EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.

200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A

NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR
THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . .
.;"

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official
Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada.
et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much
to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic release and limited readership";

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could
better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be
amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and
all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76,
80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

ESCOLIN, J.: SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: the defendant.

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, for their petition to be given due course.
566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
1829-1840, 1842-1847.
a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789- proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163- without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
2244. circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-
507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen
 that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
represent the people in cases of this character. potestad.5

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
case.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the
people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L.
which he may authorize so to be published. ... Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do
unconstitutional by this Court. so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for
me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
[penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
binding force and effect.
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
SO ORDERED. ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of
the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published.
For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
Relova, J., concurs. accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in
the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
Aquino, J., took no part. "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired
into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such
presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave. post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive
on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the
challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
Separate Opinions
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication
is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in
its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is
otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No.
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect. 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
I shall explain why. devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to
when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
one from compliance therewith. same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No.
638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as
to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. Gazette.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
Separate Opinions
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice
is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is
otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No.
386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect. 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
I shall explain why.
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
separate opinion.
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do
so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for
me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the
Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed
out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to one from compliance therewith.
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of
the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in
the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such
presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the
challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non- simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in
its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice
is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may
be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to
when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe
that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a
public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No.
638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as
to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954 comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a
vs.
regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo
Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation.
MONTEMAYOR, J.: It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no
one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant
could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or
notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. costs de oficio.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno,
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that JJ., concur.
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts
merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably,
for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of
Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars
and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle
and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the
laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include
regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de

Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
vs. legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant. consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee. Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of
ROMUALDEZ, J.: my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure Code provides the following:
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to
Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the the testator otherwise provide.
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following: And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. without any pronouncement as to costs.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
So ordered.
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001 On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT
WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF
KAPUNAN, J.: PETITIONER.

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE
OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF PETITIONER.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that:
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS
PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where
he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at
around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT
PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.
at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to
a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with the hearsay rule.
pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5
ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the
chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness, therefore, may not
construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same.
jumped out for safety. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was
then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. 6
the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes
among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official records.
the RTC decision reads: Section 44, Rule 130 provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows: Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran,
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity. (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit. person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

SO ORDERED.2
 (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him been ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied.
The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as
"official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last
to give the statements for record.
requisite is not present.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3
court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who
Villanueva.
signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report. In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal
knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3
Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-
Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it
consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such
was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered
as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the
investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of
thereof. It has been said that: the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the
testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.19
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been
made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be
shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact." elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and
specific proof of negligence.20
made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from
the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record,
considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of
official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was
The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as
due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means,
explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of
occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily
work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained
sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would
of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence
be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court
resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of administration of
those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or,
government and the interest of the public having business with officials would
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. 21
verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents.
(3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or
not available.22
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they
will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore,
whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge
shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
circumstances of each case may appear to require. the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and
therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have
 whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and
the injured person. the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that
without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the
cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of same statement for being hearsay.
which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule
of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible
which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there
as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify
was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond
thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on
plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application
the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that,
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as
language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one
to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does
not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar: application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer
The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a damages under the Civil Code.
safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the
other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x. Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction
site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also provided that:
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;]
thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act
of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. x x x.24 to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude
all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but because of said injury x x x.
argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as
under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of
defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of
say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
been established.1âwphi1.nêt
Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the
 worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from
by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the
respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all,"
the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA
442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the
fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant
action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee
action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.] merely executed her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her
personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She
did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under
employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his
the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation
supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating
Act. The Court reasoned:
procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may
explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand
May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum:
Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before
1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9,
created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991
of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency
Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x. of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any
negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is
civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she
Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make
court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under
the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations
by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice well:
of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice
as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the
before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should
death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from
be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her
Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or
Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the
mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or
Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
adjudicate that issue."

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as
of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the
early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation
months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution
Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one
finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was
remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy
"civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on
chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. 37 Equitable in nature, the police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
wrong.38
claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware
of her rights.
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they thereof cannot be held against her.
depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it
can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the
a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit
"K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and
exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive
from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is
subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages.
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40
Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
in Floresca.
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by
the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions. respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden SO ORDERED.
private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to
plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is,
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue
when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death
and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the
"fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that
there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation
of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for
that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final
say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the
principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in
the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
 G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

EMETERIO CUI, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY,Defendant-Appellee.

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant. Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee. heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:

CONCEPCION, J.:chanrobles virtual law library 1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools
offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students - for excellence in scholarship or
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good
plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof only if the students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library in the award of these scholarships.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In the language of the decision appealed from:
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing school.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from
the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university
up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in 3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools
brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees
of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the
the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to
Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having authorize such transfer.
accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos
University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the
his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of
the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of
law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff
his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said
plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release said transcript of
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As above
total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said
the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.
his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000
the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as
87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar expenses of litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private
Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding
and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's
made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:chanrobles virtual law fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
library

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another
right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid
the equivalent of my scholarship cash. or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that
the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that
the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the
contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the
aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be
said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the
entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with
corresponding department head nor published in the official
interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this
gazette.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the
question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and
University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far
Natividad, JJ., concur.
reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.
from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity
of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the
stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The
aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the
Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the
defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract
entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as
against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill.
180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state,
courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the
statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a
government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your
communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the
four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in
America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to
the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its
object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to
sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding
vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract
of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools
because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in
Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order
to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as
to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No.
38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep
outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that
university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business
potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with
sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is
good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some
kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of
social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of
the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does
not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they
transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United
States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000 He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at
the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.2
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an
award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that
the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent
issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by
to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was
the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2",
and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE
also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest
"A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the
examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his
grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1âwphi1.nêt Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to SO ORDERED.3
deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The
plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The
of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
annotation:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby
JADER ROMEO A.
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum
adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-
Def. Conflict of Laws — x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages.
with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2"). Costs against defendant-appellee.

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of SO ORDERED.4
Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates.
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a
(Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent
appeared however the following annotation:
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages
incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who the result of his removal exam.
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as
approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The petition lacks merit.

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the
occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing
with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the
relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1"). each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for
the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly
ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter's had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the
grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same. respondent court:

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had
time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-
good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from the
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-
the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access to those information and it is only appellant's name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after
the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies the deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean
with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative
control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the
in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did
orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete his
exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.12
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. 7 He must whose agency the loss occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for
see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If mere fault or
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when
he acts with negligence or abuse.15
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in
legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes
and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take
the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also
law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee
that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act must meet.
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the
community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good
faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
without the latter, the former are useless. Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1âwphi1.nêt
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait
for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare
of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for SO ORDERED.
damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
Puno, J., took no part.
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an
LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any
G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974 proper court instead of dismissing appeals, "elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for proper
review."5
JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners,
vs. Respondent city court per its order of December 11, 1971 denied petitioners' motion "for having been
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and erroneously addressed to this court" instead of to the court of first instance 6 ignoring petitioners'
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. predicament that the court of first instance had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal
of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its
judgment of conviction against them.
Martinez and Martinez for petitioners.

Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for respondent.
against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel
respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals.7

The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the petition manifesting that "we shall not interpose
TEEHANKEE, J.:p any objection whichever view point is adopted by this Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently
conflicting or clashing principles of law — finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision,"
after observing that "(F)rom the view point of equity considering that petitioners' right to appeal lapsed
The Court holds that the court of first instance of Pasay City in an appeal erroneously taken to it from or was lost through the fault, though not excusable, of their counsel, and compounded by the alleged
the city court's judgment convicting petitioners-accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent error of judgment committed by the Court of First Instance to which the appeal was erroneously
original jurisdiction of said courts should grant petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their
brought, we sympathize with petitioners' plight."
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court rather than peremptorily grant the prosecution's
motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the remand of the case to the city court for execution of
judgment. The appellate court's decision denying the relief sought by petitioners of compelling the The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973 dismissed the petition, after
elevation of their appeal to it as the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the court of finding that the city court's judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI
first instance as a nominal party notwithstanding that it was duly represented by the respondent instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be
People as the real party in interest through the Solicitor General who expressed no objection to the endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since petitioners did not implead the court of first
setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order is set aside as sacrificing substance to instance as "principal party respondent" it could not "grant any relief at all even on the assumption
form and subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities," as follows:

Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Court of Pasay1 for ... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that was procedurally wrong; of course,
allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced powers, directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals, but when
under respondent city court's decision of February 26, 1971 to six (6) months and one (1) day instead of doing so, it dismissed, it also had power to do so, and correction of it is
of prision correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00 with costs of suit. difficult to see to be remediable by mandamus, but ignoring this altogether, what
this Court finds is that since it was CFI that dismissed the appeal and according
to petitioners, wrongly, it must follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance of Pasay for mandamus to compel it to act "correctly" should have been
City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal" on the ground that since the case was
directed against said CFI, it should have been the CFI, Hon. Francisco de la
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the city Rosa, who should have been made under Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party
court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as respondent, but he was not, this being the situation, this Court can not see how it
provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. 2
can grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to
deserve some equities.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the analogous provision of Rule
50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2, 19748 and for elevation of their appeal to the
the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense to the charge, viz, that the
grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the appeal to have been wrongly offended party Atty. de Guzman had represented their son who was a suspect with two others for
brought before it, to certify the same "to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."3
robbery before the Pasay city fiscal's office and upon dismissal of the charge demanded payment
from them as parents the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they had no money to pay
The court of first instance per its order of October 29, 1971 did find that the appeal should have been him required them to sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an imaginary lady's ring to
taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the sell "on commission basis" for P1,000.00 (their "commission" to be any overprice) to assure payment
records to the city court "for execution of judgment."4 of the sum by the stated deadline of July 9, 1970 under penalty, of criminal prosecution for estafa;
and that they had then newly met Atty. de Guzman, whose services had been secured not by them
but by the family of one of the other suspects, implying the incredibility of his entrusting a lady's ring
Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the order of dismissal of their appeal and learned of it to both of them (husband and wife) for sale on commission basis when his only association with them
only when they were called by the Pasay city court for execution of the judgment of conviction. was his demand of payment of his P1,000-attorney's fee for having represented their son-suspect.
Hence, they filed with the city court their "motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals" of December
7, 1971 stating that "through inadvertence and/or excusable neglect" they had erroneously filed a
notice of appeal to the court of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the proper court Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court "for lack of sufficient merit," petitioners
and prayed that the city court, following precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it to the filed the present petition for review.9 The Court required the Solicitor General's comment on behalf of
the People of the Philippines, and upon receipt thereof resolved to consider the case as a special civil
action with such comment as answer and the case submitted for decision in the interest of justice and Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their appeal to the court of first instance, confronted
speedy adjudication. with the thorny question (which has confused many a practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction
of city courts and municipal courts of provincial and sub-provincial capitals with courts of first instance
under sections 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act where the appeal from the municipal or city
The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that the court of first instance acted with grave abuse
court's judgment should be taken directly to the Court of Appeals as held in Esperat vs. Avila 16 as
of discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal which was erroneously brought to it and
distinguished however from judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar cases within the
ordering remand of the records to the city court for execution of judgment instead of certifying and
concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of first instance where as held by this Court in People vs.
endorsing the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as timely prayed for by petitioners-
Valencia 17 the appeal should nevertheless be brought to the court of first instance which retains its
accused in their opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss appeal. We find that the Court of
appellate jurisdiction under section 45 of the Judiciary Act.
Appeals also acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition instead of setting aside
the challenged order of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing the appeal pursuant to
which respondent city court was poised to execute its judgment of conviction simply because the It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in exercise of its power to
court of first instance which is but a nominal party had not been impleaded as party respondent in "control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice" 18 to grant
disregard of the substantive fact that the People as plaintiff and the real party in interest was duly petitioners-accused's timely plea to endorse their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court
impleaded as principal party respondent and was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor and within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In a mis-directed appeal to the Court of
General. Appeals of a case that pertains to the court of first instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly
provides that the Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper
court" viz, the court of first instance in the given example. There is no logical reason why in
The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners' appeal taken to the court of first instance was
all fairness and justice the court of first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not be
"procedurally wrong" and that the court of first instance "in the exercise of its inherent powers could
likewise bound by the same rule and therefore enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but to certify the
have certified the appeal to it as the proper court instead of dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in
case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The paucity of the language of the Rule and its
holding that it could not "correct" the court of first instance's "wrong action" and grant the relief sought
failure to expressly provide for such cases of misdirected appeals to the court of first instance (owing
of having the appeal elevated to it since said court's presiding judge "who should have been-made
possibly to the fact that at the time of the revision of the Rules of Court in 1963 section 87 (c) had
under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not." The Court has always
been newly amended under Republic Act 2613 approved on June 22, 1963 to enlarge the jurisdiction
stressed as in Torre vs. Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal party" in special civil
of city courts and municipal courts of provincial capitals and provide for their concurrent jurisdiction
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and that he "is not a person "in interest" within the
with the courts of first instance and direct appeal from their judgments in such cases to the Court of
purview (of Rule 65, section 5 12)" and "accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal from or
Appeals) should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right of appeal.
seek a review on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the appellate court setting aside his dismissal of
a party's appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for him to allow the appeal.
This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned
against "narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator" " 19 and stressed
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or presiding judge who issued the
that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of
challenged order or decision is but a nominal party, the real parties in interest being "the person or
injustice or absurdity)" 20 and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would
persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty of
be unjust or lead to absurd results". 21 In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all
appearing and defending the challenged act both "in their own behalf and in behalf of the court or
the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to
judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, theformal impleading of the court of first instance which
supply the void — that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy
issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the
and inconsistency — by holding as it does now that courts of first instance are equally bound as the
interest of speedy adjudication." 13
higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper
appellate court.
Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff in the criminal proceeding against petitioners-
accused was duly impleaded and represented by the Solicitor General to defend the proceedings in
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition is hereby set aside and
the court of first instance and had expressed no objection to the appellate court's setting aside of the
in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition for prohibition against respondent
court of first instance's dismissal order, in the interest of justice and equity the appellate court's act of
city court which is hereby enjoined from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-
dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court
accused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners' appeal from its judgment to the
simply because of the non impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal party was tantamount
Court of Appeals for the latter's disposition on the merits. No costs.
to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of
procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal to the court of
first instance rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the court Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma
of first instance itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper and Aquino, JJ., concur.
court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and
leave them without any remedy.

The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by respondent appellate court of mandamus to
compel respondent city court to elevate petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court
as being within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3, providing for certification to the proper
court by the Court of Appeals of appealed cases erroneously brought to it, 14 particularly where
petitioners-accused have shown prima facie (and without this Court prejudging the merits of their
appeal) that they have a valid cause for pursuing in good faith their appeal (as against a manifestly
Separate Opinions
dilatory or frivolous appeal) and to have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support of their
defense that they were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure to pay a
purely civil indebtedness (the attorney's fee owed by their son to the complainant).
ESGUERRA, J., dissenting: Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by
judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or
I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by
certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior
analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City
courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification
Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act
by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.
No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be
sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it."
Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We
Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also
specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it was
the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court has its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance. The proper court to certify
provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is not a
Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.
concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by
judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor General
certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior
is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but the
courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification
Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof is a
by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.
party respondent in these proceedings.

We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We
The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines and
have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also
the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former may not
compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it was
be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter can be.
its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance. The proper court to certify
The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution of the
and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is not a
judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should
party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.
have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings. For their
counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor General
is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but the
Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof is a
party respondent in these proceedings.

The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines and
the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former may not
be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter can be.
The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution of the
judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should
have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings. For their
counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.

Separate Opinions

ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:

I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by
analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City
Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act
No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be
sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it."
Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the
Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a
specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing
the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court has
provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
vs.
both cases to his office for review. 9
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
REGALADO, J.: Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to
try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
separation de facto between them. having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
living apart since April, 1982. 2 Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a
resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property petitioner. 16
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4 rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
XXV, of the same court. 7 amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse,
complaint or petition. and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the law on the matter of status of persons.
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
power and option.
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
criminal case. 21
husband, in any State of the Union. ...

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof,
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
the former against the latter.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22 relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void",
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her
when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not
marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is
the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by
a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where
the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse
therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the
parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be
involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it
would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground
vs. that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
QUISUMBING, J.: Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for
the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between petitioner and private respondent.
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed
by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a
divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner. On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie
between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of
severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany
public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial
on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been
Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the
recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of
order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set
Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the
aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues
Philippine law.
relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. 4 Out of their union were
born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
5 petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien
dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.
spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had
obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order 8 dated further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50
August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the
Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is
the RTC. partially set aside with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg- SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
The decree provides in part: respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of
van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
Nov. 1997:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
The parental custody for the children recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal
assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987 custody of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. 15

is granted to the father.

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
 1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently
dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure,
challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
which provides:
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to
remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
upon is not indubitable. be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
(Emphasis supplied.) Procedure), to wit:

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading. country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14,
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for the thing;
reconsideration.

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
Procedure, which provides: judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside
the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
final order accordingly. judgment merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such,
is subject to proof to the contrary.24
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule
appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res
or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The
or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)
proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings 25 nor has she given her opinion to
not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private
the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. 27 More importantly, the divorce
in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when
same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare
finality. Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his
care and custody. 28
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of
obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany. her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between
petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of
this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property
nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this
averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the
proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be
accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no
longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of
the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which
is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September
30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the
care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the
records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.
 G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001 In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,, Petitioner, v.REDERICK A.
in Australia in 1989; 12thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
RECIO, respondent.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for
DECISION
the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
PANGANIBAN, J.: down. 13cräläwvirtualibräry

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce stated no cause of action. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce respondent. 15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; parties. 16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien resolution. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
The Case
Ruling of the Trial Court
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and the March 24, 1999 Order 2 of the Regional Trial
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
disposed as follows:
not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties.3cräläwvirtualibräry 18
Hence, this Petition.

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

Issues

The Facts
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

1
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner -- a Filipina --
and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church 2
in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as single and Filipino. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
3
secured in Australia. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in
case.
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. 4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 Divorce as a Question of Fact
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
5 comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
courts.19cräläwvirtualibräry shall specify the following:

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on xxx
two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
annulled;
rest.

xxx
The Courts Ruling

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
The Petition is partly meritorious.
applicant shall be required to

First Issue:
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration
of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 20petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
these elements. property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to be a written act or record
cannot grant it. 21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.32cräläwvirtualibräry
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 17 23 of the Civil Code. 24 In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 26 A divorce
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34cräläwvirtualibräry
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
according to their national law. 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
one issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not sufficient;
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
during which no reconciliation is effected. 46cräläwvirtualibräry

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don
remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws. On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

Burden of Proving Australian Law 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.48cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
sound discretion.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. 41 In civil cases, 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
laws. 43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license. 50cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity
void ab initio. to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d)
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorcemeans the legal
Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; 54 and
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 55 (2) for
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit 3
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; 58 (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit 5 --
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60cräläwvirtualibräry

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March
1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE , in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,

we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005 ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then
turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. 33 1awphi1.nét
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of
the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. 34 According to her, it was Mr.
Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise
DECISION
going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. 35 When they reached the
penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. 38 She
ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby him.40
Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of
Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the
testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations uninvited:
provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly
known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13
October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday
several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. 6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not
party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of
Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course." 8Mr. Reyes some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko
then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436).
the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary
thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of
queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka
belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing
imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr.
distance of several guests:
Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame
and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. 15 Like a common criminal, he was In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and
escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals,
Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17 the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts
which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely,
even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the
another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43
ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive
Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party
of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to
Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she
accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim
first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to
the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the
presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group
latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that
of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not
Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation.
that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave
For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms.
Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr.
Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. 28 Believing that Captain Batung ...
and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered.
When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a.
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603). 44 becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the
solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning
Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to
(P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. 51 One of the exceptions to this general
motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered." 46 rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party
as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals
is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food
seriously erred in –
and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in
agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
I.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS
OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.

II.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s
FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE
former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"
celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an
actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
III. generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim,
mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the
"gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s
ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s
IV. personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely
ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk
ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for
POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS him to kiss:
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet
V. table? How close was she when she approached you?

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 )
refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by ...
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order
not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him
to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms.
Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere
plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
between them. . . respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs.
Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be
rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to
made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals.
back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved
The Court of Appeals held –
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established.
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. 58
and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good
and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, 59 is not a appellees.73
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board
Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During his
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might
for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and
from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask good faith, must be his to bear alone.
Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) SO ORDERED.
it is done with intent to injure.66
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven
by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of
13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong
bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel
with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say
G.R. No. 142943 April 3, 2002 had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their
findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to
temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners,
conducted on the meter has the following findings to wit:
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
'1. Terminal seal was missing.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
'2. Lead cover seals ('90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling
out from the sealing wire.
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service
on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy '3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of
Regulatory Board. alignment and with circular scratches at the face of the register which indicates
that the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set
manually to the desired reading. In addition to this, the meter terminal blades
The Case
were found full of scratches.'

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 1, 2000
"After an hour, defendant-appellant's head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the residence of
Decision1 and the April 10, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022.
plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been tampered and unless they
The decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
pay the amount of ₱178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply
would be disconnected. Orlina informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following
"WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is hereby SET their standard operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions
ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. relative to the results of the inspection as well as the disconnection of her electrical
Plaintiffs-appellees are hereby ORDERED to pay defendant-appellant MERALCO the services for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special
differential billing of ₱193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical Accounts, Legal Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in
consumption."3 the afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio instructed its service
inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees' electric service which the
latter faithfully complied.
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

"On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the
The Facts
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite the immediate reconnection,
to order defendant-appellant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise: defendant-appellant acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in
disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due
regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation.
"Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private corporation,
authorized by law to charge all persons, including the government, for the consumption of
electric power at rates duly authorized and approved by the Board of Energy (now the "In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at the
Energy Regulatory Board). plaintiffs-appellees' house but denied liability citing the 'Terms and Conditions of Service,'
and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known a 'Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.'
"Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot
located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which they bought on April 7,
1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs "After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of plaintiffs-
engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and appellees."4 (Citations omitted)
recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a
member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Ruling of the Trial Court
Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.

The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing spouses
"On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors headed by (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering.
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single
phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows
Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in immediately
procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which was disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondent's action, ruled the RTC, constituted
granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellant's a quasi delict.
inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal
was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
the meter base plate. Defendant-appellant's inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-
appellees' secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna Quisumbing,
who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's ruling and dismissed the Complaint. It held that
the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-appellant's inspectors that they respondent's representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners' electric
service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery was
after observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim made.1âwphi1.nêt
for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential
in the amount of ₱193,3325 representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity
consumption, which had been established without being controverted.

We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:

Hence, this Petition.6

(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima
The Issues
facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefitted
thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to
In their Memorandum,7 petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: such person after due notice, x x x

"4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite the absence of an ERB representative or an
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in
officer of the law?
order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by
an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board
"4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption of (ERB)."9 (Italics supplied)
tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity
and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive?
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate disconnection
will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal
"4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily, witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative when the
whether the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243) applies discovery was made.
to the case at bar?
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may pass upon the
"4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic? evidence when the factual findings of the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals,
as in this case.10
"4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages?"8
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate court's holding that "the actions of
defendant-appellant's service inspectors were all in accord with the requirement of the law." 11
In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1) whether
respondent observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2)
whether such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3) whether petitioners are liable for Respondent's own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present when the
the billing differential computed by respondent. inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team, testified:

The Court's Ruling "Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these findings you
testified earlier, who was present?
The Petition is partly meritorious.
A The secretary, sir."12
First Issue:
"ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this inspection
at Greenmeadows Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
Compliance with Requisites of Law

A The composition of the team, sir?

Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not validly effected
because of respondent's noncompliance with the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the "Anti-Electricity
and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994." They insist that the immediate Q Yes.
disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly effected only when there is prima facie evidence
of its illegal use. To constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must be
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
"personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)."
Q You were four (4)?
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a question of fact
which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue, which was not raised in the court A Yes, sir.
below, can no longer be taken up for the first time on appeal. Assuming arguendo that the issue was
raised below, it also contends that petitioners were not able to specifically prove the absence of an
Q Who is the head of this team?
 A I was the head of the team, sir."13 "A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes Quis[u]mbing
at that time. We did tell our findings regarding the meter and the consequence with it. And
she was very angry with me.
Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only Meralco personnel
had been present during the inspection:
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs.
Quisumbing?
"Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right?

A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are referring
A Yes, sir.
to our Legal Department so could know the violation, sir."19

Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?

"A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.

A Two or three of his men.

Q What is the fist name of this supervisor?

Q All members of the inspection team?

A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.

A Yes, sir."14
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what
happened?
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only the
Meralco inspection team and petitioners' secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of the
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and she
law or ERB representative at that time. Because of the absence of government representatives, the
has to go to our Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.

Q You are talking of 'VOC,' what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners' secretary was present at the time the
inspection was made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery
"must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized A 'VOC' is violation of contract, sir."20
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)."15Had the law intended the presence of the
owner or his/her representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence
As to respondent's argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative had not been
is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt.16 Where the law is clear and
raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to
valid issue in the CA. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate
it that the mandate is obeyed.17
disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act
virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmeña, its author, stressed tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that
the need for the presence of government officers during inspections of electric meters. He said: derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be
equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
"Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations which are
listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I think they should be prudent Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that "[w]here the issues already
enough to bring in competent authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance
their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to disconnect on the basis of their findings and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the
and later on there would be a court case and the customer or the user would deny the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them." 21
existence of what is listed in Section 2, then they could be in a lot of trouble." 18 (Italics
supplied)
Contractual Right to Disconnect
Electrical Service
Neither can we accept respondent's argument that when the alleged tampered meter was brought to
Meralco's laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB representative present.
Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical service based on
Exhibits "10"22and "11,"23 or on Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of The relevant portion of these documents concerns discontinuance of service. It provides:
electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an
authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected immediately after the
"The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears
discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralco's employees. That
in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter
the ERB representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco
stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to
laboratory will not cure the defect.
comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the
Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection and found alleged adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company
meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply. Again, this verity is may disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1
culled from the testimony of Meralco's Orlina: of the former Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any
 such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the Q Whereat?
Customer."24
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence.
Petitioners' situation can fall under disconnection only "in case of or to prevent fraud upon the
Company." However, this too has requisites before a disconnection may be made. An adjusted bill
Q What happened to this occasion?
shall be prepared, and only upon failure to pay it may the company discontinue service. This is also
true in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission,
which requires a 48-hour written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant case, A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with them and
these requisites were obviously not complied with. change the venue.

Second Issue Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?

Damages A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Season's Restaurant. But it was very
embar[r]assing for us because we faxed them ahead of time before they came to Manila.
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal, factual or contractual
basis, we will now pass upon on the right of petitioners to recover damages for the improper Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection of the
disconnection. electric power on that day, Friday, what damage did you suffer?

Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them actual, moral A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. All these were overturned by the CA. embarras[s]ing for us.

As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award may Q Can you tell us how much amount?
be made. The appellate court ruled as follows:
A Approximately ₱50,000.00."30
"Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and compensatory
damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how
and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact she arrived at the amount of ₱50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence,
if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages.
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been
suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial,
no damages will be awarded."25 While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses in moving
the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it have been adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or
was before it was injured.26 They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of
susceptible of measurement.27Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of the
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. 28 actual amount thereof.31 The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal
knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial
proof.32 Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling denying the grant of actual damages.
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of
proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.29 Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to moral
damages, albeit in a reduced amount.

Petitioners' claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbing's bare testimony as
The RTC opined as follows:
follows:

"A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That furniture "This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to protect itself
from any fraud. However, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great
exhibit is only once a year.
caution and with due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual
monopoly of the supply of electric power should refrain from taking drastic actions against
Q What is this furniture exhibit? the consumers without observing due process. Even assuming that the subject meter has
had history of meter tampering, defendant cannot simply assume that the present
occupants are the ones responsible for such tampering. Neither does it serve as a license
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and exclusive
to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to due process. Defendant should have given the
marketing of our products around the world. We always have that once a year and that's
plaintiffs simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged
the time when all our buyers are here for us to show what we had that was exhibited to go
meter-tampering, which were not included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due
around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila just for this occasion. So we have
process requires reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable notice to discontinue
an appointment with our people and our buyers with SITEM and also that evening we will
supply. Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for damages. While this Court
have to treat them [to] dinner.
is aware of the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which
 causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric companies, this does It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of petitioners on
not give the defendant the right to trample upon the rights of the consumers by denying the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection
them due process."33 was thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTC's grant of moral damages to the more equitable
amount of ₱100,000.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such
case34 is when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
process of law, are violated.35 good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 48 It is not given to enrich
one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
socially deleterious actions.49 In this case, to serve an example -- that before a disconnection of
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be faithfully
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. 36 Although incapable
complied with -- we award the amount of ₱50,000 to petitioners.
of pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.37
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney's fees is likewise granted.50 It is
readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury --
extent of elevating the matter to this Court;51 thus, an award of ₱50,000 is considered sufficient.
whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated Final Issue:
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.38
Billing Differential
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners' electrical supply
without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due process in
more circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the opportunity to controvert the
immediately disconnecting petitioners' electrical supply -- respondent's counterclaim for the billing
initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC:
differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully
deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the
"More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service amount of the differential.
constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a
clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it
Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is
also established the amount of ₱193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure
considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar." 39
through which this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer
Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence showing the account's
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA40 that respondent is required to give notice of billing history and the corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections
disconnection to an alleged delinquent customer. The Court said: and examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering
that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
"x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage 52 does not
plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient
people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the evidence to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said
business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted53 that they did not have any contract for electrical
engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of
Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner the premises.
by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and testimonial evidence
before disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort." 41
presented by respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt

Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights to be
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision
trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondent's efforts to stamp out the
is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of
illegal use of electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our
₱193,332.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners ₱100,000 as moral damages, ₱50,000
people. As has been we succinctly said: "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for
as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
the right reason."42

SO ORDERED.
However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the courts,
should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. 43 Moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty.44 Moral damages are not intended to enrich a Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.45 They are awarded only to obtain a means, a diversion or
an amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the injured party has undergone by
reason of the defendant's culpable action.46 They must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.47
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying
the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs. 1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan
City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez

Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 on August 3, 1986.
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement
to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner,
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and
is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on 2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
3. All other claims are denied.6
before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her,
to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503. preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to
and ridicule if her claim was false.7
or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of
her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop
coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered
mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
 wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them?
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was
brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However,
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he
her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with
also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City.
compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry and then concluded:
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single. In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8 marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the
lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein
made the following analysis:
the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
certainly would (sic) not have allowed
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic)
their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the
is not actionable. 14
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga,
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. American states. . . . 19

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the in the statute books. 20
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
case. 15

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or Civil Code the following rule:
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
xxx xxx xxx
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
(Cruz v. Sosing, incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making a right of action.
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions
in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
And now to the legal issue. concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts
as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,
by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
from which We quote:
2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her
a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21
not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
warrant a recovery.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the Am. Jur. 662)
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
xxx xxx xxx
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because: Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
even before they had the benefit of clergy. cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case: this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge,
moral damages may be recovered:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry,
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper.
If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages,
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding
the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the
Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal
 sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is consent to the transaction was itself procured by
accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority fraud. 36
or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a
man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
indemnity.

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or
to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would
less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act
and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason. Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
dignity.
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also
at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
SO ORDERED.
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to
be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to
marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993 On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S.
Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed
that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,
to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been
Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.
given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and
that he never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for
Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for private which he has been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature
respondent. in said check was not his.

On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal
Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for
dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in
BIDIN, J.:
PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no
showing in the records of the preliminary investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in of the said investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care
CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises and prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not
Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of properly notified of the complaint against him and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.
Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent, among others, the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which
amount of P50,000.00.
bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent
Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein
The facts are not disputed. petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.

In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L.
for short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility
Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the
drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148). ground floor of Baltao Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may have been dealing
with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter,
petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of
Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the
signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." 1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;

After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand 2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good
the dishonored check.
3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;

Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing
4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have
transacted business with Albenson.
5 costs.
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint
against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against
charges was an affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, Mercantile Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment
the above-mentioned circumstances were stated. at the instance of plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-
39).
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who
manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial
damages awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
its other aspects. With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51) nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin
each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist
Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:
Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the
scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple
1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent
malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil
Code notwithstanding the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious Code of the Philippines 72).
prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil
Code . . . .
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision
unjust criminal case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs.
misdirection" and "was therefore, actionable by itself," and which "became Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . . (private respondent) was
deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called preliminary
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
investigation . . . . "
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20
speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their
3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
calculated", no evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
statement. suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona
jointly and severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be
made the basis for an award of damages.
5. Awarding respondents —

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.
5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The
in the absence of sufficient evidence to show that such was trial court as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles
actually suffered. together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint filed
against petitioners, thus:
5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the
evidence in this connection merely involved private With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not
respondent's alleged celebrated status as a businessman, much difficulty in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error
there being no showing that the act complained of adversely
should be resolved, given the admitted fact that when there was an attempt to
affected private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly warned that
material loss. plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been
dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and
5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact persisted in filing a case — a criminal case no less — against plaintiff, said
that petitioners were duly advised by counsel of their legal defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
recourse. Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).

5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the
adduced to justify such an award (Rollo, pp. 4-6). right to complain. But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit
is the area of excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing
the case of Madera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their
part absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could
anchored his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code. be validly made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under
the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of
private respondent.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the
What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2)
respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]).
regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following results: from the records of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file
unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and
a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution.
Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered
As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the
in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking
three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements
Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
he make good the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
among others, that private respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
Corporation; that he ever issued the check in question. Private respondent's counsel even went without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to
further: he made a warning to defendants to check the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law
this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from the when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
baseless accusation made against his person, he should have made mention of the fact that there
are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the
respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the
instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design
issuer of the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the
to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when
same building — Baltao Building — located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The mild
they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.
steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the
president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to
believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
when their counsel wrote respondent to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated
the complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22. deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead,
motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex
private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he
and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle
thought was propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious
the victims to damages (Ibid.).
scheme.

In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the
private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been
amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find
negligent to some extent in determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check,
the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has
the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It
was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In
the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that
and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private
actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check.
litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). However, the record shows that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the
liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio
Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and
Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong individual was obviously in the
delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was
nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith.
issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are
This error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before
two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III.
investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon
Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was
discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.
issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the
complaint before the provincial fiscal.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
attorney's fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability
under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good
damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos
malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records
show that the same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He
did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a
result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his
business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot
rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the
award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).

Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business,
trade, property, profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof
is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488
[1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award
of actual damages in favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.

Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or
oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical
Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).

As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the
general rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of
exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private
respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.

In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in
the filing of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and
bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant
case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned
judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis.
Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without
bases therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V.
No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent
Baltao.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff
in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
REYES, J.B.L., J.: ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce,
"final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2 of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following: On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register. having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great
scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following 2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena
morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to Escaño liable for damages;.
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack
of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was
parents on their counterclaims; and.
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and
Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new 4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta
continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March
1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
letters when their love was aflame.
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
the time) expressly provided that — country.

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied) give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act,
which provided the following: From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
Phil. 579).
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal. From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
valid and binding.
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding
dismissed for non-prosecution.
absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710.
The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of Court in that case:
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate
in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
 The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million
written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72) characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them"
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and
arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon
advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony Summing up, the Court rules:
was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she
is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign
was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury
decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and
being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always recover damages;
presumed until the contrary is proved.
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support,
so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or
cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been Neither party to recover costs.
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the
case of advice given to a son. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused
them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.