UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M.

Paguirigan

ISIDORO M. MERCADO, vs. LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA,
G.R. No. L-14127, August 21, 1962

FACTS: Spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte were defendants in a case where a writ of execution was
issued and levied upon rights and interests the spouses have over a disputed land.

By virtue of the writ of execution as above mentioned, the sheriff sold at public auction ½ of the lots subject of
controversy. This was was bought by Leon Viardo being the highest bidder.. The spouses failed to redeem the
property within the statutory period of one year from the date of sale. A final bill of sale was issued to buyer
Viardo, and a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was likewise issued to him.

On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case acting upon a verified
petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija, to cancel Original Certificate of
Title and to issue another in lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE ¼
share; FELISA BELMONTE, ¼ share; PILAR BELMONTE, ¹/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, ¹/8 share; and INES DE
GUZMAN, ¼ share

Spouses Driz and Belmonte filed an action in the CFI against the buyer-Viardo for reconveyance of the said land.

CFI (now RTC): The court dismissed, including the counterclaim of Viardo. Defendant is the legal owner of the land
in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed.

Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court
of Appeals.

CA: Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, Bartolome Driz died. His children of age substituted him in the
appeal.

The judgment of the CA, granting the prayer of Viardo, eventually became final and executory. The CFI issued a
writ of execution. Prior to the CA ruling, Belmonte sold her interest in the land to Isidoro Mercado. Mercado then
filed a third-party complaint against Belmonte. Viardo then sued Belmonte. CFI ruled that the heirs of Bartolome
could not be held liable personally for judgment rendered against them. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz can be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against
their father?

HELD:
NO. The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots are the children
of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of
Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as parties.
This assignment of error is without merit.
The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and
therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a
substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for whatever
judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their deceased father.

Article 774 of the Civil Code provides: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.

Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the real
party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal property.

The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor was to proceed against
the estate of Bartolome Driz.

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Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA, SR.; PEDRO LITONJUA, vs.

AGUSTIN B. MONTILLA, JR., administrator-appellee;
CLAUDIO MONTILLA, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-4170, January 31, 1952
PARAS, C.J.:

FACTS:
In a Civil Case rendered by the CFI of Negros Occidental, Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against
Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4,000 with legal interest, plus costs amounting to P39.00 In due
time, a writ of execution was issued, but no property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied upon.
In order to satisfy the said judgment Pedro L. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding of the CFI of Negros
Occidental, Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and
participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter's intestate estate be sold
and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was
opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate estate

CFI : issued an order denying the motion. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Litonjua, as a creditor, may go after the interest of Montilla Jr. in the intestate Estate of
Agustin Montilla Sr.

HELD:
NO. The creditors of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which
pertains by inheritance to said heirs, ONLY AFTER all debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid
and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs known. The debts of the deceased must first be paid
before his heirs can inherit.

A person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has NO RIGHT to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession.

An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow
and heirs of the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at the time of his death shall have been paid
can the remaining property that pertains to the said debtors heirs can be attached.

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938

VILLA-REAL, J.:

Note: This case is an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco,
Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, making
the heirs of their deceased father solidary liable as to the indebtedness incurred by their deceased father
instituted by the plaintiff-creditor in the Intestate Estate of Eusebio, their grandfather and not in the Intestate
Estate of Quitco, their father.

FACTS:
Defendants in this case are the heirs of their deceased debtor-father Lorenzo M. Quitco.

COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP: In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M.
Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is
the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo
M. Quitco came to an end.

Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter.

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THE DEBT: On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note for
or on behalf of his indebtedness amounting to 2,000 w/c is to be paid on installment.

THE MARRIAGE TO ANOTHER: Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita McLachlin. They had four (4) children,
who are the other defendants.

DEATH: On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died predeceasing his father, but, still later, that is, on December
15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death.

Administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the
"Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.

In order to satisfy the remaining value of the PN, Socorro went after the Intestate Estate of Eusebio Quitco, to
claim the indebtedness of his debtor-deceased son Lorenzo.

ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the
promisorry note has already prescribed.

HELD 1:
YES. According to the promissory note executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the
last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is,
on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years
after the expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26,
1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend
the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for
the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should not have been presented in the intestate of
Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M.
Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the
purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the
payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without
leaving any property

HELD 2:
NO. The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the PN should have been presented in the intestate of
Lorenzo and not in the intestate of Eusebio, the former’s father.

RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code,
a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring
to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only
answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from
whom they did NOT inherit anything.

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the DEFENDANTS ARE ABSOLVED from the complaint, with the
costs to the appellees

Succession as a Mode of Transferring Ownership

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ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for

herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A.
ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ,
and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996
MELO, J.:

Note: The petition before us has its roots in a COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE to compel herein
petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its
improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the parties sometime in January 1985
for the price of P1,240,000.00.

FACTS: 1st CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE: Peitioner, Romulo Coronel, et. al. being the sons and daughters of
the decedent Constancio P. Coronel (hereinafter referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled “Receipt of
Down Payment” in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The document provided that for the total amount of
P1,240,000.00, wherein a downpayment of P50,000.00 was initially paid, the Coronels bind themselves to effect the
transfer in their names the certificate of title of the house and lot they inherited from their father. They also
promised that upon the transfer of the TCT in their names, they will immediately execute the deed of absolute
sale of the property, and the other party Ramona will pay the balance of P1,190,000.00.

(Note: The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the
parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title
was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the established facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of
petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have
been executed and consummated right there and then).

2nd CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE/DOUBLE SALE: The Coronels however, upon having the property registered
in their name, sold it to Catalina Mabanag for a higher price (P1,580,000.00), and cancelled and rescinded the
contract with Ramona by depositing the amount of down payment to a bank, in trust for Ramona.

THE COMPLAINT FILED: A complaint for specific performance was filed by the Concepcion’s against the
Coronels.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents Conception’s. Judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered
ordering defendant-Coronel’s to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land

CA: Affirmed the same.

The petitioners claim that there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they were then not
yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.

ISSUE 1:
Whether or not petitioners were already the owners of the inherited property when they executed the
contract with respondents.

HELD 1:
Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will
or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are
compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last
breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or
obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

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MOOTNESS OF THE ISSUE: Be it also noted that petitioners’ claim that succession may not be declared unless
the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title
to the property from the decedent’s name to their names.

ESTOPPEL: Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into an
agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took when
they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. “Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon”. Having represented themselves as the true
owners of the subject property at the time of sale, petitioners CANNOT claim now that they were not yet the
absolute owners thereof at that time.

The sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, is deemed perfected.

PEITIONER’s ARGUMENT: Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale
between them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered impossible
the consummation thereof by going to the United States of America, without leaving her address, telephone
number, and Special Power of Attorney for which reason, so petitioners conclude, they were correct in unilaterally
rescinding the contract of sale.

ISSUE 2:
Whether or not peitioner-seller is correct in unilaterraly rescinding the contract of sale between the latter
and Ramona Alcaraz, the buyer.

HELD 2:
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant case.
We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations found only in their
responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by
the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting
evidence to substantiate petitioners' allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be proven
by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere
allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February 6, 1985, we
cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being
no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158
SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because although
the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been
dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also
in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check for
and in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned Concepcion's
authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neither did they raise any
objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned,
the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale.

ISSUE 3:
Between the Alcaraz and Catalina Mabanag, who between them is the owner of the property subject to
dispute?

HELD 3:
It belongs to Alcaraz.

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in Registry of Property.

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Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the second
contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1544
shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the exceptions
being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there be
no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the
property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will
not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first buyer.

In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished member of the
Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:

The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer
of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good
faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his registration with bad
faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs.
Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02 September 1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).

In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a
buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without
knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.

As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith, registered
the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been
annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered
the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the
same property had already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with
knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to
the defect in petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.

If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale
of the same property to a third party or that another person claims said property in a pervious sale, the
registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega,
87 SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; Fernandez
vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected on February
6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly upheld by
both the courts below.

DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED

February 25, 1999

FACTS: Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land. At the time of her
death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs.

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On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the
properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of (1/3) pro-indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son
of the late Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be included to share
in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.

ISSUE: WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evarista’s estate.

HELD: No. Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an
illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the
aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's
share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court
of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother
Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when
Francisco died, his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista.

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.
G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts: In 1988 DKC Holdings entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome.

DKC will have the option to lease or lease with purchase the land of Encarnacion which option must be exercised
within a period of two years from the signing of the contract.

DKC regularly paid the sum of P3,000.00 monthly as consideration for the option.

Before the two year period expired, Encarnacion died. Her son Victor inherited the land. He refused to accept
payments being made by DKC and even refused the offer of DKC to buy the land.

DKC sued for specific performance.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals held that the said contract was terminated upon the death of Encarnacion
Bartolome and did not bind Victor because he was not a party thereto.

Ruling: The contract of lease with option to buy is binding upon Victor. As a rule, the heirs are bound by contracts
entered into by their predecessor-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by their nature, by stipulation. or by law. There is no personal act required from the deceased. The
nature of the rights and obligations under the contract are by their nature transmissible. If the contract is of
such character that it may be performed by the promissor's representative, it does not terminate upon the death

ARUEGO VS CA
254 SCRA 711

FACTS:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian, out of which was born Antonia and Evelyn Aruego.
A Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by the two children,
represented by their mother, Fabian. Said complaint prayed for the following:
a. That Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose;
b. That petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased
Jose;
c. That their share and participation in the estate of Jose be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children.”
RTC declared Antonia as illegitimate daughter of Jose but not as to Evelyn. It ordered petitioners to recognize
Antonia and to deliver to the latter her share in the estate of Jose.

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Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court by
virtue of the advent of the Family Code. Said motion was denied. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
WON the application of the Family Code will prejudice or impair any vested right of Antonia such that it should not
be given retroactive effect.

HELD:
YES. The action brought by Antonia for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed before the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Art 285 of the Civil Code and NOT by Art 175,
par.2 of the Family Code.
The Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect as its application will prejudice the vested right of
Antonia. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the Civil Code.
The action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already
deceased, since Antonia was then still a minor when it was filed – an exception to the general rule under Art 285 of
the Civil Code.

LORENZO VS POSADAS
64 PHIL 353

Doctrine:
A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the
postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the
value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
Facts:
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable
amount of real and personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the
settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was
admitted to probate.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a
trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after
the two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and
gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff
herein was appointed in his stead. During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, Defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue assessed against the estate of Hanley an inheritance tax together with the penalties for
delinquency in payment. Lorenzo paid the amount under protest. CIR overruled the said protest and refused to
refund the same.
CFI held that the real property of Thomas Hanley, passed to his instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from the
moment of death of the former, and that from that time, the latter became the owner thereof.

Issue: Whether an heir succeeds immediately to all of the property of his or her deceased ancestor?

Held: It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the death of
the decedent. The taxpayer cannot foresee and ought not to be required to guess the outcome of pending
measures. The SC hold that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death,
notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the
tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
The mere fact that the estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our
inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax
should have been paid to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason already stated that the
delivery of the estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of the same estate to the cestui que trust, the
beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust. When Moore accepted
the trust and took possesson of the trust estate he thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to
his cestui que trust.

CASTAÑEDA vs. ALEMANY

3 PHIL 426

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Issue:
Whether or not the will of Doña Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who
signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in
conformity with law.
Held:
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the
appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his
express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it
himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does
the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will
was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section
618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in
the second.
(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in
the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in this case
make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the
property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable person
to discharge such trust.
All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are
stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the
personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows
that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised
by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the
deceased.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the will executed by
the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that
the evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as
should have been done. But we think that we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during
the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court.
No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same instrument. In
the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In
their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as
referring to the will probate they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual debera
ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be charged against the
appellants.

IN RE WILL OF RIOSA
39 PHIL 23

FACTS:
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an
estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely,
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory
of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on
and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed
by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator
and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new
law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the
testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the

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testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But
the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as
follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the
testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the
number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of each other.

The Court of First Instance for the province of Albay rendered its decision on December 29, 1917 disallowing the
will of Jose Riosa.

ISSUE:
whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at
the death of the testator, controls.

RULING:
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested
by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective
effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs
(or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to
testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern
view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections
of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58
Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs.
Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the
mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the
requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of
disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
[1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906],
202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall
not have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no
indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio
[1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation
of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section 617,
Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases, the first
being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general principle in the law of
wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the

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transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the
act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is
not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.

To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly
as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.

The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the
will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said
will to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.

ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
95 SCRA 627

FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to
be his Last Will and Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews, who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that
in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand the subject document
in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on the left hand margin of the front
page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic
numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.

The learned trial court found and declared the subject document to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a
liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling
factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate the subject document, as the Last
Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Civil Code allowing holographic wills should be applied.

HELD:
No. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be
witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time the subject document was executed in 1923 and at the time that
Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters
and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were
not complied with in the subject document because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not
signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator.

But Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon
the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of
the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the

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disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in
the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his
heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest
the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
cannot validate void wills.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the subject document is denied probate.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, ADMINISTRATOR VS. ANDRE BRIMO
50 PHIL 867

FACTS:
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they
are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated
in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with
and executed.
As to the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the
will, which says:” that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length
of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish
that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.”
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition imposed by the decedent in his will is void being contrary to law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code
provides that “Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide”.
Moreover, the said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Therefore, the condition, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
The second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

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Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees.

BELLIS vs BELLIS
20 SCRA 358

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward, George, (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry, Alexander and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses
of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives in equal shares.

Subsequently, died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, and pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's
Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
The lower court, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Issue: WON the national law of Amos Bellis should apply in the said partition.

Held: YES.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system
(law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate
or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It is evident that
whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto.

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BALTAZAR V. LAXA, G.R. NO. 174489, APRIL 11, 2012.

[DEL CASTILLO, J.]

FACTS
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster at the time she executed her will. The same was executed in the house of a
certain retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice, was signed by her, and was attested to by three credible
witness. Petitioner Rosie Mateo, daughter of the first cousin of testatrix, testified that the latter was “magulyan”
or “forgetful” because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.

ISSUE
Whether or not forgetfulness is equivalent to being unsound mind, hence lack of testamentary capacity.

RULING
NO. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Article 799 of the Civil Code provides for
the criteria for soundness of mind. In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She
specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death.

BUGNAO V. UBAG
14 PHIL 163

FACTS: The last will and testament of Domingo Ubag was admitted for probate. It was signed by him in the
presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the making of wills. The instrument was
propounded by his widow Catalina Bugnao who is the sole beneficiary.
The order admitting the will was appealed by the appellants who are brothers and sisters of the deceased and
would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased
left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line. They contend that Ubag was not of sound mind and memory,
and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The appellants pointed out that one of the attesting witnesses stated that the decease sat up in bed and signed his
name to the will, and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was
assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name.
Appellants also contended that the decedent was physically incapacitated to make the will because he was then
suffering from an advanced stage of tuberculosis, such that he was too weak to stand or even sit up unaided, and
that he could not speak when he had asthma attacks.
Of the four witnesses appellant presented who tried to prove that the attesting witnesses were not present during
the signing of the will by the decedent, two of the witnesses stand to inherit from the decedent if the will were
denied probate. These two witnesses, on direct cross-examination, later admitted that they were not even in the
house of the decedent at the time of the execution of the will. The attesting witnesses, on the other hand,
testified on the due execution and testamentary capacity of the decedent.
Appellants, who are siblings of the decedent, also claimed that the will was obtained by fraud considering that they
were excluded therefrom.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence of the appellants is sufficient to prove that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of the will or that he was induced by fraud in making the same

HELD:
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It
is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of
tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his
bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma
to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his

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mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to
the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and
physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to
give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his
property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his
widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity
and undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and
unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never
did in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in
the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters,
who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano
Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the
vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased
desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters,
who themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence
of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never
was executed.
For the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary
capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has
already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all
the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been
frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases
testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no
question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these
elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged
at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among
the objects of his bounty.
The order probating the will affirmed.

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

22 PHIL 227

FACTS: Testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he
lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his
mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of
signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.

At the time of the execution of his will, four testamentary witnesses were present: Agustin Paguio, Anacleto
Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.The testator, wrote out on pieces
of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to
Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon
which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the
testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an
affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read
in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the
testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and
that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.

The executrix and widow of the decedent, Juliana Bagtas, filed a petition to probate the will of Paguio.It was
opposed by Isidro Paguio, son of the deceased and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the
children of a deceased daughter. Their opposition is based on the ground that the will was not executed according
to the formalities and requirements of the law, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and
use of his mental faculties to execute a valid will. CFI Bulacan admits the will to probate. Hence, this appeal.

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ISSUE: DID THE TESTATOR POSSESS THE REQUIRED MENTAL SOUNDNESS TO VALIDLY EXECUTE A
WILL?

HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at
the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he
indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was
not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some
years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the
lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the
testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the
fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own
signature as a subscribing witness.

Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and his
testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the
testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the
decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before
and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was
able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of
mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor
Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to
his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The
following question was propounded to Doctor Basa:

Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he was in his
right mind?

A. I cannot say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because when I spoke
to him he did not answer me.

Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a
paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind
at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental
capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than
that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.

Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical
question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady
such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor
Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from
which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr.
Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the
mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.

We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the
appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his
death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired.
Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the
will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is
quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we cannot
include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.

The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of
the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of
this character.In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the
burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. The rule of law relating to

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the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been
adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere
weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law
does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental
powers in order to execute a valid will
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by
the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the
last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his
mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and
statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and
that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct
was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in
which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours
and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in
the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.

TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee

76 PHIL 333

FACTS: Severo Nayra died leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion
Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the
two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the
properties left by their deceased father.Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in
CFI Manila, for the recovery of ½ of a property left by their deceased father, and demanding at the same time ½
of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. CFI decided in favour of Trinidad
but at the same time ordered her to pay Encarnacion the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by virtue of said
counterclaims.Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal on a decision dated November 10, 1942, by virtue of said agreement or
compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since November 4, 1942,
and other relatives of hers, The heirs of the deceased filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the alleged
compromise or agreement, dated November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she
was already then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that if it
had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said document must have been
affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's will.
Pending the appeal before CA, Encarnacion became seriously ill and was advised by her religious adviser, Fr. Garcia
to reconcile with her sister. Trinidad was invited to her sister’s home and they reconciled while Encarnacion was
lying in bed. In the course of their conversation which they also talked about the properties left by their father
and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the
condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should
waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness
to Encarnacion. Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and
the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3,
1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly
and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad
Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted
any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and
the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the
two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr.
Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the
presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and
by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses.

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Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz argue, that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra
was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and
that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER ENCARNACION WAS OF SOUND MIND WHEN SHE SIGNED HER WILL AND THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
2. WHETHER THE WITNESSES WERE PRESENT IN THE SIGNING OF THE WILL

HELD: PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED

1.It has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the
age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years. Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination,
frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion
Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound
mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease,
like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy,
they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from
tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and
possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will,
dated November 3, 1942.
2.The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the
agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is
untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of
the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not
whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have
seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. And the
thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature.

In re estate of Piraso, deceased. SIXTO ACOP, vs. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., 52 PHIL 660

FACTS:
The proponent Acop appeals the judgment of the CFI Benguet, denying the probate of last will and testament of
the deceased Piraso. The will was written in English; that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should
have been written in that dialect.

ISSUE: WAS THE WILL VALIDLY EXECUTED?

HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the
Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the
testator,"
Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the
effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to
the contrary, even he invoked in support of the probate of said document as a will, because, in the instant case, not
only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where
the will was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the
Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which then will is
written. So that even if such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or not it be technically held that
said will, in order to be valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect
is a cultivated language and used as a means of communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso
knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is

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quite certain that the instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know,
and this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably
prevents its probate.

REYNALDO P. BASCARA V. JAVIER AND PANGILINAN G.R. NO. 188069, JUNE 17, 2015

On August 13, 2004 Rosalina Pardo borrowed money from Pangilinan and executed a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land as security. Pardo failed to pay the loan and Pangilinan foreclosed the REM and the land was sold to
her as highest bidder. After the period of redemption had expired, Pangilinan filed an ex parte petition for
issuance of the writ of possession.

The RTC issued the writ of possession. Petitioner Bascara filed an affidavit of third-party claim and to recall the
writ of possession. He alleged that the REM in favor of Pangilinan was forged as the alleged mortgagor Pardo died
in 2003 and could not have executed the mortgage in 2004. Bascara added that Pardo executed a deed of donation
mortis causa in his favor over the land which is the subject matter of the writ of possession. The RTC ruled in
favor of Pangilinan and against Biscara.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the rightful owner of the property by virtue of the deed of donation mortis
causa.

RULING: Deed of donation mortis causa executed in favor of petitioner, Bascara cannot be considered as the
basis of his ownership to subject property.

Bascara allegedly acquired the property from Pardo by reason of a donation mortis causa. He is, therefore, a
transferee or successor-in-interest who merely stepped into the shoes of his aunt. He cannot assert that his right
of possession is adverse to that of Pardo as he has no independent right of possession. Consequently, under legal
contemplation, he cannot be considered as a "third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor." The trial court had the ministerial duty to issue, as it did issue, the possessory writ in favor of
respondent Pangilinan. As it appeared, there was no reason for it to order the recall of the writ already issued.

The execution of Pardo of donation mortis causa in favor of Bascara does not immediately transfer title to the
property to the latter. Considering that the alleged donation is one of mortis causa, the same partake of the
nature of testamentary provision. As such, said deed must be executed in accordance with the requisites on
solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code; otherwise, the donation is
void and would produce no effect. Unless and until the alleged donation is probated, no right to the subject
property has been transmitted to petitioner. It was not shown that such document had been probated. Hence the
claim of petitioner cannot stand.

Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then
28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will
and testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9
August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the notary
public who notarized the testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted
on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator
and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by
his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no
longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception
is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:

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1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient
that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its
formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may
be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which
he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator
is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not even require that a notarial will
be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental
witnesses.

LOPEZ V. LOPEZ, G.R. NO. 189984, NOVEMBER 12, 2012.

[PERLAS-BERNABE, J.]
FACTS
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with the required statement in the attestation
clause as to the number of pages used upon which the will is written. While the acknowledgment portion stated that
the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC
observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having
been executed and attested in accordance with law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the discrepancy between the number of pages in the attestation clause and the actual number of
pages in the will that would warrant its disallowance.

RULING
YES. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide
that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is
to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages. Here, the will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

GERMAN JABONETA, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.

5 PHIL 541

FACTS: Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances the document in question, which has been
presented for probate as his will:
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, in this province, he ordered that the document in question be
written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed the said document
as his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the
document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of
the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the
presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to
leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put
himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless,
after Jena had left the room the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of
the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied probate because the lower court was of the
opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his
signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure..

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ISSUE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF
WITNESSES SIGNING THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER

HELD: TRIAL COURT REVERSED

We cannot agree with so much of the above finding of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not signed
in the presence of Jena, in compliance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact
that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature
to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact
there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The
fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was
being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose
of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the
witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to
Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact
signed before he finally left the room.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to be that the
testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and
the generally accepted tests of presence are vision and mental apprehension. (See Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 30,
p. 599, and cases there cited.)
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together for
the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they
choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not whether the
testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and
physical condition and position at the time of the subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables, 66 Mo., 579.)

EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the
minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants
42 PHIL 45

FACTS:
Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia; contest was made by Marino Garcia and
Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. The proponent
of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon
the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two
of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
The attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and
indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend
what he was about.
The trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing
memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.Hence this
appeal

ISSUES:
1. whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting
witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two;
2. whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of
the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.

HELD: lower court affirmed

1. While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will bay be proved by the testimony of only one of the three
attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborate
examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not
produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate of this will had

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been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal
contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent,
believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three
attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to
proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any
basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be
mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will
had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
2. We are of the opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and
the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable
that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully
complied with. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible
difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other.
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476,
479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed at the
bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right
to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever,
that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last
will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon
the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the
instrument.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

CELSO ICASIANO, vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO,
11 SCRA 423

FACTS: A special proceeding was commenced on October 2, 1958 for the allowance and admission to probate of
the original will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor
thereof. Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition. Enrique Icasiano, a son of the
testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.
Proponent subsequently filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the
decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting
the signed duplicate , which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. oppositors Natividad Icasiano de
Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition,
but by order, the court admitted said petition.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on
September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in
duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and
attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr.
Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the
same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was
actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the
decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano
and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and
testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as
to the due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was
acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared
the document. The latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of
Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one
signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted
two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.

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The court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed
directly to this Court

ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE OF A WITNESS’ SIGNATURE IN ONE PAGE

HELD: CFI AFFIRMED

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary
public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so
strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament
and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano,
49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling
it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his
own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page.
The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one
was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law,
this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the
left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement
for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers
is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.
92 PHIL 1033

FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar,
admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on
February 14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause
is not signed by the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
hand margin. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WHEN THE WITNESSES’ SIGNATURES APPEAR
ON THE LEFT MARGINS BUT NOT IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE

HELD: CFI REVERSED

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum
of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it
must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient,
it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or
all of the witnesses

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BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant..

18 PHIL 450

FACTS: The lower court admitted the instrument propounded therein as the last will and testament of the
deceased, Pedro Rimando.The defendant appeals the decision, contending that it one of the witnesses was not
present during the signing of the will by the testator and of the other subscribing witnesses. one of the
witnesses was the outside some 8 or 10 feet away, in a small room connected by a doorway from where the will was
signed ,across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED EVEN IF ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS IN
ANOTHER ROOM DURING THE SIGNING OF THE WILL

HELD: LOWER COURT AFFIRMED

In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering
their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of
course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the
instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at
that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The trial court’s decision merely laid
down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually
cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper
direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the
possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular
condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.

CANEDA VS CA
222 SCRA 781

FACTS: Testator Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children. He executed a will in the presence of three
witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer and a notary public in the preparation of his will. Under the said will, the
testator disposed of his properties to persons without blood relation to the testator. The testator himself
submitted the will to the probate court but the testator passed away even before his petition could be heard.

The petitioners, who claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the testator, filed for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Mateo. The probate proceedings and special proceedings filed were consolidated.

Petitioners opposed the allowance of the will of Mateo on the ground that on the date stated in the will, the
testator was already of poor health and could not have executed the will. They likewise questioned the genuineness
of the signature of the testator in the said will.

The probate court allowed the will. On appeal, the petitioners contended that the Attestation Clause was fatally
defective for failing to state that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses signed in
the presence of the testator and of one another.

Court of Appeals, nevertheless affirmed the probate court’s decision and held that there was substantial
compliance with Art. 805.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will complies with the requirements of Art.
805 and 809?

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HELD: In the case of ordinary or notarial wills, the attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect
known to the testator since it does not form part of the disposition. The language used in the attestation clause
likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of Art. 805 merely requires that, in
such a case, the Attestation Clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.

An Attestation Clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution of the same.

Paragraph 3 of Art. 805 requires three things to be stated in the Attestation Clause, the lack of which would
result in the invalidity of the will:
a) The number of pages
b) That the testator signed or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence
of the attesting witnesses and
c) That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages, and that
said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against any interpolation or omission of some of its pages, whereas the
subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very instrument executed by the testator
and attested to by the witnesses. By attesting and subscribing to the will. The witnesses thereby declare that due
execution of the will as embodied in the Attestation Clause. The Attestation Clause provides strong legal
guaranties for the due execution of a will and to ensure the authenticity thereof. It needs to be signed only by the
witnesses and not the testator, absence of the signature of the former invalidates the will.

In the case at bar, the will was comprised of three pages, all numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each
page bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The testamentary
dispositions were expresses in Cebuano- Visayan dialect and were signed at the foot by the testator. The
Attestation Clause was recite in English and is likewise signed at the end of three attesting witnesses.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the Attestation Clause herein is the fact that while it recites
that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of three attesting witnesses and stated as
well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
What is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another. The absence of that statement is a fatal defect which must necessarily result
in the disallowance of the will.

As to the substantial compliance rule under Art. 809, while it may be true that the Attestation Clause is indeed
subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly
cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the
presence of the testator and of each other, since the presence of such signatures only establishes the fact that it
was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of
the testator and of one another.

The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days
or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. In a
situation like in the case at bar, the defects is not only in the form or language of the Attestation Clause but the
total absence of a specific element requires by Art. 805.

In order that Art. 809 can apply, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidenced supplied by the will itself.
In the case at bar, proof of the acts requires to have been performed by the attesting witnesses san be supplied
only by extrinsic evidence thereof. Reversal of the judgment rendered by the CA.

CRUZ VS VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31

FACTS: Respondent Manuel Lugay filed a petition for probate of the will of Valente Cruz with the CFI which was
opposed by the petitioner, Agapita Cruz on the ground that the one of the three witnesses is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with Art. 805 and 806?

HELD: The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to
avow or to own as genuine, to assent and “before” means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if
the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will
in front of himself.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That
function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For them he
would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgement, which is to
minimize fraud would be thwarted.

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have
the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of
Art. 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Art 806 which requires that the testator
and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result
would be, as has been said, that only 2 witnesses appeared before the notary public for that purpose.

AZUELA VS CA
FACTS: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was
opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According
to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is
that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment.

An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares
to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act
and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was
subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid,
as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn
to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental
witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides
for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the
testator

ROXAS V. DE JESUS
134 SCRA 245
FACTS: Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the
deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook
belonging to deceased, which contained a “letter-will” entirely written and signed in deceased’s handwriting. The
will is dated “FEB./61 ” and states: “This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of deceased, identifying her
handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article
810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.
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ISSUE: W/N the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a
valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

HELD: Valid date.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad
faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56
Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal,
it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the
form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. …
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills
executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v.
Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution
nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language
known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix
agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that
the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will is not
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution.
However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and
the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date “FEB./61” appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance

LABRADOR VS CA
184 SCRA 170

FACTS: Testator Melencio died and left a parcel of land and his children as heirs. He allegedly executed a
holographic will. The holographic will was submitted for probate by petitioner Sagrado, the devisee of the parcel of
the land.

Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked
by implications of law, when the testator, before his death, sold the parcel of land to the oppositors. The said
transaction was evidenced by the new TCT issued in the name of the oppositors and the Deed of Sale executed by
the testator. Meanwhile, Jesus sold the parcel of land to a 3rd person, Sagrado sought to have the Deed of Sale
annulled on the ground that it was fictitious.

LC allowed the probate of the will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. CA reversed the judgment and
disallowed the probate of the will on the ground that it was undated.

ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will is dated?

HELD: The Holographic is dated. It appears that the date when the testator made the will was stated in the body
of the complaint, on the 2nd page of the will
“and this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fish pond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this
decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed, and the one who made this writing is no other that
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.”

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The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in
the subject will.

AJERO VS CA
236 SCRA 488

FACTS: Late Anne Sand left a will and named as devisees the petitioner, Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand. Fe Sand, Lisa Sand and Dr. Jose
Ajero Sr and their children. Petitioner filed for the allowance of decedent holographic will contending that the
latter was of sound mind and not acting under duress. Private Respondent opposed it that the testament body and
signature was not decedents handwriting and such properties, the decedent is not the sole owner. RTC admitted
the will while CA reversed it that the will fails to meet the requirements for its validity under Art 813 and 814
because the dispositions were either unsigned and undated or signed but not dated and erasure had not been
authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE: WON the will is valid?

HELD: Yes. Art 839, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:

(1) whether the instrument submitted is the decedent’s will

(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with formalities prescribed by law
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed and
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were voluntary acts of the decedent

Art. 813 of the new Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is
that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

In the case at bar, unless, the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

In addition to, courts in probate are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will. However, exception,
Courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
that Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father John Sand which Dr Ajero question her conveyance.

KALAW VS RELOVA
132 SCRA 237

FACTS: The private respondent, who claims to be the sole heir of his sister who is Natividad Kalaw, filed for a
petition to admit to probate the holographic will of his sister. In such will, private respondent Gregorio was named
as the sole heir of all the properties left behind by the testatrix and was also named as the executor of the will.

The petition was opposed by Rosa, the sister of the testatrix, who claims to have been originally instituted as the
sole heir. She alleged that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as requires by Art 814 of the Civil Code.

The court denied the petition. Rosa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the
Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as
sole heir.

Held: No. ordinarily, when a number of erasures, correction made by the testator on a holographic will not be noted
under his signature, hence the will is not invalidated as a whole but as most only as respects the particular words
erased or corrected.

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However in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication
by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple
reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written
should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature- the intention of the testator could not be ascertained. However, there is clear showing of the testator’s
intention to revoke the institution of Rosa as her sole heir.
Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the respondent judge is affirmed.

PEREZ VS TOLETE
232 SCRA 722

FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan are husband and wife, who became American citizens and
residents of New York, U.S.A, with their children, Jocelynm18; Jacqueline,16; and Josephine,14.
Each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is
not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).

To wit: “If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not
sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and
my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.”
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same
provisions as that of the will of her husband.
To wit: “If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate
shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.”

Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s
will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud
was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York
law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and
as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines
are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

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 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always
considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party.

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in
case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with
regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in
the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time
and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within
which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the
brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the
probate proceedings.

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