Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986

ALBERTO G. ROMULO, JOSE B. LAUREL, MARCELO B. FERNAN, CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA,

EDMUNDO B. CEA, ANTONIO CUENCO, HOMOBONO ADAZA, CIRIACO ALFELOR, ROLANDO
ANDAYA, HONORATO AQUINO, JOSE ATIENZA, JR., NATALIO BELTRAN, JR., CESAR V.
BOLANOS, DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, FERRER MIN A. CARAM, NENITA C. DALUZ, ARTHUR D.
DEFENSOR, EMILIO N. DELA PAZ, HILARIO DE PEDRO, DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, MANUEL
C. DOMINGO, CARLOS C. FERNANDEZ, JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, JAIME N. FERRER, WILSON
P. GAMBOA, ROGELIO GARCIA, ROLLEO L. IGNACIO, EVA ESTRADA KALAW, RAFAEL L.
LAZATIN, EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, JR.,
ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO C. MARTINEZ, ORLANDO S.
MERCADO, ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, RAMON V. MITRA, JR., JUANITA L. NEPOMUCENO,
ROY B. PADILLA, HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GONZALO G. PUYAT, II, HIALMAR P. QUINTANA,
ISIDRO E. REAL, JR., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ,
OSCAR F. SANTOS, FRANCISCO S. SUMULONG, EMIGDIO S. TANJUATCO, LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE and VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR E. YÑIGUEZ, MANUEL M. GARCIA, GUARDSON R. LOOD, RENATO L.
CAYETANO, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, DAMIAN V. ALDABA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ADELINO B.
SITOY, LEONARDO PEREZ, ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS, SALACNIB F. BATERINA, LUIS S.
ETCUBAÑEZ, CONCORDIO C. DIEL, REGALADO E. MAAMBONG, TEODULO C. NATIVIDAD,
MACACUNA DIMAPORO, SALVADOR B. BRITANICO and COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

Napoleon J. Poblador for respondent R. Cayetano.

PATAJO, J.:

Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out the
resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the
Philippines.

Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan, filed with the Batasan on
August 13, 1985 Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of President Marcos together with
a verified complaint for impeachment. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the
complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved
Resolution No. 644 and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached thereto on
August 14, 1985. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the
archives.
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from
the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was
disapproved by the Batasan.

On September 7, 1985, the present petition was filed with this Court. In said petition, petitioners pray
that after hearing this Court declare Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules on Impeachment
which was approved by the Batasan on August 16, 1984 by a vote of 114 in favor and 58 against,
unconstitutional, and Committee Report No. 154 of the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government dismissing Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment
attached thereto, null and void. They also pray that this Court issue a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondents from enforcing and questioned provisions of the aforementioned Rules and
a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution and complaint
for impeachment in order that the impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a
body.

In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang,
claiming to be members of good standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayers, filed
a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, the very same resolution subject of the present petition, dismissing
the complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in the
present case, and mandamus to compel said Committee on Justice and the Batasan, represented
by its Speaker, to give due course to said complaint for impeachment. In denying due course to said
petition and dismissing outright the same, We held:

1. The l973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and
decide all cases of impeachment. The action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom
the complaint for the impeachment of the President had been referred dismissing said petition for
being insufficient in form and substance involves a political question not cognizable by the Courts.
The dismissal of said petition is within the ambit of the powers vested exclusively in the Batasan by
express provision of Sec. 2, Article XIII of the Constitution and it is not within the competence of this
Court to inquire whether in the exercise of said power the Batasan acted wisely. There is no
allegation in the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of its powers the Batasan had violated any
provision of the Constitution. The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the
same day it was filed after deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the newspapers, radio
and television (which must have been the basis of petitioners' claim that the Committee had acted
with undue haste in unceremoniously dismissing the complaint for impeachment) does not provide
basis for concluding that there had been a violation of any provision of the Constitution which would
justify the Court's intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms and conduct.
Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its
Members and that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all
the members thereof, the Constitution says no more. It does not lay down the procedure to be
followed in impeachment proceedings. It is up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in
said impeachment proceedings, which it had already done, The interpretation and application of said
rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The powers of the Batasan to dismiss a petition
for impeachment which in its judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form and substance are
discretionary in nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.

2. The doctrine of separation of powers still exists under the 1973 Constitution though in a modified
form made necessary because of the adoption of certain aspects of the parliamentary system in the
amended 1973 Constitution. The major powers of the Government have been distributed by the
Constitution to the President, who is the head of the State and chief executive of the Republic, the
Batasan Pambansa and the Judiciary. Under the doctrine of separation of Powers as interpreted by
the decisions of the Court, mandamus will not he from one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch to compel performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. More specifically,
this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to give due course to
the complaint for impeachment. 1

We did not dismiss outright the present petition as We did G.R. No. L-71688 but required
respondents to comment thereto in view of the claim of petitioners that the provisions of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, more specifically Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 pursuant to which
the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had dismissed Resolution
No. 644 and the complaint for the impeachment attached thereto are unconstitutional, implying
thereby that the Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of powers vested upon it by
the Constitution, transgressed or violated the Constitution, certainly a justiciable question.

The provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment claimed by petitioners to be violative of
the Constitution are the following:

SEC. 4. Notice to Complainant and Respondent.— Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance. if it finds that the complaint is not sufficient in form and substance, it shall dismiss the
complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder. If it finds the complaint sufficient in form
and substance, it shall furnish the respondent with copy of the resolution and verified complaint with
advise that he may answer the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The answer may
include affirmative defenses. With leave of the Committee, the complainant may file a reply and the
respondent, a rejoinder.

SEC. 5. Submission of Evidence and Memoranda. —After receipt of pleadings provided for in
Section 4, or the expiration of the time within which they maybe filed, the Committee shall determine
whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist. If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment
do not exist, the Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report requited hereunder. If
the Committee finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall require the
parties to support their respective allegations by the submission of affidavits and counter- affidavits,
including duly authenticated documents as may appear relevant. The Committee may, however,
require that instead of affidavits and counter-affidavits, oral testimony shall be given. It may at all
events examine and allow cross- examination of the parties and their witnesses.

After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the submission of memoranda, after
which the matter shall be submitted for resolution.

SEC. 6. Report and Recommendations. —The Committee on Justice, Human Rights

and Good Government shall submit it a report of the Batasan containing its findings
and recommendations within thirty (30) session days from submission of the case for
resolution.

If the Committee finds by a vote of majority of all its members that probable cause has been
established it shall submit with its report a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment on the
basis of the evidence adduced before the Committee.

If the Committee finds that probable cause has not been established, the complaint shall be
dismissed subject to Section 9 of these Rules.

SEC. 8. Vote Required for Trial.—A majority vote of all the members of the Batasan is necessary for
the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved
by the required vote, it shall then be set for trial on the merits by the Batasan. On the other hand,
should the resolution fail to secure approval by the required vote, the same shall result in the
dismissal of the complaint for impeachment.

It is petitioners' contention that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of
Article XI I I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process
provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and
overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisitive 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan
Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various
stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when
such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an
unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can
proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan
for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a
condition not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the
endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed.

It is the contention of the respondents Speaker Nicanor Yniguez and the Members of the Committee
on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit
against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are
political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and
even supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the
dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own
sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules;
and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment
complaint.

Respondent Renato L. Cayetano on the other hand contends that (1) the question involved is purely
political; (2) the petitioners are not proper parties; (3) the petition is in reality a request for an
advisory opinion made in the absence of an actual case or controversy; (4) prohibition and
mandamus are not proper remedies, and (5) preliminary mandatory injunction is not proper; while
respondent Salacnib P. Baterina contends that the petitioners lack standing to sue and impeachment
is a power lodged exclusively in the Batasan.

A closer look at the substance than the form of the petition would reveal that resolution of the
constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the Rules is not even necessary, What petitioners
are really seeking is for this Court to compel the Batasan to proceed with the hearing on the
impeachment of the President since more than one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan had filed
a resolution for the impeachment of the President and the Batasan as a body is bound under the
Constitution to conduct said trial and render judgment only after said trial and that the Committee on
Justice has no authority to dismiss the complaint for impeachment on the ground that it is not
sufficient in form and substance. Petitioners, therefore, ask that this Court order the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives the Resolution No. 644
and the complaint for impeachment "in order that the impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith
by the Batasan as a body. (Prayer of the Petition, subpar, (ii) of Par, 2).

The question squarely presented before this Court is therefore: Has this Court jurisdiction to order
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives and
report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment? Can this court, assuming said resolution
and complaint for impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial
on the charges contained in said resolution and complaint for impeachment?

What is important to note is that when the Batasan denied the motion of MP Ramon Mitra for the
recall from the Archives of Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment, it had in effect
confirmed the action of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government dismissing
said resolution and complaint on impeachment. That the Batasan by even a majority vote can
dismiss a complaint for impeachment cannot be seriously disputed. Since the Constitution expressly
provides that "no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all its
members," a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government disapproving the resolution calling for the
impeachment of the President and dismissing all the charges contained in the complaint attached
thereto, makes mathematically impossible the required at least two-thirds vote of all members of the
Batasan to support a judgment of conviction. What purpose would be served by proceeding further
when it is already obvious that the required two-thirds vote for conviction cannot be obtained?
Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order.

A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment (which
is what the denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall from the Archives said resolution and
complaint for impeachment is tantamount to) makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the
members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the
exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court
to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by
petitioners.

The fact that petitioners are asking that it is the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, not the Batasan itself, which shall be commanded by this Court to recall from the
Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment is of no moment. Aside from
the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for
impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for
recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to
comply with any murder from this Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee
would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. Such in effect was the ruling in Alejandrino vs.
Quezon 46 Phil. 83, where this Court said:

It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme
Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our
mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and
his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, the disbursing officer of the
Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have
no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate.
The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate
who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might
have the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the
disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them
to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the
person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95
Mich. 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.) (On page 94).

See also Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612, 636, where the Court said:
. . . While it has been decided in many cases that the courts will not interfere with the legislative
department of the government in the performance of its duties, does that rule apply to the
committees duly appointed by the legislative department of the government and its officers? The
powers and duties conferred upon said committee by the Legislature granting the legality of the
object and purpose of said committee, and granting that the Legislature itself had the power to do
and to perform the duties imposed upon said committee, then an interference by the courts with the
performance of those duties by it would be tantamount to interfering with the workings and
operations of the legislative branch of the government itself. An interference by the judicial
department of the government with the workings and operations of the committee of the legislative
department would be tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of the
legislative department itself. And, again, we are called upon to say, that one branch of the
government cannot encroach upon the domain of another without danger. The safety of our
institutions depends in no small degree, on a strict observance of this salutary rule. (Sinking Fund
Cases, 99 U.S., 700, 718; Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U.S., 361, 37 1; Wise vs. Bigger, 79 Va., 269).

Moreover, while in their petition petitioners merely asked for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction "commanding the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
recall from the Archives and report out subject resolution and verified complaint for the impeachment
of President Ferdinand E. Marcos," their ultimate objective is to have the Batasan as a body proceed
with the impeachment trial. Recall of the resolution and complaint for impeachment would be
meaningless unless the Batasan can also be compelled to conduct the impeachment trial.

For this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, would be but an empty and meaningless gesture unless it would also order the
Batasan to proceed to try the impeachment proceedings. This, of course, the Court cannot do.
Quoting Judge Cooley in Sutherland us. Governor of Michigan 29 Mich. 320:

. . . in a case where jurisdiction is involved, no doubt it is not consistent with the

dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity.
..

The admonition of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra is of much relevance:

. . . But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not prove
to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will create discord
and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely
to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to
unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should
offer no means by a decision for any possible collision between it as the highest
court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate
department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive
and the Legislature. (On page 95).

In any event, We find no basis for the contention of petitioners that Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment are violative of the provisions of the Constitution on
Impeachment. As We said in Arturo de Castro vs. Committee on Justice, et at (G.R. No. L-71688),
"beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its
members and that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all
the members thereof, the Constitution says no more." The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt
rules of its proceedings (Article VIII, Sec. 8[31, may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of
procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The rules it adopted providing for dismissal of a
complaint for impeachment which is not sufficient in form or substance, or when sufficient grounds
for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or requiring a majority
vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment, are not inconsistent with the provision of Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.

More specifically, the provision requiring concurrence of at least two-thirds votes of all members of
the Batasan for conviction is not violated by any provision of the Rules which authorizes dismissal of
a petition by a majority vote of the Batasan since with such number of votes it is obvious that the
two-thirds vote of all members necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained. Such being the
case, the Batasan can specify in its rules how and when the impeachment proceedings can be
terminated or dismissed for Section 3, Article XIII merely provides for how a judgment of conviction
can be sustained but is respondent on how a complaint for impeachment can be dismissed when it
becomes apparent that a judgment of conviction by the required number of votes is not possible.

Neither is the Constitutional provision to the effect that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at
least one-fifth of the members violated by the provision of the Rules authorizing the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to dismiss the complaint for impeachment which it
finds not sufficient in form and substance (Sec. 4), does not have sufficient grounds for
impeachment (Sec. 5), or where probable cause has not been established (Sec. 6). All of said
actions of the Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint for impeachment initiated by at least
one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan. Their purpose is to determine whether or not a complaint
for impeachment initiated by the required number of members of the Batasan warrants being
referred to the Batasan for trial. They are not properly part of the "initiation phase" of the
impeachment proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase.
Such actions are liken to actions taken by this Court in determining whether a petition duly filed
should be given due course or should be dismissed outright.

While the Batasan has assigned to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
the task of determining whether the petition is sufficient in form or substance, or that sufficient
ground for impeachment exist or that probable cause has been established, said Committee is
required to submit its report to the Batasan which has the ultimate decision whether to approve or
disapprove said report. If the Batasan approves the Committee report dismissing the complaint, said
report is noted by the Batasan and sent to the Archives.

That the Rules on Impeachment of the Interim Batasan in the judgment of petitioners is better is no
argument against the validity or constitutionality of the Rules on Impeachment approved by the
Batasan. More importantly, said Rules are always within the power of the Batasan to modify, change
or replace any time. They do not have the force of law but are merely in the nature of by-laws
prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings before the Batasan. They are
merely procedural and not substantive (43 C.J. 527). They may be waived or disregarded by the
Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no concern. (South Georgia Power Co. vs.
Baumann 169 Ga. 649; 151 SE 513). As the Court said in State vs. Alt, 26 Mo. A. 673, quoted in 46
C.J. 1383 Note 31:

The rules of public deliberative bodies, whether codified in the form of a 'manual and formally
adopted by the body, or whether consisting of a body of unwritten customs or usages, preserved in
memory and by tradition are matters of which the judicial courts, as a general rule, take no
cognizance. It is a principle of the common law of England that the judicial courts have no
conusance of what is termed the lex et consuetudo parliamentary And, although this doctrine is not
acceded to, in this country, to the extent to which it has gone in England, where the judicial courts
have held that they possess no jurisdiction to judge of the powers of the House of Parliament, yet no
authority is cited to us, and we do not believe that respectable judicial authority exists, for the
proposition that the judicial courts have power to compel legislative, or quasi-legislative bodies to
proceed in the conduct of their deliberations, or in the exercise of their powers, in accordance with
their own rules If the Congress of the United States disregards the constitution of the United States,
or, if the legislature of one of the states disregards the constitution of the state, or of the United
States, the power resides in the judicial courts to declare its enactments void. If an inferior quasi-
legislative body, such as the council of a municipal corporation, disregards its own organic law, that
is, the charter of the corporation, the judicial courts, for equal if not for stronger reasons, the same
power of annulling its ordinances. But we are not aware of any judicial authority, or of any legal
principle, which will authorize the judicial courts to annul an act of the legislature, or an ordinance of
a municipal council merely because the one or the other was enacted in disregard of the rules which
the legislature, or the municipal council or either house thereof, had prescribed for its own
government.

To the same effect is 67 Corpus Juris Secundun 870, where it was said:

Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and not substantive. The rules of procedure
adopted by deliberative bodies have not the force of a public law, but they are merely in the nature of
by-laws, prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. The rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them. Where a deliberative body adopts rules of order for its parliamentary
governance, the fact that it violates one of the rules so adopted may not invalidate a measure
passed in compliance with statute. The rules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not
binding on a subsequent legislative body operating within the same jurisdiction, and, where a body
resolves that the rules of a prior body be adopted until a committee reports rules, the prior rules
cease to be in force on the report of the committee. It may be of assistance, in determining the effect
of parliamentary law, to consider the nature of the particular deliberative body.

Finally, in 'The present case, injunction to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the
Rules will not lie (aside from the fact that the question involved is political) because the acts of the
Committee sought to be restrained have already been consummated. They are fait accomplish.
Prohibition or injunction would not issue to restrain acts already performed or consummated.
Remonte us. Banto, 16 SCRA 257; Aragones us. Subido, 25 SCRA 95.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for lack of
merit, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, CJ., Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., I reserve my vote.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I reserve my vote. It may be observed, though, that this is one petition that, following the Court's
customary disposition, may well be dismissed for having become moot and academic, in view of the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President upon the holding of the presidential elections
scheduled on February 7, 1986, in which the charges brought in the impeachment resolution and
verified complaint may be duly submitted to the people for their proper consideration and judgment.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I reserve my vote. It may be observed, though, that this is one petition that, following the Court's
customary disposition, may well be dismissed for having become moot and academic, in view of the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President upon the holding of the presidential elections
scheduled on February 7, 1986, in which the charges brought in the impeachment resolution and
verified complaint may be duly submitted to the people for their proper consideration and judgment.

Footnotes

1 Resolution promulgated September 3, 1985.