Outline in

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Atty. Crisostomo A. Uribe

I. INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW

I Tolentino, Civil Code, pp. 1-10 (1990 Edition)
Balane, The Spanish Antecedents of the Philippine Civil Code,
54 PLJ 1st Quarter, p. 1
II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS - NCC 1-18
A. When do laws take effect?
NCC 2
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24
Exec. Order 200 Sec. 1 & 2

Pesigan v, Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984

Executive Order No. 626-A should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section
11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture
provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed
of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound
thereby.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability
should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe
a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when
approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly
promulgated".

People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523, October 12, 1984

Even though the Official Gazette was dated as the April 9, 1979 issue; it was only made available to the
public on June 14, 1979; thus, it is the latter date, the date of actual publication, that would govern the
reckoning point as to when the law was actually made known to the public through publication.

Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, April 24, 1985

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to
be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included
or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

MRCA v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 344, December 19, 1989

Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down
a new rule of procedure.

Yaokasin v. Commissioner, 180 SCRA 591, December 22, 1989

As to this case, if a memmo is directed to a specific person, no need to publish. This presumes that
there is no general applicability of the memo.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette, does not apply to
CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his
subordinates. the customs collectors.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official
Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, shall also be published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general applicability."
CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance
which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors). "It need not be
published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned"

Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases
the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.

Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable to be able to give effect to
the law. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to a different effectivity date that the law stated
other than the generic fifteen days following its publication in the Official Gazette. This, however, does not
imply that the requirement of publication is dispensed with altogether. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tanada v. Hon. Tuvera.

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not
part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.
B. Ignorance of the law - NCC 3

Kasilag v. Rodriquez, 69 Phil 217

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance
may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner in this case is not conversant with the laws because he is
not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief
that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof
and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner,
his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

C. Retroactivity - NCC 4, NCC 5

cf. NCC 2252- 2269
Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22
Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 , January 31, 1989
While it may be argued that Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws
unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions. A statute operates prospectively only
and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express
terms of the statute or by necessary implications.” As pointed out above, PD 1271 falls under one of the
exceptions.

Acosta v. Plan, 169 SCRA 591 , January 30, 1989

A record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those
provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

MRCA v. CA, supra

BPI v. IAC 164 SCRA 630 , August 19, 1988

As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended the bank to
safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his complaint that he is a
Philippine resident. The parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum would never have been entered into at all.

Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one business
day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be considered as
one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil
Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More
importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other. "When the nullity proceeds
from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil
Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.

Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to
remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates
in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested rights
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
D. Waiver of rights - NCC 6
cf. NCC 301.
E. Repeal of laws - NCC 7
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3

Guingona v. Carague,. 196 SCRA 221 , April 22, 1991

Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is
the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

F. Duty to render judgment - NCC 9

cf. RPC. 5
G. Applicability of custom - NCC 11-12
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art, XII Sec. 5
Rules of Court Rule 129 (2) (3)

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79 , December 27, 1910

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was
then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents
or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to
reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and
assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of
a people.

H. Legal periods - NCC 13: Periods

Cf. Rules of court (ROC) Rule 28
RAC Sec. 31

Armigos v. Ca 179, SCRA 1 , November 6, 1989

The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law
to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or
a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any
other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins
to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday
or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday
or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date.

Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969

In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which
a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the
particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added
thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days."
I. Binding effect - NCC 15

Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933

Articles 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done
the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of
their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees
of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good
morals.

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this
court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose
to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change
of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law.

Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner
which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.

Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 , November, 29, 1965

Since the divorce decree was acquired by Escano when she was still a Filipino citizen, the divorce decree
cannot give her any right to remarry because at the time she obtained the divorce decree, she was still
bound by the laws of the Philippines in relation to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. Since , private respondent already obtained a valid divorce decree
abroad, he is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
J. Human Relations - NCC 19-21
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 March 5, 1991

It does not mean that if a crime is not punishable under the RPC no liability can be created. In this case, the
SC granted damages with the Art. 21 as basis (acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy). This is becasuese during this time, the crime of phedophelia is not yet enacted.

Moral and exemplary damages awarded to the victim’s heirs despite acquittal of accused on grounds of
reasonable doubt.—Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine
is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in
Urbano v. IAC, supra. “x x x While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). x x x Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother’s
house. Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has
left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and
incredulous death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the
crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only
the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is
the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario’s vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil
liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity
on the facts found in the records of this case.

Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.

III. CIVIL PERSONALITY

A. Persons and Personality - NCC 37- 39
Concepts of person and personality
Classes of persons and there distinctions
Elements of civil capacity
Juridical capacity v. personality
Juridical capacity v. capacity to act
B. Commencement and termination of personality
1. Natural Persons
NCC 40- 41
1987 Constitution Art. II Sec. 12
P.D. 603 Art. 5; FC 164
RPC Arts. 256-259

Roe v. Wade (US) January 22, 1973

When pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short
that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination
makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate
review will be effectively denied. Laws should not be that rigid.

The Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet evading review, is an
exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review, and not
merely when the action was initiated.
Geluz v. CA, . 2 SCRA 801 July 20, 1961
Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person does not cover unborn foetus.—The
minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed
with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.

Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf.—Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.

Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.—The damages which the parents of an unborn
child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New
Civil Code).

Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970

Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will
legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742. Lower court’s theory on
article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 November 28, 1933

It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights
and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the
acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different
from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific
name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires
oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They
refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be
presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear.

It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in
which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her.

NCC 42
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 April 27, 1948
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal
fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency
derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the
present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled
only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no
juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to
fulfill those obligations of the deceased. the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations
of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, 70 SCRA 472 April 30, 1976

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack
of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He
had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 May 17, 1990
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana
was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such
facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie
entitle the petitioner to the writ. While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient
in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its
averments make a prima facie case for relief.

NCC 43
cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 1989 Revised code rules on Evidence
Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 May 29, 1953
It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be
certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for
"inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."

2. Juridical Persons
Public corporations
Private corporations
Partnerships
NCC 44- 47

Smith Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 September 17, 1919

A corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law
and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels
in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must
always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police
power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision. Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761,
which deny to foreigners the right to a certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical
as a first reading would make them appear.

Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 November 24, 1906

The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands, and under Article 46 of the Civil
Code, juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring
civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.

It is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the
Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show
that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to
the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law
the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the
purposes for which the building was consecrated.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY
A. General rule : presumption of capacity

Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911

A person suffering from monomania of wealth is not really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable
of binding himself in a contract.
B. Restrictions on capacity to act - NCC 38-39
1. Minority
Age of majority R.A. 6809
Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution
Marriage FC 5; cf R. A. 6809
NCC 1327
NCC 1390 (1) 1403 (3) ; 1397, 1399
NCC 1489
NCC 1426-1427

Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215 December 1, 1917

The sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid,
and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by
them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law.
Young v. Tecson, 39 O.G. 953
The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other contracting
party of his minority, does not affect the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his
previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing the contract

Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil. 417 January 30, 1928

The contract of purchase and sale of real property executed by a minor is vitiated to the extent of being
void as regards said minor.

Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil. 669 March 4, 1950
Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing
indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the
absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is
null and void on any ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully
efficacious as a contract executed by parties with full legal capacity. The circumstance that, about one
month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appellants of his minority, is of no
moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the
contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that the appellants in fact did not know
that the appellee was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith,
when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon
receiving from the appellants the sum of P500.

De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille, 105 Phil 456 April 13, 1959

The failure of the minor to disclose his minority when making a contract does not per se, constitute a fraud
which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. In order to hold the minor liable, the fraud must be actual
and not constructive.

Although the written contract is unenforceable because of non-age, however, the minor shall make
restitution to the extent that he may have profited by the thing he received.

Where minority is set up only as a defense to an act on, without the minor asking for any positive relief
from the contract, the four-year period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code may not be applied.
 Criminal Liability, RPC 12 (2) – (3); RPC 13 (2); PD 603 Secs. 189-204

2. Insanity

Effect on marriage, FC 45 (2)

Effect on contracts, NCC 1327, 1328
Criminal liability, RPC 12 (1)
Rule 101, Rules of court
US v. Vaguillar, 27 Phil. 88 March 13, 1914
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge,
which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield
from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a
criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the
offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.

Standard Oil v. Arenas, supra

People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65 November 21, 1991

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity, Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding
his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry
into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the act is committed.

3. Deaf – Mutism
NCC 1327 (2), 807 & 820
4. Prodigality
ROC Rule 92 Sec. 2
5. Civil Interdiction
RPC 34, 41
6. Family Relations
FC 150; cf. FC 87
7. Alien age
8. Absence
NCC 381- 396
9. Insolvency Trusteeship
NCC 1491 & 1381

V. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE

Juridical person, NCC 51
Natural persons, NCC 50; FC 68 & 69

Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991

The COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered
voter thereat. With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor of the province of
Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the
provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run
for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination
of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in
Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established
her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of
animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she
occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence
therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when
we have left friends and relatives therein although for intents and purposes we have already transferred
our residence to other places.
VI. THE FAMILY CODE
A. Effect and Retroactivity
E. O. 209 as amended by E.O. 227, RA 6809 and RA 7160
B. Repeal and Amendment
FC 253

VII. MARRIAGE
A. Concept and nature
1 Tolentino 217-221
1. Definition
FC 1
NCC 52
Article XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
Art. II, Sec. 12, 14
Art. XV
2. Nature
FC 1
Muslim Code (MC) (PD. 1083) Sec. 14
Rule 131 Sec. 3; NCC 220
3. Breach of promise to marry
NCC 19- 21; NCC 2176
MC 22

Cabague v. Auxillo, 92 Phil. 294 November 26, 1952

The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves two
kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of
the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual
promise to marry". For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages.
This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible. However Felipe Cabague's action
may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe
Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry".
Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."

Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 February 8, 1916

Verbal agreements made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry, are
not rendered invalid for not being in writing. The law only states that such agreements cannot be proven
in court if not in writing; however, since there was no objection to the presentation of evidence to prove
such verbal agreement, it is considered a waiver of the provisions of law.

Hermosisima v CA 109 Phil 629

Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing apart from right to recover money or property
advanced upon faith of such promise. Damages can be claim if seduction was involved though, in this case
the dude being 10 years younger than the girl, seduction could not have been present says the SC.

Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21.

Estremos v. Ephan, (CA) 83 OG 4022 No. 35

A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The SC previously emphasized “that
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

The Supreme Court, however, laid down certain exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v. Velez (Dec. 26,
1964). Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, the SC found that “to formally set a wedding and go through the
preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different [from a breach of promise to marry]. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art 21.”

Tanjanco v. CA, 18 SCRA 994 December 17, 1966

In an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Baksh v. CA, G.R. 97326 Feb. 19, 1993

[T]hat where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving
of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because
of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338
of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

4. Not subject to stipulation – NCC 221

Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 September 9, 1933

Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender spouse, this doesn’t mean
that the purpose of the legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A notarized contract that permits
concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the
prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity
of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.

In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 June 21, 1940

The contract(stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at
the same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the party
marrying) executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of
the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the
respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which
justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

Selanova v. Mendoza, 64 SCRA 69 May 19, 1975

A document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the spouses and licensing either one of
them to commit any act of infidelity is a void instrument because it contravenes the provisions of Article
221 of the Civil Code declaring the nullity of contracts for the personal separation of husband and wife and
for extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
Lichauco-De Leon v. CA, 186 SCRA 345, June 6, 1990
Marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code provides:
Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulations.

B. Requisites
Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter
was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity
were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.

1 Tolentino 222-269
1. Kinds of requisites, FC 2, 3, 5; cf. NCC 53
2. Kinds of non-compliance
3. Effect of non-compliance
4. Essential requisites
a. Legal capacity
(1) Gender, FC 2 (1)
(2) Age, FC 5; FC 35 (1); R.A. 6809, NCC 54 & 80 (1)
(3) Parental consent, FC 14; FC 45, NCC 61 & 85 (1)

Sison v. Te Jay Li (CA) 48 OG No. 9

Although as a general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of consent which was clearly
manifested to determine its reality, the rule has been announced, however, that mere words without any
corresponding intention will not create the marriage relation, and that notwithstanding the formalities
indicating consent have been complied with, there not a valid marriage where the parties do not intend to
enter into the marriage. And while it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties,
when it is amply proved that the marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and without consent
and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be preserved and the marriage should
consequently be annulled.

b. Consent Freely Given

(1) mistake as to identity, FC 35 (5); NCC 86 (1)
(2) Insanity, FC 45 (2)
(3) Fraud FC, 45 (3); NCC 1338- 1344
(4) Force, intimidation and undue influence, FC 45 (4); NCC 1335- 1337
(5) Physical incapacity, FC 45 (5)
(6) Affliction with STD. FC 45 (6)
5. Formal Requisites
a. Authority of the solemnizing officer
1. who are authorized
FC 7, 10, 31 & 32
NCC 56, 74, 76
1991 Local Gov’t Code, Sec 444 (b) (1) (xviii)
455 (b) (1) (xviii)
2. how authorized
FC 7 (2)
Villar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil 659 March 14, 1955
The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to
discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so with regard to the authority
to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil
Code). Registration must be made in the Bureau of Public Libraries

Aranes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, April 11, 2002

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
 3. effect of absence of authority
FC 4; FC 35 (2)
b. Marriage Ceremony
1. Form, FC 3 (3); FC 6

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil. 731 February 5, 1909

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence
of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife. The petition signed
by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents
of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced.

2. Place FC 8, FC 28-29 FC 32-33

3. Marriage certificate, FC 6, FC 22

Madridejo v. Deleon, 55 Phil. 1 October 6, 1930

· The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage
in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking
in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.

Macua v Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

4. Duties of the solemnizing officer, FC 23- 24

5. Effect of irregularity, FC 4
c. Marriage license

(1) where to apply FC 9- 10

(2) requirements for issuance
a. Application, FC 11
b. Proof of capacity, FC 12-14, FC 21
c. Parental advice, FC 15
d. Marriage counseling FC 16
e. Publication FC 17
f. Investigation of impediments, FC 18
g. Payment of Fees FC 19
h. Family planning certificate, P.D. 965
(3) Place where valid, FC 20
(4) Period of validity, FC 20
(5) Duties of the Civil Registrar, FC 24-25
(6) Marriages exempt from license requirement, FC 27-34

Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No.: 183896, January 30, 2013

The reliance of Gloria on the marriage to prove that a marriage license existed is not sufficient in light of
the fact that Syed was able to present evidence to show that the marriage license number stated in their
marriage certificate was registered to another couple. Without the actual marriage license to prove its
existence, the Court held that the marriage was void for absence of a formal requisite.
Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, March 8, 2001
Marriage Licenses; Husband and Wife; Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; Requisites.—For this
provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The
man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other, 3. The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an
affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Ninal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000

(Art.34 of the Family Code now applies and a perfect 5-year cohabitation period is no longer needed based
on Uribe’s lecture.)

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract.

C. Law Governing Validity

1 Tolentino 260- 263

1. General Rule on contracts

a. As to form, NCC 17
b. As to substantive requirements, NCC 15 & 17

2. Special rule in marriage

a. Lex Loci celebrationis, FC 26
b. Exceptions, FC 26 in relation to FC 35 (1), (4)(5), 36-38; NCC 71
D. Presumption of marriage - NCC 220, Rule 131 Sec. 3

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the
CA correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to
Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living
together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the
issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the
illegitimacy.

Fiel v. Banawa, 76 O.G. 4 619

Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who co-
habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
“married” in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
In the Philippines, the property of such “common-law relationships” are governed by Art. 144 of the Civil
Code:
“When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.”
For Art. 144 to apply, two requisites must be satisfied:
1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and
2) That the properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both or either
of them.
E. Void Marriages
1 Tolentino 270- 310
1. General rule, FC 4
2. Absence of requisites, FC 35, cf FC 234 (repealed by R.A. 68 09)
3. Bigamous and polygamous marriages FC 35 (4), 39, 40, 41, 44 RPC 349
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 645 September 28, 1954
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless: (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid
in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.This statutory provision plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from
its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or
generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.1âwphïl.nêt

People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 February 28, 1957

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.

Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 May 30, 1983

Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful
surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the
death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as
contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in
contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected, is a party defendant, and has appeared to
contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant.

In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private
respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be
corrected. While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are
presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive
evidence establishing their inaccuracy.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 August 19, 1986

Marriage; Nullity of marriage; Proof that first marriage was vitiated by force, not necessary in an action for
a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second husband; Reason.—There is no need for petitioner
to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this
to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

Introducing evidence about existing prior marriage, not necessary as the first marriage though void, still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Woman’s marriage to second husband void; Case at bar.—There is
likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 April 15, 1988
Prejudicial Question; Nature and concept of a prejudicial question.—A prejudicial question has been
defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

Requisites of a prejudicial question, not present in case at bar; Issue of nullity of the second marriage filed
by the second wife before the juvenile court is not determinative of the husband’s guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy.—The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted
that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner’s second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the
complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit.

Petitioner husband has not shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.—ln the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his
consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

The rule on prejudicial questions cannot apply since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered
as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that petitioner’s consent
to the marriage was obtained by duress, violence and intimidation.—Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in
Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence
and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and
as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Petitioner husband merely raised in case at bar the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution
of the criminal case against him,—Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage
on September 26,1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for
more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner’s averments that his consent was
obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a
subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit
which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years.
One month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it
was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 July 3, 1992

Marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence, contracting a subsequent
marriage with another woman would be bigamous.—Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with
the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in
character.

Republic vs. Cantor

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of
declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that
the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.

4. Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absent spouse

FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44
NCC 390 – 391, FC 55 (9), FC 101

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In re Szatrow, 49 OG 243
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her
absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of a particular fact for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years.
This declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it
cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved
in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.

The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence that a person not heard from in seven years
is dead, may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which
is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action
or special proceeding.

5. Bad faith of both spouses under FC 44

6. Psychological incapacity
FC 36, cf FC 68- 73
Sempio-Dy, Major Changes Introduced by the Family Code Appendix A.
Cases under Canon Laws

Republic v. CA and Molina, 240 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the
permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
Although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
 could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law
on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Choa v.Choa, 392 SCRA 641, November 26, 2002
A medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as
the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the
totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

Barcelona v. Court of Appeals and Tadeo R. Bengzon, September 24, 2003

A petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity should specifically allege the complete
facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 428 SCRA 735, May 20, 2004

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.—The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.—We find
that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it
was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused
by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,
not physical, illness.—We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There
was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms for determining psychological incapacity should
apply to any person regardless of nationality.—In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of
human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply
to any person regardless of nationality.
Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013
Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations

7. Incestuous marriage
FC 37 cf NCC 963 – 967
8. Marriages against public policy
FC 38; Compare FC 38 (9) with NCC 80 (6)
NCC 80(7), 82
Cf. NCC 963-967
9. Non – compliance under FC 53
10. Effect of nullity
FC 50-54; FC 40, compare with NCC rule
FC 237
RA 6809
FC 147- 140

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489 June 9, 1969

There are two doctrines in this case.

1. The presumption of marriage - When a man and woman lives together as husband and wife, the
presumption is they are married. Thus follow the rule on CPG (see date of marriage)
2. Since this case involves a bigamous marriage, meaning there is impediment to marry each other,
then follow the rule on Co-ownership. Thus, there is a need to show actual contribution.

"When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But stock must be taken of the
fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the
existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13
One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established,
petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that
would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear
positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect
contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. At any rate, it would seem to
us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park
property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would
be subject to the control of the probate court. Having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
(or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent
Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.

11. Who can invoke nullity - FC 39

Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and
is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.” Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For
this purpose, he can petition a court to recognise a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should
be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
In this case, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the
case at bar.

12. Prescription
FC 39; FC 36 par. 2 in relation to FC 255; FC 42, par. 2,
FC 237, for minors
13. Procedure in action for declaration of Nullity.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages

Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

The entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. More importantly,
trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as
evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature
appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some
of her government issued identification cards.The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was
established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

(a) Requisite for valid remarriage FC 40

Wiegel v. Sempio- Diy, supra
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact.

Terre v. Terre, supra

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first
place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad
faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he
had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous
and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract
a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have
known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume,
arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For
if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must
be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
Morigo v. People, 422 SCRA 376, February 6, 2004
FC - A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes
as “void. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272, February 18, 2004

[T]he declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for
the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of
the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare
their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under
Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and
formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.

Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy. It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.

People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

Bigamy; Elements of.—An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the
sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of
the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) That the offender has been
legally married; (2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistance of the first marriage. (Montañez vs. Cipriano,
684 SCRA 315 [2012])
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at
the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial
court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

(b) Support and custody pendente lite FC 49.

(c) Safeguards against collusion FC 48.
(d) No confession of judgment FC 48; cf NCC 2035

Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse has already
dead.

Tolentino v. Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1 March 15, 1974

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits
for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff

F. Voidable Marriages:

1 Tolentino 270 – 310

1. Void v. Voidable marriages FC 4 cf. 45

2. Grounds for annulment
a. Absence of parental consent FC 45 (1), 47 (1); RA. 6809
b. Insanity FC 45 (2), 47 (2)
c. Fraud; FC 45 (3), 46, 47 (3), NCC 1338- 1344

Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil. 19

VALIDEZ.-Marriage is a very sacred institution is the foundation upon which the society. To unselect, they
are necessary to clear and convincing evidence. In this case there are no such evidence.
There is no fraud. It is unlikely that the plaintiff Godofredo had not suspected anything about Luida’s
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. As she gave birth less than 3 months
after they got married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they were married. Since
Godofredo must have known that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled.

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil. 19.

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be
only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump”. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making
the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law
does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an
institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

d. Force, intimidation and undue influence

FC 45 (4) 47, (4) NCC 1335- 1337,
RPC 344 Last paragraph

Sison v. Te Lay Li, supra.

While a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation, such
cohabitation must be voluntary and “must be something more than merely living together in the same
house or even occupying the same bed, but is the living together of the parties as husband and wife, and
including sexual relations.

Ruiz v. Atienza, (CA) 40 OG 1903

The Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force"or "violence", does not seem to include
mere intimidation, at least where it does not in legal effectamount to force or violence. (See article 1267,
Civil Code.)
People v. Santiago, supra
e. Impotence, FC 45 (5), 47 (5)

Sarao v. Guevara, (CA) 40 OG 1st supp. 263

It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. In this case,
the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported by the opinion of
the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render her incapable of
copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered her sterile but did not
make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendant’s sterility cannot be a ground for annulment
since what the law provides as a ground for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate.

Jimenez v. Canizares, 109 Phil. 273 August 31, 1960

Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred,
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical
examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed.

The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.

f. Affliction with STD

FC 45 (6), compare with FC 46 (3)
3. Who can seek annulment, FC 47
4. Prescription, FC 47

5. Procedure in annulment
a. support and custody pendente lite FC 49
b. safeguards against collusion FC 48
 c. no confession of judgment FC 48; cf NCC 2035

Jocson v. Robles, supra

On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for
summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount
to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

Tolentino v. Villanueva, supra

6. Effects of annulment FC 49-54, FC 237 for minors; RA 6809
7. Marriage when one spouse is absent
FC. 41 – 44, compare with NCC 83, 85 (2) and 87 (2)
cf. RPC 349

Jones v. Hortiguela, supra

Lukban v. Republic, 98 Phil 574 February 29, 1956
Lukban does not need to secure a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her husband because the
Civil Code and not the Family Code governs their marriage which was celebrated in 1933. It provides that
“for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared
an absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse
has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Gue v. Republic, 107 Phil. 381 March 24, 1960

8. Marriage dissolved abroad, FC 26, DOJ Opinions,

Cases under NCC 15
9. Illegal Marriages
FC 4; FC 16
NCC 84
RPC 351-352

People v. Masinsin, (CA) 49 OG 3909

If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that her husband was permanently impotent
or sterile, there is no liability.

VIII. LEGAL SEPARATION AND DIVORCE

1 Tolentino 311 – 337
A. Concept and Historical Background

Benedicto v. Dela Rama 3 Phil. 34

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; SUSPENSION OF BOOK 1 OF THE CIVIL CODE.—Titles 4 and 12 of book 1 of the
Civil Code, which deal respectively with matrimony and the register of civil status, are not in force, they
having been suspended by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands shortly after the
extension of the Civil Code to this Archipelago.

SUSPENSION OF LAWS; POWER OF SPANISH GOVERNOR-GENERAL.—It Was within the power of the
governor-general of the Philippine Islands, under the Spanish regime, to suspend the operation of a general
law, such as the Civil Code.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; LAW OF 1870 NOT OPERATIVE IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.—The Law of Civil
Marriage of 1870 was never extended to the Philippine Islands, with the exception of articles 44 to 78
thereof, which were promulgated in the Archipelago in 1883.

CANON LAW; COUNCIL OF TRENT.—The canon law had no binding force outside of the church except as to
such parts thereof as by the action of the civil authorities became part of the civil law of Spain. The decrees
of the council of Trent have the force of law in Spain and determine the requisites, form, and solemnities
for the celebration of canonical marriage. Although the decrees of the council of Trent authorize the
separation by the church of husband and wife they do not state what the causes of such separation are, and
the laws of the church which do so state the causes have not the force of civil law.

1. Distinguished from separation in fact, cf FC 238-248

2. Agreement to separate, cf NCC 221 (1)

Albano v. Gapusan 71 SCRA 26

There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law,
morals and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family.
“Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution.” “The family is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects.” Marriage and the family are the bases of human society
throughout the civilized world. To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers
as void “any contract for personal separation between husband and wife” and “every extrajudicial
agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.” Before the new Civil Code,
it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void.

In re Atty. Rufillo Bucana 72 SCRA 14

The Agreement (which in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the
wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man, without
opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit bigamy) is contrary to law,
morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and of society without which
there could be neither civilization nor progress.

3. Distinguished from absolute divorce

a. Divorce decreed abroad, FC 26
Tenchaves v. Escano, supra

Van Dorn v. Rommillo, supra

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Pilapil v. Somera, supra

Garcia-Recio v. Garcia, 366 SCRA 437, October 2, 2001

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

b. Muslim divorce MC 45-55

B. Grounds for legal Separation

FC 55, compare with NCC 97
1. Sexual infidelity or perversion
FC 55 (8) compare with NCC 97 (1)
RPC 333 and 334
Goitia v. Campos – Rueda, 35 Phil. 242
The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain
an action against the husband for separate maintenance when he has no other remedy, notwithstanding
the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option
to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having
the right to the same.

People v. Zapanta, 88 Phil. 688

ADULTERY EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A CRIME. — Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as
the Supreme Courts of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is
consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse
constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569).

LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS ACTS. — True, two
or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person — the offended
husband, the same status — the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community
presented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the
offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many
times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remains unchanged, the nexus
undissolved, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional
or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.

JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED; REASON. — A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous
acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution, otherwise the adultery by the made defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be
absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant
was married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge
upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the
crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that his codefendant was a married woman and
yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

DULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE OF UNITY OF CRIMINAL INTENT OR PURPOSE. — The notion or
concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and
in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist
there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of appeal provision
infringed upon violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations
of the same penal provision are united ion one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In adultery, the last unity does not exist, because the culprits
perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they not do another or other adulterous acts to
consummate it.

5. ID.; PARDON BY HUSBAND. — Even if the husband pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not
exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon
was granted, because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent, adulterous act.

Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
It is not mere sexual infidelity that constitutes the ground for legal separation. Such infidelity must
constitute adultery or concubinage as defined by the Revised Penal Code.
 2. Drug addiction habitat alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality, FC 55(5) compare with FC 46 (4)

3. Attempt on the life of the other spouse

FC 55 (9) compare with NCC 97 (2)

Munoz v Barrios, (CA) 51 OG 5247

An attempt on the life of a person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an intention to kill the
person against whom the attempt is made, and after a careful examination of the evidence produced by
appellant we cannot make up our mind to declare that the alleged maltreatments of respondent to his wife
were moved by such intent to kill. On the contrary, we share the opinion of the trial judge who declared
that said maltreatments cannot constitute attempts on the life of appellant as provided in Article 97, No.2,
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

C. Who can ask for legal separation?

FC 55, compare with NCC 99-100
D. When may petition be filed?
FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99

Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222 May 29, 1970

The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the date
plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of
action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law
provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.

Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 January 31, 1972

An action for legal separation is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 709 October 25, 1960

While defendant's act of cohabiting with a woman other than his wife constituted concubinage, a ground
for legal separation, nevertheless, the complaint should be dismissed, because it was not filed within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from
and after the date when such cause occurred (Art. 102, new Civil Code).

The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
the latter has not condoned or consented to the adultery or concubinage committed by the other spouse
(Art. 100, new Civil Code; and plaintiff (innocent spouse) having condoned and/or consented in writing to
the concubinage committed by the defendant husband, she is now underserving of the court's sympathy
(People vs. Schneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts necessary
implied forgiveness. A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of
the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband.

E. Effect of pungency of the petition

1. Right of consortium, FC 61 par. 1
2. Administration of property, FC 61, par. 2.
3. Support and custody pendente lite, FC 62 cf. FC 49; FC 198

Yangco v. Rohde, 1 Phil. 404 October 13, 1902

The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where the existence of the status is put
in issue by the pleading it can not be presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.
4. Cooling-off period FC 58

De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13 July 31, 1920

It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded
upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to
promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule.

Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the
theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where
the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a
permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the
part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's
domicile.

Furthermore, the SC ruled that in an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which
the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction
against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal
property during the pendency of the action.

Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 July 31, 1956

"COOLING OFF" PERIOD; PURPOSE OF; CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
"PENDENTE LITE" MAY BE DETERMINED DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD.—Article 103 of the Civil Code
provides that "an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition." The period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off
period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. But this practical expedient does not have
the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law
expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are
ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.

Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, 46 SCRA 110 July 29, 1972

Ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction is not barred by the six-month statutory suspension
of trial in action for legal separation.—The court where an action for legal separation is pending according
to Article 103 of the Civil Code is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is
precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view that an ancillary motion such
as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure
to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the
need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in Article 104 of
the Code. Here there would appear to be a recognition that the question of management of the spouses’
respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may
even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation
from which the court suffers under Article 103 is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard.

Lerma v. CA., 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is, support of
the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the
conjugal partnership property. We do not see that the distinction is material in this case. In the first place
Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support,
not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the
pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases. In
the second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a
prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing
thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61, supra,
which requires, among other things, when support pendente lite is applied for, that the court determine
provisionally "the probable outcome of the case."
F. Defenses
1. Consent; FC 56 (2), NCC 100

Matubis v. Praxedes, supra

People v. Sansano, 58 Phil. 73
The husband abandoned his wife who later live with another man. After serving her sentence for adultery,
the husband did not take her back and told her to live however she wanted to live. The husband later on
lived in Hawaii and returned after 7 years to file an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery.
The husband’s conduct warranted the inference that he had consented to the philandering of his wife.

People v. Schneckenberger, 73 Phil. 413 November 10, 1941

Prior Consent; Pardon.—The document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in
which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de acción en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos", while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by
such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other.

It was said before (People vs. Guinucod), 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party from
instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. This
is a narrow view in no way warranted by the language, as well as the manifest policy, of the law.

The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "The offended party cannot in-
stitute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case,
if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the
offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer
to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her
dishonor; he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong.
For instance, a husband who delivers his wife to another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as
where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. Held: That
prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

2. Condonation; FC 56 (1)

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by
evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73)

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d).

3. Recrimination; FC 56 (4)

Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168 October 18, 1957

Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent,
whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of
agreement, to defend divorce proceedings
4. Collusion
FC 60
FC 56 (3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 231 (3)

Brown v. Yambao, supra

Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35 February 23, 1960
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE OF ADULTERY INDEPENDENTLY OF CONFESSION.
- Where there is evidence of the adultery independently of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal
separation, the decree of separation should be granted, since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
defendant’s confession.

ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION MADE OUTSIDE OF COURT. - Article 101 of the new Civil Code does not
exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court.

COLLUSION MAY NOT BE INFERRED FROM CONFESSION. - Collusion may not be inferred from the mere
fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery, desires the divorce and makes no defense.

CONDONATION; FAILURE OF HUSBAND TO SEARCH FOR ERRING WIFE. - In the case at bar, the wife left
her husband after the latter discovered her dates with other men. Held: The failure of the husband actively
to search for his wife and take her home does not constitute condonation or consent to the adultery. It was
not his duty to search for her.

5. Prescription

cf. Brown v. Yambao, supra

The appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings
until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.
Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1)
year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date
when such cause occurred.

G. Court Procedure
FC 58-60
H. Effect of Decree of Legal Separation

1. Personal relations, FC 61, 63

2. Custody of children
FC 63 (3); FC 213
NCC 106 (3)
P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3

Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340 May 30, 1956

CUSTODY OP MlNOR CHILDREN; GlVEN TO WIFE BY HUSBAND'S PERMISSION; ITS EFFECT.—Since
petitioner merely obtained the husband's permission to bring the minor children to Manila, for the purpose
of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather, petitioner obtained and has the physical possession
of the minors in a precarious manner. She holds it in the name, on behalf and by authority of husband,
whose agent she, in effect, is. He may, therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to
comply immediately with such demand. She cannot even question his authority to make it, although she is
free to seek a review of the order or decision awarding the custody of minors to him, and to ask that they
be placed under her charge
.
3. Property relations; FC 63 (2), FC 64
4. Support, FC 198
5. Use of surname; NCC 370-372
Laperal v. Republic, 116 Phil 672
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed,
shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her
married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the
policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the
benefit of all concerned.

6. Right to inherit - FC 63 (4)

7. Cost of litigation - FC 94 (10; FC 121 (9)

I. Reconciliation
1. How done, FC 65
2. Effects reconciliation, FC 66-67

IX. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

1 Tolentino 338-355
A. Obligation to live together
FC 68; FC 72; RPC 11(2); RPC 247
Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng, 103 Phil. 255 March 29, 1958
WHERE WIFE ESTABLISHES RESIDENCE APART FROM THAT PROVIDED BY HUSBAND.—Although the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual
help and assistance (Art. 109) and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision
compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her
residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in Such event there is no plausible reason
why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Goitia v. Campos – Rueda, supra

Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54 August 11, 1921

It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. The court can only admonish the wife in its decision.

Ramirez-Cuaderno v. Cuaderno, 12 SCRA 505 November 28, 1964

The court CANNOT impose on the Husband and wife to live together EVEN if this is an obligation under the
NCC (even now in FC) ti live together.
Family Domicile

1. General rule: jointly

FC 69 par. 1, compare with NCC 110

Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991

Mere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his
avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a
persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts,
activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin
must show and prove pre-ponderantly such abandonment or loss.

2. Exemption, FC 69 par. 2
C. Management and Family Support
FC 70-71

D. Exercise of Profession
FC 73, compare with NCC 117
Art. II sec. 14, and Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
cf. NCC 113.
X. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

A. What made; governs marriage settlements

1. When made; modifications
FC 1; FC 76
(Modifications after marriage)
FC 66, 67, 128, 135, 136

2. Form of MS; registration requirement

FC 77
3. Celebration of marriage
FC 81
4. Who may enter into MS?
a. Minor, FC 78
b. Persons under civil interdiction
c. Incapacitated persons
FC 79, in rel. to NCC 38-39
B. Which law governs property relations?

1. Stipulation in marriage settlements

FC 81
2. If both Filipinos
3. Mixed marriage between Filipino and alien
4. If both aliens
5. Property located outside RP
FC 80 (2) and (3) in rel. to NCC 16
FC (3) in rel. to NCC 17
C. Donations propter nuptias
1. Definition, FC 82

2. Who may be donors?

3. What may be donated by the spouses?

a. Present property FC 84
b. Future property
FC 84; NCC 761
c. Encumbered property
FC 85
d. Donations in the marriage settlements
FC 81
4. Void donations by the spouses
FC 87
a. Donations during the marriage
b. Donations in common law marriages

Matabuena v. Cervantes 38 SCRA 284

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v.
Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the
policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure
and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW
IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De
donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the
condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage.

c. Exceptions
5. Revocation of donations propter nuptias; FC 86
a. Revocation by donors, FC 86; NCC 765
b. By operation of law, FC 43; 44; 81
D. Absolute community of property (ACP)

1. When applicable, FC 75

2. Commencement, FC 88
3. Waiver during marriage, FC 89
4. Waiver after marriage, FC 89 par. 2
5. Suppletory Rules: co-ownership, FC 90; have NCC 484-501
6. What constitutes ACT, FC 91?

a. All property at time of marriage

b. Property acquired subsequently
c. Winnings from gambling, FC as of NCC 164
d. Presumption of ACP, FC 93 of NCC 160
7. What is excluded from ACP, FC 92; FC 197: FC 95

Spouses Abrenica V. Law Firm of Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art.
92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income,
if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.

8. Charges of ACP, FC 94

a. Family expenses of FC 100 (3)

b. Debts of spouses
c. Subsidiary liabilities
d. Sole obligations of a spouse
e. Gambling losses, FC 95

9. Ownership, FC 90, FC 96 in rel. to NCC 206

10. Administration and enjoyment of ACP
a. Joint administration, FC 96; FC 90; NCC 486; NCC 491
b. Sole administration
(1) Incapacity FC 96
(2) Separation in fact FC 100 (3)
(3) Abandonment, FC 101
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61

c. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 96-98

11. Effect of separation de facto, FC 100, of FC 239
12. Effect of abandonment, FC 101; FC 72
13. Dissolution of ACP, FC 99
a. Death, FC 103
b. Legal separation, FC 63 (2); FC 66
c. Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2)
d. Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
14. Effects of dissolution
 a. Liquidation procedure, FC 102
b. For cause other than death, FC 43 (2); FC 63 (2)
c. Termination due to death, FC 104
15. For marriages before FC, FC 104

Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216

(Sorry mahaba, pero this is a long case and importante yung figures, I just pasted yung sinabi ng SC and
yung pertinent provisions in the NCC, compare that with FC 104. Basically this case illustrates how FC 104
is applied - Kikoy)

The total mass of the properties should be divided between the conjugal partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each partnership. Therefore the second conjugal partnership is entitled to 46/64 of the total
mass of properties and the second conjugal partnership is entitled to 18/64. The share of the estate of
Nicolas Delizo is ½ pro indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership gains of the first and
second marriages which is equivalent to ½ of the whole estate. This will be distributed equally to his
children of both marriages and his widow will have a share equivalent to one child. Additionally, De Ocampo
is also entitled to ½ of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and Villasfer’s share is
equivalent to ½ of the net remainder of the first conjugal partnership therefore these would amount to
23/64 and 9/64 respectively.

Computation of Sharing:
(Whole Estate 64/64)
Share of Rosa Villasfer = 9/64 to be divided among three children
Share of Each Child of 1st marriage (3 children) = 9/64 +1/26 = 142/1664
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo = 23/64 +1/26 = 662/1664
Share of Each Child of 2nd marriage (9 children) = 1/26 = 64/1664
Whole Estate = 32/64 + 13/26 = 1664/1664

APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE:

Article 189. Whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by the same
person should be carried out at the same time, in order to determine the capital of each partnership all
kinds of proof in the absence of inventories shall be admitted; and in case of doubt, the partnership property
shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the
property belonging to the respective spouses.

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
by either spouse during the marriage.

Article 185. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally between the
husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements.

Article 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

Article 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall
be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child

16. Support during ACP liquidation

E. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Ballados v. CA, November 19, 1990

Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 333 February 16, 1989
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160, Civil Code).

Registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal. And there are cases where there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of
only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage of
the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented proof to rebut
the presumption.

Ansaldo v. Sheriff, 64 Phil. 115

PROPERTY RlGHTS; CONJUGAL PROPERTY; WHAT IS.—The fruits of the paraphernal property form part
of the assets of the conjugal partnership.

LIABLE FOR WHAT DEBTS.—The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses, but not to the
payment of the personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were
productive of some benefit to the family. (Civil Code, arts. 1385, 1386.)

WHEN RIGHT TO SHARE IN CONJUGAL PROPERTY VESTS.—The right of the husband or wife to one-half of
the property of the conjugal partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage, when the
conjugal partnership is also dissolved.

ESTOPPEL.—In the enforcement of a judgment against the husband, the judgment creditor, who caused to
have certain amounts belonging to the joint bank accounts of the spouses levied on execution, can not be
said to have been intentionally and deliberately led to believe that said amounts were conjugal property
subject to all debts and obligations of the husband, only because the spouses failed to allege that said
amounts were the exclusive property of the wife, when, as a matter of fact, they claimed that, while said
amounts form part of the assets of their conjugal partnership, they could not be levied upon, because they
were not subject to the payment of the personal obligations of the husband.

Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271, February 11, 2003

Where the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil
Code apply.—Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
provisions of the New Civil Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides as follows: “The
following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses; x x x.” The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage
out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code, which provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership—the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear.—Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear.

1. When CPG commences and applies

a. Marriages under FC, FC 107 of FC 88
b. Marriages before FC, FC 105 (2) of FC 256
c. When applicable, FC 105 of FC 74-74
d. Suppletory rules, FC 108
PNB v. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370
The conjugal partnership is liable for obligations contracted during marriage, and in default of conjugal
property, the spouses are jointly liable therefor with their private properties, unless by express stipulation,
they shall have bound themselves solidarily

2. What is excluded from CPG?

a. Brought as exclusive property, FC 109 (1)

Laperal v. Katigbak 10 SCRA 493

There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art.
160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for the same law is un
equivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved that it (the property) belongs exclusively to the husband
or the wife." And, examining the records and evidence in this suit, We hold that this is a case where the
presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly disproven.

Barciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53

Retirement premium forms part of conjugal estate, absent proof to contrary.—As to the retirement
premiums totaling P9,700.00, the same is presumed conjugal property, there being no proof that the
premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article 160, New Civil Code). Such
being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and
the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which shall in turn be distributed to his legal heirs.

b. Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage FC 109 (2) of FC 113; FC 115

Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil. 255
PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY RlGHT OF WlFE TO RECOVER WHEN SOLD BY HUSBAND WITHOUT HER
CONSENT.—V claimed that he had purchased certain jewels from F. M, the wife of F, claimed that such
jewels were her sole and separate property, acquired from her mother; that as such paraphernal property
she exercised dominion over them; that she had the exclusive control and management of the same; that
they had not been delivered to her husband to be administered or controlled by him; that, inasmuch as they
had not been delivered to her husband to be administered by him, she could not be deprived of them by
any act of his, without her consent, and without a compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Arts.
1382, 1384.) Held: That M was entitled to recover from V the possession of said jewels.

c. Acquired by redemption, FC 109 (3)

Plata v. Yatco 12 SCRA 716

The subsequent conveyance of paraphernal property does not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal
property, there being no proof that the money paid came from common or conjugal funds.

Lim v. Garcia, 7 Phil. 320

One claiming that certain property is the separate estate of the husband, brought by him to his marriage,
must establish that fact by evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption established in article 1407 of
the Civil Code that all the property of the spouses is conjugal partnership property (bienes gananciales).

d. Purchased with exclusive money, FC 109 (4) of FC 118-119

3. Administration of exclusive property

a. By the spouse-owner, FC 110

b. By the other spouse, FC 110 2nd par. FC 142, FC 75

Veloso v. Martinez, supra

Manotok Realty v. CA, 149 SCRA 372
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio,
the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale
cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
 4. Encumbrance / disposition of exclusive property FC 111- 112, of FC 236,
Amended by RA 6809

Palanca v. Smith-Bell, 9 Phil. 131

When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property belonging to his wife, with the consent of the latter,
the money becomes conjugal property, and if the funds are invested in the construction of a house the
building is likewise conjugal property and is liable for the debts of the husband.

Lim Queco v. Cartagena, 71 Phil. 163

The wife alone borrowed the money from "El Ahorro Insular" although she guaranteed repayment with a
mortgage on her parapherna executed with her husband's consent. Since the wife does not have the
management or representation of the conjugal partnership where the husband is qualified therefor, the
loan to her constituted a transaction that did not involve the community, and the creditor could seek
repayment exclusively from her properties. Logically, as this Court then held, the money loaned to the wife,
as well as the property acquired thereby, should be deemed to be the wife's exclusive property.

5. What constitutes CPG?

a. Definition, FC 106
b. Presumption of CPG, FC 116

Torela v. Torela, 93 SCRA 391

Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first prove that the same was acquired during
the marriages.—While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above
stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.

Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first prove that the same was acquired during
the marriages.—While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above
stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.

PNB v. CA, 158 SCRA 435

When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they were registered in the name of Donata Montemayor,
widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering properties, the mortgage loan applications of
Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted and registered in the office of the
Registered of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemaor, the PNB had the right to
rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties owned by Donata
Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered owner
and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same.

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land gas a right to rely
upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispose with the need if inquiring further, except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautions man make such inquiry. Article 160: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The
presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it
appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was
already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as
to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when
the title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The PNB had no
reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of the title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal
purpose, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgage covering said properties were
constituted the PNB was not aware to any flow of the title of the mortgagor.

At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and partitions are real actions, however, they
are actions in personal that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being
a party in said is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said
decisions when it extended the above descriptive mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal
nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties
of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover,
when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its
right thereto is beyond question.

Magallon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 252

(Another long case, basically yung doctrine is, if the land is acquired through fraud the presumption that it
is part of the CPG is not applicable. Another doctrine is that the phrase “Married to_______” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the owner. - Kikoy)

From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact
that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein, Martin
Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certificate of title has been established by evidence no
longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, on
the authority of Litam vs. Rivera 17 and Stuart vs. Yatco, 18 the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon
written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status
of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property
of Lacerna and petitioner hereyn. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160
of the Civil Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there
being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which arises by implication from the
aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim
on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan,
mother of the private respondents. The ruling in Maramba vs. Lozano 19 that the presumption does not
operate where there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired applies with
even greater force here.

Cuenca v. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In the
cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon v.
Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this
Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.

In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that
the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of
Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered the
time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon v. Montejo, supra) The fact that these parcels were
surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner
Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the
documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca.
The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Nable Jose v. Nable
Jose, 41 Phil. 713) Under the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should
also be upheld.

Dela Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, February 8, 2012

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.
Andrade v. Tan, G.R. No. 171904 and 172017, August 7, 2013
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.—Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article
160 of the Civil Code which states that “[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this
presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property
was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane, 489 SCRA 107 (2006): x x x As a
condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other
words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

c. What are included in CPG FC 117

Zulueta v. Pan AM, SCRA 1

The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiff’s contract of carriage with defendant, for which
plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said damages, there’re
fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The
damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the provisions of Article 148 NCC or other
provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I NCC, which chapter is entitled “Paraphernal
Property”. What is more if “that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
property belonging to only one of the spouses” and “that” which is purchased with the exclusive money of
the wife or of the husband: belonging exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that which
is acquired with money of conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof.

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (1988)

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends that
the disputed property is paraphernal.

d. If property bought by installments FC 118

(Under NCC: Castillo v. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102)

It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable law in 1932, the
property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate
property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code
provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:

ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only.
The last clause in Article 1401 (par. 1) indicates that the circumstance of the sale of the fishpond in question
being made by the original owners in favor of both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and Macaria Pasco, is
indifferent for the determination of whether the property should be deemed paraphernal or conjugal.

e. Credit due, FC 119

f. Improvements on CPG property

Calimlim v. Fortun 129 SCRA 675 (1984)

Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who
owns the same.
The Court held that both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal
partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a
creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal
buildings were first constructed thereon. The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was subject
to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the
date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code)

Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474

It has been held by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property
of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.

It is true that in the meantime the conjugal partnership may use both the land and the building, but it does
so not is owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct.

The ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only be
demanded in the liquidation of the partnership

6. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121

a. With consent
Javier v. Osmena, 34 Phil. 336
Inasmuch as "the fruits, revenue, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage coming from the
partnership property, or from that which belongs to either one of the spouses," is community property,
according to article 1401; and, further, as the law expressly provides that "the fruits of the paraphernal
property form a part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of the marriage
expenses" (art. 1385), hence it follows that the creditor of the husband may bring his action, not against
the paraphernal property, but against the fruits and revenues of this private property of the wife.

This conclusion is not barred by the provision of article 1386, to wit, that "the personal obligation of the
husband cannot be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal property unless it be proven that they were
incurred for the benefit of the family." It is chiefly upon this article that appellee's whole brief is based.

Vda. De Sta. Romana v. PCIB, 118 SCRA 330

Conjugal Partnership; Unpaid purchase price of lot bought by the deceased husband in behalf of the conjugal
partnership chargeable against the partnership assets as the obligation was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.—The action filed by private respondent against the petitioner Ramon Sta. Romana
was clearly a suit to enforce an obligation of the conjugal partnership. Civil Case No. 7678 arose out of the
failure of Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the purchase price of a lot he bought from C.N. Hodges presumably in
behalf of the conjugal partnership. Petitioner does not deny the conjugal nature of both Lots Nos. 1258-G
and 1258-F. Indeed she bases her contention on the claim that at least Lot No. 1258-F, together with its
improvements existing thereon, constitutes property of the conjugal partnership. It may not be denied,
therefore, that the liability incurred by Ramon Sta. Romana is chargeable against the conjugal partnership
assets, it being undisputed that the said obligation was contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. (Art. 161 [1], Civil Code.)

Inclusion of wife as party defendant in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation either pertaining
to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership in order to bind the conjugal partnership
property, not necessary; Reasons.—The non-inclusion of the herein petitioner as a party-defendant in Civil
Case No. 7678 is immaterial. There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband to enforce
an obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership, the
defendant husband must be joined by his wife. The contrary rule is prescribed in Section 4, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil Code, but not the other way around, obviously in recognition of
the legal status of the husband as the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 112, Civil Code.) There
was, therefore, no need of including the petitioner as a party in Civil Case No. 7678 for the purpose of
binding the conjugal partnership properties for the satisfaction of the judgment that could be rendered
therein.

DBP v. Adil, 161 SCRA 307 (1988)

The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides: “Art. 1112.
Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not the right
to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation
results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired.” There is no doubt that prescription
has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10, 1940. However, when respondent Confesor
executed the second promissory note on April 11,1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered
by the previous promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the
foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his
right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. This Court had ruled in a similar
case that—"x x x when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a
new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable x x x.” Thus, it
has been held—“Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it
after the same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of
prescription.”

Effects of a new express promise to pay a debt.—This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that
has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-
existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not
discharge the debt. “A new express promise to pay a debt barred xxx will take the case from the operation
of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the
remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support
a promise, to wit—a preexisting debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new promise; the new
promise upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.” “x x x x x It is this new
promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgment as a legal implication, which
is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy (which by lapse of
time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his original contract.”

Conjugal Partnership; Husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership under Art. 165 of the Civil
Code.—WE disagree. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent
Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal
partnership is liable for this obligation.

b. Without consent
Luzon Surety v. de Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969)
The benefit accruing to the family must be clear and not fanciful and remote before the conjual partnership
can be held liable. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance his reputation, such
benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the
provision.

BA Finance v. CA 161 SCRA 608

The fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case,
the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the
private respondent Lily

Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear
that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan from the
petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to
the express provision of the Civil Code.
Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361, April 9, 2002
While Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house
and lot which became the conjugal home of Manuel Abelardo and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the
alleged lack of consent of Manuel Abelardo, under Art. 121 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable
for such loan together with his wife.

c. Personal debts, FC
People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153
Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon spouses may be charged against the partnership assets
even before the liquidation of the partnership.—Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or
wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient." It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability may be enforced
presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. The termination of the conjugal partnership is
not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever doubt may still remain should be erased by the concluding
portion of Article 163 of the Civil Code which provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the partnership
such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

Reason for Article 163 of Civil Code.—The reason for Article 163 of the Civil Code is in accord with the
principle that every person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable. If the fines and indemnities
imposed upon either husband or wife were to be allowed only after liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the effect would be to exempt the accused from civil liability and the heirs of the offended party would be
made to suffer still further. Article 163 of the Civil Code minimizes the possibility that such additional
liability of an accused would be rendered nugatory. In doing justice to the heirs of the victim, no injustice
is committed against the family of the offender because it is made a condition under this article of the Civil
Code that the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 covering primarily the maintenance of the family
and the education of the children of the spouses as well as other obligations of a preferential character are
first satisfied.

Proof of requisites for applicability.—Considering that the obligations mentioned in Article 161 of the Civil
Code are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is-
made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity to show that the requisites for the
imposition and enforcement of the fines and indemnities against the conjugal partnership are obtaining,
should not be most exacting, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case
may be, representing the conjugal partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible
so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the offended party,

d. Winnings from gambling, FC 123 (cf FC 95)

7. Ownership, administration, enjoyment and disposition
a. Joint administration, FC 124 (cf FC 96)
NCC: Ysasi v. Fernandez 23 SCRA 1079
Husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership.—The husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him by law (Article 165, Civil Code). More, the
husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled—as of right—to joint administration (De la Rosa
vs. Barruga (unreported), L-2368, June 30, 1950). The husband may even enforce right of possession
against the wife who has taken over the administration without his consent. And, the wife may be punished
for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets (Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 211).
She may be required to render full and complete accounting of such properties (Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, 58 Phil. 271, 281).

When wife may ask the court to remove administration of the conjugal properties from the husband.—Of
course, it is the wife’s prerogative to ask the courts to remove administration of the conjugal properties
from the husband for her protection. This, Article 167 of the Civil Code concedes, thus: “Art. 167. In case of
abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on
petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of
property” (Italics supplied).
 b. Sole administration

(1) Incapacity, FC 124

(2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3)
(3) Abandonment, FC101
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61
b. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125 of FC 97
NCC: Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, 120 SCRA 628
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are "[T]hose where one of the parties
is incapable of giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena had no capacity to give
consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to
both spouses. The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by the legal
provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is
required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.) The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her
husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena,
who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not
likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an
inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do
during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.

Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares 410 SCRA97, August 28, 2003

[T]here is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been purchased using the
conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the
sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her action
to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the
10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period from
November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a contract
concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias action would still be within the prescribed period.

8. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127 (cf, FC 100); of FC 239

9. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 (cf. FC 101)

De la Cruz v. De La Cruz, 22 SCRA 333

If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's
leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same
zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and
children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of property.
This decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies
granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but
are designed to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a
denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but merely points up the
insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.

10. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126

a. Death, FC 126 (1)
b. Legal separation, FC 63 (2), FC 66
c. Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2)
d. Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
11. Effect of dissolution, FC 129

a. Liquidation procedure, FC 129

b. Cause other than death, FC 129; FC 43 (2), FC 63 (2)
c. Termination due to death: FC 130 (cf. FC 104)
Beumer v. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012
W/N a foreigner may seek reimbursement from a former spouse in a petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership?

IN THIS CASE, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a
joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that
he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary
thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him
or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party
to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any
rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

12. For marriages before FC, 131

13. Applicability of rules of court, FC 132
14. Support during CPG liquidation, FC 133

Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728

Fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is not a determining factor of their
right to allowance under Art 188 of the Civil Code; While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow
and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his or
her children without distinction.—The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or
married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance
under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children
of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.

Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the right
to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by
Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule; "Spouse" interpreted to be the legitimate
spouse, not common-law spouse.—Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-
law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

F. Regime of Separation of Property

a. When applicable
(1) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146
(2) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130
(3) Reconciliation in legal separation FC 66 (2)
b. Property covered, FC 144
c. Administration
(1) By owner, FC 145
(2) By other spouse, FC 142

d. Family expenses, FC 146

 G. Judicial Separation of Property
1. When possible, FC 134
2. For sufficient cause, FC 135, cf . FC 55 (10)

Garcia v. Manzano, 103 Phil. 798

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.

3. Voluntary separation of property, FC 136 of FC 74-75, FC 134

Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, 24 SCRA 837

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.

In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced
by the said arrangements.

4. Effects of judicial separation of property

a. Liquidation of CPG or ACP, FC 137 par. 1
b. Support pendente lite, FC 137 par.2
c. Regime after JSP, FC 138 of FC 66 (2)
d. Binding effect on third parties, FC 139-140; of FC 66(2)
5. Revival of property regime after JSP, FC 141 of FC 67
6. Transfer of administration of exclusive property, FC 142
H. Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
Review: FC 35-38; 53 FC 41, 44, FC 45
1. Unions under FC 147

Maxey v. CA, 129 SCRA 187 of NCC 144

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil
partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in
properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of this Court.

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial
precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the
property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of
them.

The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a woman from
a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods
through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all
of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case,
Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by
both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered
Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not
on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2) and FC 50

Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306

It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil
Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be
a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There
is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries
suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.

Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615

MARRIAGE; ILLEGAL MARRIAGES; WHEN MARRIAGE MAY BE COLLATERALLY ATTAQCKED. – Where the
marriage contracted is bigamous and null and void for being in violation of Section 29 of the Marriage Law,
the marriage is subject to collateral attack in the intestate proceedings instituted by judicial administratix
for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in the conjugal property.

BURDEN OF PROOF – As a general rule, a marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is null
and void. The only exceptions are mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of Section 29 of the Marriage law.
The burden is on the part of the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; TERMINATION; FORFEITURE OF SHARE OF SPOUSE – Facts: Defendant

contracted two marriages. The second marriage was contracted by the first wife from the second wife. The
second marriage was contracted in 1935 when the Spanish Civil Code was still in force and terminated in
1958 when the NCC was already in force. May the second wife invoke Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code
and have a declaration of forfeiture of share of the husband in the conjugal partnership having given cause
for the nullity of the second marriage? Held: No, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage
terminated by the husband’s death in 1958. By that time, the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315
The respondent GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the
late Jose Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz, on the one hand,
and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit
error when it confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second marriage of Jose
Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith. The lower court has correctly applied the ruling
of this Court in the case of Lao, et al. vs. Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the stipulation of facts and in
the decision appealed from.5 In the recent case of Gomez vs. Lipana, L-23214, June 30, 1970, 6 this Court,
in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man — a situation more or less
similar to the case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario Diaz — held "that since the defendant's
first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio
as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration
of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved
before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her
husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage."

Yap v. CA, 145 SCRA 229

There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the second
marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force when the two marriages were
celebrated. Second wife got no share in the estate of the husband only the legal wife.

Carino v. Carino, 351 SCRA 127, February 2, 2001

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”—Accordingly, the declaration in
the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not
validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership
of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
“Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.—Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same
married man,—x x x In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.

Go- Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

The SC had ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.
Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda, G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013
Edilberto himself admitted to the need to prove contributions in such a union wherein he quoted the ruling
in Borromeo v. Descallar in his petition where he stated that it is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contributions to the acquisition of propery in order to be able to lay claim to any portion
of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. Such statement is a reiteration of
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

XI. THE FAMILY

A. What governs family relations, FC 149?

Alavado, City of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230

Public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born unto
them after the celebration of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such marriage in subsequent
document were held to be competent evidence as proof of said marriage . A review of the records of this
case failed to disclose any evidence whatsoever which will overthrow the aforementioned presumption in
favor of claimant's marriage to the deceased Alavado

Arroyo v. CA, 203 SCRA 753

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime of adultery
cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the
control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively,
nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a
matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection
of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.

B. Family Relations FC 150-151

Cf. NCC 2035; ROC Rule 6 Sec. 1 ( j )

Gayon v. Gayon, SCRA 104
Inasmuch as a sister-in-law, nephew or niece is not included in the enumeration contained in Article
217,Civil Code, which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule, it follows that
the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before
filing the complaint does not bar the same.

Wainwright v. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78

Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future
support is prescribed, then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support
and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It need not be alleged in the
complaint.

Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
No motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in
the trial court and neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before
the Court of Appeals.Therefore the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent.
XII. THE FAMILY HOME
A. What constitutes the family home (FH)
B. Who may constitute the family home, FC 152, FC 161?
C. When deemed constituted, FC 153
D. When terminated, FC 153 compare with FC 159
E. Beneficiaries, FC 154
F. Exemptions, FC 155, FC 160

Modequilio v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766

It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment
was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

Siari Valley v. Lucasan, 109 Phil 294

The reason why a family home constituted after a debt had been incurred is not exempt from execution is
to protect the creditor against a debtor who may act in bad faith by resorting to such declaration just to
defeat the claim against him. If the purpose is to protect the creditor from fraud it would be immaterial if
the debt incurred be undisputed or inchoate, for a debtor acting in good faith would prefer to wait until his
case is definitely decided before constituting the family home. Indeed, it may result, as in this case, that the
Supreme Court may affirm the judgment of the lower court. If the contention of respondent be sustained a
debtor may be allowed to circumvent this provision of the law to the prejudice of the creditor. This the
Court cannot countenance. Hence, we are persuaded to conclude that the money judgment in question
comes within the purview of the word debt used in Article 243 (2) of the new Civil Code.

Spouses De Mesa v. Acero, Jr. G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it.
Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to
presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

XIII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Paternity and filiations in general, FC 163
B. Legitimate children, FC 164
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97
Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did
not take place especially if the testimony is uncorroborated. In the absence of proof that marriage did not
take place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married.

De la Purrta v. CA, 161 SCRA 661

As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of
the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing
enough to prove paternity. The same must be said of Exhibits A, A-1, B and B-1,which are pictures of Jewel
and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to
prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of complainant’s person and honor
 1. Conceived during marriage cf. ROC rule 131 Sec. 5 (11)
2. Born during marriage
3. By artificial insemination
4. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43 (1)
5. Void marriage under FC 54 in rel. to FC 36 and FC 53
6. Voidable marriages
7. Adopted children
8. Legitimated children
9. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174 cf. NCC 364, 374, 376

Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282

If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother,
should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real
paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

Naldoza, Republic, 112 SCRA 658

Mother’s desire to change her children’s surname should not be the sole consideration for the change.—To
allow them, at their mother’s behest, to bear only their mother’s surname (which they are entitled to use
together with their father’s surname) and to discard altogether their father’s surname, thus removing the
prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the
minors and their father should be consulted. The mother’s desire should not be the sole consideration. he
reasons adduced for eliminating the father’s surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To
allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors’ parentage and might create the
impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would
be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records; Minors entitled to know their
parentage; Minor when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself
and wants to use his mother’s surname only is qualified to apply for change of surname.

Legitimes of NCC 888, NCC 979

D. Illegitimate children
1. Under NCC
2. FC 165
3. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 175-176

Mangulabnan v. IAC, 185 SCRA 760

An illegitimate child like the minor Alfie in this case whose father, the private respondent herein, is married
and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a natural child but an
illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted.
There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is derived and before
support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by affidavits.

Osmena de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222

Plaintiffs may use the surname of their father as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that they are
legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more, grants
monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over the surname of their father. In other words,
said article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it cannot be
interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to be the surname of their father.
If plaintiff's theory were correct, they can stop countless inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."

E. Action to impugn legitimacy

1. Grounds, FC 166
a. Physical impossibility of access
Andal v. Macaraig, 69 Phil 165
Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that
he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse,yet that is no
evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnalintercourse. There are cases where persons suffering
from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to
sexual intercourse.

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73

During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no concrete or
substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between Elizabeth and
Crispin.Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the possibility
of access to one another.

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should
be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on
hand, that presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was
registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.

b. Biological or other scientific grounds

Jao v. CA, 152 SCRA 359
Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that the man is not the father of the child but not necessarily
that a man is the father of a particular child. Blood tests are conclusive as to non-paternity and inconclusive
to paternity.

Amurao v. CA, 168 734

Whether or not the petitioner made an admission of paternity under the terms of the trial court's order
dated September 26, 1977, thereby binding himself to give support to his child, the private respondent
herein, is a finding of fact which this Court may not review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Contrary declaration by mother, FC 167

Chua Keng Giap v. PAC, 18 SCRA 18

Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else,
it was Sy Kao who could say — as indeed she has said these many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not
begotten of her womb.

3. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169

4. Presumptions FC 170, 171

Lim v. IAC, 166 SCRA 451

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of
their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.

5. Prescription
6. Who may impugn

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563, March 7, 2002

The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be
the child of his mother’s alleged paramour.
F. PROOF OF FILIATION
1. Of legitimate children, FC 172-173
a. Record of birth

Reyes v. CA, 135 SCRA 439

The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the
mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized; and if the alleged father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence
of paternity of said child. Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco
Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument.

Castro v. CA, 173 SCRA 658

Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be signed by
the father and mother. It was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There
is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the
birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years.
Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized
natural child during the reglementary period to do so.r jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone
otherwise she may be penalized.

Mendoza v. IAC, 152 SCRA 445

Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in some other public document. In the case at bar, the only
document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate
of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating
therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya.10 However, Philippine
jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient
to prove recognition.

b. Final judgment declaring filiation

Ramos v. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284

It is true that the acknowledgment of the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a record of birth, will or other public
document (Art. 131, Old Civil Code). But the record of Civil Case No. 217, which is relied upon by the
defendants to support their defense of res judicata, indubitably shows that the plaintiffs were treated as
acknowledged natural children of Martin Ramos. The reasonable inference is that they were in the
continuous possession of the status of natural children of Martin Ramos, as evidenced by his direct acts and
the acts of his family. Even the lower court, after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the intestate proceeding
as acknowledged natural children, had no choice but to reaffirm that same holding in its 1961 decision in
this case.
c. Admission in a signed public document

Lim v. CA, 65 SCRA 160

The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed
by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the intervention of a notary;
it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is
a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and
of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark
by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.
The marriage contract does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition. Be it
remembered that recognition, under the Civil Code of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn."

d. Signed and handwritten private instrument

Ranas v. Ranas, 64 SCRA 260

e. Open and continuous possession of status
Mendoza v. CA, . September. 24. 1991
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to
comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through
others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of
Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been because
defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his
house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In fact,
Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife,
apparently without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of
Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of
defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not
been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not
continuous and intermittent.

2. Of Illegitimate Children, FC 175

Vda de Alberto v. CA, 173 SCRA 436

A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not
competent evidence of paternity.

Baluyot v. Baluyot, 166 SCRA 606

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the name
of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any
statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.

Paterno v. Paterno, 186 SCRA 630

True, certain inconsistencies may be noted in the testimony given by the witnesses for the private
respondents, but it is on the whole unanimous and consistent as to the really crucial fact that Dr. Paterno
treated and acted towards said respondents, from their birth onward, in a manner only a real father would
and leaving little doubt that he recognized and considered them as in truth his children. The simple denials
of the widow, petitioner Jacoba T. Paterno, do not suffice to refute such proof.

Compulsory recognition
Cf. RPC 345
RPC 46. 59
Gapusan v. CA, 185 SCRA 160
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the
presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. It provides that a voluntary
recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing." Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the
evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit
from her failure to impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and
conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement of her mother's
estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her
recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was
cured by her ratification of that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of
the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the
decedent's acknowledged natural daughter.
People v. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811

It is, of course, also true that the record does not show the identity and personal circumstances of the child
born out of the rape of Filomena. Even so, the Court correctly sentenced the accused "to acknowledge and
support her off-spring" considering the provisions of Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 345. Civil Liability of Persons Guilty of Crimes against Chastity. — Persons guilty of rape,
seduction, or abduction shall also be sentenced:

(2) to acknowledge the off-spring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing;
(3) in every case to support the off-spring.

and Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Article 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception;

People v. Rizo, 189 SCRA 265

We note, however, that the trial court has ordered the defendant-appellant to recognize the offspring John
Paul Valencia as his legitimate son despite the fact that said accused is a married man. The rule is that if the
rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be
any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That portion of the judgment appealed from, ordering
the accused to recognize the child John Paul Valencia as his legitimate son, should, therefore, be eliminated.

Demsey v. RTC, 164 SCRA 364

As part of the civil liability in its judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie
as his natural child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a child by her father is provided for
in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal prosecution, where the accused pleaded
guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the
trial court committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil
liability in the criminal case.

Mendoza v. CA, supra.

People v. Barranco, 177 SCRA 103 (Filipino language was used in original)

Subalit mayroong pagkakamali ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito na kilalanin ng
nahahabla bilang anak ang bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. Ang nahahabla ay may-asawa. Hindi
maaari na kilalanin ang batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng isang may-asawa. Subalit may
katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata ayon sa batas.

G. Legitimated Children

1. Who may be legitimated, FC 177

2. How legitimating takes place, FC 178, FC 180
3. Retroactivity and effect, FC 180-181
4. Action to impugn, FC 162
5. Rights of legitimated, FC 179
XIV. ADOPTION
Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by
acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of
adoption.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority
and responsibility over him.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 99, March 15, 1996

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in
compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing
was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The
local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The
necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give
notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court,
so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as
to the subject matter.

A. Who may adopt

1. Age and capacity required, FC 183
2. Husband and wife jointly, FC 185-186

Republic v. CA & Bobiles, January. 24, 1992

Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in
adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony
in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife
shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly
adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

3. Need for consent, FC 188

Santos v. Aransanzo, 16 SCRA 344
Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned
their children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge, 159 SCRA 369

Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of
their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation
where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and
every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.

Nieto v. Magat, 136 SCRA 533

The fact that the petitioners reside temporarily in Guam does not disqualify them from adopting the minor
child? A reading of Articles 27 and 28 of P.D. No. 603 gives a negative answer.

Duncan v. CFI, 69 SCRA 298

The parental consent required by law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned
their child. Thus, where the natural and unwed mother turned over her three-day old child to another
person and from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court, she is considered to have
abandoned her child and her consent to the adoption is no longer necessary.

Cang v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, September 25, 1998

From the provisions of teh law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity
of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may
acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith.

4. Aliens as adopters

Bobanovic v. Moniks, 142 SCRA 485

The Ministry of Social Services and Development did not appeal the order granting the adoption. Moreover,
in all its pleadings, the MSSD has not once insinuated that the Social Worker’s report was in any way
erroneous, incorrect or faulty. Respondent seems only to stubbornly insist and maintain that the
prerogative to make a case study pertains exclusively to the MSSD. Neither has it shown any specific fact or
circumstance warranting the denial of the travel clearance. Absent any proof that prejudice would be
caused to the Adam Christopher if he joins his adoptive parents, the MSSD should be faulted for declining
to issue the travel clearance.

Pardo de Tavera v. Cacdac, 167 SCRA 686

It may be that respondent Trial Court had not complied strictly with the provisions of P.D. No. 603 on
adoption. As it had reasoned out, however, it was satisfied with the Case Study Report submitted by the
Court Social Worker. Prior to Executive Order No. 91, amending the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the
MSSD did not have the exclusive authority to make a case study in adoption cases. The Court evaluated the
Report of its social Worker and found that it was based on "very honest insight and opinion based on
personal interviews and home study painstakingly made ..." The objections which the MSSD have (sic)
against the petitioners Gordon are all reflected in "... the case study report and such have been passed upon
by the Court in its decision granting the adoption" (P. 30, Rollo). The MSSD did not allege that the Social
Worker Report was faulty or incorrect. It thus appears that the objective of trial custody had been
substantially achieved, which is, "to assess the adjustment and emotional readiness of the adopting parents
for the legal union"
B. Who may not adopt, FC 184
C. Who may be adopted FC 183, FC 185

In re Adoption of Edwin Villa, 21 SCRA 399

The fact alone that petitioner wife and minor are siblings should not prevent the adoption.There is no
express provision in law that disallows relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one another.
D. Who may not be adopted, FC 187
E. Effect of adoption

Cervantes v. Fajardo, supra

In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social
welfare of the child; Provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years of age will not
apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.—In all cases involving the custody, care,
education and property of children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall
be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the court finds compelling
reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration
is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral
as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

1. Status, FC 189 (1)

2. Parental authority, FC 189 (2), FC 186

In Re: Habeas Corpus of Angelie Cervantes, 1169 SCRA 579

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority
and responsibility over him.

3. Succession, FC 189 (3)

F. Effect on testate succession, FC 190
G. Rescission of adoption
1. By the adopted, FC 191
2. By the adopters, FC 192
3. Affect of rescission, FC 193

XV. SUPPORT
A. What comprises support, FC 194
B. Who are obliged to provide support?

Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which
the spouses were bound together to support each other. In this issue, the husband’s duty is to pay for the
medical services rendered to his wife, not the father nor the mother in law.

Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110

HUSBAND AND WlFE; ALLOWANCE FOR SUPPORT;RlGHT OF HUSBAND TO ESTABLISH ADULTERY AS
DEFENSE AGAINST AN ACTION FOR SUPPORT "PENDENTE LITE".—The Court of Appeals erred in not
allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima
facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for
support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the
fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the' child of the defendant and, hence,
would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged,
it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the
merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertian the kind and amount of evidence which it may
deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely
provisional character of the resolution to be entered.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803

Adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support.The alleged adultery must be established by
competent evidence. .However, it is doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite
– she is asking for support to be taken from their conjugal property, not Manuel’s personal funds.
 C. Source of support, FC 197-195 cf. FC 40, 70, 94, 122.

Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes
the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in
Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses
shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is
himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other
spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under
Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced
heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the
causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the
substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
What has been said above, of course, is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation
proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It
is to be understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs
the subject of support pendente lite.

D. Order of Support
E. Manner and Time of Payment, FC 200-204

Canonizado v. 127SCRA 610

With regard to the issue of payment of current support, Article 303 of the New Civil Code provides that the
obligation to give support shall also cease "when the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or
industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the
allowance for his subsistence;" When any of the above circumstances occurs, the support stops since the
recipient no longer needs it for subsistence. It does not mean, however, that the obligation to give or the
right to ask for support also ceases permanently because the lack of a need for it may only be temporary.
In other words, the above circumstances do not affect the right to support between spouses but only the
action to make it demandable, such right being born from the law and created as such by the marriage tie.
It subsists throughout the period that the marriage subsists.

A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to increase or
decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances
exist.

F. Amount of support, FC 200-208

G. Support pendente lite, FC 188

XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

A. Concept of Parental Authority, FC 209
B. Transfer of Parental Authority, FC 210 cf. CF 234
C. Who exercises Parental Authority, FC 211-213?

Hontiveros v. IAC, 132 SCRA 745

While the petitioner would have US believe in his reply that the private respondent is unfit to take care of
his child, it is too late in the day to do so because under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised in this Tribunal What the petitioner should have done is to bring out the questions of fact in
Special Proceedings Nos. 9788. It is just too bad that the case for custody was dismissed for lack of interest
on the part of the petitioner.Clearly, the private respondent has a clear legal right under Article 17 of P.D.
603 to the custody of her minor child, there being no compelling reason to the contrary.
Unson v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183
Criterion in awarding custody of a minor child to one of the parents. — It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence
that in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from
that criterion.

Custody of minor child not awarded to the wife who has immoral influence over the child; Reasons.—With
this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the
child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation
in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral and social
outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that
petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young
to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual
and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister’s mother, is
hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father,
properly concerned with the moral well being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different
attitude than petitioner’s in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds
no alternative than to grant private
respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child in question.

Decisions of Supreme Court on custody of minor children always open to adjustment as circumstances
demand.—Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are always open
to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion
We have mentioned above. We deem it a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge to have
acted precipitably in issuing his order of December 28, 1979 here in question.

D. Substitute Parental Authority, FC 214-216, FC 233

E. Special Parental Authority, FC 218-219, FC 233
CF. FC 221 In Rel. To NCC. 2180
Exconde v. Capuno, 101 PHIL. 843
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the “duty
of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means”, while, on the other hand, gives them the “right to correct and punish them in moderation”.
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.

Palisoc v. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548

The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said
defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such
liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the
lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated
that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher
or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their
students.
Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA, 315

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-
charge of particular classes.

Salvosa v. IAC, 166 SCRA 274

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are liable for “damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody
of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180
— ‘so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in
the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from
his acts.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, 376 SCRA 473, February 6, 2002

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no
control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.

F. FILIAL PRIVILEGE, FC 215

ROC RULE 130 SEC. 25 CF. SECS. 22 & 23
G. Parental Authority Over the Children’s Person, FC. 220-222

Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 602

After Petitioner gave birth to a child, she left said child to the care of the doctor that helped Petitioner to
give birth. Petitioner never visited the said child, nor gave any money for support. After instituting an action
claiming custody of the said child, the court held in favor of the respondent who took care of said child since
birth. Supreme Court stated: “While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child,
Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and
that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother.”

Luna v. IAC, 167 SCRA 7

In child custody cases, execution of final judgment of appellate courts awarding custody to child’s biological
parents may be stayed where during hearings on execution the child manifests that she will kill herself and
escape if given to custody of her biological parents. This means that the best interest of the minor can
override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children.Since, in this case,
the very life and existence of the minor is at stake.

*Disciplinary measures, FC 223-224

 H. Parental Authority Over the Child’s Property, FC 225-227

Linda v. CA,. 212 SCRA 725

Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his minor children
does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval.
And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of
her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and management. Hence, the power to sell,
mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover, the private respondent
spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they knew right from the beginning the the transaction was
without judicial approval. Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

I. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

1. Permanent termination, FC 228 cf. RA 6809
2. Non-permanent termination, FC 229 cf. FC 193
3. Suspension of Parental Authority, FC 231-232

Chua v. Carandang, 27 SCRA 791

She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the
lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she did not
take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve
any modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with
her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she alleged, and her child was
in the custody of the Cabangbangs — should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but
still respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.. Abandonment is one of the
grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over their children.

4. Revival
XVII. EMANCIPATION
A. Cause of emancipation, FC 234 as amended
B. Effect of emancipation, FC 236 as amended cf. FC 15, NCC 2180
XVIII. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, FC 238-253
XIX. SURNAMES, NCC 364-330, RA 8805

Naldoza, v. Republic, supra

the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the
circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only
and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname.

Johnston v. Republic, 7 SCRA 1040

Use of surnames; Surname of adopted child to follow that of adopter.— The provision of Law (Article 341,
par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter’s surname, refers to the
adopter’s own original family surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. As
petitioner-appellant made the adoption without concurrence of her husband, her name as adopter was her
maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between her and the adopted, and the consent
of her husband to the adoption by her individually did not have the effect of making him an adopting father,
so as to entitle the child to the use of the husband’s surname. Since adoption gives the person adopted the
same right and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Article 341, par, 1, Civil Code), much
confusion would result if the adopted child were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join
in the adoption. It would mislead the public into believing that the child has also been adopted by the
husband, and, later, if questions of successional rights arise, the husband’s consent to the adoption might
be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.
Llaneta v. Agrava, 57 SCRA 29
The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship, relied
by the respondent judge, remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in
great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to
the community in general. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for
as long as she can remember; that all her records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita
Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin
Ferrer's nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden
shift at this time by the petitioner to the name of Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in
the birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail
endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new name.

Tolentino v. CA. 162 SCRA 66 (1988)

We rule that the use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on the rights of the petitioner. Considering
the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who may be seriously prejudiced at this stage
of her life, having to resort to further legal procedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal
transactions where she used the surname Tolentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while
still not remarried, will have to use a surname different from the surnames of her own children, we find it
just and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep
hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive relief.

Legamia v. IAC, 131 SCRA 479

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of
the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be
sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who
are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself
out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet
none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a
tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be
construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her
to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal
material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy
of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize
what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

XX. ABSENCE, NCC 381-396, FC 41

Reyes v. Alejandro, 41 SCRA 65

The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be taken
cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse
of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court
that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil
Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the
conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings,
Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).

Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, 124 SCRA 425

Presumption of death under Art. 391 of Civil Code, not applicable; Presumption must yield to the rule of
preponderance of evidence.—There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss
and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically, are
sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished
with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code must
yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro “Where there are
facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.”
Tol-Noquera v. Villamor, 211 SCRA 616
It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a
petition for administration. This was the ruling in Reyes v. Alejandro, 3 reiterating Pejer v. Martinez. 4 In the
latter case, the court declared that the petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place
the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife could be combined and adjudicated in
the same proceeding. The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the
absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the
property to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether she is one of those allowed by
law to seek the declaration of absence of Remigio Tol and whether she is competent to be appointed as
administratrix of his estate. The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned
by him should be resolved in another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed
administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue. Even if it be assumed that the title
obtained by Diosdado Tol is already indefeasible because of the lapse of the one-year period for attacking
it on the ground of fraud, there are still other remedies available to one who is unjustly deprived on his
property. One of these is a claim for reconveyance, another a complaint for damages. 5 The petitioner can
avail herself of such remedies if she is appointed administratrix of the estate of the absentee.

XXI. FUNERALS, NCC 305-310

Eugenio v. Velez, supra.

We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Thus,
it is Vitaliana’s full-blooded siblings that have the right in burying her; and not the common-law spouse.

XXII. CIVIL REGISTER. NCC 407-413

ROC RULE 108

Republic v. Sayo, 188 SCRA 634

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.

Republic V. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor
General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed
out in an appropriate proceeding.

Republic V. Marcos, 182 SCRA 223

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 168 SCRA 294
A mere petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the ROC cannot change a child’s status from
legitimate to illegitimate. Rule 108 "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108
were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the
proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise
which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article
412 of the Civil Code.