Psychological Operations (PSYOPs):

A Conceptual Overview
Sunil Narula

Abstract

The psychological dimension of a conflict is as important as its physical

dimension and psychological Operations (PSYOPs) have become even more
relevant in this age of information, especially for a nation-state where the
threat in the socio-psychological domain is more pronounced. While
combating the menace of terrorism, the psychological dimension assumes
great significance, as terrorists use violence as a psychological weapon by
terrorising the multitude, rather than physically affect a few, and in this
sense, they fight a psychological war also. The relevance of psychological
operations is much greater than the successful conduct of tactical
operations. This article is an attempt to conceptualise the term PSYOPs in
the Indian context.
The changed dynamics of international relations following the end of the
Cold War and changes in the South Asian strategic landscape, post-
September 11, have made PSYOPs more relevant for the region. It is also
important to know that differences between various related concepts like
Propaganda, Information Warfare, and Perception Management are wafer-
thin, and may lead to contested perceptions amongst various agencies
working under the overall ambit of national security, if not viewed in the
current perspective.
Therefore, clarity of the concept will set the stage for an effective
implementation of policies and help in setting up of a policy structure in
India (which does exist today in loosely knit shape) for national level
coordination of PSYOPs. Alongside the need for a disciplined, trained,
and well-equipped manpower to combat national security challenges, it is
also essential to have a comprehensive and effective machinery to conduct
psychological operations. Such a machinery must then cover the entire
spectrum of the socio-psychological threat in all its varied forms without
losing sight of the emerging global trends.
—*—

Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2004 Revised paper received
© Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses on March 21, 2004

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 177

 “There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the
long run the sword is always beaten by the mind” – Napoleon Bonaparte

Historical Perspective
Propaganda and psychological warfare are as old as the history of mankind
itself. The weak have always sought to portray themselves stronger than
they actually are. The Byzantine Empire, in its efforts to prolong its existence,
resorted to such acts. The emperor on his throne used to be raised, as if by
divine intervention and lowered again, while the stuffed lions which served
as the arm-rests of his throne belched forth fire and smoke and uttered
terrifying roars as the ambassadors from foreign lands lay prostrate before
him.1
The terms ‘Psychological Warfare’ and ‘Psychological Operations’ are
often used interchangeably to identify an activity or function which is as old
as human conflict or inter-cultural group relations. The first known application
of the term Psychological Warfare was in 1920 and Psychological Operations
in 1945.2 The British military analyst and historian, J.F.C. Fuller, is believed
to be the one who coined the term ‘Psychological Warfare’ when, in 1920, in
his scholarly analysis of the lessons learned during the First World War,
especially those related to deployment of such new weapons as Armour. He
allowed his mind to wonder imaginatively about the character of the future
battlefield.2 In his treatise on tanks, he prophesied that, “the so called
traditional means of warfare might be replaced by purely psychological
warfare, wherein weapons are not used or battlefields sought …but dimming
of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life
of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.” 3
The earliest recorded use of the term ‘Psychological Warfare’ in an
American publication occurred in January 1940, when an article entitled
“Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It” appeared in a popular American
journal.4 The term ‘Psychological Operations’ was also used in early 1945,
when Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ellis M. Zacharias, US Navy, employed
the term in an operation plan designated to hasten the surrender of Japan.
Without any description or explanation, the term suggested, “All
psychological operations will be coordinated both as to times and trends in
order to avoid reduction of effectiveness of this main operation.” 5
This term was again used in 1951, when the Truman Administration

178 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

renamed an inter-agency strategy committee, calling it the Psychological
Operations Coordination Committee. Although the US Army made the change
in 1951, it was not until the 1960s that psychological operations more
commonly used psychological warfare as the all-inclusive term. This
development was due to the fact that Americans had become increasingly
concerned about the continued use of a term that includes the word ‘warfare’
to describe an activity that is directed at friends and neutrals (see the discussion
on definitions later in the paper) as much as or more than to hostile or
potentially hostile people. This featured in the Lebanon crisis of 1958 and
the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965.5
As late as the 1980s, the term PSYOPs was repeatedly used but it was
considered a ‘nasty term — too bad’ and Fred W. Walker wrote one chapter
titled the same in Mclauren’s most authentic book on military propaganda.
In that, he also wrote:
Too often, psychological aspects of operations are placed at the back of the
book and completely neglected. Commanders and staff officers usually fail
to consider these aspects because the term is misunderstood. Many are
unaware of PSYOP’s true nature, and intangibility makes it difficult to
quantify or measure its effectiveness. To compound this, one enters a dense
forest of obscurity when seeking official guidance. No clear direction is
established for the military services except in wartime. As a result, the
services are reluctant to deal with it at all, and operational effectiveness
suffers.6
Notwithstanding the above predicament (relevant even today), PSYOPs
remain a key element in both combat and peacetime situations and is an
important non-lethal force multiplier.
Historically, the application of psychological operations in one form or
another has proven to be almost as essential to the successful waging of war
as the use of manpower and weaponry. However, in spite of its long history
of successful usage, “the potential for using the power of persuasion through
psychological operations as a force multiplier to achieve national objectives
with a minimum of destruction, has been recognised by very few even among
the most perceptive military leaders and statesmen.” 7
Alexander the Great perfected a method of psychological harassment,
which was the hidden cause of many of his victories. Alexander developed
psychological procedures and his actions were similar to modern-day

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 179

psychological operations. He developed the following practices: -
• Maintain good relations with pacifist elements within neighbouring
people in order to take advantage of favourable opinions and
sentiments.
• Use secret agents to infiltrate and spread rumours and news.
• In moments of crisis, bury the enemy — with public opinion —
under an avalanche of information, true or false, that can produce
concern, demoralisation and chaos.
Genghis Khan, ‘the true father of psychological warfare’, is credited with
leading huge hordes of savage horsemen across Russia and into Europe.
Agents, planted in advance to spread rumours and other forms of propaganda,
exaggerated the size of his army. To supplement his PSYOPs activities,
Genghis Khan also used rapid troop manoeuvres to confirm the illusion of
invincible numbers. Since the Mongols created an image of total barbaric
domination, target groups never believed they were the victims of astute
psychological warfare.8
Other than the above, there are numerous examples in recent times
wherein the application of PSYOPs has been a key winning factor, including
the current war in Iraq (on this a comprehensive case study will be presented
separately). During the Second World War, all sides made extensive use of
PSYOPs. The ‘Tokyo Rose’ of Japan and ‘Axis Sally’ of Germany are well
remembered by veterans. The subtleties of these radio programmes remain
unmatched till date. Even the BBC had the most innovative use of PSYOPs
when they broadcast English language lessons for the Germans, the would-
be invaders from across the English Channel. These were presented in flawless
German and the stated purpose of these broadcasts can be analysed from
these examples:9
“…and so it will be best if you learn a few useful phrases in English before
visiting us. For your first lesson, we take ‘DIE KANAUEBERFAHRT’.
The channel crossing.”
“Now, just repeat after me: ‘DAS BOOT SINKT.’ The boat is sinking. The
boat is sinking”
“DAS WASSER IST KALT. The water is cold. SER KALT. Very cold”
“Now I will give you a verb that should be very useful. Again, please repeat
after me. ICH BRENNE. I am burning. Du Brennst. You are burning. ER
BRENNT. He is burning. WIR BRENNEN. We burn. IHR BRENNT. You

180 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

 are burning. SIR BRENNEN. They are burning.”
History is replete with examples of PSYOPs applications. Some
interesting examples can be seen from the Korean War, the Vietnam War,
and the Gulf War I.10

Korean War
One published report mentioned that Van Fleet banknotes were airdropped
over North Korea sometime in 1951 by helicopters assigned to the United
States battleship, New Jersey.

The Ridgway Banknote Leaflet

General Ridgway was appointed commander of all the United Nations

forces in Korea on April 11, 1951. One of the most important surrender
leaflets printed during Ridgway’s tenure was a safe conduct pass altered to

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 181

look like the North Korean 100 Won note of 1947. His troops were able to
place more than one thousand Ridgway leaflets in an artillery shell and
‘sprinkle them like snow’. They were fired at the enemy whenever their troops
in the line were changed. The Communists considered possession of these
surrender passes to be proof of intent to desert, a charge usually punishable
by death which caused significant confusion among the Koreans.10

Gulf War 1991

Sample of one of the leaflets dropped over Iraq

Translation
Front — The Cold face of death.
Back — O’ Sons of Iraq. In your death you lengthen the life of Saddam, but
you shorten the life of your homeland Iraq.10

Information Age and Warfare

Alongside the above mentioned examples of the usage of PSYOPs in
conflict situations, civil society had also been making a transition to a new
age. Twenty-three years ago, Alvin Toffler referred to this transition as the
Third Wave, in his book of the same title.11
According to Toffler, the pattern of societal development follows a series
of waves, each of a lesser time-span than the previous one. Toffler writes:
Until now the human race has undergone two great waves of change, each
one largely obliterating earlier cultures or civilisations and replacing them
with ways of life inconceivable to those who came before. The First Wave
of change — the agricultural revolution — took thousands of years to play

182 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

 itself out. The Second Wave — the rise of industrial civilisation — took a
mere three hundred years. Today, history is even more accelerative, and it
is likely that the Third Wave will sweep across history and complete itself
in a few decades.11
The Third Wave, and the societal revolution, that Toffler predicted, is
readily acknowledged today as the Information Revolution/Information Age.
The US Army Field Manual 100-6, 1996 on Information Operations, describes
Information Age as:
The future time period when social, cultural, and economic patterns will
reflect the decentralised, non-hierarchical flow of information; contrast this
to the more centralised, hierarchical, social, cultural, and economic patterns
that reflect the Industrial Age’s mechanisation of production systems.
In this age of information, one gets to hear the application of PSYOPs as
an important tool in both military and non-military scenarios. There is thus a
need to examine the interplay of PSYOPs with Information Warfare. In chapter
seven of the RAND Report titled “Strategic Appraisal of Changing Role of
Information in Warfare”, Brian Nichipauk writes:
“One of the major features of information warfare research is the pot-pourri
of different definitions for the term information warfare. Without engaging
in that debate, this chapter will simply define information warfare as the
process of protecting one’s own sources of battlefield information and, at
the same time, seeking to deny, degrade, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s
sources of battlefield information. This is taken to include six pre-existing
sub areas that have only recently been grouped together under the heading
of information warfare: operational security, electronic warfare (EW),
psychological operations (PSYOPs), deception, physical attack on
information processes, and information attack on information processes.
Since operational security is all about defensive information warfare, it is
not as important to us here as the other five sub areas. Therefore, offensive
information warfare consists of the aggregation of EW, PSYOPs, deception,
physical attack, and information attack. PSYOPs are all about using
information dissemination to weaken the enemy’s morale and, ultimately,
to break his will to resist.” 12
Thus, this definition of information warfare makes PSYOPs appear as
one of the tools of information operations rather than an application/concept,
when viewed in the overall ambit of warfare using information. Most of the
discussions presented on the websites on information warfare describe

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 183

PSYOPs as one of the key elements of information warfare, which uses
information to affect enemy reasoning.13 In a study at the Swedish Institute
of International Relations, an attempt was made to describe different
perspectives of the concepts for information warfare itself, and the main
conclusion of that study was that the philosophies behind the concepts of
information warfare are not something new, but it is the new technology,
which is opening up new possibilities. One such example is the attack on the
source of information as a weapon. The main focus of discussions on
information warfare has been on using the right technology for controlling
the information flow surrounding a crisis.14
As more and more vistas of information technology and cyberspace open
up, the understanding of the concept of information warfare is likely to become
clearer. In a study at The Emirates Centre of Strategic Studies and Research,
Joseph Moynihan writes:
At the greatest level of abstraction, Information Warfare is thought by some
to include the public diplomacy programs of US information agency, the
covert action programs (propaganda and political actions) of the CIA,
perception management, PSYOPs, Command and Control Warfare (C2W),
Command, Control and Communication Counter Measures (C3CM) and
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I)
programs of US Department of Defense.15
Here an attempt is made to come out of the abstractness, to arrive at the
authentic domain of definitions, which guide the strategy planners and those
involved with the very application of theories and concepts.

The Definition Clutter

Psychological operations may broadly be defined as the planned use of
communications to influence human attitudes and behaviour, to create in
target groups, behaviour, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment
of national objectives. This form of communication can be as simple as
spreading information covertly by word of mouth or through any means of
mass media. Interplay with forms of communication and information also
explains the mix up with Information Warfare discussed above. Numerous
connotations of psychological dimensions of war and related terms are being
laid out in the paper to afford better comprehension of the conceptual
framework of this subject of considerable depth.

184 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

 The most comprehensive source of definitions is the Joint Chief of Staff
publication titled US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms
foreworded by Drew Middleton (Military Correspondent, The New York
Times). Interestingly, PSYOPs find a special mention in his Foreword.
Middleton writes as follows (leaving a doubt about his own understanding
of the concept in those times):
At first glance ‘psychological operations’ and associated terms might seem
to offer an entirely new field. But psychological warfare, although not
identified by that term, is as old as war itself. All the great captains from
Alexander onward have practiced it, although of course they did not use
such a high-toned term. In fact, ‘psychological operations’ and ‘military
deception’ are old friends from over the ages.16
In this publication, each definition is attached with symbols, i.e., DOD,
IADB, NATO and I. These symbols denote that the particular definition is
to be used by this agency and its components.
(DOD) Established for use by all Department of Defense components, which
will use the terms and definitions so designed without alteration unless a
distinctly different context or application is intended.
(I) US Government inter-departmental approval has been achieved for
national usage.
(IADB) Established for use by the member nations of the Inter-American
Defense Board, consisting of: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
(NATO) Established for use by the member nations of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, comprising: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA.

Psychological Operations

DOD: “Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to

foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups,
and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 185

reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favourable to the originator’s
objectives.” Also called PSYOP.

IADB: “These operations include psychological warfare and, in addition,

encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned
and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions,
attitudes, or behaviour to support the achievement of national objectives.”

NATO: “Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy,

friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour
affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include
strategic psychological activities, consolidation of psychological operations.

US Army Field Manual 33-1:‘Psychological Operations’ definition

“Psychological operations (PSYOPs) include psychological warfare and
encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned
and conducted to create in neutral, friendly, and non-hostile foreign groups
the emotions, attitudes, or behaviour to support the achievement of national
objectives.”

Psychological Warfare

DOD, IADB: “The planned use of propaganda and other psychological

actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions,
attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support
the achievement of national objectives.”

US Army Field Manual 33-1: ‘Psychological Operations’ definition):

“Psychological warfare is the planned use of propaganda and other
psychological actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and
behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the
achievement of national objectives.”

Propaganda

DOD, US Army Field Manual 33-1: ‘Psychological Operations’ definition):

“Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to
influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any group in
order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”

Perception

186 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

US Army Field Manual 33-1 ‘Psychological Operations’ definition: “...The
process of evaluating information which has been received and classified by
the five physical senses (vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) and
interpreted by criteria of the culture and society (emphasis added).”

Perception Management (DOD): “Actions to convey and/or deny selected

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,
motives, and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at
all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign
behaviours and official actions favourable to the originator’s objectives. In
various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations
security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.”
Having gone through the definitions clutter, it is evident that the wafer
thin differences between these inter-related terms are difficult to identify, in
the first place, and harder to resolve while conceptualising PSYOPs, especially
in the Indian context. The NATO definition of PSYOPs can be left out of the
discussion due to its structure being specific to usage. As regards US Field
Army Manual 33-1 ‘Psychological Operations’, it takes into account the IADB
usage. Strangely, the DOD definition allows space for many connotations by
bringing in objectives of the originator rather than that of the nation. The
rigour of national objectives cannot be diluted at any stage and they act like
unquestionable terms of reference for all actions related to PSYOPs, especially
in the Indian context.
Also, the denial of information as included in perception management
has defensive connotations, whereas, inclusion of ‘intelligence systems and
leaders’ brings in the offensive covert operations to its fold. The purpose of
influencing official estimates in the same may require strategic deception
and is not a desirable activity for conduct of PSYOPs in the Indian context.
Accordingly, a balanced definition of PSYOPs in our context could be on
the following lines, taking into consideration the key elements, without being
sinister, and away from the mystique of psychology, as suggested below:
Planned use of all forms of communications/information and other
psychological actions including political, military, economic and ideological
actions, with the purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes
and behaviour of hostile and non-hostile groups, both foreign and
indigenous, in such a way as to support the achievement of national
objectives.17
In this definition, an attempt has been made to answer two basic queries

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 187

of what and how. Although, the application of this concept may appear more
relevant in the non-military context, it is actually not the case. As in military
applications, it is the following three levels which lay down the objectives
and nature of PSYOPs without any conceptual modifications. This becomes
clearer from their textbook definitions as given below:18

Strategic PSYOPs: “They are conducted at a global/regional plane to support

national strategy. At [the] strategic level, it may take many forms including
diplomatic initiatives, aggressive military posturing, policy statements, threat
of use of force, military deployment, etc., to send a powerful psychological
message of national intent and impending penalties for an act of aggression.”

Operational PSYOPs: “It is conducted within a defined geographic area in

support of a theatre commander’s overall plan or as part of joint operations.
Conduct of War manoeuvres close to [the] international border/line of control,
forward deployment of army units, deliberate disclosure of target
vulnerabilities etc., are effective deterrents and potent means of subjugating
the enemy into adopting reactive/defensive posture.”

Tactical PSYOPs: “At the tactical level, they are targeted at the individual
engagements in consolidation of the overall effort against an opposing force
or audience. Publicity of destruction of [the] enemy’s vital installations,
images of the dead, propaganda in the form of make-believe planned stories
of human rights violations such as cruelty against women and children,
invincibility of own forces, etc., have a strong impact on adversary’s morale.”

PSYOPs and Communication

From the examination of a wide variety of definitions, it becomes clear
that whatever may be the context, PSYOPs are applicatory in nature and
these are related to the conditioning of the mind of the target group. As Phillip
P. Katz argues, the function of PSYOPs is to use communication to influence
behaviour. Therefore, a basic understanding of the nature of communication
in a social environment, and the process of communication (how people
communicate with each other) is necessary, in order to develop a meaningful
PSYOPs programme. According to him, communication in a very broad sense,
includes the various processes by which one person influences another, and
involves the total spectrum of human actions, including speech, written matter,
music, drama, the pictorial arts, and other forms of behaviour.19

188 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

 Melvin L Defleur in his book, Theories of Mass Communication, describes
human communication as the basis for group norms. It is the means by which
social control is exerted, roles are allocated, coordination of effort is achieved,
expectations are made manifest, and the social process is carried on.20
Communication then can be considered as a great relating tool. It relates
individuals to each other and to their historical perspectives. This makes
group functioning possible and allows societies to live in harmony. Link it
up with the definitions of perception given above, where emphasis has been
added to the fact that human perception is interpreted by the criteria of the
culture and society.
Therefore, PSYOPs, being applicatory in nature, deal directly with human
behaviour and must come to grips with attitudes, opinions, emotions, and
behaviour of the target groups, for, these shape their perceptions, which leads
to their reactions to the persuasive nature of PSYOPs communications. In
his chapter on “Objectives and Policy: The Nexus”, in a book a Military
Propaganda, edited by him, Ron D. Mclaurin writes:
The interests of any single country in the drama of international politics
are threatened, protected, served, undermined, or altered as a result of human
behaviour. That is, both individual and group behaviour affect national
interests, and this is so whether the behaviour be active (such as individual’s
speech or a nation’s waging [of] war) or passive (such as beliefs, attitudes,
opinions, thoughts, emotions).21
Even Cantril, who developed a theory, which brings together perceptual
research and the individual’s relations to society and social movements, holds
the view that we must deal not only with the ‘objective’ world surrounding a
person, but also with his perceptual world as he sees it.22 Accordingly, while
planning and conducting PSYOPs, we must have a clear understanding of
social communication and the related theories of mass communication,
wherein social communications are classified in four categories both from
the sender’s or the receiver’s point of view, as follows:23

Point of View

Sender’s Receiver’s

To Inform To Understand

To Instruct To Learn

To Entertain To Enjoy

To Persuade To Dispose or Decide

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 189

 It is important that a PSYOPs programme/campaign is designed and
developed in a manner that it performs one or more of the above-mentioned
functions of social communication depending on the objective and nature of
the application.

Conclusion
An attempt has been made in this paper to understand the conceptual
framework of Psychological Operations evolved in the recent times, where
the threat to a nation-state exists in the socio-psychological domain and the
psychological dimension of a conflict is as important as the physical.
PSYOPs, when used in conjunction with other activities, can make an
important contribution towards achieving the overall national objectives by
influencing attitudes and behaviour of the affected parties to the conflict,
both in times of war and peace. Along with the need for having disciplined,
trained, and well-equipped manpower to combat national security challenges,
the requirement for a comprehensive national response on a psychological
plane cannot be ignored. This response must cover the entire spectrum of the
socio-psychological threat in all its varied forms without losing sight of the
emerging global trends. There is no denying the fact that we need to first
evolve a national philosophy of PSYOPs, including its thrust and a centralised
structure, to monitor the same. This will then pave the way for the adoption
of that philosophy by respective security agencies in the form of operational
doctrines dealing with PSYOPs.

References/End Notes

1 Roetter, Charles, Preface. In Psychological Warfare. 1974. B.T. Batsford Ltd;

London.
2 Daugherty, William E., Origin of Psyop Terminology. In Ron D. Mclaurin, Ed.
Military Propoganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations. 1982. Praeger
Publishers; New York. p. 257.
3 Fuller, JFC, Tanks in the Great Wars 1914-1918. 1920. Murray; London. p. 320.
4 Anon, Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It. Current History and Forum,
LI, January 1940, 52-53.
5 Zacharias, Ellis M., Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer. 1946.
G. P. Putnam’s Sons; New York. p. 345.

190 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004

6 Walker, Fred W., PSYOPs is a Nasty Term-Too Bad. In Ron D. Mclaurin, no. 2, p.
259.
7 Excerpted from the history of PSYOPs at http//www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html.
8 Excerpted from the chapter on historical examples at http//www.global
security.org/military/library/report/1990/BJE.htm.
9 no. 7.
10 For detailed information see http//www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html.
11 For detailed discussion on the subject see Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave. 1980.
William Morrow and Co. ; New York.
12 Nichipauk, Brian, US Military Opportunities: Information-Warfare Concepts
of Operation. In RAND Corporation report at http//ww.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/reports.
13 “Cornerstones of Information Warfare” at http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/
resources/fm3-0/chapter11.htm.
14 Friman, Henrik “Perception Warfare: a Perspective for the Future” Discussion
paper at http://www.militaryscience.org/public/media/publications/Friman
(1999) PW.PDF
15 Moynihan, Joseph, Information Warfare: Concepts, Boundaries and Employment
Strategies. The Emirates Occasional Papers. 1997, (7) Abu Dhabi, UAE.
16 Middleton, Drew, Foreword. In DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. 1988. Joint
Chief of Staff publication, Arco; New York. p. vi.
17 The author is grateful to the peers in IDSA to have taken active part in the
debates/discussions before finalising the definition and invites further quest in
the field for a meaningful concept of PSYOPS, which if coordinated well at
National level may bring about the much needed revolution in military affairs
of different kind ( more Indian in its character ).
18 As given out in course study material issued by Defense Services Staff College,
Wellington.
19 Katz, Philip P., Communication Theory and Research and their Application to
Psychological Operations. In Ron D. Mclaurin, no. 2, p. 19.
20 Defleur, Melvin L., Theories of Mass Communication. 1966. David McKay; New
York.
21 McLaurin, Ron D., no. 2, p. 1.
22 Cantril, Hadley, The Psychology of Social Movements. 1941, 1963. New York;
The Politics of Despair. 1958. Basic Books; New York; A Study of Aspirations.
Scientific American. 1963. 41-45.
23 McLaurin, Ron D., no. 2, p. 21.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview 191

 Lt Col Sunil Narula is a Research Fellow at IDSA. He
has been pursuing his specialisation in Psychological
Operations since his days in MI-1 at Army HQ during
the Kargil War. He is a war wounded and decorated
Infantry officer of the J&K Light Infantry, with a Q‘I’
grade in Senior Command Course from College of
Combat, Mhow.

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(If Foreigner, state the country or origin)
Address As above in (4)
6 Names and addresses of individuals As above in (4)
who own the journal and partners
of shareholders holding more than
one per cent of the total capital

I, K. Santhanam, hereby declare that the particulars given are true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Sd/- K. Santhanam
Dated: March 1, 2004 Signature of Publisher

192 Strategic Analysis/Jan-Mar 2004