CASES PART II (TORTS & DAMAGES) Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

MEANING OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE (a) there must be an act or omission;

Chan vs INC
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
-em-

Facts: (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and

The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by Chan. It is located in Sta. Rita East,
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent.

The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation
washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a retired general which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on
allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. respondent’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the
Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement which stipulated that “any respondent on the other.
damage within or outside the property of the first party (Chan) incurred during the
digging shall be borne by the second party (Yoro)”. Further, the MOA discusses the
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are
division of wealth in case hidden treasure is found during the digging. After some time,
joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
Chan was informed by the members of the INC that the digging traversed and
quasi-delict is solidary.
penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel
was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the
respondent. The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer
him clear of any liability.
A complaint against petitioner was filed by the respondent before the RTC.

Chan avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate,
argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of
must be given weight by the courts. a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.

Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had
provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within
Issue:
or outside petitioner’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner
WN the MOA entered into by Chan and Yoro has the effect of making the latter solely from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.
responsible for damages to the respondent?
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed the
respondent’s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the
diggings, his security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller.
Held:

No. Chan is still liable. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: MAMADOR and GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents.
-zyka-
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
FACTS:
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-corporation
(Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance
was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on because there was the employer’s prohibition. Many courts hold that violation of a
its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances.
another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in However, there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
the death of said Mamador and injury to the others. promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be an
evidence of negligence.
Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased. [Criminal Case No. 1491] He has paid nothing however, to the latter. This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation than
The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the the rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of as possible evidence of negligence; but it declared that under the circumstance, the
compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death. laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed,
since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
Petitioner maintains that this claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify Moreover, the Commission has not declared that the prohibition was known to
the heirs of the deceased and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said Mamador. Yet the employer does not point out in the record evidence to that effect.
heirs and Macunat. Supposing Mamador knew the prohibition, said the referee, “can we truthfully say that
he boarded the fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the danger, if any
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which at all, that an ordinary prudent man would try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall in the presence of doubt, the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless of course, we
be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his can attribute to him a desire to end his life. Nowhere in the records of this case can we
find the slightest insinuation of that desire.”
employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; xxx” Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious”
negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross” negligence
It is the Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome constituted 3 — implying “conscious indifference to consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct
an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having which would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter disregard of consequences.”
the effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck
for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk was
heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by apparent.”
the court.

As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” The contention may not be sustained, TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE
inasmuch as all the widow promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution.

In addition, Petitioner claims that the deceased violated the employer’s prohibition Picart vs. Smith
against laborers riding the haulage trucks, thus, such violation was the laborer’s -pochi-
“notorious negligence” which, under the law, precludes recovery.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony. However, before he had gotten half way across
WON there is “notorious negligence” on part of the laborer which precludes recovery. the bridge, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As
the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
HELD: warning of his approach. However, being perturbed by the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
[Article 1173 of the New Civil Code defines negligence as the omission of that degree going to the left.
of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.] As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently
negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
without diminution of speed. threatened harm.

When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse Court held: As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car to escape that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved
hitting the horse but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for
toward the railing. In so doing, the horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.
violence.
In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
Thus, the petitioner sought to recover from Frank Smith, Jr., the sum of P31,000, as some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the
damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control
of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his
Court of First Instance: Absolved the defendant from liability. duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were
no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far
Petitioner appealed. away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.

Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon
ISSUE: the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an
was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he
done? YES, defendant was guilty of negligence. might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the
defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent
RULING: in the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular

case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, DISPOSITIVE:
then he is guilty of negligence. xxx that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her
rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. Xxx The question as the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned
to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of
the facts involved in the particular case.

xxx Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
 CONCEPT OF EMERGENCY RULE harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about
to be pursued?

Gan vs. CA A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule,
-monica- - one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and
- is required to act without time to consider the best means that may
Petitioner: Hedy Gan y Yu (Accused) be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
Respondent: CA
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
FACTS: may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."
In front of a house were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the
road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As Hedy
Gan’s car (Toyota) approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, a vehicle In the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
coming from the opposite direction followed by another tried to overtake and bypass resulting in Homicide.
the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused.
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, Gan swerved to the right and not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of
as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is
was about to cross, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for
appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the
The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to
the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged others.
on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck
sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. A certain Isidoro Casino was Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution
pronounced dead. with respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the
oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did have
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner. sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve
Trial Court: rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for her car to the light without stepping on her brakes.
the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence
CA: Modified TC ruling to Crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence and to Therefore, the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case
indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of P12,000.00 at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection
- CA suggested a course of action that petitioner should have taken: “accused with the incident under consideration.
should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite
direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its DISPOSITIVE:
left xxx” WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of
the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the
ISSUE: P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the
victim.
WON petitioner is negligent which caused the injury or damage? NOT NEGLIGENT

RULING:

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent
man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee
 Valenzuela vs CA The lower court found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for
-ron- damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to
Facts: Article 2180.

This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries Defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration. The trial
sustained in a vehicular accident. court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent
Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the
right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."
 At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a car from her restaurant to her home. She was Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate
travelling with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading to Manila. petitions before this Court:
 She noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place.
She has been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and  Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for
that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition. damages because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
 She parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
 She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car  On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the
driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it
 Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial
of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was court.
pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to
the middle of her thigh, with only some skin connected to the rest of the body. Issues:
 She was brought to a Medical Center where she was found to have a
1. Whether or not Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence in parking her
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to above the knee". She was confined in
car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking
the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial
zone. (no)
leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of
2. Whether or not Richard Li is guilty of negligence in driving his company-issued
the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
car. (yes)
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent: 3. Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. is also liable as the owner of the
car driven by Richard Li. (yes)
 He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining,
visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. Ruling:
 He was driving along the inner portion of the right lane when he was suddenly
Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness,
confronted with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
Rogelio Rodriguez. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven at a "very
with "full bright lights".
fast" speed. When he saw the car hit Valenzuela, he crossed the street, noting that a
 Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding
man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending vehicle to survey
with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see
the incident. Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car
because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's
device, and the area was poorly lighted.
car was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-
 He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was
serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not even know the
protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of
accident victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar
the right lane.
to his testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony
 He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the
deserves greater weight.
car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the
sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was 1. We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory
reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver. negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that our
required to conform for his own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard
standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, we believe Li's employer, Alexander
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
The employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of
without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was In providing for a company car for business use and/or for furthering the company's
brought by his own negligence. image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial
or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the can use the company issue capably and responsibly.
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which
is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his
of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office
the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting
night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These meetings,
so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients
likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the were both social as well as work-related functions.
emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone)
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised
because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to
motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora
Li. No allegations were made as to whether the company took the steps necessary to
Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full
and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation.
and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly
unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora during the accident.
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all
reasonable precautions.

2. Obviously, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND FREDDIE L.
the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an SUELTO, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ERLINDA V.
undue risk of harm to others." It is the failure to observe that degree of care, VALDELLON
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other -gaddi-
person suffers injury.
Facts:
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly
demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears * Erlinda V. Valdellon- owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No.
emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City.
had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial * The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC)- the owner-
evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. operator of a passenger bus.
* Suelto- employee of MALTC, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.
3. We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based
- at around 2:00 pm, was driving the aforementioned passenger bus along
on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards EDSA. The bus
servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the
 suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial * Section 35 of the law provides, thus: Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person
apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and
* Valdellon- filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper. . .
to property against Suelto. * Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the
* An Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if
* Suelto- during the trial, testified that at 2:00 p.m., he was driving the bus on its at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission,
way to Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. When he reached the corner petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly
of K-H Street at Kamias Road, Quezon City, a passenger jeepney suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private
crossed from EDSA going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied respondent.
by the bus. Suelto had to swerve the bus to the right upon which it hit the * It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution that the commercial
side front of the terrace of Valdellon's two-door apartment. apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage. It is quite reasonable to conclude
- On cross-examination, declared that he saw the passenger jeepney when it that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried
was a meter away from the bus. Before then, he had seen some passenger to avoid the passenger jeepney. The damages could not have been caused except by
jeepneys on the right trying to overtake one another. a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his
* RTC- rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident,
* Suelto- on appeal, further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal case the damages would have been less severe.
for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He * The severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a
maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be.
* OSG- posited, the burden was on Suelto to prove that, in swerving the bus What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the
to the right, he acted on an emergency, however, he failed to discharge this burden. commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was
* CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court. driving too fast in a usually crowded street.

ISSUE: W/N the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against
petitioner Suelto MCKEE vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
-joy-
NO.
* We find and so resolve that respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove FACTS:
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with
recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private respondent's Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge
apartment. along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a
* We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by the trial court head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate
and the appellate court, petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben
emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane of the Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose
bus he was driving. Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,
* It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto's defense that he and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh
acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and
intruded into the lane of the bus. Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred
* Gan v. Court of Appeals- Sudden Emergency Rule- One who suddenly finds himself (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort,
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge,
method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the
negligence.
* Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and
operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied
the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his
car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was  The stay of the newly wed Ruelito and his wife at the resort was by
the opposite lane, on the said bridge. virtue of a tour package-contract with respondent that included
transportation to and from the Resort and the point of departure in
As a consequence of the mishap, civil and criminal cases were filed against Galang. In Batangas.
the civil case, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which  Migual Matute, scuba diving instructor gave his account on the
"invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang. incident which led to the filing of the complaint.
ISSUE: WON Jose Koh negligent  According to Matute, he was with 25 other guest including
petitioners’ son and wife who trekked to the other side of the Coco
HELD: NAWP Beach Mountain.
 After the boat sailed, it started to rain which became stronger
RATIO: Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided causing the boat to tilt from side to side. The waves got more
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would unwieldy. After getting hot by two big waves, M/B Coco capsized
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. putting all passengers underwater.
 Help came after about 45 minutes. As a result of the incident, 8
IN THIS CASE: it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
passengers, including petitioners’ son and his wife died.
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two
 Respondent denied any responsibility for the incident which it
boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering
considered to be fortuitous event.
the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and  RTC dismissed the petitions which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals
could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
That respondent is a private carrier which is only required to
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
observe ordinary diligence, that respondent in fact observed
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence,
extraordinary diligence in transporting its guests on board M/B
if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his Coco Beach III, and that the proximate cause of the incident was a
squall, a fortuitous event.
own negligence."

Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find ISSUE:
that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting WON the death of Ruelito Cruz and his wife was due to a fortuitous event
them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
HELD:

 NO.
FORTUITOUS EVENT; ELEMENTS  The following are the elements of a fortuitous event:

1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of

CRUZ VS SUN HOLIDAY INC. the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been independent of
-jeanelle- human will;
2) The event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to
foresee, or if foreseeable, impossible to avoid;
Facts:
3) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the
 Spouses Dante and Leonora Cruz lodged a complaint against Sun debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner; and
Holidays Inc with RTC for damages arising from the death of their 4) the obligor must have been free form any participation in the aggravation
son Ruelito Cruz who perished with his wife on board the boat M/B of the resulting injury to the creditor.
Coco Beach III that capsized en route to Batangas to Puerto  To fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must
Galera. The resort was owned and operated by respondent Sun have been the proximate cause of the loss. And it should have exercised due
Holidays Inc.
 diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in
occurrence of the fortuitous event. Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there
 The squall that occurred during the voyage was not a fortuitous evince since was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents,
it was expected under the weather condition of September 11, 2000. they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
 Evidence shows that M/B Coco Beach III suffered engine trouble before it explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another
capsized and sank. there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of
God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable
 The incident was, therefore, not completely free from human intervention.
or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
 The respondent also failed to demonstrate that it exercised due diligence to
are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been
prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
squall. impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God
 Thus, respondent is liable for the death of Ruelito Cruz and his wife. doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence
of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into
the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of
NAPOCOR v. CA the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the
-em-
rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon
"Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their
Facts: negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near
the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their
properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike
opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the
one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause
residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and
people to take precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not
contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of
delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the municipalities
floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of
concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were
its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further
delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said
contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage
notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the
and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk
residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not
by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and
receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants
are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.
allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim,
as they do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice
Issues: has absolved them from liability.

(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the (3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the
typhoon is a fortuitous event damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum
absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was physical damage,
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no question
that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and
(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
injuria countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify
the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such ectent. Needless to say,
Held: petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous
event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation
 NEGLIGENCE PER SE AND WHEN NOTNEGLIGENCE PER - invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he
SE alleged was due to a fortuitous event.

- In support of his argument, he cites the following provisions of the Civil Code:
[G.R. No. 107968. October 30, 1996] ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or
E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when
APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC., respondents. it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
-zyka- obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
FACTS:

PETITIONER Elias Cipriano ART. 1262. An obligation which consists in the delivery of a
determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or
- Owner of E.S Cipriano Enterprises: engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred
under the style Motobilkote in delay.

Private Respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous
events, the loss of the thing does not extinguish the obligation, and
- On April 30, 1991, through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride
he shall be responsible for damages. The same rule applies when the
Peoples car to petitioners shop for rustproofing. nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.
- The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581. Neither
the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was specified. - testified that he employed an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting
in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. And had installed fire-fighting devices
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which
and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid
petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop.
of any negligence on his part
The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondents Kia
- He further averred that private respondents car was ready for release as early
Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from theft.
as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was private respondents delay in
Petitioner claiming it that was the cause of the loss.

- explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like materials

- claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was simply not enough
underneath motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the
time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which had been saved
materials and chemicals used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore,
because they were parked near the entrance of the garage he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due to fire
On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding - He also claimed that he was not required to register his business with the
reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No.
1572.
In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event.

Private Respondent Private Respondent

- brought suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against petitioner - argued that petitioner was liable for the loss of the car even if it was caused
- Alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the by a fortuitous event.
petitioner, citing petitioners failure to register his business with the - It contended that the nature of petitioners business required him to assume
Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as the risk because under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was required to insure his
required in the rules implementing the Decree property as well as those of his customers.
Petitioner Trial Court
 - court sustained the private respondents contention that the failure of - There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to
defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for
negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered
the car even if the same was caused by fire a fortuitous event,[13] this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability
for loss.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed

Hence, this appeal.

F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., vs. CA
ISSUE: -pochi-

[a] whether or not petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles Petitioner: F.F. Cruz (furniture manufacturing shop)
received by him in the course of his business; if so, Respondents: CA; GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE
MABLE and children
[b] whether or not his failure to do so constituted negligence, rendering him liable for
loss due to the risk required to be insured against.
TOPIC: NEGLIGENCE PER SE
HELD: We hold that both questions must be answered in the affirmative.
FACTS:
JURISPRUDENCE CITED:

In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a furniture shop The petitioner shop is adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Private
liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his respondent Gregorio Mable approached petitioner's plant manager to request that a
establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the firewall be constructed between them but was unheeded.
construction of a firewall.
Subsequently, a fire broke out in petitioner's shop and spread to private respondents'
In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to house. Both were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never
be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was discovered, but NBI found burned structures negative for the presence of
not only an act negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death. inflammable substances.

Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner.

SUPREME COURT

- Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent CFI: held for private respondents granting actual, moral, exemplary damages and
does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as atty’s fees
we recently held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals.[11] Petitioner's negligence is the
source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages
obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a
duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss
occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate
cause of the loss. ISSUE: WON petitioner was negligent making them liable for the injury caused?
YES, res ipsa loquitur applies to the case. Also, even without applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
- Thus, P.D. No. 1572, requires service and repair enterprises for motor accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and negligence. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.
Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order
No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage RULING:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is as follows:

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed
the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the case. CA reversed.
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable.
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA RULING: Decision affirmed.
448.]
RATIO: Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of
IN THIS CASE the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the
fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila
had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that
Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere fact of
in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible
violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was
material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and
the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has
lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that
violation of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner Dispositive: The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that

- petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the

residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance;
JONAS AÑONUEVO vs CA and JEROME VILLAGRACIA
- that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit -ron-
cigarette;
- that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and
- that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop xxx
Facts:

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct Petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the
a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of car which had struck him. The argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to install safety
negligence. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations devices on his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist himself
had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence (Teague v. Fernandez). caused the collision with his own negligence.

DISPOSITIVE: Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED Both RTC and CA adjudged petitioner Añonuevo liable for the damages for the injuries
sustained by the cyclist Villagracia.

TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ The accident occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at an
-monica- intersection in Mandaluyong:

 Villagracia was traveling on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the

FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-
opposite lane was driving his car.
appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture
situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the  The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s
afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials brother, Jonathan.
located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store  Añonuevo was making a left turn when the collision occurred.
and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute  Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four
Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes operations.
Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others
injured on account of the stampede. The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo
before the MTC, but the latter was acquitted of the criminal charge. Trial on the civil Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
action ensued, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
ordering them to pay Villagracia for actual damages, moral damages, and attorney’s violating any traffic regulation.
fees, as well as legal costs. Both defendants appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto. The provision’s applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is
no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage.
CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among them:
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached
 That it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had struck Villagracia. responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated
 That Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. The fact that there
causing a comminuted fracture. has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles,
 That as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion
Añonuevo was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left turn into that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher
Libertad. standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing
 That considering Añonuevo’s claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing with other types of vehicles.
his path as he made the turn, Añonuevo had enough warning to control his
speed. Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized
 And that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and vehicles, even if by analogy.
diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided. 2. Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia, this
Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious should not preclude any possible finding of negligence on his part.
conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is
negligence of Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. persons, of the time and of the place. However, the existence of negligence in a given
Issues: case is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but
rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.
1. Whether or not Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver
of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed a
of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles. (no) municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety
2. Whether or not Villagracia’s own fault and negligence (for transgressing a devices thereon. This view finds some support if anchored on the long standing
municipal ordinance requiring the registration of bicycles and the installation principle of negligence per se.
of safety devices) serves to absolve the Añonuevo of any liability for damages. The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes
(no) negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.
Ruling: In Teague vs. Fernandez, the Court cited with approval American authorities elucidating
1. Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn on the rule:
or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance. Nor was it duly "The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference
registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained.
ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to
his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil be the proximate cause of the injury."
Code applies by analogy. The provision reads: It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped
with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of
road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the
danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated.
But this is by no means a simple case. Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left the law, precludes recovery. The Commission has not declared that the prohibition
turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless was known to Mamador.
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s * Supposing Mamador knew the prohibition, can we truthfully say that he boarded the
car as it turned into the intersection. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the danger that an ordinary
have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially prudent man would try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even in the presence of
considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he doubt, the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless of course, we can attribute to
him a desire to end his life. Nowhere in the records of this case can we find the slightest
had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia
insinuation of that desire.
because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
* There is no doubt that mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not
the left turn. dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular
instance because there was the employer's prohibition. Does violation of this order
The failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous enough so as to negate monetary
constitute negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance
relief. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, constitutes negligence per se.
whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate * However, there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence
sustained. of negligence.
* This prohibition of the employer couldn't be of a greater obligation than the rule of
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) a Commission or board. And the referee of the Commission correctly considered this
meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Añonuevo would violation as possible evidence of negligence; but it declared that under the
have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that circumstances, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence since
Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility that the prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the riders.
the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident. Petition * Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not notorious
DENIED. negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as gross
negligence—implying "conscious indifference to consequences" "pursuing a course
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury" "utter disregard of
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO consequences. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's haulage truck couldn't
MAMADOR AND GERONIMO MA. COLL be gross negligence, because as the referee found, "no danger or risk was apparent."
-gaddi-

FACTS: SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.,

vs.
* Deceased Mamador together with other laborers of Marinduque Iron Mines Agents THE COURT OF APPEALS
Inc. boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio -joy-
Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work
at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the
company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said FACTS:
Mamador and injury to the others.
* Procopio Macunat- prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Bent panel truck of petitioner
of the deceased. Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and
the injuries of several others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in
ISSUE: Whether the act boarding the truck, which violates the employer’s Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of
prohibition, constitutes negligence per se. those who died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioner's
driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable
NO.
to private respondents.
* The most important aspect of this appeal is the effect of the deceased's having
violated the employer's prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks. The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-45, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one
Petitioner claims such violation was the laborer's "notorious negligence"which, under of the employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that
at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger
way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner's panel truck, jeepney ahead of it as well.
bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite direction.

Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence
CONCEPTOF PROXIMATE CAUSE
and, therefore, its liability should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It claims that
the driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules and regulations at the BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was -jeanelle-
presumed to be negligent.
Facts:
-overloaded
 Medina Transportation was operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina
-4 adults (including the driver accupied the front seats) under a Certificate of Public Convenience. Driver was Conrado Saylon
 18 passengers, the driver and the conductor were on board the bus wherein
- only one headlight Juan Bataclan was one of the passengers.
 One of the front tires of the bus burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until
because of his negligence (i.e., the aforementioned violations of traffic rules and it fell into a canal and turned turtle
regulations such as the use of only one headlight at night and the overcrowding at  Some passengers managed to get out of the bus but 4 including Bataclan
the front seat of the vehicle), he was not able to avoid a collision with the panel could not get out of the bus.
truck.  After half an hour, ten men came carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
approached the overturned bus, then a fierce fire started burning the bus
ISSUE: won the alleged aforementioned violation of traffic rules negligence per se including the passengers inside the bus and resulted to the death of the
passengers trapped including Juan Bataclan.
HELD: nawp  Petitioner, the widow of Juan Bataclan brought an action against Mariano
Medina.
Petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received
and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the Issue:
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
WON the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus.
substantially contributed thereto.
Held:
RATIO: Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the  Yes.
injury.  PROXIMATE CAUSE

IN THIS CASE: Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one - That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident," that efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and would not have occurred.
that the tact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded
"decreased [its] maneuverability," However, mere allegations such as these are not - The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
the contributing cause of the injury. The testimonies show that the driver of the panel natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
negligence of petitioner's driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner's responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioner's driver was person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
 default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Dra. dela Llana demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay. Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional
 The proximate cause in this case is the overturning of the bus. Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as
 The vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the a result of the vehicular accident. In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. had no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed between the
 That the coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to the call for vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (2:30AM), the accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and costs
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural of the suit.
area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.
 The coming of the men was to be expected and was a natural sequence of Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the met several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the
call for outside help. diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She
 The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of pointed out that she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as
the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. well as barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed
 According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road that she only hired Primero after he successfully passed the driving skills test conducted
walking back and forth. The driver should and must have known that in the by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked in the area in and around the bus. Dra. dela Llana’swhiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.
 The fact that gasoline was spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the CA: the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. preponderance of evidence.

De La Llana vs Biong
Issue:
-em-
Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
FACTS:
injury.
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997
Toyota Corolla car alongNorth Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was
seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan Held:
stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned
red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck suddenly rammed the car’s rear No. Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission
and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana.
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
any other visible physical injuries. In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began
between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to
to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became
establish a quasi-delict case are:
more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. Dra. Dela Llana (1) damages to the plaintiff;
needed to undergo operation of her spine and neck due to severe pain. The operation
released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery. whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
 (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show
damages.28 the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the
breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the
or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others.29 evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be
established.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before
Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. She should show the chain of causation between the trial court shows that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or
Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury.Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence
not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that
of Joel - arise. vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
this Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth of their judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces
of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with
Article 2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by
his employee." prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.

The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra- JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO,
contractual obligations. REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO and
MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
-zyka-
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of
evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.
FACTS:
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
PRIVATE RESPONDENT - owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City
are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
PETIITIONER - owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between
Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit
must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. respondent’s house.

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L.
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
Reyna.
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.
 - It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
and property of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
building be declared as a structural hazard. of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which
- In their Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
for damages based on culpa aquiliana, alleged that the damage to their house Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others foreseen nor resisted. Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that [f]ortuitous events may be
houses. produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods,
- Sought to recover from petitioner payment for damages epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by
bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.
PETITIONER
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary
- In its Answer, averred that subject school building had withstood several that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the
devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of
any portion thereof giving way a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible
- that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school adverse consequences.
building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or
in tip-top condition injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
- and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond immediate or proximate causeof the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.
human control such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man whether
it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is
TRIAL COURT hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

- giving credence to the ocular inspection report, found that, while typhoon
SUPREME COURT
Saling was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to private respondents
house could have been avoided if the construction of the roof of [petitioners] In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to the
building was not faulty finding of the investigating team that subject school buildings roofing had no sufficient
anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds. Based on
PETITIONER APPEALED TO THE CA – affirmed with modification trial court’s such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for
decision damages to private respondents.
HENCE, THIS PETITION. This Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual
findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
ISSUE: and conclusive upon this Court. We find exception to this rule and hold that the lower
courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
[A] Whether or not the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents
resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off DISCUSSION
by the strong winds of typhoon Saling, was, within legal contemplation, due to
fortuitous event; if so, - There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
[B] WON petitioner can be held liable for the damages suffered by the private foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from
respondents any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
human participation amounting to a negligent act.
HELD:
- In other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be
[A] APPLICABLE PROVISION (NCC): guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which
 naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the Petitioner: Owner of the Nissan van
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the Respondent: Jose Ching and/or Liberty forest (owner of the prime mover); Cresilito
circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something which a Limbaga (driver of the prime mover)
prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do. TOPIC: Proximate Cause Distinguished from Remote Cause
[B] From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was
negligent, such that if it were not, the damage caused to private FACTS:
respondent’s house could have been avoided
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc.
- At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the
while a Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the
negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by
negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence
private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by
presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
The night before, the prime mover suffered a tire blowout, thus they parked the
- Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the
on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an lane of the passenger bus.
ocular inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term
imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What
The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates,
is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind.
the early warning device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute,
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the
conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioners school prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed
building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.
design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any
substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger
conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. When Ortiz
saw the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents,
to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover.
city building official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioners school
The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
building were approved prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it was a
legal requirement before the construction of any building to obtain a permit from the
city building official Ortiz only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a
result of the incident.
In like manner, after construction of the building, a certification must be secured from
the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the edifice. Having Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against private
obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy, these are, at the very respondents
least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school
building
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc.: that
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the proximate cause of collision was improper parking of the prime mover and the
the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not absence of an early warning device on the vehicle
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling was Private respondents appealed to the CA.
the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondent’s house.
CA: reversed RTC: that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the
DISTINGUISHED FROM REMOTE CAUSE failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger
bus, thus:
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., vs. Ching
-pochi- Hence this appeal.
Issues: prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
(a) whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was negligent in parking the his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
vehicle? YES
(b) whether or not Limabaga’s negligence (skewed parking) was the proximate How to establish proximate cause?
cause of the damage to the Nissan van? YES There is no exact mathematical formula.
- Plaintiff must establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the
Ruling: damage or injury.
- That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach.
(1) Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national
- The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or
highway; he failed to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming omission.
motorists.
IN THIS CASE
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the
improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of
the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to
The test of negligence (Picart v. Smith) is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would
triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.

IN THIS CASE
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all damages that
- Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew, occupying
resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those
a substantial portion on the lane of the passenger bus. It is common sense
damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by other motorist in trying to
that the skewed parking posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists.
avoid collision with the parked prime mover.
- Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by (1)
not immediately inform his employer that the prime mover suffered two tire
blowouts, (2) simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the prime As We see it, the passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the Nissan
mover to serve as warning hence NO WARLY WARNING DEVICE and (3) van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover. The driver of the
slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to the left, onto the lane of the
- Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime mover in proper condition passenger bus, hitting the parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not have
as it had worn out tires, and only equipped with one spare tire. swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying his van’s lane. The
passenger bus, in turn, would not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan
van if not for the prime mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed
(2) The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of
parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
the collision.
DISPOSITIVE:
What is proximate cause?
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals decision dated
the result would not have occurred. August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC decision dated August 7, 2001 is
REINSTATED IN FULL.
More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
 pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the public and can only be categorized
CONCURRENT CAUSES as inefficiency on the part of the govt law office.

Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS asscociate Tria is reprimaded and warned that a repetition of the same acts shall be
-monica- dealt with severely.
The original members of the legal tean of the OSG are admonished and warned tha a
Facts: repetition shall also be dealt with more stringently.
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC)
arrived at the port of Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilot's Dispositive: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and FESC are declared
Association (MPA) to conduct docking manuevers for the safe berthing of the vessel. solidarily liable with MPA entitled to reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of
Gavino stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its
Kavankov, beside him. prescribed reserved fund.
When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However the
anchor did not hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. Tamayo vs Señora
A commotion ensued between the crew members. When Gavino inquired about the -ron-
commotion, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable Facts:
damage to the pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against FESC, Gavino
and MPA. CA ruled in favor of PPA holding them liable with MPA (employer of The factual antecedents, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, are as follows:
Kavankov) entitled to reimbursement from Gavino.
 Antonieto M. Señora, a police chief inspector of the PNP, was riding a
Issue: motorcycle and crossing an intersection when a tricycle allegedly bumped his
Are the counsels for the parties committed acts which require the exercise of the motorcycle from behind.
court's disciplinary powers?  As a result, the motorcycle was pushed into the path of a delivery van, which
was cruising along Sucat Road.
Held:  The delivery van ran over Señora, while his motorcycle was thrown a few
YES. The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario thru its meters away.
associate, Atty Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC in both GR no 130068 and GR  He was recovered underneath the delivery van and rushed to the Medical
no 130150. GR 130068 which is assigned to the Court's second division, commenced Center of Parañaque, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
with the filing of a verified motion for extension of time which contained a
certification against forum shopping signed by counsel Tria stating that to the best of The tricycle was driven by Leovino F. Amparo, who testified that it was the delivery van
his knowledge there is no action or proceeding pending in the SC, CA or any other that bumped Señora’s motorcycle. He also said that when he was brought to the police
tribunal. station for investigation, he brought his tricycle to disprove the claim of the delivery
Reviewing the records, the court finds that the petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 van driver by showing that his tricycle sustained no damage.
then pending with the third division was duly filed with a copy thereof furnished by
registered mail to counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to conclude that when The delivery van, on the other hand, was driven by Elmer O. Polloso and registered in
FESC filed its petition GR no 130068, it would aready have received a copy of the the name of Cirilo Tamayo. While trial was ongoing, Tamayo was suffering from lung
copy of the petition by MPA. It wa therefore encumbent upon FESC to inform the cancer and was bedridden. His wife, petitioner Constancia, testified on his behalf.
court of the pending action. But considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of Constancia narrated that she and her husband were managing a single proprietorship
the proceeding , it being unnecessary to file such certification of non forum shopping
known as Tamayo and Sons Ice Dealer. She testified that it was Tamayo who hired
with a mere motion for extension, the court disregarded such error.
their drivers. She claimed that, as employer, her husband exercised the due diligence
On the other hand it took the OSG, representing PPA, an ordinately and unreasonably
of a good father of a family in the selection, hiring, and supervision of his employees,
long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these
cases. In GR no 130068, it took 210 days before the OSG filed its comment. FESC including driver Polloso. Tamayo would tell their drivers not to drive fast and not to be
was not even furnished with a copy. In Gr no 130150 it took 180 days before too strict with customers.
comment was filed. This disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required
One of Tamayo’s employees, Nora Pascual, testified. She narrated that, while they were
traversing Sucat Road, she saw a motorcycle going towards Filipinas Avenue. Pascual
said that, when they reached the intersection of Sucat Road and Filipinas Avenue, PROSPERO SABIDO AND ASER LAGUNDA VS. CARLOS CUSTODIO
Polloso blew the horn. She then saw a tricycle bump the rear of the motorcycle. She -gaddi-
said that Polloso stopped the delivery van. When they alighted, they saw the motorcycle
already under the delivery van. Pascual further testified that Polloso was a careful driver FACTS:
who drove the truck slowly and followed traffic rules. She also said that Tamayo called
for a meeting before the delivery trucks left and told his drivers to be careful in their * In Lumban, Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to
driving and to be courteous to their customers. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, sliding downward a slope; and the other driven by Aser
Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, climbing up with no cargoes or passengers
RTC found defendants Amparo (tricycle driver), Polloso (delivery van driver) and on board, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve.
Tamayo (employer of Polloso) liable jointly and severally to plaintiffs for actual * Agripino Custodio- passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the left side of
damages, loss of life, loss of earnings and for attorney’s fees. CA affirmed the RTC’s the bus, full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Aser
decision, but modified the amount of loss of earning capacity from ₱1,152,360.00 to Lagunda. As a result, he was injured and died.
₱1,887,847.00. * Belen Makabuhay- Custodio's widow, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running
fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity
Issue: to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because
the two trucks never collided with each other.
1. Whether or not Polloso was guilty of negligence in driving the delivery van. * CFI & CA- concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co and its driver Nicasio
2. Whether or not Tamayo exercised the degree of diligence required in hiring Mudales had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio,
and supervising his employees. whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by
reason of which all of them were held solidarily liable in the manner above
Ruling: indicated.
- The fact of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side of the truck,
The petition has no merit and is hereby denied. makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages.
- Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been
The issues raised by petitioners are questions of fact. The Court will not disturb factual sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with
findings of the lower courts unless there are compelling or exceptional reasons. No each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck
such reasons exist in this case. could have avoided hitting Agripino Custodio. Both drivers must have
driven their trucks not in the proper line and are, therefore, both reckless and
The Court holds that the RTC and the CA correctly found Polloso negligent. negligent’.
If, as Pascual testified, the truck stopped when the tricycle bumped the motorcycle
ISSUE: (1)W/N the petitioners were solidarily liale with the carrier and its driver.
from behind, then there would have been no accident. Even if the motorcycle was
(2) Whether a breach of contract may be joined with quasi delict in a cause
nudged into the path of the truck, as she claimed, there would have been no impact if
of action.
the truck itself was not moving, and certainly not an impact that would pin the
motorcycle’s driver under the truck and throw the motorcycle a few meters away. HELD:
The Court likewise finds that the CA did not err in upholding Tamayo’s solidary liability
* The carrier and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino
for Señora’s death. The RTC correctly disregarded the testimonies of Tamayo’s wife Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus and that this negligence was the
and his employee, leaving no other evidence to support the claim that he had exercised proximate cause of Agripino’s death. It should be noted, however, that the lower court
the degree of diligence required in hiring and supervising his employees. had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as
much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners’
CA’s decision is AFFIRMED. truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a
sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, said truck was
driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite
direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.
* Lagunda saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same
was still 5 or 7 meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between
the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if
his truck were not running at a great speed.
* Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent of the negligence
of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of
the death of Agripino Custodio.
* Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and
its driver, because the latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of
the former springs from a quasi-delict.
* The rule is, however, that where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and
it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either
is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused
the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other
tort-feasor.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed