Fiestan vs CA

A petition for review on certiorari

Facts:- Records show that Lot No. 2-B was acquired by the DBP as the highest bidder at a public auction sale on
August 6, 1979 after it was extrajudicially foreclosed by the DBP in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, for failure of petitioners to pay their mortgage indebtedness
-Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property within the one (1) year period which expired on September 28,
1980, petitioners' TCT T-13218 over Lot No. 2-B was cancelled by the Register of Deeds and in lieu thereof TCT T-
19077 was issued to the DBP upon presentation of a duly executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership
-DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria in a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same was registered.
-After title over said lot was issued in his name, Francisco Peria secured a tax declaration for said lot and
accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. He thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB Vigan Branch as security for
his loan of P115,000.00. Since petitioners were still in possession of Lot No. 2-B, the Provincial Sheriff ordered them
to vacate the premises
-On the other hand, petitioners filed on August 23, 1982 a complaint for annulment of sale, mortgage and
cancellation of transfer certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag City, PNB Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria
and the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3447-V before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur
-After trial, the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20, rendered its decision dismissing the complaint
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC of Vigan
- The motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
with this Court. Petitioners seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property on August 6,
1979 in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on the ground that it was conducted by the
Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur without first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the public
auction sale. Petitioners thus maintained that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale being null and void by virtue of lack
of a valid levy, the certificate of sale issued by the Provincial Sheriff cannot transfer ownership over the lot in
question to the DBP and consequently the deed of sale executed by the DBP in favor of Francisco Peria and the real
estate mortgage constituted thereon by the latter in favor of PNB Vigan Branch are likewise null and void

Issue: Is the extrajudicial foreclosure sale valid?

Held: Yes!!
- The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a valid
attachment lien under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed
property can be sold at public auction. At the outset, distinction should be made of the three different kinds of
sales under the law, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, because a different set of law applies to each class of sale mentioned. An ordinary execution sale is governed
by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court applies in cases of judicial
foreclosure sale. On the other hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118 otherwise known as "An Act to
Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages" applies in
cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sale
- The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The public auction sale conducted
on August 6, 1979 by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur refers to the "sale" mentioned in Section 1 of Act No. 3135,
as amended, which was made pursuant to a special power inserted in or attached to a real estate mortgage made
as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation
- There is no justifiable basis, therefore, to apply by analogy the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
ordinary execution sale, particularly Section 15 thereof as well as the jurisprudence under said provision, to an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended. Act No. 3135, as
amended, being a special law governing extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the same must govern as against the
provisions on ordinary execution sale under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
- Levy, as understood under Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to execution of money judgments,
has been defined by this Court as the act whereby a sheriff sets apart or appropriates for the purpose of satisfying
the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment-debtor's property.
-In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed need not be identified or set apart
by the sheriff from the whole mass of property of the mortgagor for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage
indebtedness.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK and Jose Henares vs Court of Appeals and Marinduque Mining
and Industrial Corporation
G.R. No. 84526 / 193 SCRA 452
January 28, 1991

Petition for Certiorari to Review the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Facts:
- The instant case originated from an action filed with the NLRC by a group of laborers, who obtained a
favorable judgment for the payment of backwages against private respondent.
- NLRC issued a writ of execution, directing the Deputy Sheriff of Negros Occidental to enforce the same.
o Sheriff was instructed to collect the amount of backwages, and then turn over the same to the
commission. In case of failure to collect, sheriff was instructed to cause the satisfaction of the
same on movable or immovable properties of respondent not exempt from execution.
- Deputy Sheriff went to the mining site of private respondent to serve the writ, but failed to execute the
same. He then prepared Notices of Garnishment addressed to 6 banks, one of which is the petitioner
herein, directing the banks to immediately issue a check, in the name of the Deputy Sheriff, in the amount
equivalent to that of the garnishment.
- Upon advice of counsel, issued a debit memo for the full amount of private respondent’s balance, then
issued a manager’s check in the name of the Deputy Sheriff. The check was encashed the next day.
- Private respondent then filed a complaint before the RTC-Manila against petitioners, alleging that its
current account deposit was levied upon, and that the bank, with undue haste, unlawfully allowed money
to be withdraw from the same, and that it refused to restore the amount despite demand. Petitioners
denied the allegations, stating that they were all in accordance with the law.

RTC: Judgment in favor of respondent bank.

CA:
- Initial judgment was the reversal of the RTC judgment.
- On MR, the CA annulled and set aside the initial judgment.

Issues: Whether or not the bank is liable for releasing its depositor’s funds on the strength of a notice of
garnishment made by the Deputy Sheriff, pursuant to a writ of execution.
- Whether or not petitioners had legal basis in releasing the garnished deposit.
- Whether or not petitioners violated the Bank Secrecy Law.

SC: Initial judgment of the CA REINSTATED.

- Petitioner Henares, the bank manager, sought advice from the bank’s counsel, and that he checked twice
with the provincial sheriff, who informed him of the absence of restraining order, belie allegations that the
garnishment was done with undue haste.
o Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the
judgment debtor. The garnishee is obliged to deliver the credits to the proper officer issuing the
writ, and the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or control any credits
or personal property belonging to the judgment debtor, if such were delivered to the clerk,
sheriff, or other of the court in which the action is pending.
 - Rule 39, Sec. 41 applies, not Rule 39, Sec. 39.
o “After an execution against the property has issued, a person indebted to the judgment debtor
may pay the officer holding the execution…”
o The immediate release of funds, on the strength of the notice of garnishment and writ of
execution, enjoys the presumption of regularity.
- There was no violation of the Bank Secrecy Law.
o There was no real inquiry of the existence of the deposit, nor was there any evidence that
petitioners divulged information that private respondent had an account with petitioner bank.

Nudo vs Caguia
Facts:
- private respondents, spouses Petronilo and Marcela Nudo, filed a complaint for partition and damages against the
spouses, Gumersindo and ZosimaNudo. Petronilo and Gumersindo are brothers and pro-indiviso co-owners of a
parcel of land located in Baguio City.
- Petronilo had requested Gumersindo to accede to the partition of the property, but the latter refused, thus
forcing him to initiate the complaint.
- During the pendency of the case, more specifically, GumersindoNudo died. No substitution was effected by the
court.
- RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondents
- Defendants(petitioners) counsel brought the case to the CA on appeal. Dismissed.
- ZosimaNudo died.
- private respondents filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the court
- Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court on July 22, 2004. On September 12, 2005, Sheriff
Ruben L. Atijera returned the writ unenforced on the ground that Susana Nudo, daughter of Gumersindo and
ZosimaNudo, promised to settle with private respondents and offer the purchase of their share in the subject
property
- An Alias Writ of Execution was issued, but the same was again returned unenforced on December 27, 2005. The
Sheriffs Return stated that the defendants house, which was being occupied by defendants heirs, still encroached
approximately 82 sq m of the portion allotted to the private respondents, and that Susana Nudo refused to accept
private respondents proposed partition.
- petitioner, Andrew B. Nudo, son of Gumersindo and ZosimaNudo, filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment,
seeking to annul the RTC Decision in the partition case. Petitioner alleged therein that neither he nor the other
heirs were substituted in place of their parents in the proceedings for partition before the trial court. This allegedly
rendered the proceedings null and void
- CA issued a Resolution dismissing outright the petition for annulment of judgment. CA denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Issue: Should the judgment in Civil Case No. 3493-R be annulled on the ground that petitioner was not
substituted for his deceased parents in the said case?

Held: No!!!
- An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the
Court. It is a recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to
prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated
decision that has long become final and executory
- Non-substitution of the heirs of a deceased party is not jurisdictional. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would
continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate. It is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.
-We note that both parents of the petitioner were defendants in the case for partition. Hence, even after
Gumersindo died, Zosima remained a party. And both defendants continued to be represented by counsel as, in
fact, a notice of appeal was filed by their counsel before the CA.
-In this petition, petitioner gives the impression that his mother, ZosimaNudo, died while the appeal was still
pending before the CA. The records, however, show that Zosima died on June 22, 2003, after the CAs resolution
dismissing the appeal became final and executory. Therefore, at no time were the petitioners parents deprived of
any representative in the partition case, until the judgment therein became final and executory.
- Petitioner cannot therefore claim now that the judgment in the partition case is null and void for failure of the
court to implead him, as the judgment became final and executory prior to the death of his mother. The judgment
in the partition case is now enforceable against Gumersindo and Zosimas successor-in-interest, including herein
petitioner, following Sec. 7(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Perla Compania vs Ramolete

Facts:
- In the afternoon of 1 June 1976, a Cimarron PUJ owned and registered in the name of Nelia Enriquez, and driven
by Cosme Casas, was travelling from Cebu City to Danao City. While passing through Liloan, Cebu, the Cimarron PUJ
collided with a private jeep owned by the late CalixtoPalmes (husband of private respondent PrimitivaPalmes) who
was then driving the private jeep. The impact of the collision was such that the private jeep was flung away to a
distance of about thirty (30) feet and then fell on its right side pinning down CalixtoPalmes. He died as a result of
cardio-respiratory arrest due to a crushed chest.
-On 25 June 1976, private respondents PrimitivaPalmes (widow of CalixtoPalmes) filed a complaint against Cosme
Casas and Nelia Enriquez (assisted by her husband Leonardo Enriquez) before the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch 3, claiming actual, moral, nominal and exemplary damages as a result of the accident
- Court of First Instance rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent PrimitivaPalmes
- The judgment of the trial court became final and executory and a writ of execution was thereafter issued. The writ
of execution was, however, returned unsatisfied. Consequently, the judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez was
summoned before the trial court for examination on 23 July 1979. She declared under oath that the Cimarron PUJ
registered in her name was covered by a third-party liability insurance policy issued by petitioner Perla
- private respondent Palmes filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued against
the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor. On 6 August 1979, respondent Judge
issued an Order directing the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party liability insurance policy
- Petitioner then appeared before the trial court and moved for reconsideration of the 6 August 1979 Order and for
quashal of the writ of garnishment, alleging that the writ was void on the ground that it (Perla) was not a party to
the case and that jurisdiction over its person had never been acquired by the trial court by service of summons or
by any process. The trial court denied petitioner's motion. An Order for issuance of an alias writ of garnishment
was subsequently issued on 8 April 1980.
-More than two (2) years later, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this Court on 25
June 1982 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering garnishment of
the third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez

Issue: Is there grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or without jurisdiction on the part of respondent
Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment debtor's third-party liability insurance?

Held: No!!
- Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or
payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the substitution of creditors: the
judgment debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of garnishment,
substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been
described as a warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay
the money or deliver the property to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff's suit
- In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary
that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is
necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession
credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment.
-The Rules of Court themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the
case in order to make him liable
- In the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court actually acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner Perla when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the third-party liability insurance policy it had
issued in favor of judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez. Perla cannot successfully evade liability thereon by such a
contention.
-Every interest which the judgment debtor may have in property may be subjected to execution. In the instant case,
the judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez clearly had an interest in the proceeds of the third-party liability insurance
contract. In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of paying the injured third
party to whom the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon as the liability of the insured to the injured
third person attaches. Prior payment by the insured to the injured third person is not necessary in order that the
obligation of the insurer may arise. From the moment that the insured became liable to the third person, the
insured acquired an interest in the insurance contract, which interest may be garnished like any other credit
- Accordingly, Rule 39, Section 45 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the instant case, and we see no need to
require a separate action against Perla: a writ of garnishment suffices to hold petitioner answerable to the
judgment creditor. If Perla had any substantive defenses against the judgment debtor, it is properly deemed to have
waived them by laches.

Solco vs. Provido

Facts:
- Josefa Pea vda. de Villaruel, Claudina V. Provido, Antonio P Villaruel,, Carmen P. Villaruel, Maria Teresa P. Villaruel,
Rosario P. Villaruel, Jesusa P. Villaruel, Alfredo P. Villaruel, Jr., and Josefina Villaruel-Laudico, through their attorney-
in- fact respondent Maria Teresa P. Villaruel, executed a Contract to Sell and Memorandum of Agreement with
petitioner Jerome Solco over Lot No. 1454-C located at Mandalagan, Bacolod City and covered by TCT No. T-84855
for P3M. The agreement provided for the payment of P1.6M upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of
P1.4M upon the dismantling of the structures thereon and the clearing of the premises of its occupants within six
(6) months from the execution of the contract. Thereafter, Solco entered the premises and commenced the
construction of the improvements.
-However, on September 19, 1989, the Villaruels filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages and
application for a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Bacolod City. They alleged that Solco violated the
terms of their agreement.
- the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Solco
- The Villaruels appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court
- Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the Villaruels filed a petition for review on certiorari before
this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152781. However, it was denied in a Resolution dated July 1, 2002. Villaruels
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on December 2, 2002. Judgment was entered and became final
and executory on June 12, 2003
- Sheriff Jose Gerardo Y. Garbanzos served the writ on Solcos counsel who informed him that the balance of the
purchase price will be paid only if all the adverse occupants have vacated the property
- Sheriff again demanded from Solco payment of the balance of the purchase price less all damages awarded, but
to no avail
-Villaruels counsel wrote a letter to the clerk of court stating that Solco failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price, and prayed for the full implementation of the writ of execution by garnishing cash deposits of Solco.
-On August 16, 2005, Solco filed a manifestation with motion asking the court to accept the Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (MBTC) cashiers check dated August 22, 2005 in the amount of P1,287,786.00 as full compliance of
his obligation under the contract. In its Order dated November 23, 2005, the RTC accepted the payment as full
compliance of Solcos obligation and ordered the Villaruels to execute the deed of absolute sale over the property,
and appointed the clerk of court to execute the said deed in their behalf should they fail to comply with the order.
-Villaruels filed a complaint for Cancellation of Contract, Quieting of Title and Damages. Villaruels also filed a
motion to quash the writ of execution and to set aside the November 23, 2005 Order claiming that the writ of
execution was void because it varied the terms of the judgment and that the RTC had no jurisdiction to alter or
modify a final judgment. The RTC denied the said motion to quash. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it
was denied.
-Thus, the Villaruels filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.. The Court of Appeals granted the
petition.
- Solco argues that the payment with the clerk of court of MBTC cashiers check dated August 22, 2005 in the
amount of P1,287,786.00 as full payment of the balance of the contract
price was in accordance with Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that if the judgment obligee is
not present to receive the payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the said payment to the sheriff, who shall
turn over all the amounts coming to his possession to the clerk of court. The clerk of court encashed the check for
the Villaruels, but they refused to accept the payment. Moreover, assuming the RTC erred in accepting the
payment as full compliance under the contract, it pertains only to an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction
correctible by certiorari

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the Order of the RTC dated November 23, 2005 accepting the
MBTC check as full payment of the contract price?
Held: Yes!

- As regards the issue of whether the payment to the clerk of court was valid, please see Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court
- In reversing the assailed Orders, the Court of Appeals held that the payment with the clerk of court of MBTC
cashiers check representing the balance of the purchase price less the damages awarded did not comply with the
foregoing rule as it was made payable to the clerk of court and not directly to the Villaruels.
-This Court recognizes the importance of procedural rules in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, while it is desirable that the Rules of
Court be conscientiously observed, the Court has never hesitated, in meritorious cases, to interpret said rules
liberally.
-Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over its process of execution. This power carries with it
the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution, as well as the power
to compel the Villaruels to accept the payment made pursuant to a validly issued writ of execution. As the
prevailing party, Solco should not be deprived of the fruits of his rightful victory in the long-drawn legal battle by
any ploy of the respondents. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
-Under the foregoing rules, a sheriff is under obligation to enforce the execution of a money judgment by
demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment directly to the judgment obligee or his
representative of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. However, if the judgment
obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the rules require the sheriff to receive the
payment which he must turn over
within the same day to the clerk of court. If it is not practicable to deliver the amount to the clerk of court within
the same day, the sheriff shall deposit the amount in a fiduciary account with the nearest government depository
bank. The clerk of court then delivers the amount to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. If the
judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor.
- Moreover, the fact that payment was made to the clerk of court is of no moment. Indeed, the Rules require that
in case the judgment obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the judgment obligor shall
deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff, who shall turn over all the amounts coming into his
possession within the same day to the clerk of court, who in turn shall deliver the amount to the judgment obligee
or his representative in satisfaction of the judgment. However, it would be defeating the ends of justice to rigidly
enforce the rules and to invalidate the acceptance of the payment made directly to the clerk of court just because
it was not initially paid to the sheriff, who is duty bound to turn over all the amounts coming into his possession to
the clerk of court. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and
rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must always be avoided

Jacinto vs Gumaru
Facts:
- On December 6, 2004, a Decision 6 was rendered in favor of respondent Eduardo Gumaru, Jr. and against
petitioner Joselito Ma. P. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group
- Petitioner and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
However, the appeal was not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or surety bond; this was the finding of
the NLRC in its Resolution dated September 30, 2005. Thus, the December 6, 2004 Decision became final and
executory. Entry of judgment was issued by the NLRC on November 23, 2005
- On February 6, 2006, a Writ of Execution was issued in the labor case. A Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued
and returned when the first one expired. By virtue of such alias writ, real property belonging to petitioner – located
in Baguio City – was levied upon, and was scheduled to be sold at auction on June 27, 2008 or July 4, 2008.
-On June 20, 2008, petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy on Execution praying, among
others, that the scheduled June 27, 2008 auction sale be restrained, and that the execution process covered by the
Second Alias Writ of Execution be invalidated.
-On June 26, 2008, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order Annul Levy on Execution
- Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Order to the NLRC, which in a Resolution, set aside the same. Petitioner
went up to the CA on certiorari Petitioner went up to the CA on certiorari, assailing the November 28, 2008 and
July 27, 2009 Resolutions of the NLRC. The Petition 18 in CA-G.R. SP No. 111098 contained a verification and
certification of non-forum shopping that was executed and signed not by petitioner, but by his counsel Atty. Ronald
Mark S. Daos. This was denied.

Issue: Should petitioner be given due course?

Held: No!
- However, while the Court takes the petitioner's side with regard to the procedural issue dealing with verification
and the certification against forum shopping, it nonetheless appears that the Petition has been overtaken by
events. In a May 24, 2011 Manifestation, respondent informed this Court that the judgment award has been
satisfied in full. The petitioner does not dispute this claim, in which case, the labor case is now deemed ended. "It is
axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all."And
"when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the
proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and
irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is
estopped from taking an appeal therefrom."
-With the above development in the case, the instant Petition is rendered moot and academic. The satisfaction of
the judgment in full has placed the case beyond the Court's review. "Indeed, there are no more proceedings to
speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment."

Villasenor vs Ombudsman

Facts:
- The petitioners, along with several others, were administratively charged in connection with the Manor Hotel fire
tragedy that took place on August 18, 2001, killing 74 people and causing injury to others. Petitioner Villaseñor was
an electrical inspector from the Electrical Division, and petitioner Mesa was an inspector from the Electrical
Engineering Office, both of Quezon City
- Investigating Panel of the Office of the Ombudsman ruled that petitioners are guilty. Ombudsman approved the
findings in the Joint Decision as regards the petitioners.
- Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the Joint Decision. Ombudsman denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by Mesa and those of the other accused, and affirmed in toto the Joint
Decision. Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, however, was not enumerated as one of the pleadings resolved
-Mesa appealed to the CA..Villaseñor made no appeal, his motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman
being yet unresolved
- pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman directed the
Mayor of Quezon City and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government to enforce the Joint
Decision immediately upon receipt of the order.
- Villaseñor and Mesa filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 121378,
assailing the August 23, 2006 Order of the Ombudsman ordering the immediate implementation of the Joint
Decision despite the pendency of Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration and Mesa’s appeal. They prayed that the
said order be annulled and an injunction be issued to restrain its implementation.
-CA dismissed

Issue: Can the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year be implemented
pending resolution of petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and petitioner
Mesa’s appeal before the CA?

Held: Yes!!
- Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, dated
September 15, 2003, provides:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.– Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or
a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and
conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of
the Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer
- From the above, it can be gleaned that the Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases may either be
unappealable or appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and executory, and they are as follows: (1)
respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not
more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to one month’s salary. Appealable decisions, on the other hand,
are those which fall outside said enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such
shall be executed as a matter of course.
-Petitioner Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while petitioner Villaseñor was ordered
dismissed from the service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are immediately executory pending
appeal
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied
retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17. No
vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the respondent in the administrative case is
considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is
important to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can
be said to have any vested right in an office.
-The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, in fact, settled in Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it
was held that such are immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or
the issuance of an injunctive writ. The petitioners argue that this particular case cannot be applied to them because
it was based on Section 7, as amended by A.O. No. 17,which cannot be applied to them retroactively. Their
argument cannot be given credence. As already discussed, Section 7 may be retroactively applied in the case of the
petitioners.
- The Ombudsman did not, therefore, err in implementing the orders of suspension of one year and dismissal from
the service against the petitioners.

Flora HOLASCA vs Anselmo PAGUNSAN JR

A.M. No. P-14-3198

Office of the Court Administrator vs Francisco Calibuso

A.M. No. P-14-3199

July 23, 2014

Administrative Matters in the Supreme Court.

Facts:
- Petitioner Holasca was the plaintiff in an ejectment case where she obtained a favorable judgment. She
sought the execution of a writ to eject defendants Spouses Moya, and to collect money judgment from the
same. Said writ was to be executed by respondent Sheriff Pagunsan.
- Allegedly, Sheriff, along with a court process server, and respondent Clerk of Court Calibuso, went to the
disputed property. However, instead of ejecting the defendant spouses, respondent Sheriff simply told
them to not talk to anybody about their ejectment case, and not to worry. Petitioner further alleged that
sheriff did not conduct an inventory of all chattels found inside the house of defendants, nor evict them
from the premises. Respondent sheriff, however, admitted such fact due to defendants not letting them
inside the gate. He also admitted not evicting defendants because the Notice to Vacate gave defendants 3
days to voluntarily vacate the premises.
- When petitioner inspected the property, she discovered that the defendants had vacated the premises,
but left the area in total disarray and littered with debris. When she reported the incident to respondent
sheriff, the latter did not do anything.
- Petitioner also alleged that respondent sheriff was hesitant to locate the defendants’ whereabouts due to
‘lack of funding’ (walasiyang pang-abono).
- Respondent sheriff answered, that in addition to the prior admissions, he claimed to have instructed
petitioner to secure a Break Open Order, which the latter failed. This, according to him, caused the
unsuccessful implementation of the writ.
- Respondent Clerk, in his affidavit, alleged that respondent sheriff erred in not immediately evicting
defendants from the property, and denied that they were refused entry by the same. He also denied any
facts regarding the Break Open Order, and insisted that he gave respondent sheriff P1.5k to shoulder
expenses during the implementation of the writ. However, he denied taking advantage of his position in
court, and only financed the expenses out of extreme gratitude to petitioner.

Investigating Judge: Sheriff guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty, no charge against Clerk.
- Act of respondent sheriff in allowing defendants to vacate the premises at their own will, and without
exacting amounts due to petitioner, can be rightly considered as dispensing special favors to anyone, to
the prejudice of petitioner.
- Clerk’s financial assistance was not considered a wrongful act.

Office of the Court Administrator: Sheriff and Clerk BOTH SUSPENDED for 6 months and one day, without pay.
- Sheriff’s explanation that they were not allowed entry into the premises was found unsatisfactory, and
that he failed to strictly comply with the writ of execution when he did not immediately and expressly
order defendants to vacate the property. This was considered a dereliction of duty in the performance of
his functions as sheriff.
 - Clerk’s acts, although noble, fell short of the standards expected of a court employee. While there was no
proof that he took advantage of his position as a court personnel, his conduct tends to tarnish the image
and integrity of his public office.

Issue: Whether or not sheriff erred in the implementation of the writ.

SC: OCA ruling upheld, but sentenced sheriff to a 9-month suspension without pay.
- Duties of the sheriff:
o To give notice of the writ, and demand that the judgment obligor, and all persons claiming under
him, vacate the property within 3 days (Sec. 10).
o To enforce the writ, by removing the judgment obligor, and all persons claiming under him (Sec.
10).
o To remove judgment obligor’s personal belongings in the property, as well as destroy, demolish,
or remove the improvements constructed thereon, upon special court order (Sec. 10).
o To execute and make a return on the writ 30 days from receipt of the writ, and every 30 days
thereafter, until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires (Sec. 14).
 Rule 39, Section 10, provides for the manner a writ for the delivery or restitution of real
property shall be enforced by the sheriff.
 Rule 39, Section 14, requires sheriffs to execute, and make a return on the writ of
execution after its implementation.
 Said provisions leave no room for exercise of discretion on the part of the sheriff on how
to perform his or her duties. His or her compliance is not merely directory, but
mandatory.
 A sheriff is expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to his functions as an
officer of the court.
o It can be noted that petitioner and respondent clerk made follow-ups regarding the status of the
writ’s implementation, but respondent sheriff did not answer.
o Sheriff also failed to return to the occupied property on the date of implementation.
o Due to respondent sheriff’s delay and reluctance to implement the writ, he also failed to collect
the money judgment in favor of petitioner.
 He did not conduct an inventory of the defendant’s personal properties.
 Demonstrates his incompetence and gross inefficiency.
o In serving court writs, sheriffs should see to it that the execution is not unduly delayed. Once a
writ is placed in his hand, it becomes the sheriff’s duty to proceed with reasonable speed to
enforce the writ to the letter, ensuring at all times that the implementation of the judgment is not
unjustifiably deferred, unless the execution is retrained by the court.
- Respondent Clerk had no business getting personally involved in matters directly emanating from court
proceedings.
o A public employee is expected to do no more than what duty demands, and no less than what
privilege permits.
o By getting personally involved in the writ’s implementation, respondent clerk transgressed the
strict norm of conduct prescribed for court employees, which is to avoid impressions of
impropriety, misdeed, or misdemeanor, not only in the performance of his duty, but also in
conducting himself outside or beyond his duties.
o His acts undermined the integrity of the service, and jeopardized the public’s faith in the
impartiality of the courts.

Spouses TABINO vs Lazaro TABINO

G.R. No. 196219 / 731 SCRA 372
July 30, 2014
Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts:
- Petitioner Mauricio Tabino was a technical sergeant in the military, while his brother, respondent Lazaro
Tabino, was a colonel. They occupied a 353-sq. meter lot in Pembo, Makati. While petitioner established
residence within the lot, respondent continued to reside in Novaliches, Q.C.
- Said lot was later subdivided into Lot 2 and Lot 3. Prior to the institution of the case, Proclamation 518
authorized areas around Fort Bonifacio as available for disposition.
- Petitioner applied for coverage for Lot 2, covering 169 sq. meters, while respondent applied for coverage
for Lot 3, but was authorized only to occupy 150 sq. meters.
- Respondent then filed an ejectment case against petitioner spouses with the MeTC-Makati. Respondent
alleged that he is the true and sole owner of the 353-sq. meter lot, and that petitioner merely occupied
the premises by tolerance of respondent.
- Petitioners countered that respondent had no right to eject them. They alleged that an agreement to act
as caretakers of the lot was pertaining only to Lot 3. They further alleged that respondent would pay them
a monthly salary of P800.00, but failed to honor such agreement.
- Lastly, they alleged that there was a pending protest filed with the DENR, regarding Lot 2.
- Apparently, the first DENR case, filed by respondent against petitioners, was denied.
o Respondent was not qualified to acquire Lot 2 since he was already awarded another home lot.
o Respondent failed to prove that petitioner was not a bona fide resident/occupant of Lot 2. On the
contrary, it was shown that petitioner was in actual possession and occupation of the lot, and not
respondent.
- The second DENR protest, filed by petitioners, was resolved in their favor.
- In BOTH DENR cases, it was ruled that respondent was disqualified from acquiring any more lots within
Fort Bonifacio, and that he is not a bona fide resident/occupant of Lot 3, and that petitioner has been in
actual possession and occupation of Lt 3.

MeTC: Ruling in favor of petitioner spouses.

- The only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the premises. Possession is nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession, in ejectment cases.
- A revocable permit was extended to respondent, and for him to occupy beyond what was allowed him
would be contrary to said permit.
- DENR decisions were accorded respect, and declared that petitioners are truly the owners of the subject
property.

RTC: MeTC decision affirmed in toto.

- On account of the DENR cases, petitioners are registered claimants and bona fide residents thereof, while
respondent was permitted to occupy an area of only 150 sq. meters thereof.

CA: MeTC and RTC decisions REVERSED. Petitioners ordered EJECTED from the premises.
- On appeal, respondent insisted that he had a better right of possession, since he was the bona fide
occupant of Lot 2, and that petitioner was merely a caretaker.
- Respondent also added that petitioner executed an affidavit acknowledging that respondent was the true
owner of Lot 2, and that he was merely allowed by him to occupy the same and introduce improvements
thereon. This operated as an admission against interest of petitioners.
- He also argued that the DENR Cases were not yet final and executory on account of his pending appeal.
Hence, the courts may not rely on the findings made by the DENR.
- In reversing the decisions of the MeTC and RTC, the CA appreciated the affidavit, and that it should be
taken against petitioners.
- In an unlawful detainer case, the issue of respondent being authorized to occupy only 150 sq. meters was
irrelevant, but the actual physical or material possession was important.
 o Respondent satisfactorily showed that he was in actual possession of Lots 2 and 3, and that he
was entitled to recover the same from petitioners.
- CA also held that the DENR decisions did not have any bearing in the unlawful detainer case. Since such
were still the subject of appeals, they could not have any conclusive effect.

Issues:
- Whether or not the DENR findings be nullified by the court in an ejectment case.
- Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate on review the findings of fact
by the DENR without having exhausted administrative remedies first.
o Petitioners claim that respondent should not have resorted to filing the ejectment case without
exhausting all administrative remedies available to him through the DENR.
- Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
o Petitioners arguethat respondent filed theejectment case without awaiting the resolution of the
DENR protests.
o Respondent, however, claim that petitioners are estopped from raising such issue, since it was
not raised in the lower courts.

SC: CA decision MODIFIED in that the order on petitioners to vacate is REVERSED. Court proceedings are
SUSPENDED until DENR cases are concluded.
- Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and forum shopping since they were raised for the first time in the petition for review in the SC.
- SC finds that the CA erred in ordering petitioners to vacate the premises.
o While the DENR protests are pending, respondent’s claim of possession and right to recover is
placed in issue.
o If the ejectment case is allowed to proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR Protests, a
situation might arise where the structures inside the premises might be demolished.
- The Doctrine of Exjaustion of Administrative Remedies
o The first DENR case did not favor respondent. In the second DENR case, the issue of respondent’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies was touched upon.
o Reasons for the doctrine:
 Courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions, and discharge
their respective responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence.
 Separation of powers. The theory is that administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise, and that errors
committed by their subordinates may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to
do so.
o The party with an administrative remedy must not only commence with the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention, in order to give the agency an opportunity to decide the matter
itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

Campit v. Gripa
GR No. 195443
September 17, 2014
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts:
Herein respondents assert their rightful claim over a parcel of agricultural land located in Pangasinan, which
petitioner Campit claims to have purchased from his father, Jose Campit. An earlier civil case resulted in the
cancellation of the titles of the petitioner and his father because the same was said that have been obtained by the
misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather.

Despite demands to surrender the title to the property, Campit refused to comply. Respondents consequently filed
an action for annulment and cancellation of title with the RTC. Campit opposed the action, arguing that the prior
decision in the civil case which declared his title null and void, could no longer be enforced due to the execution
already having had been barred by the Statute of Limitations. The judgment had not been executed within 10 years
from July 19, 1979, the date of finality of judgment.

RTC: The Court noted that the action filed by respondents Gripa and others was NOT one for revival of judgment.
The RTC proceeded to hear the case, and rendered judgment favorable to the respondents. Campit’s TCT was once
again declared null and void, and he was ordered to surrender the same.

CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Registration of real property, while not being the true
owner of the same, under the Torrens System does not create of vest title because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, hence this controversy before the
Supreme Court

Issues: W/N the first civil case decision which declared his title null and void, was never executed and alongside
the certificate of title he obtained, was proof that he was entitled to ownership and possession of the subject
property.

Held: No, he is not entitled to ownership and possession of the subject property.PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI IS DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.

As to the validity of his title to the subject property, petitioner Campit can no longer deny the same, the decision of
the court in the earlier civil case being final and executory on July 19, 1979. Res judicata bars the review of the
same.

The decision, however, had not been executed or enforced within the period allowed under law. It has clearly gone
beyond the period under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, where a final and executory judgment may be
executed by the prevailing party as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the entry of
judgment, failing which the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action which must be enforced by the institution
of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from finality of the judgment.

Respondents did not file any motion or an action to revive judgment.

As the petitioner argued, his title had already become incontrovertible since the Torrens system of land registration
provides for the indefeasibility of the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the expiration of
one (1) year from the date of entry of the registration decree.

But the Court still denied that petitioner Campit is entitled to maintain his title and benefit from the fraudulent acts
of his forebearer. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor
can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.
Quicho v. Reyes Jr.
AM No. P-14-3246
October 15, 2014

Facts:

The present case stems from an Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC of Quezon City, the validity of which was
then pending with the Court of Appeals. Pending its resolution, Atty. Quicho sought the relief of Sheriff Reyes,
whom he claimed exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the Alias Writ of Execution at the main office of
BOC and in the BOC branch in Lipa, Batangas.

Atty. Quicho alleged in a sworn letter-complaint, that the procedure observed by Sheriff Reyes in implementing the
alias writ violated the Revised Manual for Clerks of Court which provides:

"[i]f the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of
every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution
giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to
satisfy the judgment."

Atty. Quicho asserted that as the holder of the assets of Traders Royal Bank, the judgment obligor, BOC was given
the option to choose which property was to be surrendered to satisfy the judgment. He argued that BOC was only
forced to surrender under protest a certain property in Paranaque to preserve other properties from being
wrongfully levied. He argued that Sheriff Reyes never gave BOC a chance to exercise its option, and that he induced
terror by bringing with him agents of PNP and NBI and forced open vaults to forcibly take the money within to
satisfy the judgment.

Sheriff Reyes denied the charges in his comment. According to him, he did not violate any law when he refused the
offer of a property. He contended that judgment obligor was mandated to pay their obligation in cash, certified
bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee and the law was silent on a real estate
property being offered as a form of payment. Furthermore, BOC had refused to pay the judgment award despite
the validity of the writ of execution having had been affirmed by the CA, and had become final and executory.

The sheriff argued that he had not abused his authority when he implemented the writ, and that there was no
basis to order his relief or suspension as Sheriff.

Atty. Quicho filed a reply that under Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it was clear that if the judgment
obligor could not pay the judgment debt in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the
judgment oblige, he still had the option to choose which of his properties he could offer to satisfy the obligation.

Atty. Quicho reiterated his claims that the sheriff abused his authority when he levied on the computers which
were essential to banking operations, and cash through force.

Sheriff Reyes claimed in his rejoinder that BOC already waived its option to choose properties to be levied on when
it offered to pay its liabilities through cashier’s check and real property eight months after he served the demand to
pay the judgment award.

OCA: Sufficient grounds to hold Reyes administratively liable for his overzealousness in implementing the alias writ
of execution were found. Reyes should have brought the question of whether the real estate properties were
acceptable to the attention of the court.
Reyes acted in clear excess of his authority. OCA recommended that the matter be redocketed as a regular
administrative case against Sheriff Reyes, and that he be found guilty of Grave Abuse of Authority. The sheriff is to
be sternly warned that repetition would be dealt with more severely.

CA: CA adopted the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Under Rule 39, Section 9, the duties of a sheriff are: (1) to first make a demand from the obligor for the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and of all lawful fees; (2) to receive payment in the form
of cash, certified bank check payable to the obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter; (3) to
levy upon the properties of the obligor, not exempt from execution, if the latter cannot pay all or part of the
obligation; (4) give the obligor the opportunity to exercise the option to choose which property may be levied
upon; (5) in case the option is not exercised, to first levy on the personal properties of the obligor, including the
garnishment of debts due the obligor and other credits, i.e., bank deposits, financial interests, royalties,
commissions and other personal properties not capable of manual delivery or in the possession or control of third
parties; and (6) to levy on real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

From the aforecited provisions, it is clear that the sheriff shall demand from the judgment obligor the immediate
payment in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the
judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which
of his property can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this option immediately or when he is absent or cannot
be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

BOC clearly exercised its option to choose the property that would be levied, albeit belatedly. Reyes, however,
ignored the BOC’s option to surrender the Paranaque property. He insisted on levying other personal properties of
the BOC despite the offer. This is a clear violation of the Rules.

Furthermore, Reyes took it upon himself to make determination as to a legal question, which he should have
sought clarification of, from a judge.

SC AFFIRMS OCA’S FINDINGS OF GRAVE ABOUSE OF AUTHORITY.

Nicart, Jr vs Titong
Petition for Review under Rule 45
FACTS:
- The Governor of Eastern Samar Evardone issued 93 appointments including the respondents

- However, the CSC regional office disapproved the appointments due to the violation of Section 2.1 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007
- Evardone appealed but was denied; respondents individually moved for reconsideration but later
withdrew their motions via an Omnibus Joint Motion and separately converted the same to an Appeal by
means of a petition for review with the CSC proper.
- Meanwhile, respondents asked for their first salary but was denied by COA and the petitioner incumbent
governor; But were granted on appeal by CSC on the ground that the two are qualified for the positions to
which they were appointed
- Petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA arguing that appointments were in violation of the CSC
Memo and that the exemptions laid down in Nazareno v City of Dumaguete were not met for the
following reasons: (a) there was no need to fill up the vacancies immediately; and (b) the appointments
were made en masse.
- Pending resolution in CA, respondents were granted a motion for writ of execution ordering petitioner to
pay the salary
 - However, Petitioner still refused to pay thus respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with against
petitioner
- Petitioner answered, among others, is that Mandamus is not the proper remedy and litispendentia
- CA ruled that the appointments are not valid for having been issued in violation of CSC Rules;
respondentssought recourse in the SC but was denied
- Meanwhile, the RTC granted the mandamus of respondent.
- RTC held that the non-issuance by the CA of a restraining order or injunction restraining it from proceeding
with the Civil Case coupled with respondents’ filing of a Rule 45 petition before this Court thereby staying
the Decision of the CA which reversed the ruling of the CSC and declared respondents’ appointment as
invalid, results in the continued the effectivity of the CSC Decision in respondents’ favor.
- SC affirmed their decision that the appointments of herein respondents are invalid

ISSUE: WON the enforcement of the Decision of the CSC upholding the legality of respondents’ appointment
remains to be proper considering Our affirmation of the invalidity thereof in Our Resolutions

HELD: NO.

The foundation for the RTC’s continuation of the proceedings is Section 82 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s.
1999. Said provision states that the filing and pendency of a petition for review with the CA or certiorari with the
Supreme Court shall not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a
restraining order or an injunction. This, coupled with the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction or restraining
order upon CSC Resolution, and its opinion that the CA’s decision will not constitute res judicata or in any way affect
the petition for mandamus considering that the reliefs sought were allegedly not founded on the same facts,
convinced the trial court that there is sufficient basis to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus compelling
petitioner, among others, to acknowledge respondents’ appointment and to pay the salaries and emoluments due
them.

Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction or restraining order would make the CSC Resolution
executory pending appeal per Section 82 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999, making it a proper
subject of a petition for mandamus. However, what the RTC failed to take into account is the fact that the
propriety of the very directives under the writ of mandamus sought is wholly reliant on the CA’s resolution and
that judicial courtesy dictates that it suspend its proceedings and await the CA’s resolution of the petition for
review.

When the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well aware of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 the
subject of which is the reversal and setting aside of the CSC’s affirmation of respondents’ appointments.

In this regard, the Court has, in several cases, held that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court
or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. Unfortunately, the RTC did not find
the said principle applicable in this case.

To Our mind, considering that the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or invalidity of the appointments
which issue is to be resolved by the CA, the court a quo incorrectly concluded that it may take cognizance of the
petition without erroneously disregarding the principle of judicial courtesy.

Nevertheless, enforcement of the disputed CSC Resolution is no longer proper and necessary in light of Our
Resolutions affirming the CA’s ruling that respondents’ appointments were not valid, making the issue on the
propriety of enforcing the CSC Resolution pending appeal, moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over
such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.
Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our issuance of two minute resolutions––one denying the petition,
and the second denying reconsideration thereof––thereby affirming CA’s finding against the validity of respondents
appointments and effectively reversing the RTC’s affirmation of the CSC’s findings. When we dismissed the petition
and denied reconsideration thereof, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned.

Having written finis to the issue of whether respondents’ were validly appointed or not, the mandamus now has no
basis upon which its issuance can be anchored under the principle of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.

Sia vs Arcenas
Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:
- Due to the real property tax delinquencies of Panay Railways, Incorporated (PRI) over the subject lots in
Roxas City covering the years 1992 to 1996, the City Treasurer of Roxas City (City Treasurer) auctioned the
subject lots, with petitioner as the highest bidder.
- Petitioner was not able to take possession thereof in view of the refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a
Final Bill of Sale despite the lapse of the one-year redemption period; WORSE, Mayor Alba issued EO 08-97
nullifying the auction sale
- Petitioner filed a Petition for the annulment of EO 08-97 and mandamus before the RTC
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioner; PRI appealed but CA affirmed the decision; SC also denied the appeal of
PRI for having been filed out of time thus the decision became final and executory
- Writ of execution was granted to petitioner but the City treasurer still refused to issue Bill of sale positing
that petitioner still had to settle the delinquent real property taxes over the subject lots
- Petitioner filed a Motion for Order Divesting PRI of the Title and Vesting Title to Sia which the RTC granted
and likewise held that petitioner cannot be held liable for any real property tax prior to the issuance of a
Final Bill of Sale.
- Writ of possession and Writ of demolition was issued against the lessees (respondents) of PRI who are
occupying the lots
- Respondents file a motion to Quash contending that the decision above sought to be executed arose from
a mandamus petition where a writ of possession is proscribed. They posited that the execution of a final
judgment in a mandamus case is similar to the execution of special judgments as provided in Section 11,
Rule 39 in relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
- RTC denied the MTQ and held that the proceeding for tax delinquency sale at a public auction takes the
nature of an extrajudicial foreclosure, thus necessitating the issuance of the corresponding writs of
possession and demolition.

CA reversed and held that the writs are void because they were issued beyond the ambit of the Decision above
favoring the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly declared the writs of possession and demolition null and void

HELD: YES.

At the outset, it is essential to note that the petition in SCA No. V-7075 before the RTC Br. 17 is primarily that of
mandamus.

As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a “command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.
In this case, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 primarily compels the City Treasurer to issue the Final Bill of Sale
covering the subject lots in favor of petitioner pursuant to Section 262 of the LGC, a ministerial duty, which said
officer unduly refused to perform. Thus, it may be properly deemed as a judgment ordering the issuance of a writ
of mandamus against the City Treasurer.

Given that the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the
performance of a ministerial duty, and not the payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal
property, the same is in the nature of a special judgment – that is which a judgment directs the performance of a
specific act requiring the party or person to personally do because of his personal qualifications and circumstances.
As such, execution of the said judgment should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 11. Execution of special judgments. – When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than those
mentioned in [Sections 9 and 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court], a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached
to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or
upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished
for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

This is in consonance with the rule on service and enforcement of orders or judgments concerning, among others,
the special civil action of mandamus under Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

The rule therefore is that the service and execution of a special judgment, such as a favorable judgment in
mandamus – as in this case – should be deemed to be limited to directing compliance with the judgment, and in
case of disobedience, to have the disobedient person required by law to obey such judgment punished with
contempt.

In this case, it is undisputed that the City Treasurer obstinately refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale in petitioner’s
favor, despite the finality of the judgment in SCA No. V-7075, as well as the issuance and service of the Writ of
Execution commanding him to do so. In view of such refusal, the RTC should have cited the City Treasurer in
contempt in order to enforce obedience to the said judgment. However, instead of simply doing so, it granted
petitioner’s numerous motions, resulting in, among others, the issuance of a writ of possession.

The issuance of a writ of possession is only proper in order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific
properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 sought to be enforced in the case at bar only declared valid the
auction sale where petitioner bought the subject lots, and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue a Final
Bill of Sale to petitioner. Since the said judgment did not order that the possession of the subject lots be vested
unto petitioner, the RTC Br. 15 substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid judgment – and thus, exceeded its
authority in enforcing the same – when it issued the corresponding writs of possession and demolition to vest unto
petitioner the possession of the subject lots. It is well-settled that orders pertaining to execution of judgments
must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not
vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity. Had the petitioner pursued an action for ejectment or
reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession and demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil
action for mandamus, as in this case.