Motorcycle Industry in Vietnam
Motorcycle Industry in Vietnam
Mai Fujita*
July 2008
Abstract
Vietnam’s burgeoning market for motorcycles has attracted global industry leaders,
players from developing countries, and local firms. This has led to a dynamic
evolution of value chains. This paper presents an explanation of the varieties of the
growth patterns experienced by the local suppliers, focusing on the roles of customer
and local supplier strategies. Case studies showed that while the role of customers
may be important, strategies of suppliers to improve the competitive edge in the
production of motorcycle components and to diversify into other products account
for important variations of growth trajectories among local suppliers. Findings
presented in this paper suggest the need to direct more attention to strategy that local
firms use to boost their competitive edge in business.
* Associate Senior Research Fellow, Southeast Asian Study Group II, Area Studies
Center, IDE ([email protected])
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental,
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views
expressed within.
1
shifting structures of governance of international trade and industrial production as well as
the sequences of value-adding activities that are functionally integrated and coordinated by
powerful lead firms from developed countries. Compared to approaches such as the global
production network approach (Ernst and Kim, 2002), the GVC approach is unique in that it
emphasizes the “power” that certain actors in chains exert over others. The concept of
value chain “governance” has been central to the GVC approach because it provides a base
for looking at the relationships of producers in developing countries vis-à-vis global lead
firms.
The GVC approach is used in this research as the basis for constructing a
framework to explain the growth of local firms. In particular, this research builds on the
framework presented in a seminal article by Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005).
These authors propose a typology of value chain governance consisting of market-based
relationships between firms and vertically integrated firms at the two opposite ends of the
spectrum of explicit coordination between firms and three types of intermediate modes of
governance in-between. The types of value chain governance are therefore as follows, in
the ascending order of the level of explicit coordination: (1) market, (2) modular, (3)
relational, (4) captive, and (5) hierarchy. The authors argue that the forms of inter-firm
governance are fundamentally shaped by three factors: (1) complexity of information and
knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular transaction, (2) the extent to which this
information and knowledge can be codified, and (3) the capabilities of actual and potential
suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transaction.
Since this research is primarily concerned with the growth of local firms, the
dependent variable is growth trajectories of local suppliers. This variable not only captures
the absolute level of the growth in a firm at a particular point of time but also growth
performance over time and sources of growth, such as specific activities and strategies that
bring about growth performance.
Industrial Customer
Settings Strategies
Supplier Growth
Strategies Trajectories of
Local Suppliers
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the variables that explain growth
trajectories of local suppliers. The key features of this model are: (1) the strategies of
customers and strategies of local suppliers are treated as two separate variables; and (2) the
impact of customer strategies on the growth trajectories of local suppliers is mediated by
the strategies of local suppliers. These are the main differences of the framework adopted
in this paper from the previous GVC literature, which has focused on value chain
“governance” as the key determinant of the upgrading of a local firm (Schmitz ed., 2004,
Schmitz, 2006). Though governance is a useful concept for explaining power constellations
2
in the value chain, it obscures strategic intents and actions taken by individual players in
the chains and the resulting power dynamics. In particular, the concept tends to divert the
focus of analysis away from the strategies and actions of suppliers.
The variable “customer strategies” in this paper is similar to value chain
governance, which means that “lead firms set and/or enforce terms under which others in
the chains operate (Schmitz, 2006: 547)”. In value chains governed by Japanese
motorcycle manufacturers, motorcycle manufacturers are the lead firms and they determine
which of the value-adding functions are to be done in-house and which are to be
outsourced to external actors. They also set and enforce the parameters for transactions
involving what is to be produced (product definition), how it is to be produced, when it is
to be produced, and how much is to be produced 2 (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001: 21-22).
As with “governance”, this variable is determined by the industrial settings that shape the
requirements of the transactions.
The variable “supplier strategies” so far remains relatively under-investigated in
GVC research. Many researchers acknowledge that buyers do not always upgrading by
suppliers, and that it requires continuous effort and investment by local suppliers in people,
organization, and equipment (Schmitz 2004: 356; 2006: 555). However, these concerns are
limited to upgrading within value chains serving global lead firms. Viewing the business of
local firms in developing countries holistically, they are commonly engaged in a variety of
activities. Even those serving global customers often have a diversified customer base
including local customers, with whom local firms are likely to develop more symmetrical
relationship than with the global customers 3 . This suggests that local suppliers have at least
some room to maneuver with their own growth strategies. This paper directs attention to
how this important yet largely dismissed factor plays a role in determining the growth
trajectories of local suppliers both within and beyond the value chains serving global lead
firms.
The GVC approach is based on an underlying assumption that serving the global
market is the key to the growth and upgrading of the local firms in developing countries.
The industry under investigation largely targets the domestic market of developing
countries, and this may be seen as incongruent with the GVC approach. However, recent
research has shown that the essence of the GVC approach can be used to analyze inter-firm
linkages serving domestic markets of developing countries (Bazan and Navas-Aleman,
2004; Navas-Aleman, 2006; Tewari, 1999). Indeed, Sturgeon (forthcoming), relative to the
above-mentioned framework of value chain governance (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon,
2005), has argued that “(r)egional, national and local value chains are nested firmly within
global value chains, as we perceive them, and GVC governance theory operates equally
well at any and all of these spatial scales” 4 .
2
The factor of “price” may also be added to the list of parameters set by lead firms (Humphrey and
Schmitz, 2001).
3
This is illustrated by the cases of footwear and furniture producers in Brazil (Bazan and
Navas-Aleman, 2004; Navas-Aleman, 2006) and knitwear producers in India (Tewari, 1999). However,
these authors did not explicitly examine the role of the strategies of local suppliers in explaining their
growth and upgrading trajectories.
4
While Bazan and Navas-Aleman (2004) and Navas-Aleman (2006) emphasize the role of “national”
value chains in promoting the upgrading (especially the functional upgrading) of local firms, whether or
not the spatial scale (“national” versus “global”) is the key attribute for explaining upgrading by local
firms is still controversial.
3
3. Industrial Settings
3.1 Global Configuration and the Nature of Technology
This paper focuses on an industry that produces low-displacement, business-use
motorcycles. Such motorcycles often serve as an important means of transportation in
developing countries that are at relatively low stages of development especially
pre-motorization phases. The motorcycle industry is thus a typical import-substituting
industry in developing countries.
A prominent characteristic of the industry is the leading position of Japanese
motorcycle manufacturers combined with the mature nature of the product 5 . The basic
technology for this segment of motorcycles was developed in 1958 when Honda launched
the highly acclaimed “Supercub” and established an integrated mass production system to
produce it. There have been few if any radical product innovations since that time. This
model continues to be used as a base model by many firms (Ohara, 2006a: 26-27). The
focus of innovation has shifted to incremental process improvements for greater efficiency
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978: 44), and the continuous improvement of “quality, costs,
and delivery” (QCD) has become one of the critical factors for sustaining the competitive
edge in the industry. By the mid-1980’s, Honda (with Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki who
had successfully followed suit), expanded operations overseas and captured around 50% of
the global market 6 . The leadership of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers was sustained
primarily by superior QCD performance in the production process of their own as well as
their component suppliers.
This highly concentrated market structure has changed over the past decade with
the rise of local indigenous motorcycle manufacturers in China and India. In particular, the
newly emerging Chinese motorcycle industry has exhibited organizational features
strikingly different from the Japanese motorcycle industry discussed above. Chinese
motorcycle manufacturers have achieved strong price-based competitiveness in the
production of copies or slightly modified versions of Japanese base models (Ohara 2006a).
3.2 The Case of Vietnam 7
Vietnam has a short history of motorcycle production. The industry started in the
mid-1990’s and is characterized by the important role played of FDI and harsh competition
between players of diverse nationalities. Table 1 provides a list of major foreign
motorcycle assemblers in Vietnam. The three Japanese firms arrived by the late 1990’s.
However, massive imports of cheap “knocked-down” components from China (usually
referred to as “China Shock”) during 2000 and 2001 8 gave rise to more than 50 local firms
engaged in the assembly of motorcycles using Chinese components. These “Chinese
motorcycles” (xe may Trung Quoc) are primarily copies or slightly modified versions of
Japanese base models. Chinese motorcycles, with what seems to be poor quality, have
5
This paragraph is based primarily on Otahara (2000) and Ohara (2006b).
6 This figure includes production in Japan as well as exports of vehicles and knocked-down
components from Japan that are assembled overseas (Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 1986: 4).
7
This section is based on Fujita (2006, 2007, 2008).
8
Imports were in the form of “knocked-down” kits rather than assembled vehicles because Vietnam
had prohibited imports of assembled vehicles since 1998.
4
prices as low as one-third to one-fourth of Japanese-brand models. They have been able to
penetrate medium- and low-income consumer markets in urban and rural areas, markets
that had remained unexploited by Japanese and Taiwanese firms. The entry of Chinese
motorcycles has led to a remarkable market expansion (Figure 2), where local assemblers
of Chinese motorcycles have accounted for a major share in the years 2001 and 2002
(Figure 3).
Vietnam Suzuki Corp. Suzuki Corp. (Japan, 35%)、Sojitz (Japan, 35%), Vikyno: Southern
1995
Agricultural Machinery Corp.(Vietnam, 30%)
Honda Vietnam Co., Ltd. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (42%), Asian Honda Motors (Thailand, 28%),
1996
Vietnam Engine & Agricultural Machinery Corp. (Vietnam, 30%)
(Source) 1) Survey by the author; 2) Survey conducted by Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam
Academy of Social Science as commissioned by the Institute of Developing Economies in 2004.
5
Figure 2. Growth of Vietnam's Motorcycle Market
2,500 25
Registered Motorcycles/Population
2,000 20
Sales (thousand units)
1,500 15
(%)
1,000 10
500 5
0 0
06
04
05
99
00
01
02
03
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
20
20
20
20
20
19
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Sekai Nirinsha Gaikyo (World Motorcycle Facts & Figures), 2007.
2,500
2,000
Sales (thousand motorcycles)
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
(Source) Bo cong nghiep, “Quy hoach phat trien nganh cong nghiep xe may Viet Nam giai doan
2006-2015, co xet den nam 2020”, Vien nghien cuu chinh sach, chien luoc cong nghiep, 2007.
6
Figure 4. FDI in Production of Motorcycle
Components (Number of Projects Licensed)
90
80
70
Number of Projects
60
China
50 Korea
40 Japan
30 Taiwan
20
10
0
1992-1994 1995-1999 2000-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007
70 100%
Vietnam (by Nationality)
Number of Suppliers in
60
30 40%
20
20%
10
0 0%
2001 2004 2007
8
components. Incumbent suppliers then faced enormous pressure to reduce costs as
suppliers were compared on the basis of their QCD levels and prices. When Wave Alpha
was launched, 27 types of components, some of which had previously been sourced from
Japanese suppliers, were sourced from China through Honda Sundiro Motorcycle Co., Ltd.
in China. Further, the local content of Wave Alpha and the number of suppliers in Vietnam
increased substantially during the few years after Honda started to produce Wave Alpha
(Figure 5).
Honda launched an extensive search for new potential suppliers by dispatching
experts from Japan. Many non-Japanese firms (especially Taiwanese and Vietnamese
firms) became Honda’s suppliers at this stage. It is important to note, however, that the
above changes took place only for non-core components. Honda’s relationship with the
supplier of core components remained largely unchanged: these components continued to
be developed in collaboration with its “group” suppliers 11 in Japan and Thailand.
Although this may seem to be a radical change, the development Wave Alpha did
not change the basic nature of value chain governance. Instead, it eventually led to an
expansion and deepening of captive networks in Vietnam. An increase in local content
ratios after the initial launch of Wave Alpha also entailed gradually replacing Chinese
components with locally produced components as incumbent suppliers in Vietnam made
progress in cost reduction and eventually achieved higher QCD levels than suppliers in
China.
The development of Wave Alpha, combined with local content rule, also brought
about an increase in the number of second tier suppliers. This important change came about
when pressure to substantially reduce production costs led to Japanese and Taiwanese first
tier suppliers attempting to replace imported components with locally sourced components.
They further sought to replace components sourced from Japanese suppliers with
components sourced from Taiwanese or Vietnamese suppliers. The author interviewed six
suppliers from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea in 2004 and 2005. They used a total of 162
second tier suppliers, at least 106 of which were Vietnamese firms 12 . The majority of
second tier Vietnamese suppliers were small-scale private firms or businesses located near
the first tier suppliers. Many had previously expanded production of components for local
assemblers and subsequently began to take part in both Vietnamese-Chinese and Japanese
chains.
Honda’s captive networks experienced further consolidation during the following
years 2005 through 2007. During this period, Honda’s production scale expanded rapidly
from roughly 400,000 units per year in 2002-2003 to approximately 1 million units in
2007 13 . This booming production led to an increase in FDI by Japanese and Taiwanese
suppliers (Figure 4), including those that had hesitated to invest in Vietnam in the late
1990’s. The larger scale of orders and intensified competition among suppliers tilted
bargaining power towards Honda, and this led to further consolidation of captive networks.
11
Among Honda’s subsidiaries and affiliates (which have Honda’s capital participation) in Japan, 48
are producers and distributors of automobile and motorcycle components
(http://www.honda.co.jp/group/Manufacturing/, accessed on March 4, 2008). Many of these group
companies have established factories abroad to supply components to Honda’s overseas subsidiaries.
12
It is possible that some suppliers were counted more than once.
13
This is an expected figure as of November 2007 (Viet Nam News, November 17, 2007).
9
4.2 The Vietnamese-Chinese Chains: Evolving Market Relations
Local assemblers organized value chains in ways strikingly different from
Japanese assemblers. While there are variations in the strategic orientations of local
assemblers (Fujita 2006), this paper specifically focuses on the following three assemblers:
(1) assemblers M1 and M2 which expanded sales by pursuing the “low price” strategy, and
(2) assembler M3 which pursued a slightly different strategy of “higher price, better
quality”. Among local assemblers, M1, M2, and M3 ranked first, fourth, and nineteenth,
respectively, in terms of the amount of sales in 2006 14 .
During the “China Shock”, local assemblers were primarily engaged in the
assembly of motorcycle component kits imported from China. The sourcing strategies of
local assemblers emerged in the period 2002 to 2003 when the government stepped up
enforcement of local content rules and introduced regulations for motorcycle assembling
firms. These rules required local assemblers to produce certain key components in-house
and to achieve a minimum local content ratio of 20% 15 .
All three assemblers combined in-house production, domestic sources (Chinese,
Taiwanese and Vietnamese suppliers in Vietnam), and imports (mainly China). Despite
variations in the combinations across assemblers as well as changes over time, similarities
in sourcing patterns could be identified. Unlike Japanese assemblers, local assemblers have
been producing copies or slightly modified versions of Japanese base models, and thus
components have been mostly general components in the sense that they are not
customized to specific models. Their value chains are best characterized as market-based.
While the transactions may not necessarily be “on-the-spot” and may extend over months
or years, switching of suppliers does take place, predominantly on the basis of price. Since
assemblers do not demand strict quality and delivery requirements from suppliers,
exchanges of complex information between assemblers and suppliers do not take place.
While above accounts of sourcing strategies of local assemblers still remain valid,
the author’s field research in 2007 suggests that market-based chains were gradually
evolving. Customized components, which are designed for each model that an assembler
launches, and general components, which are used in common to different models and
different assemblers, must be distinguished. Plastic covers and engine covers determine the
external appearance of products. For the three assemblers, these belonged to the category
of customized components and were designed for each model to meet rapidly changing
consumer preferences. The remaining components belonged to the category of general
components. M3 designed and manufactured plastic covers within the firm. M1 and M2
depended on a Chinese supplier in Vietnam for such covers.
Perhaps more importantly, the customer-supplier relationship has partially moved
away from “on-the-spot” market-based transactions. In November 2007, the author
interviewed a Chinese supplier who supplied plastic covers and frames to 43 local
assemblers, including M1 and M2. The interview uncovered the fact that this supplier used
market information and requests provided by customers (local assemblers), and market
information collected in-house to design approximately four models per year. The
14
Ranks are based on results of the 2006 enterprise survey conducted by the General Statistical Office
of Vietnam.
15
Regulations included, among others, minimum investments, the minimum local content ratio, and
requirements for in-house manufacturing of key components.
10
relationship between this Chinese supplier and local assemblers seems to have shifted to
one characterized by mutual dependence or “relational” governance. This is because the
knowledge of local assemblers about the Vietnamese market and the design and
manufacturing capabilities of the Chinese supplier have become critical for each other.
However, this shift to relational governance has been only partial. As for non-
customized components, market-based transactions continued to prevail. Further, the entry
of an increasing number of Vietnamese, Taiwanese, and Chinese firms into production of
motorcycle components and the abandonment of local content rules by the Vietnamese
government have made it easier for local assemblers to switch suppliers on the basis of
price. By 2005 even M3, which had primarily relied on Taiwanese and local suppliers,
increasingly turned to Chinese suppliers in Vietnam and direct imports from China 16 .
Supplier
Assembler (J, T)
(J)
Supplier (V)
Competition
Supplier (V)
Assembler
(V) Supplier (V)
Supplier (C)
16
This development is also due to the increase in FDI by Chinese component manufacturers (Figure 4)
and the reduction of tariff rates for motorcycle components.
11
Analysis in this section has shown how the different nature of products and
requirements of transactions led Japanese motorcycle manufacturers and local Vietnamese
assemblers to adopt different sourcing strategies. It has also revealed how competition
between these two groups of motorcycle manufacturers has brought about adjustments and
adaptations to their sourcing strategies. These changes in sourcing strategies created new
opportunities for Vietnamese firms to enter into the production of motorcycle components.
Figure 6 provides a summary of the transformation of value chains as well as
changes in positions of local suppliers. The most remarkable changes are two-fold: (1)
increased numbers and layers of suppliers which suggests consolidation and deepening of
both Japanese and Vietnamese-Chinese value chains, and (2) emergence of overlap
between Japanese and Vietnamese-Chinese chains: this indicates that some suppliers have
started supplying to both Japanese and local assemblers.
Sales (billion
205 66 24 n.a. 58 17
VND)
Stainless Steel
Diesel Engines, Agricultural
Kitchenware, Components for Replacement
Other Products Agricultural Replacement Parts Machinery and
Interior Decoration Electronic Products Parts
Machinery and Parts Components
Items, etc.
(Source)
1) Survey conducted by Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science as
commissioned by the Institute of Developing Economies in 2004.
2) The author’s interviews (A1: Aug. 2002, A2: Sep. 2004, B1: July 2005, B2: Aug. 2005, C1: Aug.
2004, C2: Aug. 2005).
13
motorcycle components. C1 experienced 31% decline in sales between 2002 and 2005 17 .
The sales growth rate of C2 also decreased from 27% in 2002 to only 10% in 2003.
17
This large decline in sales was partly due to the relocation of the factory in order to obtain more
space for production.
18
A similar point is made by Nguyen Duc Tiep (2006), who argued for the role of “responsiveness” in
14
strategies of product and customer diversification, although at this stage it was not possible
to identify which strategy was superior to others. Some suppliers were found to concentrate
in producing motorcycle components, while others actively diversified into related
industries. Further, suppliers could concentrate exclusively on foreign or local customers,
or deliberately try to combine both types of customers.
The two suppliers in Group A exhibited different growth trajectories, and
differences were related to both how proactive they were to customer demand and to their
strategies of diversification. A1 expanded its relationship with Honda Vietnam much faster,
and its diversification into new products and the strengthening of traditional products was
more active than that of A2. By 2004, A1 had received orders from Honda for increasing
varieties of pressed steel components. A1 also actively invested in new production capacity
in response to Honda’s increasing demand. This included construction of two plants
specifically designed for production of motorcycle components. The company also
diversified its products and its customer base by supplying interior decoration products for
a large European buyer. On the other hand, from 1999, A2 supplied only one type of
component to Honda. A2 continued to produce its traditional products, but despite the fact
that it was facing the stiff competition of cheaper products imported from China, the
company did not make an active effort to boost competitiveness of its existing products
that included components of agricultural machinery and diesel engines. When interviewed
in 2004, the vice director discussed a decision to invest in the production of transmission
components for automobiles as a part of a project led and subsidized by the Vietnamese
government and undertaken by the state-owned enterprise group that A2 belonged to. To
the author ’s knowledge, such a project does not seem to have made headway as of the end
of 2007.
One factor that seems to explain the different growth patterns of A1 and A2 is
the difference in how proactive they were in investment strategies. Although both were
state-owned, A1 adopted proactive investment strategies to actively capture new business
opportunities in both business with Honda and in the development of new customers and
products. Granted substantial autonomy by the local government 19 to make managerial
decisions (including investments), the general director of A1 was ready to make
investments in machinery even before receiving formal orders from Honda 20 . In contrast,
A2 was slower and more passive in making investment decisions. As the above example of
investment in production of automobile components shows, the company’s investment
decisions were heavily influenced by the policies of the government and the state-owned
enterprise group it belonged to rather than the demand of the market. The company only
invested in expanding its capacity in 2004, and this was after being pressed by Honda
Vietnam.
Divergent growth trajectories were observed within Group B, and these reflected
active yet different diversification strategies. B1 tried to concentrate exclusively in
subcontracting relationships with foreign manufacturer by improving the production
process management technology for plating. The company even employed a part-time
Japanese advisor in 2005 so that the level of quality controls could be improved. Using its
enhancing the effectiveness of knowledge transfer between Honda Vietnam and its suppliers.
19
The company was under the supervision of the People’s Committee of Hanoi City.
20
This statement was made during the author’s interview in August 2002 of the Japanese General
Director of a joint venture between a Japanese component supplier and A1.
15
experience and its record of supplying motorcycle components to the renowned Japanese
firms, the company diversified its customer base to Japanese and Taiwanese firms in
motorcycle and other manufacturing industries. In contrast, B2 emphasized both
transactions with its Japanese customer and production of its traditional products pf
replacement parts for motorcycles and bicycles. These were seen as two pillars of the
company’s business. In the company’s workshop, production management techniques
designed to sustain QCD levels were practiced only in those lines producing components
to be supplied to the Japanese customer, not in other lines producing replacement parts and
components to be supplied to local assemblers. More effort was directed to distribution and
branding of replacement parts rather than improvement of production and process
technology.
The difference in the growth performance of Group C was more subtle than that
of Groups A and B, given that both firms in Group C were facing decreasing orders from
local assemblers. However, differences in how proactive these companies were in coming
up with and implementing strategies to diversify their product beyond components to be
supplied to local assemblers seemed likely to make a difference in the medium term. While
both of these two companies were stagnating, C1 was more active than C2 in trying to sow
the seeds for future growth. As sales to local assemblers declined from 2002, C1 made a
decision to concentrate on its traditional products (replacement parts) and developed a new
and improved version of one of its major products, valves. To learn the technology and
acquire equipment necessary to develop the new product, the company sent its engineers to
visit and observe a partner company’s factory in Taiwan. This was regarded as a cost
effective way of introducing new technology when limited capital was available for
investment. While the impact of C1 launching this new product cannot yet be assessed, C2
took no substantive action to compensate for the loss of sales to local assemblers. C2 was
and is a member of the same group of state-owned enterprises as that of A2, but the bulk of
its sales has continued to be in machinery components that are sold to other member
enterprises of the group. Behavior has not changed from what it was before the rise of local
assemblers.
6. Concluding Remarks
The Vietnamese motorcycle industry has indeed achieved remarkable growth
since the turn of the century. While local Vietnamese component suppliers have largely
been dismissed as non-competitive, the rise of local assemblers and the ensuing
transformation of value chains have opened up new opportunities for the growth of local
suppliers. This has been done directly by inducing the entry of local firms into
manufacturing motorcycle components and indirectly by affecting the sourcing strategies
and value chain structure of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. This paper has included
an analysis of the growth trajectories of local Vietnamese motorcycle component suppliers
amid dynamic transformation of the Japanese and Vietnamese-Chinese value chains in the
industry, and has also included an explanation of the differences in growth trajectories.
Despite a limited industrial foundation and a short history, local component
suppliers have gone through rapid growth and transformation. Preliminary analysis shows
wide varieties of growth trajectories, both within and beyond the manufacturing of
16
motorcycle components. Among the determinants of local supplier growth patterns, the
role of customers was found to be powerful, and this is congruent with findings of previous
GVC research. In the motorcycle industry, Honda has strong product and brand leadership
as well as thorough knowledge about manufacturing technology. It has been able to
influence the global configuration of the industry and the nature of technology and
innovation. It has also been able to draw a clear line between the functions that it
undertakes by itself and the functions to be outsourced to the different categories of
suppliers. Even the most competitive group of Japanese suppliers has had no other choice
but to follow this. In contrast, local assemblers have been in desperate need of suppliers
with competence in designing components, but such competence has only been found in
Chinese suppliers based in Vietnam.
However, supplier strategies also seem to account for significant variations in
their growth patterns. It must be emphasized that strategies of suppliers make a difference
despite the fact that customer control has been very powerful and supplier capability only
emerging. Though preliminary, this is an important finding in the context of GVC research
that has consistently emphasized the roles of buyers or customers in governing the value
chains. This finding suggests a need to direct attention to the variety of efforts by local
firms to improve their competitive edge in overall business rather than only their
performance in the limited range of functions they undertake in linkages with global
customers.
While evidence presented in this paper on the growth of local suppliers is limited,
findings constitute a good starting point for conducting further empirical investigations
with larger samples based on a more refined conceptual framework. Such research may
indeed uncover the mechanisms that underlie the growth of local firms amid dynamic
transformations of value chains.
17
References
18
National University.
Sato, Y. and M. Ohara (eds.) (2006). Asia’s Motorcycle Industry: The Rise of Local
Companies and the Dynamism of Industrial Development. Chiba: Institute of
Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (in Japanese).
Schmitz, H. (2004). Globalized localities: introduction. In H. Schmitz (ed.) (2004).
----------------- (2006). Learning and Earning in Global Garment and Footwear Chains.
Schmitz, H. (ed.) (2004). Local Enterprises in the Global Economy: Issues of Governance
and Upgrading. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Sturgeon, T. (forthcoming). From Commodity Chains to Value Chains: Interdisciplinary
Theory Building in an Age of Globalization. In J. Bair (ed.) Frontiers of Commodity
Chain Research, Stanford University Press.
Tewari, M. (1999). Successful Adjustment in Indian Industry: the Case of Ludhiana’s
Woolen Knitwear Cluster. World Development, 27(9), 1561-1671.
Ueda (2003). Motorcycle Industry. In K. Ohno and N. Kawabata (eds.) Vietnam’s
Industrialization Strategy: Industrial Assistance to Developing Countries under the
Age of Globalization, Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron Sha (in Japanese).
19
~Previous IDE Discussion Papers ~
No. Author(s) Title
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, Border Barriers in Agricultural Trade and the Impact of Their
160 2008
Kuo-I CHANG Elimination: Evidence from East Asia
Satoru KUMAGAI, Toshitaka
The IDE Geographical Simulation Model: Predicting Long-
159 GOKAN, Ikumo ISONO, 2008
Term Effects of Infrastructure Development Projectso
Souknilanh KEOLA
A Journey Through the Secret History of the Flying Geese
158 Satoru KUMAGAI 2008
Model
A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games: A
157 Satoru KUMAGAI 2008
Contribution to the Theory of Game Systems
Kazunobu HAYAKAWA, The Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on International Trade:
156 2008
Fukunari KIMURA The Implication for Production Networks in East Asia
The Choice of Transport Mode: Evidence from Japanese
155 Kazunobu HAYAKAWA 2008
Exports to East Asia
Monetary Systems in Developing Countries: An Unorthodox
154 Jose Luis CORDEIRO 2008
View
Development of Border Economic Zones in Thailand:
153 Takao TSUNEISHI Expansion of Border Trade and Formation of Border Economic 2008
Zones
Improving the Foreign Direct Investment Capacity of the
152 Nguyen Binh Giang 2008
Mountainous Provinces in Viet Nam
Infrastructure (Rural Road) Development and Poverty
151 Syviengxay Oraboune 2008
Alleviation in Lao PDR
Infrastructure Development of Railway in Cambodia: A Long
150 Chap Moly 2008
Term Strategy
Foreign Direct Investment Relations between Myanmar and
149 Thandar Khine 2008
ASEAN
148 Aung Kyaw Financing Small and Midium Enterprises in Myanmar 2008
Arup MITRA and Yuko Migration and Wellbeing at the Lower Echelons of the
51 2006
TSUJITA Economy: A Study of Delhi Slums
Bo MENG, Hajime SATO, Jun
NAKAMURA, Nobuhiro
Interindustrial Structure in the Asia-Pacific Region: Growth and
50 OKAMOTO, Hiroshi 2006
Integration, by Using 2000 AIO Table
KUWAMORI, and Satoshi
INOMATA
Maki AOKI-OKABE, Yoko
49 KAWAMURA, and Toichi International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan 2006
MAKITA
Agglomeration Economies in Japan: Technical Efficiency,
48 Arup MITRA and Hajime SATO 2006
Growth and Unemployment
Organization Capability of Local Societies in Rural
47 Shinichi SHIGETOMI Development: A Comparative Study of Microfinance 2006
Organizations in Thailand and the Philippines
46 Yasushi HAZAMA Retrospective Voting in Turkey: Macro and Micro Perspectives 2006
Kentaro YOHIDA and Machiko Factors Underlying the Formation of Industrial Clusters in Japan
45 2005
NAKANISHI and Industrial Cluster Policy: A Quantitative Survey
44 Masanaga KUMAKURA Trade and Business Cycle Correlations in Asia-Pacific 2005
Transformation of the Rice Marketing System and Myanmar's
43 Ikuko OKAMOTO 2005
Transition to a Market Economy
The Impact of United States Sanctions on the Myanmar
42 Toshihiro KUDO 2005
Garment Industry
President Chain Store Corporation's Hsu Chong-Jen: A Case
41 Yukihito SATO 2005
Study of a Salaried Manager in Taiwan
40 Taeko HOSHINO Executive Managers in Large Mexican Family Businesses 2005
Key Factors to Successful Community Development: The
39 Chang Soo CHOE 2005
Korean Experience
38 Toshihiro KUDO Stunted and Distorted Industrialization in Myanmar 2005
Etsuyo MICHIDA and Koji
37 North-South Trade and Industly-Specific Pollutants 2005
NISHIKIMI
36 Akifumi KUCHIKI Theory of a Flowchart Approach to Industrial Cluster Policy 2005
Effectiveness and Challenges of Three Economic Corridors of
35 Masami ISHIDA 2005
the Greater Mekong Sub-region
Trade, Exchange Rates, and Macroeconomic Dynamics in East
34 Masanaga KUMAKURA 2005
Asia: Why the Electronics Cycle Matters
Theoretical Models Based on a Flowchart Approach to
33 Akifumi KUCHIKI 2005
Industrial Cluster Policy
The Regional Development Policy of Thailand and Its
32 Takao TSUNEISHI 2005
Economic Cooperation with Neighboring Countries
Economic Reform and Social Setor Expenditures: A Study of
31 Yuko TSUJITA 2005
Fifteen Indian States 1980/81-1999/2000
Towards the Compilation of the Consistent Asian International
30 Satoshi INOMATA I-O Table: The Report of the General Survey on National I-O 2005
Tables
An Economic Derivation of Trade Coefficients under the
29 Bo MENG and Asao ANDO 2005
Framework of Multi-regional I-O Analysis
Nobuhiro OKAMOTO, Takao Estimation Technique of International Input-Output Model by
28 2005
SANO, and Satoshi INOMATA Non-survey Method
Masahisa FUJITA and Tomoya
27 Frontiers of the New Economic Geography 2005
MORI
26 Hiroko UCHIMURA Influence of Social Institutions on Inequality in China 2005
Shinichiro OKUSHIMA and
25 Economic Reforms and Income Inequality in Urban China 2005
Hiroko UCHIMURA
No. Author(s) Title