Decision Making using

Game Theory
An introduction for managers

Anthony Kelly
p u bl i s h e d by th e p r e s s s y n d i c a te of th e un i v e r s i t y o f c a m b r i d g e
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
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© Cambridge University Press 2003

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no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2003

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Typeface Minion 11.5/14pt System Poltype“ [v n]

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Kelly, Anthony, 1957–
Decision making using game theory: An introduction for managers / Anthony Kelly
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 521 81462 6
1. Game theory I. Title.

HB144 .K45 2002

658.4'0353–dc21 2002019217

ISBN 0 521 81462 6 hardback

 Contents

Preface ix

1 Introduction 1

Terminology 3
Classifying games 6
A brief history of game theory 8
Layout 14

2 Games of skill 17

Linear programming, optimisation and basic calculus 18

The Lagrange method of partial derivatives 27

3 Games of chance 32

An introduction to basic probability theory 33

Games of chance involving risk 37
Games of chance involving uncertainty 45

v
 Contents
vi

4 Sequential decision making and cooperative games of

strategy 48

Representing sequential decision making 49

Sequential decision making in single-player games 52
Sequential decision making in two-player and multi-player games 66
Cooperative two-person games 72

5 Two-person zero-sum games of strategy 77

Representing zero-sum games 78

Games with saddle points 80
Games with no saddle points 86
Large matrices generally 90
Interval and ordinal scales for pay-oVs 93

6 Two-person mixed-motive games of strategy 98

Representing mixed-motive games and the Nash equilibrium 99

Mixed-motive games without single equilibrium points:
archetype 1 – leadership games 102
Mixed-motive games without single equilibrium points:
archetype 2 – heroic games 104
Mixed-motive games without single equilibrium points:
archetype 3 – exploitation games 105
Mixed-motive games without single equilibrium points:
archetype 4 – martyrdom games 107
Summary of features of mixed-motive prototypes 113
The Cournot, von Stackelberg and Bertrand duopolies:
an interesting application of mixed-motive games 115
Solving games without Nash equilibrium points using mixed
strategies 129
 Contents
vii

7 Repeated games 135

InWnitely repeated games 135

Finitely repeated games 139

8 Multi-person games, coalitions and power 149

Non-cooperative multi-person games 150

Mixed-motive multi-person games 151
Partially cooperative multi-person games 153
Indices of power: measuring inXuence 155

9 A critique of game theory 174

Rationality 174
Indeterminacy 177
Inconsistency 178
Conclusion 180

Appendix A Proof of the minimax theorem 182

Appendix B Proof of Bayes’s theorem 190

Bibiliography 192
Index 199
 1 Introduction

Man is a gaming animal. He must always be trying to get the better in something or other.
Charles Lamb 1775–1834 ‘Essays of Elia’

Game theory is the theory of independent and interdependent decision

making. It is concerned with decision making in organisations where
the outcome depends on the decisions of two or more autonomous
players, one of which may be nature itself, and where no single decision
maker has full control over the outcomes. Obviously, games like chess
and bridge fall within the ambit of game theory, but so do many other
social situations which are not commonly regarded as games in the
everyday sense of the word.
Classical models fail to deal with interdependent decision making
because they treat players as inanimate subjects. They are cause and
eVect models that neglect the fact that people make decisions that are
consciously inXuenced by what others decide. A game theory model,
on the other hand, is constructed around the strategic choices available
to players, where the preferred outcomes are clearly deWned and
known.
Consider the following situation. Two cyclists are going in opposite
directions along a narrow path. They are due to collide and it is in both
their interests to avoid such a collision. Each has three strategies: move
to the right; move to the left; or maintain direction. Obviously, the
outcome depends on the decisions of both cyclists and their interests
coincide exactly. This is a fully cooperative game and the players need to
signal their intentions to one other.
However, sometimes the interests of players can be completely
opposed. Say, for example, that a number of retail outlets are each
1
 Introduction
2

vying for business from a common Wnite catchment area. Each has to
decide whether or not to reduce prices, without knowing what the
others have decided. Assuming that turnover increases when prices are
dropped, various strategic combinations result in gains or losses for
some of the retailers, but if one retailer gains customers, another must
lose them. So this is a zero-sum non-cooperative game and unlike
cooperative games, players need to conceal their intentions from each
other.
A third category of game represents situations where the interests of
players are partly opposed and partly coincident. Say, for example, the
teachers’ union at a school is threatening not to participate in parents’
evenings unless management rescinds the redundancy notice of a
long-serving colleague. Management refuses. The union now compli-
cates the game by additionally threatening not to cooperate with
preparations for government inspection, if their demands are not met.
Management has a choice between conceding and refusing, and which-
ever option it selects, the union has four choices: to resume both
normal work practices; to participate in parents’ evenings only; to
participate in preparations for the inspection only; or not to resume
participation in either. Only one of the possible strategic combinations
leads to a satisfactory outcome from the management’s point of view –
management refusing to meet the union’s demands notwithstanding
the resumption of normal work – although clearly some outcomes are
worse than others. Both players (management and union) prefer some
outcomes to others. For example, both would rather see a resumption
of participation in parents’ evenings – since staV live in the community
and enrolment depends on it – than not to resume participation in
either. So the players’ interests are simultaneously opposed and coinci-
dent. This is an example of a mixed-motive game.
Game theory aims to Wnd optimal solutions to situations of conXict
and cooperation such as those outlined above, under the assumption
that players are instrumentally rational and act in their own best
interests. In some cases, solutions can be found. In others, although
formal attempts at a solution may fail, the analytical synthesis itself can
illuminate diVerent facets of the problem. Either way, game theory
oVers an interesting perspective on the nature of strategic selection in
both familiar and unusual circumstances.
The assumption of rationality can be justiWed on a number of levels.
 Terminology
3

At its most basic level, it can be argued that players behave rationally by
instinct, although experience suggests that this is not always the case,
since decision makers frequently adopt simplistic algorithms which
lead to sub-optimal solutions.
Secondly, it can be argued that there is a kind of ‘natural selection’ at
work which inclines a group of decisions towards the rational and
optimal. In business, for example, organisations that select sub-optimal
strategies eventually shut down in the face of competition from opti-
mising organisations. Thus, successive generations of decisions are
increasingly rational, though the extent to which this competitive
evolution transfers to not-for-proWt sectors like education and the
public services, is unclear.
Finally, it has been suggested that the assumption of rationality that
underpins game theory is not an attempt to describe how players
actually make decisions, but merely that they behave as if they were not
irrational (Friedman, 1953). All theories and models are, by deWnition,
simpliWcations and should not be dismissed simply because they fail to
represent all realistic possibilities. A model should only be discarded if
its predictions are false or useless, and game theoretic models are
neither. Indeed, as with scientiWc theories, minor departures from full
realism can often lead to a greater understanding of the issues (Romp,
1997).

Terminology
Game theory represents an abstract model of decision making, not the
social reality of decision making itself. Therefore, while game theory
ensures that a result follows logically from a model, it cannot ensure
that the result itself represents reality, except in so far as the model is an
accurate one. To describe this model accurately requires practitioners
to share a common language which, to the uninitiated, might seem
excessively technical. This is unavoidable. Since game theory represents
the interface of mathematics and management, it must of necessity
adopt a terminology that is familiar to both.
The basic constituents of any game are its participating, autonomous
decision makers, called players. Players may be individual persons,
organisations or, in some cases, nature itself. When nature is desig-
 Introduction
4

nated as one of the players, it is assumed that it moves without favour

and according to the laws of chance. In the terminology of game
theory, nature is not ‘counted’ as one of the players. So, for example,
when a deck of cards is shuZed prior to a game of solitaire, nature – the
second player – is making the Wrst move in what is a ‘one-player’ game.
This is intrinsically diVerent from chess for example, where nature
takes no part initially or subsequently.
A game must have two or more players, one of which may be nature.
The total number of players may be large, but must be Wnite and must
be known. Each player must have more than one choice, because a
player with only one way of selecting can have no strategy and therefore
cannot alter the outcome of a game.
An outcome is the result of a complete set of strategic selections by all
the players in a game and it is assumed that players have consistent
preferences among the possibilities. Furthermore, it is assumed that
individuals are capable of arranging these possible outcomes in some
order of preference. If a player is indiVerent to the diVerence between
two or more outcomes, then those outcomes are assigned equal rank.
Based on this order of preference, it is possible to assign numeric
pay-oVs to all possible outcomes. In some games, an ordinal scale is
suYcient, but in others, it is necessary to have interval scales where
preferences are set out in proportional terms. For example, a pay-oV of
six should be three times more desirable than a pay-oV of two.
A pure strategy for a player is a campaign plan for the entire game,
stipulating in advance what the player will do in response to every
eventuality. If a player selects a strategy without knowing which strat-
egies were chosen by the other players, then the player’s pure strategies
are simply equivalent to his or her choices. If, on the other hand, a
player’s strategy is selected subsequent to those of other players and
knowing what they were, then there will be more pure strategies than
choices. For example, in the case of the union dispute cited above,
management has two choices and two pure strategies: concede or
refuse. However, the union’s strategic selection is made after manage-
ment’s strategic selection and in full knowledge of it, so their pure
strategies are advance statements of what the union will select in
response to each of management’s selections. Consequently, although
the union has only four choices (to resume both practices; to partici-
pate in parents’ evenings only; to participate in preparations for gov-
 Terminology
5

Table 1.1 The union’s pure strategies

And if
If management management
chooses to . . . Then the union will . . . chooses to . . . Then the union will . . .
Concede Resume both practices Refuse Resume both practices
Concede Resume both practices Refuse Resume parents’ evenings
Concede Resume both practices Refuse Resume inspection preparations
Concede Resume both practices Refuse Resume neither practice

Concede Resume parents’ evenings Refuse Resume both practices

Concede Resume parents’ evenings Refuse Resume parents’ evenings
Concede Resume parents’ evenings Refuse Resume inspection preparations
Concede Resume parents’ evenings Refuse Resume neither practice

Concede Resume Ofsted preparations Refuse Resume both practices

Concede Resume Ofsted preparations Refuse Resume parents’ evenings
Concede Resume Ofsted preparations Refuse Resume inspection preparations
Concede Resume Ofsted preparations Refuse Resume neither practice

Concede Resume neither practice Refuse Resume both practices

Concede Resume neither practice Refuse Resume parents’ evenings
Concede Resume neither practice Refuse Resume inspection preparations
Concede Resume neither practice Refuse Resume neither practice

ernment inspection only; not to resume participation in either), they

have 16 pure strategies, as set out in Table 1.1 above. Some of them may
appear nonsensical, but that does not preclude them from consider-
ation, as many managers have found to their cost!
In a game of complete information, players know their own strategies
and pay-oV functions and those of other players. In addition, each
player knows that the other players have complete information. In
games of incomplete information, players know the rules of the game
and their own preferences of course, but not the pay-oV functions of
the other players.
A game of perfect information is one in which players select strategies
sequentially and are aware of what other players have already chosen,
like chess. A game of imperfect information is one in which players have
to act in ignorance of one another’s moves, merely anticipating what
the other player will do.
 Introduction
6

Classifying games
There are three categories of games: games of skill; games of chance; and
games of strategy. Games of skill are one-player games whose deWning
property is the existence of a single player who has complete control
over all the outcomes. Sitting an examination is one example. Games of
skill should not really be classiWed as games at all, since the ingredient
of interdependence is missing. Nevertheless, they are discussed in the
next chapter because they have many applications in management
situations.
Games of chance are one-player games against nature. Unlike games
of skill, the player does not control the outcomes completely and
strategic selections do not lead inexorably to certain outcomes. The
outcomes of a game of chance depend partly on the player’s choices
and partly on nature, who is a second player. Games of chance are
further categorised as either involving risk or involving uncertainty. In
the former, the player knows the probability of each of nature’s re-
sponses and therefore knows the probability of success for each of his
or her strategies. In games of chance involving uncertainty, probabili-
ties cannot meaningfully be assigned to any of nature’s responses
(Colman, 1982), so the player’s outcomes are uncertain and the prob-
ability of success unknown.
Games of strategy are games involving two or more players, not
including nature, each of whom has partial control over the outcomes.
In a way, since the players cannot assign probabilities to each other’s
choices, games of strategy are games involving uncertainty. They can be
sub-divided into two-player games and multi-player games. Within
each of these two sub-divisions, there are three further sub-categories
depending on the way in which the pay-oV functions are related to one
another – whether the player’s interests are completely coincident;
completely conXicting; or partly coincident and party conXicting:
∑ Games of strategy, whether two-player or multi-player, in which the
players’ interests coincide, are called cooperative games of strategy.
∑ Games in which the players’ interests are conXicting (i.e. strictly
competitive games) are known as zero-sum games of strategy, so
called because the pay-oVs always add up to zero for each outcome of
a fair game, or to another constant if the game is biased.
 Classifying games
7

GAME THEORY

Games of skill Games of chance Games of strategy

Games involving
risk

Games involving
uncertainty

Two-person Multi-person

Cooperative Mixed- motive Zero-sum

Coalitions not permitted

Purely Minimal Infinite Finite Non-cooperative Cooperative

cooperative social
situation

Perfect info
Essential Non-essential
Symmetric No saddle Saddle coalitions coalitions
Imperfect info games

Mixed strategy Power

indices

Have optimal Have no optimal

equilibrium points equilibrium points Dominance &
Shapley– admissability Shapley
Snow

ShapleyÐShubik
Leadership
Johnston
Heroic
Duopoly
models DeeganÐPackel
Exploitation
Banzhaf
Repeated games
Martyrdom

Figure 1.1 A taxonomy of games.

∑ Games in which the interests of players are neither fully conXicting

nor fully coincident are called mixed-motive games of strategy.
Of the three categories, this last one represents most realistically the
intricacies of social interaction and interdependent decision making
and most game theory is concentrated on it.
 Introduction
8

A brief history of game theory

Game theory was conceived in the seventeenth century by mathema-
ticians attempting to solve the gambling problems of the idle French
nobility, evidenced for example by the correspondence of Pascal and
Fermat (c. 1650) concerning the amusement of an aristocrat called de
Mere (Colman, 1982; David, 1962). In these early days, largely as a
result of its origins in parlour games such as chess, game theory was
preoccupied with two-person zero-sum interactions. This rendered it
less than useful as an application to Welds like economics and politics,
and the earliest record of such use is the 1881 work of Francis
Edgeworth, rediscovered in 1959 by Martin Shubik.
Game theory in the modern era was ushered in with the publication
in 1913, by the German mathematician Ernst Zermelo, of Uber eine
Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, in which
he proved that every competitive two-person game possesses a best
strategy for both players, provided both players have complete infor-
mation about each other’s intentions and preferences. Zermelo’s the-
orem was quickly followed by others, most notably by the minimax
theorem, which states that there exists a strategy for each player in a
competitive game, such that none of the players regret their choice of
strategy when the game is over. The minimax theorem became the
fundamental theorem of game theory, although its genesis predated
Zermelo by two centuries. In 1713, an Englishman, James Waldegrave
(whose mother was the daughter of James II) proposed a minimax-
type solution to a popular two-person card game of the period, though
he made no attempt to generalise his Wndings (Dimand & Dimand,
1992). The discovery did not attract any great attention, save for a
mention in correspondence between Pierre de Montmort and Nicholas
Bernouilli. It appears not to have unduly distracted Waldegrave either,
for by 1721, he had become a career diplomat, serving as British
ambassador to the Hapsburg court in Vienna. Nevertheless, by 1865,
Waldegrave’s solution was deemed signiWcant enough to be included in
Isaac Todhunter’s A History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability,
an authoritative, if somewhat dreary, tome. Waldegrave’s contribution
might have attracted more attention but for that dreariness and his
minimax-type solution remained largely unknown at the start of the
twentieth century.
 A brief history of game theory
9

In 1921, the eminent French academician Emile Borel began pub-

lishing on gaming strategies, building on the work of Zermelo and
others. Over the course of the next six years, he published Wve papers
on the subject, including the Wrst modern formulation of a mixed-
strategy game. He appears to have been unaware of Waldegrave’s
earlier work. Borel (1924) attempted, but failed, to prove the minimax
theorem. He went so far as to suggest that it could never be proved, but
as is so often the case with rash predictions, he was promptly proved
wrong! The minimax theorem was proved for the general case in
December 1926, by the Hungarian mathematician, John von
Neumann. The complicated proof, published in 1928, was subsequent-
ly modiWed by von Neumann himself (1937), Jean Ville (1938), Her-
mann Weyl (1950) and others. Its predictions were later veriWed by
experiment to be accurate to within one per cent and it remains a
keystone in game theoretic constructions (O’Neill, 1987).
Borel claimed priority over von Neumann for the discovery of game
theory. His claim was rejected, but not without some disagreement.
Even as late as 1953, Maurice Frechet and von Neumann were engaged
in a dispute on the relative importance of Borel’s early contributions to
the new science. Frechet maintained that due credit had not been paid
to his colleague, while von Neumann maintained, somewhat testily,
that until his minimax proof, what little had been done was of little
signiWcance anyway.
The verdict of history is probably that they did not give each other
much credit. Von Neumann, tongue Wrmly in cheek, wrote that he
considered it an honour ‘to have labored on ground over which Borel
had passed’ (Frechet, 1953), but the natural competition that can
sometimes exist between intellectuals of this stature, allied to some
local Franco–German rivalry, seems to have got the better of common
sense.
In addition to his prodigious academic achievements, Borel had a
long and prominent career outside mathematics, winning the Croix de
Guerre in the First World War, the Resistance Medal in the Second
World War and serving his country as a member of parliament,
Minister for the Navy and president of the prestigious Institut de
France. He died in 1956.
Von Neumann found greatness too, but by a diVerent route. He was
thirty years younger than Borel, born in 1903 to a wealthy Jewish
banking family in Hungary. Like Borel, he was a child prodigy. He
 Introduction
10

enrolled at the University of Berlin in 1921, making contacts with such

great names as Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard and David Hilbert. In 1926,
he received his doctorate in mathematics from the University of
Budapest and immigrated to the United States four years later.
In 1938, the economist Oskar Morgenstern, unable to return to his
native Vienna, joined von Neumann at Princeton. He was to provide
game theory with a link to a bygone era, having met the aging
Edgeworth in Oxford some 13 years previously with a view to convinc-
ing him to republish Mathematical Psychics. Morgenstern’s research
interests were pretty eclectic, but centred mainly on the treatment of
time in economic theory. He met von Neumann for the Wrst time in
February 1939 (Mirowski, 1991).
If von Neumann’s knowledge of economics was cursory, so too was
Morgenstern’s knowledge of mathematics. To that extent, it was a
symbiotic partnership, made and supported by the hothouse atmos-
phere that was Princeton at the time. (Einstein, Weyl and Neils Bohr
were contemporaries and friends (Morgenstern, 1976).)
By 1940, von Neumann was synthesising his work to date on game
theory (Leonard, 1992). Morgenstern, meanwhile, in his work on
maxims of behaviour, was developing the thesis that, since individuals
make decisions whose outcomes depend on corresponding decisions
being made by others, social interaction is by deWnition performed
against a backdrop of incomplete information. Their writing styles
contrasted starkly: von Neumann’s was precise; Morgenstern’s elo-
quent. Nonetheless, they decided in 1941, to combine their eVorts in a
book, and three years later they published what was to become the most
famous book on game theory, Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
iour.
It was said, not altogether jokingly, that it had been written twice:
once in symbols for mathematicians and once in prose for economists.
It was a Wne eVort, although neither the mathematics nor the econ-
omics faculties at Princeton were much moved by it. Its subsequent
popularity was driven as much by the Wrst stirrings of the Cold War
and the renaissance of capitalism in the wake of global conXict, as by
academic appreciation. It did nothing for rapprochement with Borel
and his followers either. None of the latter’s work on strategic games
before 1938 was cited, though the minimax proof used in the book
owes more to Ville than to von Neumann’s own original.
In 1957, von Neumann died of cancer. Morgenstern was to live for
 A brief history of game theory
11

another 20 years, but he never came close to producing work of a

similar calibre again. His appreciation of von Neumann grew in awe
with the passing years and was undimmed at the time of his death in
1977.
While Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour had eventually
aroused the interest of mathematicians and economists, it was not until
Duncan Luce and Howard RaiVa published Games and Decisions in
1957 that game theory became accessible to a wider audience. In their
book, Luce and RaiVa drew particular attention to the fact that in game
theory, players were assumed to be fully aware of the rules and pay-oV
functions of the game, but that in practice this was unrealistic. This
later led John Harsanyi (1967) to construct the theory of games of
incomplete information, in which nature was assumed to assign to
players one of several states known only to themselves (Harsanyi &
Selten, 1972; Myerson, 1984; Wilson, 1978). It became one of the major
conceptual breakthroughs of the period and, along with the concept of
common knowledge developed by David Lewis in 1969, laid the foun-
dation for many later applications to economics.
Between these two great works, John Nash (1951) succeeded in
generalising the minimax theorem by proving that every competitive
game possesses at least one equilibrium point in both mixed and pure
strategies. In the process, he gave his name to the equilibrium points
that represent these solutions and with various reWnements, such as
Reinhard Selten’s (1975) trembling hand equilibrium, it remains the
most widely used game theoretic concept to this day.
If von Neumann was the founding father of game theory, Nash was
its prodigal son. Born in 1928 in West Virginia, the precocious son of
an engineer, he was proving theorems by Gauss and Fermat by the time
he was 15. Five years later, he joined the star-studded mathematics
department at Princeton – which included Einstein, Oppenheimer and
von Neumann – and within a year had made the discovery that was to
earn him a share (with Harsanyi and Selten) of the 1994 Nobel Prize for
Economics. Nash’s solution established game theory as a glamorous
academic pursuit – if there was ever such a thing – and made Nash a
celebrity. Sadly, by 1959, his eccentricity and self-conWdence had
turned to paranoia and delusion, and Nash – one of the most brilliant
mathematicians of his generation – abandoned himself to mysticism
and numerology (Nasar, 1998).
Game theory moved on, but without Nash. In 1953 Harold Kuhn
 Introduction
12

removed the two-person zero-sum restriction from Zermelo’s the-

orem, by replacing the concept of best individual strategy with that of
the Nash equilibrium. He proved that every n-person game of perfect
information has an equilibrium in pure strategies and, as part of that
proof, introduced the notion of sub-games. This too became an im-
portant stepping-stone to later developments, such as Selten’s concept
of sub-game perfection.
The triad formed by these three works – von Neumann–Morgen-
stern, Luce–RaiVa and Nash – was hugely inXuential. It encouraged a
community of game theorists to communicate with each other and
many important concepts followed as a result: the notion of
cooperative games, which Harsanyi (1966) was later to deWne as ones in
which promises and threats were enforceable; the study of repeated
games, in which players are allowed to learn from previous interactions
(Milnor & Shapley, 1957; Rosenthal, 1979; Rosenthal & Rubinstein,
1984; Shubik, 1959); and bargaining games where, instead of players
simply bidding, they are allowed to make oVers, counteroVers and side
payments (Aumann, 1975; Aumann & Peleg, 1960; Champsaur, 1975;
Hart, 1977; Mas-Colell 1977; Peleg, 1963; Shapley & Shubik, 1969).
The Second World War had highlighted the need for a strategic
approach to warfare and eVective intelligence-gathering capability. In
the United States, the CIA and other organisations had been set up to
address those very issues, and von Neumann had been in the thick of it,
working on projects such as the one at Los Alamos to develop the
atomic bomb. When the war ended, the military establishment was
naturally reluctant to abandon such a fruitful association so, in 1946,
the US Air Force committed $10 million of research funds to set up the
Rand Corporation. It was initially located at the Douglas Aircraft
Company headquarters, but moved to purpose-built facilities in Santa
Monica, California. Its remit was to consider strategies for interconti-
nental warfare and to advise the military on related matters. The
atmosphere was surprisingly un-military: participants were well paid,
free of administrative tasks and left to explore their own particular
areas of interest. As beWtted the political climate of the time, research
was pursued in an atmosphere of excitement and secrecy, but there was
ample opportunity for dissemination too. Lengthy colloquia were held
in the summer months, some of them speciWc to game theory, though
security clearance was usually required for attendance (Mirowski,
1991).
 A brief history of game theory
13

It was a period of great activity at Rand from which a new rising star,
Lloyd Shapley, emerged. Shapley, who was a student with Nash at
Princeton and was considered for the same Nobel Prize in 1994, made
numerous important contributions to game theory: with Shubik, he
developed an index of power (Shapley & Shubik, 1954 & 1969); with
Donald Gillies, he invented the concept of the core of a game (Gale &
Shapley, 1962; Gillies, 1959; Scarf, 1967); and in 1964, he deWned his
‘value’ for multi-person games. Sadly, by this time, the Rand Corpor-
ation had acquired something of a ‘Dr Strangelove’ image, reXecting a
growing popular cynicism during the Vietnam war. The mad wheel-
chair-bound strategist in the movie of the same name was even thought
by some to be modelled on von Neumann.
The decline of Rand as a military think-tank not only signalled a shift
in the axis of power away from Princeton, but also a transformation of
game theory from the military to the socio-political arena (Rapoport &
Orwant, 1962). Some branches of game theory transferred better than
others to the new paradigm. Two-person zero-sum games, for
example, though of prime importance to military strategy, now had
little application. Conversely, two-person mixed-motive games, hardly
the most useful model for military strategy, found numerous applica-
tions in political science (Axelrod, 1984; Schelling, 1960). Prime among
these was the ubiquitous prisoner’s dilemma game, unveiled in a
lecture by A.W. Tucker in 1950, which represents a socio-political
scenario in which everyone suVers by acting selWshly, though ra-
tionally. As the years went by, this particular game was found in a
variety of guises, from drama (The Caretaker by Pinter) to music (Tosca
by Puccini). It provoked such widespread and heated debate that it was
nearly the death of game theory in a political sense (Plon, 1974), until it
was experimentally put to bed by Robert Axelrod in 1981.
Another important application of game theory was brought to the
socio-political arena with the publication of the Shapley–Shubik
(1954) and Banzhaf (1965) indices of power. They provided political
scientists with an insight into the non-trivial relationship between
inXuence and weighted voting, and were widely used in courts of law
(Mann & Shapley, 1964; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973) until they were
found not to agree with each other in certain circumstances (StraYn,
1977).
In 1969, Robin Farquharson used the game theoretic concept of
strategic choice to propose that, in reality, voters exercised their
 Introduction
14

franchise not sincerely, according to their true preferences, but tacti-

cally, to bring about a preferred outcome. Thus the concept of strategic
voting was born. Following publication of a simpliWed version nine
years later (McKelvey & Niemi, 1978), it became an essential part of
political theory.
After that, game theory expanded dramatically. Important centres of
research were established in many countries and at many universities.
It was successfully applied to many new Welds, most notably evolution-
ary biology (Maynard Smith, 1982; Selten, 1980) and computer
science, where system failures are modelled as competing players in a
destructive game designed to model worst-case scenarios.
Most recently, game theory has also undergone a renaissance as a
result of its expansion into management theory, and the increased
importance and accessibility of economics in what Alain Touraine
(1969) termed the post-industrial era. However, such progress is not
without its dangers. Ever more complex applications inspire ever more
complex mathematics as a shortcut for those with the skill and knowl-
edge to use it. The consequent threat to game theory is that the
fundamentals are lost to all but the most competent and conWdent
theoreticians. This would be a needless sacriWce because game theory,
while undeniably mathematical, is essentially capable of being under-
stood and applied by those with no more than secondary school
mathematics. In a very modest way, this book attempts to do just that,
while oVering a glimpse of the mathematical wonderland beyond for
those with the inclination to explore it.

Layout
The book basically follows the same pattern as the taxonomy of games
laid out in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 describes games of skill and the
solution of linear programming and optimisation problems using
diVerential calculus and the Lagrange method of partial derivatives. In
doing so, it describes the concepts of utility functions, constraint sets,
local optima and the use of second derivatives.
Chapter 3 describes games of chance in terms of basic probability
theory. Concepts such as those of sample space, random variable and
distribution function are developed from Wrst principles and
 Layout
15

explained. Games involving risk are diVerentiated from those involving

uncertainty, using principles such as maximin and the von Neumann
utility function. Organisational characteristics such as risk aversion,
risk neutrality and risk taking are also considered.
Chapter 4 digresses from the typology of games to consider sequen-
tial and simultaneous decision making. Standard means of represen-
ting sequential decision making, like directed graphs and trees, are
discussed and examples are used to illustrate techniques such as the
method of backward induction and optimal sub-paths, for both single-
player and multi-player games. A sub-section considers the common
but interesting case of single-player games involving uncertainty, the
notions of a priori and a posteriori probability and Bayes’s formula.
The chapter Wnishes by considering brieXy the category of games
known as two-person cooperative games and the minimal social situ-
ation.
The remaining chapters consider games of strategy. Chapter 5 con-
siders two-person zero-sum games of strategy. Games with saddle
points are discussed in terms of the principles of dominance and
inadmissibility, and games without saddle points are solved using
mixed strategies. The solution of large matrices is considered using the
notion of embeddedness and examples of interval and ordinal scales
are shown to be adjustable using linear transformations.
Chapter 6 considers two-person mixed-motive games of strategy
and how to represent them. The famous prisoner’s dilemma game and
its suggested solution in metagame theory is discussed along with three
other categories of mixed-motive games without unique equilibrium
points: leadership games; heroic games; and exploitation games. The
Cournot, von Stackelberg and Bertrand duopoly models are fully
explored, as is the solution of games without Nash equilibrium points.
Chapter 7 examines how repeated dynamic games can be analysed
and how repetition itself aVects outcome. Finitely and inWnitely repeat-
ed games are considered, illustrated by example, and developed in the
context of important concepts such as credibility, threat and discount-
ing future pay-oVs. The paradox of backward induction is also de-
scribed and four theoretical methods of avoiding it are discussed.
Chapter 8 describes multi-player cooperative, non-cooperative and
mixed-motive games of strategy, coalitions and the real distribution of
power among voting factions on committees. Measurements of voting
 Introduction
16

strength such as the Shapely value, the Shapley–Shubik, Johnston,

Deegan–Packel and Banzhaf indices are described and an extended
real-life example is fully explored, with some interesting results.
Finally, Chapter 9 presents a brief critique of game theory, consider-
ing the problems of rationality, indeterminacy and inconsistency, and
the future role of game theory in a learning society.
Nearly 100 illustrations and 40 worked examples hopefully make this
book accessible, even for those without formal mathematical training.
The examples are all drawn from commonplace situations and are
intended to illustrate the fundamental theoretical precepts upon which
problems and conXicts are resolved, rather than the complicated reality
of everyday decision making. Thus, some of the examples may appear
over-simpliWed or a triXe contrived, but better that than the principles
become obfuscated by detail, no matter how realistic. In addition, some
examples are worked and then re-worked under slightly diVerent
conditions in order to present a coherent progressive study. This has
the intended merit of demonstrating how subtle changes in circum-
stance can result in signiWcant diVerences in outcome, but it has the
unfortunate side eVect that readers who miss the point initially, be-
come even more confused as the story unfolds. Great care has been
taken to explain these examples in the simplest terms – especially in the
initial workings – to avoid the likelihood of this happening. Hopefully,
the strategy has paid oV and the reader’s enjoyment of the book will not
be curtailed by the necessity to be diligent.