatives in weapons employment.
7.3.1.3.5. Threat Picture . A key objective for planners is to minimize risk to aircrew.
Therefore, planners receive regular order of battle updates and have an understanding of
enemy threats, particularly enemy doctrine and tactics (lethal and non lethal alike). Weapons
selection focuses as much or more so on those weapons which allow for survivable delivery
tactics against the anticipated threat as those weapons which give the best Pd. The challenge
to planners is to balance desired Pd or weapons choice against the risky delivery parameters
necessary to meet them.
7.3.1.4. Damage Expectancy (DE) . DE for each target can be calculated using Pd and Pa, and
further force selection computations should be based on DE rather than Pd. The Pa for different
systems can vary considerably, and these factors should be reflected in the target analysis. The
use of DE allows the analyst to compare the capabilities of each system and to select the best
weapon system for the mission. DE is the product of Pd and Pa computed for a given single system
attacking a single target (figure 7.1). Often the mistake is made of compounding probabilities of
damage first and then applying Pa, resulting in an incorrect answer. If more than one aircraft is
attacking a target, DE should be compounded, not Pd.
7.3.1.4.1. Pa Calculations. Pa figures are developed by analysts using intelligence about the
enemy defensive posture, capabilities, and intentions; and the anticipated routing to potential
targets. Targeteers must provide these analysts an up-to-date target list as soon as practical.
Although changes in the final force application process may require last minute adjustments,
the Pa figures should be relatively firm. However, they should be prepared as an array for the
various available vehicles and delivery tactics that might be encountered with any last minute
changes. For nonnuclear weapons, weapon reliability is included in the JMEM methodology
for determining probability of damage and should be excluded from the Pa computation.
7.3.1.4.2. Other Considerations . Planners formulate, review, or modify employment pro-
cedures based upon the tactical situation. Information operations, psychological operations,
and tactical deception, et al., can be used to provide a synergistic effect or advantage to the
execution of the ATO.

Figure 7.1. Damage Expectancy Formula.

DE = Pd x Pa
NOTE: DE is based on attack by a single system against a single target.

7.3.2. Tentative Force Assignment. In this step, the target analyst tries to determine which targets
will be attacked by which forces. The targeteer must use as much operational data as possible in per-
forming this task. However, the specific forces and weapons can only be determined by operations
personnel who actually select the targets. Operations personnel who make the final force application
decisions will then adjust these recommendations. A targeting oriented solution is absolutely neces-
64
sary to ensure that target intelligence and weapon parameters are satisfactorily reflected in the final
force assignment.
7.3.2.1. The targeteer must compare the expected effects of the tentative force selection to the
stated daily operational and campaign objectives and adjust the input to the selected model and
rerun, if necessary. If the tentative solutions do not satisfy the operational objectives, the targeteer
should reexamine the data and alternative solutions to determine if there is a better solution. This
may include additional target development. If the targeteer finds it is not possible to satisfy the
stated objective (within reasonable bounds), the commander should be informed. The decision
maker then can modify the objective or accept less than the expected results in the original plan.
Ongoing testing of performance against objectives is an integral part of the targeting function and
must occur in order to keep the decision maker informed and to help decide how future efforts will
be applied.
7.3.2.2. The outcome is an initial flow chart or matrix showing the sets of aircraft or other forces
assigned against one target. Each set is given a mission number. The unit, aircraft or weapons
platform, weapons loads, and times-over target (TOTs) as well as, specific target aimpoints are
also assigned to the mission. The flow chart may also identify the groupings of missions which
can mutually support one another; that is, act as a mission package.
7.3.2.3. Tentative Package Development . To complete the mission packages framed in force
assignment, planners conduct package development. Combat Plans assign the non-attack mission
platforms ((i.e., air-air, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), jamming, airborne control,
tactical reconnaissance, air refueling, and CSAR aircraft)) which support the package ingress and
egress. Planners next ensure the mission packages are deconflicted with other mission packages.
This is accomplished primarily through the use of the Airspace Control Order (ACO).
7.3.3. Recommend Targets, Forces, Weapons, Fuzing, and Assessment Criteria. Targets, deliv-
ery systems, weapons, fuzing, aim points, and assessment criteria are presented to the operations staff.
Targeteers must provide much more information to the operations staff than just a list of targets. After
making the recommendations, targeteers and operations planners must work closely to adjust the rec-
ommendations as necessary. Presentation is important. Format should be tailored to the decision
maker and staff present. The only constant is the targeteer must be ready to address the significance
of the target list and know the munition effects of the recommendations.
7.3.4. Adjust Recommendations. Because the information available is fluid, when operations plan-
ners apply specific sorties to specific targets, the recommended plan may need adjusting. The targe-
teer, who should be readily available to assist, can best evaluate the impact of changes upon the entire
targeting effort. The targeteer must also be aware of changes to update analysis calculations and pro-
jected results.
7.3.5. Present Joint Recommendations to Decision Maker. The targeteer must be able to present a
comprehensive briefing on the recommended plan that explains the reasoning behind the target selec-
tion. If the analyst has prepared a thorough analysis of the target system and has good documentation,
it should be easy to prepare a briefing. Generally, operations and intelligence each brief a portion of
the recommended plan.

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 Chapter 8

EXECUTION PLANNING

8.1. Overview. This planning is necessary to prepare for attack after force application recommendations
have been approved by the commander. It includes monitoring the execution of air operations. In a
highly complex warfighting environment, a great deal of planning is required to execute operations effec-
tively. This phase is almost administrative in nature as plans are finalized and materials gathered. Con-
ceptually it also includes “thinking about doing.” It is here the planning work to put "iron on target" (or
any other weapon for that matter) is brought into the reality of an actual mission.
8.1.1. Execution planning begins after the commander approves the force execution recommenda-
tions. It occurs at both the operational and tactical level. The functions of targeteers during this phase
depends on the level they are working.

8.2. Execution Planning at the Component Level. At the component level, execution planning gener-
ally consists of the following steps:
• Prepare inputs for ATOs, operations orders, or plans.
• Determine target materials and mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) requirements for tacti-
cal units and ensure support in these areas is provided.
• Prepare for execution monitoring.
• Prepare for combat assessment.
8.2.1. Preparing Inputs for ATOs, Operations Orders, or Plans . The approved course of action
is translated into information and tasking for those who will execute the plan. ((Refer to the JCS Joint
Operational Planning System (JOPS), Volumes I and II, and AFM 28-3, The USAF Operation Plan-
ning Process, for formats and procedures used in preparing plans to support JCS tasking and USAF
unilateral plans)).
8.2.1.1. The ATO may or may not be published in one message or at one time, depending upon
command policy, directives, and the situation. The ATO must include the information required by
subordinate units and be understandable. Targeting and operations personnel work together in
preparing the ATO (filling in the required information into a fixed format text).
8.2.1.2. Target information should include: the basic installation identification elements (BE
number, functional classification codes, target name, target coordinates, and country code);
graphic references (i.e., imagery references or prepared graphics); a textual description of the spe-
cific aimpoint; recommended munitions and fuzing. When required for the weapon system;
source, accuracy, or validity of the target coordinates should be included.
8.2.2. Support to Operational Units. A review and determination is made for what target materials
and maps and charts are available for each unit to carry out command decisions. During target devel-
opment the lack of adequate target materials should be documented and production requests submit-
ted. During execution planning the requests should be reviewed and unit support functions notified of
discrepancies. Potential requirements must be identified as early as possible so that target materials
will be available at the wing and squadron level when it is time to execute an operation. Although
there is the Shared Production Program to build and preposition target materials to cover most situa-
tions, it is not possible or cost-effective to cover all contingencies. Good planning can help prevent

66
 unexpected target material requirements from outstripping stockpile or production capability. Current
efforts to utilize advances in digital technology and products should also alleviate problems being
encountered with hardcopy materials.

Foot Stomper Box. When doing this phase of targeting the most overlooked task is to plan execution mon-
itoring. Do not go straight from publishing the plan to monitoring its execution. Plan to react. Be situa-
tionally aware. Check how the enemy is reacting to current operations. Make sure the weather and
maintenance is up to expectations. Do some “what if” thinking. Once the ATO is being executed it is too
late to step back, review what the commander wants to do, and how that particular ATO impacts the enemy
and supports objective achievement
8.2.3. Preparation for Combat Assessment. The time to begin thinking about assessment is before
mission execution, not afterwards. This ensures the right people and resources have the tasking orders
and other information required to support combat assessment. It involves determining assessment
objectives and adjusting or establishing requirements. A full understanding of the sub-assessments of
combat assessment presented in the next chapter are essential. Again this illustrates the targeting pro-
cess is a conceptual construct and not always a step by step process.
8.2.3.1. Determining Assessment Requirements . Five questions to help determine require-
ments.
• What information is required? (objective fulfillment)
• From which sources will information be available in the required time frame? (collection
management)
• When is the information required and how soon can it be obtained? (timing and sequenc-
ing)
• Who requires the information and how is it best presented? (AOC organization/ C2 struc-
ture)
• What efficiencies can the targeteer add to the production requests? (munition effects and
signatures)
8.2.3.2. Establish Requirements . Using answers derived from the above questions, the targe-
teer can develop the requirements needed for combat assessment.
8.2.3.2.1. Information on target significance is critical, the target system, and how they impact
the objectives and guidance are critical. Subsequently, the choice of source usually depends
on how much time is available. If the decision to restrike must be made within minutes or
hours, two primary sources of information are reports from the crew or forward air controller
(FAC) and near real time sensor collection. If more time is available, other sources of infor-
mation can be used, such as processed imagery. Only for very significant targets does the
assessment of munitions effects require real time information. Of course, in accomplishing
this task, collection and exploitation requirements set earlier during the target development
and weaponeering phases will need to be adjusted.
8.2.3.2.2. A requirement must also be set up to designate the personnel, equipment, and facil-
ities which will perform the combat assessment. In many cases, target analysts, imagery inter-
preters, and intelligence analysts will all be needed in this process.

67
 8.2.3.2.3. In addition, distribution requirements must be decided for the combat assessment
report. If the appropriate personnel do not receive the assessment, they may not have enough
information in time for the commander and his or her staff. In this case, the commander may
have to risk crews in restriking a target even though it has already been sufficiently damaged.
8.2.3.2.4. Information on any executed action cannot be attained instantaneously. Sensor,
processing, analysis, and dissemination times need to be factored into execution monitoring
planning. To use limited resources as efficiently as possible the weaponeering planning fac-
tors do not equal 1.0. Many attacks may not have the full physical damage expected or the tar-
get may simply be missed. Enough time must be allowed to get enough information to make
a decision for diverts, and retargeting.

8.3. Execution Planning at the Unit Level. Execution planning at the unit level consists primarily of
mission planning functions and mission folder construction. See chapter 10 for more detailed informa-
tion.
8.3.1. Mission Planning . At the unit level, it is typical for there to be a mission planning cell whose
entire job is build the mission folders. Generally, this cell will include aircrew, targeteers, and intelli-
gence analysts. Each person contributes to the mission planning in their area of specialty. Every unit
performs this function slightly differently, however, to meet their own unique mission requirements.
Targeteers need to be well aware of their own unit’s uniqueness.
8.3.2. Mission Folder Construction . Routes are planned considering package timing, tankers, and
threat This goes into the mission folder. This folder contains all of the key information needed by the
aircrew to perform the mission. MCR 55-125 outlines the specifics of what a mission folder should
look like. In general, the folder will contain ingress & egress routes, radar predictions, weapons data,
and target data, to include strike procedures. This is a vital document. Errors here may, at a mini-
mum, mean mission failure, or, in the worst case, cause the loss of lives.
8.3.3. Reporting Preparation and Mission Support . Two other significant tasks unit level person-
nel accomplish during execution planning are reporting preparation and mission support. Targeteers
support BDA reporting by their knowledge of weapon effects. They can also support interpretation of
cockpit videos if the videos capture weapon impact and detonation. The target materials prepared for
each mission provide debriefers an invaluable reference in debriefing aircrews. Another important
aspect of unit level support to execution planning is the determination of mission support require-
ments. These requirements include all of those things which will be needed during combat operations
and may be difficult to acquire (e.g., key maps and charts, imagery, target materials, basic supplies).
It is imperative that targeting personnel ensure that they have an adequate stockpile of these. A good
relationship with headquarters targeting personnel and the target material producer may yield great
benefits.

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 Chapter 9

COMBAT ASSESSMENT

9.1. Overview. Effective campaign planning and execution require a continuing evaluation of the impact
of combat operations on the overall campaign. Combat assessment (CA) evaluates combat operations
effectiveness in achieving command objectives and recommends changes to tactics, strategies, objectives,
and guidance. It has several sub-assessments including MA, BDA, and MEA. The military end state, as
written in the campaign estimate and modified during an operation, is directly linked with CA. CA com-
pares the results of the operation to the objectives to determine mission success or failure within the guid-
ance parameters. More important than a review, it looks forward to determine if additional missions are
needed and/or if modification to the objectives are necessary. The two pillars of combat assessment prep-
aration are audience-awareness and prior planning. The desired outcome are a satisfied commander, staff,
and operators. Combat assessment is one concept with many implementations.
9.1.1. Combat assessment examines lethal and non lethal strikes on the enemy (targets and target sys-
tems) to determine the effectiveness of operations. It answers the question: “How good of a job are
we doing and what is next?” Combat assessment provides information to commanders, battle staffs,
planners, and other decision makers. This wide audience complicates definitions and functions as
applied across all components and joint staffs. Concept robustness is, therefore, all the more impor-
tant for effective application. CA is focused on effectiveness not efficiency, (except to follow the mil-
itary tenet on Economy of Force), and in order to be an accurate measure of effectiveness great care
and significant effort should be placed on developing useful measures of merit to gauge effectiveness
of the air campaign.

9.2. Who Is It For. Combat assessment tailors products for a particular C2 environment. CA belongs to
the warfighter. As such it is the intent, or audience, of the assessments that molds the product. BDA has
many uses and is the most visible product for combat assessment. It has the broadest audience. This
overshadowing has unfortunately relegated the other assessments into obscurity. Munitions effectiveness
assessment’s audience includes the operators (e.g., aircrew, artillery crews), force packaging planners,
and weapon logisticians and producers. Mission assessment’s audience includes operational and strategic
planners and commanders, both supported and supporting.

9.3. Where Is It Done. Combat assessment is done at all levels of the joint force (figure 9.1). The Joint
Force Commander (JFC) establishes a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, the
joint task force J-3 will be responsible for coordinating CA, assisted by the joint task force J-2. The JFC
and component staffs continuously evaluate the results of operations and provide these to the JFC for the
overall evaluation of the current campaign. They must take into consideration the capabilities/forces
employed, munitions, and attack timing in assessing the specific mission and operations' success and
effects against the specific targets attacked, target systems/objectives, and remaining enemy warfighting
capabilities, relative to the objectives and strategy. Future enemy courses of action and remaining enemy
combat capabilities should be weighed against established JFC and component targeting priorities to
determine future targeting objectives and recommend changes in courses of action. Although CA is listed
as the end of the joint targeting process, it also provides the inputs for process reinitiation and subsequent
target development, weaponeering, force application, force execution, and combat assessment. CA must
be done jointly by targeteers, operators, engineers, and intelligence analysts. It is an ongoing, dynamic
process that drives current and future targeting decisions. It is done to various levels of detail including
69
near-term (e.g., diverts, alerts, targets of opportunity) mid-term (e.g., ATO cycle) and long-term (e.g.,
campaign phasing and analysis). It should come from all sources and be integrated into the battle man-
agement processes.

Figure 9.1. Levels of Combat Assessment.

9.3.1. Combat assessment is the purview of the warfighters. CONUS organizations have the best
resources to exploit peacetime intelligence. However the very large volume of theater intelligence
and operational data developed during wartime is unavailable to CONUS organizations in its original
form and timing. The majority of the data is in the theater after operations commence. Specifically;
aircraft weapon video, mission reports, operational reports, situation reports, tactical reconnaissance,
UAVs, JSTARS, and some U-2 data. These are the important sources of combat assessment. More-
over the commanders’ responsibility and intent reside only with them in theater.
9.3.2. Components provide their own CA up the chain of command, laterally to supporting com-
mands, and to those they are supporting. Tactical units do not often produce their own complete CA
but provide input through their mission (air) and operations reports for BDA, MA, and MEA. As an
example, Special Operations participates in combat assessment through debriefs of SOF after mis-
sions are completed. Mission success is gauged by whether the targeted enemy facilities, forces,
actions, and/or capabilities were affected as desired. A review of battle damage assessment (for DA
missions) is critical to the JFC and other components who can change the course of action or order
restrikes in response to the current operational situation.
9.3.3. Combat assessment includes three principal sub-assessments: Battle Damage Assessment
(BDA), Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA), and Mission Assessment (MA). Battle Damage

70
 Assessment is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military
force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Munitions Effectiveness Assess-
ment details the effectiveness of the munitions damage mechanisms and the delivery parameters.
Mission Assessment addresses the effectiveness of operations for tasked or apportioned missions.

9.4. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting
from the application of military force, either lethal or non lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle
damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval,
space, IW, and special forces) throughout the range of military operations. BDA is primarily an Intelli-
gence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from Operations. Battle damage assessment is
composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment
(figure 9.2). BDA is the study of damage on a single target or set of targets. It is used for target study and
target system analyses, reconstitution estimates, weaponeering, database updates, and for deciding
restrikes. BDA was previously known in the air-to-surface arena as “bomb damage assessment” which
still retains its own definition in JCS Pub 1-02. The BDA process answers the following questions:
• Did the weapons impact the target as planned?
• Did the weapons achieve the desired results and fulfill the objectives, and therefore purpose, of
the attack?
• How long will it take enemy forces to repair damage and regain functionality?
• Can and will the enemy compensate for the actual damage through substitution?
• Are restrikes necessary to inflict additional damage, to delay recovery efforts, or attack targets not
successfully struck?
• What are the collateral effects on the target system as a whole, or on other target systems?
9.4.1. Physical Damage Assessment . A physical damage assessment is an estimate of the extent of
physical damage to a target based upon observed or interpreted damage. This post-attack target anal-
ysis should be a coordinated effort among combat units, component commands, the JTF, the combat-
ant command, and national agencies. Some representative sources for data needed to make a physical
damage assessment may include the following: mission reports, imagery, weapon system video,
visual reports from ground spotters or combat troops, controllers and observers, artillery target sur-
veillance reports, SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, and open sources. The unit that engaged the
target initially assesses physical damage and may recommend an immediate reattack before sending
the report to the appropriate BDA cell for further analysis. Tactical objectives can be compared to the
levels of physical damage achieved to identify any immediate problems with force employment (e.g.,
MEA) or to identify any requirements for reattack.
9.4.2. Functional Damage Assessment . The functional damage assessment estimates the remain-
ing functional or operational capability of a targeted facility or object. Functional assessments are
inferred from the assessed physical damage and include estimates of the recuperation or replacement
time required for the target to resume normal operations. This all source analysis is typically con-
ducted by the combatant command, in conjunction with support from the national-level assets. The
combatant command BDA cell integrates the initial target analyses with other related sources includ-
ing HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT. BDA analysts then compare the original objective for the attack
with the current status of the target to determine if the objective has been met.

71
 9.4.3. Target System Assessment . Target system assessment is an estimate of the overall impact of
force employment against an adversary target system. These assessments are also normally con-
ducted by the combatant command, supported by national-level assets, and possibly other commands
which provide additional target system analysis. The combatant command fuses all component BDA
reporting on functional damage to targets within a target system and assesses the overall impact on
that system’s capabilities. This lays the groundwork for future recommendations for military opera-
tions in support of operational objectives.

Figure 9.2. Battle Damage Assessment Example.

The following example of an attack on a headquarters building illustrates the processes described above. Ini-
tial physical damage assessment indicates 40 percent of the west wing of the building sustained structural
damage. Functional assessment subsequently reveals sensitive communications equipment located in this
wing was damaged to the extent that command and control activities have ceased. Assessing the effects of
the attack on the target system, it was determined the loss of command and control from this headquarters
severely degraded coordination in the forward area requiring subordinate commanders to rely on slower and
more vulnerable means of communication.

9.4.4. BDA must be tailored to the decision maker and phased into the planning and execution cycles.
Inputs into assessments must be planned and scheduled. Theater tactics, techniques, and procedures
manuals must include assessment timelines. Instantaneous ground truth is impossible. Availability of
selection and collection and assessment times must be anticipated in planning. Comprehensive BDA
requires too much time even in a perfect world. This fact drives the phasing of BDA. The time phases
should, therefore, correspond to the planning cycle. Table 9.1. illustrates BDA in air-to-surface oper-
ations.

Table 9.1. Air-Surface Damage Assessment Matrix.

Air-Surface Damage Assessment Matrix(Who We Supply CA/BDA To)
Phase 1 2 3 3
~ Time (see Note) <24 Hours 1-3 Days 4 Days - Weeks 4 + Days-Weeks
Decision Cycle ATO Execution ATO Generation Air Operations Theater Campaign
Planning Planning
Decision Aids Raw Intel Fused Intel Intel Analysis Intel Analysis
Mission Reports Mission Reports 1-3 Phase Reports 1-3 Phase Reports
1st Phase Reports 1-3 Phase Reports Databases Databases
Databases Databases Target Materials Target Materials
Target Materials Target Materials Strike Histories Components’ As-
Some Images Images sessments
Decision makers Combat Operations Combat Plans Long Range Plans JF-CINC/J3
Location Air Operations Center JF HQ

72
Supporting In- JFACC/Other Theater Assets JICs JICs
telligence Orga- Components National Assets National Agencies National Agencies
nizations Minimal Image Nat
Supt
Theater Assets
NOTE: The time phases listed are intended as a conceptual guide, i.e., generally phase 1 reporting is
used to guide combat operations; phase 2 for ATO generation timelines. The Matrix shows that time
frames most impact the ATO cycle, not necessarily the times used in intelligence reporting. JP 2-01.1
does not use these time frames for BDA purposes.
9.4.5. BDA strike histories are important and must be kept for air delivered munitions. The fact that
several strikes hit a target before a report is produced, or several reports from different sources are
produced after one strike complicates the analysis process. Report source(s) also impact assessments
over time (figure 9.3).

Figure 9.3. Target and Time Arrow.

9.5. Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA). MEA is the function that weaponeers, engineers, and
operators use to analyze the effectiveness of the munitions damage mechanisms and the delivery parame-

73
ters. Essentially there are two types of MEA, short-term feedback for the operators, and long-term analy-
sis for the weapons development and acquisitions communities. MEA includes:
• Recommending changes in methodology, techniques and tactics, fuzing, or weapon selection to
increase effectiveness.
• Guiding imagery interpreters and intelligence analysts in conducting their analysis.
• Recommending development of new weapon capabilities and techniques.
• Determining problem areas in the employment of weapons.
9.5.1. MEA includes both the munitions data and the weapon platform delivery conditions. It is per-
formance-based therefore comparisons between expected performance and actual performance are
appropriate. Two central questions to ask are:
• Were actual delivery parameters similar to those expected?
• Were there any unanticipated operational limitations?
9.5.2. In wartime, MEA is the most often overlooked portion of combat assessment, but has the high-
est payoff for weapons and tactics development. Collection of delivery parameters must not be over-
looked in contingency operations and takes few resources beside forethought. In peacetime this data
is collected and incorporated into the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEM) and other ser-
vice and platform specific products. These manuals include methodologies from target acquisition
and delivery parameters to weapons effects. The Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions
Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) manuals were developed to provide tri-service-approved and accepted data
and methodologies to permit standardized comparison of weapon effectiveness. This means, in a
practical sense, a Department of Defense planner in the Pentagon, a Navy weapons officer on the USS
Carl Vinson, and an Air Force targeteer in Korea, should be able to draw essentially the same conclu-
sion about Mk 82 general-purpose bomb effectiveness against Fan Song radars and have standardized
data available for use in weapons procurement, stockpile decisions, or development of force employ-
ment options. On 14 December 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked military services to develop a
joint manual that would provide effectiveness information on air-to-surface non nuclear munitions,
and they named the Army as executive agent. The resulting coordination drafts of the Joint Munitions
Effectiveness Manual for Air-to-Surface Non nuclear Munitions (JMEM A/S), as prepared by the
JTCG/ME, were reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency. These manuals have been continually updated and are now being con-
verted to hypertext documents to speed weaponeering.

Foot Stomper Box. There is a new term, and a very useful one, that may be included in the future as a
subset of MEA, Bomb Impact Assessment. The explosion in the number of drop-and-forget munitions
such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) has expanded the need for a new mechanism or techno-
logical technique(s) to answer the most basic of questions. Bomb (munition) Impact Assessment answers
three simple questions; 1) Did the bomb hit its desired impact point? 2) Did the bomb detonate high
order? 3) Did the bomb fuze function as intended? These few questions, if answered, take much uncer-
tainty out of operational assessments given the known JMEM probabilities of effects.

9.6. Mission Assessment (MA). MA addresses the effectiveness of operations for tasked or apportioned
missions. While battle damage and munitions effectiveness assessments address force employment

74
against individual targets and systems, MA evaluates a tasked mission such as interdiction, counterair, or
maritime support. It directly impacts the JFACC’s apportionment nominations and the resultant JFC’s
decision. Mission assessments are made by the supported commander.
9.6.1. The cumulative damage to targets does not represent the total effectiveness of the operation
because it does not account for the intangible effects on enemy activities, for the effectiveness of non
lethal force employment, or for enemy alternative courses of action. There are also many other factors
to consider; the enemy rate of supply and resource consumption, enemy mobility, use of reserves,
cushion, availability of repair materials, reconstitution or recuperation time and costs, plus the status
of defenses. Additionally, mission assessment examines the effectiveness of tactical considerations
such as tactics, penetration aids, and enemy and friendly countermeasures.
9.6.2. MA answers the questions outlined below. Answers to these questions help determine the
effectiveness of the operations to meet mission objectives:
• Is the assigned mission's operations achieving command objectives and intent?
• Do the objectives require modification?
• Do the missions' level of effort require modification for that phase of the operation?
• How effective were operations in terms of impacting the enemy's actions or capability?
• What specific changes in combat operations would improve friendly efforts to degrade the
enemy's will and capability to wage war?
• Does a particular enemy target system require more, or less, emphasis in future combat opera-
tions?
• Were there any unanticipated operational limitations?
• Were there any unintended consequences of the operation; that is, did strikes achieve some
bonus damage or inflict undesirable collateral damage?
9.6.3. The mission is successful if the enemy is reacting as intended. MA’s inputs come from internal
and external sources. The measures of merit (effectiveness) are not common for all missions. Differ-
ent missions require organizations to tailor responses for the process level in which they are involved.
Some examples follow.
9.6.4. Major inputs for Close Air Support (CAS) mission assessment come from the Air Support
Operations Center "bean counts". This is passed to the AOC by the CAS Summary Message (CAS-
SUM). This is not a true assessment. The ground component commander is the primary decision
maker for CAS mission assessment since he is the supported commander. His assessment in turn is
used to identify possible target systems for air support.
9.6.5. Defensive Counter Air (DCA) mission assessment inputs flow throughout the Theater Air Con-
trol System. DCA mission assessment is primarily an Operations decision of the Area Air Defense
Commander, if appointed. Intelligence inputs come from mission debriefs, the threat, and a solid
knowledge of enemy tactics and capabilities. When blended with the JFACC's goals and strategies
these provide the basis for a DCA apportionment recommendation.
9.6.6. Strategic Attack mission assessment is easy in a macro sense. Total enemy capitulation
equates to 100 percent effectiveness. However, it is difficult, at best, to determine how an enemy per-
ceives any threat or risk to himself. Does he calculate the threat using statistics and probabilities
based upon actual observed threat? Does he perceive a threat in vague general terms without detailed

75
 analysis or statistical evaluation of its actual magnitude? Does he care about destruction of his eco-
nomic infrastructure compared with the bigger issues of power or ideology? If an enemy can be made
to perceive a particular course of action is hopeless, his behavior can be channeled into another direc-
tion. Enemy perception of a great threat or high risk is as important as the actual threat.
9.6.7. Interdiction mission assessment is based on its impact to the enemy force’s capabilities, not just
how many trucks or bridges are destroyed. For example, if the enemy believes they will suffer unac-
ceptable losses in resupplying his forces through route A, they may begin to move supplies through
route B which is longer and requires more transit time. In effect, the enemy will be delayed and his
timetable disrupted, which can be a measure of success for the interdiction operation. The quantities
of supplies reaching the enemy forces at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) has historic sig-
nificance in the outcome of battles and should be considered one of the main measures of effective-
ness. Unfortunately, this quantity is extremely difficult to measure. Reduced levels of fighting
(changing from offensive to defensive operations) is another measure of effectiveness.
9.6.7.1. Duration of individual choke point closure caused by interdiction appears to offer one
reasonable surrogate measure of enemy resupply capability. Another may be counting trucks
passing clandestine sensors along roads (the Vietnam Era IGLOO WHITE program did this). This
is costly but it can be coordinated with strikes to destroy vehicles. Trucks “reported” destroyed
through MISREPs is probably the poorest method used in analysis. (There are varying degrees of
destruction or damage and uncertain excess transport capability.)
9.6.7.2. Another way to assess interdiction results is to measure post-offensive buildup in the first
few days, weeks, or months after an operation. Rate and type of resupply and reconstitution are
indicators of what the enemy would like to do and of the damage sustained.
9.6.7.3. There are at least three measures of very little use in analyzing interdiction effectiveness;
namely, sorties flown, bombs dropped, and days in combat. Unfortunately General Schwartzkopf
said this is what he had to do during the Gulf War.
9.6.7.4. Two factors stand out in all interdiction analysis. First, large ground force campaigns
without deep interdiction are less effective than a coordinated operation including both. Con-
versely, a deep interdiction campaign without coordinated ground operations to increase the
enemy's supply consumption would be less effective than a coordinated campaign. Second, it is
the enemy's behavior or activity which must be modified. Destruction of individual targets and
the resulting “body” count, as an effectiveness measure contributes little to the overall objective.
It is the activity that must be attacked or struck. It is the effectiveness of the attack on the activity
that must be measured.

9.7. How It Is Done. All objectives should have measures of merit developed during the planning phase
and refined in the target development process in an iterative fashion. Intelligence assists the commander
in determining when objectives have been attained so joint forces may be reoriented or operations termi-
nated. Intelligence evaluates military operations by assessing their effect on the adversary situation with
respect to the commander’s intent and objectives, and those of the adversary. The intent is to analyze with
sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy to try to determine:
what attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary's plans or capa-
bilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives. CA
requires constant information flows from all sources. However, the same basic information is generally
collected for all assessments. The information (data) gathered for mission assessment is similar, and in

76
many instances the same, as collected for battle damage assessment and munitions effectiveness assess-
ment. A collection plan, tailored EEIs, and the objectives’ measures of merit are required to do the assess-
ment. The JFC apportions joint force reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that
exceed the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their
requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative. CA differs from
wartime to contingency operations. The closely held nature of some contingency operations has led to
badly coordinated collection plans. Very specific EEIs should be developed. Intelligence analysts and
collectors must be knowledgeable of the targeting objectives, weapons, timing, and targets.
9.7.1. There are many different measures of merit, an example of one follows, from a general compo-
nent objective down to a specific measure of merit :
• Achieve Air Superiority
• Deny Enemy Air EW and GCI support
• Degrade Air Defense Network by 75%
• Destroy SOCs I, II, III
• Enemy Air Intercepts non-existent/non-effective
9.7.2. Information must get to the right offices. The ATO must be disseminated to the imagery inter-
preters to provide them numbers and types of weapons along with the desired point of impact. The
ATO must also be distributed to other intelligence analysts (e.g., SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT) for
time-over-target and aimpoints. A good example is the SEAD mission, especially anti-radiation mis-
sile operations that must be coordinated with the SIGINT collectors to the extent possible.
9.7.3. Intelligence contributes to the mission/strike cycle function of assessment. Assessment can
either be inductive (using sensors or aircrews to directly observe damage inflicted) or deductive (using
indirect means to ascertain results). Examples of inductive observation could involve secondary
explosions seen by the aircrew or movement stopping after attacks. Assessment can be deduced if
damage is unobserved but verified by third party sources. Indirect bomb damage assessment can also
be inferred from the miss distance (the distance between weapon detonation and the target). A mea-
sure of success of the attack is the impact on the activity the enemy is performing through the respec-
tive target system. Qualitative assessment should be used in addition to quantitative analysis. Single
methods of measurement should be avoided, because they may lead to unsound or distorted results.
9.7.4. Time impacts CA and the functions an organization performs. Component force headquarters
are concerned with near-term and mid-term combat assessment for the majority of their work. This of
course leaves out the long range (strategic) planners at the components. The current operations targe-
teer and Intelligence analyst maintain a continuous awareness of the battle situation, the targeting
objectives and near-term combat assessment in order to provide the best recommendation to the battle
managers. The targets branch usually contains the Combat Assessment Cell. This cell of targeteers
and other disciplines provides the main fusion center for near term and mid-term (component) into
combat assessment. It also provides the inputs for collection requests across the spectrum of combat
assessment. It is the focus of all intelligence inputs to combat assessment. It is responsible for man-
aging inputs to, coordinating, and analyzing combat assessment information and its distribution to
decision makers and other users. Requirements for most long-term assessment studies will be gener-
ated at the theater. Theater wide intelligence producers such as Joint Intelligence Centers provide
their studies and analysis to the joint force commander and to lower and higher echelons. JCS/J2T
and DIA will normally be the national level focal point for input into long-term combat assessment.

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 Chapter 10

TARGETING FUNCTIONS AT THE COMBAT UNIT LEVEL

10.1. Combat Intelligence Functions at the Unit Level. Most unit level intelligence organizations are
composed of two branches--operational intelligence (also termed “combat” intelligence) and target intel-
ligence. Each performs a specific function:
10.1.1. Operational intelligence keeps the commander and aircrews informed of intelligence matters
needed to perform the mission. It maintains intelligence database holdings, provides briefings and
training, and helps with mission planning.
10.1.2. Target intelligence assembles and maintains mission or planning folders with related target
planning documentation.

10.2. Unit Level Targeting Functions. Five important target intelligence functions are performed at the
unit level:
• Mission planning
• Mission folder construction and maintenance
• Aircrew target study and certification
• Debriefing, battle damage assessment, and intelligence reporting
• Identification of unit support requirements (including identifying, requisitioning, and safeguard-
ing target materials for combat and training missions).
10.2.1. Targeteers also perform normal administrative functions such as updating and posting
changes to publications, classified document control and inventories, periodic aircrew or com-
mander's briefings, and issue and control of classified training and mission target materials. The
extent to which targeting personnel will be involved in these administrative functions depends on
command policy for using targeting personnel, the desires and motivation of individuals, and the
unit's mission and organizational responsibilities. Targeting functions at the unit level are critical to
mission success, and unit targeting personnel are vital to mission planning and provide the link to the
targeting branch at the air operations center. Targeting personnel must be mission-oriented, highly
motivated, and involved in unit activities. In the course of performing their duties, they must:
• Work closely with planners from Standardization and Evaluation (StanEval), weapons and
tactics, training, and scheduling. They must be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of mission
planning, tactics, and weapon system characteristics and capabilities.
• Think in terms of aircrews and the mission. Their primary concern must be what the aircrews
need to accomplish their mission.
• Identify deficiencies in targeting support for the aircrews from higher headquarters and help
to devise solutions to the problems identified.

10.3. Mission Planning. Targeting personnel at a unit are generally intimately involved in the mission
planning process. It involves the selection of optimum routes and profiles under fixed criteria considering
all related aspects of ingress, weapon delivery, escape, and egress; and delivering a weapon on target is

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the primary objective of mission planning and execution. The Air Force Mission Support System
(AFMSS) is being used at the unit level to automate this process.
10.3.1. Mission Components. A mission is typically divided into four parts: ingress, initial point
(IP) to the target or weapon release point, escape, and egress.
10.3.1.1. Ingress can be planned for high or low level flight, with fuel consumption and enemy
defenses primary planning considerations. At low altitudes, the aircraft may be less vulnerable to
some types of enemy defenses, but fuel consumption is greater. At higher altitudes, the aircraft
could be affected by radar guided and other defensive systems but requires less fuel. Aircrews
make navigation and weapons systems checks during this portion of the mission, and in some
cases weapon programming and pre-arming are also completed.
10.3.1.2. From the IP to the target, the aircrew acquires the IP, establishes run-in speed and head-
ing, makes final determination of target area tactics, identifies reference points which will assist in
target acquisition (final check points, offset aim points, etc.), and prepares or activates weapons or
ordnance for release.
10.3.1.3. The escape phase of the mission begins immediately after weapon release and continues
until a predetermined point, or adequate time or distance, from a target is reached.
10.3.1.4. Egress begins where the escape ends and continues until post strike base (PSB) recov-
ery.
10.3.2. Route Planning Priorities. Three general route planning priorities guide mission planning:
delivery of the weapons on target; survival of the aircrew; and recovery of the aircraft. A
well-planned route will allow for a higher probability of success for all three. This planning must also
consider how to avoid friendly weapon detonations, use acceptable reference points for navigational
positioning, avoid enemy defenses, use reentry corridors, consider fuel minimums, and provide
mutual defense support. These criteria are outlined in Air Force Instructions and supplemented by
commands based on their specific requirements.
10.3.3. Profile Selection. There are two types of mission profile reference terms: high (H) and low
(L). Weapon system capabilities and characteristics, reference point and target identification, and
enemy defenses are primary considerations for deciding which profile or combination of profiles to
use. For example, a profile could be divided into three sections, each represented by a single let-
ter--H-L-H. The first letter represents a high level ingress. The second letter indicates a low level
entry point--either an arbitrary point or the initial point--and continues through the escape to the start
climb point. The third letter represents egress at high level. Missions are usually planned for both
instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR).
10.3.4. Standard Planning Data. In most units, standard mission planning guidelines are developed
by the unit StanEval section from aircraft technical orders. Standardized data might include air-
speeds, climb schedules, let-down schedules, acceleration data, tank jettison data, programmed turn
information, reference point selection criteria, orbit point data, fuel flows under various conditions,
etc. Standard planning data must be used so unit planning and mission folder programs are uniform.
10.3.5. Mission Planning and Delivery Tactics . Missions may be either preplanned or immediate.
In any case, there must be some degree of planning at the unit level. Usually, this is the execution
planning portion of operational plans, because each unit is the most knowledgeable of its own capabil-
ities.

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 10.3.5.1. Delivery maneuvers and parameters for existing air-to-surface delivery systems (includ-
ing operational sequences, system components, and component functions) are described in the
Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual, Air-to-Surface Delivery Accuracy, TH 61A1-3-3. Nonnu-
clear delivery techniques include visual manual delivery (level or dive bombing, loft or toss
bombing, strafing, and rocket attacks); computer-aided visual delivery for targeting designated
systems; radar bombing systems, both high and low levels; and air-to-surface guided weapon
delivery Global Positioning System (GPS), Inertial Navigation System (INS), Terrain Contour
Matching (TERCOM), TV-guided, semi-active laser-guided, remotely controlled weapons,
radar-homing, and radiation detecting).
10.3.5.2. Nuclear delivery techniques are divided into two categories: strategic and tactical. Stra-
tegic delivery methods include “Short Look” and “Pop-up” (PUP) maneuvers. PUP is the normal
planned delivery mode for bomber aircraft with operational terrain following equipment. The
Short Look option is normally used only during IFR conditions or when terrain following naviga-
tional ability is lost. Tactical delivery methods include the loft over-the-shoulder, level release,
laydown, and low angle drogue delivery (LADD) maneuvers. In all cases, weapon release alti-
tudes and airspeeds are dependent on the characteristics of the weapon involved.

10.4. Mission Folder Construction. Prior to the fielding of AFMSS, many staff elements at the unit
level helped prepare mission folders particularly with the target intelligence branch assembling the infor-
mation and constructing the folder itself. The staff, frequently with aircrew participation, performed the
actual “cut and paste” work with the charts, including informational overlays and data cards for rapid
in-flight use, with necessary annotations. Typical annotations and overlays include Navigational Infor-
mation Blocks or course arrow boxes that detail course, heading, airspeed, altitude, en route timing, etc;
weapon data cards; route check point, turn point, target, and offset aim point (OAP) coordinates; and
enemy defense information. This process is now performed by aircrews on an AFMSS machine with help
from intelligence personnel. It is important that intelligence personnel remain involved since during an
actual mission, with many different activities occurring simultaneously, aircrews need clear and concise
information to achieve mission success. Refer to applicable Air Force Instructions and command supple-
ments for detailed guidance on folder building procedures and quality control.

10.5. Aircrew Target Study and Certification. Combat mission folders with aircrew study materials
are broken down into two sections: the Combat Mission Section (CMS), which the aircrew takes on the
mission, and the Mission Planning Section (MPS), which provides expanded intelligence and operational
data for crew study. The MPS can include information on weapon effects, limitations, and employment;
route threat assessments; enemy air order of battle information; escape and evasion data; safe areas and
overflown country briefings; target significance; and C2. Targeting personnel should be available to
assist and support aircrews with additional information, materials, maps, charts, and graphics, as required.

10.6. Debriefing and Battle Damage Assessment. Targeting personnel generally do not debrief air-
crews. They should, however, become involved with and support those who do.
10.6.1. Targeting personnel can insure the debriefers have suitable visual aids (maps, charts, target
imagery) and target information (identification data, descriptions, aim points, objectives, etc.). The
debriefers must know the mission background and details of the missions of other units having similar
objectives. Furthermore, targeteers should review essential elements of information (EEI) questions
to be used by the debriefers. While EEIs are included in command-prepared documents and regula-

80
 tions, specific targets may require additional EEIs. The debriefings also provide information on other
targets and items of interest. All of this information should be given to the debriefers prior to mission
execution.
10.6.2. Targeteers should ensure aircrews are informed of the results of their mission (munition
effects or accuracy scoring) and should work with imagery interpreters and provide the same target
materials, maps, charts, and intelligence given to the debriefers. Targeting personnel should be
among the first to receive the results of imagery readouts.
10.6.3. Targeteers must work closely with aircrews and debriefers, as well as other intelligence spe-
cialists and mission planners from the operations staff in order to prepare timely and credible assess-
ments. These assessments provide decision makers with information on the need to restrike a target
or change munitions or tactics to improve mission effectiveness.

10.7. Ensuring Mission Support. Although higher headquarters should pass on necessary intelligence
and procedural information to subordinate units, unit targeting personnel must ensure they have the infor-
mation necessary to support their mission. If there are deficiencies, they must be promptly identified to
the headquarters staff. Unit targeting personnel must also identify and resolve problems, limitations and
constraints affecting targeting functions, as soon as possible. Target intelligence personnel also deter-
mine requirements, requisition procedures, stockpiling and control of maps, charts, graphics, and other
materials needed to prepare target folders and support the unit mission. The branch usually acts as a
source of supplies for unit target materials users, as well as librarian for Air Force and command direc-
tives and publications used to requisition target materials.

10.8. Developments in Unit Level Targeting. Because of continual advances and modifications in
weapons systems and expected accuracy’s, targeting data also must be constantly updated for complete-
ness and accuracy. Advances in imagery have made it possible to develop highly accurate and reliable
targeting information. For example, the Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System, though rela-
tively old, is still in use at the air component and command level to locate both target coordinates and pre-
cise reference point positioning. The new Digital Point Positioning Data Base (also imagery based) will
provide even more up-to-date positioning capability down to the unit level.

10.9. Conclusion. The unit targeting function not only demands time and skill, but is challenging as well.
With new concepts, programs, data, and equipment, new skills and techniques will have to be developed
and adapted for unit use. Leadership, resource management, and coordination with other unit specialties
are required to accomplish any unit mission. With continued improvements and changes in data collec-
tion, dissemination, usage, and the advent of new plans, procedures, and equipment, the target intelli-
gence function will become not only more important at the combat unit level, but also more challenging
to targeting personnel.

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 Chapter 11

TARGETING IN THE INFORMATION AGE

11.1. Information Operations (IO) and Information Warfare . Information is central to the way the
U.S. wages war and will be critical to Air Force operations in the 21st Century. As Air Force doctrine
changes to recognize air and space operations, targeting will transition leaving behind the old paradigms
and institutionalizing info-oriented perspectives.
11.1.1. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive S-3600.1 updates IO and IW policy, definition, and
responsibilities within the DoD. IW is a sub-set of Information Operations and is defined by the
directive as “Information’s Operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or pro-
mote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.” Information Operations is defined
as “actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own
information, and information systems.” The goal of IW is to achieve the Air Force core competency
of information superiority by successfully performing the missions of counter-information. Informa-
tion superiority is obtained over an adversary by controlling the information environment, exploiting
our advantage in information and information systems, and by using information to enhance our oper-
ations. IW employs a force-multiplier capability, enhancing and synergistically adding to other meth-
ods of warfighting.
11.1.2. Counter-information includes both defensive counterinformation (DCI) and offensive coun-
terinformation (OCI). DCI consists of security measures (information assurance and information
security), counterintelligence, counterdeception and counterpsychological operations (PSYOP). OCI
consists of PSYOP, electronic warfare (electronic attack, electronic protections, and electronic war-
fare support), military deception, physical attack and information attack. During times of crisis or
conflict (war), USAF IW activities must be integrated into the joint air and space operations plan and
air tasking order (ATO).
11.1.3. The Air Force leadership (CSAF and SECAF) views IW as an emerging concept of great sig-
nificance, as signified in the foreword of “Cornerstones of Information Warfare”:
• “As information systems permeate our military and civilian lives, we are crossing a new fron-
tier - the Information Age. It will define the 21st century and influence all we do as an air
force. Information Warfare has become central to the way nations fight wars, and will be crit-
ical to Air Force operations in the 21st century. This means, of course, that today we must
invest in our people, planning, equipment, and research so our ambitions can become reality.
We will involve every Air Force person in this effort, generating a wave of momentum that
will carry us into the next millennium."
• “Information Warfare is not the exclusive domain of the Air Force, or any other service.
Information technology advances will make dramatic changes in how this nation fights wars
in the future. They will allow a commander’s vision and view of the battlespace to be shared
at the lowest level. Because of this, every practitioner of the profession of arms has a respon-
sibility to understand the impact of information warfare on their service. From our unique
perspective as soldier, sailor, marine, or airman, we can then forge a common understanding
of how to use information warfare to enhance joint warfighting capabilities.”

11.2. Objectives. “Cornerstones of Information Warfare” and “Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD)

82
2-5, Information Operations” discuss the three objectives of IW:
• Control the information realm so we can exploit it while protecting our own military information
functions from enemy action
• Exploit control of information to employ information warfare against the enemy
• Enhance overall force effectiveness by fully developing military information functions

11.3. Challenges. As the Air Force recognizes the significance of IW, its impact will be felt throughout
all aspects of Air Force intelligence. Unprecedented levels of detail, the identification of critical informa-
tion elements contained throughout the spectrum of the target categories, and compressed collection time-
lines are expected to characterize the general direction of change. Targeting support to IW is a challenge
and will require a collaborative effort across the operations, intelligence, and technical communities.
11.3.1. The ability to directly influence the information realm through Direct IW (Information
Attack) requires an entirely new direction of intelligence support. Methods of collecting and analyz-
ing the new types of intelligence necessary to plan and execute offensive and defensive aspects of this
mission will need to be incorporated. Targeting and combat assessment functions will become
increasingly complicated as they expand from their purely physical orientation to support warfare in
the information realm.
11.3.2. The Air Force views information as a separate realm, potent weapon, and lucrative target. In
looking at information as a distinctive realm, we are looking at expanding from the physical or mate-
rial level to what is described as the virtual level; a layer without geographical constraints. Within the
information battlespace, the means to achieve military objectives has now expanded. Not only can we
target traditional force elements with precision, but we can hold at risk the architecture that orches-
trates modern warfare. Information technologies will enable us to attack a significantly larger set of
targets using enhanced lethal and non lethal capabilities, greatly complicating weapon system alloca-
tion decisions.

11.4. Information Warfare and the Targeting Process. The impact of IW is addressed in detail across
the six phases of the targeting process: objectives and guidance; target development; weaponeering; force
application; execution planning; and combat assessment.
11.4.1. Objectives and Guidance Derivation . The development and dissemination of objectives
and guidance mark the first step in the targeting process and arguably the most critical. Targeting pro-
fessionals must comprehend National Command Authority (NCA) IW objectives and guidance as
passed to the Combatant Commanders. SECAF and JAG IW guidance must be followed and incorpo-
rated into IW actions. Targeteers should be intimately involved in the delineation of the cyberspace
equivalents of fire control measures, ( e.g., FSCL and Corps/Division boundaries) to ensure deconflic-
tion and avoid fratricide. They also must become knowledgeable of Joint policy and doctrine for IW.
Targeting support to IW should be included not only in Air Force documents as this pamphlet but also
in joint documents such as Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations and in
the forthcoming Joint Pub 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support
to Targeting.
11.4.2. Target Development .
11.4.2.1. Intelligence must be readily accessible, timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed to sup-
port an array of DoD IO requirements, to include, research, development and acquisition and oper-

83
 ational support. Detailed intelligence on the information systems and the IO doctrine likely to be
employed by a wide range of adversaries must be provided. Essential Elements of Information
(EEIs) which support the prosecution of an IW strategy against individual targets and as part of an
overall campaign must be documented. Targeteers must work closely with the collection manage-
ment community to develop and modify EEIs for IW. The following sample IW EEI’s (figure
11.1) were developed in the Directorate of Research, Air Command and Staff College research
paper, "Information Warfare: An Opportunity for Modern Warfare":

Figure 11.1. Sample IW EEIs.

- What is the IW Target description, location, significance?

-- What are its primary/secondary functions?

-- What type of information is used/processed/communicated by the target? How is this information
received/stored/cataloged/transmitted/destroyed?

- What physical attributes does the IW target possess?

-- Number of structures (physical description and locations of each)

-- Layout of each structure (size, entry/exit points, room locations)
-- Construction and key components (materials, types of equipment)
-- Functional organization in each area (command, operations, maintenance, communications)

- What communications does the IW target use?

-- Type and parameters (telephone, TV, terrestrial radio, satellite, fiber, modulation type, waveform, fre-
quency(s) and power)

--- Country of origin, year manufactured, model, frequencies

--- Methods and procedures for securing communications
--- System manning and operating procedures
--- Number of each type of device and location
--- Signal allocation, controlling authority
--- Radio/TV broadcast and newspaper (controlling agency, locations, operating procedures, political
affiliation, etc.)
--- Visual signs used (flags, panels, lights)
--- Noise signals used (klaxons, sirens)

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 --- With whom does the target normally communicate?
--- Associated support facilities/equipment and their locations
--- Number and location of personnel
--- Internal and external links
--- Switchboard, relay towers, rerouting centers
--- Type/number/location of antennas, cables, microwaves, local/wide area networks, point-to-point,
etc.

- What is the primary and alternate power supply?

-- Type, number, and locations

-- Associated facilities (transformers, relays, etc.)
-- Fuel supply (type, location)
-- Conduits (type, location)

- What on-site security is employed?

-- Physical security (guards, fences, vaults, passive/active detection systems, alarms etc.)

--- Location and type (guard posts, bunkers, trenches, etc.)

--- Physical description

---- Dimensions
---- Lighting (type, location, schedule)
---- Power source and location
---- Frequency/schedule for patrols or security checks

-- Physical security procedures

--- Patrols (type, size, patrol routes, armament)

--- Detection systems (cameras, ground/water/air alarms, electromagnetic, etc.)
--- Barriers and obstacles (type, size, locations)
--- Entry and exit procedures (key, cipher, personnel recognition, code words, etc.)

- What type of communications security and computer security are employed?

-- Type of security (cryptographic, physical access, hard wire, brevity codes, "sneaker" net)
-- Operating procedures

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 -- Cryptologic change schedule
-- Computer security

--- Type of security (physical, password, software monitoring)

--- Operating procedures

11.4.2.2. IO are conducted across the full range of military operations. The focus of IO is on deci-
sionmaking and information-dependent systems, including weapons, infrastructure, command and
control, computer and associated network systems. Developing an IW targeting strategy requires
detailed intelligence and thorough analysis and planning to determine the best targets to achieve
desired effects efficiently and effectively. Critical elements must be developed for information
attack targets. Many target sets need to be reevaluated in light of the "information age" which has
automated many functions of modern day facilities. Target system category classifications must
be updated to facilitate analysis of IW considerations. DIA may need to update "Critical Elements
of Selected Generic Installations" (DDB-2800-2-83 Chg 8, Aug 94) to identify critical informa-
tion elements and information attack options. This document currently identifies the critical ele-
ments of selected generic or typical installations appropriate for attack by air-delivered
conventional weapons and unconventional warfare (UW) operations; installations are identified
by the category codes of the DIA “Standard Coding Systems Functional Classification Hand-
book” (DIAM 65-3-1, Jul 95). Each listing begins with a brief general description of the installa-
tion summarizing its function and physical characteristics, followed by a table identifying the
critical elements and an estimated recuperation time for each critical element. A few examples
identifying information "critical elements" are taken from a paper on notional critical target sets
(figure 11.2) by Dr. Dan Kuehl from National Defense University, School of Information War-
fare, titled "Target Sets for Strategic Information Warfare in an Era of Comprehensive Situational
Awareness" and an Air University publication by Maj Steven M. Rinaldi, “Beyond the Industrial
Web, Economic Synergies and Targeting Methodologies.”

Figure 11.2. Notional Critical Target Sets -- Strategic Information Warfare.

Infrastructure

- Energy and power sources (both electric and POL)

-- Production centers
-- Transformer stations
-- Distribution nodes
-- Control centers for POL production and refining
-- Pumping stations
-- Backup systems

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 -- Example: Use intrusive IW to seize control of the computer-controlled valve network in a major
POL refinery and shut down the flow of both unfinished and refined POL products. This would require
physical repairs such as valve replacement to offset the effects of the attack, and the plant would remain
hostage to a destructive attack using precision weaponry. This action would have impact ranging from mil-
itary effects (interdicting the supply of refined POL products) through economic and social effects. Maj
Rinaldi states “pipeline controls are electromechanical (relays) or solid state. The control network ties to-
gether all the elements of the pipeline system. Pipelines rely upon computerized supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) system for control and management functions. SCADA systems are used to
control all operations and transmit information between dispatch control centers and remote terminal units
at pipeline facilities. Manual work arounds to loss of SCADA, electromechanical controls might be ex-
tremely difficult to carry out.”

- Information infrastructure
-- Telecommunications (radio & TV); public and secure switches
-- Radio relay facilities
-- Telephone exchanges
-- Fiber optic networks, nodes, and repeater stations
-- Microwave transmission networks and nodes
-- SATCOM links
-- Computer and data processing centers
-- National C3I centers
-- Example: use intrusive IW to override SATCOM dish controls and cause the dish to realign itself to
a useless/unusable orientation. This would prevent our adversary from using its SATCOM capability with-
out requiring US forces to engage in destructive actions.

Political

- Internal state police and control forces

-- Headquarters for internal control agencies ("secret police")
-- Intelligence collection systems (i.e. SIGINT intercept)
-- Databases supporting internal control systems
-- Example: Alter/destroy via intrusive IW the enemy's computerized database of suspected internal
subversive elements. Follow up this action with an intensive PSYOPS effort aimed at dissident elements
in the population; this could seriously undermine a totalitarian state’s control over segments of its popula-
tion, possibly threatening unrest or revolt.

- Financial centers and networks

-- Institutions (banks, trading centers, etc.)

-- Currency controls and depositories

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 -- Databases for financial management
-- Example: Electronically impose a UN-mandated quarantine of a rogue state’s financial reserves;
could prevent arms purchases or the leader from looting the national treasury and fleeing.

11.4.2.3. Many organizations are developing decision aiding software applications that have the
ability to produce, as a final outcome, an installation (target) list. Examples include National Air
Intelligence Center’s Interactive Country Studies and Links and Nodes Telecommunications
Databases; Air Force Information Warfare Center’s SENSOR HARVEST; NSA’s Adversary; and
some Joint Warfare Analysis Center’s products. The final products of these various applications
must be able to interface with the targeting community’s Rapid Application of Air Power
(RAAP), the USAF standard targeting application and the joint standard Air Tasking Order target-
ing application within the JFACC environment. RAAP is the interface between targeting planners
and the Advanced Planning System (APS) in CTAPS. This incorporation would enhance infor-
mation operations supporting C2W/IW target system analysis and target list development. Auto-
mated target system analysis capabilities must be easily accessible by targeting personnel.
11.4.3. Weaponeering . Methodologies are needed to quantify the expected results from non lethal
weapons for IW attacks on specific types of targets, similar to JMEMs, which provides kill mecha-
nisms (blast, penetration, crater, fire), vulnerability data and damage criteria information for conven-
tional weapons. Candidate IW employment concepts include the following: (Research paper;
"Information Warfare: An Opportunity For Modern Warfare")
• Corruption - The alteration of information content; the manipulation of data to make it either
nonsensical or inaccurate. Destroying existing knowledge.
• Deception - A specific type of corruption; the alteration of, or adding to, information to por-
tray a situation different from reality. Creating false knowledge to include masquerading.
• Delay - The reversible slowing of the flow of information through the system, and the slowing
of the acquisition and dissemination of new knowledge.
• Denial - The reversible stopping of the flow of information for a period of time; although the
information may be transmitted and used within friendly territory, the adversary is denied
access to it. The prevention of the acquisition and dissemination of new knowledge.
• Disruption - The reduction of the capacity to provide and/or process information (reversible).
This is a combination of delay and corruption. The delay of the acquisition and dissemination
of new knowledge and the destruction of existing knowledge.
• Degradation - The permanent reduction in the capacity to provide and/or process information.
• Destruction - The destruction of information before it can be transmitted; the permanent elim-
ination of the capacity to provide and/or process information.
Each of the potential effects listed above have both desirable and undesirable attributes. While devel-
oping an IW strategy to employ these concepts, the planner must consider the potential impact of
these attributes on achieving the overall objective. These attributes include:
• Persistency - How long will the IW strategy affect the target?
• Speed - How long will it take to achieve the desired IW effect?
• Latency - Can the IW tactic lie dormant within the target until needed?

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 • Reversibility - Is the IW effect reversible? Both reversible and irreversible effects can be
desirable.
• Fratricide - Does the attack method cause unwanted effects on friendly systems?
• Collateral Damage - Will attacking the target cause collateral damage in other systems
because of its linkage(s)? Will the method of attack cause unwanted effects on other systems?
• Stealth - How easily can an enemy detect the friendly IW strategy? Exploitation and corrup-
tion of the enemy's information must be accomplished in a manner which is not readily detect-
able. The effectiveness of the attack is obviously degraded if the enemy gains knowledge of
it. (Note: In some cases, it may be beneficial to ensure the enemy knows the friendly infor-
mation operation capability).
• Mutual Interference - Will attacking the target negate other information operations? If the
information employment concept is designed to create a false reality, then one must allow the
adversary to "see" or "hear" the false reality. Similarly, planners would not want to target a
critical node which can be exploited and serves to enhance information available to friendly
forces. This attribute, perhaps more than any other, affirms the need for a fully coordinated
and integrated IW strategy concept.
11.4.4. Force Application . Targeteers will need to become versed in lethal and non lethal methods
of attack available under IW, in addition to the more familiar conventional modes usually used. The
varied methods of attack and weapons will require strict deconfliction between planning and opera-
tions personnel. Targeting staffs which will be generating the ATO/ITO will need to be responsible
for integrating the IW campaign effort (Table 11.1.). HQ staff must push for appropriate levels of
participation commensurate with this responsibility.
• Target development team members in the AOC for Information Warfare and Command and
Control Warfare (IW/C2W) must be defined. The target development A3/A2 members in the
AOC should be augmented as needed by members of the Air Force Space Support Teams
(AFSST), Information Warfare Support Teams (IWST), Joint C2W Center (JC2WC) Teams,
Land IW Activity (LIWA) and Naval IW Activity (NIWA)/Fleet IW Center (FIWC). These
players can assist with IW/C2W expertise for joint/combined air campaign level targeting.
The A3/A2 must determine the mix of augmentation and reachback needed to augment his
own IW/C2W expertise and what the role, if any, of the 9AF IW Squadron and other IW’s
will be, once formed. Figure 11.3 illustrates the proposed USCENTAF IW Cell.

Table 11.1. Disabling Technologies and Kill Mechanisms.

MECHANISM EFFECT
Combustion Chemistry Shut off/overspeed engine
Contaminate fuel
Polymer chemistry agents Damage vital components (e.g., Air filters)
Polymerize fuel system
Depolymerize plastics and electrical components
Runway and roadway slippery/stick
Damage power grid (colloidal dust)

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Antimateriel biological agents Thicken fuels
Dissolve electronics, plastics, solder, and other sub-
stances
Superagents, acids, oxiders, and dissolving Damage tires
agents Disable mines
Blind optical ports/sensors
Computer viruses or worms Subvert communications, radar, satellite and com-
puter signals control operations
Electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) Damage communication systems
Explode ammo dumps
Blinding lasers Blind optics, dazzle operators, overload tracking
and targeting sensors
Neural inhibitors Short circuit human synoptic pathways
Calmative agents Tranquilize personnel
Infrasound Sound projection to disorient, sicken, or frighten
people from designated areas
Holographs PSYOPS to convince adversaries to act in desired
manner

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Figure 11.3. USCENTAF IW Cell.

11.4.5. Execution Planning . The existing ATO process used to provide mission targeting data is
tied to a 24- hour cycle of air combat operations. Incorporating IW techniques into an Integrated
Tasking Order (ITO) may require significant evolution of the process. Potential IW weapon systems
may be able to attack numerous targets within compressed time frames. In addition, generating addi-
tional information attacks from a particular weapon will not be tied to sortie turn rates and aircraft
maintenance capacities. An ITO process must be developed which will be able to fully exploit IW
capabilities as they become available. As IW capabilities are developed, the acquisition/ engineering
team should work with targeting personnel to ensure timelines for attack planning, generation, and
re-generation are known. These timelines should be taken into account and drive modifications to the
existing ATO process as necessary.
11.4.5.1. Execution planning for IW will require target materials tailored to application of unique
weapons systems. Existing BTGs and other materials will not suffice for direct information attack

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 techniques. Tools which aid selection of IW DMPI equivalents will be different from the standard
imagery and chart based target folders used today, and the requirement for a new line of IW target
materials needs to be considered. The particular requirements for mission planning and execution
will need to be taken into account in order to develop a product formatted to suit the needs of the
customer. One method of providing the vast amounts of data necessary for executing IW attacks
could be through “virtual” target folders. The particular information needed could be accessed
through an on-line or electronic product without deluging the operational planner with a huge hard
copy inventory.
11.4.6. Combat Assessment . The value of any targeting strategy is lost without an effective assess-
ment process. The AF must explore development of ways to measure non lethal battle damage to
allow for proper BDA. Planners must be able to provide probable effects of any given action to max-
imize the effectiveness of the IW strategy being developed, linking anticipated effects to desired
objectives. Using these probable effects, planners can then identify potential indicators that some-
thing has occurred as a result of our actions and develop an IW assessment plan to task collection
assets. Finally, analysts would conduct an IW reattack recommendation to evaluate the results of IW
actions taken. Current imagery based BDA methodology will not suffice for IW - there may be no
"smoking holes." The academic community should be tapped for technical research in this arena. The
Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible in DoDD S-3600.1 “to provide the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commands with the timely intelligence required for effective IW
post-strike analysis.”

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 Chapter 12

TARGET MATERIALS

12.1. Overview. Target materials are “graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video or other physical and quan-
titative presentations” of target intelligence. These products locate, identify, and describe potential tar-
gets with enough accuracy to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapon
systems. Target materials are also suitable for training, planning, and evaluating such operations. Three
will be discussed here: Air Target Materials (ATM), Tactical Target Materials (TTM), and targeting
tools.

12.2. Air Target Materials (ATM) Program (ATMP). The ATMP includes products in the form of
target graphics and supporting documents required for visual and radar bombing training and operations,
at both high and low altitudes. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) manages the ATMP.
All active foreign and domestic ATM products held in inventory can be found in the NIMA Catalog, Part
4, “Target Material Products.” Current ATM products include:
12.2.1. Air Target Charts (ATC). These are the standard medium scale (1:200,000) air target charts
produced for areas of Korea, the Former Soviet Union, PRC, Europe, Turkey, and Southeast Asia, as
well as for selected training areas in the US. Series 200 ATCs are geographically integrated charts
having a sheet pattern delimited by a five-by-five (25 sheets) subdivision of the areas identified within
the World Aeronautical Chart (WAC). These charts provide the cartographic, intelligence, and radar
return information needed to plan, train, brief, and execute either visual or radar bombing operations
at any altitude. The reverse of each sheet includes textual data describing installations depicted in the
area. The graphic or textual representations on the chart include the Radar Significant Analysis Code
(RSAC), Radar Significant Power Lines (RSPL), Precise Radar Significant Location (PRSL) points,
Radar Fix Points (RFP), special areas and geographic coordinate information. (NOTE: PRSL infor-
mation is not shown on Series 200 ATCs produced after 1 October 1978.) ATCs are being phased out;
phase out date is projected for the year 2000.
12.2.2. Series 1501 Joint Operations Graphic--Radar (JOG-R). This standard medium scale
(1:250,000) chart is produced for target areas where contingency operations might occur, but are not
covered by ATCs. They provide RSAC, RSPL, and PRSL information and are used to support com-
bined and joint tactical operations; pre-flight and operational planning; training, pilotage, or opera-
tional functions; and intelligence work.
12.2.3. Consolidated Air Target Materials Notices/Target Materials Bulletin, Vol umes I and
II. Semiannual publications that provide information affecting the operational use of the Air Target
Materials. Volume I contains changes and special notices in textual form. Volume II contains change
notices in graphic form (correction overlays). These two volumes are classified.

12.3. Target Materials (TM) Program (TMP). TMs are graphics providing a representation of the
installation including identification, location, and textual description. The program itself was established
to provide DoD users from national to unit level a common basis for communication. Its objectives are to
produce and maintain tactical materials so that operational forces may deploy from one theater to another
without having to adjust to new targeting procedures; to minimize duplication of effort; and to economize
on production resources. For additional information on allied participation, security classifications and
markings, and production specifications, refer to DIAM 57-24, U.S./Allied Target Materials.

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12.3.1. JCS/J2T has the worldwide management responsibility for policy on TM matters such as pro-
gram indoctrination; the development of new or modified materials; technical and analytical proce-
dures; changes in production specifications; and standardization. In crisis situations, J2T also
functions as a central clearinghouse to assign command approved TM production priorities and
requirements to provide the supported commander with appropriate TMs in a timely manner while
eliminating duplication of effort.
12.3.2. TM production is provided by designated Service and Command JIC/JACs, and by selected
Allied production centers. TM production responsibilities are assigned to centers already responsible
to the tasking command for general intelligence production; however, special support agreements are
necessary to ensure TM production for commands without a subordinate production capability.
12.3.3. TM Products.
12.3.3.1. Automated Tactical Target Graphic (ATTG). First produced in 1971, these graphics
were a total installation data base recognized as a desirable method of recording target data.
ATTGs have been replaced by the Basic Target Graphic, but some are still available, particularly
in areas of the world with lower production priorities. The ATTG is normally a two-section doc-
ument, with one page containing the annotated target photograph and the second section contain-
ing the textual description of the installation. The information is stored on a computer punch card
called an aperture card. The card program was designed to provide an imagery data base to oper-
ational units, with source material for initial contingency planning and operations. It is easily
stored and can be rapidly sorted and used commonly by commands throughout the world.
12.3.3.2. Basic Target Graphic (BTG). The BTG is the basic general purpose imagery-based
product used to delineate and describe the elements of a target/installation to support a wide range
of target related functions. It provides a photographic database divided into two sections: the
graphic page, which shows the target facility; and the text page, which provides detailed informa-
tion on the target. This information is all-source, derived from imagery analysis, general intelli-
gence data, and MC&G data. The content of a BTG is determined by EEIs developed for the
functional category code of the target to which the BTG belongs.
12.3.3.2.1. BTGs can consist of several graphic pages to provide more detailed visual refer-
ences for TM users. An orientation graphic provides small-scale imagery to aid in orientation
and relative location of the target. A target or detail graphic is used primarily for positive tar-
get identification and clearly shows all components of the target. Unannotated graphics are
added to the BTG at the producer’s discretion to provide a clear view of the target graphic. An
overall map view depicting the target location (on a JOG or topographic map) may be included
in lieu of broad area coverage. Supplemental data and graphic sheets associated with the BTG
include the Enhanced Target Graphic, Seasonal Target Graphic, Hard Target Graphic, and the
Positional Data Graphic.
12.3.3.3. Training Target Graphic (TTG). The TTG is produced on CONUS and European
ranges for use in military training and in exercises. They are frequently unclassified and so can be
used for illustrative purposes. The format mirrors that of the BTG. The 480 IG produces TTGs.
12.3.3.4. Operational Target Graphic (OTG) . An OTG is a low volume, high detail target
graphic, built to help locate hard to find and complex targets. The OTG must provide six manda-
tory images to include 15, 5-8, 1, and <1 NM overviews, as well as individual closeups of each
functional and radar/infrared overview.

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 12.3.3.5. Quick Response Graphic (QRG). When target graphics are required during emer-
gency or crisis situations, it may be necessary to modify the production standards to provide a
QRG. Modifications are made by the responsible combatant command commander, who autho-
rizes production of QRGs that use only selected EEIs in the annotations and textual description, or
that eliminate all EEIs except basic identification of target components. QRGs will be identified
by codes that differ from those used with BTGs. See DIAM 57-24 for more information.
12.3.3.6. Future Products . To meet rigorous targeting requirements of new weapon systems, a
new TM, the Joint Digital Target Material (JDTM), is currently under development. It will pro-
vide a general reference describing an individual installation or facility’s location, function, sig-
nificance, critical elements, and other pertinent targeting information. The JDTM concept calls
for a product consisting of text, imagery and geospatial overlays in varied formats (e.g., raster,
vector), allowing a user to select and manipulate only those elements required. The JDTM will be
an integrated relational set of standard formatted data pulled from varied data bases, such as
MIDB and NIMA’s Global Geospatial Information & Services (GGI&S), packaged in a standard-
ized manner, and validated by a target material producer. The JDTM with its geocoded layered
approach provides a means to significantly improve intelligence support to the targeting and mis-
sion planning process. Current technology supports the concept and accepted standards allow for
interoperability with automated theater battle management systems.

12.4. Targeting Tools. There are three basic types of targeting tools. The first provides target intelli-
gence on installations or facilities and contains preliminary information necessary to select potential tar-
gets. The second concerns such weaponeering tools as physical vulnerability (PV), target values,
weaponeering methodology, and battle damage assessment (BDA). The data contained in these tools pro-
vide targeting personnel, weaponeers, analysts, mission planners, and decision makers with a common
base of information necessary to perform the targeting function. The third provides target planning infor-
mation for unit mission planning including appropriate OPlan/Conplans and directives dealing with pol-
icy and procedures. The most important targeting tools are described below:
12.4.1. Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) . The MIDB is the key to the DoD targeting pro-
gram. It is a standardized intelligence data system designed to provide for data exchange between
intelligence and operational consumers from the national to tactical levels. The database contains a
baseline source of intelligence on installations, military forces, population concentrations, C2 struc-
tures, significant events, and equipment. A targeting extension to the MIDB is being developed which
will extract selected data fields from the database to support targeting. Of note, because of production
costs, data on areas of less interest to the US intelligence community can be limited.
12.4.2. Basic Encyclopedia (BE) . This compendium of installation intelligence taken from the
MIDB is the most inclusive of all installation lists. It describes every identified installation with an
active function or of valid interest to intelligence agencies, particularly to the operational and planning
staffs of the Unified commands. The BE contains basic data on the identification, location, and func-
tion of each installation. It may be used to select potential fixed targets for employment of ground,
sea, or air weapons, or to identify installations (such as public utilities and hospitals) to be withheld
from attack. The BE lists installations in five geographic areas: Eurasia; Western Europe; Latin
America and the Atlantic; Middle East and Africa, and Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.
12.4.3. Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specifications (GIIPS). Established by
DIA to provide comprehensive documentation of all product specifications for various MIDB pro-

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grams. GIIPS has replaced the Target Data Inventory (TDI) handbook and Contingency Planning
Facilities List (CPFL) production documentation. This handbook contains specific guidance and pro-
cedures for use in analysis, production, and processing of target intelligence by DIA, the combatant
commands, Services, and other organizations responsible for maintaining the DoD installation intelli-
gence data base.
12.4.4. Target Intelligence Handbook (TIHB) . This handbook contains specific guidance and
procedures for use in analysis, production, and processing of target intelligence by DIA, the Unified
and Specified commands, Services, and other organizations responsible for maintaining the DoD
installation intelligence database. The TIHB includes information on BE numbering and naming pro-
cedures, security classification guidance, coordinates, abbreviations, target intelligence programs,
products, and geographic areas of coverage. It is published as required to facilitate the production,
maintenance, and use of the BE, GIIPS, and related target intelligence documentation programs.
12.4.5. Standard Coding System Functional Classification Handbook . This handbook contains
guidance and procedures on the use of functional category codes, which classify installations by func-
tion through the use of standard intelligence codes that indicate the products, capability, or activity
associated with the installation. The classification system consists of a five-digit numeric character
code. The handbook is published as required and is intended for use with the BE, GIIPS, and related
targeting documents.
12.4.6. Point Reference Guide Book (PRGB) . This document provides guidance for selecting ref-
erence points needed to derive geographic coordinates. Such reference points locate critical func-
tional elements of installations in the various target categories. Each photograph or sketch depicts a
sample installation, annotates the reference point at the recommended location, and explains briefly
how to locate the reference point.
12.4.7. Physical Vulnerability (PV) Handbook--Nuclear Weapons . This handbook is the recog-
nized DoD reference on the use of nuclear weapons. It is intended for use by operational planners, tar-
geting personnel, and physical vulnerability analysts who are concerned with the delivery of nuclear
weapons and the prediction of their effects.
12.4.8. Definition of Nuclear Damage . This document contains nuclear damage definitions, dam-
age criteria, and recuperation time estimates for each major TDI category or subcategory.
12.4.9. Physical Vulnerability (PV) Data Sheets . This document provides complete physical vul-
nerability information for installations contained in the GIIPS whose vulnerability cannot be accu-
rately coded using the existing vulnerability number (VN) system. The vulnerability information is
presented as adjusted vulnerability numbers for use with specific yields of nuclear weapons and in the
form of mathematical equations which can be readily adapted to computer use.
12.4.10. Target Value System (TVS) Manual . This manual describes the target value system used
by STRATCOM/J5 to determine the relative importance of enemy installations.
12.4.11. Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEM ) and Joint Technical Coordinating
Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) Publications. These publications deal with US
systems and munitions and are the recognized DoD references on nonnuclear weapons and their effec-
tiveness, selection, and requirements. They provide the basic data required for conventional weap-
oneering, including step-by-step instructions on the computations necessary. The large sections on
target vulnerability and delivery accuracy are the most widely used.

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 12.4.12. BDA Assessment Handbooks . These handbooks are the recognized DoD references on
the assessment of battle damage, either by nuclear or conventional weapons.
12.4.13. Operations Plans Appendices . Plans which task units to support specific operations nor-
mally contain an installation target list. This list allows a unit to obtain the target materials needed for
mission planning and aircrew study of specific targets.
12.4.14. Operational Support Plan Graphics . These are DIA produced documents that provide
detailed information on CINC tasked OPLAN targets. Data is obtained through Special Access
Required programs.
12.4.15. Air Force Guide No. 2, USAF Standard Aircraft Missile Characteristics. Volume I, or
the Green Book, and Volume II, or the Brown Book, give the characteristics and performance of aero-
space systems, propulsion systems, and training equipment. Data on the systems are published ini-
tially during the validation phase and updated periodically throughout the life cycle of the system.
12.4.16. Numerical Index and Requirement Table for Fighter Aircraft Technical Orders, Gen-
eral Aircraft Technical Orders, and Bomber Aircraft Technical Orders. These publications pro-
vide specific technical information for detailed comparison of systems.
12.4.17. Flight Information Publications (FLIP). A series of publications presenting textual and
graphic data required to plan and conduct IFR flight. The three basic categories of FLIPs are plan-
ning, enroute, and terminal.
12.4.18. Nonnuclear Consumables Annual Analysis (NCAA). This document serves as the basis
for air munitions War Reserve Material planning and programming for five fiscal years.

12.5. Target Materials Users Group/Target Materials Producers Group (TMUG/TMPG) Confer-
ences. JCS/J2T convenes semiannual TMUG/TMPG conferences to examine recommendations for
improving the target intelligence and target materials program and to review associated procedures. Con-
ferees discuss and evaluate recommendations for changes in the scope, format, content, production proce-
dures, and specifications for a number of programs and associated documentation, such as the BE, the
BTG, and several DIA manuals, handbooks, lists, and programs. The 497 IG/INOT, Targeting Division,
is the Air Force voting representative to this forum.

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 Chapter 13

THE TARGET LOCATION

13.1. Target Location. The target location is defined by coordinates. Coordinates are “linear or angular
quantities which designate the position that a point occupies in a given reference frame or system.” With
advancements in systems, the traditional role (previously used only as a “cueing” device to get weapon
systems into the proper area) of the coordinate has changed. As a major component of weapon system cir-
cular error probable (CEP), targets that are not precisely and accurately located mean higher warhead and
sortie costs. While cartographic techniques of deriving coordinates are suitable for supporting the “cue-
ing” function, they cannot provide the precise coordinates needed for many of the newer weapon systems.
Consequently, a precise geopositioning capability (PGC) was identified and developed to meet geoposi-
tioning requirements.
13.1.1. Coordinate Reference System . Coordinate reference systems are a shorthand means of
communicating location on the earth’s surface. The most familiar coordinate reference system uses
latitude, longitude, and elevation. Others include the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) and Uni-
versal Polar Stereographic (UPS) grid system, which are two-dimensional. Simply put, these are grids
placed on maps which allow a location to be identified without the lengthy description of degrees,
minutes, and seconds of latitude and longitude. The Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) is an
alphanumeric shorthand for expressing UTM and UPS coordinates with fewer numbers. Of note, a
coordinate reference system always connects to a datum that defines its reference frame and point of
origin; when the datum changes, so do the coordinates of the position.
13.1.1.1. Geodetic coordinates (geodetic latitude, geodetic longitude, and geodetic height) define
the position of a point on the surface of the Earth with respect to the reference spheroid. Geo-
graphic coordinates, on the other hand, are quantities of latitude and longitude which only define
the position of a point on a reference surface .

13.2. Datums. A critical consideration often overlooked in using coordinates is the geodetic datum upon
which the coordinates and stated accuracy are based. A datum is a regional or global coordinate reference
system. It includes a reference ellipsoid (a mathematical representation of the size and shape of the earth)
and a specific origin point. Coordinates within the same geodetic datum are directly related to the same
origin point. Coordinates within different datums must be converted to a common reference before they
can be used for targeting.
13.2.1. The World Geodetic System (WGS) provides the basic reference frame and geometric figure
for the earth, models the earth gravimetrically, and provides the means for relating positions on vari-
ous local geodetic systems to an earth-centered, earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinate system. WGS 84 cur-
rently is the ECEF system officially authorized for DoD use. {WGS is the preferred designation,
rather than WGS 84, which many assume is the currency date.} WGS represents NIMA's modeling
of the earth from a geometric, geodetic, and gravitational standpoint. It was developed using new and
more extensive data sets and improved computer software. The availability of a more extensive file
of Doppler-derived station coordinates, improved sets of ground-based Doppler and laser satellite
tracking data and surface gravity for local geodetic systems, and satellite radar altimetry for geoid
heights resulted in significant improvements over the previous system (WGS 72). WGS parameters
and models are constantly being upgraded as new information is being incorporated. NIMA currently
does not plan to create another WGS-XX.

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13.3. Measures of Accuracy. The accuracy measures provided with geospatial paper product and digital
data define the envelope of reliable use. Geospatial data cannot be more accurate than its original source,
and sources vary in accuracy. In addition, each step in the production process can introduce errors due to
limitations of the production hardware and software, human factors, and the inherent characteristics of the
product itself (i.e., size and scale of the chart or the specification accuracy for digital data). These typi-
cally manifest themselves as errors in position or elevation.
13.3.1. Classes of Errors. The production and presentation of geospatial information involves many
steps. Numerous observations, measurements, and display operations are involved. Because of
instrumental imperfections and human limitations, errors can occur at almost any point in the produc-
tion process. These errors fall into three general classes: blunders, systematic errors, and random
errors.
13.3.1.1. The basic definition of an error distribution assumes that systematic errors and blunders
have been removed and only random errors are left. However, systematic errors cannot be
removed from positional information unless some means exist for their detection, such as compar-
ing this information against given control. Consequently, if systematic errors are not removed,
they will have an effect, for example, on geodetic and photogrammetric measurements and the
resulting positional information.
13.3.1.2. Statistical techniques are used to measure and identify these errors. These measures
convey a confidence level to the user for the probably accuracy of NIMA data. Depending on the
data’s intended use, geospatial accuracy’s are usually expressed in terms of absolute or relative
accuracy, or both. Absolute accuracy tells how close each feature or data point is to the specified
higher standard. It includes all random and systematic errors. Relative accuracy tells how close
the measured distance or elevation is between two features or data points over a specified distance
within the standard. It includes only random errors. Geospatial position accuracy is traditionally
measured in feet or meters of Linear Error (LE) for heights and feet or meters of Circular Error
(CE) for horizontal position, both at 90% probability. Spherical Error (SE) is the three-dimen-
sional combination of horizontal and vertical errors at 90% probability and will be increasingly
used as the measure of geospatial fidelity in the near future.
13.3.1.3. Certain weapons use circular measures of absolute and relative accuracy at 50% proba-
bility that reflect the intended uses of these systems. The 50% Circular Error Probable (CEP) fig-
ure is the radius of a circle around the target within which 50% of the weapons should fall. The
remaining 50% fall outside the CEP. The Spherical Error Probable (SEP) is a three-dimensional
combination of horizontal and vertical errors at 50% probability.
13.3.1.4. Target Location Error (TLE) is the difference between the actual location of the target
and the expected location. Understanding and predicting TLE is particularly crucial to autono-
mous weapons development because of low CEP objectives. The total overall error is a statistical
combination of TLE and the errors associated with the weapon (e.g., INS, GPS, aircraft, and oper-
ator).
13.3.2. Precision and Accuracy. Although the terms precision and accuracy are often used inter-
changeably, there is an important difference between them. “Precision” is the closeness with which
repeated measurements made under similar conditions are grouped together, and “accuracy” is the
closeness of the best estimated value obtained by the measurements to the “true” value of the quantity
measured.

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 13.3.2.1. Precision is affected only by the random errors in the measuring process, while accuracy
is affected by precision as well as the existence of unknown or systematic errors. Measurements
may be both precise and inaccurate, but they cannot be accurate unless they are precise.
13.3.2.2. Coordinates that are developed, transmitted and used should have a format (capability)
to support measurements to a deci-foot (equivalent to DDD MM SS.SSS or thousandths of an arc
second). The associated accuracy of the coordinates should also be stated. The User can deter-
mine from these parameters whether the coordinate data will meet User requirements. {Note:
This does not mean all coordinates must be derived to that level of precision or that the position be
accurate to that level. Example: Measurements of an object on the source may be precise to the 6
inches. The positional accuracy of the object itself may within 100 feet. If the intended use is to
measure the object, this precision may support the process. If the intended use is to verify the
object and to bomb the object, the precision is superfluous and the accuracy may or may not be
adequate based on the bombing scenario.
13.3.3. Error Budget Concept . When the strike system is not terminally guided, or when the crew
member does not acquire the target visually, the aimpoint coordinate is a critical component of system
accuracy. Total system accuracy may be viewed as an “error budget” in considering each source con-
tributing to the total error. Conceptually, the CEP “error budget” is a set of systematically defined
error sources, each of which contributes some identifiable portion to total system inaccuracy. The
“error budget” concept allows us to systematically address error contribution to ensure that no single
component is excessive. Targeting personnel must ensure that lack of target location accuracy does
not degrade the overall system accuracy.
13.3.4. Precise Geopositioning Capability. Coordinate derivation is the process of generating geo-
detic coordinates that precisely identifies the position of a point or target. Due to the development of
systems with greater precision, it is critical that the accuracy of the target coordinate be commensurate
with the strike system CEP. Furthermore, the target coordinate must be described in terms common
to the strike. Accurate coordinates and their conversion to a frame of reference usable by the strike
system are required because it affects the system and its means of employment (tactics). Targeteers
are responsible for converting target coordinates into these common terms and generating the required
offset data (i.e., OAP to target, range, and bearing, or rectangular coordinates). Accuracy in describ-
ing target position, a desired ground zero (DGZ), or desired point of impact within a common refer-
ence system is a key element in targeting and is an important strike/attack cycle mission function.
13.3.4.1. Point Positioning Data Base (PPDB). PPDBs are sets of geodetically controlled pho-
tographic materials, accompanying data, and computer programs which enable trained personnel
to derive accurate coordinates for any identifiable ground feature within the database area. PPDB
accuracy is estimated for the entire coverage. Derivation of target or point coordinates from
PPDBs requires the use of the Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (APPS) for men-
suration and geopositioning. The APPS is a manual system in which the operator selects the
APPROPRIATE stereo pair, locates the target optically, and determines the geoposition of the
point. NIMA began phasing out hardcopy PPDB’s production in FY96. The use of APPS and
PPDBs is decreasing and will culminate as other PGCs mature.
13.3.4.2. Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB). DPPDB is a classified image product
consisting of high-resolution digital stereo image pairs and replaces the hardcopy PPDB. The
DPPDB provides warfighters with a deployable product from which latitude, longitude, and eleva-
tion can be quickly and accurately derived on digital exploitation workstations with stereo capa-

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bility. The DPPDB consists of three main components: 1) imagery support data, 2) a digital map
graphic for reference, and 3) stereo imagery. The area coverage of nominal DPPDB is a rectangle
measuring 60 nm on each side. This rectangle is termed a "product rectangle". At the equator, a
product rectangle is a 1 degree x 1 degree geocell and is bounded by 1 degree parallels on the
north and south and by 1 degree meridians on the east and west. DPPDBs can be produced that are
smaller than a product rectangle and not constrained by geocell boundaries. Ground coordinates
derived using the DPPDB rational function model are referenced to the WGS ellipsoid. The abso-
lute and relative accuracy of the DPPDB is consistent with the rigorous triangulation performed
by NIMA’s Digital Production System (DPS). The computed absolute and relative accuracy val-
ues, which vary from product to product, are provided as part of the imagery support data. Basic
DPPDB imagery viewing and point mensuration can be performed on a suitably equipped work-
station using NIMA’s DEW Drop software.

JOHN P. JUMPER, Lt Gen, USAF

DCS, Air & Space Operations

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 Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS

References
AFDD 1-1, Basic Air and Space Doctrine of the United States Air Force
Cohen, Eliot A., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol I: Planning and Command and Control; 1993
Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994
FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, March 29, 1990
TH 61A1-1-1-1, Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual Air to Surface, Vol I & II, December 1980
Robin Higham, Air Power: A Concise History, New York: St. Martin’s Press 1972, 21-23
Edgar S. Gorrell, “Early History of the Strategical Section,” in The U.S. Air Service in World War I. Vol.
2, ed. Maurer Maurer (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 143.
U.S. Bombing Survey in The U.S. Air Service in World War I. Vol. 4, ed. Maurer Maurer (Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 501-502.
Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I. Vol. 3 (Washington D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1978), 215.
”Provisional Manual of Operations,” in The U.S. Air Service in World War I. Vol. 2, ed. Maurer Maurer
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 279.
Maj T. D. Milling, Air Service Assistant Commandant, "The Air Service Tactical School: Its Function
and Operation," Langley Field, Virginia: Air Service Tactical School, 1924.
Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940 (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University
1955), 31.
Haywood S. Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan (Washington D.C.: Office of
Air Force History, 1986), 10-11,19, 21-22.
Harold B. Hinton, Air Victory: The Men and the Machines, with a Foreword by Barton K. Yount (New
York: H Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948), 145-146.
William A. Goss, “The AAF,” in The Army Air Forces In World War II, Vol. 6, ed. Wesley Frank Craven
and James Lea Cate (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History 1983) 40.
Thomas H. Greer, “Other Training Programs,” in Craven Vol 6, 687.
Alfred Goldberg, “Establishment of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom,” in Craven Vol 1 624.
Robert Frank Futrell, “US Army Air Forces Intelligence in the Second World War,” in The Conduct of the
Air War in the Second World War, ed. Horst Boog (New York: St Martin’s Press 1988), 539, 547-548.
Arthur B. Ferguson, “The CBO Plan,” Craven Vol 2, 352-354.
James Lowe, “Intelligence in the Selection of Strategic Target Systems” (lecture, Air War College, Max-
well field, AL, 1946)

102
George C. McDonald, “U.S. Air Force Intelligence Prior to and During World War II and Today” (lec-
ture, Air War College, Maxwell Field, Al, 1947), 5.
The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European and Pacific Wars) (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 39 & 117.
United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict 25 June - 1 November 1950 (Maxwell AFB,
Al: Air University, 1952), 52-53, 84.
Korean War Report . Vol. 2. (Far East Air Force (FAEF) Report, ca. 1955), 141-142, 146-147.
United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 July 1952--27 July 1953 (Maxwell AFB, Al:
Air University, 1956), 10.
Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1961 -
1984, Vol. 2 (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University Press, 1989), 304.
USAF Intelligence Activities in Support of Operations in Southeast Asia 1 January 1965 - 31 March 1968
(Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University, 1972), 8.
Thomas E. Lee & Samuel M. Taylor, “Air Force Target Intelligence Enhancement Program,” (technical
note, Bolling AFB, D.C.: Air Force Intelligence Service, 1985), 4.
AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations -- Counter Air, Close Air Support and Interdiction
John Heidrick, "9TIS/INT Planning Procedures for Internal Look-90 and Operation Desert Shield,"
undated paper provided to author for the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) and MFR (S), “USAF/
INT Targeting/MC&G Support to DESERT SHIELD,” Col James R. Blackburn, USAF/INT, 17 October
1990.
DIA Memo, From the Chief DB-6 to VP, subj: “Overall Perspective on Target Materials Available at Cri-
sis Initiation,” dated 29 August 1990.
Consolidated Tactical Target Materials Catalog (TTMC) Langley AFB, VA: 480 Tactical Intelligence
Group, 1990.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA—Anti Aircraft Artillery
ACCI—Air Combat Command Instruction
ACFT—Aircraft
ACINT—Acoustic Intelligence (non compressed fluids)
ACO—Airspace Control Order
ACOUSTINT—Acoustic Intelligence (compressed fluids)
ACTS—Air Corps Tactical School
ADRG—ARC Digitized Raster Graphics
AFDD—Air Force Doctrine Document
AFIWC—Air Force Information Warfare Center
AFM—Air Force Manual (old designation)
103
AFMSS—Air Force Mission Support System
AFSST—Air Force Space Support Teams
AI—Air Interdiction
AIF—Automated Installation Intelligence File
AIS—Air Intelligence Squadron
AOC—Air Operations Center
AOR—Area of Responsibility
APPS—Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System
APS—Advanced Planning System
ASOC—Air Support Operations Center
ASTS—Air Service Tactical School
ASW—Antisubmarine Warfare
ATC—Air Target Chart
ATM—Air Target Material
ATMP—Air Target Materials Program
ATO—Air Tasking Order
ATTG—Automated Tactical Target Graphic
AWOP—Automated Weaponeering Optimization Program
AWPD—Air War Plans Division
BDA—Battle Damage Assessment
BEI—Bridge Effectiveness Index
BTG—Basic Target Graphic
C2W—Command and Control Warfare
C3CM—Command, Control, Communications Countermeasures
C3I—Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C4I—Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CA—Counter Air; Combat Assessment
CAS—Close Air Support
CASSUM—CAS Summary Message
CBU—Cluster Bomb Unit
CENTAF—See USCENTAF
CENTCOM—See USCENTCOM

104
CEP—Circular Error Probable
CI—Counterintelligence or Counterinformation
CIA—Central Intelligence Agency
CICV—Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam
CINC—Commander in Chief
COA—Committee of Operations Analysts
COM—Collection Operations Management
COMINT—Communications Intelligence
CONOP—Concept of Operations
CONPLAN—Concept Plan (operation plan in concept format)
CONUS—Continental United States
CPFL—Contingency Planning Facilities List
CR—Collection Requirement
CRC—Control and Reporting Center
CRM—Collection Requirement Management
CSAF—Chief of Staff Air Force
CSAR—Combat Search and Rescue
CSS—Central Security Service
CTAPS—Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
DC—Crater Diameter
DCA—Defensive Counter Air
DCI—Defensive counterinformation
DCS/I—Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DEP—Deflection Error Probable
DGZ—Desired Ground Zero
DIAM—Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DMPI—Desired Mean Point of Impact
DPI—Desired Point of Impact
DPPDB—Digital Point Positioning Data Base
DPS—Digital Production System
DTED—Digital Terrain Elevation Data
ECCM—Electronic Counter Countermeasure

105
ECEF—Earth-Centered, Earth-Fixed
ECM—Electronic Countermeasure
EEI—Essential Elements of Information
ELINT—Electronics Intelligence
EMD—Effective Miss Distance
EMP—Electromagnetic Pulse
EOB—Electronic Order of Battle
EW—Early Warning
FAC—Facility
FACP—Forward Air Control Party
FC—Fire Control
FEAF—Far East Air Force
FEBA—Forward Edge of Battle Area
FEC—Far East Command
FIS—Foreign Instrumentation Signals
FIWC—Fleet Information Warfare Center
FLIP—Flight Information Publication
FLOT—Forward Line of Own Troops
FSCL—Fire Support Coordination Line
GCI—Ground Control Intercept
GGI&S—Global Geospatial Information and Services
GIIPS—Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specifications
GPS—Global Positioning System
HUMINT—Human Intelligence
IDB—Integrated Data Base
IFR—Instrument Flight Rules
IMINT—Imagery Intelligence
INS—Inertial Navigation System
INSCOM—United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
INTELINK—Intelligence Link (INTERNET for Intelligence)
IO—Information Operations
IP—Initial Point

106
IPA—Image Product Archive
ITO—Integrated Tasking Order
IW—Information Warfare
IWST—Information Warfare Support Teams
JAADC—Joint Area Air Defense Commander
JAC—Joint Analysis Center
JAG—Judge Advocate General
JC2WC—Joint Command and Control Warfare Center
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM—Joint Direct Attack Munition
JDTM—Joint Digital Target Material
JFACC—Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC—Joint Force Commander
JFSOCC—Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIC—Joint Intelligence Center
JMEM—Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
JOPS—Joint Operational Planning System
JSTARS—Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
JTCG—Joint Target Coordination Board
JTF—Joint Task Force
LASINT—Laser Intelligence
LE—Linear Error
LIWA—Land Information Warfare Activity
LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict
MA—Mission Assessment
MACV—Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAE—Mean Area Of Effectiveness
MASINT—Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MC&G—Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
MEA—Munitions Effectiveness Assessment
MGRS—Military Grid Reference System
MIDB—Modernized Integrated Data Base

107
MISREP—Mission Report
MK—“Mark” item identification
MPI—Mean Points of Impact
MPS—Mission Planning Section
MRC—Major Regional Conflict
NCA—National Command Authority
NCAA—Nonnuclear Consumables Annual Analysis
NH—Number of Hits
NIMA—National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NITFS—National Imagery Transmission Format Standard
NIWA—Naval Information Warfare Activity
NM—Nautical Mile
NSA—National Security Agency
NSG—Naval Security Group
NTB—National Target Base
NUCINT—Nuclear Intelligence
OAP—Offset Aim Point
OCI—Offensive Counterinformation
OPLAN—Operations Plan
OPTINT—Optical Intelligence
OTG—Operational Target Graphic
PD—Probability of Damage
PGC—Precise Geopositioning Capability
PGM—Precision-Guided Munition
POC—Point of Contact
POL—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PPDB—Point Positioning Data Base
PRC—Peoples Republic of China
PRGB—Point Reference Guide Book
PRSL—Precise Radar Significant Location
PSB—Post Strike Base
PSYOP—Psychological Operations

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QRG—Quick Response Graphic
RAAP—Rapid Application of Airpower
RADINT—Radar Intelligence
REP—Range Error Probable
RFI—Request for Information
RFP—Request for Procurement/Proposal
RINT—Unintentional Radiation Intelligence
ROE—Rules of Engagement
RSAC—Radar Significant Analysis Code
RSPL—Radar Significant Power Line
SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR—Search and Rescue
SATCOM—Satellite Communications
SCADA—Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SEAD—Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
SECAF—Secretary of the Air Force
SEP—Spherical Error Probable
SIGINT—Signals Intelligence
SIOP—Single Integrated Operational Plan
SIPRNET—SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SLAR—Sidelooking Airborne Radar
SSM—Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSPD—Single Shot Probability of Damage
STRATCOM—Strategic Command
TACC—Tactical Air Control Center
TACS—Theater Air Control System
TARBUL—Target Bulletin
TDI—Target Data Inventory
TELINT—Telemetry Intelligence
TERCOM—Terrain Contour Matching
TI—Target Intelligence
TIHB—Target Intelligence Handbook

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TLAM—Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TLE—Target Location Error
TM—Target Material
TMP—Target Materials Program
TMPG—Target Materials Producers Group
TMUG—Target Materials Users Group
TOT—Time on Target
TPFDL—Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TTG—Training Target Graphic
TTM—Tactical Target Material
TTMC—Tactical Target Materials Catalog
TTMP—Tactical Target Materials Program
TVS—Target Value System
UAV—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGS—Unattended Ground Sensors
USCENTAF—United States Central Command Air Forces
USCENTCOM—United States Central Command
USSBS—United States Strategic Bombing Surveys
UTM—Universal Transverse Mercator (map projection)
UW—Unconventional Warfare
VA—Vulnerable Area
VFR—Visual Flight Rules
VN—Vulnerability Number
WAC—World Aeronautical Chart
WGS—World Geodetic System
WPN—Weapon

Terms
ACQUIRED CHARACTERISTICS—The changes to the original or designed characteristics of an
object or area.
ACTUAL GROUND ZERO—The point on the surface of the earth at, or vertically below or above, the
center of actual nuclear detonation. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
ACTUAL RANGE—In bombing, the horizontal distance a bomb travels from the instant of release until
the time of impact.

110
AFTERWINDS—Wind currents set up in the vicinity of a nuclear explosion directed toward the burst
center, resulting from the updraft accompanying the rise of the fireball. (DoD)
AIR ATTACK—:
a. Coordinated -- A combination of two or more types of air attack (dive, glide, low-level) in one
strike, using one or more types of aircraft.
b. Deferred--A procedure in which attack groups rendezvous as a single unit. It is used when attack
groups are launched from more than one station with their departure on the mission being delayed
pending further orders.
c. Divided--A method of delivering a coordinated air attack which consists of holding the units in
close tactical concentration up to a point, then splitting them to attack an objective from different
directions. (DoD, IADB)
AIRBURST—:
a. An explosion of a bomb or projectile above the surface, as distinguished from an explosion on
contact with the surface or after penetration.
b. (Nuclear) The explosion of a nuclear weapon in the air, at a height greater than the maximum
radius of the fireball. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
AIRSPEED—The speed of an aircraft relative to its surrounding air mass. (DoD, IADB)
AIR TARGET CHART—Standard medium scale (1:200,000) charts produced for areas of Korea, the
Former Soviet Union, PRC, Europe, Turkey, and Southeast Asia, as well as for selected training areas in
the US. These charts provide the cartographic, intelligence, and radar return information needed to plan,
train, brief, and execute either visual or radar bombing operations at any altitude. The reverse of each
sheet includes textual data describing installations depicted in the area. (DoD)
AIR TARGET MATERIALS PROGRAM (ATMP)—The ATMP includes products in the form of
target graphics and supporting documents required for visual and radar bombing training and operations
at both high and low altitudes. (DoD)
AIR TARGET MOSAIC—A large scale mosaic providing photographic coverage of an area and
permitting comprehensive portrayal of pertinent target detail. These mosaics are used for intelligence
study and in planning and briefing air operations. (DoD)
ALLOCATION—The designation of specific numbers and types of aircraft sorties for use during a
specified time period or for carrying out an assigned task. (DoD, IADB)
APPORTIONMENT—Dividing of air resources among the various missions, that is, close air support,
interdiction, and counter-air. (DoD)
AREA BOMBING—Bombing of a target which is in effect a general area rather than a small or pinpoint
target. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
AREA TARGET—A large area usually composed of multiple elements or components. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
ARMING SYSTEM—That portion of a weapon which serves to ready (arm), safe, or re-safe (disarm)
the firing system and fuzing system and which may actuate devices in the nuclear system. (DoD, IADB)
ASSESSMENT—Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned

111
intelligence activity. (DoD, IADB)
ASSIGNMENT—:
a. A specified number of complete nuclear rounds authorized for expenditure by a commander. An
assignment may be made for a specific period of time, for a phase of an operation, or to accom-
plish a particular mission. (DoD)
b. Commitment of a particular weapon system or systems against a particular target. (DoD)
ASSURED DESTRUCTION—The capability to destroy an aggressor as a viable society, even after a
well-planned and executed surprise attack on our forces. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
AUTOMATED TACTICAL TARGET GRAPHIC (ATTG)—A tactical target materials item which
provides aerial photographic coverage of a target and a limited area surrounding it at a scale permitting
optimum identification of target detail. The ATTG also provides textual intelligence on a sheet separate
from the graphic portion. ATTGs cover single targets and come in two forms: a lithographic sheet and a
miniaturized version of an aperture card. The majority of ATTGs have been replaced by the Basic Target
Graphic. (DoD)
BALLISTIC DEFLECTION ERROR—That distance, expressed in feet, in deflection measured from
the mean point of impact that contains one quarter of the impact points where aiming error is disregarded
and only random errors, such as are due to manufacturing tolerances and weapon stability characteristics,
are considered. (TIN)
BALLISTIC DISPERSION—The variation of a path of a bomb or projectile which is attributed to
physical tolerances in the weapon dimensions and to the stability of the weapon. The error produced by
this variability is commonly stated as standard deviation in range and deflection of the error with respect
to the mean point of impact.
BALLISTIC RANGE ERROR—That distance, expressed in feet, measured from the mean point of
impact that contains one quarter of the impact points when aiming error is disregarded and only random
errors, such as are due to manufacturing tolerances and weapon stability characteristics are considered.
(TIN)
BASIC ENCYCLOPEDIA—A compendium of installation information describing every identified
installation that has an active function or valid capacity and is of interest to intelligence agencies,
particularly to the operational and planning staffs of the unified and specified commands. (DoD)
BLAST LINE—A horizontal radial line on the surface of the earth originating at ground zero on which
measurements of blast from an explosion are taken. (DoD, IADB)
BOMBING ANGLE—The angle between the vertical and a line joining the aircraft to what would be the
point of impact of a bomb released from it at that instant. (DoD, NATO)
BOMB, CONVENTIONAL—Any nonnuclear bomb designed for explosive, flame, penetration, smoke,
or photoflash effect, as distinguished from a chemical or biological bomb.
BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT—The determination of the effect of all air attacks on targets (for
example, bombs, rockets, or strafe). (DoD, IADB)
BOMB IMPACT PLOT—A graphic representation of the target area, usually a pre-strike air
photograph, on which prominent dots are plotted to mark the impact or detonation points of bombs
dropped on a specific bombing attack. (DoD, IADB)

112
BOMBING ERRORS—:
a. 50% CIRCULAR ERROR--The radius of a circle, with a center at a desired mean point of impact,
which contains half the ordnance independently aimed to hit the desired mean point of impact.
(NATO, CENTO, IADB)
b. 50% DEFLECTION ERROR--Half the distance between two lines, drawn parallel to the aircraft’s
track and equidistant from the mean point of impact, which contains half the ordnance indepen-
dently aimed to hit the desired mean point of impact. (NATO, CENTO, IADB)
NOTE: The above bombing errors should imply overall errors unless otherwise stipulated by inclusion
of the word “random” or “systematic” where necessary. (NATO, CENTO, IADB)
BOMBING HEIGHT—Distance above the target at the moment of bomb release, measured vertically
from the target to the level of the bombing aircraft. (NATO, CENTO, IADB)
BOMB LINE—An imaginary line arranged, if possible, to follow well-defined geographical features,
prescribed by the troop commander and coordinated with the Air Force commander, forward of which Air
Forces are free to attack targets without danger to or reference to ground forces. Behind the line all
attacks must be coordinated with the appropriate troop commander.
BOMB RELEASE LINE—An imaginary line around a defended area or objective over which an
aircraft should release its bombs in order to obtain a hit in an area or objective. (DoD, NATO, IADB)
BOMB RELEASE POINT—The point in space at which bombs must be released to reach the desired
point of detonation. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
BREAKAWAY—The onset of a condition in which the shock front moves away from the exterior of the
expanding fireball produced by the explosion of a nuclear weapon. (DOD, NATO, CENTO)
BUFFER DISTANCE (NUCLEAR):—
a. The horizontal distance which when added to the radius of safety will give the desired assurance
that the specified degree of risk will not be exceeded. The buffer distance is normally expressed
quantitatively in multiples of delivery error.
b. The vertical distance which is added to the fallout safe height of burst in order to determine a
desired height of burst which will provide the desired assurance that militarily significant fallout
will not occur. It is normally expressed in multiples of the vertical error. (DOD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
C2 ATTACK—Any action against any element of the enemy’s command and control system.
CARPET BOMBING—The progressive distribution of a mass bomb load upon an area defined by
designated boundaries, in such a manner as to inflict damage to all portions thereof. (DOD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
CIRCULAR ERROR—An error associated with delivery of munitions on a target. It is the distance
measured between the desired and actual points of impact of a munition. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABLE—:
a. An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining proba-
ble damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of the missiles or projectiles
are expected to fall.

113
 b. An indicator of the accuracy of a missile or projectile, used as a factor in determining probable
damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of the missiles or projectiles are
expected to fall.
c. A measure of aiming accuracy expressed in feet. Its value is estimated by the radius of a circle,
with its center at the mean point of impact containing half of the impact points of independently
aimed bombs or half of the mean points of impact (MPI) resulting from independent aiming oper-
ations. The circular error probable is associated with the circular normal distribution with an aim-
ing error standard deviation equal to 0.849 CEP and is a meaningful measure of accuracy if the
impact pattern is reasonably circular. As the pattern becomes more elliptical, Deflection Error
Probable (DEP) and Range Error Probable (REP) become more accurate descriptions of the pat-
tern (DOD, IADB)
CLEAN WEAPON—A nuclear weapon in which measures have been taken to reduce the amount of
residual radioactivity relative to a “normal” weapon of the same energy yield. (NATO, CENTO, IADB)
COLLATERAL DAMAGE—The damage to surrounding resources, either military or non-military, as
the result of actions or strikes directed specifically against enemy forces or military facilities. (DOD,
NATO, CENTO, IADB)
COMMAND and CONTROL—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
COMPLETE ROUND—A term applied to an assemblage of explosive and non-explosive components
designed to perform a specific function at the time and under the conditions desired. Examples of
complete rounds are:
a. Separate loading--consisting of a primer, propelling charge, and except for blank ammunition, a
projectile and fuze;
b. Fixed or semifixed--consisting of a primer, propelling charge, cartridge case, a projectile, and a
fuze except when solid projectiles are used;
c. Bomb--consisting of all component parts required to drop and function the bomb once;
d. Missile--consisting of a complete warhead section and a missile body with its associated compo-
nents and propellants; and
e. Rocket--consisting of all components necessary, for it to function.
CONTACT BURST PRECLUSION—a fuzing arrangement which prevents an unwanted surface burst
in the event of failure of the airburst fuze. (DOD)
CONTAMINATION—The deposit and/or absorption of radioactive material, biological, or chemical
agents on and by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
CONTINGENCY PLANNING FACILITIES LIST (CPFL)—A joint Defense Intelligence Agency/
unified and specified command program for the production and maintenance of current target
documentation of all countries of contingency planning interest to United States military planners.
(DOD)
CONTINUOUSLY COMPUTED RELEASE POINT—Solution of the weapon delivery release point
by continuous prediction of the release point for a given set of ballistics, altitudes, and airspeeds. (NATO)
CONTROLLED EFFECTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS—Nucl ear weapons desi gned t o a chi eve

114
variation in the intensity of specific effects other than normal blast effect. (DOD)
COUNTERFORCE—The employment of strategic air and missile forces in an effort to destroy or
render impotent, selected military capabilities of an enemy force under any of the circumstances by which
hostilities may be initiated. (DOD, IADB)
COUNTERINFORMATION—Actions designed to establish a desired degree of information
superiority to enable friendly use of the information environment while impeding the use of the same
environment by the adversary. Includes offensive and defensive counterinformation.
COUNTERVALUE—The employment of strategic air and missile forces against an enemy’s urban
industrial economic base in an attempt to destroy his ability or will to support the war-making effort.
(DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
DAMAGE CRITERIA—The critical levels of various effects such as blast procedure and thermal
radiation required to achieve specified levels of damage. (DOD, IADB)
DAMAGE MECHANISMS—Characteristics of the effects of the warhead or munition that is delivered
(for example, fragmentation, incendiary, etc.).
DEFENSIVE COUNTERINFORMATION—Actions protecting our military information functions. It
includes security measures (information assurance and operations security), counterintelligence,
counterdeception, and counterpsychological operations.
DEFLECTION ERROR—An error associated with delivery of munitions on a target. It is the distance
measured between an imaginary line drawn through the desired point of impact and an imaginary line
drawn through the actual point of impact, both lines drawn parallel to the axis of attack. (DOD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
DEFLECTION ERROR PROBABLE—:
a. A value equal to half the distance between two imaginary lines which are drawn parallel to the
aircraft’s track, are equidistant from the desired point of impact, and contain half the impact points
of independently aimed weapons. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
b. A measure of aiming accuracy expressed in feet. Its value is estimated by half the distance
between two lines, drawn parallel to the aircraft’s track, that are equidistant from the desired mean
point of impact and contain half the impact points resulting from independent aiming operations.
If the impact pattern is bivariant normal as is usual, the aiming error standard deviation is equal to
1.483 DEP. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
DEFLECTION SINGLE SHOT PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE—The probability of achieving a
specified damage criterion against a target assuming no range error and a weapon reliability of 100
percent. (TIN)
DEGREE OF RISK (NUCLEAR)—As specified by the commander, the risk to which friendly forces
may be subjected from the effects of the detonation of a nuclear weapon used in the attack of a close-in
enemy target; acceptable degrees of risk under differing tactical conditions are emergency, moderate, and
acceptable. (DOD, IADB)
DESIRED GROUND ZERO—The point on the surface of the earth at, or vertically above or below, the
center of a planned nuclear detonation. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
DESIRED MEAN POINT OF IMPACT—The planned point whose coordinates are the arithmetic

115
means of the coordinates of the separate points of impact of a finite number of projectiles fired or released
at the same aiming point under a given set of conditions.
DEVIATION:—
a. The distance by which a point of impact or burst misses the target.
b. The angular difference between magnetic and compass headings. (DOD, NATO, CENTO,
IADB)
DIRECT INFORMATION WARFARE—Changing the adversary’s information without involving the
intervening perceptive and analytical functions.
DIRTY WEAPON—A weapon which produces a larger amount of residual radioactivity than a
“normal” weapon of the same energy yield.
DISPERSION ERROR—The distance from the point of impact or burst of a round to the mean point of
impact or burst. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
DIVE TOSS—A weapon delivery maneuver in which the aircraft is dived to a predetermined altitude and
point in space, pulled up, and the weapon released in such a way that it is tossed into the target.
DYNAMIC PRESSURE—Pressure resulting from some medium in motion, such as the air following a
shock front of a blast wave. (DOD, NATO, CENTO)
EFFECTIVE MISS DISTANCE—The distance which munitions may miss the desired point of impact
or detonation and still cause the desired damage to the target. (DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
EFFECTIVE PATTERN LENGTH—An expression of the length of the stick plus twice the radius of
the cluster for stick-delivered cluster munitions. (TIN)
EFFECTIVE PATTERN WIDTH—An expression of the width of the stick plus the radius of the
cluster for stick-delivered cluster munitions. (TIN)
EFFECTIVE TARGET AREA LENGTH—An expression of the length of the target area plus twice
the range weapon radius for stick-delivered munitions. (TIN)
EFFECTIVE TARGET AREA WIDTH—An expression of the target area width plus twice the
weapon radius in deflection. (TIN)
EFFECTIVE TARGET DIAMETER—An expression of the target diameter plus twice the miss
distance within which a miss will produce the desired damage. (TIN)
EFFECTIVE TARGET LENGTH—An expression of the length of the target plus the miss distance
within which the weapon will produce the desired damage (or for bridges, the diagonal distance across the
bridge along the approach axis). (TIN)
EFFECTIVE TARGET VULNERABLE LENGTH—An expression of the effective target length
multiplied by the probability that a hit produces the desired damage. (TIN)
EFFECTIVE TARGET WIDTH—An expression of the width of the target plus the miss distance
within which the weapon will produce the desired damage (or for bridges, the width of the bridge
perpendicular to the aircraft’s approach axis). (TIN)
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION PROPAGATION—The emission or transmission of wave
energy; gamma radiation; x-rays; visible, infrared, and ultraviolet radiation; and radar and radio
transmissions. (DoD, IADB)
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EMERGENCY RISK (NUCLEAR)—A degree of risk where anticipated effects may cause some
temporary shock, casualties, and may significantly reduce the unit’s combat efficiency. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
ENVIRONMENTAL SCALE FACTOR—A factor to account for the weapon effectiveness
degradation due to jungle foliage, tall grass, etc. (TIN)
EXECUTING COMMANDER (NUCLEAR WEAPONS)—A commander to whom nuclear weapons
are released for delivery against specific targets or in accordance with approved plans. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
EXO-ATMOSPHERIC BURST (NUCLEAR)—The explosion of a nuclear weapon (above 120
kilometers) where atmospheric interaction is minimal. (DoD, IADB)
FALLOUT—The precipitation to earth of radioactive particulate matter from a nuclear cloud; also
applied to the particulate matter itself. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
FALLOUT PREDICTION—An estimate, made before and immediately after a nuclear detonation, of
the location and intensity of military significant quantities of radioactive (DoD, IADB)
FALLOUT SAFE HEIGHT OF BURST—The height of burst at or above which no military significant
fallout will be prided as a result of a nuclear weapon detonation. (DoD, IADB)
FALLOUT WIND VECTOR PLOT:—
a. A wind vector based on the wind structure from the earth’s surface to the highest altitude affecting
fallout pattern.
b. A wind vector diagram based on the wind structure from the earth’s surface to the highest altitude
of interest. (DoD, IADB)
FIRST STRIKE—The first offensive move of a war. (Generally associated with nuclear operations.)
(DoD, IADB)
FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY—The ability of a nation to launch a first strike without receiving
unacceptably high damage in return. (TIN)
FIRST USE—The initial use of nuclear weapons by either party of a conflict. This can apply to a first
strike or retaliatory strike.
FLASH BURN—A burn caused by excessive exposure of bare skin to thermal radiation. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
FLESHETTE—A small, inert, fin-stabilized missile. A large number may be loaded into a single
warhead. (TIN)
FUZE—A device designed to initiate detonation in any type of ammunition by an action such as
hydrostatic pressure, target proximity, chemical impact, mechanical time, or a combination of these.
Various types of fuses are:
a. Air nose--a point-detonating rocket fuze which uses vanes rotated by the air stream to arm itself.
b. Air pressure--A barometric fuze.
c. All way -- An impact fuze designed to function regardless of its orientation on impact.

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 d. Ambient--A type of proximity fuze which is not activated as a consequence of actual determina-
tion of target presence but by a measurement of parameters associated with the environment in
which the target is normally found.
e. Fuse and burster--A combination of fuze and burster for use in a bomb, such as a liquid-filled
incendiary bomb, which may be filled in the field.
f. Antidisturbance--A fuze designed to become armed after the weapon is emplaced, so that any fur-
ther movement or disturbance will result in detonation.
g. Antiwithdrawal--A fuze incorporating an antiwithdrawal device.
h. Barometric--A fuze that functions as a result of change in the ambient air pressure.
i. Combination--A fuze combining two different types of fuze mechanisms; especially one combin-
ing impact and time mechanisms.
j. Delay--A fuze incorporating a means of delaying its action after sensing the target. Delay fuses
are classified according to the length of time they delay.
k. Electrical--A fuze which depends upon events of an electrical or electronic nature for its arming
and functioning. Such a fuze may not be entirely electrical, but may contain mechanical compo-
nents.
1. Electric time--A fuze in which the time from initiation of action to functioning is controlled
electrically.
m. Impact--A fuze whose action is initiated by the force of impact; also called a contact or percussion
fuze.
n. Contact--A fuze where primary initiation results from actual contact with an object, including such
phenomena as impact, crush, tilt, or electrical contact.
o. Inertial--A fuze using acceleration forces to establish location in trajectory. It senses rate of change in
velocity due to thrust or drag forces and transforms this data to a distance measurement by an integrating
device or other methods.
p. Influence--A fuze initiated by changes in the environment of the fuze; for example, magnetic thermal,
or movement changes.
q. Long delay--A type of delay fuze, especially for land mines, in which the fuze action is delayed for a
relatively long period of time, up to days.
r. Mechanical--Any fuze which depends for its arming and functioning on events primarily of a mechan-
ical nature such as a clock-type mechanism.
s. Mechanical and superquick--A mechanical time fuze containing an additional device designed to cause
instantaneous activation as a result of impact.
t. Medium delay -- A type of delay fuze, especially for bombs, in which the fuze action is delayed for a
period of time between that of a short delay and long delay fuses. This delay is normally four to fifteen
seconds.
u. Nondelay--A fuze that functions as a result of the inertia of a firing pin as the fuze is retarded during
penetration of an object. The inertia causes the firing pin to strike the primer, initiating fuze action. This
type of fuze is inherently slower in action than the superquick or instantaneous fuze since its action
depends upon deceleration of the missile during impact with an object.

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v. Nose--A fuze for use in the forward end (nose) of a bomb or other type of missile.
w. Proximity--A fuze wherein primary initiation occurs by sensing the presence, distance or direction of
an object through the characteristics of the object itself or its environment. This name is preferred over
synonymous terms such as VT fuze.
x. Selective delay--A delay fuze which permits a selection from two or more functioning times.
y. Self-destroying--A fuze containing a device which causes the projectile bursting charge to detonate if
prior functioning has not been caused by object presence or other triggering mechanisms.
z. Superquick--A type of delay fuze used in bombs in which the fuze action is delayed for a short period
of time, usually less than one second.
aa. Tail--A fuze designed to be inserted in the tail of a bomb.
ab. Time--A fuze designed to function after the lapse of a predetermined period of time.
ac. VT--See proximity fuze.
FUZE ERROR—The variation in the fuze functioning time from the intended functioning time. (TIN)
FUZE SAFE-ARMING DISTANCE—The distance from the aircraft within which an unintentional
warhead burst could result in injury to flight personnel or serious damage to the aircraft. (TIN)
GLIDE BOMBING—The action of bombing a target from an aircraft at dive angles of 30 degrees or
less. (DoD, IADB)
GROSS ERROR—A nuclear weapon detonation at such a distance from the desired ground zero as to
cause no nuclear damage to the target. (DoD)
GROUND ZERO—The point on the surface of the earth at, or vertically below or above, the center of a
planned or actual nuclear detonation. (DoD, NATO CENTO, IADB)
HEIGHT OF BURST—:
a. The vertical distance from the earth’s surface oar target to the point of burst.
b. For nuclear weapons, the optimum height for a particular target (or area) is that at which it is esti-
mated a weapon of a specified energy yield will produce a certain desired effect over the maxi-
mum possible area. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
HEIGHT OF BURST ERROR PROBABLE—Error in height of burst which missile or projectile fuses
may be expected to exceed as often as not.
HIGH ALTITUDE BURST—The explosion of a nuclear weapon which takes place at a height in excess
of 100,000 feet. (NATO)
HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING—Horizontal bombing with the height of release over 15,000 feet.
(DoD, IADB)
HORIZONTAL ERROR—The error in range, deflection, or radius, which a weapon may be expected
to exceed as often as not. Horizontal error of weapons making a nearly vertical approach to the target is
described in terms of circular error probable. Horizontal error of weapons producing elliptical dispersion
patterns is expressed in terms of probable error. (DoD NATO, CENTO, IADB)
IMMEDIATE MISSIONS—Those missions for which specific target makeup and location cannot be
determined in advance.

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IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR SUPPORT—Nuclear support to meet specific requests which arise during
the course of a battle and which by their nature cannot be planned in advance. (DoD, IADB)
INDIRECT INFORMATION WARFARE—Changing the adversary’s information by creating
phenomena that the adversary must then observe and analyze.
INFORMATION—Data and instructions.
INFORMATION ATTACK—Directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical
entity within which it resides.
INFORMATION FUNCTIONS—Any activity involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or
transformation of information.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS—Actions taken to access or affect information or information
systems while defending our own.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY—The ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information
while denying an adversary the ability to do the same.
INFORMATION WARFARE—Information operations conducted primarily during the time of crisis or
conflict to achieve information superiority and other military objectives.
INITIAL POINT—:
a. The first point at which a moving target is located on a plotting board.
b. A well-defined point, easily distinguishable visually or electronically, used as a starting point for
the bomb run to the target. (DoD, IADB)
INITIAL RADIATION—The radiation, essentially neutrons and gamma rays, resulting from a nuclear
burst and emitted from the fireball within one minute after burst. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
INSTALLATION—A grouping of facilities located in the same vicinity, which support particular
functions. (DoD, IADB)
INSTALLATION DATA BASE—A set of intelligence data about installations in a geographic region
or functional grouping, usually but not necessarily filed in a computer and used as a base for a variety of
intelligence products.
INSTALLATION INTELLIGENCE—The intelligence pertaining to the basic elements of information
on an installation which is derived from single or multiple sources of information and used as an
intelligence data base.
INSTALLATION LIST—A compendium of objects or areas used primarily for reference purposes.
JOINT MUNITIONS EFFECTIVENESS MANUALS—A DoD publication series containing data
and methodologies for conventional weaponeering. (TIN)
KILL EFFECTS—Destructive effects available upon detonation of a weapon. Kill effects are blast,
penetration, perforation, fragmentation, cratering, earth shock, fire, nuclear and thermal radiation, and
combinations of these in varying degrees. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
LASER GUIDED BOMB (LGB)—A general purpose bomb fitted with a special guidance and control
kit which will guide the freefall towards a target illuminated by a laser beam. (DoD, NATO, CENTO,
IADB)

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LASER TARGET DESIGNATION—The use of a laser to direct a light beam onto the target so that
appropriate sensors can track or home on the reflected energy.
LAYDOWN BOMBING—A very low level bombing technique wherein delay fuzes or devices are used
to allow the attacker to escape the effects of the bomb. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
LINEAR TARGET—A target characterized by a long and narrow shape; for example, a runway or
railroad track.
LOFT BOMBING—A method of bombing in which the delivery aircraft approaches the target at a very
low altitude, makes a definite pull-up at a given point, releases the bomb at a predetermined point during
the pull-up, and tosses the bomb onto the target. (DoD, IADB)
LOW AIRBURST—The fallout safe height of burst for a nuclear weapon which maximizes damage to
or casualties on surface targets. (DoD, IADB)
LOW ANGLE DROGUE DELIVERY (LADD)—A method of bombing that employs a timed release
system based upon a ground reference point on a target. (TIN)
MACH STEM—The shock front formed by the fusion of the incident and reflected shock fronts from an
explosion. The term is generally used with reference to a blast wave, propagated in the air, reflected at the
surface of the earth. In the ideal case, the Mach stem is perpendicular to the reflecting surface and slightly
convex. Also known as Mach front. (DoD, NATO, CENTO)
MEAN AREA OF EFFECTIVENESS (MAE)—A measurement, in square feet, of an abstract area
determined by dividing the area affected by a weapon into small elements and, finally, summing the
product of the probability of damage within each element and the area of each element. MAE depends
upon target vulnerability, weapon characteristics, impact velocity, weapon angle of fall, and burst height.
(DoD, NATO, CENTO)
MEAN POINT OF IMPACT:—
a. The point whose coordinates are the arithmetic means of the coordinates of the separate points of
impact of a finite number of projectiles fired or released at the same aiming point under a given
set of conditions.
b. The point that has as its range and deflection coordinates the arithmetic means of the range and
deflection coordinates and the individual weapon impact points. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
MEDIUM ALTITUDE BOMBING—Horizontal bombing with the height of release between 9,000 and
14,000 feet. (DoD, IADB)
MEGATON WEAPON—A nuclear weapon, the yield of which is measured in millions of tons of TNT
explosive equivalents. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
MILITARY INFORMATION FUNCTION—Any information function supporting and enhancing the
employment of military forces.
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT FALLOUT—Radioactive contamination capable of inflicting radiation
doses to personnel which may result in a reduction of their combat effectiveness. (DoD, IADB)
MINIMUM ALTITUDE BOMBING—Horizontal or glide bombing with the height of release under
900 feet. It includes masthead bombing, which is sometimes erroneously referred to as skip bombing.
(DoD, IADB)

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MINIMUM SAFE DISTANCE (MSD)—(NUCLEAR)--The sum of the radius of safety and buffer
distance. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
MISSION PLANNING—Premission preparation to a crew with all necessary information and material
to successfully deliver a weapon against an assigned target. (TIN)
MODERATE DAMAGE—Damage which prevents the use of equipment or installations until extensive
repairs are made. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
MODERATE RISK (NUCLEAR)—A degree of risk where anticipated effects are tolerable, or at worst,
a minor nuisance. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
MUNITION:—
a. In a broad sense, any and all supplies and equipment required to conduct offensive or defensive
war, including war machines, ammunition, transport, etc.
b. In a restricted sense, ordnance.
MUNITIONS DELIVERY ERROR—An error associated with the delivery of munitions on a target
which occurs after release or launch of the weapon. The error is measured in distance between the desired
and actual points of impact. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGET LIST (NSTL)—A listing of all installations of strategic
targeting importance.
NATIONAL TARGET BASE—The JSTPS produced and maintained file of installations which,
individually and collectively, meet the requirements for achieving the national targeting objectives
specified in the JCS guidance as implemented in the SIOP or the theater nuclear employment plans of the
unified and specified commands.
NEGLIGIBLE RISK (NUCLEAR)—A degree of risk where personnel are reasonably safe, with the
exceptions of dazzle or temporary loss of night vision. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
NUCLEAR COORDINATION—A broad term encompassing all the actions involved with planning
nuclear strikes, including liaisons between commanders for the purpose of satisfying support
requirements or because of the extension of weapons effects into the territory of another. (DoD, IADB)
NUCLEAR DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS—The determination of the damage effects to the population,
forces, and resources resulting from nuclear attack. It is performed during the trans-attack and post-attack
periods. It does not include the function of evaluating the operational significance of nuclear damage
assessments. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
NUCLEAR WARNING MESSAGE—A warning message which must be disseminated to all affected
forces any time a nuclear weapon is to be detonated if effects of the weapon will have impact on those
forces. (DoD, IADB)
NUCLEAR YIELDS—The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured in terms of
the kilotons or megatons of TNT required to produce the same energy release. Yields are categorized as:
a. Very low--less than 1 kiloton.
b. Low--1 kiloton to 10 kilotons.
c. Medium--over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons.
d. High--over 50 kilotons to 500 kilotons.

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 e. Very high -- over 500 kilotons. (NATO CENTO)
OFFENSIVE COUNTERINFORMATION—Actions taken to affect an adversary’s military
information functions. It includes psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare, military
deception, physical attack, and information attack.
OFFSET AIMING POINT (OAP)—The radar significant ground fix point used in the offset bombing
mode. (TIN)
OFFSET BOMBING—Any bombing procedure which employs a reference or aiming point rather than
the actual target. This type of bombing is employed when the target cannot be seen or is a poor reference
point. (NATO)
ON-CALL TARGET—A planned nuclear target other than a scheduled nuclear target for which a need
can be anticipated but which will be delivered on request rather than at a specific time. Coordination and
warning of friendly troops are mandatory. (DoD, IADB)
OPTIMUM HEIGHT OF BURST—For nuclear weapons the height of burst for a particular target or
area is that at which it is estimated a weapon of a specified energy yield will produce a certain desired
effect over the maximum possible area. (DoD, NATO, IADB)
OVERPRESSURE—The pressure resulting from the blast wave of an explosion. It is referred to as
“positive” when it exceeds atmospheric pressure and “negative” when less than atmospheric pressure.
(DoD
NATO, CENTO, IADB)
OVER-THE-SHOULDER BOMBING—A special case of loft bombing, where the bomb is released
past the vertical in order that the bomb may be thrown back to the target. This method is also known as
the Low Altitude Bombing System (LABS). (DoD, IADB)
PEAK OVERPRESSURE—The maximum value of overpressure at a given location which is generally
experienced at the instant the shock (or blast) wave reaches that location. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
PEAK PRESSURE—The measure of the maximum force exerted against an object by a blast wave and
equals the pressure exerted multiplied by the area over which it acts.
PERMISSIVE ACTION LINK—A device included in or attached to a nuclear weapon system to
preclude arming or launching until the insertion of a prescribed discrete code or combination. (DoD)
PLANNED TARGET (NUCLEAR)—A nuclear target planned on an area or point in which a need is
anticipated. A planned nuclear target may be scheduled or on call, and firing data may or may not be
determined in advance. (DoD, IADB)
POINT TARGET—:
a. A target of such small dimensions that it requires the accurate placement of ordnance in order to
neutralize or destroy it.
b. (NUCLEAR) A target in which the ratio of radius of damage to target radius is equal to or greater
than 5. (DoD, IADB)
POTENTIAL TARGETS—An enemy entity, one that satisfies the foregoing criteria, does not become a
target until military action is planned against it. That action may include capture, destruction, disruption,
degradation, neutralization, or exploitation.

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PRECAUTIONARY LAUNCH—The launching of nuclear loaded aircraft under imminent nuclear
attack so as to preclude friendly aircraft destruction and loss of weapons on the ground or carrier. (DoD)
PRECURSOR—A pressure wave which precedes the main blast wave of a nuclear explosion. (DoD,
NESN, NFSN, IADB)
PREPLANNED MISSIONS—Those missions for which a requirement can be foreseen, thereby
permitting detailed planning and coordination.
PREPLANNED NUCLEAR SUPPORT—Nuclear support planned in advance of operations. (DoD,
IADB)
PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE—The probability that damage will occur to a target expressed as a
percentage or as a decimal. (DoD, NATO, CENTO IADB)
PROBABILITY OF PERISHABILITY—The likelihood that a target has changed significantly within
the time parameters of the established targeting time budget.
PROJECTILE—An object projected by an applied exterior force and continuing in motion by virtue of
its own inertia, as a bullet, shell, or grenade. Also applied to rockets and guided missiles. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
RADIAL ERROR—An error associated with delivery of munitions on a target. It is the distance
between the desired point of impact and actual point of impact, both points projected and measured on an
imaginary plane drawn perpendicularly to the flight path of the munition.
RAD—Unit of absorbed dose of radiation. It represents the absorption of 100 ergs of nuclear (or
ionizing) radiation per gram of the absorbing material or tissue. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
RADIUS OF DAMAGE—The distance from ground zero at which there is a 0.50 probability of
achieving the desired damage. (DoD, IADB)
RADIUS OF SAFETY—The horizontal distance from ground zero beyond which the weapon effects on
friendly troops are acceptable. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
RAINOUT—Radioactive material in the atmosphere brought down by precipitation. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
REFLECTED SHOCK WAVE—When a shock wave traveling in a medium strikes the interface
between this medium and a denser medium, part of the energy of the shock wave in the denser medium
and the remainder of the energy results in the formation of a reflected shock wave which travels back
through the less dense medium. (DoD, IADB)
RELEASING COMMANDER (NUCLEAR WEAPONS)—A commander who has been delegated
authority to approve the use of nuclear weapons within prescribed limits. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
REM (ROENTGEN EQUIVALENT MAMMAL)—One REM is the quantity of ionizing radiation of
any type which, when absorbed by men or other mammals produces a physiological effect equivalent to
that produced by the absorption of one roentgen of X-ray or gamma radiation. (DoD, IADB)
RESIDUAL RADIATION—Nuclear radiation caused by fallout, radioactive material dispersed
artificially, or irradiation which results from a nuclear explosion and persists longer than one minute after
burst. (NATO, CENTO)
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT—Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the

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circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered. (NATO)
SAFE BURST HEIGHT—The height of burst at or above which the level of fallout, or damage to
ground installations is at a predetermined level acceptable to the military commander. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
SALTED WEAPON—A nuclear weapon which has, in addition to its normal components, certain
elements or isotopes which capture neutrons at the time of the explosion and produce radioactive products
over and above the usual radioactive weapon debris. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
SCHEDULED TARGET—A planned target on which a nuclear weapon is to be delivered at a specified
time during an operation of the supported force. The time is specified in minutes before or after a
designated time or in terms of the accomplishment of a predetermined movement or task. (DoD, IADB)
SECOND STRIKE—The first counterblow of a war (generally associated with nuclear operations).
(DoD, IADB)
SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY--The ability of a nation to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy
who struck first. (NATO, CENTO, IADB)
SENSOR HARVEST—SENSOR HARVEST is a command and control warfare target analysis support
(CTAS) tool produced by the Air Force Information Warfare Center. This product is designed to support
the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) with a C2W intelligence tool that considers
operations security (OPSEC), deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW)
and physical destruction while it is being constructed. The end result is a list of recommended C2W target
nominations.
SHOCK FRONT—The boundary between the pressure disturbance created by an explosion (in air,
water, or earth) and the ambient atmosphere, water, or earth. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
SHOCK WAVE—The continuously propagated pressure pulse formed by the blast from an explosion; in
air by the air blast, underwater by the water blast, and underground by the earth blast. (DoD, NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
SINGLE SHOT PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE—The statistical likelihood of achieving a stated
damage criterion against a target with a single weapon. (TIN)
SINGLE WEAPON EFFECTIVE LENGTH—A computational factor equal to twice the sum of the
deflection weapon radius and the ballistic deflection error. (TIN)
SKIP BOMBING—A method of aerial bombing in which the bomb is released from such a low altitude
that it slides or glances along on the surface of the water or ground and strikes the target at or above the
water or ground level. (DoD, IADB)
SPAN OF DETONATION (ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITION EM—P L O Y M E N T ) - - T h a t
total period of time resulting from a timer error between the earliest and latest possible detonation time.
(DoD)
STICK—A succession of bombs released separately at predetermined intervals from an aircraft.
STICK PATTERN LENGTH—An expression in feet of the distance between the first and last bomb
impacts in a stick or the distance between the center of the first and last impacts of the cluster patterns for
the stick delivery of dispenser weapons. (TIN)

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STICK WIDTH—An expression in feet of the width of the impact pattern of a stick of weapons. It
includes the contributions due to the location of weapons on the aircraft and the rack ejection velocities.
(TIN)
SURFACE BURST (NUCLEAR)—An explosion of a nuclear weapon at the surface of land or water; or
above the surface, at a height less than the maximum radius of the fireball. (DoD, NATO. CENTO,
IADB)
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON EMPLOYMENT—The use of nuclear weapons by land, sea, or
air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities in support of operations which
contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of a limited scope or in support of the military
commander’s scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area of military operations. (DoD, IADB)
TACTICAL TARGET MATERIALS (TTM)—Materials which provide a graphic representation of
individual or multiple facilities, installations, or targets with specific identification, geographic location,
and textual description of location and physical characteristics. (DoD)
TACTICAL TARGET MATERIALS PROGRAM (TTMP)—A DoD program established for the
production of tactical target materials and related items in support of unified and specified command and
allied participant TTM requirements. (DoD)
TARGET—:
a. A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military
forces.
b. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence
operations are directed.
c. An area designated and numbered for future firing.
d. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst which hits the target.
e. A thing or place to be aimed at or hit. (DoD, NATO, IADB)
TARGET ACQUISITION—The detection identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to
permit the effective employment of weapons. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
TARGET ANALYSIS—An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority
of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (DoD, NATO, CENTO,
IADB)
TARGET ARRAY—A graphic representation of enemy forces, personnel, and facilities in a specific
situation. (DoD, IADB)
TARGET CATEGORY—A group of targets all of which serve the same function or can produce the
same product.
TARGET COMPLEX—A geographically integrated series of target concentrations. (DoD NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
TARGET CONCENTRATION—A grouping of geographically proximate targets. (DoD, NATO,
IADB)
TARGET DATA INVENTORY—A basic targeting data base which provides standardized target data
in support of the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military departments, and unified and specified

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commands for target planning, coordination and weapons application. (DoD, IADB)
TARGET DENSITY—The number of elements per unit of area; target compactness; proximity to other
targets.
TARGET DISCRIMINATION:—
a. The ability of a surveillance or guidance system to identify or engage one target while multiple
targets are present.
b. That quality of a guidance system which enables it to distinguish a target from its background or
between two or more targets in close proximity. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
TARGET DOSSIERS—Files of assembled target intelligence about a specific geographic area. (DoD,
NATO, CENTO, IADB)
TARGET ELEMENT—The basic unit of a target. Some targets consist of one element; for example, a
single locomotive or bunker. Others consist of similar multiple elements; for example, a POL tank farm.
TARGET FOLDERS—The folders containing target intelligence and related materials prepared for
planning and executing action against a specific target. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
TARGET GRID—Device for converting the observer’s target locations and corrections with respect to
the observer target line to target location, and corrections with respect to the gun target line. (NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
TARGET ILLUSTRATION PRINT—A single contact print or enlarged portion of a selected area from
a single print, providing the best available illustration of a specific installation or point target. (NATO,
CENTO, IADB)
TARGET INFORMATION SHEET—Brief description of the target, including technical and physical
characteristics details on exact locations, disposition, importance and possible obstacles for an aircraft
flying at low altitudes.
TARGETING—The process through which objectives are selected for attack and desired effects are
determined based upon a stated mission, force posture and capabilities, aerospace doctrine, plans,
concepts of operations, and target intelligence.
TARGET INTELLIGENCE—Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or
target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
TARGET ISLAND—A geographical grouping of targets.
TARGET LIST—A listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command. It
contains those targets which are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a “list of
targets” which may be maintained by any echelon of command as confirmed, suspect, or possible targets
for informational and planning purposes. (DoD, IADB)
TARGET MATERIALS—Graphic, textual, tabular, or other presentations of target intelligence
primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapons systems.
Target materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, or evaluating such operations. (DoD,
IADB)
TARGET PERISHABILITY—The possibility or probability that a target will change significantly
during a specific period of time. A significant change is one where the target no longer exists (has moved

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or been dismantled) or the target has changed to the extent that it is no longer lucrative for strike.
TARGET PRIORITY—Sequential ranking of targets based on given criteria.
TARGET RESPONSE (NUCLEAR)—The effect on men, materiel, and equipment resulting from the
explosion of a nuclear weapon. (DoD, NATO, CENT, IADB)
TARGET SELECTION CRITERIA—General or specific criteria used in the selection of target
systems or specific targets. The criteria include concepts such as importance, cushion, depth, reserves,
recuperation, vulnerability, dispersion, location, identification, and perishability.
TARGET SYSTEM—:
a. All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related.
b. A group of targets which are so related that their destruction will produce some particular effect
desired by the attacker. (DoD, NATO, CENTO IADB)
TARGET SYSTEM COMPONENTS—A set of targets belonging to one or more groups of industries
and basic utilities required to produce component parts of an end product, or one type of a series of
interrelated commodities. (DoD, IADB)
TARGET VALUE SYSTEM—A system used by the JSTPS to determine the relative importance of
enemy installations in accordance with national guidance.
THERMAL RADIATION—:
a. The heat and light produced by a nuclear explosion.
b. Electromagnetic radiation’s emitted from a heat or light source as a consequence of its tempera-
ture. (DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON—A weapon in which high temperatures are used to bring about the
fusion of light nuclei such as those of hydrogen isotopes (for example, deuterium and tritium) with the
accompanying release of energy. The high temperatures required are obtained by means of fission.
(DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
TIME CONTROLLED TARGET—A target for which timing must be controlled.
TIME ON TARGET (TOT):—
a. Time at which aircraft are scheduled to attack or photograph a target.
b. The time at which a nuclear detonation is planned at a specified desired ground zero. (NATO,
CENTO)
TIMER REFERENCE POINT (TRP)—A visually or radar significant ground fix point at which the
timing sequence of the Low Angle Drogue Delivery (LADD) is initiated.
TIME URGENT TARGET—A target which may not be time dependent initially but becomes so once
the decision has been made to execute an attack against it.
TOSS BOMBING—A method of bombing where the aircraft flies on a line toward the target, pulls up in
a vertical plane, releasing the bomb at an angle that will compensate for the effect of gravity on the bomb.
(DoD, IADB)
TRAIN BOMBING—A method of bombing in which two or more bombs are released at predetermined
intervals from one aircraft as a result of a single activation of the bomb release mechanism in the aircraft.

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(DoD, NATO, CENTO, IADB)
UNDERGROUND BURST (NUCLEAR)—The explosion of a nuclear weapon in which the center of
the detonation lies at a point beneath the surface of the ground.
UNDERWATER BURST (NUCLEAR)—The explosion of a nuclear weapon in which the center of the
detonation lies at a point beneath the surface of the water.
VULNERABILITY—Susceptibility of a target to destruction by available weapons. (DoD, IADB)
VULNERABLE AREA—An expression of the area of a target is vulnerable to the damage mechanism
of a given weapon. (DoD, NESN, NFSN, IADB)
WEAPON ALLOCATION—The PREPLANNED distribution of the committed weapons over the
target system to achieve the mission objectives.
WEAPON DELIVERY—The total action required to locate the target, establish the necessary release
conditions, and maintain guidance to the target if required. It includes the detection, recognition, and
acquisition of the target, the weapon release, and weapon guidance.
WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS—The statistical estimate of the expected results if a specific munitions
employment, considering target vulnerability, munitions effects, target environment, damage criteria,
delivery accuracy, external ballistics, and weapon reliability.
WEAPON RELIABILITY—The dependability of the warhead functioning properly.
WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS—A statistical estimate of the expected results of a specific
munitions employment considering weapon effectiveness and the probability of weapon system arrival.
WITHHOLD (NUCLEAR)—The limiting of authority to employ nuclear weapons by denying their use
within specified geographical areas. (DoD, IADB)
ZERO POINT—The location of the center of a burst of a nuclear weapon at the instant of detonation.
The zero point may be in the air, on or beneath the surface of the earth or water, dependent upon the type
of burst, and it is thus distinguished from ground zero. (DoD, IADB)
ZONE I (NUCLEAR)—A circular area, determined by using minimum safe distance as the radius and
the desired ground zero as the center from which all armed forces are evacuated. If evacuation is not
possible or if a commander elects a higher degree of risk, maximum protective measures will be required.
(DoD, IADB)
ZONE II (NUCLEAR)—A circular area (less Zone I) determined by using minimum safe distance as
the radius and the desired ground zero as the center, in which all personnel require maximum protection.
Maximum protection denotes that armed forces personnel are in “buttoned up” tanks or crouched in
foxholes with improvised shielding. (DoD, IADB)
ZONE III (NUCLEAR)—A circular area (less Zones I and II) determined by using minimum safe
distance as the radius and desired ground zero as the center in which all personnel require minimum
protection. Minimum protection denotes that armed forces personnel are prone on open ground with all
skin areas covered and with an overall thermal protection at least equal to that provided by a two-layer
uniform. (DoD, IADB)

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 Attachment 2

THE EVOLUTION OF TARGETING

(ADAPTED FROM THE ARTICLE......, JOHN GLOCK)
The choice of enemy targets is the most delicate operation of aerial warfare
Giulio Douhet 1921
The key to air power is targeting and the key to targeting is intelligence
Col John Warden 1990

Those who have written about or employed aerospace power have long recognized the importance of tar-
geting and understood the successful application of airpower depends on targeting. This section traces the
evolution of Air Force targeting.

WORLD WAR I

From their earliest days, aerospace forces have pursued the idea of the "strategic" application of airpower.
German Zeppelin raids on London in 1917 are probably the first known uses of air forces beyond direct
support of ground operations. While the material effects of these raids were minimal, the effects on the
conceptual role of airpower were tremendous. During this period, the US developed its concept for "stra-
tegic bombing" against commercial centers and lines of communications. In November 1918, Maj. Edgar
S. Gorrell developed the first strategic bombardment plan for the Air Service, American Expeditionary
Force (AEF). Gorrell’s objective was to "drop aerial bombs upon commercial centers and the lines of
communications (LOC) in such quantities as will wreck the points aimed at and cut off the necessary sup-
plies without which the armies in the field cannot exist." To achieve this result, planners required targets.
To determine these targets, airmen systematically analyzed critical enemy industrial centers and LOCs to
ascertain which should become targets. (Given the accuracy of bombing at this point, only installations
needed to be identified). The ability to identify critical components at installation would not be needed
until Vietnam. (Between 12 June 1918 and 11 November 1918 U.S. bombers dropped 275,000 lbs of
bombs on rail yards, factories, bridges, other LOCs, command post, troop concentrations, etc.). However,
the war ended before the AEF could fully execute the plan. The [WW I] U.S. Bombing Survey concluded
that the Air Service needed to identify critical targets to support a systematic plan for air operations. The
Survey stated:

The greatest criticism to be brought against aerial bombardment as carried out in the war of 1914-1918 is
the lack of a predetermined program carefully calculated to destroy...those industries most vital in main-
taining Germany's fighting force.

It recommended that:

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A careful study should be made of the different kinds of industries and the different factories of each.
This study should ascertain how one industry is dependent on another and what the most important facto-
ries of each are. A decision should be reached as to just what factories if destroyed would do the greatest
damage to the enemy’s military organization as a whole.

Another lesson from the war was that dedicated, trained individuals, knowledgeable of airpower, were
needed to undertake this careful study. The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) created an Air
Intelligence (A-7) subsection. 1st Lt Alfred T. Bellinger, a G-2/A-7 staff officer, reported that there were
some who believed that the “work of air intelligence belonged properly to the Air Service. ...Supporters of
this theory [believed] it was necessary for an Intelligence Officer to have technical knowledge of aviation
for the proper performance of his duties.” Immediately following WW I Gen Mitchell identified the need
for [target] intelligence officers at the staff and unit level. He saw the need for these officers “to compile
and maintain all information of value in the preparation of bombing missions, an indexed file of photo-
graphs, and a stock of maps and charts showing bombing targets and intelligence concerning them.”

WW I showed that successful application of airpower requires a predetermined plan calculated to destroy
the enemy's will and war sustaining capability. Achieving this goal requires systematic analysis to deter-
mine which targets, if destroyed, would do the greatest damage to the enemy. An organization with a con-
stant focus on air targeting is needed to undertake this kind of systematic study. This organization needs
to maintain files of information about potential targets, as well as requisite target materials. From the
beginning, the Air Service took the lead in air targeting. It developed the first concepts, not only for the
offensive use of air forces, but also for the intelligence support required.

INTERWAR YEARS

As a result of lessons from WW I, the Air Service/Corps recognized it needed to more fully develop its
concepts for the employment of airpower. Through the interwar period, the Air Service Tactical School
(ASTS)/Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) continued to develop the concept of strategic bombing. The
instructors recognized targeting was an integral part of bombardment. By 1926, many airmen considered
bombardment the most important role for air power, and the predominance of bombardment led to an
increasing emphasis on targeting. Maj. Donald Wilson, an instructor at the ACTS, believed that attacking
a few critical targets would disrupt an enemy's economy. These targets, if successfully destroyed, would
have a twofold effect. First, the enemy’s industrial complex could not sustain its fielded forces. Sec-
ondly, the effect on the day-to-day lives of the civilian population would be so disruptive that they would
lose faith with their government and military, and force the national leadership to sue for peace. Accord-
ing to then Lt. Haywood Hansell (one of two officers assigned to help Maj. Wilson), one of the principal
tenets upon which the school based its strategic doctrine stated:

Proper selection of vital targets in the industrial/economic/social structure of a modern industrialized

nation, and their subsequent destruction by air attack, can lead to fatal weakening of an industrialized
enemy nation and to victory through airpower.

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By the 1930s the Air Corps developed a doctrine based on the belief that airpower could achieve victory
by breaking the enemy’s will and capability to fight. It would accomplish this by:

Destroying organic industrial systems in the enemy interior that provided for the enemy’s armed forces in
the field; and paralyzing the organic industrial, economic, and civic systems that maintained the life of the
enemy nation itself.

Although this concentration on strategic bombing to the exclusion of development of escort fighters was
to later prove disastrous, the doctrine led to an even greater need for target intelligence. Maj. Gen
Hansell, in his memoirs, stated that ACTS believed strategic intelligence was: "vital to the planning and
conduct of strategic air warfare." He continues:

Much of the value of the bombing offensive, should there be one, would of necessity rest on intelligence
data and the conclusions planners gleaned from it. In truth these specific questions were beyond the com-
petence of the Tactical School. Strategic air intelligence on the major world powers would demand an
intelligence organization and analytical competence of considerable scope an intelligence and complex-
ity.

Yet during the lean years of the "all-pilot Air Corps," when the Air Corps was struggling for its survival,
there was no time or inclination to train officers in combat intelligence. Despite the clear lessons of WW
I, the Air Corps entered the Second World War without an intelligence organization capable of conduct-
ing systematic studies of potential enemies and recommending vital targets whose subsequent destruction
would lead to victory. The Air Corps still relied on Army G-2 to maintain sufficient data and target mate-
rials to support both the planning and conduct of air operations.

WORLD WAR II

On the eve of WW II, the Army Air Corps had a well-developed doctrine, but Army G-2 was not provid-
ing the intelligence support needed to turn doctrine into operations:

The American airman entered the war with a rather well-developed body of doctrine on how the airplane
should be employed...but it was evident from an early date that the [Army Air Force] AAF was poorly
prepared for waging a strategic campaign against Germany, or any other enemy, because of the paucity of
organized intelligence on the target itself.

In 1940, Gen Arnold recognized the Air Corps was not receiving the intelligence it needed to establish
requirements or plan operations. He requested and received permission to establish an air intelligence
organization under the Chief of the Air Corps. Then Maj. Hansell was the first Chief of the Strategic Air

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Intelligence Section, A-2. His section performed economic-industrial-social analysis. It analyzed and
described the vital and vulnerable systems, selected targets, and prepared target folders. In July 1941,
Gen Arnold assigned Maj. Hansell to the new Air War Plans Division (AWPD). The initial effort of the
Division was to prepare the Army air section of the Joint Board Estimate of United States overall Produc-
tion Requirements. (The AWPD input was simply known as AWPD-1. While technically a requirements
document, it was really a blueprint for our air operations plan against Germany).

However, when war began, the AAF still had inadequate intelligence to plan and conduct combat opera-
tions and lacked a systematic method for selecting targets. The Air Corps had made no provision for air
intelligence training. General Eaker, Commander Eighth Air Force, reported in March 1942: "Intelligence
represents the section of activity in which we are weakest." Colonel McDonald, Chief of Eighth Air
Force Intelligence, recalled that no one provided intelligence "in any useful form at the beginning of the
war--we went into the field empty handed in this respect." While there was an Air Intelligence Section,
there was still no organization capable of performing the systematic analysis required for proper targeting
and no trained target intelligence officers. There was also no database of potential targets or target mate-
rials to support the air forces.

During the fall of 1942, the air requirements plan (AWPD-42) against Germany was under discussion at
the highest level, and as the discussion progressed, its limitations in the field of target analysis became
readily apparent. The AAF had accumulated a vast amount of data on Germany, but no rational system
for target selection existed. Gen Arnold established the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) in
December 1942 to overcome this shortfall. For the first time the United States had a single organization
responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence for the purpose of air target selection. Air plan-
ners used the COA’s target selection as the basis for the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany
and the strategic campaign against Japan. This group eventually evolved into the first Joint Target Group,
with the Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Targeting as its head. Also in 1942, the AAF created a
school to train air intelligence officers. Another outgrowth of the attempt to find a systematic approach to
target selection was the creation of a database of potential targets. It was called the Bombing Encyclope-
dia, (the Bombing Encyclopedia was the first effort to automate the handling of the vast amount of infor-
mation needed to provide target recommendation for every country in the world) the forerunner of today’s
Basic Encyclopedia.

By 1944, most in the AAF recognized the importance of intelligence to air operations. Gen Hansell
stated:

I believed foreign industrial analysis and targeting was the sine qua non of strategic air warfare. Without
such intelligence and analysis there could be no rational planning for the application of airpower. Dou-
het's statement to effect that the selection of objectives and targets was the essence of air strategy was
patently true.

Maj. General McDonald, USAF Director of Intelligence, was even more specific when he said: “target
intelligence was the basic requirement, because: A Strategic Air Force is nothing more than a large collec-

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tion of airplanes unless it has a clear conception of what to use its planes against.” Just as the (WW I)
Bombing Survey had, the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (USSBS) emphasized the importance
of target selection to the planning and conduct of operations. The USSBS stated:

The importance of careful selection of targets for air attack is emphasized by [our] experience. Our stra-
tegic intelligence...at the outset of the war was highly inadequate. ...[I]f a comparable lack of intelligence
should exist at the start of a future national emergency, it might prove disastrous. The present shortage of
trained and competent intelligence personnel give cause for alarm and requires correction.

Two World Wars showed that the proper selection of vital targets is critical to the successful application
of airpower and is dependent on a systematic study of available intelligence. Without such intelligence
and its systematic analysis there can be no rational planning for the application of airpower. An organiza-
tion with a high degree of analytical competence is required to perform this targeting function. It requires
competent, trained personnel who understand the capabilities and limitations of intelligence, as well as
aerospace forces. These individuals must have access to a current database and the knowledge to use it.

KOREAN WAR

Five years after WW II the prophetic words of the USSBS were realized. The US did not possess the
organization, intelligence personnel, database and target materials needed to support the application of
aerospace forces on the Korean peninsula. (The advent of nuclear weapons led many to believe that tar-
geting was not a required discipline. There was no need to analyze the enemy target sets when we were
going to destroy whole cities. According to Dr. Futrell, in the late 1940s there was a belief in USAF
Directorate of Intelligence that ‘Targets should be working for the Directorate of Plans.’ Much of the
knowledge of the intimate relationship of air intelligence and air operations was lost during the rapid
demobilization of the wartime intelligence force.) Prior to the outbreak of war, there was no organization
in the Air Force maintaining and analyzing the North Korean target base. The existing database on North
Korea was inadequate. In part this was due to the Far East Command’s (FEC) lack of contingency plans
for war with North Korea. A Far East Air Force's (FEAF) report highlights these shortfalls.

The probability of fighting in Korea largely had been overlooked in the years following WW II. As a
result, we had practically no ready target intelligence. ...[We] found [ourselves] without a targeting sys-
tem capable of fulfilling the requirements. ...However, an even more serious deficiency was the small
amount of Korean targeting which had been accomplished. ...The latter stemmed from several basic
causes, the most obvious of which was the small number of intelligence personnel who had been assigned
to FEAF.

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Only 53 targets in North Korea had target folders, and these were out of date. Also, there were no current
target materials on Korean targets. There was even a lack of basic imagery products. The FEAF Bomber
Command stated that the available imagery, when it did exist, was of poor quality.

The problem of inadequate numbers of trained intelligence personnel to support the targeting function
continued throughout the war. Two separate studies (Barcus and Stearn) were conducted to evaluate the
effectiveness of the Air Force in Korea. Both indicated that the outbreak of the war had created an imme-
diate shortage of intel personnel and pointed out that inadequate training made these shortages more
acute. The shortage was so acute that the FEAF had to draft flying officers to perform intelligence func-
tions. As late as July 1952, the FEAF Bomber Command "lacked sufficient personnel to handle any large
day-to-day quantity of targets." The FEAF Report states:

The Korean campaign provided more than enough evidence to bolster the contention that neglect of intel-
ligence training during peacetime is a serious mistake, if that point had not already been made powerfully
clear at the outset of WW II. The FEAF was woefully lacking in competent Combat Intelligence Officers.

General Headquarters Far East Command (GHQ FEC) assumed responsibility for targeting. The chief of
staff established the GHQ Target Group on 14 July 1950 and made it responsible for target nominations.
However, the GHQ Target Group was not capable of performing this task. The work of this group was
neither systematic nor thorough and resulted in information of questionable value. Of the 220 primary
and secondary targets the group nominated, twenty percent did not even exist. The remainder were often
unsuitable for attack by aircraft. Finally, of the targets that did exist and that were suitable for attack by
aircraft, many were not supported with adequate imagery or information. Eventually, the FEAF took on
a greater portion of the target nomination process and gradually became the theater targeting body,
responsible for nominating targets that were the basis for air campaigns meeting the needs of the FEC.
However, it was two years before there was a fully integrated joint targeting effort.

The lack of trained analysts affected two additional areas: combat assessment and weapon recommenda-
tions. The FEAF Report on the Korean War indicates that there were few studies conducted on the results
obtained from our bombing. It states: "If a more extensive effort had been devoted to [combat assess-
ment], a more accurate appraisal of the value of [our] target plans would have resulted." The report also
indicates there was little effort to make weapon recommendations. Just ten days before Armistice the
FEAF Director of Intelligence was finally able to establish a Vulnerability Division to provide effective
and economical weapon recommendations. If this Division had been established earlier it undoubtedly
would have contributed to a more efficient accomplishment of FEAF’s mission in the Korean War.

FEAF lessons learned stated:

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Although we had failed to stockpile targeting materials on Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a
greater initial deficiency was a lack of a targeting system. ...Our hastily improvised targeting pro-
gram...suffered from a lack of trained and experienced intelligence officers. ...[This] resulted in a lack of
sufficient enemy reaction studies, and an inability to provide complete weapon recommendations. ...The
inability to perform these vital targeting functions caused us to over-estimate the results of several air
campaigns.

It went on to say that:

Good target research must include physical vulnerability studies and weapons selection recommenda-
tions. [And that] a truly effective targeting program must...be initiated before fighting starts.

Experiences gained during the Korean Conflict reinforced the lessons learned in both World Wars--the
proper selection of vital targets is critical to the successful application of airpower. Selecting these targets
requires trained, experienced personnel familiar with both the operations and intelligence worlds. In an
effort to correct deficiencies existing at the start of the Korean Conflict, the Air Force created the targets
officer career field in 1954. It enlarged the scope of the database of potential targets to include many
more potential enemies. Also, at the request of the JCS, the Air Force became the executive agency for
the DoD Air Target Materials (ATM) Program (ATMP) in 1953 in order to ensure the adequacy of air tar-
geting materials.

VIETNAM CONFLICT

Unfortunately, much of the progress the Air Force made in the fifties was lost in the early sixties. One of
President Kennedy’s first acts was to restructure the DoD to make the department more efficient and flex-
ible. One way of doing this was to centralize functions that were not service specific, one of which was
intelligence. In 1962 the DIA took over much of the intelligence work previously performed by the ser-
vices, including maintenance of the targeting database. DIA also became responsible for the ATMP and
the Tactical Target Materials Program (TTMP). Unfortunately DIA (and the Air Force) largely ignored
conventional targeting applications in the nuclear age. The Air Force would soon feel the results of both
the centralization of intelligence and the neglect of conventional operations.

Some believed the centralization of the targeting functions within a national agency was imprudent. Gen
Keegan, the Seventh Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 1968-1969, said: "Years ago, the
mission of targeting was taken away from the Department of the Air Force and passed to DIA, where it
simply died." At the beginning of our involvement in Vietnam the Air Force did not have an adequate tar-
geting organization to support our combat operations. As one lesson learned states:

136
The targeting function is an essential element in the effective employment of fighting forces. ...[T]he Sec-
ond Air Division intelligence organization could not provide adequate planning and execution support to
the rapidly escalating air operations.

The situation was very similar to that of the Korean Conflict. The BE provided targeteers and planners
with basic infrastructure and industrial installations. Pacific Command planners were able to identify
ninety-four targets in North Vietnam, which were arranged into four attack options in an OPlan. Each
option provided for escalation of the conflict. But the objectives of the war were constrained, and the US
was forced to attack “in-country” targets. Because the Air Force did not have a targeting organization
capable of supporting this:

[Military Assistance Command Vietnam] MACV J-2 developed its own organization, the Target
Research and Analysis Center (later renamed the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV)), to
accomplish the in-country targeting task.”

During the battle for Khe Sanh (Operation NIAGARA), MACV relinquished control of targeting, and the
Air Force created an ad hoc targeting organization to effectively use air assets. Seventh Air Force Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCS/I), augmented by TDY personnel, established an intelligence control
center. This center represented the first major Air Force contribution to the in-country targeting effort. In
March 1968 the Air Force recalled the TDY personnel and terminated the operation of the intelligence
control center, effectively conceding de facto control of targeting back to MACV. This again limited the
Air Force to providing on call fire support to the ground forces in Vietnam, just as in Korea. “The Air
Force quickly found itself woefully short of targeting personnel. By 1969 [the] Air Force had just about
exhausted its cadre of experienced targeteers fighting the war. The void was filled with “CBPO” targe-
teers with little or no experience.”

The war effort was negatively impacted by a shortage of intelligence personnel and their lack of training:

Although the Air Force had been in [South East Asia] SEA since late 1961, adequate intelligence person-
nel resources were still unavailable when the rapid buildup began. ...The buildup began at a time when the
Air Force was actually reducing manpower resources in response to budgetary and gold flow constraints.
...[T]he lack of adequate formal and technical training for intelligence personnel adversely affected intel-
ligence in SEA.

There were many positive lessons from Vietnam. Air Force doctrine recognized that target intelligence is
essential to aerospace operations:

The role of intelligence support in the effective employment of tactical air forces is of critical importance.
Targeting is the key function and includes exploitation of all intelligence sources for target development,
material production, target analysis, recommendations for strike and strike assessment.

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Air Force Intelligence also learned critical lessons. It realized that it was not sufficient to merely assign
intelligence officers to targeting positions; intelligence officers needed formal targeting training. In 1974
the Air Force established the Armed Forces Target Intelligence Training Course, which trained Army,
Navy and Air Force officers in the capabilities and limitations of all services’ weapons systems support-
ing air operations. It also trained students in analytical methodologies for selecting, prioritizing and rec-
ommending targets meeting the commander's objectives and guidance. Graduates of this course were
unique because they possessed an understanding of air operations as well as intelligence operations

THE GULF WAR

Building on nearly eight decades of history and lessons learned, the Air Force entered the Gulf War more
prepared to apply aerospace forces than at any time in the past, but even with these preparations problems
occurred. Air Force targeting officers did not provide the support that decision makers, planners, and air-
crews required. Some of these problems were institutional, some resulted from changing concepts of air-
power employment, and others were systemic within the intelligence bureaucracy.

In 1990, an Air Force targeting element supported each Unified Command. In February 1990 USCENT-
COM directed its Air Force component (9th Air Force/CENTAF) to update the air plan for OPLAN
1002-90. In support of this request the 9th Tactical Intelligence Squadron (TIS) Target Intelligence Divi-
sion (now the 609 AIS) began target development for the draft OPLAN. Air Force targeting officers took
the objectives the air planners provided and identified target systems to meet them. They researched
known installations and developed lists of potential targets and used these lists to produce the Iraqi Target
Study published on 15 June 1990.

Two recurring problems hampered these efforts. First was the inadequacy of the installation database.
DIA maintained a worldwide installation database known as the Automated Installation File (AIF) to
store, manipulate and retrieve target intelligence. Ideally, it would contain information on every installa-
tion or place of potential military significance. However, 40% of the targets struck during the Gulf War
were not in the database in July 90. In addition to listing installations, the AIF could contain vital target-
ing information such as construction data and identification of critical components. Unfortunately, many
of its records fell far short of providing the information necessary for accurate targeting.

The second problem the 9TIS targeting staff encountered was a lack of necessary imagery and supporting
target materials. Only 90 of the 218 targets the 9TIS identified had imagery. Of these, only 30 had target
materials. Of the targets actually struck during the war, only eleven percent had target materials on 2 Aug
90. In a 29 Aug 90 DIA memo to the Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence, the DIA Chief of Targets
acknowledged that DIA had “issues to resolve and problems to fix [with availability of target materials]
after the crisis.” In addition to the basic shortage of target materials at the beginning of the crisis, many
were of questionable utility due to their currency. The ATTG was the basic target material at this time.
Figures taken from CENTAF (15 Jun 1990) and CENTCOM (27 Jun 1990) target list and the Consoli-

138
dated Tactical Target Materials Catalog. The average date of production was 1982, with the oldest pro-
duced in June 1973.

Despite these problems, the contributions of Air Force targeteers were significant. Ninety-seven percent
of the targets in the 9TIS Iraqi Target Study (produced a month and a half prior to the Iraqi invasion) were
struck during DESERT STORM. By comparison, only thirty percent of the targets in the July 1990 CEN-
TCOM Joint Target List and ninety-three percent of the 12 Aug 90 Air Staff target list (the well-known
list produced by CHECKMATE) were struck during the war. Looking at the issue from the stand point of
what percentage of the total targets struck were identified in various list prior to the war, one finds that the
percentages for the 9TIS, CENTCOM and the Air Staff are forty-three, twenty-two, and nineteen respec-
tively. More than four months prior to the invasion, the 9TIS identified information and imagery short-
falls that would impact combat operations if not satisfied.

Air Force targeting officers were also available to support planners in the area of weapon recommenda-
tions and critical element analysis. They recommended the optimum mix and number of weapons, fuzing,
and critical elements throughout the war, but in some cases planners chose to disregard this information.
The planners often thought the recommendations were too conservative.

Three examples should illustrate this point. In Aug 90 CENTAF targeting personnel recommended that
bridges only be attacked by aircraft using PGMs. Initially, this advice was ignored, but based on unac-
ceptable results, planners shifted to using PGMs. Also in August, targeting officers estimated a particular
target would require more PGMs than planners thought it should. This target was struck but never pene-
trated during the war. At the end of the war it was fully functional. In Jan 93, as part of Operation South-
ern Watch, this same target was struck using the number of weapons recommended by the targeting staff,
resulting in the functional destruction of the facility. Finally, on 19 Jan 91, a targeting officer recom-
mended using CBU-89s and CBU-87s against mobile SCUDs. Following the recommended strike, there
was a break of sixty hours before the Iraqis launched another SCUD against Israel and more than five
days before there another mass launch. However, planners switched back to PGMs in an effort to achieve
physical destruction instead of using an area denial strategy to achieve a functional kill. There is still no
evidence that the “SCUD hunting” mission with PGM’s achieved a single kill. All examples are based on
the experiences of the author. The second example is collaborated by Col Deptula in an interview con-
ducted by Dr. Berry Watts, the third is recounted in the Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress
on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 166.

Targeting officers were not as successful in providing essential combat assessment information. One rea-
son for this was a lack of training. The former Armed Forces Targeting Course provided only five hours
of instruction on combat assessment. Exercises also provided little training.

DESERT STORM raised fundamental questions about the effectiveness of targeting. Targeting planners
were not always correct and did not provide the best support possible.

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TODAY

The global geopolitical situation has changed, resulting in the downsizing and restructuring of the military
services. The Air Force decided to eliminate all of the functional career fields, including the targeting
officer. The decision was based on budgetary and manpower constraints and the rationale that it is more
cost efficient to maintain generalists at the expense of trained specialists.

Since the end of the Gulf War many have written about the war’s lessons. Most authors have addressed
how precision weapons and stealth platforms have altered the nature of warfare. This masks another more
critical lesson -- the importance of targeting. Greater precision requires even greater and more detailed
target analysis. In each conflict weapon accuracy has improved. An enduring lesson learned about deliv-
ery accuracy during the last eight decades is that the greater the weapons’ accuracy the more accurate tar-
geting must be.

In 1992 Congress “encourage SECDEF, heads of military services, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Director of DIA to make resources available for a Joint Target Training Program.” (Congress, Senate,
Select Committee for Intelligence, July 1992.) For the first time since 1918, the Air Force has not taken
the lead in a targeting program. Although the Air Force has the greatest experience in joint air targeting
and the preponderance of air assets, it has taken a back seat in the future of joint targeting.

CONCLUSION

The Air Force offers the quickest, longest range, most flexible force available to the nation. As we con-
tinue to draw down, our power projection capabilities will become even more vital in protecting U.S.
interests. To rapidly deploy and sustain sizeable combat air power from home bases to crisis hot spots
around the world, aircrews require intelligence tailored to the decisive application of air power. The the-
ater battle management system of the future will integrate all intelligence inputs, disseminate real-time
updates to the ATO, and provide the feedback required to affect tomorrow’s ATO. The intelligence sys-
tems currently being fielded and those on the horizon, coupled with an invigorated intelligence training
concept, will provide capabilities far surpassing that available in any previous conflict. But most impor-
tantly, those systems will required trained, capable intelligence analysts, planners, and targeting profes-
sionals to provide quality support to combat air operations whenever and wherever required.

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 Attachment 3

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE

A3.1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT refers to all information obtained directly from
human sources. It includes a wide range of activities from direct reconnaissance and observation to the
use of informants and spies. HUMINT may provide such information as insights into adversary plans and
intentions for target development, adversary deliberations and decisions for developing our own objec-
tives, research and development goals and strategies, blueprints for weaponeering, etc. Some intelligence
requirements can best be satisfied by human source exploitation.
A3.1.1. HUMINT includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the individuals who
exploit, control, supervise, or support these sources.
A3.1.1.1. Overt activities are performed openly without concealment. While some aspects may
be classified, the overall activity is generally easily detected, or the sources are exploited in an
open but discrete manner. Some overt HUMINT activities are: conventional programs for the
interrogation of ÈmigrÈs, refugees, escapees, and prisoners of war; debriefing aircrews and legal
travelers; and programs to exploit open publications.
A3.1.1.2. Sensitive activities fall between overt and clandestine. Because their disclosure would
be detrimental to the best interests of the United States, they require special protection from dis-
closure, as well as concealment of the sponsor's identity.
A3.1.1.3. Clandestine activities must be conducted so that both the existence of the operation
itself and the identity of the sponsor are secret.
A3.1.2. Advantages of HUMINT:
• Can be used to reveal enemy plans and intentions and uncover scientific or weapon develop-
ments before they are used or detected by other technical collection systems
• Can provide documentary evidence of enemy activities
• Relatively cost effective
• May provide coverage in areas beyond the capabilities of other sources, such as detailed
descriptions of underground facilities or those located below jungle canopy, as well as internal
facility arrangements
• Can reveal construction characteristics for vulnerability estimates
• Can determine production capabilities and impact of facilities on enemy military and indus-
trial needs
• Yields information on the sources of raw materials, equipment, and necessary transportation
for systems analysis
• May reveal direct and indirect relationships between facilities
• Can give near-real-time target intelligence via radio transmission
• Can cover targets against which sensor programs are restricted by political restraints
• Targeteer can use it to refine or revise intelligence estimates based on other sources of infor-
mation; helps the analyst learn identification and functions previously unidentified, as well as
give direct and indirect effects of airstrikes during hostilities

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 A3.1.3. Limitations of HUMINT:
• Time lag between collection, reporting, and verifying some information can be so long AND
render it useless
• Collection success cannot be predicted with certainty
• May be politically sensitive
• Dissemination and fusion of information into targeting channels is often inadequate and diffi-
cult to accomplish
• Determining reliability of the source and verifying the information is often very difficult

A3.2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) . SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising, either individ-
ually or in combination, all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronics intelligence (ELINT),
and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. It is derived from foreign commu-
nications and electronics signals in two principal categories: COMINT, which is derived from the inter-
cept of foreign communications; and ELINT, which is derived from the analysis of foreign
noncommunications and electromagnetic radiation emitted from other than nuclear detonations or radio-
active sources.
A3.2.1. NSA is responsible for the US SIGINT program. Each military service has a service crypto-
logical agency, operationally directed by NSA through the Central Security Service (CSS), to ensure
missions are properly assigned and duplication of effort is avoided. In the Air Force, this mission is
assigned to Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). The Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) and the Naval Security Group (NSG) make up the remaining agencies of the military NSA
and CSS structure. The Director of NSA also serves as Chief of CSS.
A3.2.2. SIGINT has many uses, but its application requires a thorough knowledge of the product.
Order of battle depends heavily on correlation and analysis of COMINT and ELINT. Mission route
planning requires current intelligence on enemy defensive positions and capabilities. Targets can be
detected and located through airborne direction finding techniques. Intelligence concerning enemy
operational plans may be obtained through signal analysis or cryptologic procedures. Confirmation of
other types of intelligence can be made by targeting personnel with the aid of SIGINT reports.
Finally, post strike or attack data and damage resulting from missions may also be obtained.
A3.2.3. Advantages of SIGINT:
• Potential for almost instantaneous information
• Can sometimes reveal specific information on enemy units
• Levels of activity and significant changes in these levels can often be determined
• Organizational structure and order of battle may be obtained
• Can cue other systems
• Equipment capability can be learned
• Emitter location can be approximated or pinpointed (dependent on accuracy capability of the
system)
• Site function can be determined
A3.2.4. Limitations of SIGINT:

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 • Data may be denied by use of secure communications
• False information may be passed by the enemy for deception purposes
• Collection subject to atmospheric conditions
• Locations derived from SIGINT may be imprecise
• Specially configured collection platforms required
• Use of SIGINT collection platforms requires extensive coordination between collectors and
users

A3.3. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) . MASINT is obtained by quantitative

and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wave length, time dependent, modulation, plasma,
and hydromagnetic) derived from sensing instruments other than those generally used for communica-
tions, electronics intelligence, or imagery collection.
A3.3.1. MASINT includes but is not limited to the following disciplines:
• Radar intelligence (RADINT)
• Nuclear intelligence (NUCINT)
• Unintentional radiation intelligence (RINT)
• Acoustic intelligence (non compressible fluids (ACINT), compressible fluids (ACOUSTINT)
• Electro-optical intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT)
• Event-related dynamic measurement photography (DMPINT)
• Debris collection
• Laser Intelligence (LASINT)
A3.3.2. Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) is technical information and intelligence information
derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry and is a special category of
signals intelligence. TELINT gathers quantitative data on foreign missiles and space and aerody-
namic vehicles. TELINT and other foreign instrumentation signals (FIS) collection needs are
expressed as MASINT requirements.
A3.3.3. The term MASINT refers to the above categories of special sensor disciplines. The term
"measurement" refers primarily to data collected for the purpose of obtaining finite metric parameters.
For the most part, the characteristics of collection instruments used are irrelevant to the data. Typical
examples of data are reentry vehicle trajectory, beta, and drag history. The term "signature" refers pri-
marily to data indicating the distinctive features of phenomena, equipment, or objects as they are
sensed by the collection instrument. The signature is used to recognize the phenomena, equipment, or
object when their distinctive features are detected.
A3.3.4. Advantages of MASINT:
• Can provide cues for other collection sensors or strike systems
• Potential for near instantaneous display capability exists
• Information can be obtained from the periphery of areas of interest
• Because it works in different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, MASINT detects infor-
mation patterns not previously exploited by other sensors

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 A3.3.5. Limitations of MASINT:
• Sources and information are technical and difficult to use
• Subject to deception
• Full exploitation is costly, requires extensive support facilities, and may require near continu-
ous coverage and extensive coordination among participants
• Source locations may be imprecise

A3.4. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS).

A3.4.1. The conflict in Southeast Asia brought about the development and use of this unique intelli-
gence source. These sensors were developed using technology derived from sonobuoys used by the
Navy for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and from intrusion detectors developed for the Army. Sensor
technologies are typically categorized as acoustic, seismic, magnetic, electromagnetic, or electro-opti-
cal.
A3.4.1.1. Acoustic sensors sense the acoustic energy (sound waves) emitted by a potential target.
They allow analysts to calculate the target's position by measuring the time of arrival of sound
waves at several known sensor locations; to identify or classify targets based on the emitted acous-
tic energy; or to monitor sounds or conversations.
A3.4.1.2. Seismic sensors detect or measure seismic disturbances generated by moving vehicles
or personnel. They can be used to cue other, higher resolution sensors (for example, acoustic or
electro-optical sensors) and identify or classify targets.
A3.4.1.3. Magnetic sensors detect changes in the ambient magnetic field caused by the movement
or presence of metallic objects. Their range is extremely short, but they can be used to cue other,
higher resolution sensors and to identify or classify targets.
A3.4.1.4. Electromagnetic sensors detect target emitted electromagnetic radiation. Such sensors
depend on target self-emission, target motion, or conversion of mechanical disturbance into elec-
tromagnetic radiation.
A3.4.1.5. Electro-optical sensors systems image potential targets to detect, locate, and identify
them. The most common are unattended infrared (IR) ground sensors, although sensors detecting
in the visible light end of the spectrum have also been investigated.
A3.4.2. Advantages of unattended ground sensors:
• Great growth potential as intelligence sources
• Can detect movement and activity patterns not previously exploited by other sensors
• Can detect and relay actual sounds
• Have a nearly instantaneous intelligence capability
• Cue other sensors
A3.4.3. Limitations of unattended ground sensors:
• Must be placed by other systems
• Environment affects the sensor
• Expensive, sophisticated, and secure relay equipment is required

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 • A sophisticated analysis support system is required
• Sensors must be concealed
A3.4.4. Unattended sea sensors can provide valuable support to tactical air forces conducting sea
interdiction and reconnaissance or surveillance operations. Potential sea sensor roles, advantages, and
limitations are generally the same as those for unattended ground sensors.

A3.5. Imagery. Collectively, imagery is the representation of objects reproduced optically or electroni-
cally on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Imagery comes from visual photography, radar
sensors such as sidelooking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. While
each sensor operates at different spectrum frequencies and each type of imagery has distinctive character-
istics, the advantages and limitations of each are similar.
A3.5.1. Advantages:
• A variety of platforms and media is available
• Capable of pinpoint target positioning
• Activity can be detected
• Order of battle can be counted
• Target characteristics (physical or environmental) can be studied in detail
• Large area collection possible
• Excellent resolution possible
• Highly credible because it can be seen by the user
A3.5.2. Limitations:
• Except for radar, imagery quality normally degraded by darkness, adverse weather.
• Subject to deception or concealment techniques
• Requires extensive support facilities
• Can be expensive
• Subject to misinterpretation or misidentification
• Situation represented on the image may exist only for the instant it was captured

A3.6. Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence . This is the product resulting from collecting, eval-
uating, analyzing, and interpreting foreign scientific and technical information. It covers foreign develop-
ments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and scientific and technical
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems,
and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for
their manufacture
A3.6.1. Advantages:
• The most accurate intelligence available on capabilities and characteristics of foreign weapon
systems
• May be used to determine systems capabilities

145
 • Engineers, scientists, and technical experts intimately familiar with the subject being investi-
gated
A3.6.2. Limitations:
• May be extremely limited or inaccurate on new systems or systems to which there has been no
hands-on access
• Prolonged analysis may be required
• Capabilities do not necessarily indicate intentions

A3.7. Open Source Literature . Newspapers, magazines, books, and foreign broadcasts make up the
greatest volume of intelligence materials. Telephone directories, films, maps, and charts are also useful.
A3.7.1. Advantages:
• Often presents an "insider's" view.
• Frequently provides a source of pictures and information not obtained from any other source
• Gives insight into another's thought processes and intentions
• May be the most timely information available
• Timeliness
A3.7.2. Limitations:
• Materials (particularly military and scientific journals) often represent an idealized rather than
a real picture of a capability that is aspired to rather than possessed. However, such materials
can provide a window into the future, if this caution is kept in mind.
• Censorship or other motivations limit promulgation of military related information
• Deception is possible
• Translations may be needed, which often causes a delay in using the information
• Significant information may be overlooked in the high volume of material to be processed

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 Attachment 4

TARGETING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A4.1. Introduction. During planning, targeting personnel must contend with two external sources of
restrictions on weapons and target selection. First, and most basic, are the constraints imposed by inter-
national law. Second are other constraints imposed by higher headquarters for military or political rea-
sons. This attachment concerns itself solely with the restrictions on weapons and targeting imposed by
international law.

A4.2. General Restrictions on Air Bombardment: The Immunity of Civilians.

A4.2.1. Protection of the Civilian Population and Civilian Objects. The civilian population as
such, as well as individual civilians, may not be made the object of attack. Acts of violence intended
primarily to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. Neither may civilian property
that is not a military objective be the object of attack.
A4.2.1.1. Non-participation in Hostilities . Civilian immunity carries with a strict obligation on
the part of civilians not to take a direct part in hostilities--they must not become combatants. Tak-
ing a direct part in hostilities means engaging in acts of war directed toward enemy personnel or
materiel. Civilians who take part in fighting (whether singly or as a member of a group) become
combatants and lose their personal immunity.
A4.2.1.2. Requirement to Distinguish . The requirement to distinguish between combatants
and civilians and between military objectives and civilian objects imposes obligations on all the
parties to a conflict. This is true whatever the legal status of the territory on or over which combat
occurs. For example, civilians may not be used in an attempt to render an area immune from mil-
itary operations. Also, civilians may not be used to shield a defensive position, to hide military
objectives, or to screen an attack. Neither may they be forced to leave their homes or shelters in
order to disrupt the movement of an adversary.
A4.2.2. Military Objectives. Military attacks must be directed only against military objectives. Mil-
itary objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the
circumstances offers a definite military advantage.
A4.2.2.1. Many objects are clearly military objectives --for example, the enemy’s military
encampments or armament (such as military aircraft, tanks, antiaircraft emplacements, and troops
in the field). Factories, workshops, and plants that directly support the needs of the enemy’s armed
forces are also generally conceded to be legitimate military objectives.
A4.2.2.2. Controversy exists over whether, and under what circumstances, other objects such as
civilian transportation and communications systems, dams, and dikes can properly be classified as
military objectives. Modern transportation and communications systems are deemed military
objectives because they are used heavily for military purposes in intense conflicts.
A4.2.2.3. However, the inherent nature of an object is not controlling. Even a traditionally civil-
ian object (such as a civilian house) can be a military objective when it is occupied and used by
military forces during an armed engagement. The key factor is whether the object makes an effec-

147
 tive contribution to the adversary’s military action, so that its capture, destruction, or neutraliza-
tion offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

A4.3. Precautions in Attack. Only a military objective is a lawful object of attack. Therefore, constant
care must be taken when conducting military operations to spare nonmilitary objects and persons, and
positive steps must be taken to avoid or minimize any civilian casualties or damage. The principle of pro-
portionality must always be followed, which prohibits an attack when the expected collateral civilian
casualties or damage to civilian objects is excessive or disproportionate to the military advantage antici-
pated by the attack.
A4.3.1. Types of Precautions. The extent of danger to the civilian population varies with the type of
military objective attacked, the type of terrain, the type of weapons used, the kind of weather, and
whether civilians are nearby. It also depends on the combatant’s ability and mastery of bombardment
techniques, the level of the conflict, and the type of resistance encountered during the attack. There-
fore the following steps must be taken:
A4.3.1.1. Identification of Military Objectives . Initially, those who plan or decide upon an
attack must do everything feasible under the specific circumstances at the time to ensure military
objectives, and not civilians or civilian objects, are in fact being attacked. Sound target intelli-
gence enhances military effectiveness by showing that the risks undertaken are militarily worth-
while.
A4.3.1.2. Incidental Civilian Casualties Must Be Minimized . Attacks are not prohibited
against military objectives even though they may cause incidental injury or damage to civilians.
In spite of precautions, such incidental casualties are inevitable during armed conflict.
• This incidental injury or damage must not outweigh the expected direct military advan-
tage. That is, the potential military advantage must be balanced against the probable
degree of incidental injury or damage to civilians. If an attack is carried out efficiently,
using the principle of economy of force, against a military installation, it would not be
likely to violate this rule.
• On the other hand, if the attack were directed against objects used mainly by the civilian
population in an urban area (even though they might also be military objectives), its mili-
tary benefits would have to be carefully weighed against the risks to civilians.
• Required precautionary measures are reinforced by traditional military doctrines, such as
economy of force, concentration of effort, target selection for maximization of military
advantage, avoidance of excessive collateral damage, accuracy of targeting, and conserva-
tion of resources.
A4.3.1.3. Cancellation or Suspense of Attacks in Case of Mistake . Target intelligence may
be found to be faulty before an attack is started or completed. If it is apparent that a given target
is not a military objective, or that the target is under the special protection of international law, the
attack must be canceled or suspended. An example of such special protection would be a hospital
protected under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
A4.3.1.4. Warning Requirement . Under the Hague Regulations, a warning must be given prior
to bombardment, when circumstances permit, to permit the civilian population an opportunity to
avoid injury. The "Hague Rules", written at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, deal largely
with how to fight an enemy who is in the field, and is still fighting, while the Geneva Conventions

148
 deal chiefly with the respect due our enemy, who is no longer able to fight, as well as treatment of
civilians and civilian objects. If civilians are unlikely to be affected by the attack, the warnings
need not be given. A general warning may satisfy this requirement, because a specific alert could
jeopardize the attack force or the mission.
A4.3.2. Prohibition of Attack on Undefended Areas. Under the Hague Regulations, towns, vil-
lages, dwellings, or buildings that are undefended may not be attacked or bombarded. An undefended
place is any inhabited place near, or in, a zone where opposing armed forces are in contact, and which
is open for occupation by an adverse party without resistance.

A4.4. Separation of Military Activities.

A4.4.1. International law generally gives civilians “immunity” from attack during armed conflict.
However, the parties to a conflict must also take all the precautions practical to protect their own civil-
ian population, individual civilians, and civilian objects. For example, they should remove civilians
from military objectives and avoid locating military objectives in or near densely populated areas.
A4.4.1.1. Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, safety zones or demilitarized zones may be cre-
ated between the parties of the conflict. Although the creation of such zones is unlikely if past
experience is any indication, if created they would be an effective measure to enhance protection
of a state's own civilian population.
A4.4.1.2. Under these rules, persons who are combatants are required to wear uniforms, and facil-
ities such as hospitals should be clearly marked. Similarly, international law also requires bellig-
erents to locate military objectives away from hospitals and not to use civilians to shield military
objectives from attack.
A4.4.2. Result of Failure to Separate Military Activities. A state’s failure to segregate and sepa-
rate its own military activities and to avoid placing military objectives in or near a populated area may
greatly weaken protection of its civilian population. Such protection is also compromised when civil-
ians take a direct part in hostilities or are used unlawfully in an attempt to shield attacks against mili-
tary objectives .

A4.5. Special Protection. In additional to the general rules for protecting civilians and civilian popula-
tions, there are specific rules for protecting certain persons and facilities. Under the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, the following persons and objects must be protected from attack:
A4.5.1. Wounded and Sick, Medical Units and Hospitals, and Medical Means of Transport.
• Hospitals and other fixed or mobile medical establishments.
• Medical personnel and chaplains.
• Medical transport.
• Medical aircraft, when flying at agreed times on agreed routes.
• Hospital ships and, to the extent possible, sick bays of warships.
• Wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons must not knowingly be attacked, fired upon, or
unnecessarily prevented from discharging their proper function. However, the incidental
injury of personnel or damage to objects that are at, or near, a military target which is being
attacked by fire, gives no just cause for complaint.

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 A4.5.2. Religious, Cultural, and Charitable Buildings and Monuments. Because they are not
used for military purposes, buildings devoted to religion, art or charitable purposes, as well as histor-
ical monuments, may not be made the object of air bombardment. However, combatants have a duty
to identify such places with distinctive and visible signs. When such buildings are used for military
purposes, they may qualify as military objectives and may be attacked. Lawful military objectives are
not immune from attack because they are located near such buildings, but all possible precautions
must be taken to spare the protected buildings.
A4.5.3. Prisoner of War (PW) Camps. Prisoners of war may not be the object of attack. They may
not be kept in a combat zone or used to render an area immune from military operations. When mili-
tary considerations allow it, prisoner of war camps are identified by the letters “PW” or “PG” placed
so they are clearly visible from the air. The use of PW camp markings for any other purpose is pro-
hibited.

A4.6. Weapons: The Distinction Between an Unlawful Weapon and Unlawful Use of a Weapon.
International law may prohibit completely the use of a specific weapon or may prohibit a specific use. A
weapon is illegal per se if international law has forbidden its use in all circumstances. Poison as a gas, as
a coating on munitions, or as a contaminant of water is an example of such an illegal weapon. However,
any weapon may be used unlawfully; for example, firing a rifle at civilians or at combatants who have sur-
rendered.

A4.7. General Principles Applicable to Weapons.

A4.7.1. Unnecessary Suffering. It is forbidden to employ any method or weapon of warfare which
causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. This firmly established rule, incorporated into the
Hague Regulations, is a concrete expression of the general principles of proportionality and humanity.
All weapons cause suffering. Whether particular weapons or methods of warfare cause unnecessary
suffering (and hence are unlawful per se) is best determined by the practice of states. The critical fac-
tor is whether the weapon has been designed, or is used, so that it will cause suffering or aggravation
of wounds as a separate element in the attack, and not the degree of suffering itself. Treaties banning
specific weapons, such as gas and toxin weapons, also give specific content to this principle. The rule
against unnecessary suffering also prohibits the infliction of suffering for its own sake, or for mere
indulgence in cruelty. International law has condemned the use of expanding bullets against combat-
ants and determined that it is illegal per se to use:
• Projectiles filled with glass or other materials inherently difficult to detect medically
• Any substance on projectiles that tends unnecessarily to inflame the wound they cause
• Irregularly shaped bullets. It is illegal to score the surface, or file off the ends of the hard
cases, of bullets, so that they will expand upon contact and thus aggravate the wound they
cause
A4.7.2. Indiscriminate Weapons. The law of armed conflict also prohibits the use of any weapon
that cannot be directed at a military target. However, a weapon is not unlawful simply because its use
may cause incidental civilian casualties. An indiscriminate weapon is one that cannot be controlled,
through design or function. Some weapons are considered indiscriminate because, although they can
be directed at a military objective, they may have otherwise uncontrollable effects that cause dispro-
portionate civilian injuries or damage. Biological weapons are an example.

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A4.8. Biological and Chemical Weapons.
A4.8.1. Biological Weapons. International law prohibits the use of biological weapons or methods
of warfare. These weapons are also prohibited by the 1972 Convention of the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
their Destruction. The US, along with many other states, is party to this treaty.
A4.8.2. Chemical Weapons. The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
tion, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons And on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Con-
vention), entered into force on 29 April 1997 and bans the use of chemical weapons as a method of
warfare. The Chemical Weapons Convention corrects a shortfall in the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, which prohibits the use of chemical weapons in combat, but not their develop-
ment, production, stockpiling or transfer.
A4.8.3. Herbicides and Riot Control Agents. US policy on herbicides and riot control agents in
war is set forth in an Executive Order: The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy,
first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control
of vegetation within US bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters and
first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives, such as:
• Use of riot control agents in riot situations in areas under direct and distinct US military con-
trol, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
• Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks
and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
• Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews
and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
• Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to pro-
tect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The Secretary
of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use of riot control agents and
chemical herbicides in war by US Armed Forces is prohibited unless such use has Presidential
approval in advance. Executive Order Number 11850, 8 April 1975. The Chemical Weapons
Convention bans the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. However, the use of
riot control agents permitted under Executive Order 11850 has been deemed consistent with
the Chemical Weapons Convention since the listed uses are not considered ‘as a method of
warfare.’
A4.8.4. Poison. Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations forbids states to employ poison or poisoned
weapons. The prohibition against poison is based on its uncontrolled character, on the fact that it is
inevitably disabling or fatal, and on the traditional belief that it is treacherous to use poison.

A4.9. Nuclear Weapons. The US does not regard the use of explosive nuclear weapons, whether by air,
sea, or land forces, as a violation of existing international law. Nuclear weapons can be directed against
military objectives as can conventional weapons. However, the authority of United States forces to
employ nuclear weapons resides solely with the President. Moreover, the United States is a party to
numerous treaties that regulate the use of nuclear devices. Some examples are the Additional Protocol II
to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Outer Space Treaty, and a
treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons on the seabed.

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A4.10. Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems.
A4.10.1. Aircraft, Rockets, and Guided Missiles. The use of aircraft, rockets, and guided missiles
by land, sea, or air forces against combatants and other lawful military objectives is clearly permissi-
ble.
A4.10.2. Fragmentation Weapons. The use of explosives and fragmentation particles, such as those
contained in projectiles, mines, bombs, rockets, missiles, and hand grenades, is not prohibited under
the law of armed conflict. Cluster bomb units, a more recent development in warfare, are only a
refinement or special type of fragmentation munition.
A4.10.3. Incendiary Weapons. Incendiary weapons, such as incendiary ammunition, flame throw-
ers, napalm, and other incendiary agents, have widespread uses in armed conflict. They are clearly
regarded as lawful in situations requiring their use. Any controversy over their use arises from a con-
cern for the medical problem in treating burn injuries and from arbitrary attempts to analogize their
use to the use of prohibited means of chemical warfare. The potential danger of spreading fire has
also raised concerns about civilian protection. Their use should be avoided in urban areas, to the
extent that other weapons are available and are equally effective.
A4.10.4. Delayed Action Weapons. Air-dropped mines and other delayed action weapons are legal.
However, mines are unlawfully used when they are attached as booby traps to any object that is pro-
tected under international law, such as to wounded and sick personnel, dead bodies, or medical facili-
ties. Also objectionable are portable booby traps, such as fountain pens, watches, and trinkets, that
would expose any civilians who might be attracted to the object, to an injury. Mines must not be used
to prevent the rescue of wounded and sick persons, or to deny civilians protection. Under the Hague
Convention VIII, there are specific treaty restrictions on the use of mines in sea warfare.

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 Attachment 5

TARGET ANALYSIS

A5.1. Introduction. Target analysis is extremely important when making recommendations regarding
which targets should be attacked to fulfill a commander’s objectives. This attachment examines several
methods of determining relative worth or value of targets. Types of rankings, and methodologies used in
the USAF Nonnuclear Consumables Annual Analysis (NCAA), nuclear targeting, and the determination
of priorities are included. This attachment also examines several types of analysis, along with illustrative
examples.

A5.2. Types of Ranking.

A5.2.1. Ordinal Scale. One of the easiest methods of ranking target value involves the use of ordinal
scales to assign factors a priority according to their relative worth. Target A may be more important
or valuable than Target B but less valuable than Target C. It would be logical to infer that Target C is
also more valuable than Target B. However, their absolute relationship remains unknown under this
approach. Using this method, we may know that Target A is more important than Target B, but we do
not know how much more important.
A5.2.2. Metric Scales. A second method of ranking targets would be to use metric or cardinal scales
to determine their worth in some “real” sense. In a simple case, we can rank people by their ages. Joe
might be 25 years old and Sam 37 years old. We can rank these individuals not only relatively but
also absolutely. Relatively, Sam is older than Joe; absolutely, Sam is 12 years older than Joe. Thus,
metric scales can apply to targets. For example, one airfield's runway is 2,000 feet longer than
another's; one airfield has 25 more assigned aircraft than another. This method of ranking is most
desirable but the most difficult, because there is rarely any single measure of their comparative value.
A combination of measurements must be used. Usually the ways these factors are measured does not
directly reveal their threat to friendly forces or value to the enemy.
A5.2.3. Ratios. Another method is to develop a ratio of relative worth by determining, for example,
that Target D is twice as important as Target E, and four times as important as Target F. However,
this method does not measure each individual target's absolute value. Often a value of 1 is assigned to
some baseline target, and all other targets are assigned values with respect to the baseline. The USAF
Nonnuclear Consumables Annual Analysis (NCAA) uses this type of ranking, which recognizes that
the relative value of targets can change over time during a conflict. This methodology divides the
period of action into three phases: the initial or intense phase, covering the first 10 days of action; the
transition phase, covering the next 20 days; and the sustained, or steady state phase, covering the
remainder of the conflict. Target values for this type of ranking are determined by combining the
independent assessments of several analysts. The final target value set is the weighted geometric
mean of the values submitted. The baseline target in this methodology is a tank platoon, which is
assigned an arbitrary value of one. Values for other targets are computed to determine their relative
importance compared to the tank platoon, for the initial, transition, and sustained phases of the con-
flict. Some representative target values for the three phases are shown inTable A5.1..

153
Table A5.1. Representative Target Values.
Target Initial Phase Transition Phase Sustained Phase
Air Defense Control Center 15.0 8.0 7.0
Mobile SAM 15.0 17.0 16.0
Tank Column (10 tanks) 12.0 20.0 15.0
Tank Platoon (3 tanks) 1.0 1.0 1.0
Military Headquarters 0.3 0.3 1.0
Airfield Runway/Taxiway 19.0 12.0 10.0
EW/GCI Radar Site 14.0 16.0 15.0
Mobile SSM 10.0 18.0 13.0
Ammunition/Weapons Plant 0.1 0.2 20.0
A5.2.4. The “Split 100” Method. Another method of ranking, often called the “split 100” method, is
to use total points. For example, we might assign a total set of points, adding up to 100, for distribu-
tion among a set of targets. We might then divide the 100 points among all the targets, giving Target
A so many, Target B some, and so on, and rank them on an arbitrary scale. However, we still do not
know any given target’s absolute values.
A5.2.5. Aggregation Ranking. Targets can also be ranked by an aggregation of their specific char-
acteristics. Does an airfield have an active air order of battle? What level of activity is apparent? Has
the enemy sought to repair damage inflicted on the target? How concentrated have his efforts been? Is
the target heavily defended? Are some of its elements hardened to protect them against attack? The
answer to each of these questions is relative to the issue of relative target worth. Taken together, these
factors can reveal important information that can lead to target ranking. Several statistical techniques
may be used to combine these factors into measures of relative utility. The combination of measure-
ment methods will be treated in the remainder of this section.

A5.3. Qualitative Analysis. Because the decision making process is constrained by time, costs, previous
experiences, and perceptions of the participants, much decision making in the target development arena is
based on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. Since analysis occurs in an environment where
power relationships, personal desires, and the necessity for coordination exist, problems can almost never
be approached on a completely systematic basis. Many decisions are somewhat arbitrary, in that critical
choices have already been made in selecting the alternatives. Much of targeting is concerned with value
choices that can be explicitly described in words but are extremely difficult to express in the languages of
mathematics or the computer.
A5.3.1. However, qualitative analysis is not a substitute for quantitative analysis. Both are useful and
complementary techniques for structuring a problem to reach a rational conclusion. Both may be used
to reduce uncertainty in decision making. Each technique has strengths that tend to diminish the lim-
itations of the other.
A5.3.2. In targeting, qualitative analysis is the examination of potential targets to determine impor-
tance, significance, and priority of attack based upon value choices which are not quantifiable. Qual-
itative analysis is often necessary when precise information on quantities is unavailable. For example,
the quantities of supplies reaching the enemy forces at the forward area has shown historic signifi-
cance in the outcome of battles. Unfortunately, this effect is extremely difficult to quantify.

154
A5.4. Quantitative Analysis. In its present form, quantitative analysis appears under various labels:
operations research, systems analysis, management science, policy analysis, computer analysis, weap-
oneering, or any one of a number of others. These labels have in common the use of mathematical models
to aid in problem solving.
A5.4.1. Since targeting decisions vary in complexity, quantitative analysis can be used in various
ways. The numbers of people and organizational units affected, the degree of structural change
required, and the costs of such changes are factors that determine the scope of a given decision situa-
tion.
A5.4.2. The targeting decision maker has many quantitative models to choose from. These models
tend to be either macrosystems or microsystems. Macrosystem analysis approaches a problem from
an extensive point of view. It attempts to consider all of the variables that could contribute to, or
extract value from, the proposed alternatives. For example, it might weigh the technical, political,
economic, social, and aesthetic considerations that would lead to success in a given battle. Mac-
roanalysis tends to take place at the higher levels of the DoD hierarchy where decisions concern broad
allocation of resources, planning for major campaigns, and overall review of ongoing operations. At
these levels, decision makers are not necessarily interested in the implications and overall impact of
the specific situation. Microsystems analysis, on the other hand, approaches a problem from an inten-
sive point of view, concentrating on a single variable, such as the cost of destroying a particular target.
This approach leaves the consideration of remaining variables such as how to win the battle to other
efforts. At lower levels, applications lean toward a micro approach, where decisions are made to
ensure specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently.
A5.4.2.1. The use of models and quantitative analysis techniques in targeting offers many advan-
tages. They allow planners to handle problems that are both large and complicated, allowing con-
sideration of only the most relevant factors. They provide a risk-free, low-cost environment to test
tactics and strategy before implementation.. Alternative courses of action can be recommended to
the commander accompanied by impact analysis. Finally, the use of models makes it necessary to
define the facts for a given problem and forces the decision making participants to state their feel-
ings, objectives, values, and assumptions explicitly.
A5.4.3. Examples of Quantitative Analysis.
A5.4.3.1. Simple Target Methodology . Most of these applications have been oriented toward
examination of selected components of target systems. In the case of an aircraft delivery system,
the weaponeering model attempts to grasp the physical characteristics of the aircraft as it moves
through air space, the weapons as they strike the target and the resulting interaction of the weap-
ons effects on the target structure. The weaponeering model of this problem considers a large
number of details, ranging from the position of the aircraft in space to the geometry of the bombs
hitting the ground. However, the model involves only one aircraft and one target. The situation
and the scope of the models also limited by the assumption that the aircraft successfully reaches
and acquires the target. Table A5.2. shows a sample set of inputs and outputs for a typical
non-nuclear weaponeering problem.

155
Table A5.2. Input and Output Weaponeering Sample.
Inputs
Variables Values

# of Acft 7
Impact Angle for Bomb 57 degrees
Circular Error Probable (CEP) 40 mils
Altitude of Release of First Bomb 7000’
Slant Range 8000’
Length of Stick 250’
Width of Stick 40’
Length of Area 1000’
Width of Area 1000’
Ballistic Dispersion 5 mils
Bomb Reliability 0.95
# of Weapons Released per Pulse 1
Number of Pulses 3
Outputs
Fractional Damage Expected from One Pass 2030
Damage Expected from All Seven Passes 7970
A5.4.3.2. Complex Target Methodology. This method expands the scope of models to include
complex targets with multiple parts. For example, a model might determine the probabilities of
damage to several of the components of a large airfield complex.
A5.4.3.2.1. A typical approach using traditional weaponeering concepts would be to compute
the probabilities of inflicting various types of damage on each of the components of the air-
field separately. Thus, the runway would be weaponeered with a given number of aimpoints,
while the hangarettes might be considered separately, as a single area (or set of area targets),
and POL, storage areas, and support buildings would each be weaponeered separately.
A5.4.3.2.2. Another approach would be to treat the entire airfield as a single complex target.
The separate components would be defined in the context of the larger model which considers
all of the parts and their relationships to each other. A sample airfield with such geographic
interrelationships is shown in figure A5.1.

156
Figure A5.1. Illustrative Airfield. The entire airfield is a single complex target, with separate com-
ponents defined in the context of the entire complex. Thus, all parts and their relationships may be
explicitly determined.

A5.4.3.2.3. After the airfield has been described, with appropriate structural descriptions and
distance measurements, it is then possible to evaluate potential collateral damage on compo-
nents near the selected target. For example, when the target is an aircraft shelter, the probabil-
ity of cratering the taxiway would be evaluated. The problem of collateral damage can be
computed with point or area targets, if either guided or unguided weapons are used. This com-
plex model can be used to compute damage to targets offset from the aiming point and to
determine damage probability for the target at the aiming point and any other target in close
proximity. This approach makes it possible to evaluate all targets and their structural charac-
teristics and sizes. The problem can also be solved using more complex methodologies based
on simulation techniques.
A5.4.4. Target Utility Analysis. Target utility systems can be applied to problems of varying scope,
ranging from large scale problems (strategic planning applied to an entire country) to small scale situ-
ations. In this analysis technique, the utility or usefulness of different targets is weighed against the
cost of attacking the target. Those targets with the highest pay-off at lowest losses are then prioritized.
The following paragraphs is an example of how to use a subjectively derived weighing scheme to
evaluate an attack against a complex installation such as an airfield.
A5.4.4.1. The concept of attacking enemy airfields is an integral part of counterair operations.
However, its value depends largely on two factors: analysis of results to be achieved versus losses
to be incurred, and the trade-off between the use of air assets for airfield attack as opposed to other
missions.
A5.4.4.2. A number of factors must be considered in targeting airfields--formidable air defenses;
sheltering of aircraft; hardened command and support facilities; dispersed target elements at the
main field and dispersal or forward operating bases which are equipped well enough to support air
operations in the event the main operating bases are attacked.

157
 A5.4.4.3. When attacking an airfield, a number of potential results may be sought. For example,
if the commander wants to ensure aircraft at the airfield are destroyed, all effort may be directed
against the aircraft themselves. However, because other aircraft can readily be moved into the air-
field complex, it may also be useful to damage the airfield facilities. In this case, attacks would be
directed against the runway, the POL, or other collocated facilities to make them unusable.
A5.4.4.4. Options could be arranged into categories. For example, in one case three general
objectives could be of interest: the first would involve destroying aircraft; the second, cutting run-
ways; and the third, destroying support areas. Under each of these options, Table A5.3. shows the
following factors that must be considered:

Table A5.3. Example Options/Factors Case.

Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

Destroy Aircraft Cut Runway Destroy Support Area

Aircraft in open Short term damage POL

or revetments (Minimal cuts)

Aircraft in shelters Long term damage Ammunition storage

(Heavy damage to runway)

EW/GCI
A5.4.4.5. The planner can assign these categories relative weights from a total pool of 100 points.
For example, all 100 points could be assigned to Category 1 and none to categories 2 and 3 if the
interest is only in destroying aircraft and not in closing the runway or destroying the support facil-
ities. To emphasize each category, the 100 points could be distributed as follows: Category 1, 50
points; Category 2, 30 points; Category 3, 20 points. The decision maker must make the final
decision as to the best combination of objectives.
A5.4.4.6. The second step is to assign weights within each category. For example, in Category 1
(Destroy Aircraft), the 100 points could be divided with aircraft in open or in revetments, 20
points, and aircraft in shelters, 80 points. This could be because all of the aircraft are equally
important regardless of whether they are in the open, in revetments, or in shelters, but 80 percent
of them may be in shelters in an attack.
A5.4.4.7. After all discussion and final agreement by the planners and other participants, the final
assignment for all factors might be as shown in Table A5.4.:

158
Table A5.4. Example Relative Weight Assignment.
Category 1 (50 points) Category 2 (30 points) Category 3 (20 points)

Destroy Aircraft Cut Runway Destroy Support Area

Aircraft in open Short term close POL (30 points)

(20 points) (70 points)

Aircraft in shelters Long term close Ammunition storage

(80 points) (30 points) (30 points)

EW/GCI (40 points)

A5.4.4.8. Under this scoring system, the factors of destroying aircraft and closing the runway
have more weight than destroying support facilities unless they are adjusted. To adjust these fac-
tors, multiply the points assigned to each individual factor by a “fractional bias” factor for the
component (figure A5.2). Here the fractional bias factor (represented by “f” in the following cal-
culations) is the number of factors in the category, divided by the total number of factors listed.

Figure A5.2. Fractional Bias Factor.

(Category 1) = number of factors in Category 1

number of factors in all categories

f (Category 1) = 2/7
f (Category 2) = 2/7
f (Category 3) = 3/7

These factors are then used to weigh the assigned values for each factor as shown below:
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

Destroy Aircraft Cut Runway Destroy Supplies

Aircraft in open Short term POL

(20 x 2/7 = 5.71) (70 x 2/7 = 20) (30 x 3/7 = 12.86)

Aircraft in shelters Long term Ammunition

(80 x 2/7 = 22.86) (30 x 2/7 = 8.57) (30 x 3/7 = 12.86)

159
 EW/GCI
(40 x 3/7 = 17.14)

A5.4.4.9. The final weights for the factors would then be determined as illustrated in figure A5.3.
The weighted factors can then be multiplied with computed probabilities of damage (PD) into
munitions effectiveness values that show the relative value of attacking each target. This number
can be used in weaponeering as a means to optimize target selection for the most valuable output
by comparing the potential value of an attack on each component.

Figure A5.3. Airfield Attack Options: Adjusted Scoring System.

Fl = Aircraft in open = 5.71 x 50 = 285.5

F2 = Aircraft in shelters = 22.86 x 50 = 1143.0
F3 = Close Runway (Short term) = 20 x 30 = 600
F4 = Close Runway (Long term) = 8.57 x 30 = 257.1
F5 = Destroy POL = 12.86 x 20 = 257.2
F6 = Destroy Ammunition = 12.86 x 20 = 257 .2
F7 = Destroy EW/GCI = 17.14 x 20 = 342.8

Finally, these weighted factors can be combined with probabilities of damage based on standard weap-
oneering calculations into a single measure of effectiveness (EM) as follows:

EM = F1 x Pd1 + F2 x Pd2 + F3 x Pd3 + F4 x Pd4 + F5 x Pd5 + F6 x Pd6 + F7 x Pd7

A5.4.5. Expected Value Model. This example describes the use of a mathematical model developed
around the concept of “expected value.” Targets are defined in terms of size and relative worth.
Weaponeering calculations provide estimates of potential levels of damage coverage or from a single
sortie for each target. Targets and their associated factors are then combined into a scheme that lets us
compare the impact of striking the target system one way versus another.
A5.4.5.1. In two target cases, for example, it is possible to compute the damage expected to each
of the two targets over a range of application levels. Trade-offs can then be made between putting
ordnance on one target or another. Keeping track of the total damage to be expected while making
these tradeoffs allows us to find the optimum approach.
A5.4.5.2. It is possible to compute the expected damage from striking one target with one aircraft,
a few aircraft, numerous aircraft, or with all the sorties that are available. The curve in figure A5.4
suggests the effects of striking a given target with varying numbers of sorties. The shape of the
curve reveals that the more sorties allocated to damage the target, the harder it is to increase the

160
 damage level beyond a given point. The curve represents the classical economic principle of the
law of diminishing returns.

Figure A5.4. Sorties Allocated to the Illustrative Target. The shape of the curve reveals that the
more sorties allocated to the target, the harder it gets to increase the damage level.

A5.4.5.3. Further defining the sample problem, assume that 100 aircraft sorties are available to
allocate against two targets. They could all be assigned against the first target, all of them against
the second target, or assigned between both targets. The diminishing return curves for both targets
could be plotted on the same graph, constructing one from left to right and the other from right to
left (figure A5.5). That is, if all sorties are allocated to Target A, then Target B will get none; if
Target B gets all the sorties, then Target A will get none; and if Target A gets 20 sorties, then Tar-
get B gets 80, and so forth. In its current state, the Y or vertical axis of the graph is dimensionless,
representing relative levels of damage rather than absolute levels.

161
Figure A5.5. Sorties Allocated to Two Illustrative Targets.

A5.4.5.4. Under the concept of expected value, values can be assigned to this axis. The Y axis
would represent the total expected value achieved on the target, based on a consideration of the
fractional level of damage achieved and on the pre-assigned values. If the total expected values
for both targets at any given point on the graph are added, a new curve as shown in figure A5.6 is
produced. For example, if 40 sorties are placed on Target A and 60 sorties are placed on Target B,
a total expected value of 100 points (or area killed, etc.) is determined (25 from Target A, and 75
from Target B). The third curve in the graph reveals the optimum point (or indifference range)
where optimum damage is achieved. Allocating sorties in a manner indicated outside the range is
inefficient. For example, if 80 sorties were placed on Target A, then only 20 would be left for Tar-
get B. In this case, the curves reveal that too much effort is allocated to Target A and the resulting
overall damage is degraded to 75 units of total expected value.

162
Figure A5.6. Sorties Allocated to Two Illustrative Targets Using a Total Value Curve.

A5.4.6. Linear Programming Analysis. One of the other general tools available to the analyst is lin-
ear programming. It has a special value in transportation scenarios as it arises naturally in the context
of determining optimal shipping patterns. It is also useful in structuring targeting problems involving
systems designed to supply people and material. An example of its application follows.
A5.4.6.1. There are four SAM supply points in a given area. Each supply point has a maximum
of 50 missiles that can be used to resupply designated area sites. Each supply point has primary
responsibility for two general SAM site areas. The sketch in figure A5.7 shows how these systems
might be arranged.

163
Figure A5.7. Illustrative Example of SAM Supply Points and Site Areas.

A5.4.6.2. It is assumed each supply area is primarily responsible for the two general site areas
associated with it, but missiles can be transported to other sites on an emergency basis. It is also
assumed under combat operating conditions each area requires ten missiles a day to replace its
expended inventory. Because each supply point is set up to provide replacements for its two pri-
mary areas, it is less expensive to the enemy to move the missiles from the supply point to the two
primary areas than to move them from that point to secondary areas. The farther the area is from
the supply point, the more it costs the enemy in terms of time, transportation, equipment, men, and
other assets. The assumed costs are indicated in Table A5.5.:

164
Table A5.5. The SAM Supply Problem: Missile Shipping Cost.
Costs of Shipping Missile from Supply Points to Areas of Sites, Based on Time, Labor, Equipment Used,
and Other Factors
Area Area Area Area Area Area Area Area
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Supply Area A 10 10 20 20 30 30 40 40
Supply Area B 20 20 10 10 20 20 30 30
Supply Area C 30 30 20 20 10 10 20 20
Supply Area D 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10
A5.4.6.3. Table A5.6. illustrates the distribution breakout, if each area expends ten missiles a day
and requires resupply, and if the enemy uses the most efficient method of resupply. Using this dis-
tribution, each area would receive the ten missiles needed, and the total costs to the enemy would
be 800 cost units (men, material, etc.). These costs can be determined by looking at the above
chart and considering costs per unit for the preceding chart. Each missile costs ten units to send to
the nearest area. Ten missiles cost 100 units. The total adds up to 800 units.

Table A5.6. The SAM Supply Problem: Possible Distribution of Missiles.

Distribution of Missiles in an Economic Manner
Area
1

Supply Area A 10
Supply Area B
Supply Area C
Supply Area D
A5.4.6.4. When conducting operations against such a system, the commander is interested in the
greatest possible disruption of resupply efforts. If enough attack forces were available, they might
eliminate all four supply areas and all of the missile sites. However, when competition is high for
the allocation of attack resources, it is not normally possible to perform such a devastating task.
Therefore, a planner should examine the relative merits of destroying parts of the system. These
merits can be measured in terms of equipment available to the enemy, costs associated with mov-
ing the equipment around, or a combination of both approaches.
A5.4.6.5. As an example, if strikes eliminated the first supply area, the enemy would have to
resupply from other, undamaged areas. Since the resupply capability of each area is limited, the
most economical solution would be as shown in Table A5.7.. Because it costs more to send mis-
siles from supply area B to areas 1 and 2 than it did from supply area A, the total minimum cost of
the effort to the enemy has been raised to 1000 cost units. Strikes that destroy both supply area A
and supply area B make the enemy’s resupply costs even higher, as shown in Table A5.8..

165
Table A5.7. The SAM Supply Problem: Redistribution Resulting from Strikes to One Area.
Area Area Area Area Area Area Area Area
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Supply Area A (Destroyed)

Supply Area B 20 20 10 10
Supply Area C 10 10
Supply Area D 10 10=100

Table A5.8. THE SAM SUPPLY PROBLEM: REDISTRIBUTION RESULTING FROM

ADDITIVE STRIKES.
Area Area Area Area Area Area Area Area
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Supply Area A (Destroyed)

Supply Area B (Destroyed) 10 10
20
Supply Area C 30 20 20 10 10
Supply Area D 40 10 10=150
A5.4.6.6. This sample application of the transportation problem to a targeting situation is rela-
tively simple. Once the problem is appropriately structured, the relative merits of approaching the
target system become more apparent. In the real world of targeting, problems are rarely this sim-
ple. However, it is possible to use more elaborate models that include a greater level of detail,
such as factors of resupply, exchanges between attacking aircraft and SAM sites, etc. Once the
problem is appropriately structured, linear programming techniques already developed for the
computer will determine relative solutions and give indications of their merits.
A5.4.7. Network Models in Targeting. The network model is also useful in targeting situations
where it can be used to represent systems that have something flowing through them,(i.e., lines of
communication, command networks, or power systems.) To illustrate this approach, an example
based on a simplified representative power system is used. Figure A5.8 shows a power grid support-
ing a city and the relationship among power sources, switching stations, and power lines. From this
diagram, key points may be identified which, when destroyed, will have the greatest impact on the
overall system.

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Figure A5.8. Representative City Power System.

A5.4.7.1. Under the best of conditions, if all of the available power is directed toward the city,
disregarding any line loss, a total of 2,440,000 kilowatts (kW) are available. If parts of the system
are removed, the resulting effects on the city’s power supply can be computed. For example, if
Switch #3 were removed there would be no change because the power would simply be rerouted
through Switch #1. However, if Switch #1 were removed, 1,050,000 kW, or 43 percent of the
total power in the system, would not be available to the city.
A5.4.7.2. Under normal conditions. it could be difficult to remove parts of a system. Weaponeer-
ing techniques can compute the probabilities of success and the results would dictate the optimum
allocation of available aircraft. All available sorties might be best used against Switch #1, or the
sorties might be divided among the various power sources to produce the same effect. Although
this example is greatly simplified, full network models can handle the hundreds of variables that
comprise elaborate flow systems, and complex computer programs have been developed to handle
such models.
A5.4.7.3. Lines of Communication (LOC) Network Mode . Several network models for LOCs
are available for examining interdiction problems. Computer models have been developed to
evaluate the capability of a transportation network to deliver supplies to destinations while road
segments of the network are being successively destroyed and repaired. Initial models took an
austere approach defining the logistical network in its simplest form. What roads are there? How
are they connected? What is their capability to carry traffic? How many trucks are available?
Similar models can be expanded to include additional costs (cost of repair, cost of interdiction,
etc.) and other constraints (total repair capability, etc.). They can also account for the cushioning

167
 effect of interim supply points. Several criteria can be stated for these models in terms of: maxi-
mum cost to the enemy; minimum flow through the system; minimum cost to friendly forces; or
any combination of these orientations. A sample LOC network is shown in figure A5.9.

Figure A5.9. LOC Network Example.

A5.4.7.3.1. One difficulty with an LOC network model is that it is a tremendous consumer of
data. For example, thousands of road segments must sometimes be described to the computer
and then constantly updated. The running of such models is expensive in terms of personnel,
machines, and time.
A5.4.7.4. Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). Another useful tool is the spe-
cialized version of PERT. PERT was originally developed in 1958 for use in managing the Polaris
Fleet Ballistic Missile program. The missile program constituted the desired hardware, while
PERT was a software development designed to aid in planning, scheduling, and controlling com-
plex projects. Specific versions of PERT can be used to aid in the analysis of targeting problems.
The first step in using it is to construct a network diagram of the problem so that the proper rela-
168
 tionship in the situation can be examined (figure A5.10). The PERT terms of reference for this
network diagram include:
A5.4.7.4.1. Network. It is the pictorial description of the related series of events and activi-
ties. All of these must be completed for the enemy to possess a particular capability. For
example, producing aircraft requires the ability to manufacture the fuselage, engines, landing
gear, and navigation and control systems.
A5.4.7.4.2. Event. An event is an identification of a requirement and does not represent any
activity or time consumed. Thus, it can be either the initiation or completion of an activity, in
a series of related activities. It is represented by a circle in the pictorial representation.
A5.4.7.4.3. Activity. Lines in the diagram represent the activities involved in moving from
one event to another. The lines represent that time is being consumed in the cycle.
A5.4.7.4.4. Critical Path. The sequence of events is indicated by sequential numbering of
each circle. The general direction of the arrows is from left to right. Time is expressed above
each activity line in hours, days, and so forth. The longest path through the network of events
and activities, in terms of time, is designated the critical path. Using PERT, one can determine
what the critical path is and target it. This action can lengthen the enemy’s time to complete
the critical path and result in the delay or prevention of the enemy’s completion of a product.
Of note, targeting which increases the time of other paths may not delay the product unless it
makes one of those paths greater than the critical path. Target analysis should also evaluate
the vulnerability as well as the length of paths when determining the most efficient way to
reduce enemy system output.

Figure A5.10. Typical Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) Network Diagram.

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 A5.4.8. Decision Tree Approach . This technique is used to display information and represent alter-
natives, objectives, and the consequences of a series of decisions. The decision tree is an algorithm
for the analysis of complex sequential decision problems. It can be used to depict a series of true-false
sequences or to depict subjective probabilities and their relationships.
A5.4.8.1. The four-step decision tree technique is straight forward. First, identify the available
options and the possible chance events that might occur. Second, draw the tree skeleton. Third, if
probabilities are being expressed, enter the economic or statistical data and associated (subjective)
probabilities. Finally, analyze the tree to determine the best course of action.
A5.4.8.2. The decision tree terms of reference include decisions, which are normally represented
by squares; and change events, represented as circles. The connecting lines are termed branches
and depict the alternate courses of action. The trees are normally drawn from left to right but may
be drawn from top to bottom for easier presentation.
A5.4.8.3. As an example, consider a patio party. There is a 40 percent chance of rain, and the
party cannot be moved once the decision is made. There are only two options: inside or outside.
The chance event is rain or no rain. Figure A5.11 illustrates the scenario.

Figure A5.11. Decision Tree.

A5.4.8.4. Next, it is necessary to assess the subjective values of the alternatives in the circles. On
an ascending scale, outside - no rain - comfort would rate “4” while outside - rain - disaster would
be rate “1”. Finally, it's 60 to 40 against rain. Figure A5.12 illustrates the results of multiplying
the subjective value by the value of the chance event. Thus, there is a slight quantified edge (2.8
versus 2.4) for holding the party outside. The use of the decision tree gives the decision maker a

170
 simple graphic device, showing the areas where the analyst has been subjective and how that sub-
jectivity affects the recommended course of action.

Figure A5.12. Subjective Values of Alternatives for Decision Tree.

Inside Outside

No Rain (.6)Rain (.4) No Rain (.6)Rain (.4)

Discomfort (2) Discomfort (3) Comfort (4)Disaster (1)

.4 x 3 = 1.2 .4 x 1 = 0.4
.6 x 2 = 1.2 .6 x 4 = 2.4
Inside = 2.4 Outside = 2.8

A5.5. Substitutes for Quantitative Analysis. Because the decision making process can be constrained
by time, costs, prior experiences, and perceptions, quantitative analysis is not always used. Since analysis
occurs in an environment where power relationships, personal desires and the necessity for coordination
exists, problems almost never can be approached exhaustively or on a completely systematic basis. Some
alternatives to quantitative analysis follow.
A5.5.1. Intuition . There are two general approaches to this method of decision making. The first
involves analytic reasoning by using logical models. Analytic reasoning reduces problems to a base
of underlying causal relation. A logical model structured with an explicit set of axioms, premises, and
assumptions is set forth, and all effort is directed toward detection of relationships. The decision vari-
ables are manipulated in such a manner that some “optimal” equilibrium is reached to form the basis
for a decision. The model produced is explicit and well defined, and its behavior can be deduced as
logical consequences of its premises. Different people analyzing the same question should arrive at
the same answer on the basis of logic alone.
A5.5.1.1. The second approach is a method of heuristic (trial and error) reasoning, using intuitive
models and emphasizing workable solutions to total problem situations. The intuitive models may
not have well-defined boundaries and are frequently not internally consistent. They are not
derived from logic but are based on common sense, intuition, and unquantifiable feelings, making
it difficult to determine the mechanisms at work. The heuristic analyst typically shifts thought
patterns from one aspect of the situation to another, using loose definitions and bringing various
parts of their knowledge to bear.
A5.5.2. Influence . Influence in the form of orders, advice, appeal to authority, or expertise, can
come to the decision maker from several directions and can often replace analysis in decision making.
An analyst may receive direction from a higher echelon or lateral pressure from personnel at equal
levels which will significantly affect the decision. Also, subordinates often make suggestions, recom-
mendations, and comments that also influence the decision.

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 A5.5.3. Experience and Expertise . Often the analyst will ask the experts on the staff for advice on
a given targeting problem, and their advice can supplant a significant amount of analysis. When the
decision situation resembles a previous situation, this experience often helps to replace some of the
analysis the decision situation deserves.
A5.5.4. Habit . Experience can become a habit through repetitive responses. Habit has been called
the most general and pervasive of all techniques for making decisions. The collective memories of
members of an organization are vast encyclopedias of factual knowledge, habitual skills, and operat-
ing procedures. These habits are in part provided by the organization, and in part brought in by new
personnel who learned them in educational institutions or on previous jobs. Habits become standard
operating procedures when they are accepted and internalized in the organization through formal writ-
ten, and recorded programs.

A5.6. “Target System Flow Charting” Analysis. In identifying target system components, specifying
the activities of each component, and preparing an analysis model (steps two and three of target develop-
ment), flow charting is a useful technique. An elaborate computer-based model is not always needed. A
simplified model is often adequate. For example, the simplified basic industrial model shown here (figure
A5.13.) shows how the basic industrial model may be applied to a nation’s petroleum industry (figure
A5.14.).

Figure A5.13. Figure A5.13. The Basic Industrial Model.

A5.6.1. The generalized component of the petroleum industry models are identified by the Functional
Classification Coding System which identified nine broad groups of targets and their subgroups. Spe-

172
 cific installations can then be identified and manipulated using computers. Flow charting is extremely
useful in finding where a system and its components are vulnerable. A flow chart may be used to rep-
resent components and their relationships at very general levels, or at a single installation. Imagery
interpretation manuals are an excellent source of information for flow charting. Another form of flow
charting which is useful for time-sensitive targeting is critical time analysis.

Figure A5.14. The Petroleum Industrial Model. The interconnecting lines represent transport or
storage in this simplified representation of the petroleum industry.

A5.7. Critical Time Analysis. Critical time parameters are time-sensitive tasks that an enemy must
complete effectively and efficiently to achieve its objectives. This analytical method is used to identify
those time parameters and the task objectives, and to support target selection. For example, analysis
might show that the critical time for an infantry unit is the 18-hour period immediately prior to launching
an attack. The enemy’s command and control system during that time may include vulnerable communi-
cations links between commanders and their units. These communications channels contain directives
and information that must be processed in the critical time. The pattern of signals could also indicate a
unit’s state of readiness for an attack. By targeting these communications channels for destruction or dis-
ruption during the critical time, command and control could be degraded, thereby reducing the enemy’s
effectiveness.

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 Attachment 6

NONNUCLEAR AND NUCLEAR DAMAGE MECHANISMS

A6.1. Nonnuclear Damage Mechanisms. Knowing the damage each type of weapon can produce is as
important as knowing the damage to which targets are susceptible. The nature of the damage a weapon
can produce (its damage mechanism) must be correlated to specific target vulnerabilities, or the result
may be nothing more than noise, flashes of fire, or holes in the ground. A modern conventional munition
is generally composed of a fuze, an explosive filler, and an aerodynamically shaped casing or body, which
is strong enough to contain the components during delivery.
A6.1.1. Damage mechanisms are optimized by appropriate fuzing and delivery systems. Some
mechanisms are so specialized that they are useless against certain types of targets. For example,
despite all of its reassuring dust, blast alone does less damage to many targets than military purposes
require. Fragmentation, penetration, and fire also have limitations that can reduce weapon effective-
ness when improperly applied. Proper weapon selection must reflect damage mechanism capabilities
and limitations for each weapon in the munitions delivery.
A6.1.2. Four basic damage mechanisms are produced by nonnuclear weapons--blast, fragmentation,
penetration, and flame or incendiary effects.
A6.1.2.1. Blast. One of the most familiar damage mechanisms is blast, which is the result of two
factors acting on structures. The first, peak pressure, is a measure of the maximum force exerted
against an object by a blast wave and equals the amount of pressure exerted multiplied by the area
over which it acts. To cause damage, blast must be large enough to overcome the structural
strength of an object and deform it. The second factor is the duration of the pressure. The force
must act long enough to overcome inertia and deform the object sufficiently to cause the required
damage. Impulse is a measure of the combined pressure and duration of the blast. Thus, the peak
pressure must exceed a minimum value, and the duration of the pressure must be of sufficient
length to cause damage by blast.
The minimum values of peak pressure and impulse depend upon the structure type of the target.
For example, to collapse a 15-inch thick brick wall generally requires a peak pressure of 3 to 4
pounds per square inch for at least 100 to 120 milliseconds. The pressure required is low because
a brick wall is structurally weak under the action of a lateral force. On the other hand, the impulse
(time) required is relatively high because of the considerable inertia of a brick wall.
Factors such as the structural strength of an object, its resilience (ability to deform and return to its
original state), its size, and its orientation with respect to bomb detonation all influence blast
effects on a structure. Blast must be concentrated and accurately positioned against vital elements
to produce significant damage.
A6.1.3. Fragmentation. When a charge of high explosive detonates inside a closed metal container,
such as a bomb, the container usually breaks into fragments. These fragments are hurled outwards at
high velocities and become projectiles that can, depending on their size, velocity, and distribution,
greatly damage nearby objects. Combining fragmentation with blast improves effectiveness against
most targets.
A6.1.3.1. Obviously, when fragments of jagged steel penetrate an object at an extremely high
velocity, they can cause damage that shock waves from an open air blast could not. There are,

174
 however, limits to their effectiveness. Most of the fragments spread out in a side spray. The
amount of damage from fragmentation depends on the orientation of a munition, as well as its dis-
tance from the target when it detonates. The ground burst of a bomb that strikes almost parallel to
the surface may cause only a small part of the damage the munition is capable of because many of
the fragments impact directly into the ground or are dispersed into the open air.
A6.1.3.2. Lethality depends greatly on how fast the fragments strike the target. At the instant a
munition bursts, their speed may be seven times the speed of sound, but they slow as they travel
through the air. Small fragments may slow to subsonic speeds in less than a hundred feet; larger
ones travel twice as far before becoming subsonic. Generally, fragments are considered damaging
only when they are traveling faster than the speed of sound.
A6.1.3.3. The size and shape of fragments can be controlled by changing such factors as the type
of explosive and the charge-to-weight ratio of the munition. Mechanical control of fragment num-
bers, size, and shape can be achieved by grooving or notching the munitions case or by using other
methods of predetermining case breakup.
A6.1.4. Penetration. Some targets may be damaged or destroyed by penetration. The ability of a
projectile to destroy a target depends chiefly on the relationship between missile velocity and the
amount of protection possessed by the target. Competition between protection strength and missile
power is as old as warfare.
A6.1.4.1. One of the most effective penetrators is the shaped charge, which typically has a deep,
cone-shaped, metal-lined cavity in the nose of its main explosive charge. When it explodes, the
detonating wave is reinforced as it passes from rear to front in the charge. This detonating wave
transforms the cone into a molten jet, traveling at nearly 20 times the speed of sound. The high
velocity and intense pressure of this jet are so effective that a shaped charge 3 inches in diameter
will penetrate 10 to 12 inches of steel.
A6.1.4.2. A second method of overcoming hard targets is through use of a kinetic energy penetra-
tor. Some kinetic energy projectiles make use of an armor piercing cap on the nose, in order to
increase the velocity at which the projectile shatters, by decreasing initial impact stress due to
inertia. Sometimes the core of a projectile is placed inside a carrier or jacket of low density mate-
rial such as aluminum. The core is that part of the complete projectile which is intended to perfo-
rate the armor. The jacket may be discarded in flight, in which case it is called a “sabot”, or the
jacket may remain with the projectile until impact, termed “composite rigid type.”
A6.1.5. Flame and Incendiary Effects. Firebombs can be highly effective in close air support.
Their short, well defined range of effects can interrupt enemy operations without endangering friendly
forces. They are also effective against supplies stored in light wooden structures or wooden contain-
ers.
A6.1.5.1. Flame and incendiary weapons, however, are often misleading as to the actual physical
damage they inflict. Even a relatively small firebomb can provide a spectacular display but often
does less damage than might be expected. When a large firebomb splashes a burning gel over an
area the size of a football field, it may boil flames a hundred feet into the air. This effect is impres-
sive to the untrained observer, and experienced troops have broken off attacks and fled when
exposed to napalm attack. However, soldiers can be trained against this tendency to panic. They
can be taught to take cover, put out the fires, and even to brush burning material off their own
clothing.

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 A6.1.5.2. Near misses with firebombs seldom cause damage to vehicles, and the number of troops
actually incapacitated by the attacks is usually rather small. Incendiaries of the type that started
great fires in Japanese and German cities in World War II projected nonmetallic fragments. They
had little penetrating capability. Today’s newer munitions have full fragmentation and penetrating
capabilities, as well as incendiary devices. However, both types can penetrate and start fires and
are highly effective against fuel storage tanks or stacked drums of flammable material of any sort.

A6.2. Nuclear Damage Mechanisms. As with conventional high explosives, a nuclear explosion results
from the very rapid release of a large amount of energy within a limited space. High explosive detonation
results from chemical reactions, a rearrangement of the atoms present in the explosive. The energy is pri-
marily manifested as blast energy. A nuclear explosion results from a fission process, a fusion process, or
a combination of the two. Detonation involves the creation and destruction of atomic nuclei with the
release of large quantities of energy in each action. The forces between the protons and neutrons within
the atomic nuclei are tremendously greater than those between atoms. Consequently, nuclear energy is of
a much higher order of magnitude than conventional (or chemical) energy when equal masses are consid-
ered. Because of the much greater amount of energy being released and because of nuclear particles in the
detonation being released, there are more and different effects to be considered when dealing with nuclear
weapons.
A6.2.1. Types of Bursts. The immediate phenomena associated with a nuclear explosion vary with
the spatial location of the burst in relation to the target. The main types of bursts are subsurface, sur-
face, air, high altitude, and exo-atmospheric.
A6.2.1.1. In a subsurface burst, the center of the explosion occurs beneath the surface of the
ground or water.
A6.2.1.2. A surface burst is one that occurs either at the actual surface of the land or water or at
any height that permits the fireball, at maximum brilliance, to touch the land or water.
A6.2.1.3. In an airburst, the weapon is exploded at such a height above the surface that the fireball
does not touch the earth.
A6.2.1.4. A high altitude burst takes place between 100,000 and 400,000 feet.
A6.2.1.5. An exo-atmospheric burst occurs above 400,000 feet.
A6.2.2. Damage Mechanisms. The four basic nuclear weapon damage mechanisms include blast,
thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and electromagnetic phenomena.
A6.2.2.1. Blast. Most of the physical damage in a nuclear explosion results from the blast.
Although the phenomena and sequence of events in the blast wave are similar to those from a con-
ventional weapon the greater energy of the nuclear explosion exaggerates the blast effects accord-
ingly.
A6.2.2.1.1. The destructive effects of a blast wave are produced both by overpressure (crush-
ing effect) and dynamic pressure (drag effect). Both effects are expressed in pounds per
square inch (PSI). Overpressure, p, is the amount by which the static pressure of the blast
wave exceeds normal pressure. Dynamic pressure, q, is associated with the mass motion of air
in the blast wave. It is like a strong wind striking a stationary object.
A6.2.2.1.2. An example of a target susceptible to overpressure is a large POL drum. The
increased air pressure causes it to collapse. A telephone pole is an example of a target suscep-

176
 tible to dynamic pressure damage. Overpressure would not necessarily hurt it, but dynamic
pressure on the order of one PSI would be enough to snap it off.
A6.2.2.1.3. Impulse is one of the primary measures of blast effects in nuclear weapons, as in
conventional weapons. Impulse is a measure of the average pressure and the time during
which the pressure acts. Damage inflicted on a target by a blast wave is generally a complex
function of peak overpressure, peak dynamic pressure, pulse duration, and target structural
response characteristics.
A6.2.2.1.4. Nuclear detonations must occur within the earth’s atmosphere for any significant
blast damage to result because as the altitude of the detonation increases, the blast effects
decrease.
A6.2.2.1.5. Mach Stem. When a blast wave strikes a denser medium such as the earth’s sur-
face, it is reflected. The reflected wave near the surface travels through a region that is heated
and made denser than the ambient atmosphere, by the initial or incident shock front as it
passes. Since shock front velocity is greater in heated air, a portion of the reflected shock can,
under appropriate conditions, overtake and merge with the incident shock front (initial shock).
This forms a single shock front called the Mach stem, which produces higher peak overpres-
sures and lower dynamic pressures at or near the surface.
A6.2.2.1.5.1. A target above the top of the Mach stem receives two shocks, corresponding
to the arrival of both incident and reflected waves. A target at or below the top of the Mach
stem receives a single shock.
A6.2.2.1.5.2. The reflection process transforms part of the incident dynamic pressure into
overpressure. A target below the top of the Mach stem is subjected to a higher over-pres-
sure impulse and a lower dynamic pressure impulse than a target above the top of the Mach
stem.
A6.2.2.1.6. Blast wave form and impulses can be affected by a number of conditions, includ-
ing height of burst and a variety of environmental conditions. Surface conditions, topographic
conditions, atmospheric moisture, formation of a precursor (a fast moving thermal layer which
moves ahead of the shock wave and disturbs the wave form), and atmospheric pressure must
be considered in estimating blast effects.
A6.2.2.1.7. In surface or subsurface bursts, part of the blast will be transmitted into the earth
or water. The effects (cratering, shock, etc.) are essentially the same, except in magnitude, as
those for nonnuclear weapons, and are therefore not discussed further in this section.
A6.2.2.2. Thermal Radiation. Within a few seconds after the explosion, a typical low altitude
nuclear fireball emits about one-third of the weapon yield as infrared, visible, and ultraviolet radi-
ation. This sudden pulse of thermal energy may damage any target that is susceptible to high tem-
peratures. The damage may take many forms, but the most frequent is from fires that start when
combustible materials ignite, and injuries to personnel, in the form of burns. Generally, the most
serious thermal effects are termed “prompt thermal pulse.” Clouds and dust will reduce the trans-
mission of thermal energy, and very little thermal energy is radiated from subsurface bursts. Rar-
efied air at high altitudes will increase thermal effects from 100,000 feet up to about 140,000 feet;
above that the thermal efficiency drops again.

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 A6.2.2.2.1. X-rays. X-ray energy is radiation from an extremely high temperature source, at
frequencies from about 10l6 HZ to about 1020 HZ. The rays overlap ultraviolet radiation at
the low end of the frequency spectrum and gamma rays at the higher end. X-rays are essen-
tially bursts of energy produced when fast moving free electrons are decelerated through colli-
sion, or when electrons in an atom change from one energy level to a lower one. The x-rays
exhibit particle-like qualities (for example, in collisions with a particle) and wave-like proper-
ties (for example, like visible light waves).
The main effects of x-rays are in their impact upon matter. When x-ray energy strikes an
object, it heats rapidly, sending shock waves through the structure and often melting or vapor-
izing solid material. This shock wave can also damage or weaken the structure by spallation,
debonding, or fracturing.
X-rays are rapidly attenuated in nuclear detonations near the surface. In high altitude bursts,
the x-rays can travel long distances before they are degraded or absorbed. This makes x-rays
the major nuclear effect for high altitude bursts.
A6.2.2.3. Nuclear Radiation Phenomena. One special feature of a nuclear explosion is the
emission of gamma rays, neutrons, beta particles, and a small portion of alpha particles.
A6.2.2.3.1. There are essentially three effects of radiation that concern the target analyst: ini-
tial radiation (that which occurs within one minute); residual radiation consisting of neutron
induced activity in the earth below an air burst; and residual activity consisting of fallout
(radioactive residues deposited after a surface burst).
A6.2.2.3.2. The primary effect of these phenomena is on personnel, with penetrating radiation
(gamma rays and neutrons) being the most dangerous. Under certain conditions, residual
nuclear radiation, from fallout or neutron-induced gamma activity, can deny entry to a bombed
area for some period of time after a detonation. Direct nuclear radiation effects on materials
and equipment are less significant, except for sensitive detector materials and certain elec-
tronic components.
A6.2.2.4. Electromagnetic Phenomena. Because of the importance of this effect, it is consid-
ered separately. The two principal phenomena caused by a nuclear detonation affecting electro-
magnetic propagation (for example, the ability to transmit or receive radio, radar, and optical
waveforms) are electromagnetic emissions and atmospheric ionization.
A6.2.2.4.1. The first category consists of EMP, thermal radiation, and emissions from chemi-
cal reactions in the atmosphere. These radiations and emissions produce noise throughout the
radio and optical spectra.
A6.2.2.4.1.1. Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE). A special area of
interest to the target analyst is the environment created around electronics packages (radio,
radar, computers, etc.) by initial nuclear radiation. Weapon burst radiation of interest
includes neutrons, gamma rays, x-rays, and, to a much lesser extent, electrons.
A6.2.2.4.1.1.1. Most electronics, especially solid state electronics, are much more
sensitive to radiation than other equipment and components such as hydraulic systems,
fuel systems, etc. The response of electronics to radiation from a nuclear blast depends
not only on the radiation present but on the operating state of the electronics at the time
of exposure and on the electronics in the system.

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 A6.2.2.4.1.1.2. The weapon’s radiation environment lasts for a short time. However,
its effect on electronics can be either short or long term. For example, it may cause a
transfer of charges between materials, a change in current flow, a change in material
properties (both chemical and optical properties), a change to component performance,
or damage due to heating from radiation.
A6.2.2.4.1.2. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) . Whereas TREE refers to the direct effect
of nuclear radiation on electronic equipment, EMP refers to its indirect effect. EMP sig-
nals are produced when energetic gamma radiation from a nuclear detonation is scattered
in radial beams. The effect of EMP comes from the electromagnetic field that is created
and propagated through waveforms in the radio and microwave frequency bands. The
electrons that are separated from atoms in the air by gamma rays lose energy to surround-
ing air molecules. The energy lost in these collisions is used to free additional electrons
which create further ionization. The net result is a flow of negatively charged electrons
moving radially outward from the explosion. This results in an electromagnetic field being
radiated from the source. EMP contains only a very small part of the energy produced by
a nuclear explosion. However, under certain circumstances EMP can severely disrupt, and
sometimes damage, electronic and electrical systems at distances where all other effects
are absent. In fact, a detonation above 130,000 feet can produce EMP effects over thou-
sands of square miles on the ground.
A6.2.2.4.2. The second phenomenon, atmospheric ionization, involves alteration of the elec-
trical properties of the atmosphere. Electromagnetic waves propagating through the ionized
atmosphere can incur amplitude and phase changes. For detonations below about 50,000 feet,
the principal phenomenon affecting electromagnetic propagation is the fireball. While rela-
tively small, it can be intensely ionized for a few tens of seconds. For detonations above
15,000 ft, the fireball can remain intensely ionized for thousands of seconds. A significant
fraction of the primary products of the weapon can escape to great distances, and the attendant
ionization in the atmosphere can persist for a time ranging from minutes to hours.

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 Attachment 7

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

A7.1. Introduction. According to DIA’s BDA Quick Guide (PC-8060-1-96, Feb 96), collateral damage
is assessed and reported during the BDA process. Broadly defined, collateral damage is unintentional
damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel occurring as a result of military
actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities. Such damage can occur to friendly, neutral,
and even enemy forces. During Linebacker operations over North Vietnam, for example, some incidental
damage occurred from bombs falling outside target areas. Consequently, there was an effort to minimize
such collateral damage to civilian facilities in populated regions. Determining collateral damage con-
straints is a command responsibility. If national command or theater authorities do not predetermine con-
straint levels for collateral damage, a corps or higher commander will normally be responsible for doing
so.
A7.1.1. When a commander is planning strikes near his own forces, there is always some element of
risk. Usually, conservative calculations will be prepared (except under emergency conditions) and
will lead to minimal risks to friendly forces. Planning may also lead to maximizing collateral damage
to enemy facilities near struck targets.

A7.2. Risk. A planner may accept different levels of risk when weapons are to be used near friendly
forces. Risk levels are: negligible, moderate, or high (emergency).
A7.2.1. At a negligible risk distance, troops are fairly safe. Such a risk would be considered if
nuclear weapons were to be used near friendly troops. Any greater risk would be accepted only when
significant advantages could be gained.
A7.2.2. At a moderate risk distance, anticipated damage levels are tolerable, or at worst a minor nui-
sance. Moderate risk might be considered acceptable in close air support operations.
A7.2.3. At an emergency risk distance, some injuries and fatalities may occur. An emergency risk
should be accepted only when absolutely necessary and be exceeded only in extremely rare situations.

A7.3. Safe Distances for Friendly Troops (Conventional Weapons). When computing nonnuclear
damage to enemy forces, the effectiveness index lethal area is used. Lethal area is sometimes incorrectly
assumed to be a circle, and attempts are made to determine the resulting lethal radius. This cannot be
done because the lethal area is not a physical area but instead an integrated probability over the area of
effectiveness.
A7.3.1. Some agencies have been provided safe distances using damage criteria developed for deter-
mining effectiveness against enemy soldiers, such as the 5-minute casualty criterion. These distances
are much larger than the lethal radii discussed above but are still not considered suitable for the safety
of friendly troops. For friendly troops, a much more stringent criterion for safety has been estab-
lished. Effectiveness indices (EI) have been established to provide numerical values to establish the
relationship between the target, weapon, and operational factors that influence the weapon’s effective-
ness. The effective target dimensions (length X width) cannot be used to determine a minimum safe
distance from the impact point. Refer to the separate JMEM document Risk Estimates for Friendly
Troops, 61A1-3-9. This document contains information pertaining to safe distances and provides esti-
mates as to the percentage of casualties that could be expected to friendly troops by the delivery of

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 munitions from friendly aircraft in close air support of those troops. Information is also provided per-
taining to the minimum safe distance from bursting munitions that would ensure safety for personnel
involved in training exercises, firepower demonstrations, testing and storage of munitions, etc.

A7.4. Safe Distances for Friendly Troops (Nuclear Weapons). Conventional weapons have relatively
small effective radii against personnel, but their use in close support of tactical operations still involves
some risk to friendly forces. Nuclear weapons increase this risk considerably because of their larger
effective radii. Therefore, in the analysis of a potential nuclear target close to friendly troops or to a
friendly civilian population, safety risk must be carefully evaluated. The following discussion of troop
safety criteria is summarized in table A7.1.

Table A7.1. Troop Safety Criteria for Radius of Safety.

VULNERABILITY CON- CRITERIA
DITIONAND DEGREE OF
RISK
Unwarned, exposed
Negligible Two-thirds of the thermal input (cal/cm2) required to produce first
degree burns on bare skin, or 5 rads nuclear radiation.
Moderate The thermal input (cal/cm2)) required to produce first degree
burns on bare skin, or 20 rads.
Emergency Two-thirds of the thermal input (cal/cm2) required to produce sec-
ond degree burns on bare skin, or 100 rads.
Warned, exposed
Negligible Two-thirds of the thermal input (cal/cm2) required to scorch sum-
mer khaki uniforms, or 5 rads.
Moderate The thermal input (cal/cm2) required to produce first degree burns
under summer khaki uniforms, or 20 rads.
Warned, protected
Negligible 5 rads inside medium tanks, or 3 psi over pressure.
Moderate 20 rads inside medium tanks, or 5 psi overpressure.
Emergency 100 rads inside medium tanks, or 10 psi overpressure.
A7.4.1. When nuclear weapons are considered for employment against close-in targets, troop safety
considerations may determine whether or not nuclear weapons will be used. If they are used, troop
safety may influence the selection of yield, delivery means, location of the desired ground zero
(DGZ), height of burst (HOB), and time of burst, as well as the ground commander’s scheme of
maneuver. Because of delivery errors and prevailing weather and terrain conditions, calculating the
risk to friendly troops involves the use of probabilities and good judgment. It would be desirable to
have a 100 percent assurance that no friendly casualties would result from our use of nuclear weapons,
but as long as the possibility of delivery error exists, such an assurance is unlikely. As a rule, the com-
mander will want a very high assurance (0.99 probability) that his troops will not be exposed to
weapon effects higher than those considered acceptable.

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 A7.4.2. When nuclear weapons are employed at a considerable distance from friendly troops, safety
is a matter of concern from the following viewpoints:
A7.4.2.1. Areas of fallout contamination from surface bursts may preclude or interfere with
friendly force use of, or passage through, these areas.
A7.4.2.2. A reasonable margin of safety must be provided for military and civilian populations of
friendly and neutral countries in accordance with the area commander’s weapons restraint policy.
A7.4.2.3. Temporary dazzle during daylight conditions, loss of night visual adaptation, or retinal
burns may handicap friendly forces if they are not warned to protect their eyes at the time of deto-
nation.
A7.4.3. In addition to degrees of risk, one of the following three conditions of personnel vulnerability
can be expected at the time of burst: unwarned, exposed; warned, exposed; or warned, protected.
A7.4.3.1. Unwarned, exposed troops are assumed to be standing in the open at burst time but to
have dropped to a prone position by the time the blast wave arrives. They are expected to have
areas of bare skin exposed to direct thermal radiation, and some personnel may suffer temporary
dazzle. For example, this condition can be expected in an offensive situation where the majority
of the attacking infantry are in the open and cannot be warned of the burst.
A7.4.3.2. Warned, exposed troops are assumed to be prone on open ground, with all skin areas
covered, and with overall thermal protection equal to that provided by a two-layer summer uni-
form. For example, such a condition is expected to prevail when a nuclear weapon is detonated
over a target at a prearranged time during an attack when troops are expecting the burst but do not
have time to prepare foxholes.
A7.4.3.3. Warned, protected troops are assumed to be “buttoned up” in tanks or crouching in
foxholes with improvised overhead thermal shielding. For example, such a condition is expected
to prevail when nuclear weapons are used in support of an attack by our armored forces.
A7.4.4. The predicted ranges for thermal radiation and initial nuclear radiation are provided in the
DIA manual, Physical Vulnerability Handbook--Nuclear Weapons, AP-550-1-2-INT.
A7.4.5. Troop safety distance calculations are usually based on a high assurance of not exceeding a
certain criterion for safety. Aircraft and guided missile-delivered weapons require a horizontal buffer
distance (d ) of 2 CEP for a very, very high safety assurance (0.99~ for a straight line troop disposi-
tion; 2.3 CEP for a very high assurance (0.95) for either a half-circular or a circular troop disposition.
A7.4.6. A weapon set to burst at a fallout-safe height of burst has a 0.50 probability of being below
the “selected” burst height on detonation. Therefore, to achieve an assurance of no fallout (of military
significance), a vertical buffer distance must be added to the HOB. These distances can be obtained
from figures in the Physical Vulnerability Handbook--Nuclear Weapons, AP-550-1-2-INT.
A7.4.7. For a very high assurance that friendly troops will not be exposed to any weapons effects
greater than those considered acceptable, add 2 CEP to the radius of safety (RS) to obtain the mini-
mum safe distance (MSD), and add 3.5 Probable Error in Height (peh) to the fallout-safe height of
burst (HOBfS).

A7.5. Macro Models for Computing Collateral Damage . Standard models are available in conven-
tional and nuclear weaponeering manuals for use in determining expected collateral damage involving

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one or a few sorties and one or a few target elements. The planner can use these models as they stand,
based on “average” estimates, or can apply conservative factors as outlined earlier in the sections on safe
distances. For detailed target analysis collateral damage avoidance tables for each weapon system and
yield can be obtained in FM 101-31-2/AFP 200-31, Volume II, Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects
Data.
A7.5.1. These data can be aggregated into larger models providing insight into large scale situations
involving thousands of targets and weapons. One such model is TANDEM (Tactical Nuclear Damage
Evaluation Model), developed by the RAND Corporation. This program takes target data such as
location and the probability of damage to targets and population centers, vulnerability numbers, inter-
relation maps, weapon assignments (yield, height of burst, CEP, etc.) and other factors as inputs.
TANDEM is analyzed, and outputs may indicate target damage, collateral damage, and bonus dam-
age.
A7.5.2. A number of other programs are available or can be modified to compute large scale collat-
eral damage. Nonnuclear weaponeering programs provided by the JMEM for programmable calcula-
tors provide an “offset” capability to determine collateral damage. In these programs, the range offset
and the deflection offset can be used to represent distances from aimpoint for facilities that may be
subjected to collateral damage. These programs can be modified to provide numerous computations.

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 Attachment 8

GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND PRODUCTS

A8.1. Geospatial Information. Any information that has associated with it some geographical and tem-
poral reference (includes what is referred to as Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy; Imagery; and Imagery
Intelligence). Data defining characteristics, properties, and location of physical and cultural phenomenon
associated with the earth’s natural and man-made environment (information generally found on maps and
charts, spatially controlled imagery).
A8.1.1. Global Geospatial Information & Services (GGI&S). Worldwide, accurate, current, spa-
tially co-referenced, attributed feature information about the earth arranged in a coherent structure to
support measurement, mapping, monitoring, modeling, terrain elevation, and spatial reasoning appli-
cations.
A8.1.2. GGI&S Community. Refers to the combined efforts of any and all U.S. organizations deal-
ing with the planning, collection, production, dissemination, ordering, or exploitation of GGI&S for
the purposes of supporting the JCS, Unified Commands, Services, and agencies.

A8.2. Aeronautical Products. A specialized representation of mapped features of the Earth, or some
part of it, produced to show selected terrain, cultural, and hydrographic features, and supplemental infor-
mation required for air navigation, pilotage, or for planning air operations.
A8.2.1. Global Navigation and Planning Chart (GNC). Worldwide small-scale (1:5,000,000)
aeronautical chart series. Used for high-altitude, high-speed, extended long-range navigation and
flight planning.
A8.2.2. Jet Navigation Chart (JNC). A worldwide small-scale(1:2,000,000) aeronautical chart
series. Used for high-altitude, high-speed, long-range navigation and planning and as a source for
navigational filmstrips.
A8.2.3. Operational Navigation Chart (ONC). The ONC is the standard worldwide small-scale
(1:1,000,000) aeronautical chart series, and contains cartographic data with an aeronautical overprint
depicting obstructions, aerodromes, special use airspace, navigational aides, Maximum Elevation Fig-
ures (MEFs), and related data. Because of scale, some features, including obstructions, are general-
ized in developed regions. A Military Grid is overprinted for interoperability, especially in regions of
no TPC coverage. Designed for medium altitude high-speed visual and radar navigation. Also used
for mission planning/analysis and intelligence briefings, and as source for navigational filmstrips, spe-
cial purpose, and cockpit/visual display products.
A8.2.4. Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC). The TPC is the standard worldwide medium-scale aeronau-
tical chart series (1:500,000). TPCs provide essential cartographic data appropriate to scale, and are
overprinted with stable aeronautical information such as obstructions, aerodromes, special use air-
space, navigational aids, MEFs, and related data. Cartographic data with aeronautical overprint
depicting obstructions, aerodromes, special use airspace, navigational aids and related data. Because
of scale, some features, including obstructions, are generalized in developed regions. A Military Grid
is overprinted for interoperability. Designed for very low-altitude through medium-altitude
high-speed visual and radar navigation. TPCs are also used for mission planning/analysis and intelli-

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 gence briefings, and are source for navigational filmstrips, special purpose, and cockpit/visual display
products.
A8.2.5. Joint Operations Graphic-Air (JOG-A) Chart. The standard DoD medium scale chart,
1:250,000 scale. The JOG-A is a standard series modified for aeronautical use. The JOG-A displays
topographic data such as: relief, drainage, vegetation, populated places, cultural features, coastal
hydrography, aeronautical overprint depicting obstructions, aerodromes, special use airspace, naviga-
tional aids and related data. The JOG-A supports tactical and other air activities including low alti-
tude visual navigation.
A8.2.6. Chart Updating Manual (CHUM). A semi-annual publication containing a complete list of
published aeronautical charts and a list of known corrections, if any, to each chart. A CHUM supple-
ment is published monthly during the five months between issues of the complete CHUM and con-
tains a cumulative listing of additional corrections since the previous CHUM was published. The
CHUM is used to manual amendment of selected aeronautical charts with update or corrected infor-
mation pertaining to safety of navigation. The contents of the CHUM include chart series, chart
name, edition number, aeronautical information, current date and corrections for the available charts
in a given series. The CHUM lists only the known chart discrepancies that meet the CHUM criteria
and which are received on or before the published cut-off date. The chart corrections found in the
CHUM are retained in the CHUM or CHUM Supplements until the chart in question is obsolete or
replaced by a new edition.
A8.2.7. Electronic CHUM (ECHUM). ECHUM will contain the same information as the CHUM
but the information is accessible by dial-up capability/electronically accessible.
A8.2.8. Flight Information Publications (FLIP). Provides aeronautical information required by
aircrews in flight and is designed for worldwide use in conjunction with the Enroute Supplements. A
series of textual and graphic products aligned to the three phases of Flight Planning (Planning Docu-
ment), Enroute, (Flight Information Handbook, Enroute Supplement, Enroute Charts, Terminal Area
Charts, Area Arrival Chart Depicting Terrain Data), and Terminal (Terminal Instrument Approach
Procedures, Standard Instrument Departure Procedures). These products are geographically grouped
into seven regions. They are published in 28-day cycles to coincide with internationally established
effective dates. Designed primarily for use in instrument flight conditions and for planning. Product
is critical to the safety of flight.

A8.3. Topographic Products.

A8.3.1. City Graphic. Large-scale lithographic map of populated places and environs portraying
streets and through-route information. Features include important buildings, airfields, military instal-
lations, industrial complexes, embassies, government buildings, hospitals, schools, utilities, and
places of worship. Militarily significant relief is shown. A guide to numbered buildings and an index
to street names are provided in the margin. Used to support administrative and tactical planning and
operations in urban areas.
A8.3.2. Joint Operations Graphic - Ground (JOG-G). The standard DoD 1:250,000 scale
medium scale map. This series is produced by several nations using the same product specification.
The JOG-G displays topographic data such as: relief, drainage, vegetation, populated places, cultural
features and coastal hydrography. The JOG-G supports ground forces employed in joint air/ground
operations and is used primarily for tactical and logistical planning and search and rescue.

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 A8.3.3. Topographic Line Map (TLM). A lithographic map that portrays topographic and cultural
features (1:100,000 and 1:50,000). Feature portrayal includes relief, drainage, vegetation, populated
places, cultural features, roads and railroads. The map is a true representation of terrain detail. Prima-
rily used by land and air forces in support of ground operations for planning, tactical operations, ter-
rain study, and target acquisition.

A8.4. Digital Products.

Composite Data Geographic object composed of a raster product format frame (RPF) with
vector product format (VPF) features located within the boundaries and
text product format paragraphs whose indexes fall within the boundaries.
Raster Data A representation of Geospatial data characterized by a matrix of evenly
spaced rows and columns of data points. These data points (Pixels) typi-
cally represent some value at that point, while the position within the col-
umns and rows determines the geographic position. Raster data structures
are typically used to record scanned maps and charts, image data, or grided
data.
Vector Data Data which represents each cartographic feature by an entity description
(feature code) and a spatial extent (geographic position). Geographic posi-
tion may be two-dimensional (horizontal position only) or three-dimen-
sional (including elevation). Features are categorized as point, line, or area
features. The position of a point feature is described by a string of coordi-
nated of points lying along the line, while the extent of an area feature is
described by treating its boundary as a line feature. Vector data may be
stored in a sequential, a chain node, or a topological data structure.
A8.4.1. ARC Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG). ADRG is a standard NIMA digital product
designed to support applications that require a raster map background display. Paper maps and charts
are converted into digital format by raster scanning and transforming the data into the Equal Arc-Sec-
ond Raster Chart/Map (ARC system frame of reference). Data collected from a single map/chart
series and scale are maintained as a worldwide seamless data base of raster graphic data, with each
pixel having a distinct geographic location. NIMA has produced more than 4,500 CD-ROM titles
with worldwide coverage of GNC, JNC, ONC, and TPC products. Extensive coverage of JOGs is pro-
vided, and some coverage is provided of TLM 100s and TLM 50s, for high-interest areas.
A8.4.2. ARC Digital Raster Imagery (ADRI). ADRI is digital imagery produced to support vari-
ous Air Force weapons and mission support systems. ADRI is currently produced from panchromatic
SPOT commercial imagery which is orthorectified using NIMA DTED or other elevation data to
remove terrain displacement and other distortions which may be present within the original source
imagery. ADRI can be used as a digital map substitute, as a background display for command and
control systems, as controlled imagery for draping during terrain visualization, and as a metric foun-
dation for anchoring other spatial data in geographic information systems or to anchor more current
imagery for interpretation. A joint requirement has been recognize, and is being documented, for
abroad-area CIB.

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A8.4.3. Compressed ARC Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG). A Joint Services’ standard map
background product. CADRG will be produced in multiple scales in support of systems with map
background display, coordinates selection, and perspective view generation capabilities. CADRG is a
compressed version of ADRG (nominal compression of 55:1 over ADRG). CADRG is RPF and
NITF compliant.
A8.4.4. Controlled Image Base (CIB). CIB is unclassified digital imagery, produced to support
mission planning and command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. CIB will be used
as a map substitute for emergencies and crises in the event that maps do not exist or are outdated. CIB
is panchromatic digital imagery and is produced from SPOT commercial imagery that has been
orthonormalized using NIMA DTED. CIB is RPF and NITF compliant.
A8.4.5. Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD). DFAD is a standard NIMA product that supports
radar return simulation, navigation and terrain obstruction studies. When combined with DTED,
DFAD provides an off-line data base for use by weapon system flight simulators and other types of
simulation, such as line of sight, obstruction, and perspective view development. It portrays major
natural and man-made features on the Earth’s surface; the features and associated attributes of which
are generally of radar reflectance significance. Content is derived from both cartographic and photo-
grammetric source material.
A8.4.6. Digital Chart of the World. A comprehensive 1:1,000,000 scale vector base map of the
world. It consist of cartographic, attribute and textual data stored on CD-ROM. The primary source
for the data base is the NIMA’s ONC series. This is the largest scale unclassified map series in exist-
ence that provides consistent, continuous global coverage of essential base map features. The data
base contains more than 1,500 megabytes of vector data and is organized into 17 thematic layers. The
data includes major road and rail networks, major hydrologic drainage systems, major utility net-
works, all major airports, elevation contours, coastlines international boundaries and populated
places. The DCW also has an index of geographic names to aid in locating areas of interest.
A8.4.7. Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB). A new digital product produced by NIMA,
replacing the hard copy Point Positioning Data Base product. The DPPDB provides the warfighter
with a deployable data base, in a computer workstation environment from which latitude, longitude,
and elevation can be quickly and accurately derived on digital image exploitation systems.
A8.4.8. Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED). DTED was originally developed in the 1970s to
support aircraft radar simulation and prediction. DTED supports many applications, including
line-of-sight analyses, terrain profiling, 3-D terrain visualization, mission planning/rehearsal, and
modeling and simulation. DTED is a standard NIMA product that provides medium resolution, quan-
titative data in a digital format for military system applications that require terrain elevation. DTED
Level 1 has a post spacing of 3 seconds or 100 meters. DTED Level 2 has a post spacing of 1 second
or 30 meters.
A8.4.9. Vector Smart Map (VMAP). A collection of data bases that provide vector-based geo-spa-
tial data at low, medium, or high resolution. These data are separated into nine thematic layers and are
topologically structured. This product is designed to support geographical information system analy-
sis and can be used for various situation/map background displays. VMAP Level 0 contains the
low-resolution feature and attribute content of ONC. VMAP Level 1 will contain the feature and
attribute content similar to JOG scale. VMAP level 2 will have the feature and attribute content sim-
ilar to TLM scale. VMAP is VPF and NITF compliant.

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A8.5. Documents. The NIMA Catalogs contain the stock numbers needed to order products.
A8.5.1. Part 1 Aerospace Products, Volume I, Aeronautical Charts, Flight Infor mation Publi-
cations and Related Products (CATP1V01). Provides coverage, product availability, and ordering
procedures for aeronautical navigation and planning charts, Flight Information Publication (FLIP),
Navigational Filmstrips, and related products.
A8.5.1.1. Semiannual Bulletin Digest for Aeronautical Products (CATP1UBD). Used to
update Part 1.
A8.5.2. Part 3, Topographic Products, Volume I, All Scales (CATP3V01U). This catalog identi-
fies the topographic products available from NIMA.
A8.5.2.1. Semiannual Bulletin Digest for Topographic Products (CATP3V01UBD). Used to
update Part 3.
A8.5.3. Part 3, Topographic Products, Volume II, Classified Topographic Maps and Related
Products (SECRET) (CATP3V02C). This catalog identifies the classified topographic products
available from NIMA.
A8.5.3.1. Semiannual Bulletin Digest for Classified Topographic Maps and Related P r o d -
ucts (CONFIDENTIAL) (CATP3V02CBD). Used to update Part 3, Vol II.
A8.5.4. Part 4, Target Material Products, Volume I, Air Target Materials Charts ( C O N F I -
DENTIAL) (CATP4V01). A semiannual publication listing air target materials.
A8.5.5. Part 7, Digital Data Products, Volume I, Terrain, Feature and World Vec t o r S h o r e -
line Data (CATP7V01). Provides information on the availability of DTED and DFAD.
A8.5.6. Part 7, Digital Data Products, Volume III, ARC Digitized Raster Graphics
(CATP7V03). Contains aeronautical and topographic ADRGs that are portrayed graphically and
listed by stock number.
A8.5.7. Consolidated Air Target Materials Notices/Target Materials Bulletin, Vol u m e I
(SECRET) (CATP4CATMNV1). Contains informational articles and ATM change notices in tex-
tual form. Provides an inventory of previously published and new ATM changes to Series 200 Air
Target Charts and Series 1501 Radar Joint Operations Graphics.
A8.5.8. Consolidated Air Target Materials Notices/Target Materials Bulletin, Vol u m e II
(SECRET) (CATP4CATMNV2). Contains ATM changes notices in graphic form. Provides an
inventory of previously published and new ATM changes to Series 200 Air Target Charts and Series
1501 Radar Joint Operations Graphics.
A8.5.9. NIMA Chart Updating Manual (CATP1CHUM). Produced semi-annually, contains a
complete list of published charts for each series and a list of known corrections, if any, to each chart.
A8.5.10. NIMA Chart Updating Manual Supplement (CATP1CHUMSUP). Published monthly
during the five months between issues of the complete CHUM and contain a cumulative listing of
additional corrections.
A8.5.11. NIMA Interim Catalog of Controlled Image Base (CIB) Products (CATP7V04). This
catalog contains CIB graphics along with text pages showing stock numbers.

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A8.6. Software. NIMA produces general purpose utility software to standardize the examination of
MC&G digital data.
A8.6.1. DEW_Drop DPPDB Exploitation. DEW_Drop allows the user to quickly and accurately
view DPPDB imagery and to perform point mensuration.
A8.6.2. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Utility Software Environment (MUSE). MUSE repre-
sents an effort to develop a standard suite of software to access NIMA digital data sets and work with
standard NIMA datum transformations and coordinate conversions. The MUSE objectives are to pro-
vide multiple system platform interpretability (MS-DOS, Windows, Macintosh, and UNIX), access to
standard NIMA products, NIMA standard datum transformations and coordinate conversions, and
applications demonstrating NIMA digital data synergy and exploitation. The standard NIMA spatial
(raster) products that can be accessed are ADRG, ADRI, CADRG, CIB, and DTED. The standard
NIMA VPF products that can be accessed are DCW and VMAP. MUSE applications are provided to
demonstrate raster/vector map construction and manipulation, raster/elevation draping and perspec-
tive views, and raster elevation line of sight analysis.
A8.6.3. Vector Product Format VIEW (VPFVIEW). The VPFVIEW software designed to access
any database implemented in VPF and query data contained in any VPF data base but its analytical
capability is limited to constructing views and themes. It enable you to select data for display by geo-
graphic region as well as type.

Datum A math model of the Earth’s shape used as a basic reference to cal-
culate position coordinates, heights, and distances. The datum is
the origin or point of reference.
WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984 is the official DoD positional refer-
ence system. WGS 84 is a unified earth-centered model of the
globe based on improved geometric, geodetic, and gravity infor-
mation. WGS 84 relates positions on the other datums to a single
interoperable standard.

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