Today is Thursday, August 15, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

55 and the resolution of said court en banc of December 5, of the same year, denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision.

, is a civic and benevolent institution engaged in the promotion and development of the character, patriotism, courage, self-reliance,
the petitioner as scout executive, holding such position and rank from 1948 up to her dismissal from the service on June 1, 1954. Re
thereof. On January 29, 1954, respondent filed charges with the National Bureau of Investigation against Exequiel Villacorta, Chief S
of the Philippines, Jose B. Vargas, bringing to his attention the charges she had filed against Villacorta with the NBI. She also sent an
nt of the Philippines, to scouters all over the Philippines, and to all the delegates to the 15th Annual Meeting, National Council, Boy Sc

a letter to respondent, which is self-explanatory, and which we quote below:

al Executive Board of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, to the effect that you have engaged systematically in activities inimical to the
s:

equiel Villacorta, Chief Scout Executive of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, with the President's Complaints and Action Commission

us newspaper offices in the City of Manila, and sent copies thereof to various Scouters in the City of Manila and the provinces, notwit

l has your complaints under consideration, and that the report of the NBI agent, in charge of the case, has not been submitted to nor
and/or mailed copies, thereof to the delegates.
 ing that no delegates had taken up the subject matter of your complaints at the Council Meeting, you proceeded to see Mr. Rafael Ya
were made the subject matter of Mr. Yabut's broadcast in the morning of May 12, 1954.

eply to the above specification of charges, and explain within 72 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for yo

mical to the interests of the BSP, but trying to justify the same.

que A. Lolarga, Sergio Bayan, F.E.V. Sison, Eugenio Padua, and Teodoro K. Molo, the latter reserving his vote, filed a report with the
udged in the light of her past record, is such that her continuation in the service of the scouting movement in the Philippines is highly p
1, 1954, sent a letter to respondent dismissing her from the service of the BSP.

air labor practice, alleging that her dismissal was in violation of Section 4, Subsection (a), paragraphs 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 875
the case. On October 4, 1954, the BSP filed a motion to dismiss the case among other grounds that the CIR had no jurisdiction over
sdiction. By the order of October 14, 1954, the CIR deferred action on the motion to dismiss, until trial, so that all questions of law an

ainst it;

without prejudice to all privileges accruing in her favor, from June 1, 1954 up to her reinstatement;

to remain posted therein for thirty (30) days from the date of this decision becomes final and executory.

d Arsenio I. Martinez, concurring, denied the motion for reconsideration, while Associate Judge Juan L. Lanting, took no part. As alrea

s of the case.

nd the respondent a labor or industrial dispute cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations?

which involved the question of whether the employees of said hospital were entitled to extra compensation for working at night and w
led by the U.S.T. Hospital Employees association, for lack of jurisdiction, and we held that inasmuch as the Santo Tomas University H
may not be considered as industrial employment, and that their controversy with the hospital regarding additional pay cannot be con

lege vs. National Labor Union, et al., 97 Phil., 787, 51 Off. Gaz. 5636, where this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, held that
y controversy or dispute they may have with the College in connection with or arising out of their employment does not come within th

. (12) 6175, respectively, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jugo, held, citing the Santo Tomas University Hospital case (supra), that "wit
sation Commissioner requiring the Quezon Institute to pay indemnities to two employees of said Institute who contracted tuberculosis
 he employees of the Red Cross filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila, claiming overtime pay, including payment for s
onwealth Act No. 444, did not apply to said employees of the Red Cross, this Court affirmed the order of dismissal, and through Mr. Ju
demand as a matter of right the application to them of the Eight Hour Labor Law.

Hospital, San Beda College, Quezon Institute, and Philippine National Red Cross, supra, it was claimed that none of these cases is in
trial Court has no jurisdiction over the present case, but rather to show that this high Tribunal has laid down the doctrine that labor leg
d operated for charity, education, etc., and not for profit or gain, as far as the relationship between the management and its employee
o extend to the workers in these charitable and educational organizations, the benefits of extra compensation for overtime work and
t, Republic Act 875, also a labor law, has no application to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.

urt of Industrial Relations, 91 Phil., 840, and Government Service Insurance System vs. Castillo, 98 Phil., 878, 52 Off. Gaz. (9) 4269, s
aged in the production of goods nor in seeking monetary gain, Metropolitan Water District having been established to render public s
still we held that the Industrial Court had jurisdiction under Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, to settle disputes between said en
em are government corporations or entities engaged not in governmental functions, but rather in proprietary functions of the Governm
strikes for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and conditions for employment of employees in the Govern
sewerage service it renders, it charges compensation, sometimes at a rate which in the opinion of the consumers is above the value
so that after many years, the property, resources and assets of the Metropolitan Water District will be far in excess and beyond its or
would be a sizeable, if not a tremendous gain for the Government. Besides, any increase in pay, extra compensation, monism, etc.,
ely, the Metropolitan Water District can in no sense be considered a charitable, benevolent, or philanthropic institution. And as to the
its insured. Surely, said insurance entity does not operate for charity, but in practice operates for profit or gain for the benefit of those

ain, be considered as engaged in an industry so that its relation with its employees may be governed by the Industrial Peace Act, Re
ognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations?

t for profit but for more elevated purposes, charitable, humanitarian, etc., like the Boy Scout of the Philippines, is included in the defin
ct which may be considered unfair labor practice, within the meaning of said Republic Act, would come under the jurisdiction of the C

e National labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act; that said Wagner Act contains Similar definitions of "employer" and "emplo
ofit organizations and charitable institutions fall within the scope of the term employer within the meaning of the Wagner Act, and on t
nder our Industrial Peace Act, and so any unfair labor practice committed by the management of said institution would come within th

er Act and the corresponding Act 875:

obvious implication is that the Wagner Act and later as amended, made an express exemption or exception in favor of all those entiti
efinition of employer. Naturally, the Federal courts in interpreting this part of the Wagner Act and finding that the exemption or except

ons, such as any individual employed in the domestic service or any person employed by his parent or spouse. Such exemptions are
mption under our own Industrial Peace Act. For instance, there can be no question that under our Industrial Peace Act, the Republic
ndividuals employed in the domestic services, like private or domestic drivers, housemaids, kitchen help, etc., should be excluded. Fro
sary exemptions or exceptions, but left it to the courts for interpretation and application. For this reason, the decided by the United St

interpretation of Republic Act 875, cannot be considered applicable, even relevant. The Wagner Act, a Federal legislation, was prom

omulgate the Wagner Act is that dealt with and involved interstate commerce, otherwise, the Federal Congress would have no jurisdic
reign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations Board, and for other purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)

k of commerce and flow of commerce:

al by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which ha
urrent of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods
e channels of commerce.

of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership-association
ustry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.

argain collectively safeguards from injury, impairment or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recogn
orking conditions, and by restoring equality or bargaining power between employers and employees.

n substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
ves of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protectio

n among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory
e or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country. (Emphasis supplied.)

eliminate the causes of the interruption or obstruction to the free flow of commerce among and between the States and between the U
ong as its activities cross state lines, and that any labor dispute between it and its employees may affect. obstruct, or interrupt intersta
on why in the Federal cases cited, specially in the case of The Polish National Alliance vs. N.L.R.B. 322 U.S 643, and the N.L.R.B. vs
ct. In the first case, The National Labor Relations Board found that the Police National Alliance was engaged in unfair labor practice.
owing:

accident benefits to its members and their beneficiaries. Incorporated under the laws of Illinois, it is organized into 1,817 lodges scatte
outstanding, in 1941, 272, 897, insurance benefit certificates with a face value of nearly $160,000,000.00. Over 76% of the certificate
eign government bonds, bonds of various States and their political subdivisions, railroad, public utility, and industrial bonds, and stock
out over $38,000,000 in mortuary claims.

anizers and field agents in twenty-six States whose traveling expenses are borne by Alliance and who receive commissions for new m
, endowment, and term coverage. These Policies contain the typical loan, cash surrender value, optional settlement, and dividend pro
s, and reinsures substandard risks with an Indiana company.

ois. The councils elect delegates to the national convention, and it in turn elects the executive and administrative officers. The Censo
ed to persons living outside of Illinois.

t amply shows the web of money-making transactions woven across many State lines. An effective strike against such a business en
e state lines. Stoppage or disruption of the work in Chicago involves interruptions of the steady stream, in and out of Illinois, of bills, n
e effect of such interruptions on commerce is unmistakable. The load of interstate communication and transportation services is lesse
le in interstate industries, railroads and other public utilities. In 1941, it acquired securities in an amount in excess of $11,000,000, an
state enterprises in which the large assets of Alliance are invested. That such are the substantial effects on interstate commerce of d
retofore been challenged. Considerations like these led the Board to find that petitioner's practices 'have a close, intimate, and substa
g commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7),' and as such, prohibited by Section 10 of the Wagner Act, 29 USCA, Section

xxx xxx xxx.

justified in finding that the unfair labor practices found by it would affect commerce. And the undoubted fact that Alliance promotes, a
 e Board could find that its cultural and fraternal activities do not withdraw Alliance from amenability to the Wagner Act" (Polish Nation

al, the National Labor Relations Board certified to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, the enforcement of its ord
d that it is a non-profit charitable institution not engaged in trade, traffic, commerce, or transportation within the meaning of the Nation
nvolved the sale of medical services and supplies for which it received about $600,000 a year and it purchased from commercial hous
"such activities are trade and commerce and the fact that they are carried on by a charity hospital is immaterial to a decision of this is
e by English and American common law cases, going back to 1793.

tional Labor Relations Board therein created, Rothenberg in his book on Labor Relations, p. 311, says the following:

merce or the alternative view that the basic state commerce, under either position the elements of interstate commerce is an integral a
ct is scrutinized carefully, it will be found that the applicability of the Act itself and the jurisdiction of the Board is predicated on two ele

t a later and appropriate point.

t must be remembered that this was passed by Congress in exercise of its right to control and regulate interstate commerce and it wa
ly a proper subject matter, but also an involvement of interstate commerce. (Emphasis supplied.).

dered. Republic Act 875 is concerned only with regulating relations between management and labor, not commerce or the flow of co
entities created and operated for profit, engaged in a profitable trade, occupation, or industry. The law itself is called "An Act to Prom
Then Section 10 entitled "Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to the National Interest", provides that when in the opinion of th
d in mind and what it intended the law to govern were the industries, whose meaning is too obvious to need explanation. Surely, insti
lleviating the suffering of humanity and in developing the character in the youth of the land, in furnishing milk to babies of the indigen

arly, the Federal Labor Relations Act, including the labor relations acts of the different States. Naturally, American authorities interpre

nnsylvania Labor Relations Act, and particularly, whether the Salvation Army was governed by it. A union of hotel and restaurant emp
wenty-eight employees and it had declined to bargain collectively, and asking that the Board investigate the matter. The petition was
sentatives for the purpose of collective bargaining. Upon exceptions, the Board upon hearing, dismissed the exceptions and reaffirme
vania, the latter cited the case of Western Pennsylvania Hospital, where it was decided that the State Labor Relations Act did not app
and by express terms the Act must be liberally construed. We quote:

ot possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract. Employers in many instances, organized in corporate or other forms
adversely affects the general welfare of the State by creating variations and instability in competitive wage rates and working conditio
e people; (2) increasing the disparity between production and consumption; and (3) tending to produce and aggravate recurrent busin
s, and other forms of industrial strife and unrest, which are inimical to the public safety and welfare, and frequently endanger the pub

d bargain collectively removes certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, encourages practices fundamental to the frie
ployees. . .

aw and the mischief to be remedied we are drawn irresistibly by the language used to the conclusion that the Legislature meant to lim
tainly do not relate to charitable or eleemosynary associations. It appears too plain for argument that the Legislature intended all of th

s Acts that said Act and our Industrial Peace Act are similar, at least in basic purpose.
ch is in point. It would appear that the members of a trade union, working as non-professional employees of St. Lukes Hospital, sough
lies. It seems that the Labor Relations Commission took action on the petition for certification. The Hospital filed action against the Co
ission from taking any further action in the certification proceedings. Acting upon the appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu
iction over the petition for certification filed by its employees. It would also appear that the State Labor Relations Act is similar to our

antial obstructions to trade and industry arising from disputes between employers and employees by removing the basis of such dispu
own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.

representatives selected by the employees as their bargaining agency, to define the units for such representation, to decide, whethe

olves an interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act itself, after which, as already stated, our Industrial Peace Act is patterned.
employees. The Board found that the labor organizations represented by the Teamsters were employers with respect to their own em
policies of the Act (National Labor Relations Act) would not be effectuated by asserting jurisdiction in the proceeding". From the action

Courts of which have held that charitable institutions, like hospitals, are not exempted from the provisions of their labor relations laws
unfair labor practice for having refused to bargain with the union with which its employees were affiliated, for the reason that said Soc
ons in contained exceptions, it was presumed that any institution not excluded in said exemptions was covered by the law. Moreover,
as the Industrial Peace Act, and there is every reason to believe that it applies and was intended to apply only to industries, not to ch

es Union, 294 N.W. 215, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the Northwestern Hospital was not exempted from the operation of t
e Wisconsin Supreme Court decision about the exemptions contained in its Employment Peace Act are applicable to the Minnesota S
so exempted would naturally come under their operation. But even if we assume that the court decisions in these two States hold tha
etts as more reasonable and more in keeping with the spirit that pervades our Industrial Peace Act.

ter has been rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its decision in National Labor Relations Bo
bia was interpreting and applying the Wagner Act, which as we have already explained, was intended to cover only entities and instit

ated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations by the vote of many natio
eople. We see no incompatibility between said recognition by our country of the right to self-organization and the non-application of ou
Peace Act entitled "Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government," provides that government employees may belong to any labor or
uts, or a charity hospital organizing themselves into an association or in joining a labor union. The line is drawn only when they try to

abor relations laws, not excluding our Industrial Peace Act. When a person or a group of persons organizes and operates a business
laborers. The state feels that when the capitalists and management make substantial and sometimes excessive profits, labor should
asonable share in said profits in the form of more reasonable wages, better working conditions, etc. So, labor relations acts were pas
ng it an unfair labor practice for said management to refuse to bargain, or to discriminate or take measures of reprisals against the em
entities or institutions are organized not for profit, but for humanitarian, charitable, benevolent and analogous purposes, then the situ
me from voluntary contributions, endowments, government subsidies, etc. Oftentimes, the top executives and officials in these organiz
o the use and benefit of the persons from whom they were intended. Naturally, the reason for the promulgation and operation of thes
pay higher wages. Besides, the application of these labor relations acts to these charitable institutions would in some cases be disas
time purposely sought when there was a raging epidemic of say, influenza or cholera; the activities of the hospital will then be paraly
or even prevent said employment and hiring of substitutes by picketing the hospital premises. The same would be true with employe
ch as a destructive typhoon, flood, earthquake, etc., thereby paralyzing the activities of said Red Cross and preventing it from extendi

om Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight Hour Labor Law, to the Industrial P
eir industrial employees, but not to organizations and entities which are organized, operated, and maintained not for the profit or gain
or disputes and unfair labor practice, does not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and consequently, the Court of Industrial Re

pondent.

certiorariof a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

ainst it;

without prejudice to all privileges accruing in her favor, from June 1, 1954 up to her reinstatement:

to remain posted therein for thirty (30) days from the date of this decision becomes final and executory.

and conclusive upon Us—denying a reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. We quote from said resolution:

s the president, of a labor union of employees in the Boy Scouts of the Philippines named 'BSP Employees Welfare Association'. At t
s. When he heard about the union, he called an emergency meeting of directors and exerted them to desist from getting on with the o
oes not need any union'. He also instructed the employees not to join the union, and the directors to convince every employee not to

draft proposals for collective bargaining, she gathered from the members certain facts and data which pointed to the existence of ser
ve, was allowing his wife to transact business with the BSP; that Mrs. Villacorta was using the BSP, thus utilizing official property for p

V. Araos on February 1, 1954 filed formal charges against Mr. Exequiel Villacorta with the National Bureau of Investigation. Copy of t
Finding no response or reaction on these charges from the BSP authorities, Mrs. Araos sought action from the 15th Annual Meeting
Mr. Exequiel Villacorta.' This memorandum was signed and distributed by her in her capacity as President, BSP Employees Welfare A

ed by the complainant.

ee, on May 18, 1955, addressed a letter to Mrs. Juliana V. Araos informing her that 'A report and complaint have been received by Pr
e Boy Scouts of the Philippines, with total disregard and defiance of the duly constituted authorities of the Boy Scouts of the Philippin
ines, with total disregard and defiance of the duly constituted authorities of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.' The letter gave Mrs. Ar

ns for her activities in filing charges against the Chief Scout Executive and denying that those activities were inimical to the best intere

and complaint filed against Mrs. Araos, particularly on her activities which respondent considered to be inimical to its best interests.

ed its report on the record of service and activities of Mrs. Araos and on the basis of such record and activities recommended her im

based reviewed the activities of Mrs. Araos culminating in the filing by her of charges against Mr. Villacorta and ended up with this st
 llacorta.

charges of which he was found guilty by the NBI and allowed him to resign enabling him to collect as gratuity a sizeable sum.

gs, against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, took place therein, according to the decision appealed from, from which we quote:

omplaint, charging respondent of having committed unfair labor practices in contemplation of Section 4, sub-section (a), paragraphs (4

d for cause and not for union activity; that she was not discriminated in regard to her connection with or her tenure of employment; tha
n of employees under her supervision in accordance with Section 3 of the said Act; and that respondent is not covered by Republic A

3, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, deferred the consideration of the above-mentioned motion to dismiss until the termination of the trial, s

d unfair labor practices against the complainant, and as affirmative defenses, it reiterated its stand in its motion to dismiss.

ms.

motion to dismiss, and found the same untenable, upon the ground that respondent herein was not a "supervisor", as the term is defin

the following conclusion:

at Mrs. Juliana V. Araos is one of the organizers of the BSP Employees Welfare Association of which she is the president of the same
deal business transactions with the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and that Mrs. Villacorta delivered her merchandise using the Boy Sc
st the chief scout executive, Mr. Exequiel Villacorta, because there was graft and corruption in the BSP office which was tolerated by
nes sent a letter to Mrs. Araos informing her that 'A report and complaint have been received by President Jose B. Vargas, and the N
es, with total disregard and defiance of the duly constituted authorities of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines', but no investigation or he
rest of the institution was that stated in the findings of the Personnel Committee, the pertinent portion of which stated: 'Instead of takin
s was dismissed by the respondent's Personnel Committee for having filed charges against the respondent's chief scout executive. F
n the meaning of Section 4, subsection (a), paragraph 5, of Republic Act No. 875, could be traced at the door of the management of t
gation, was thrown out of employment, the official who was found guilty of those charges was allowed to resign and collect his gratuit

st Mr. Villacorta but for engaging in activities inimical to the best interests of the BSP and for disregarding and defying duly constitute
charges against the Chief Scout Executive, or in acts in prosecution of the same. The statement of the Personnel Committee in its re
nvey the idea that the organization and leadership of a labor union is the antithesis of taking care of the welfare of the employees, and
dores only', that the 'BSP does not need only union', in his instructions to the employees not to join the union, the cumulative effect of
is already a form of employer interference prescribed by the Act. There is therefore, sufficient substantial evidence in the record to ju
of legitimate labor organization. This dismissal being traceable to her union activities is clearly an unfair labor practice within the mea

abor union and became its president" (despite the advise, of the Chief Scout Executive, Mr. Villacorta, to the contrary, for the "organiz
ut Executive, which culminated in his resignation.

d the provisions of section 4 thereof, defining unfair labor practices, are applicable to petitioner herein, the Boy Scouts of the Philippin
without investigation or hearing, on account of her union activities.

ercial nor an industrial enterprise, but a civic and benevolent institution engaged in the promotion and development of character, patri
ociation vs. Santo Tomas University Hospital, 95 Phil., 40; San Beda College vs. National Labor Union, 97 Phil., 787, 51 Off. Gaz. 56
on of the Court of Industrial Relations. The Marcelo case was an action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The issue th

rivate, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the

s, except in the case of compulsory arbitration in labor disputes "in industries indispensable to the national interest", under section 10

uestion was whether the claimants were engaged in "industrial employment" under the Workmen's Compensation Act (No. 3428), sec

trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, except domestic service. (Emphasis ours.)

n Act, and the absence of a similar provision in the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), indicates that the latter does not follo

onwealth Act No. 103, section 4 of which says that said "Court shall take cognizance . . . of any industrial or agriculturaldispute causin
decision in the San Beda case was based upon the ruling in the U.S.T. case, and this, in turn, was premised upon the theory that the
he issue before Us.

rary. In Metropolitan Water District Worker's Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 91 Phil., 840 and Government Service Insurance
e aforementioned instrumentalities of the Government, on the one hand, and its employees, on the other, despite the fact that the for
pply and sewerage service" to the inhabitants of Manila, and other political subdivisions (Acts Nos. 2832, 3109 and 4079; Com. Act N
86, sec. 3; Rep. Act Nos. 660, 728 and 1123.).

onetary gain" because

t a rate which in the opinion of the consumers is above the value of said service, resulting in general complaints and petitions for redu
nd assets of the Metropolitan Water District will be far in excess and beyond its original capital or investment, and any time or when th
mendous gain for the Government. Besides, any increase in pay, extra compensation, bonus, etc, which may be demanded by and gr

schools or colleges and say, paraphrasing the majority opinion: . . For the . . . service" the school "renders it charges compensation,
enses incurred by the" school "is utilized to expand its facilities and resources, so that after many years, the property resources and a
ble, if not tremendous gain for the" school. "Besides, any increase in pay, extra compensation, bonus, etc., which may be demanded
could be said about the U.S.T. hospital and other similar institutions. Yet, in the U.S.T. Hospital and the San Beda College cases (su

, is the mainand ultimate goal of the institutions under consideration, as determined by the charter of its organization or the law creati
evenue, 95 Phil., 16: American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil., 386, 54 Off. Gaz. (7) 2187; Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, 319
in a particular year. Surely, Congress could not have intended to place in the hands of the parties sought to be regulated by law, the

nd derived from the contributions of government employees, in huge amounts and at substantial interest, and the profits made therefr
This, aside from the fact that insurance has been generally considered and even held by the courts to be a business.

ed "for the benefit of those insured by it," I can not see how it may be deduced therefrom that the System seeks profit or gain. A char
fit organizations. Pursuant to the line of reasoning in the majority opinion, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines should be regarded as se

the profits derived from the investments "are in part distributed as dividends among its insured", this is made merely to reduce the co
the dividends received by them. Certainly, this does not convert the System into an institution seeking monetary gain. Thus, mutual s
ed exclusively for the benefit of its members, corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable
 exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, and other similar enterprises, are expressly exempted from the tax on corporations (S
general.

No. 186) declares positively that the same was created "to promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the Government o
he method by which it operates or conducts its business" (In re First National Safe Deposit Co., 173 S.W. 2d 403, 351 Mo. 423). Like
urce." (Roche's Breach vs. Comm. 96 F 2d 776.).

of his union activities. The right to form and join labor organizations was not in issue in any of said cases. Hence, the question involv

ct No. 875. Paragraph (a) thereof reads:

owered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by an

So long as there is an unfair labor practice to be prevented, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. The acts constituting such unfair la
ed" in section 3, is unfair labor practice. Said section 3, in turn, provides:

zations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
ization of employeesunder their supervision but may form separate organizations of their own. (Emphasis ours.).

o therein? Are employees in charitable institutions within the purview of said section 3? What "employers" are referred to in the aforem
this Act:

xxx xxx xxx.

or indirectly but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacit

yee of a particular employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a co
sis ours.).

rtly "modelled . . . after the U.S. National Labor Relations Act", otherwise known as the Wagner Act (Act of July 5, 1935). Construing t
sistently and uniformly, in one (1) decision of the Supreme Court of the United States—

ernal benefit society providing death, disability and accident benefits to its members and their beneficiaries—

o a charitable hospital;

others, a chamber of commerce;

it cooperative news association;

orporation composed of farmers, business and professional people;

ornia Corporation composed of employers"—and.

. 329-330 and 26 A.L.R. [2d] 1022)—

ng with a chamber of commerce;

it hospital.

Court of Appeals in Associated Press vs. N.L.R.B. (supra) (see 301 U.S. 103, 133, 81 L. ed. 953, 961) and refused to review the deci

ase at bar because of: (a) the difference between the definition of the terms "employer" and "employee" under Republic Act No. 875 a

or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway

yees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
t shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or persons at his home,

e Wagner Act:

st two (2) cases only. However, section 11 of the same Act2 specifically places, also, beyond the meaning of said term, (a) "the Gove
eir terms and conditions of employment," which are governed by law. Accordingly, the Industrial Peace Act removes from the import
abor Act. But this is not really an exception, because such persons are subject to said special Labor Act (which has no counterpart in
gner Act.

n as the Taft-Hartley Act, which, among other things, amended the definition of the term "employer" under the Wagner Act by increas

ngs inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual').

rt of the net earnings" of which "inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual"—have been consistently held to be sub
R. 3020)—which, upon approval, became said Taft-Hartley Act—sought to exclude from the operation of the law all charitable instituti

Bill's definition which would have established charitable and kindred purposes as a basic test of 'employer' status, it seems evident th
 an 'employer' under the Act. (Emphasis ours; Page 330.)

ployer", under Republic Act No. 875, the majority opinion concludes "that our Legislature, in drafting the law, particularly the portion d
gree with this conclusion, for the following reasons:

te—what "our Legislature . . . did not deem it necessary or advisable to make the . . . necessary exemption or exceptions. "As above
had under the Wagner Act, and includes charitable or non-profit organizations.

from its operation some charitable institutions, namely, hospitals "no part of the net earnings" of which "inures to the benefit of any pr
ment of our Industrial Peace Act. Thus our Congress has implicitly, but clearly, rejected said restriction imposed by the Taft-Hartley Ac

f a particular employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conseq

the foregoing, the following qualification:

c service of any family or persons at his home, or any individual employer by his parents or spouse.

he Wagner Act, leads to no other conclusion than that Congress did not intend to subject the term "employee" to the limitation found i
es, but, also, more, namely, all charitable and non-profit organizations. Apart from being, to my mind, untenable, from a syllogistic vie
er, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise." Republic Act No. 875 does not explicitly state the charitable and non-profit organization

ase, the majority opinion points out the fact that the Wagner Act was approved to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening of o
ction 2 (6) of the Wagner Act:

mong the several States or between the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between any foreign country and any State or other T
y other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country. (Emphasis ours.)

al ventures involving several states of the Union, but, also, undertakings affecting the "traffic, . . . transportation or communication" be
e engaged in interstate commerce? Charity implies that he who practices it does not thereby seek his financial advantage and is not

. Central Dispensary Emergency Hospital (135 F. 2d. 852), have been stressed in the majority opinion in order to show, apparently, th
rein to any monetary profit realized—for there were none—in the operation of the Polish National Alliance and the Central Dispensary

anizations, the big amount of their respective capitals, the great number of employees and/or persons involved in the operation of ea
Relations Board is, under the Federal Law, competent to hear unfair labor practice cases involving charitable or non-profit organization
nver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 95 L. ed. 1284; Office Employees International Union vs. N.L.R.B., 235 F. 2d. 832;
ption of jurisdiction by the Board, not to demonstrate, either that the institutions in question were commercial establishments organize

ndition precedent to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is one of the features which has not been incorporated into
sactions seeking financial advantage. In the language of the explanatory note to the bill which later became Republic Act No. 875,

shown the need for further safeguards to the right of workers to organize. The attached bill seeks to provide these safeguards, follow

t charitable and non-profit organizations are subject to the Wagner Act, which is the declared pattern of Republic Act No. 875, prefers
 of America, particularly, the Federal Labor Relations Act, including the labor relations acts of the different States.

gislation in the United States of America, particularly the Federal Labor Relations Act" (in general). It was specifically modelled after t
Act No. 875 are quoted on the margin.4 Neither was it patterned after "the labor relations Acts of the different States." Said explanator

xxx xxx xxx.

vary depending upon the language of the statute involved. In New York, for instance, "employees of charitable, educational and relig
—Minnesota. Wisconsin and Utah—follow the Federal view aforementioned, in—

294 N.W. 215, involving " a non-profit, charitable corporation operating a public hospital;

Wis. 78 7 N.W. 2d. 590, involving a "church society organized as a non-profit corporation; and

d 1012, involving a "charitable hospital."

a. 382 [1941] Salvation Army case (1944), 349 Pa. 105. 36 A 2d. 479), and Massachusetts (St. Luke's Hospitals vs. Labor Relations
etts case had been decided—the soundness of the view of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in its two (2) decisions cited above (a
as Circuit Justice. In this connection, the majority opinion in the case at bar says: We cannot subscribe to this claim or contention." B

an exemption of charitable hospitals. In the interpretation act the Pennsylvania court held that even though the words might be broad
cannot understand that considerations of public policy deprive hospital employees of the privilege granted to the employees of other
hose states, present what seems to us the only tenable view as to the spirit and policy of such statutes. (Emphasis ours.)

tion, were those given in Northwestern Hospital vs. Public Building Service Employees' Union (supra) and Wisconsin Employment Re
erein had been rendered by said federal court. Incidentally, the same could not mention the Supreme Court of Utah, because its deci

tained in the formal act prior to 1947 amendment specifically exempting charitable hospitals were within the average of the state act
ning with a union since it was guilty of an unfair labor practice, where the union sought to establish itself as the collective bargaining
strikes and strife in labor relations, the court said that there was no reason why the position and rights of workers in a hospital were n

ct No. 875 was approved on June 17, 1953, years after the Wagner Act had been consistently applied to institutions seeking no mater
Section 2 (c) of said Republic Act No. 875, adhering in principle to the definition in the Wagner Act. The inevitable conclusion, therefo

and has been judicially declared — "a fundamental one." (National Labor Relations Board vs. Jones S. Laughin Steel Corp., 301 U.S
y 15, 1891 [Rerum Novarum] par. 38, and the Encyclical of May 15, 1931 [Quadragesimo Anno], par. 30). In short, it is not a right me
y Central Council 257 US 184, 209, 66 L. ed. 189, 199). Our Industrial Peace Act guarantees said right and encourages and protect it
rd, 237 Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791).

of the Constitution), as well as the right of association under the Bill of Rights (Art. III, section 1 [6].Both constitutional mandates — it i

rt. 23[4], adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, on December 10, 1948, by the vote of 48 nations, including the Phi
y." I cannot see, therefore, how we could say-what the eight (8) abstaining members of the UNO dared not say-that the right do apply
haracter of the right to self-organization. It has, also, undertaken "to promote respect" therefor and "to secure" the universal and effec
ublic Act No. 875 was passed in faithful compliance with the aforementioned commitment, made by the Philippines less than five (5) y
and it provisions for the protection of said right, are applicable to employees, may lead to a serious implication in the international field

not being as industrial organization, whereas and legislation is entitled "An Act to promote industrial peace and for other purposes" an
imes, it is used as synonymous with labor, work, employment, toil, laboriousness, diligence or perseverance (Roget's International Th
a body (see Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, 1952 ed. p. 1255). At other times, it is used to refe
vs. Arter, 63 S.E. 2d. 572, 574, 135 W. Va. 391: People vs. Maggi, 39 N.E. 2d. 317, 318, 378 Ill. 595). In a more restricted sense, ind
334). As a consequence, the adjective "industrial" is, also, used to refer to matters pertaining, either, (1) to labor, or (2) to trade and c
ense is the term used in Republic Act No. 875?.

United States of America, particularly, the Federal Labor Relations Act. Thus, our lawmakers have merely substituted the term "indust

at the phrases "industrial peace", and "industrial dispute", found in said Act, simply mean, respectively, "peace in the relations betwe
s called upon to settle issues involving "labor-relations" or controversies or disputes between capital and labor, and between employe

ole, applies only to laborers or employees in factories or mercantile establishments and to the latter. There are several provisions in s

ant to section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, excluded from the operation of said Act, only in the sense that the "terms and conditions of
of employment". Said section provides, also, that "such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
ment including but not limited to governmental corporations." In other words, the right to self-organization is extensive to all employees
or profit or not.

whereby either party thereto promises: (a) "not to join, become or remain a member of any labor organization"; or (b) to withdraw from
of said Act. It is clear from the broad and emphatic language used in said section 8 that same applies to any and all contracts of emp

olving or growing out of labor dispute." Section 12 prescribes the rules governing the "exclusive collective bargaining representation fo
and the "handling of grievances", are the subject-matter of sections 13, 14, 15 and 16, whereas section 17 touches on the "rights and
eements," the holding of "labor-management conferences", the organization of an "advisory Labor-Management Council", the "study

public Act No. 875 — apart from the Court of Industrial Relations — has applied it to charitable or non-profit organizations. Thus, for
organizations, such as the U.S.T. Employees and Laborers Association, the U.S.T. Hospital Employees Association(U.S.T. Hospital
ection 23 of said Act, which creates the Position of Registrar of Labor Organizations, defines his duties, prescribes the procedure for t
n. Said section 23 merely qualifies and expands the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 213, which declares that "a legitimate labor
onsistent with the laws of the Philippines," which is substantially identical to the definition given by Republic Act No. 875, pursuant to

ment of Labor, and includes any branch or local thereof. (Emphasis ours.).

ewise registered in the Department of Labor, are legitimate labor organizations,," under both laws, and have been considered subjec

us declare that Republic Act No. 875 does not apply to enterprises not engaged in trade or industry — strict sense — or to its laborers
es Employees Welfare Association or of the association of the Employees and laborers of other non-profit or charitable institutions, if
or any of said labor organizations should fail to file, either "its financial report." or "the names of its new officers along with their non-su

e, are merely passing upon the applicability to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines of the provisions of said Act relative to unfair labor pra

r legislation from Commonwealth Act No. 103 creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight-Hour Labor Law, to t
es of profit and gain, and their industrial employees, but not to organizations and entities which are organized, operated, and maintain
 acter, patriotism and kindred virtues in the youth of the nation, etc.

and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of profit or gain and their industria
fair labor practices, does not apply to the Boys Scouts of the Philippines."

f Republic Act No. 875 relative to labor, disputes and unfair practices, on the one hand, and the remaining provision of said Act, on th
" and "universal" right, "inherent" in "all members of the human family" Accordingly, if some provisions of said Act are applicable to la
r enterprises of the provisions guaranteeing the right to self-organization, defining unfair labor practices, and determining the jurisdict

egulating the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes; and (2) section 10, authorizing compulsory arbitration "when in the opinion of th
ese provisions to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines is not an issue in the case at bar. It has not been raised in the pleadings. Under th
reof, where the employer is a non-profit organization. like the Boy Scout of the Philippines.

such organization from striking, if the President entertained the opinion and issued the certification referred to in section 10. I believe

ilar civic organizations, should expand the operation thereof to such degree, that, in the course of time, a substantial portion of the re
e of such magnitudes as to require the determined and concerted efforts of everybody; and that, taking advantage of this situation, th
strial Relations and an order thereof prohibiting the strike would not be feasible under said section 11, even if the President were of th
ecause of the modern trend to shift to civic institutions the burden of providing relief to the needy.

cited in the majority opinion, in support thereof, is authority favor of respondent herein. Petitioner therein, a labor union, had charged
ard said — it asserted jurisdiction" only in exceptional circumstances. It held also, that the activities of said unions were such that the
disturb the action of the board, upon the ground that its decision "fell within the broad discretion which seems to be established as ap

urisdiction over the issues raised and over the parties. However, said Board had, under the federal law, discretion of exerciseor not sa
ed the doctrine, laid dawn by the Supreme Court of the United States in National Labor Relations Board vs. Denver Bldg. & Const. Tr

d to take jurisdictionof a complaint, Board sometimes properly declines to do so, stating that the policies of the Act would not be effect

o lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.' Section (7) of the National Labor Relation
y situations adversely affect commerce when judge by the full reach of the constitutional power of Congress. (Polish National Alliance

on, the Board found — and the Circuit Court did not disturb the finding — that the respondent unions were "employers" with respect t
anizations." This confirms the fact that term "commerce", as used in said Act, does not refer solely to enterprises seeking, material ga

organization and the non-application of our Industrial Peace Act to charitable institutions. The employees and laborers in these charit
t government employees may belong to any labor organization provided that said organization does not impose the obligation to strik
on or in joining a labor union. The line is drawn only when they try to compel the management to bargain and if refused, resort to coer

el the management of petitioner herein to bargain with the labor union organized by Mrs. Araos, or to resort to coercive measures whi
mselves into labor unions and operate the same, if they could legally be dismissed for joining a union or por engaging in union activitie
or organizations and — if the majority opinion were correct — thus placed them at the mercy of the employer, for he could thereby im

of the right to self-organization, when employees in charitable institutions are involved, may be sought from the ordinary courts of jus
 of Industrial Relations "over the prevention of unfair labor practices" is exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of adju

anization of "employees" under section 3 of the Act. As used therein, "the term 'employee' shall include any employee and shall not b
ation.

n thereof must be deemed part of our law. Referring to the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed itself in th

the proceeding by its own complaint, the conduct of the hearing, the adjudication and the granting of appropriate relief. The Board as
ct in order to remove obstruction to interstate commerce.

o enforce it. For that purpose the Board is empowered to petition the Circuit Court of Appeals for decree of enforcement. The court is
ay order the Board, its member or agent, to take it. The Board may then modify its findings of fact, and make new finds. The jurisdict
on or group, or by any employee or group of employees, to secure enforcement of the Board's order. The vindication of the desired f

on to prevent and redress unfair labor practices, and, taken in conjunction with section 14, establishes clearly that this bill is paramou
nt administrative or quasi-judicial authority in connection with the development of the Federal American Law regarding collective barg
rson from the procedure provided in section 10, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice listed in sec. 8 'affe
hus made the paramount agency for dealing with the unfair labor practices described in the bill.

es, and especially to the power to reinstate employees with or without back pay, the Committee confined:

ted are matters of public concern, by their nature and consequences, present or potential; the proceeding is in the name of the Board
re by the law declared to be detrimental to the public weal." .

r upon the Board to prevent any unfair labor practice, as defined, — a power not affected by any other means of 'prevention that has
ment. The decree in no way alters, but confirms, the position of the Board as the enforcing authority. It is the Board's order on behalf o
remedy.' Both the order and the decree are aimed at the prevention of the unfair labor practice. If the decree of enforcement is disobe
h the violation of its decree as a contempt. As the court has no jurisdiction to enforce the order at the suit of any private person or gro
ed Edison Co. of New York, 309 US 261 265-270, 84 L. ed. 738, 742-744; Emphasis ours.)

1949. Convention No. 98, concerning the application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, was appro
employment", more particularly in respect of acts calculated to "cause dismissal or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union m
members in their establishment, functioning or administration" (Art. 2). In this connection, it will be recalled that courts in the United S
less than a month before the approval of said convention, a resolution had been passed to the effect among other things, that "labou
, 1951, Vol. 11, p. 694).

ion of several Conventions adopted by the International Labour Conference from 1948 to 1951. Among these conventions were said

nd, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organization, of their own choosing without previous authorization. (

ce undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to

at the same is "substantially in accord" with said convention No. 98, and that the ratification of the same and that of said Convention N
mentioned, unless the contrary should appear in a positive and clear manner, and, I think, it does not so appear.
strial Peace Act," the majority says:

etimes excessive profits, labor should receive a reasonable share in said profits in the form of fair wages . . . Naturally, the reason for
se or occasion for resort to coercive measures like strikes, in order to force these institutions to bargain and pay higher wages. (Emph

n which it is predicated, the intent to give to the laborers a share in the "substantial and sometimes excessive profits" made by the "c
on-profit organizations, the majority deduces that the same are not subject to said laws. In short, this inference either overlooks the o

will be noted that no legal provision, decision, explanatory note, portion of the Congressional Record, or opinion of any recognized a
ons are subject to the Wagner Act — after which our Republic Act No. 875 has been modelled — and, also, to the Taft-Hartley Act (e
on for the purpose of gain," (sec. 39 [d], as amended by Republic Act No. 772), Republic Act No. 875 contains no similar provision, th
es excessive profits," a share therein, then the employer would have been exempted from liability by law whenever the operation of h
"when the capitalists or management" do not make any profit, or, even, if they made some profit, "when" the same is neither "excess
reof, it is not only already refuted by the other portions of the majority opinion, which concedes the applicability of the Industrial Peace

ct No. 875 apply to charitable and non-profit organizations, because its employees might demand higher wages and stage strikes pre
ned consequences. Independently of whether Republic Act No. 875 applies or, not to charitable or non-profit institutions, its employee
ubject to Republic Act No. 875, as the majority opines, the Court of Industrial Relations could not exercise the authority granted there
, as advocated by the majority.

, but also, during normal times — when staged in important sectors of trade or industrial, like those engaged in supplying electric pow
Act No. 875 was enacted precisely to avert such consequences.

n the assumption that strikes as promoted by the organization of labor unions, which, in turn, is encouraged by Republic Act No. 875.
rough judicial interpretation. The majority opinion is permeated by the feeling that Republic Act No. 875 tends to obstruct industrial pe
ween employers and employees, and that is prone to accentuate or increase the differences between them. Needless to say, this is n

set forth in the title and in section 1 thereof, which are borne out by the other provisions of said Act, its objective is to "eliminate the c
by "the settlement of issues respecting terms and conditions of employment through the process of collective bargaining", by advanc
he parties to collective bargaining" agreements, through adherence to certain rules, specified in said Act, "in the negotiations and adm
ned that its provisions be applied to all employees not expressly exempted therefrom, as well as to all employees, "unless the Act exp
greatest possible number of employers and employees and/or classes thereof.

ef and opinion underlie the philosophy of the law. In fact, they constitute its spirit and essence, which it is the duty of the courts of jus
6 Phil., 234, 238; Director of Lands vs. Abaja, 63 Phil., 559, 565). The role of said courts is to settle justiciable controversies by the ap
Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S., 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 234). In the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for this Court, in Quintos

et and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. Emphasis ours.).
uaranteed in section three;

ot join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;

of any labor organization or to contribute financial or other support to it;

tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act or any other
erein, of such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section twelve;

oyee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under this Act;

bject to the provisions of sections thirteen and fourteen.

hree, provided that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquis

e in violation of subsection

ship in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which mem

tative of the employees subject to the provisions of Section thirteen and fourteen.

deliver any money or other thing of value in the nature of an exaction for services which are not performed or not to be performed." (

mployment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to b
any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall ap

operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty of children or
otherwise intended to influence legislation." (Emphasis ours).

ng legislation on the subject of industrial relations. It views the problem of industrial relation, as a whole and consider its various aspe

e principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, which was approved by the International Labor Conference in the co

ose its will upon the other. It is, therefore, of primary importance that workers should be enabled to possess a bargaining power at lea

shown the need for further safeguards to the right of workers to organize. The attached bill seeks to provide these safeguards, follow

xxx xxx xxx.

tes' National Labor Relations Board. The Court of Industrial Relations is given the power to prevent unfair labor practices while the De
e bargaining unit (employer, unit, craft unit, or plant unit) may be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employ
n a company or plant. (Emphasis ours.).

uth Africa, USSR, Yugoslavia.

e hereafter made, whether written or oral, express or implied, constituting or contained in any contract or agreement of hiring or emp

, become or remain a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization; or.

ll withdraw from an employment relation in the event that he joins, becomes or remains a member of any labor organization or of any

nfair labor practices defined in section four hereof." (Italics ours.).

yees of their right to self-organization"-and, according to its explanatory note, to provide "further safeguards to the right to workers to

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