CARPIO-MORALES v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 217126-27

November 10, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

SUBJECT MATTER:
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court

APPLICABLE CONCEPTS:
Doctrine of condonation
Elective official’s reelection serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, cutting the right to remove him. It is a legal fiction
grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all the activities and behavior of the elective local official. It is presumed that when the
electorate exercised their right to choose, they were all aware of “all” the misconducts of the public official.
BAD DOCTRINE STRUCK DOWN BY THIS CASE. (Abused by officials) – Prospective application

LEGAL BASIS:
1987 Constitution
Sec 30, Article VI
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and concurrence.

Sec 5, Art XI
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.

Sec 5, Art VIII

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Sec. 14 of RA 6770, The Ombudsman Act

Section 14. Restrictions - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court on pure question of law.

Sec. 24 of RA 6770, The Ombudsman Act

Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

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The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6)
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

Paragraph 4 of Sec 27 of RA 6670

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for
certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition:
 Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction
 Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon the lower court
 Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the quest and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petition or the subject matter of the action is perishable
 Where, under the circumstance, a MFR would be useless
 Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency of relief
 Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable
 Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process
 Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object
 Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved

ACTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
-CA decision granting Binay, Jr’s prayer for TRO on his preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman, and
-CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment

Petitioner(s): Conchita Carpio-Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman

Parties
Respondent(s): Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, JR.

SUMMARY:
Cases were filed against Binay Jr. et al. Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order. CA granted Binay’s petition for certiorari
using the doctrine of condonation. CA has jurisdiction of petition for certiorari because Sec 14 par 1 of RA 6770 invoked by
Ombudsman does not insulate Ombudsman from judicial power, and Sec 14 Par 2 of RA 6770 was ruled unconstitutional (similar to
Sec 27 RA 6770 in Fabian v Desierto). SC directs CA to act on Binay’s petition for certiorari. Condonation doctrine is abandoned
prospectively.

ANTECEDENT FACTS:
 July 22, 2014: Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas Enciso VI (before the Office of the Ombudsman) filed a complaint against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of plunder and violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) in connection with the 5 phases of the procurement and construction
of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
o In response, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators which charged them with:

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  6 administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service
 6 criminal cases for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of
Public Documents
o Furthermore, Binay, Jr. was alleged to be involved with the anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction during his previous and present terms as Mayor of Makati
 Binay’s 1st term (2010-2013)
o Sept 21, 2010: Binay issued Notice of Award for Phase III to Hilmarc’s Construction without the required
publication and lack of architectural design. Millions of pesos that amounted to around 562 million pesos were
released in intervals from Dec 15, 2010 to July 7, 2011)
o Aug 11, 2011: Binay issued Notice of Award for Phase IV to Hilmarc’s Construction without the required publication
and lack of architectural design. Millions of pesos that amounted to around 558 million pesos were released in
intervals from Oct 4, 2011 to Oct 1, 2012)
o Sept 6, 2012: Binay issued Notice of Award for Phase V to Hilmarc’s Construction without the required publication
and lack of architectural design. Released funds amounting to around 62 million on Dec 20, 2012.
 Binay’s 2nd term (2013-2016)
o July 24, 2013: Approved funds for remaining balance with MANA Architecture and Interior Design (429,011 pesos)
 March 6, 2015: A 2nd Special Panel was constituted to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication
 March 10, 2015: Upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension on
Binay, Jr. et al. Requisites for preventive suspension of public officer are present:
o Evidence of guilt is strong
 (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the
irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project;
 (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
 (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds
o They were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service
 (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
 (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS)
o Their positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation
 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension, arguing that he
cannot be administratively liable because:
o Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected mayor
o Phases III to V transpired during his first term, and his reelection condoned his administrative liability therefore
o Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him was
strong
 March 16, 2015: Although Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the said order, CA released a resolution on the
same day granting Binay, Jr.’s prayer. The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay’s petition for certiorari
o Governor Garcia Jr v CA if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr.
were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.’s reelection meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged.
 The Ombudsman then filed the present petition claiming that:
o The CA has no jurisdiction as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the
Ombudsman investigation without prima facie evidence that the subject matter is outside their jurisdiction
o The CA’s directive to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt is illegal and improper considering that the
Ombudsman, as an impeachable officer, cannot be subject to contempt proceedings

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ISSUES AND HOLDINGS:

1. WON the present petition is the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy and adequate remedy? – YES.
2. WON the CA has jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari – YES
3. WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a presumptive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman? – YES
4. WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the preventive suspension based on the condonation doctrine. - NO
5. WON the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt is improper and illegal –
PREMATURE
RATIO:

1. WON the present petition is the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy and adequate remedy? – YES.
 Certiorari and prohibition can only be invoked when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (basis: Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
 GENERAL RULE: A motion for reconsideration should be filed to allow the lower courts to correct any actual or perceived
error
 APPLICABLE EXCEPTIONS:
o Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the quest and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petition or the subject matter of the action is perishable
o Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved
 Since the case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the Ombudsman, the Legislature and the Judiciary, it involves
an issue of transcendental public importance needing a careful but expeditious resolution + questions on the propriety of
the continuous application of the condonation doctrine

2. WON the CA has jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari – YES
 Sec 14 of Ombudsman Act is unconstitutional (Sec 30, Art VI 1987 consti). A remedy for certiorari for an unappealable
Ombudsman order is properly filed with the CA before the SC.
 RULE: A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
o Rationale: subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court
to take cognizance of and to render judgement on action
 Ombudsman argument on CA’s lack of jurisdiction is based on her interpretation of Sec. 14, of the Ombudsman Act
o First paragraph: prohibition against any court (except SC) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman
o General Rule: an injunction is a judicial writ, process of proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain
from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely provisional remedy for and as an incident of the main
action
 Considering textual qualifier “to delay”, the injunction referred to is of the provisional kind
o Exception: When there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter is outside Ombudsman’s jurisdiction
 On Ombudsman’s jurisdiction:
o Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective officials with the exception of impeachable officers of
Congress and Judiciary
o Ombudsman retains power to investigate impeachable offense
o Ombudsman also has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of
regular courts/admin agencies BUT has primary jurisdiction to investigate those under the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan
 Second paragraph: no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman
with the exceptions of SC on pure questions of law (main basis for the Ombudsman’s contention)
o The Court ruled that it’s vague because:
 It is unclear what “application for remedy” or “findings” refer to

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  It does not specify which procedural remedy is solely allowable by the SC, save that the same be taken
only against a pure question of law
 Court applies statutory construction to rule on the issue
o The Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman for their argument DO NOT actually pertain to the second
paragraph; the deliberations cited did not reflect in the text of Sec. 14, of the Ombudsman Act; Court held that it’s
more logical to assume that the quoted deliberations referred to Sec. 27
o The Court construed the second paragraph such that all remedies against issuances of the Office of Ombudsman
are prohibited, except through certiorari on pure questions of law
 The Court held that the second paragraph attempts to effectively increase the SC’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice
and concurrence because it limits the remedy against Ombudsman’s finding/decision to Rule 45 appeal. This is very similar
to paragraph 4 of Sec 27 RA 6770.
 Fabian v. Desierto, there was a similar provision (par. 4 of Sec. 27, RA 6670) struck down by the court as it had the effect of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
1987 Const. This provision was also inconsistent with Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the present Rules of Procedure, which applies only
to a review of “judgements or final orders of the CA, Sandiganbayan, CTA, RTC, or other courts authorized by law” and not
of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Ombudsman
o The remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the CA
o Fabian should apply because the provisions are in pari materia
o Since the 2nd paragraph is determinative of CA’s jurisdiction Court resolved this issue on its own motion (basis:
case law - Fabian)
 “Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court’s own motion ”
o Since the preventive suspension is unappealable (as an interlocutory order), jurisprudence holds that a petition for
certiorari can be filed before the CA, and not directly before SC
o Office of the Ombudsman vs. Capulong: since there was GAD by the Ombudsman, the CA has imperative to grant
incidental reliefs
o Dagan vs. Office of the Ombudsman: certiorari is correct remedy for unappealable Ombudsman’s order. And
although SC and CA have concurrent jurisdiction, it should be filed with CA first

3. WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a presumptive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman? – YES
 The prohibition of injunctive reliefs in Sec. 27 of RA 6770 violates the separation of powers doctrine, it is deemed
ineffective
 The Ombudsman invokes the 1st paragraph for her contention that CA cannot issue such orders
o On Ombudsman’s independence:
 Sec. 5, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
 In Gonzales III: The Court observed that
 The Ombudsman does not owe its existence to Congress but to the Constitution itself
 They have fiscal autonomy
 The need for independence is premised on the effectivity of the body – needs to be insulated
from political pressure
 But this freedom is only from control or supervision of the Executive Department
 Therefore its need for independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate Ombudsman from judicial power
 On the first paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770
o The constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of the case
o Sec. 1 of Art. VIII states that judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts
 Only SC is created by the Consti, all other lower courts may be established by Congress
 Through the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the CA, RTC, MTC (metro and municipal) and, MCTC
were established
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  Through RA 1125 and PD 1486, the CTA and Sandiganbayan were established
o Sec. 2 of Art. VIII, empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts EXCEPT SC’s
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5
o Jurisdiction pertains to “jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action”
 In The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC: subject matter jurisdiction defined as the authority to hear and
determine cases of the general call to which proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the courts and defines its powers
o The basis for CA’s subject matter jurisdiction is Sec. 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129
 CA has original and concurrent certiorari jurisdiction with RTC and SC
 In lieu of concurrent jurisdiction, hierarchy of courts should be followed
 A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case should conform to the limits and parameters of
the rules of procedure duly promulgated by the SC
o Note: Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority, it simply directs the manner in which it shall be
fully and justly exercised
o Only SC can promulgate rules (basis: Sec. 5(5) Art. VIII)
o Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice: the 1987 texually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court’s rule-making powers (basis: National
Assembly’s deliberations)
o Ergo, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules and procedure
 The Court has rule-making authority which includes the identification of procedural remedies needed for the reasonable
exercise of every court’s judicial power the provisional remedies of TROs and WPI were this provided
o TRO and WPI are by nature ancillary and are dependent on the main action
 The power of a court to issue injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue auxiliary writs…. To carry its
acquired jurisdiction into effect under Sec. 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court
o Inherent powers doctrine: to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of their jurisdiction (Smothers v. Lewis)
 issuance of provisional injunctive relief is an exercise of the court’s inherent power thus any attempt to
interfere is unconstitutional
o Also in Smothers: Legislative’s authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean it
could control the appellate judicial proceeding
 Congress interfered with the provisional remedy created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure…
without the Court’s consent… there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle
o By passing the first paragraph,, Congress took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI…
encroached upon SC’s rule-making authority
o First paragraph DOES NOT vest jurisdiction because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion subject matter
jurisdiction
 Subject matter jurisdiction is in BP 129, which were not shown to be repealed
 The breach also dilutes the court’s ability to carry out its functions because a particular case can easily be
mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended
 As Congress may not interfere with SC’s promulgated rules, the prohibition on the issuance of injunctions in first paragraph
shall be ineffective until its is admitted in the rules.

4. WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the preventive suspension based on the condonation doctrine. - NO
 CA merely followed precedents that used the condonation doctrine, which were at that time, still good law. However, the
Court held that the doctrine must be abandoned.
 Preventive suspension order: purpose is to prevent official from using his position and powers of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper records which are vital in the prosecution of the case against him
 Condonation doctrine (w/c is the basis of CA enjoining the suspension order): a jurisprudential creation originating from
Pascual case, which connotes complete extinguishment of liability

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 o Ombudsman argued that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across the US, so there is no weight of authority
that can be attributed to this doctrine. But, the Court held that Pascual ruling needs to be reexamined to reflect
prevailing legal norms, as Pascual was decided w/in the context of the 35 consti
o Pascual’s ratio decidendi:
 Penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in w/c the public officer was elected, for each
term is separate and distinct
 Elective official’s reelection serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, cutting the right to remove
him
 Court may not deprive electorate of their right to elect officers
 After a reexamination, the Court found that:
o 1973 & 1987 Const: introduced accountability of public officers
o LGC of 1991: introduced grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official like Binay Jr. Nothing in
the LGC states that admin liability is extinguished by reelection.
 The basis of doctrine of condonation is BEREFT of legal basis.
o Election is not a mode of condoning an admin offense
o Liability arising from admin offenses may be condoned by the Pres light of Sec. 19, Art. VII
o It is only the enforcement of the penalty of suspension that LGC prohibits, not that admin liability is completely
extinguished
o There is no basis in presuming the electorate’s knowledge of an official’s character in voting for him: misconduct
can be covered up and is usually unknown to the voter. Thus, there can be no condonation of an act that is
unknown.
o However, the abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be applied prospectively.
 The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion because they were still following the cases which were
at that time, good law.
 So, the WPI against Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
 Considering that the suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that aids in the Ombudsman’s
investigation, it has no more purpose upon Ombudsman’s finding him administratively liable and
imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal
5. WON the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt is improper and illegal –
PREMATURE
 Premature for Court to rule on this issue because resolution does not show the Ombudsman has already been subjected to
the contempt proceedings
o CA has not given due course to Binay Jr’s contempt petition
 Premise of Ombudsman’s contention: as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt because this action is criminal and the penalty results in her removal from office

WHEREFORE, Petition is partially granted.

 Par 2, Sec 14 is unconstitutional.
 The policy against issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than SC under Par 1 is ineffective until it is
adopted as part of the Court’s Rules of procedure.
 The Condonation doctrine is abandoned.
 The CA is directed to act on Binay’s petition for certiorari and resolve his petition for contempt.

DISSENTING:

BERSAMIN, J.:

 It was wrong to determine WON CA gravely abused its discretion on the basis of the doctrine of condonation
o Should have referenced Sec 24 of RA 6770
 Ombudsman can preventively suspend any officer pending investigation if evidence of guilt is strong:
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  (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
 (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
 (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
 The CA erroneously banked on the pronouncements in the post-Pascual cases to espouse the doctrine of condonation as
the basis to issue the WPI
o According to these cases, condonation shall apply only in case of the reelection of a public officer who is sought to
be permanently removed from office as a result of misconduct, not while the officer is undergoing investigation,
as in this case.
o Condonation only applies to the penalty imposed AFTER investigation
o The cases cannot be applied in Binay’s case bec preventive suspension pending investigation was not yet a penalty
in itself, but a mere measure of precaution.
 Preventive suspension (imposed during investigation) is NOT a penalty of suspension (served after the
final disposition of the case)
o CA’s application of condonation doctrine was unnecessary and by relying on it, CA went beyond the parameters for
determining W/N to issue the injunctive writ
o What was raised by Binay for the CA to determine was WON the ombudsman satisfactorily established that he had
the right to the lifting of the suspension order
 The Court should excuse itself from exercising juris because the main case on the admin proceedings against the
respondents has already been decided by the Ombudsman on the merits

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