EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97105. October 15, 1991.]

ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

and ROGER G. MERCADO, Respondents.

Lino M. Patajo for Petitioner.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE; HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVE TRIBUNAL (HRET); SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS ON ELECTION RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS. — The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many
cases. (Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780). The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election
returns and qualifications of its members is beyond dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution)

2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO REVIEW DECISIONS OR FINAL RESOLUTIONS OF HRET, GROUNDS. —
Judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court’s so-
called "extra-ordinary jurisdiction" — upon a determination that the tribunal’s decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law,
or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. (Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429, 431; Lazatin v.
House of Electoral Tribunal, supra; Robles v. HRET, supra) Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown that the Court interferes with the HRET’s judgment or decision.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BEST EVIDENCE IN ELECTION CONTESTS. — In an election contest where
what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the
election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined that actual voting and
election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting centers, the election
returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must
be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting.

4. ID.; ID.; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; ORIGINAL COPY PREFERRED OVER XEROX COPY; CASE AT BAR. — The
evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election returns while the Comelec’s copy of the
certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original thereof had not been produced. Under the best
evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other
than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
Court. The exceptions are not present here.

5. ID.; ID.; SECONDARY EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS DISOWNED BY

SIGNATORIES; CASE AT BAR. — The xerox copy of the certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary
evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have not been met. Besides this certificate of
canvass had been disowned by the chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers, claiming
that the same was falsified since their signatures and thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and the
number of votes credited to Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had been reduced from 1,811 to 1,411.

6. ID.; ID.; FINDING OF COMELEC IN PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTEST THAT COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF

CANVASS GENUINE, NOT BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE ON APPEAL. — The finding of the Comelec in the pre-
proclamation proceedings that its copy of the certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which
finding was sustained by this Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — This Court sustained the use of the Comelec’s copy of the certificate of canvass
instead of the copy of the provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie (but not actually) the
winner (as called for by the summary nature of pre-proclamation proceedings), without prejudice to a more
judicious and unhurried determination in an election protest. Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as
genuine and authentic for purposes of canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and
authentic for the purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the election.

8. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTION CONTEST, PURPOSE. — The very purpose of an election
contest is to establish who is the actual winner in the election.

9. REMEDIAL LAW; ESTOPPEL. WILL NOT APPLY IF IT WOULD CONTRAVENE PUBLIC POLICY; CASE AT BAR.
— Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the Comelec’s
copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias
agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had been altered. It
is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy. At any rate, she
cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters’ will because such estoppel would contravene
public policy. Moreover, as indicated in the discussion hereinabove, under the circumstances relating to pre-
proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply.

10. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; "NEIGHBORHOOD RULE," EXPLAINED. — "Neighborhood
rule" under Subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, a ballot where only the first name of a
candidate or his surname is written is considered a vote for such candidate as there is no other candidate
with the same first name or surname for the same office.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL TO COUNT BALLOT CAST WHERE ONLY FIRST NAME OF CANDIDATE WAS
WRITTEN, A VIOLATION THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — The majority opinion, therefore, which did not count
the ballots cast where only the first name of Lerias was written "Rosette," "rosit" or "roset" is contrary to
said subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code. In her certificate of candidacy, Lerias gave her full
name as "Rosette Yniguez Lerias." It is for this reason that the Tribunal during the appreciation of the ballots
in its executive sessions admitted as votes for Lerias ballots containing, "Yniguez R," "Yniguez L," Yniguez
Roset," "R. Yniguez" or "L. Yniguez" written on the first line of senators for it is very clear that said ballots
were intended to be cast for Lerias. Under Subsec. 3 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, said
ballots should be counted as votes for Lerias inasmuch as there is no other candidate for the same position
of Representative who is an incumbent.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE NAME OF CANDIDATE FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE WAS WRITTEN ON
LINE INTENDED FOR SENATORS OR IN SHADED BOX IMMEDIATELY ABOVE THE LINE FOR
REPRESENTATIVE. — What is settled is the guideline adopted in the case of Nograles v. Dureza (HRET Case
No. 34, June 16, 1990), and on the basis of which the Tribunal admitted the ballots in question. Thus: ‘2.
Ballots where the name of a candidate was written on line 1 for Senators or in the shaded box immediately
above the line for Representative, were counted in favor of that candidate, provided, that (1) the line for
Representative had been left blank, and (2) no other name of a candidate for Representative was written on
other lines for Senators, in the same ballot (Mandac v. Samaoante, 54 Phil. 706 [1903]) "This rule does not
distinguish between ballots written by the voter himself or assisted by another." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

13. ID.; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTION PROTEST; CANDIDATE WHOSE VOTES WAS FRAUDULENTLY TAKEN
AWAY, MUST BE DECLARED WINNER. — Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes
fraudulently taken away from Lerias should be returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon,
she received 1,811 votes. From the original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as
against the 35,793 votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of the review of
the ballots in the counter-protested precincts would be, wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the
majority, or as found by the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by 20
votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner.

PADILLA, J., dissenting opinion: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; SOLE JUDGE OF ALL

CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR MEMBERS. — The
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in no uncertain terms, provided in Sec. 17 of Article VI thereof that: the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective member.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SOLE JUDGE," CONSTRUED. — The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred on the House Electoral Tribunal such that judicial review of final
decisions or resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is possible only in the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s extra-ordinary jurisdiction, i.e., upon a determination that the electoral tribunal’s decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for
such abuse.

3. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; DECISIONS GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE
SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS. — The House Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court
may not review its decisions except when the Tribunal is clearly shown to have issued them with grave
abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is fundamental that for grave abuse of
discretion to exist, there must be a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction; or that the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, GENERALLY
UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. — The records of this case, disclose that the petitioner anchors her
arguments on alleged election abnormalities. And yet, all her allegations are based on questions of fact the
appreciation of which vests solely within the jurisdiction and competence of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Nowhere in the records of this case is it disclosed that the House Electoral Tribunal resorted to arbitrary or
improvident use of its power as to constitute a denial of due process nor is there any evidence of a clear
unmitigated error manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion for which the Court should afford
a remedy. The absence of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts, is demonstrated by the
fact that the Tribunal was so closely divided, which means that the facts were susceptible of appreciation
one way or the other. It is precisely because of such situations that the Constitution has constituted the
House Electoral Tribunal — not this Court — as the sole judge of all election contests involving members of
the House of Representatives.

5. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. — The Supreme Court, moreover, is not a trier of facts
and can do no more than to abide by the House Electoral Tribunal’s appreciation of the facts in cases within
its unquestioned exclusive jurisdiction.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

Politicians who are members of electoral tribunals, must think and act like judges. Accordingly, they must
resolve election controversies with judicial, not political, integrity.

The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET for brevity) as a constitutional
body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. (Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168
SCRA 391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780). The power of the HRET,
as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its members is beyond
dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution) Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of
the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court’s so-called "extraordinary jurisdiction" — upon a
determination that the tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for
such abuse. (Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429, 431; Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, supra; Robles v.
HRET, supra) Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown that the Court interferes with
the HRET’s judgment or decision.

Accordingly, it is in this light that We shall proceed to examine the contentions of the parties in this case.
libra ry
chanro bles. com.ph : vi rtual law

Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official of the UPP-KBL for the position of
Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of
candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette Yniguez Lerias." Her maiden name is Rosette Yniguez.
Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the administration candidate for the same position.

During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Southern Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which
had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the candidates
who received the two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y.
Lerias with 34,128 votes, respectively.

In the provincial board’s copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received
1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the
canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado’s 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a
winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate
of canvass contained erasures, alterations and super imposition’s and therefore, cannot be used as basis of
the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal
board of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did
not affect the integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of
all the nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.

Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the Comelec praying that the Commission
order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon.

At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, Atty. Valeriano Tumol, then counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the
Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar
reservation was made by counsel for Mercado.

The Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was produced and when opened it showed that Lerias
received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 she received in each of the said
precincts 100 votes less than what she received as shown in the provincial board of canvasser’s copy of the
certificate of canvass. The alleged discrepancy is as follows: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Provincial Board of Comelec Copy

Canvasser’s Copy

Precinct 6 162 votes 62 votes

" 10 123" 23"

" 18 132" 32"

" 19 156" 56"

Nevertheless, the Comelec, (Second Division) in its Resolution dated June 6, 1987, directed the provincial
board of canvassers to complete the canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the
votes received by them, respectively, as shown in the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass. So, on
June 7, 1987, the provincial board of canvassers reconvened, resumed the canvass and proclaimed
Mercado, as the winning candidate, having received the highest number of votes — 35,793. Lerias, his
closest rival, received 35,539 votes or a difference of 254 votes. On June 7, 1987, Lerias filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for the reconsideration of the June 6, 1987 resolution. She prayed that the members of the
municipal board of canvassers be summoned to testify on the authenticity and veracity of the Comelec copy
of the certificate of canvass and statement of votes submitted to the Comelec and that the election returns
for precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 be produced. chan rob les vi rtual lawlib rary

On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition (SPC No. 87-488) for the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon
be ordered opened and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a motion to suspend the
effects of the proclamation of Mercado.

There being no action taken by the Comelec on the said motion and since the term of office of the members
of the House of Representatives would commence on June 30, 1987, Lerias filed on June 30, 1987 before
this Court a petition (G.R. No. 78833) for the annulment of the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the
proclamation of Mercado.

Meanwhile, in SPC-87-488, the Comelec en banc required Mercado to file an answer. Instead of filing an
answer, however, Mercado filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the resolution dated June 6,
1987 had already become final because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias was ex-parte and did
not stop the running of the period to appeal therefrom and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for the annulment of the Comelec’s June 6, 1987 resolution and the subsequent proclamation of
Mercado, she had abandoned her previous petition with the Comelec.

At the scheduled hearing on June 16, 1987 of SPC-87-488, the members of the municipal board of
canvassers of Libagon and the school teachers who served as inspectors of Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 were
present and manifested that they were ready to testify and affirm that the Comelec copy of the certificate of
canvass was not authentic for it did not correctly state the number of votes received by the parties since
Lerias actually obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon, not 1,411 votes. The Comelec did not want to hear the case
on the merits opting instead to merely hear Mercado’s motion to dismiss. The said witnesses were not given
the chance to testify.

On June 17, 1987, the Comelec resolved to dismiss SPC-87-488 because the petitioner had filed a case with
the Supreme Court and had, therefore, abandoned her case with the Comelec.

On July 22, 1987 Lerias filed with this Court a second petition to set aside not only the Comelec’s resolution
of July 6, 1987 but also the resolution of July 17, 1987.

The petition was heard on oral argument and on September 10, 1987, this Court dismissed the petition
because (a) the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado had already become
executory inasmuch as five days had elapsed from receipt of a copy of said resolution by petitioner and no
restraining order had been issued by the Court citing Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, and (b) Lerias
thru counsel had agreed before the Comelec (Second Division) during the hearing therein on June 5, 1987 to
use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass.

Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed an
election protest with respondent HRET.

In her protest, Lerias contested the results of the election in Precincts Nos. 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon
asserting that the total votes credited to her in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than or short
by 400 votes from that actually obtained by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board of canvasser’s
copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon were to be used as basis of the canvass instead of the Comelec
copy, she would have garnered 35,939 votes as against Mercado’s 35,793 votes or a winning margin of 146
votes. Thus, Lerias prayed that (a) precautionary measures be undertaken for the safekeeping and custody
of the ballot boxes and election documents used in the protested precincts and that they be brought to the
Tribunal to prevent tampering and to protect their integrity; (b) a recount of the votes cast in said precincts
be immediately ordered; and (c) the proclamation of Mercado be set aside and that she be declared the duly
elected Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte. She further prayed that Mercado be ordered
to pay damages, attorney’s fees and costs. chanrobles. com:cra law:red

Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the material allegations of the protest and counter-
protesting the results of the elections in 377 precincts. He alleged that the votes cast for him were (a)
intentionally misread in favor of Lerias; (b) not counted or tallied, and/or counted or tallied in favor of
Lerias; (c) considered marked or were intentionally marked and; (d) tampered and changed. The counter-
protest also charged that blank spaces in the ballots were filled with Lerias’ name; that various ballots for
Lerias, pasted with stickers, were considered valid and counted for Lerias, that votes in the election returns
were tampered with the altered in favor of Lerias, and that terrorism and massive vote-buying were
employed by her.

The initial hearing was scheduled for August 22, 1988, but on March 7, 1988 unidentified uniformed armed
men raided the municipal building of Libagon and stole the ballot boxes for the 20 precincts of Libagon
stored in the office of the municipal treasurer. Fortunately, these armed men overlooked the ballot box
which was kept in the office of the election registrar at the second floor of said municipal building. Said
ballot box contained all the copies of the election returns of Libagon which were used in the municipal
canvass. It is in the said office that said ballot box remained until a representative of the HRET went to
Libagon on March 23 and 24, 1988 to take possession of the contents of the same particularly the election
returns kept in said ballot box.

On December 6, 1990, the Tribunal (by a vote of 5-4) promulgated its now assailed Decision, the pertinent
portion of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"On the basis of all of the foregoing, and the supporting details as contained in ANNEXES A, B and C and in
order to determine the final results of the elections for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, representing the lone district of Southern Leyte, a full and final RECAPITULATION is
hereunder provided: c hanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

FINAL TABULATION

Mercado Lerias

Votes per tally of the

Provincial Board of

Canvassers, used to

PROCLAIM protestee

Mercado 35,793 35,539

deduct: Votes per

election Returns —

from 81 protested precincts 2,154 6,885

——— ———

UNCONTESTED VOTES 33,639 23,654

Add: Votes per

REVISION (physical count) 2,28 6,867

——— ———

Totals 35,926 35,521

Revision Results: chan rob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

deduct: Rejected

Ballots (objected) 362 252

——— ———

Totals 35,564 35,269

add: Claimed and

ADMITTED Ballots 26 273

——— ———

35,590 35,542

add: Restored Votes 0 2

——— ———

FINAL RESULTS 35,590 35,544

====== ======

(Protestee Mercado wins by a plurality of 46 votes).

"ACCORDINGLY, THE PROTEST of protestant Lerias is dismissed; and by virtue of the results of revision of
the eighty one (81) counter-protested precincts, the Tribunal declares that protestee Mercado is the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte, by a plurality of FORTY SIX
(46) votes; having garnered a total of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY (35,590) votes as
against the THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (35,544) votes of protestant Lerias. No
pronouncement as to costs. chanro bles law li bra ry

"WHEREFORE, as soon as this Decision becomes final, notice and copies of the Decision shall be sent to the
President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on
Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
Section 28.

"SO ORDERED." (pp. 136-137)

The Chairperson of the Tribunal, the Honorable Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera dissented, in this wise: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph

"It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of numbers; by overturning, at the post-appreciation
stage, the rulings earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for Protestant Lerias; by
departing from the interpretation of the neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the Tribunal;
by injecting ‘strange jurisprudence,’ particularly on the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering
the figures that reflect the final outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the true will
of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte.

"Premises Considered, I vote to declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias the winner in this election protest. To
the plurality of 20 votes obtained by her in the counter-protested precincts according to the outcome of the
appreciation of ballots, must be added the 400 votes that should have been counted in her favor in the
municipality of Libagon. All told, Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with a total of thirty six
thousand eight (36,008) votes as against thirty five thousand five hundred eighty eight (35,588) votes for
Protestee Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twenty (420) votes." (pp. 169-170 Rollo)

Likewise, the Honorable, Justice Isagani Cruz, concurring with the dissent of Justice Herrera stated: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph

"I cannot help noting that, as in several earlier cases, all the five members representing the majority party
are again voting together in favor of the Protestee, who also happens to belong to their party. Whatever this
coincidence may import, I repeat my observation in the Ong cases (HRET Nos. 13 and 15, Nov. 6, 1989)
that ‘although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly legislative, the function of this body is purely
judicial, to be discharged on the basis solely of legal considerations, without regard to political, personal and
other irrelevant persuasions." (pp. 258-259, Rollo)

The Honorable, Justice Emilio Gancayco (now retired) concurred with the dissent of Justices Herrera and
Cruz.

Another member of the Tribunal, Representative Antonio H. Cerilles, also in his dissent, stated: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"Going over all the foregoing facts and circumstances, I honestly fear that the majority decision will open
the Tribunal to a charge of grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the protest and disallowing the admission
of the results of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 and 19 of the Municipality of Libagon, Southern Leyte, as reflected in
the election returns, and the overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidences introduced, supported
by well-settled jurisprudence. The same grave abuse of discretion may be said of the replacement of the
results of the Screening Committee where protestant Lerias was originally a winner by twenty (20) votes
over Mercado on the counter-protest alone, but which tabulation was considered and ultimately replaced
with a revised tabulation which altered the result, this time with protestee Mercado winning by forty-two
(421 votes over Lerias, without any identification and ocular review of the ballots of the protestant thus
rejected and no proper showing of the grounds for such rejection. c ralawnad
"All these considered, I feel compelled to register my dissent to this shameful and blatant disregard of the
evidence, the law, and the rudiments of fairness. I regret that the majority decision will lend truth to the
suspicion that a protestant from an opposition party cannot secure substantial justice from this Tribunal. It
is the perception of many that the odds are stacked against such party mainly because of the composition of
the Tribunal, and no evidence, no law, no jurisprudence, not even elementary principles of fair play, equity
or morality can outweigh a determined demonstration of party stand, partiality and bias. I will not be party
to such travesty of justice.

"This is not the first time — and it certainly will not be the last — when I as the lone opposition member of
this Tribunal joined the three Justices of the Supreme Court in dissent. But I do so guided no less by the
pronouncement of Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a member of this Tribunal, when he said: ‘Whatever this division
may imply, it is worth stressing that although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly legislative,
the function of this body is purely judicial, to be discharged, on the basis solely of legal considerations
without regard to political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions.’ 1 (Emphasis supplied).

"I now indicate that I favor the admission of the results of the election returns of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18,
and 19 of the Municipality of Libagon, Southern Leyte, and to return to protestant Lerias the 400 votes
which was fraudulently taken away from her. Likewise, the original revision results of the screening of the
ballots of the counter-protested precincts, as submitted to and previously approved by the Tribunal, which
reflected that Lerias was ahead of Mercado by 20 votes, should be upheld. Protestant Lerias should thus be
credited with a totality of 36,008 votes as against 35,588 votes of protestee Mercado, in a final untarnished
count.

"Protestant, should, therefore, be declared the winner in the May 11, 1987 election for the Lone District of
Southern Leyte, having obtained a majority of the valid votes cast in the said election, with a plurality of
four hundred twenty (420) votes over the protestee, and thus, further declare protestant Rosette Y. Lerias
as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Southern Leyte." (Rollo, pp. 287-189).

Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado also filed a partial motion for reconsideration.

Acting on the said motions, the Tribunal, on January 31, 1991 promulgated its assailed Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to DENY protestant’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Protestee’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration, is hereby GRANTED. The Tribunal also DIRECTS motu proprio
the appropriate correction of the ‘Votes per Revision’ of the Protestant, pursuant to the verified errors
committed, so as to reflect the true and correct votes actually garnered by the protestant and the protestee.

"ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Tribunal promulgated on December 6, 1990 is hereby amended and
modified, by declaring protestee Mercado as the duly elected Representative of the Lone Legislative District
of the Province of Southern Leyte, by a plurality of SIXTY SEVEN (67) VOTES, having garnered a total of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (36,528) VOTES of protestant Lerias." (pp. 344,
Rollo)

In her revised Dissenting opinion, (pp. 346-353 Rollo) the Honorable Justice Herrera made the following
clarifications: cha nrob les law li bra ry

"Interpolating the necessary corrections, therefore, the final tabulation of votes obtained by the pa ties in
the counter-protested precincts should be revised as follows: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

Mercado Lerias

Votes per

proclamation 35,793 35,539

Deduct: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Votes in 81

counter-protested
precincts 2,154 6,885

—— ——

Votes-Uncontested

precincts 33,639 28,654

Add: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Votes per

revision

(physical count,

as corred 2,292(formerly 6,851(formerly

—————— ——————

2,287 6,867

TOTAL 35,931(formerly 35,505(formerly

35,926 35,521

Deduct: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Rejected ballots 363 249

TOTAL 35,568 (formerly 36,256 (formerly

35,563) 35,272)

Add: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Claimed ballots

admitted

(as corrected) 25 347 (formerly

334)

Add: votes restored 0 2

——

TOTAL VOTES 35,593 (formerly 35,605 (formerly

35,588) 35,608)

Plurality of Protestant Lerias — 12 votes (instead of 20 in the original dissent)

"To this plurality of twelve (12) votes obtained by Protestant Lerias in the counter-protested precincts must
be added the 400 votes obtained by her in the four contested precincts in Libagon. Protestant Lerias should,
therefore, be credited with a total of thirty six thousand five (36,005) votes as against thirty five thousand
five hundred ninety three (35,593) votes for Protestee Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twelve (412)
votes, instead of the 420 votes in the original dissent.

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, in so far as the undersigned’s dissent is concerned, Protestee Mercado’s Partial
Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and I reiterate my vote to proclaim Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the
duly elected Representative for Southern Leyte." (pp. 351-353, Rollo)

Justice Cruz maintained his original dissent.

Representative Cerilles filed a "Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Protestant’s Motion for Reconsideration" (pp.
355-357 Rollo) stating that:jgc:chanrob les.com .ph

"In sum, Protestant should therefore be declared winner in the May 11, 1937 election for the Lone District of
Southern Leyte having obtained a plurality of four hundred four (404) votes over the Protestee, and thus
further declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Southern Leyte." (pp. 356-357, Rollo)

We have read and examined, with utmost interest and care, the contentions of the parties, the majority
opinion of the five members of the Tribunal as well as the separate dissenting opinions of the chairperson
and some members of the electoral tribunal, and the Court arrived at the conclusion, without any hesitation,
reservation, or doubt, that the Tribunal (the majority opinion) in rendering its questioned Decision and
Resolution had acted whimsically and arbitrarily and with very grave abuse of discretion. It is for this reason
that We cannot bring ourselves to agree with their decision. chanrobles lawlib rary : re dnad

The Protest

Lerias contended that in the four (4) protested precincts of Libagon where her votes were determined to be
1,411 only, the same were allegedly reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400, the details of
which reduction are as follows: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Precinct Lerias’ Lerias’

Protested Credited Votes Claimed Votes

No. 6 62 162

No. 10 23 123

No. 18 32 132

No. 19 56 156

Should her claimed votes as aforestated be sustained Lerias’ total votes from the municipality of Libagon
shall be 1,811 votes. In such an eventuality, Lerias shall have been able to recover 400 votes, more than
sufficient to overcome the winning margin of Mercado, thereby prevailing by a plurality of 146 votes.

To prove her contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the certificate of canvass of the municipal board
of canvassers and d the provincial board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the election
returns for the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon. These documents, particularly the election returns
showed that Lerias received 162 votes in Prec. No. 6,123 votes in Prec. No. 10, 132 votes in Prec. No. 18
and 156 votes in Prec. No. 19 to give her a total of 1,811 votes in the entire municipality of Libagon.

Upon the other hand, Mercado relied mainly on the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass for the Comelec.
This certificate showed that Lerias received 62 votes in Prec. No. 6, 23 votes in Prec. No. 10, 32 votes in
Prec. No. 18 and 56 votes in Prec. No. 19.

The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because (1)
the Comelec found that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic on
its face" and said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2) the protestant
(meaning Lerias) had agreed during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the Comelec copy of the
certificate of canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four (4) disputed precincts
had not been established.

The reasons given by the majority for doubting the authenticity of the election returns are: (a) the non-
production of the election returns during the entire pre-proclamation proceedings definitely creates much
doubt as to their authenticity especially so when they surfaced only almost a year later after the ballots had
been stolen; (b) during that time, the election returns may have been tampered with and "doctored" to
Lerias’ advantage; (c) no proof whatsoever was offered to show that the integrity of the ballot box in which
they were kept was not violated; and (d) the witnesses presented by Lerias had shown their partisanship in
her favor by executing affidavits to support her protest.chanroble s.com:c ralaw:re d

The foregoing findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majority opinion) are totally bereft of any support
in law and settled jurisprudence.

In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate,
the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced
or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined
that actual voting and election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting
centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of
the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting.
Canvassing boards, the Comelec and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may
do so only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And,
conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered with,
who should submit proof of this allegation.

At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election
returns while the Comelec’s copy of the certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original thereof
had not been produced.

Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry, other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of
the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here. Moreover, the xerox copy of the certificate of
canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have
not been met. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 254) Besides this certificate of canvass had been disowned by the
chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers, claiming that the same was falsified since
their signatures and thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and the number of votes credited to
Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had been reduced from 1,811 to 1,411. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1988 AM, pp.
74-78; TSN, Sept. 13, 1988 PM, pp. 41-46; Dissenting Opinion, Rep. A.H. Cerilles, p. 2)

The finding of the Comelec in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its copy of the certificate of canvass is
"genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not
binding and conclusive. The HRET must be referring to the following portion of the decision of this Court —

"Public interest demands that pre-proclamation contests should be terminated with dispatch so as not to
unduly deprive the people of representation, as in this case, in the halls of Congress. As the Court has
stressed in Enrile v. Comelec, and other cases, the policy of the election law is that pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and
proclamation should be delayed as little as possible. The powers of the COMELEC are essentially executive
and administrative in nature and the question of fraud, terrorism and other irregularities in the conduct of
the election should be ventilated in a regular election protest and the Commission on Elections is not the
proper forum for deciding such matters; neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC or
the board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of elections returns to look beyond the face thereof ‘once
satisfied of their authenticity’. We believe that the matters brought up by petitioner should be ventilated
before the House Electoral Tribunal. Unlike in the past, it is no longer the COMELEC but the House Electoral
Tribunal which is ‘the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications’ of the
members of the House of Representatives.

"In opting to go by the COMELEC copy which on its face did not show any alteration, the COMELEC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion, specially since both parties agreed to the COMELEC using its own
copy (Copy No. 3).

"Accordingly, the Court resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order
issued on July 23, 1987 is hereby LIFTED effective immediately." (Rollo, pp. 264-265) chan robles lawlib rary : rednad

It would appear, therefore, that this Court sustained the use of the Comelec’s copy of the certificate of
canvass instead of the copy of the provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie (but not
actually) the winner (as called for by the summary nature of pre-proclamation proceedings), without
prejudice to a more judicious and unhurried determination in an election protest, and because Lerias’ thru
counsel had previously agreed conditionally and qualifiedly to its tentative use for pre-proclamation
proceedings. The decision of this court was merely an affirmance of the action of the Comelec and it cannot
be relied upon as a final adjudication on the merits, on the issue of the genuiness and authenticity of the
said certificate of canvass. Besides, the use of said Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass by the board
of canvassers did not foreclose the right of Lerias to prove that the votes attributed to have been received
by her as stated, in said certificate of canvass is not correct. Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as
genuine and authentic for purposes of canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and
authentic for the purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the election. But the very purpose of an
election contest is to establish who is the actual winner in the election.

Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the Comelec’s
copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias
agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had been altered. It
is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy. At any rate, she
cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters’ will because such estoppel would contravene
public policy. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 5) Moreover, as indicated in the discussion hereinabove, under the
circumstances relating to pre-proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply.

As to the delay in presenting the election returns because these were not presented during the whole pre-
proclamation proceedings, it must be noted that at that time, the four ballot boxes of Libagon with their
corresponding ballots were still intact and as these would have provided the best evidence, resorting to the
election returns was uncalled for. It is for this reason that Lerias had asked for a recount of the ballots and
this would have obviated the need for the election returns. Under these circumstances the failure of Lerias to
ask for the production of the election returns during those times that the ballots were still available cannot
be considered as ground for considering said election returns as of dubious character.

The "suspicion" of the HRET (majority opinion) regarding the possible tampering of the election returns are
at best merely speculative and dispelled by the incontrovertible evidence in the case. On its face, these
election returns have no traces of tampering. Even the majority decision admits that said election returns
"appear to be originals and on their faces, authentic." (Decision, p. 21)

The authenticity of said returns, particularly those of Precincts 6, 10, 18, and 19, the four disputed
precincts, had been further established by the testimonies of the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors of said precincts during the hearing before the Tribunal and before the hearing officer designated
to hear the case. More importantly, examination of said returns conclusively established the identity of said
returns as the very same ones prepared by the respective Board of Election Inspectors during the counting
of the votes. The election returns for Precinct 6 was marked as Exhibit "F" ; that of Precinct 10, Exhibit "AA"
; Precinct 18, Exhibit "U", and Precinct 19, Exhibit "P."
chanrobl es law lib rary

The election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 0138; for Precinct 10, No. 0142; for Precinct 18, No.
0150; and for Precinct 19, No. 0151. The minutes of voting for each of said precincts which were submitted
to the Comelec and later on presented in evidence before the Tribunal, indicated the serial numbers of the
election returns for said precincts and they corresponded to the serial numbers of election returns for the
four precincts.

The NAMFREL reports, (copy from the National Headquarters) which were presented during the initial
hearing before the HRET by a representative of the national headquarters of NAMFREL, as well as the copies
of said reports of Bencouer Gado, the municipal coordinator of NAMFREL in Libagon, also indicated that the
election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 0138; Precinct 10, Serial No. 0142; Precinct 18, Serial No.
0150 and Precinct 19, Serial No. 0151. 2 The envelopes wherein said election returns were originally placed
by the Board of Election Inspectors from said precincts, when they turned over said election returns to the
election registrar, were the very same envelopes which contained the election returns from said precincts at
the time that they were turned over to Luspo (the Tribunal’s representative) on March 24, 1988. The
identity of said envelopes had been conclusively proven by the fact that the serial numbers that they bear
and the Comelec paper seal sealing said envelopes are the same. The serial numbers of said envelopes had
been noted in the minutes of each of said proceedings.

The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 042366 and the Comelec paper
seal thereof bears Serial No. 017318.

The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 10 bears Serial No. 042370 and the Comelec paper
seal thereof bears Serial No. 0173226.
The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 18 bears Serial No. 04373 while the Comelec paper
seal thereof bears Serial No. 0173326.

The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 19 bears Serial No. 042379 while the Comelec
paper seal thereof bears Serial No. 173332.

When the chairmen of each of said precincts testified before the Hearing Officer designated by the Tribunal,
they all identified their respective signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the envelopes for said four
precincts. Ruego, the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers and acting election registrar during the
election, also identified his signature on the envelopes acknowledging the receipt of said envelopes
containing the election returns for said precincts.

The four chairmen of said precincts also positively identified that the election returns shown to them for
their respective precincts taken from the custodian of the Tribunal and placed inside Envelopes A and B were
the very same election returns prepared by them. They identified their own signatures and thumbmarks and
those of the other members of the board of election inspectors in their respective precincts.

On the basis of the election returns from the four disputed precincts, the votes of Lerias and Mercado in said
precincts were as follows: c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw libra ry

Precincts No. Lerias Mercado

6 162 45

10 123 79

18 132 46

19 156 24

It would appear then that the votes of Lerias as indicated in the Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass
(Exh. 22) had been systematically reduced by 100 votes in each of the four precincts. With the correction of
the votes of Lerias in said four precincts as reflected in the election returns it would result that in the entire
Municipality of Libagon protestant received 1,811 votes while Mercado received only 1,361 votes.
Consequently, the total number of votes Lerias received in the entire congressional district would be 35,939
votes (400 votes more than what was credited to her in the Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass
which was the basis of the proclamation of Mercado) while Mercado received 35,793 votes giving a margin in
favor of Lerias of 146 votes before the revision of the ballots in the precincts involved in the counter-protest
of protestee.chan roble s law lib rary : red

The number of votes received by protestant and protestee in the four precincts of Libagon as shown in the
election returns for said precincts is substantiated by the following documentary evidence: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

1. The NAMFREL Operation Quick Count (OQC) reports, national headquarters’ copies and copies of the
municipal coordinator of NAMFREL in Libagon (Exhs. EE, FF, GG, HH, H, CC, X);

2. The certificate of votes of the candidates (CE form 13) issued to the representatives of the political
parties (Exhs. D and E for Precinct 6; Exhs. V and UU for Precinct 18; Exhs. Land M for Precinct 19);

3. The certified result of the canvassing prepared by watchers of UPP-KBL (Exhs. G for Precinct 56; Exh. DD
for Precinct 10, Exh. Y for Precinct 18 and Exh. O for Precinct 19);

4. The Municipal Board of Canvassers’ copy of the certificate of votes and its supporting statement of votes
(Exh. LL);

5. The Provincial Board of Canvassers’ copy of the Certificate of Canvass and its supporting statement of
votes (Exh. LL)

6. The letter report to Comelec, Manila, dated May 18, 1987, of Manuel Paler, OIC Mayor of Maasin as
municipal chairman of Lakas ng Bansa (Exh. J);
7. The letter report to Comelec, Manila, dated May 18, 1987 of Rito B. Go, PDP-Laban Chairman for
Southern Leyte (Exh. I); and

8. The tally board (photograph taken by photographer Rodriguez (Exh. NN).

According to NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075576 for Precinct 6, both the national
headquarters’ copy and the copy of the NAMFREL municipal coordinator, Bencouer Gado (Exhs. H and CC),
protestant got 162 votes while protestee got only 45 votes.

NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075580 prepared by NAMFREL representative Edna Pajo, duly
certified by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10 after verifying its accuracy,
checking the same against the election returns and the tally sheet, both national headquarters’ copy and the
copy of the municipal coordinator, showed that in said Precinct 10 protestant received 123 votes while
protestee received 79 votes (Exh. CC and Exh. FF).

NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075590 for Precinct 18 prepared by NAMFREL watcher Rito
Lopina, certified by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precinct after verifying if they
tally with the results as shown in their tally board showed, that in said precinct protestant received 142
votes as against protestee’s 46 votes (Exh. X).

NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075589, prepared by NAMFREL watchers assigned to Precinct
19, duly certified to by the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precinct, after checking
whether the votes of the candidates contained in said OQC report tally with the election returns in the tally
sheet showed, that protestant obtained in said precinct 156 votes while protestee received 24 votes (Exh.
N).

The certificate of votes (CE Form No. 13) issued to the watchers of the political parties (Exhibits E, D. V.
WW, L and M), as well as the reports prepared by the watchers of UPP-KBL (Exhibits G, DD, Y and O) also
showed the same votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed precincts as reflected in
the election returns for said precincts.
chan roble s.com : virtual law lib rary

The tally board used in the canvass remained displayed in the session hall of the municipal building of
Libagon for several months after the elections. Pictures of said tally board were taken by Rudy Rodriguez, a
professional photographer (Exh. NN, TSN Sept. 12, 1988, p. 48). According to said tally board the votes of
protestant and protestee were the same as those shown in the election returns. If they were erroneous,
Mayor Paitan of Libagon who has his office on the same floor who saw said tally board every day, would
have complained about the entries particularly for Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19, which were the subject of the
raging election contest between protestant and protestee.

The reports of Manuel Paler, OIC Mayor of Maasin and chairman of Lakas ng Bansa to the chairman of the
Commission on Elections dated May 18, 1987, received by the Law Department of Comelec on May 20,
1987, and the report of Rito Go, chairman of PDP-Laban for Southern Leyte, to the chairman of the
Commission on Elections dated also May 18, 1987 and received by the Law Department on May 20, 1987
(Exhibits J and I), similarly reflected that Lerias received 1,811 votes in Libagon while Mercado obtained
1,351 votes.

In the entire congressional district Lerias obtained 35,937 votes while Mercado obtained 35,795 votes.
These are reports coming from Lakas ng Bansa and PDP-Laban, political parties who had their own
candidates. They would not have filed said reports admitting that Lerias obtained more votes than their own
candidates unless the same were actually the votes obtained by her as verified by their own representatives.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers’ copy of the Certificate of Canvass and supporting statement of votes as
well as the Provincial Board of Canvassers’ copy of said reports showed that Lerias obtained 1,811 votes in
Libagon. True, that the Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected their copy of said Certificate of Canvass
because of certain erasures and alterations therein. But the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
explained to the Provincial Board of Canvassers that the corrections made by them were merely to correct
certain clerical errors. It should be pointed out here that the corrections and erasures made did not refer to
the votes of the congressional candidates. The votes of Lerias and Mercado in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 of
Libagon bear no corrections or erasures. And in the canvass for the senatorial candidates, the Provincial
Board of Canvasser’s copy which the board rejected in the congressional canvass, was used as basis of the
canvass. The board would have rejected the same were it not authentic. The fact that said copy of the
Certificate of Canvass was used in the senatorial canvass conducted after the congressional canvass would
indicate that the board considered the same authentic. (Dissenting Opinion of Rep. Cerilles, pp. 13-19).

The fact that the members of the board of election inspectors in the disputed precincts had executed
affidavits in support of the claim of Lerias cannot be considered as partisanship since it is the duty of said
members of the board to inform the Comelec, of the actual results of voting in their respective precincts.

In any event, the test of whether or not the testimonies of said election officials should not be believed
because they are biased or prejudiced would be the tenor of their respective testimonies or affidavits,
whether the same are credible and corroborated by other evidence. The testimonies of these election
inspectors that the election returns were the very same election returns prepared by them were
corroborated by the documentary evidence which had not at all been disputed such as the NAMFREL reports,
the statement of votes given to the representatives of the other parties, the tally sheets, the certificates of
canvass, both the municipal board and provincial board of canvassers’ copies (not the Comelec copy which
reflected a different result).

In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. in G. R. Nos. 78833, 79882-83 entitled
"Lerias v. Comelec et al", is very pertinent:c hanrobles. com:c ralaw:red

"Another inexplicable act of the COMELEC is the refusal to even hear the members of the Libagon municipal
board of canvassers and the election board of inspectors of the four disputed precincts who expressed
willingness to testify as to which certificates are genuine. When the very persons whose signatures appear
on the questioned certificates attest that those are not their signatures because the correct copies are the
two copies carrying their corrections, it is the height of incongruity to even refuse to hear them. The are the
persons in the best position to state what they did, what they entered on the various election forms, etc.,
but they were unceremoniously ignored. To say that these persons were either purchased or coerced is not
only unkind, to say the least, but irrational and without basis. First, their testimonies could be rejected if
perceived as not truthful. But they should be heard. Second, these personnel manning the election precincts
and canvass boards are all government employees. The head of the municipal canvass board is a COMELEC
employee. The rest of the canvassers are other government officials. The precincts are manned totally by
school teachers. Why should they be summarily rejected as the most competent of all possible witnesses?
(Italics supplied)

x x x

"The tactic of ‘win the proclamation and delay the protest’ is even more rampant than when it first surfaced.
The ruling in Espino v. Zaldivar (21 SCRA 1204, 1213) that we should not wink at a brazen form of
wrongdoing to subvert the people’s will and in mockery crown the loser with victory; the genuine returns
must be ascertained and the obvious forgery disregarded remains as true now as it was then." (Italics
supplied) (pp. 279-280, Rollo).

But more importantly, another xerox copy of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass exactly the same
as the xerox copy of the Comelec copy submitted to the HRET is attached to the joint affidavit of the
Chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon, to show that their signatures and
thumbmarks appearing in the Comelec copy before the HRET are not their own signatures and thumbmarks.
For purposes of comparison, they affixed their respective signatures and thumbmarks on the margin of said
xerox copy of the supposed Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass. Therefore, the Comelec’s copy of the
certificate of canvass used by the Comelec and sustained by the Tribunal’s majority opinion is not only a
xerox copy but is a xerox copy of a falsified and forged document. This being the case, it should not be
given any evidentiary value. It is incredible that the majority opinion in the HRET decision would deliberately
use forged signatures and thumbmarks simply in their desire to produce an infamous political decision.
Surely this is pure anathema to all rules of fair play.

All told, the Court is of the considered opinion that the HRET (majority opinion) had no basis at all in
considering the election returns from Precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 as not authentic. And considering the
overwhelming and indubitable evidence presented by Lerias in support of her protest, more particularly the
election returns which in the absence of the ballots would constitute the best evidence, the actual number of
votes received by Lerias and Mercado in the four (4) contested precincts are as follows: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

Precinct No. Lerias Mercado

6 162 45
10 123 79

18 132 46

19 156 24

and that in the entire municipality of Libagon, Lerias obtained 1,811 votes while Mercado obtained 1,351
votes. Based solely on the protest, in the whole congressional district, Lerias obtained 35,939 votes as
against Mercado’s 35,793 votes, giving her a winning margin of 146 votes.

The Counter-Protest

After the Tribunal had screened and appreciated both the "objected to" and "claimed" ballots from the 81
precincts subject of the counter-protest of Mercado, the result was 363 ballots of Mercado and 249 ballots of
Lerias were rejected and 25 ballots claimed by Mercado and 334 ballots claimed by Lerias were admitted.
Two ballots were also restored to Lerias after it was found out that her name written thereon was tampered
with or erased by another person and the name of Mercado written in its place. This gave Lerias a winning
margin of 20 votes over Mercado as shown in the following tabulations: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

LERIAS MERCADO

Votes Per Proclamation 35,539 35,793

Votes-Counter-protested

precincts 6,885 2,154

——— ———

Votes-Uncontested

precincts 28,654 33,639

Votes-Per Revision + +

of ballots 6,867 2,287

——— ———

35,521 35,926

Rejected Ballots 249 363

Claimed Ballots + +

Admitted 33425 cralaw: red

——— ———

35,606 35,588

Votes Restored to

Lerias 2

———

35,608
Plurality of Lerias 20

This was disregarded by the majority and in the revised tabulation reflected in the majority decision,
Mercado no longer lost by 20 votes. Instead he already won by a plurality of 42 votes over Lerias. This came
about through the simple expedient of reducing the already admitted claimed ballots of Lerias by 57 votes
(from the original 334 to 277); invalidating 3 more ballots of Lerias (from 249 to 252) and adding 1 more to
the claimed ballots of Mercado (from 25 to 26) at the same time rejecting 1 more ballot of Mercado (from
363 to 364).

The modification consisted in: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. Where only the first name of the candidate is written on line 1 for senator, the neighborhood rule will not
apply. According to the majority the neighborhood rule itself is but an exception to that accepted rule on
appreciation that the candidate’s name placed in another line not the proper space for the position he is
aspiring is a stray vote, and being already an exception the same must be applied most rigidly and very
strictly. (Decision, p. 35)

Thus, according to the majority, ballots with "Rosette, or "roset" or "rosit" written on line 1 for senators,
even if the space for congressman is blank and no other candidate for congress is written on the ballot, were
rejected and denied admission by the majority. chanrob les.com : vi rtua l law lib ra ry

2. The same principle of strict application of the intent or neighborhood rule was applied to votes placed on
line 1 for senator, which merely reflects the initials of the first name of a candidate but whose surname or
maiden surname happens to be the same surname of a legitimate candidate for senator. Under this
application of the neighborhood rule, votes for protestant cast as "R. Yniguez" or "Yniguez R." or L. Yniguez"
or Yniguez L" were also rejected.

3. A ballot where the name Lerias is written on line 1 for senator is rejected where it appears that it is
written by an assistor.

4. Where the only entry in the space for Representative was Yniguez, said ballot is considered as a
misplaced vote for senatorial candidate Yniguez since there was an Yniguez who was a candidate for senator
who is at the same time an official.

The aforementioned departures from the application of the "neighborhood rule" laid down in "Nograles v.
Dureza" (HRET Case No. 34, June 16, 1990) are unwarranted and clearly designed by the majority to reduce
the claimed votes to be admitted for Lerias and make Mercado eventually the winner.

Under Subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, a ballot where only the first name of a candidate
or his surname is written is considered a vote for such candidate as there is no other candidate with the
same first name or surname for the same office. The majority opinion, therefore, which did not count the
ballots cast where only the first name of Lerias was written "Rosette", "rosit" or "roset" is contrary to said
subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In her certificate of candidacy, Lerias gave her full name as "Rosette Yniguez Lerias." It is for this reason
that the Tribunal during the appreciation of the ballots in its executive sessions admitted as votes for Lerias
ballots containing, "Yniguez R", "Yniguez L", Yniguez Roset", "R. Yniguez" or "L. Yniguez" written on the first
line of senators for it is very clear that said ballots were intended to be cast for Lerias. Under Subsec. 3 of
Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, said ballots should be counted as votes for Lerias inasmuch as
there is no other candidate for the same position of Representative who is an incumbent. Subsec. 3, Sec.
211 reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"3. In case the candidate is a woman who uses her maiden or married surname or both and there is another
candidate with the same surname, a ballot bearing only such surname shall be counted in favor of the
candidate who is an incumbent." (p 315, Rollo)

In said particular ballots they cannot be considered as votes cast for senatorial candidate Yniguez inasmuch
as in the same ballot Yniguez had also been voted for as senator in the proper space for senators.

Some of the ballots rejected by the majority also contain the name "Lerias" on line 1 for Senator. These
ballots were written by assistors, and therefore, were admitted as valid. (Timbol v. Lazatin, HRET Case No.
46, 22 March 1990). The majority rejected these ballots by discounting the applicability of the
"neighborhood rule."

On this point, the Honorable Chairperson, J. Herrera in her dissent aptly ruled: jg c:cha nrob les.com. ph

"Strangely enough, according to the majority, the ‘neighborhood rule’ liberalizes the ‘proper space’ rule
because the voter may not be literate, ‘but should find no applicability where the ballots are filled by
assistors who themselves appear illiterate’ (p. 37, Majority Opinion). This pronouncement has been plucked
from thin air and appears nowhere in electoral jurisprudence.

"What is settled is the guideline adopted in the case of Nograles v. Dureza (HRET Case No. 34, June 16,
1990), and on the basis of which the Tribunal admitted the ballots in question. Thus: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

‘2. Ballots where the name of a candidate was written on line 1 for Senators or in the shaded box
immediately above the line for Representative, were counted in favor of that candidate, provided, that (1)
the line for Representative had been left blank, and (2) no other name of a candidate for Representative was
written on other lines for Senators, in the same ballot (Mandac v. Samaoante, 54 Phil. 706 [1903].’
(Decision, p. 17)

"This rule does not distinguish between ballots written by the voter himself or assisted by another." (p. 168,
Rollo)

Finally, there are 170 ballots of Lerias with stickers which had been rejected. Again, the majority had
committed an error in rejecting said ballots. Justice Cruz, in his dissent stated: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"In addition to the above observations, I will also express my objections to the rejection of the 170 ballots
cast for the Protestant which were considered marked with stickers by the majority.

"As long as the stickers were pasted on a blank space on the ballot, I agree that the ballot should be
invalidated under Section 211, Rule 20, of the Omnibus Election Code. But I maintain that where the
stickers appeared to have been hastily and surreptitiously stuck on other parts of the ballots (mostly
diagonally and without any uniform location), this was done by persons other than the voters themselves,
precisely to invalidate the ballots. It is illogical for a voter to take the trouble of writing down the names of
his candidates, sometimes laboriously, only to nullify the ballot (and all his votes) by pasting a sticker on it."
(pp. 257-258, Rollo) chan roble s lawli bra ry : rednad

But, what is more revealing are the following observations of Rep. Cerilles in his dissent, as follows: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"Based on the evidence presented, I am thoroughly convinced that Lerias was systematically cheated of one
hundred (100) votes in each of the four precincts of Libagon. The majority of the Tribunal refuse to reinstate
these 400 votes of Lerias inspite of the overwhelming weight of evidence and the laws and jurisprudence in
point. And now that she won by twenty (20) votes in the original tabulation on the counterprotest submitted
before the Tribunal, inspite of the dismissal of her protest, the majority simply decided to change the results
with Mercado coming out with a plurality of forty-two (42) votes. All told, the results of this election have
been magically changed twice and, in both instances, always against the protestant Lerias. This is definitely
bad precedent. It may be that in the future candidates will no longer believe in the counting of votes for,
after all, the results can easily be changed, or otherwise replaced, substituted, modified or altered as in this
case, by the sheer force of the majority, no matter how erroneous, arbitrary and legally unjustified that
judgment may be. Although I recognize the reality of the composition of this Tribunal, still I am tempted to
ask whatever happened to our conception and application of the Rule of Law?

"Having asked that question, I entertain serious doubt about the legality of the action undertaken by the
majority especially so since the winner in the original tabulation suddenly became the loser. Clearly, it was
an afterthought on the part of the majority. This, to say the least, is anomalous because the result of the
screening of ballots had already been approved previously by the Tribunal after a random checking was
made in accordance with established procedures.

"In effect, therefore, the majority re-opened what was already approved and simply reconsidered their
previous ruling thus rejecting fifty-seven (57) ballots claimed by the protestant which were already admitted
in her favor, and invalidating three (3) more from her valid ballots. This action is arbitrary because these
already admitted ballots were reconsidered and rejected without the benefit of an ocular review by the
members of the Tribunal. And it becomes all the more irregular because these ballots were just deducted
from the total ballots claimed by the protestant and already admitted without identifying which ballots these
are.

"Absent such identification, it is downright unfair to have these ballots rejected on the mere say-so of the
majority without the benefit of the examination. Might is not necessarily right." (pp. 283-284, Rollo)

This was the same observation made by the Honorable Justice Herrera, when she stated in her dissent,
thus: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"In the executive session of 15 November 1990, the re-appreciation of some of the ballots was sought.
Some members of the Tribunal firmly opposed any re-opening of the case on the ground that it would entail
delay in its resolution, besides the fact that all observations/objections should have been raised and ruled
upon during the appreciation state. Attention was also called to the fact that rulings on the ballots
appreciated were made by at least a majority vote of the members present in meetings where there was a
required quorum, hence, the resolutions arrived at were valid and official acts of the Tribunal. When the
issue was subsequently put to a vote, a majority of the members voted to overturn the previous rulings of
the Tribunal, even as the other members urged that the rulings made by the Tribunal during the
appreciation of ballots should no longer be disturbed as the case had already been submitted for decision.

"It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of numbers; by overturning at the post-appreciation
stage, the rulings earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for Protestant Lerias; by
departing from the interpretation of the neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the tribunal;
by injecting ‘strange jurisprudence’, particularly on the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering
the figures that reflect the final outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the true will
of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte.’ (pp. 168-169, Rollo)

Conclusion

Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias should be
returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the original
35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado giving her
a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts
would be, wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found by the dissenting
members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by 20 votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias
would still be the winner.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner Rosette Yniguez Lerias is the duly elected representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte. chanroble s lawlib ra ry : rednad

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Cruz, J., took no part.

Feliciano, J., No part being a member of the HRET.

Sarmiento, ** J., Did not take part in the deliberation.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

In my dissenting opinion in G.R. Nos. 92191-92 entitled "Antonio Y. Co v. House Electoral Tribunal" and G.R.
Nos. 92202-03 entitled "Sixto T. Balanguit v. House Electoral Tribunal", which involved the question of
whether or not therein respondent Jose Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen and, therefore qualified or
not to be a member of the House of Representatives, I stated the following, among others: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is,
by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present
controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in
the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would
be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a
person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the
exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review."cra law virtua1aw li bra ry

In the present case, however, the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal revolves around
questions of fact in connection with alleged irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election.
Regardless of how far we may differ from the factual findings of the House Electoral Tribunal and its
resultant conclusions, I submit that this Court may not review and alter such findings and conclusions
because the House Electoral Tribunal, under the Constitution, is the sole judge thereof. chanro bles vi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s.com:c hanro bles. com.ph

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, in no uncertain terms, provided that: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective member.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its chairman." 1 (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that the intent of the 1987 Constitution is to make the Electoral Tribunals of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives the sole judge of all election contests concerning their respective Members.
This is vividly highlighted by the following discussion on the matter: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"MR. MAAMBONG.

Thank you. Madam President.

One more question on this point. Could we make a general statement that the jurisdiction of this electoral
tribunal, either of the Senate or of the House, is exclusive and unlimited and, therefore, there will be no
appeal to the Supreme Court?

MR. AZCUNA.

It is the sole judge, I think that further implies that there is no appeal elsewhere.

MR. MAAMBONG.

In other words, its judgment is final and not appealable.

MR. AZCUNA.

Insofar as the qualifications, returns and elections are concerned." 2

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred on the House
Electoral Tribunal such that judicial review of final decisions or resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is
possible only in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s ‘extra-ordinary jurisdiction’, i.e., upon a determination
that the electoral tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered, without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion or, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 3

The House Electoral Tribunal is not an ordinary agency established by statute or executive fiat to better
handle administrative concerns assumed by line departments of the executive branch. It is a constitutional
body created precisely to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives. 4
The House Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court may not review its decisions
except when the Tribunal is clearly shown to have issued them with grave abuse of discretion as to amount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 It is fundamental that for grave abuse of discretion to exist, there must be
a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or that the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, amounting
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." 6 chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

The House Electoral Tribunal is a tribunal in the true and strict sense of the term, with the limited but
exclusive jurisdiction granted to it by the fundamental law and its functions are properly judicial. This power
granted by the Constitution is not as abstract or empty as a carcass, but real and positive, with all the
attributes for effective manifestation in the external world and, like all human powers, needs the tools and
instruments linking the cause and effect. 7

I submit that the Supreme Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review over decisions and orders of
the House Electoral Tribunal, except only upon the strongest showing that a constitutional norm — like the
mandate of natural-born citizenship for members of the House of Representatives — has been violated, or a
patently manifest grave abuse of authority committed; for "courts are mere creatures of the state and of its
power, and while their life as courts continues, they must obey the law of their creator." 8

The records of this case, disclose that the petitioner anchors her arguments on alleged election
abnormalities. And yet, all her allegations are based on questions of fact the appreciation of which vests
solely within the jurisdiction and competence of the House Electoral Tribunal. Nowhere in the records of this
case is it disclosed that the House Electoral Tribunal resorted to arbitrary or improvident use of its power as
to constitute a denial of due process nor is there any evidence of a clear unmitigated error manifestly
constituting such a grave abuse of discretion for which the Court should afford a remedy. The absence of
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts, is demonstrated by the fact that the Tribunal was
so closely divided, which means that the facts were susceptible of appreciation one way or the other. It is
precisely because of such situations that the Constitution has constituted the House Electoral Tribunal — not
this Court — as the sole judge of all election contests involving members of the House of Representatives.
The proper role for the Court to perform is to apply the law based on the findings of fact of the electoral
tribunal. This inevitably leads to a dismissal of the petition in this case.

This Court cannot remedy, as the majority would have it, a situation where the House Electoral Tribunal has
arrived at a conclusion which, in the perception of the majority in this Court, is gravely erroneous. The
Supreme Court is, in my opinion, powerless to review, much more, revise the decision of the House Electoral
Tribunal in this case; for otherwise it can be charged with usurping power not granted to it by the
Constitution. The Supreme Court, moreover, is not a trier of facts and can do no more than to abide by the
House Electoral Tribunal’s appreciation of the facts in cases within its unquestioned exclusive jurisdiction.
True, the circumstance that the decisions of the House Electoral Tribunal are final and without appeal may
seem unreasonable, or better still, inequitable, but then the decisions of this Court in matters within its
jurisdiction are likewise final and without appeal. "There must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding
every question in the world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals for all human institutions are imperfect
— courts as well as commissions and legislatures . . . It may be that our legislatures, (or, in this case, our
electoral tribunals), are invested with too much power, open as they are, to influences so dangerous to the
interests of individuals, corporations and society. But such is the Constitution of our republican form of
government and we are bound to abide by it until it can be corrected in a legitimate way." 9 After all, "the
courts are without authority to repress evil save as the law has proscribed it and then only according to
law." 10chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

Believing, therefore, that what the Court seeks to do today in this case carries unwarranted and even
dangerous consequences for our state, government and people, in that it blurs (if not demolishes) the
constitutional boundaries between the Court and the Electoral Tribunals in matters where the latter are, by
express constitutional design, and mandate, made sole judges, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Endnotes:

1. Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, dissenting together with Tribunal Chairman Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressman Antonio H. Cerilles, in Balanquit Jr. v. Ong Chuan, Jr.
(HRET Case No. 15), 86 D.G. No. 4, January 22, 1990, 720-721.

2. Exh. H, NAMFREL report, National Headquarters’ copy for Precinct 6; Exh. CC, NAMFREL report, National
Headquarters’ copy for Precinct 10; Exh. X, NAMFREL report, National Headquarters’ copy for Precinct 18;
and Exh. N, NAMFREL report, National Headquarters’ copy for Precinct 19 and Exhs. EE, FF, GG, HH, Godos
copies of the NAMFREL reports for Precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

** Retired on October 8, 1991.

1. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Tuesday, July 22, 1986 found in volume two, page 113.

3. Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 780.

4. Veloso v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 88372, July 18, 1989.

5. Aznar v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 65000, January 9, 1990.

6. People v. Marave, G.R. No. L-19023, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 618.

7. Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948).

8. Cardozo, Growth of the Law, p. 49.

9. Justice Harlan F. Stone’s dissent in United States v. Butler, 297 US 1.

10. Viereck v. United States, 318 US 236, 245.