PerspeCtive

BRICS in Global Governance

A Progressive and Cooperative Force?

NIU HAIBIN
September 2013

„„ Given their expanding economic size and increasingly active diplomacy, the BRICS
countries are gradually gaining greater influence over the international decision-­
making process. Managing the influence of these emerging powers and reforming
global institutions will become decisive issues for establishing an effective global
governance system.

„„ The slow pace of governance and quota reform at the IMF is a backward step. The
US and Europe should truly raise emerging powers’ rights in return for an increase
in financial contributions to the IMF. Both sides should treat the reform seriously.

„„ The international community should encourage the five permanent members of the
UN Security Council to offer emerging powers a non-permanent, but longer-term
and more substantial standing on the Council. This would be a good way to preview
the performance of emerging powers. Gradual changes to the Council may also be
amenable and beneficial to established powers.

„„ The deepening of cooperation between BRICS countries is resulting in some substan-

tial institutional initiatives such as the creation of a New Development Bank. Such
initiatives will open up to the developing world new resources, experiences, and an
understanding of the priorities of emerging powers. The impact of such initiatives
on existing international financial institutions is to be observed.

„„ I n general, an incremental and cooperative approach, guided by the mindset of co-

operative stakeholders, might serve BRICS better in their efforts to transform the
current world order peacefully and constructively.
 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

Does BRICS Matter?­­­ global strategy to develop their international influence,

while at the same time promoting regional cooperation.
One prominent feature of the current international sys- With their global strategy, emerging powers are trans-
tem is tha­­­­t several key emerging economies are gaining forming their role: not only are they important trading
more space as influential global players. The acronym partners for the developed world, but also key develop-
BRIC was firstly identified by Goldman Sachs in 2001 to ment partners for the developing world. Despite these
characterize the growing economic potential of coun- economic achievements, their limited experience and
tries including Brazil, Russia, India and China. Since then capacity as real global players means that it is still very
the term BRIC has become a widely used symbol for the difficult for these emerging powers to reshape the world.
shifting of global economic power from developed eco-
nomies to major developing countries. Goldman Sachs In the past decade, the international community has wit-
forecast that BRIC economies could become as large as nessed BRICS members becoming more actively involved
the G7 economies by 20321. With South Africa joining in in world affairs. Individually, the BRICS countries are
April 2011, the political implication and global character prominent regional players, maintaining regional security
of the grouping was increased still further. and dealing with economic challenges either by working
through regional institutions or sometimes coordinating
»Emerging economy« is a theoretical term employed to with major external players. The political responses to
define the economic dynamics of developing countries. crises such as nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran,
It does not, however, adequately reflect their geopolitical peacekeeping in Haiti, the coup d’état in Honduras, and
and foreign policy impact. Translating economic power the separation of the two Sudans, have involved BRICS
into international influence, for instance by changing the members in either a supporting or lead capacity. Collect-
way that a country is perceived or treated, or by contrib- ively, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China)
uting to international public goods, is a difficult process. grouping has been working consistently on international
Considering their increasing international influence, this climate change negotiations since the 2010 Copenha-
article prefers to use the term emerging powers rather gen conference; the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa)
than emerging economies in order to describe the mul- grouping is working on promoting UN Security Council
ti-dimensional power of BRICS members. reform and regional development in Africa; and the
BRICS grouping is aiming to build a fairer and more just
It is noteworthy that, with the exception of Russia, these world order by increasing the role of developing coun-
emerging powers are for the first time in their history tries in the global governance system.
acting as real global players. China’s previous dominant
influence was mainly established in the East Asian region This proactive posture on the international stage reflects
during an era that preceded the modern international the fact that emerging powers see their future in a more
system based on state sovereignty. Similarly, India’s tradi- deeply integrated role in the international system and
tional power was mainly limited in the South Asian area. the globalized world. In order to create a better external
Both Brazil and South Africa have only a relatively short environment for their domestic development and to pro-
history as strong regional players and limited global par- tect their increasing overseas interests, the BRICS nations
ticipation experience. have become an entity that is both exploring internal
economic opportunities among its members while at the
As regional powers, BRICS countries realized that pro- same time promoting the reform of the current global
jecting their influence onto the global level cannot be governance system. The reform of existing global insti-
achieved by relying exclusively on regional bases. In fact, tutions is becoming a priority for BRICS members. Such
their regional leadership is often still contested, both by reform would enable these institutions to be used to pro-
regional rivals and global powers from other regions. tect the BRICS group’s increased systemic interests and to
Against this backdrop, most emerging powers adopt a reflect their values and visions for the future world order.
Exemplary for this heightened engagement in global gov-
1. Jim O’Neill and Anna Stupnytska, »The Long-Term Outlook for the ernance, the subsequent sections will reflect on efforts
BRICs and N-11 Post Crisis,« Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No: undertaken by BRICS with regards to UN peacekeeping,
192, December 4, 2009, 3. http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/
brics-at-8/BRICS-doc.pdf. the reform of the Security Council, the G20 and interna-

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 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

tional financial institutions, as well as the prospect of the ness to support any peacekeeping mission during the
New Development Bank. 1970s.4 South Africa is also a major contributor to the
UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Russia has contrib-
uted $22 million to the UN’s peacekeeping operations in
UN Peacekeeping and„ Lebanon, Ivory Coast and in Darfur.5 A lack of sufficient
the Responsibility to Protect funding is one of the main challenges for collective action
at the UN. Declining military and financial contributions
All BRICS countries are key UN members when it comes to to UN peacekeeping operations from G7 countries, par-
maintaining international peace and security. Both China ticularly as a result of the budgetary constraints triggered
and Russia are permanent members of the UN Security by the international financial crisis, have boosted the im-
Council. Others within the group are frequently elected portance of the contributions of either military personnel
as non-permanent members of the Council. In fact, in or financial resources made by BRICS countries to UN
2011 all BRICS countries were on the Council. Most of peacekeeping.
them make valuable contributions to UN peacekeeping
operations by providing troops, training, or voting for UN peacekeeping is facing more complexity as internal
supportive mandates. Besides peace operations, BRICS conflicts have increased. Internal conflicts on the African
members consider the UN to be the most legitimate continent, manifested by violent armed struggles
institution for adopting collective action for restoring between governments and opposition or militia groups,
and keeping peace such as preventive deployments and have repeatedly left BRICS facing dilemmas around the
post-conflict peace-building. All member nations want notion of sovereignty, especially when humanitarian
the UN to play a central role in international peace and crises require external intervention. The attitude of
security affairs; a role that has expanded from interna- BRICS towards the concept of »Responsibility to Protect
tional conflicts to domestic turmoil, global pandemics, (RtoP)« is a key dimension for evaluating their depth of
transnational terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of peacekeeping determination in this regard. RtoP, as it
mass destruction. In view of the importance of the UN was adopted by all UN Member States in 2005, stipulates
in dealing with international security affairs, BRICS coun- that each individual state has the responsibility to protect
tries are trying to play a greater role within the UN frame- its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-
work, either by contributing more available resources or ing and crimes against humanity. If a state cannot – or
by promoting reform of the UN Security Council. deliberately does not want to – assume this responsibility,
the international community is tasked to step in and, as
Most BRICS members are regular UN peacekeepers. a last resort, the Security Council may have to authorize
These deployments enable emerging powers to assume a coercive intervention. In general, BRICS countries are
their international responsibilities and, at the same time, hesitant to vote for military action in the UN Security
to train and exercise the overseas military operation Council. This cautious posture can be explained by their
capacities of their armed forces. Policymakers in Brazil history as victims of external power interventions: a pro-
consider peacekeeping to be part of the price that the cess that resulted in the adoption of strict interpretations
country has to pay to be among the nations that make of sovereignty. It is in this light that recent voting on Libya
the rules. As a result, the country has sent troops to take and Syria has reflected the concerns of BRICS countries
part in half of the approximately 60 UN operations since about UN Security Council resolutions being abused by
1948.2 India has contributed nearly 100,000 troops, and Western powers. However, in the case of Libya, BRICS cri-
participated in more than 40 missions,3 as well as con- ticized the way that the intervention was implemented by
tinuing to provide eminent Force Commanders for UN NATO rather than the RtoP principle itself. Consequently,
Missions and training to military officers from many dif- to prevent future abuses of the authorization of military
ferent countries. China now has a record of international means in RtoP cases, Brazil proposed the norm of »re-
peacekeeping commitments spanning the globe, which sponsibility while protecting«.
represents a big departure from the country’s unwilling-

2. »Brazil and Peacekeeping: Policy, not Altruism« The Economist, 4. See Bonny Ling, »China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy,« International Re-
Sep 23, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17095626. lations and Institutions, No. 1, 2007, p. 47.
3. http://www.un.int/india/india_and_the_un_pkeeping.html. 5. http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/10/29/59547139.html.

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 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

Though the UN upholds basic normative standards on a High-Level Panel was created that came up with two
the use of force, it will take emerging powers more time alternative recommendations for reforming the Council.
to accept RtoP than it took them to accept peacekeeping The first plan was to invite India, Japan, Brazil, Germany
norms. It is difficult for emerging powers to acknowledge and two African states to join the Council as permanent
that human rights norms should be considered to have members without a veto. The second plan was to adopt
primacy over national sovereignty. This is partly because rotating members rather than add new permanent mem-
of their history of colonization and partly because, as bers. Resistance from regional peers and the unwilling-
rising powers, they have no intention of playing an ness of the P5 to push for real reform meant that neither
aggressive international role. However, the increasing plan was able to muster sufficient support. Without a
scope of their international ambitions, coupled with the determined drive under US leadership, the necessary
growth in their vested interests overseas, has meant that regional consensus, and an imperative systemic threat
emerging powers are being challenged to rethink their to global security, the obstacles to reform of the Council
attitudes towards RtoP on two counts. The first challenge seem insurmountable. Even if the BRICS’ non-permanent
for BRICS countries is that by adopting an overly cautious Council members, together with Germany and Japan,
or even a »non-cooperative« approach on RtoP, they could win two-thirds of the UN General Assembly, the
might influence the chances for UN Security Council re- decision would still require domestic legislative ratifica-
form: established Western powers might conclude that a tion by two-thirds of the member states, including all P5
reformed UN Security Council with new BRICS members members.
might make it even more difficult for the council to reach
any resolution, thus reducing the political will of estab- The growing influence in global governance of regional
lished powers to permanently accommodate these new institutions and the politics of groupings composed by
powers within the UN Security Council. The second chal- different states for different topics makes it imperative
lenge for emerging powers is that their increasing over- to reform the composition of the Council and to make
seas interests make it more difficult for them to stay away it more effective. In general, BRICS is a relevant group in
from countries that turn out to be RtoP cases. Emerging the debate surround Council reform. Two of its members,
powers are becoming the main investors in, importers namely China and Russia, are permanent members of the
from, and exporters to regions where most peacekeep- Council, while the other three are among the most prom-
ing efforts have been undertaken. In the Middle East for inent candidates for future permanent membership. All
instance, China and India are the main importers of oil, BRICS members agree that the UN needs comprehensive
but also the primary exporters of goods to the region. reform, including reform of the Security Council to make
The Arab-South American summits have underlined the it more effective, efficient and representative. After the
importance of the region for Brazil. Broader involvement first round of BRICS summits, it has become clear that,
of this kind might be creating opportunities for emerging although they support the aspirations of Brazil, India and
powers to assume their responsibility. In the future, the South Africa to play a greater role in the UN, China and
decisions of BRICS countries on RtoP cases are therefore Russia do not explicitly back the ambition of these coun-
likely to be more pragmatic and interest-based rather tries to become permanent members of the UN Security
than ideological. Council. Any forging of a clear, unified and firm position
among the BRICS nations on this question would surely
change the dynamics of Council reform.
Reforming the Security Council
As for the established Western powers, their biggest
The UN Security Council has frequently been criticized as concern is the uncertainty about how emerging powers
a reflection of the world of 1945 rather than the world of would behave if they did obtain permanent seats on the
today. The Council is seen as increasingly anachronistic, Council. Even though Brazil, India and South Africa are
failing to reflect shifts in global power or include even emerging major democracies, their approach to interna-
a single country from Africa or Latin America on a per- tional affairs tends to be similar to that adopted by the
manent basis. Bringing the Security Council up to date is global South. As discussed above, emerging powers are
therefore the core item on the UN reform agenda. Under hesitant to use the Council’s coercive tools to defend in-
the leadership of then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ternational norms. For instance, there has been concern

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 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

that India might try to import its nonaligned rhetoric into complicate efforts to reach a consensus on India’s per-
the Council.6 Conversely, its aggressive approach during manent Council seat.8
the Apartheid period and its desire to play a leadership
role in Africa have made South Africa very reluctant
to tackle regional instability by contributing to any ex- The G20 and the Reform of
ternal intervention. It clearly prefers regional solutions ­International Financial Institutions
to regional affairs. In another example, Brazil’s efforts,
together with Turkey, to mediate in the Iranian nuclear The story of the evolution of the G20 has a lot to tell
issue in 2010 were not appreciated by the P5 of the us about the complexity of today’s world economy
Security Council. Brazil’s closing ranks with other BRICS and the rising influence of emerging economies in its
members in the Council votes on Libya and Syria also management. The G20 summit is the first international
left a negative impression among established Western platform with a structure that fundamentally reflects the
powers. After what they saw as the bad precedent set distribution of economic power in today’s world. The
by the Libya case, the BRICS group united to oppose the countries around the table account for about 85 per-
stance taken by Western powers and prevent a repetition cent of global GDP.9 The group was established at the
in the Syrian crisis. As debates on norms like the protec- level of finance ministers in 1999 in a bid to solve the
tion of civilians in armed conflicts and RtoP have reflected problems facing emerging economies as a result of the
the lack of consensus between emerging and established Asian financial crisis. G20 meetings were promoted to a
powers, the latter have felt less inclined to go along with summit level, not least with the help of China and Brazil,
the push for reform of the Council’s composition. and mainly with the goal of tackling the problems then
facing developed economies due to the financial crisis of
Some commentators have argued that it is important 2008. But the G20 summit was not only created to solve
to discard the concept of a single BRIC bloc in order to the problems of developed economies with the help of
understand the future prospects for the UN.7 Accord- emerging economies, but also to maintain stability in the
ing to this line of reasoning, there are three categories world economy by universally managing the impact of
of power. The US is in a category by itself and prefers highly-risk financial instruments.
direct action. The second category comprises the other
four permanent members of the Security Council. These The first BRIC summit also took place during the 2008
countries are skeptical about Council reform, which they financial crisis, focusing on how to understand the crisis
fear would dilute their influence. The third category is and how to work together within the G20 to reform in-
the have-nots, including half of the BRICS group. For ternational financial institutions. The main achievements
them, Council expansion would bring prestige, influence of the G20 included a $1.1 trillion global recovery plan
and bargaining power, but little actual responsibility or and increased IMF resources. BRICS countries in particular
commitment since they are not well enough prepared contributed to both packages. China launched an im-
to assume great power responsibilities abroad. What pressive domestic stimulus plan while Brazil transformed
emerges is a complicated picture of the Council reform itself from being a decade-long debtor into a key contrib-
efforts. Without mutual trust based on common norms, utor to the IMF. In exchange, the IMF Governing Board
behavioral approaches, and shared interests, it is difficult agreed on a transfer of IMF voting shares to emerging
to see substantial reform of the Security Council. The economies. Also, other governance efforts, such as the
political unity among BRICS members still lags far be- G20’s initiatives on a Financial Stability Board, financial
hind their aspiration to reform the UN system. Tensions regulatory policies, mutual assessment mechanisms, and
in Sino-Indian relations over the Dalai Lama and border the development agenda, are all highly relevant to the
disputes between the two sides are just two issues that futures and concerns of emerging economies.

6. Stewart Patrick and Preeti Bhattacharji, »Rising India: Implications for

World Order and International Institutions,« http://www.cfr.org/projects/ 8. See Jagannath P. Panda, »Beijing’s Perspective on UN Security Council
world/rising-india-implications-for-world-order-and-international-institu- Reform: Identity, Activism and Strategy,« Portuguese Journal of Interna-
tions/pr1545. tional Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 24-36.
7. See G. John Ikenberry & Thomas Wright, Rising Powers and Global 9. Robert B. Zoellick, »Five Myths about the G-20,« The Washington
Institutions, the Century Foundation, 2008, pp. 1-34. Post, October 28, 2011.

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 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

In all these bodies, BRICS countries have augmented their the funding resources available to the IMF are limited
legitimacy through their increased integration into the and an approach based on increasing contributions from
world economic system. All of them are major economies emerging economies in exchange for voting share reform
in their own regions and influential members in the World is needed. Lastly, the IMF needs to enhance its role in reg-
Trade Organization. Its newly-obtained WTO member- ulating and supervising international financial markets to
ship might improve Russia’s economic outlook, especially avoid systemic risks.
given that the country’s financial power is relatively small
and its political leverage is largely based on the influence Both the G20 and institutions like the IMF are working
of the Russian energy sector on consumers in Europe hard to prevent the collapse of the international eco-
and Asia. China and Brazil were the main beneficiaries of nomic system. All major economies are supporting these
the IMF quota reform in 2008. Brazil, China, Russia and efforts. However, there is intense competition among
India were the major bonds buyers of the total IMF quota the major economies within the G20 and other relevant
increase as part of the 2009 reform. Emerging powers institutions for special interests and influence. While the
China, India, Russia and Brazil will see their quota shares United States and other major powers share a compelling
increase from 3.996%, 2.442%, 2.494% and 1.783% interest in protecting the global system from collapse,
in 2008 to 6.394%, 2.751%, 2.706% and 2.316% re- within that system they have every incentive to compete
spectively. The structure of the Board of Directors will be for political and economic gain.11 The US and Europe
adjusted to minimize the privileges of European countries should transfer some rights to the emerging powers in
by reducing the number of their directors by two, and exchange for a greater contribution of financial resources
by ensuring that all directors are elected rather than ap- to the IMF. With the increasing diffusion of global power,
pointed. any reform of international institutions will be impossible
without positive cooperation between both established
Under the current international monetary system, BRICS and emerging IMF members. However, the slow pace of
countries have accumulated huge foreign reserves. In the recovery of the world economy has prompted stake-
view of the devaluation challenge of these reserves for holders from the developed world to express less willing-
the US Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing monetary ness to implement the agreed 2010 IMF governance and
policy, emerging powers have suggested either promot- quota reform. Backward steps like this might well reduce
ing the status of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) or pushing the impetus among BRICS to cooperate with developed
forward the internationalization of their own curren- countries within the G20 framework.
cies.10 From the perspective of the BRICS grouping, there
are some aspects that need to be reformed. Firstly, the
diversification of international reserve currencies should Prospect of New Development Bank
be accelerated, and a rational international currency sys-
tem is needed. Secondly, disequilibrium in the balance of The fifth BRICS summit in South Africa on 27 March
payments on a global scale is of serious concern. Since 2013 took place under the overarching banner of »BRICS
the late 1990s, the current account surplus in emerging and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and
markets has been increasing while the current account Industrialization«. The fifth gathering was important not
deficit in the United States as an investment destination only because it successfully concluded the first cycle of
for emerging markets has been increasing. Thirdly, the BRICS summits, but also because of the broad agenda
decision-making mechanism at the IMF is dominated by and the institutional and substantial initiatives that were
a few actors, such as the United States and European approved. Among these, the decision to establish a New
countries. The mechanisms for selecting senior IMF Development Bank is the most relevant development for
managers are not transparent, and the standard criteria the rest of the world. The initiative was originally raised
are based on nationality rather than expertise. Fourthly, during the BRICS summit in India. The feasibility and vi-
ability of setting up such a bank were reviewed over the
10. The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 period of a year before the fifth BRICS summit decided
to supplement its member countries‹ official reserves. Its value is based
on a basket of four key international currencies, and SDRs can be ex-
changed for freely usable currencies. Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the 11. Bruce Jones, »Beyond Blocs: The West, Rising Powers and In-
People‹s Bank of China, argued that the SDR has the potential to act as terest-based International Cooperation,« Policy Analysis Brief, October
a super-sovereign reserve currency in 2009. 2011, The Stanley Foundation.

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 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

to go ahead and establish the New Development Bank. Conclusion

Though the headquarters, head, and initial contribution
and funding allotments are still to be decided, the sum- With their increasingly comprehensive power, BRICS
mit statement says that initial contributions to the Bank countries will definitely have the capacity to contribute
should be substantial and sufficient for it to be effective more to international public goods. The agenda at the
in financing infrastructure. fifth BRICS summit included almost all the major issues
currently facing the world: international security, devel-
The initiative to establish a New Development Bank is a opment, the world economy and human rights, etc. This
part of general efforts on the part of the BRICS group was not just in response to calls from the international
to promote international development and reflects their community to face up to daunting global challenges. The
understanding of where the priorities lie when it comes BRICS know that it is in their own interest to raise their
to promoting development. According to current inform- international status and protect their expanding global
ation, the Bank will mainly provide financial support to interests. To deliver such goods, BRICS states will mainly
infrastructure projects in developing countries. From the work through current international institutions such as
perspective of both BRICS members and most African the UN and IMF; however most of these institutions
countries, infrastructure spending is a key item for sus- continue to be dominated by the interests and norms
tainable development. But the fact is that infrastructure of Western powers. A mutual and gradual process of
development in developing countries still lacks sufficient adaptation will be required to accommodate emerging
long-term financing and foreign direct investment, espe- powers into the system. The key to this process will be a
cially investment in capital stock. Furthermore, investing cooperative spirit and a pragmatic approach rather than
in infrastructure is not a priority for the World Bank’s loan any zero-sum game or block thinking.
policy. African countries hope the New Development
Bank will also enable foreign reserves built up by BRICS Since the current global governance structure has mainly
members to be invested in their continent’s infrastructure been created and led by established Western powers,
sector. emerging powers should use their collective influence
to reshape the international system to reflect their own
The question of the future relationship between the New concerns. With the emergence of the G20 summits, the
Development Bank and the World Bank is a big concern old pattern of G8+5 or Outreach 5, with its unequal
for developed countries and developing ones alike. As a and ad hoc character, has lost its dynamic. The BRIC/
newly established bank, the New Development Bank will BRICS summit was initiated to create a new platform for
have a lot to learn from the World Bank while, at the same emerging powers to work together as a group of rising
time, encouraging the World Bank to rethink its policies powers that are both willing and able to play a collective
on international development. Some observers have role in international affairs. What emerging powers are
already predicted that there will be competition between pursuing collectively is a new international political and
the two banks as the emerging-market institution has the economic order built on the principles of multi-polarity,
potential to lend more capital at cheaper rates and with justice, fairness and democracy. As newly influential
less conditionality than traditional Washington facilities.12 members of the current international system, emerging
Whatever their relationship, the New Development Bank powers wish to increase their voice in the global gov-
will provide additional financial sources for developing ernance structure in order to reflect their perspectives
countries, which is likely to have a very positive impact on and interests. They are working together to make global
efforts to improve the current global governance system. governance structures more representative and effective
One thing is clear: investing in infrastructure represents a through peaceful and gradual reforms. In this context,
solid investment in the future.13 the BRICS group is not conceived as a counterbalance
to the established western powers; it seeks instead to
pursue a more effective or equal interaction with them
to build a better world order for humanity.
12. Samuel George, »BRIC by BRIC: Building an Alternative to Bretton
Woods Development,« Bertelsmann Foundation Report, April 4, 2013.
13. Bunn Nagara, »BRICS Bank: Doing Development Differently?«, South
Views, No. 59, 12 April 2013.

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 NIU HAIBIN | BRICS in Global Governance

BRICS remain wary of becoming »responsible stake-

holders« or partners in maintaining the Western order.14
Emerging powers resisted many Western liberal policies,
from humanitarian interventions to financial deregula-
tion, and object to conditionality requirements imposed
by Western dominated institutions. The sluggish efforts
of developed partners to reform the current international
financial institutions have also reduced the willingness
among BRICS members to cooperate. The creation of the
New Development Bank is an important initiative because
it will contribute to global governance in a way that the
BRICS feel is appropriate. This might all appear to be a
catalogue of reasons why Western countries might see
the BRICS as a stumbling block rather than a progressive
force. But a reluctance on the part of Western countries
to cooperate in reforming current institutions is perhaps
making just as much of a contribution to the problem.
As to reform of the Security Council: the international
community could encourage the P5 to accommodate
emerging powers by providing 2 or 3 long-term rotating
seats within the UN Security Council, and ensuring that
these seats are open to all countries and can be reelected
every six years. Offering them a more substantial stand-
ing on the Council would be a good way of previewing
the performance of emerging powers.

14. Cynthia Roberts, »Building the New World Order BRIC by BRIC,« The
European Financial Review, Feb/Mar 2011, p. 8.

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About the Author: Imprint

Dr. Niu Haibin is Assistant Director at the Institute for Interna- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Global Policy and Development„
tional Strategic Studies and Research Fellow at the Center for Hiroshimastr. 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany
American Studies, both at the Shanghai Institutes for Interna-
tional Studies. Responsible:„
Catrina Schläger | Resident Director FES Shanghai „
This article is an updated version of the »BRICS in Global Gov- Hubert René Schillinger | Coordinator Dialogue on Globalization
ernance: A Progressive Force?« which was published by FES New
York, April 2012. Phone ++49-30-269-25-7415 | Fax: ++49-30-269-35-9246„
http://www.fes.de/GPol/en

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