[G.R. No. L-52688. October 17, 1980.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J p:

Honorato ambal appealed from the decision of the Court First Instance of Camiguin convicting him
of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand
pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near
the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48,
mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised
hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor,
went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed
his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was
bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which
were exacerbated by the fact that the sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the
night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine
for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated altercation. Felicula told her
husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark
infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After
a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on march 4, 1977 the
fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the
defense of Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor
Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in
the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's
mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive,
emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to
November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and
was normal (44-46 tsn November 3, 1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied:
"Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but during
the commission of the crime, that is what we call 'Psychosis' due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna, a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of
mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental
disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a minor psycho-neurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 tsn November 15, 1977). The doctor
concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 tsn). He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the
incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly
not in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that was charged with the
capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During
his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked
in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle
when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet
while plowing He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That
was the commencement of his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not
insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.
"Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness
or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity." (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary, an imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane
person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. "Imbecil vale tanto como escaso
de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juicio." An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no
puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de razon, pue; en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juicio
mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the
brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic,
and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective
faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).
"The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary" (Art.
800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305 308). The law always presumes
all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz,
109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113
Phil. 841).
"When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the
criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or
that he was generally considered to be insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy —
the legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to
overcome this presumption" (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
"Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments
prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition"
(U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed
(People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely a reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,
1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an
imbecile (Formigones case).
 Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his
acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not insanity,
especially considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed his
wife. (Cruz case.)
"There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such
a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a
quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always,
acts like a madman, The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning
of the word 'crazy' is not synonymous with the legal terms 'insane', 'non compos mentis,' 'unsound mind',
'idiot', or 'lunatic'." (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
"The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity."
(People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
"One who, in possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless
be shielded from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the
commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was
insane, and that the offense was the direct consequence of his insanity." (State vs. Stickley, 41 Iowa 232m
cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-
year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders,
cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
155). LLphil
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120
Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the
rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
"In the early stages of our law, wayback in medieval times, insanity was never a defense for crime.
The insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and would often
get one. He had no defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits. This was
what was become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the limits of the defense were
expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he
was incapable of appreciating the difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and
wrong of particular case, but right and wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes
said, between good and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong generally would not charge with responsibility if there was no capacity
to understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.
"The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the House
of Lords to questions submitted by judges in the famous case of Mc-Naghten, who was tried for the murder
of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel."
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: "To
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at time of committing the act,
the party accused was under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20,
1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the
private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister. M'Naghten shot Drummoned, thinking he was Sir
Robert. M'Naghten labored under the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies and that
the prime minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten was affected by
morbid delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him unable to distinguish
right and wrong, and that he was incapable of controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The
jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted,
is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act
which is the subject of the inquiry." (Coleman's case, 1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
 Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him
to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is
excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease
he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie
Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible impulse
test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged
mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental
disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful
act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having such effect
on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement of deterioration, and either
congenital, or the of injury or of a physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874,
45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity
to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible
impulse" test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although
he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
"Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or 'Product' rule, also permits inability to
distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses limit the inquiry to that topic,
it would appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that
the only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is not met, but
in which a defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized." (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence.
The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and
freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any disease or defect. cdphil
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to
be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the
authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The
lesser penalty should because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of
aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Concepcion Jr. is abroad. Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
||| (People v. Ambal, G.R. No. L-52688, [October 17, 1980], 188 PHIL 372-383)
 [G.R. Nos. 61864-69. May 8, 1992.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE FAMILY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (Formerly
Family Savings Bank), petitioners, vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO as PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH II, AND HERNANI PALILLO, respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTION TO QUASH; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES. — It is a
settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof (People v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 175; Ada v. Virola,
G.R. Nos. 82346-47, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 336). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e)
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(Tangan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 73963, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 435).
2. ID.; COURT; JURISDICTION; MUNICIPAL OR CITY COURT; MAXIMUM PENALTY IMPOSABLE IS CONTROLLING.
— In determining whether a criminal case is within the jurisdiction of a Municipal or City Court, the maximum
punishment that might be imposed is controlling, and the fact that the minimum punishment is within its
jurisdiction is immaterial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Taking into account the amount of each check which is P85,000.00 upon
which the court may base the alternative imposable penalty of fine pursuant to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in the
information filed in the City Court, it is clear that the latter has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that
the imposable fine will be P85,000.00. at the very least up to the amount of P170.000.00 which is way beyond
the maximum amount of P6,000.00 from which the City Court may validly draw concurrent jurisdiction over
the case. It is this alternative penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which divests the City Court
of its jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 10323. Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed said case
and since the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the
same offense in the proper court. (U.S. v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 6027 19 Phil. 265; Cristobal v. People G.R. No. 1-
1542, 84, Phil. 473).
4. ID.; ID.; GUARDIAN OF THE RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AS WELL AS OF THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. — This Court had
occasion to rule in People v. Pablo, G.R. No. L-37271, June 25, 1980 (98 SCRA 289) that the court should bear
in mind that it is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as of the people at large, and that it should
not unduly force the accused to go to trial, or for light cause, jeopardize the rights or interest of the public.
The rights of the offended parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally entitled to the
protection offered by the courts to the public at large in the trial of a criminal case. (People v. Declaro, G.R.
No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142)
5. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMPETENCE TO PASS UPON ISSUE ON JURISDICTION OF CITY COURT
WHICH TRIED THE FIRST OFFENSE. — Respondent Court obviously has the competence to pass upon the issue
of the city court's jurisdiction over the first information. It should be pointed out that in order to resolve
whether or not an accused has been placed twice in jeopardy, the court should first determine whether or not
a first jeopardy had legally attached. As already discussed before, a legal jeopardy attaches only if the court
which first tried the offense is a court of competent jurisdiction. And since the herein private respondent
interposed the defense of double jeopardy on the basis that the city court had validly acquired jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 10323, it is necessary for the respondent court to pass upon the said issue.
6. ID.; MOTION TO QUASH; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; DEFENSE MAY BE INVOKED EVEN AFTER ARRAIGNMENT. —
Anent the contention of petitioner that private respondent had waived the defense of double jeopardy when
she failed to plead the said defense at the time of arraignment, suffice it to say that the promulgation of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure had effectively granted to an accused the right to invoke the defense of
double jeopardy even after arraignment.
 DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J p:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside and nullify the orders of respondent Judge Benigno
M. Puno in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Hernani Palillo" filed before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II with station at
the City of Lucena, to wit: a) the order dated July 30, 1982, granting respondent Palillo's Motion to Dismiss
dated July 30, 1982 and ordering the dismissal of the aforementioned cases, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finding the Motion to Quash filed by the
accused TENABLE, hereby DISMISSES the above-entitled cases.
"With costs de oficio.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 27, Rollo)
and b) the order dated August 26, 1982, denying the separate motions for reconsideration of the order
dated July 30, 1982 filed by petitioner People of the Philippines (People) and petitioner Family Bank and
Trust Company (Family) which reads:
"AFTER a careful and thorough study of the allegations in the Motions for Reconsideration,
dated August 3 and 13, 1982, filed by the Prosecution, together with the Opposition dated
August 12, 1982 and the Supplemental Opposition dated August 21, 1982, filed by the
Defense, the Court finds the said motion(s) without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 28, Rollo)
The facts of these cases are not in dispute. On December 23, 1981, the City Fiscal filed against the accused an
information (Criminal Case No. 10323) for six (6) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, with the City
Court of Lucena, Branch I. prcd
On March 3, 1982, the accused was arraigned by the court and she pleaded not guilty to the charge.
In compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice contained in a letter from the Chief State Prosecutor
dated March 9, 1982 in connection with the criminal charges against private respondent Palillo, the Office of
the City Fiscal filed on March 22, 1982 six separate criminal informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486,
3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hernani Palillo," to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3485:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54332 dated
January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored
and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not
have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant
herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused
to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00 Philippine
Currency.
Contrary to law. (pp. 32-33, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3486:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980 in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check. no. AA37-54329 dated
January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored
and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not
have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant,
herein the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to
deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check; to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
"Contrary to law." (pp. 34-35, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3487:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54330 dated
January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored
and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not
have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant
herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused
to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover said check, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine
currency.
"Contrary to Law." (pp. 36-37, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3488:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54328 dated
January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored
and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not
have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant
herein the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to
deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine
Currency.

"Contrary to Law." (pp. 38-39, Rollo)

Criminal Case No 3489:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54331 dated
January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored
and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not
have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant
herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused
to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
"Contrary to law." (pp. 40-41, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3490:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the city of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54334 dated
January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored
and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not
 have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant
herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused
to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine
currency.
"Contrary to law." (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
On April 5, 1982, the City Fiscal filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323, pending before the City
Court of Lucena, on the ground that proper informations have been filed with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon.
The counsel for the accused filed an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw on the ground that the filing of so-
called proper informations with the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not a legal ground to withdraw the
above-entitled case, considering that the City Court of Lucena had already acquired jurisdiction over the case
and the accused had already been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On April 16, 1982, the City Court issued an order, dismissing Criminal Case No. 10323, for lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, upon motion of private respondent through counsel, Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487,
3488, 3489 and 3490 pending in various branches of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, were consolidated
for trial before Branch II of the aforesaid CFI, presided by the respondent judge.
On July 28, 1982, private respondent was again arraigned, now before the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch II and she entered a plea of "Not Guilty" in all aforesaid six (6) criminal cases.
After entering her plea of "Not Guilty," private respondent filed on the same day a Motion to Dismiss the
aforementioned six (6) criminal cases on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming that the City Court of Lucena
City had already acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323 and that, therefore, the dismissal of the
last mentioned case, the very case bearing the same causes of action as the six (6) criminal cases, constituted
a dismissal on the merits.
On July 29, 1982, the City Fiscal filed an Opposition to the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss, citing as grounds
therefore that the private respondent had not been placed in jeopardy before the City Court since she was
arraigned under a defective information before the latter Court and such court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 10323.
On July 30, 1982 the respondent CFI judge issued the first questioned order granting private respondent's
motion to dismiss all the six (6) criminal informations filed against her.
On August 5, 1982, the complainant through Assistant City Fiscal Elviro Q. Quitain of Lucena City filed a motion
for reconsideration of the said order.
On August 12, 1982, private respondent filed an Opposition to the City Fiscal's motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, the A.M. Perez and Associates Law Office, through Atty. Dante T. Ramos, filed its formal
appearance on August 12, 1982 as private prosecutor in behalf of the Family Bank and Trust Company (herein
private petitioner) under the direct control and supervision of the City Fiscal in the six (6) criminal cases before
the CFI of Quezon.
On August 16, 1982, with the conformity of the City Fiscal, the private prosecutor through the abovenamed
counsel filed its own Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent judge's order of dismissal. LibLex
On August 23, 1982, private respondent Palillo through counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the
prosecution's motions for reconsideration.
On August 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued the second questioned order, denying both the City Fiscal and
the private prosecutor's motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition which the City Fiscal and the private prosecutor jointly filed directly with this Court.
In his comment, the Solicitor General recommended that the questioned orders of the respondent judge be
reversed and set aside and that the case be remanded to the court a quo for trial.
On the other hand, the counsel for the herein private respondent, after four (4) motions for extension of time,
failed to file his own comment.
Accordingly, on March 2, 1983, this Court issued a resolution dispensing with the private respondent's
comment, giving due course to the petition and declaring the case submitted for decision.
In support of their petition, petitioners contend that, in issuing the orders complained of, respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess or lack of jurisdiction because:
a) The respondent judge was without jurisdiction to inquire into, much less reverse the City Court's finding
contained in its order dated April 16, 1982 that the City Court had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
10323, the latter order having long become final and constituted res judicata between the parties thereto.
b) The respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction of the City Court over
Criminal Case No. 10323, such competence being in law reserved only to the Supreme Court.
c) The respondent judge's holding that the City Court had concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance
of Lucena over the offense charged under Criminal Case No. 10323 and that the dismissal of said case thereby
precludes further prosecution of the accused under the six (6) cases before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon finds no valid support in law and jurisprudence.
d) The orders complained of effectively denies the prosecution of its day in Court and of its right to due
process.
e) The respondent judge gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the accused, herein, respondent
PALILLO, has waived the defense of double jeopardy and is thus estopped from setting up said defense (p. 78,
Rollo).
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10323 pending before the
City Court of Lucena, Branch I, for lack of jurisdiction and the subsequent filing of other informations (Criminal
Cases Nos. 3485-3490) with the respondent Court against the same private respondent for the same offenses
had placed her in double jeopardy.
A careful scrutiny of the circumstances of these cases would clearly show that no double jeopardy exists. It is a
settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof (People v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 175; Ada v. Virola,
G.R. Nos. 82346-47, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 336). LLphil
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (Tangan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 73963, Nov. 5, 1987,
155 SCRA 435).
As correctly found by the City Court of Lucena, jurisdiction over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No.
10323 exclusively pertains to the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides for a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine or imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 provides that the municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and
sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties
charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law
does not exceedprision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos or both . . . (Section 87).
In determining whether a criminal case is within the jurisdiction of a Municipal or City Court, the maximum
punishment that might be imposed is controlling, and the fact that the minimum punishment is within its
jurisdiction is immaterial.

Taking into account the amount of each check which is P85,000.00 upon which the court may base the
alternative imposable penalty of fine pursuant to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in the information filed in the City
Court, it is clear that the latter has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that the imposable fine will be
P85,000.00. at the very least up to the amount of P170.000.00 which is way beyond the maximum amount of
P6,000.00 from which the City Court may validly draw concurrent jurisdiction over the case. It is this
alternative penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which divests the City Court of its jurisdiction
to try Criminal Case No. 10323. Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed said case and since the
dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the same offense in
the proper court. (U.S. v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 6027 19 Phil. 265; Cristobal v. People G.R. No. 1-1542, 84, Phil.
473).
It is noteworthy that the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323 and the subsequent filing of the six (6)
criminal informations with the Court of First Instance were made in compliance with the directive of the
Ministry of Justice. Clearly, these were designed to correct the error committed with respect to the filing of
the information in Criminal Case No. 10323. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the error does not constitute
substantial prejudice to private respondent considering that no evidence yet has ever been presented and the
private respondent was never exposed to trial. Thus, the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 were
as though the accused was being tried and prosecuted under an original information. The constitutional
mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the
accused from going through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present its own evidence to substantiate the
allegations in the information, there is no second jeopardy to speak of. Contrary to the stand of the private
respondent in its motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490, the City Court's order of dismissal cannot be
considered as a judgment of acquittal since, as already pointed out, the said court has no jurisdiction to try the
case. llcd
Moreover, the assailed order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 unjustly deprives the State of its
right to due process.
This Court had occasion to rule in People v. Pablo, G.R. No. L-37271, June 25, 1980 (98 SCRA 289) that the
court should bear in mind that it is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as of the people at large,
and that it should not unduly force the accused to go to trial, or for light cause, jeopardize the rights or
interest of the public. The rights of the offended parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally
entitled to the protection offered by the courts to the public at large in the trial of a criminal case. (People v.
Declaro, G.R. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142)
In the earlier case of Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, G.R. No. L-46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 19, We
ruled that:
"The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity
to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded this right to
the prosecution and, where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending
court action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information
deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict, it denies the prosecution its
day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and,
therefore null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is,
due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double
jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-
founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal
and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in
court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent
miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be
prejudiced thereby." (People v. Navarro, etc., 63 SCRA 264)
We disagree, however, with the petitioner's contention that respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue of jurisdiction of the City Court over Criminal Case No. 10323. Respondent Court obviously has
the competence to pass upon the issue of the city court's jurisdiction over the first information. It should be
pointed out that in order to resolve whether or not an accused has been placed twice in jeopardy, the court
should first determine whether or not a first jeopardy had legally attached. As already discussed before, a
legal jeopardy attaches only if the court which first tried the offense is a court of competent jurisdiction. And
since the herein private respondent interposed the defense of double jeopardy on the basis that the city court
had validly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323, it is necessary for the respondent court to pass
upon the said issue. LibLex
Anent the contention of petitioner that private respondent had waived the defense of double jeopardy when
she failed to plead the said defense at the time of arraignment, suffice it to say that the promulgation of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure had effectively granted to an accused the right to invoke the defense of
double jeopardy even after arraignment. Thus, Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the New Rules provides:
"SECTION 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash, or failed to allege the same in
said motion shall be deemed a waiver with the grounds of a motion to quash except the
grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction, of the
offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3
of this Rule." (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisitions with respect to the procedural issues raised, this petition warrants
the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for, there being no double jeopardy in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. These
cases are hereby REMANDED to the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Quezon to which Criminal Cases Nos.
3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490 are assigned to proceed with the trial on the merits against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Puno, G.R. Nos. 61864-69, [May 8, 1992], 284-A PHIL 48-62)
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE; NECESSARY. —

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense
entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRITERIA IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF INSANITY. — It is difficult to distinguish sanity
from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction,
there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible
impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no
reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he is
of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of
which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress
or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his
free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers
from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
3. ID.; ID. ;ID.; SECTION 1039 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE AS A TEST OR CRITERION FOR INSANITY.
— So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person
has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; INSANITY AS A DEFENSE; MAY BE SHOWN BY SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
THROWING LIGHT THEREOF. — Insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on
the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST HAVE REFERENCE TO THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE PERSON WHOSE SANITY IS IN
ISSUE AT THE VERY TIME OF DOING THE ACT WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY. — Evidence of insanity must
have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act
which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a
reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor
the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only
be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through
which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64
Phil. 87)
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME;
NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence.
The statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew
the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act
charged. As stated by the trial court: "The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated
the act was sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an
envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a
pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore
murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times,
he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest.
This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts
in stabbing the victim." (Rollo, p. 63)
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — The quantum of evidence required to
overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession
and avoidance, and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully
discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely,
knowingly, and intelligently.
8. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF SANITY; BURDEN OF PROVING INSANITY RESTS ON THE DEFENSE. — Generally, in
criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as
to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of sanity. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of
insanity rests on the defense. Thus: "In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime,
the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code; U.S. v.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconciously. (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes
insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218)" (People v.
Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

This is an automatic review of the Decision * of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54,
Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of
treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the
chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
"All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation
and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was
committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength
and cruelty." (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of
2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs.
Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing
the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying
along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan, reveals that the victim
sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the
accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so
many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department
of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further
testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and
related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her
husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in
December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his
two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for
one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not
able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two
weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their
children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter
had paid; chasing any child when their children quarreled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day
of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did
not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to
the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in
his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had
arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as
"stabbing' and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around,
including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that
is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be
able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The
testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard
their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband
exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the
wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981) cdll
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August
25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long
before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-
27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to finish his
two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he
claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to
know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was his
patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending
physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in
their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence.
(TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988)
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime
of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
 "1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
"2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 30, Rollo).
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The act of
concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended
and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the
mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-appellant.
The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime
charged.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense
entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity,
namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by
a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given
circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person
believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an
irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between
right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and
wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral
faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2) LexLib
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person
has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent
with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the
very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The
vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and
emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime
charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual
disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and
disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was
organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did not
have a period for normal thinking. To quote.
"Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals
unfortunately are not present, sir."
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated with
medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the
manifestation of insanity is curable.

Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:
"Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has
been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan
my record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7)
months before his contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of
1987, the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be
in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of
sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir." (TSN, pp. 21-22,
August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3)
months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the
testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations
on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused
was really insane or not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has no
lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime
charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He
complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim.
We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
"Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused
Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the
accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he
wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was
requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the
DAR. Furthermore he wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the
Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late
Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father,
what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of
me?"
 Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to
make a request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father
in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the
accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer
of the landholding in the name of my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987).
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during this
confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We
infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was
not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have been
aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
"Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when
asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not
yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel
did not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset
the same to another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory
examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient,
like for example praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is
one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to
explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior,
then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have
encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this case
we have really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the
things we considered. Like for example he shouted out 'Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigual' at
that particular moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim
in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was
aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there." (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983;
emphasis supplied).
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert
witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done
makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial
court:
"The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane.
The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an
 envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused
consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the
killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of
the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in
Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of
the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in
stabbing the victim" (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the
witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
"In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code; U.S. v.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it
is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288) . . .
Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
(U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218)" (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance, and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the
crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently. Cdpr
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.
(People v. Bonoan, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. PARRICIDE; INVOLUNTARY ACTS OF ACCUSED; EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY. —By

virtue of the facts stated in the decision, Held: That the defendant acted while in a dream of his acts, with
which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
AVANCEÑA, C.J p:

Potenciano Taneo lived with his wife in his parent's house in the barrio of Dolores, municipality of
Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were
entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon,
Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and,
upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked
Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's
wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the
fætus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was
sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down
and fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of
the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when
he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab
him with a bolo, while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that he
his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door,
he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really
wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he
attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or had any motive for
assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged,
were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a
motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they
are not known to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one's conscience where they may be found,
hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral
perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it.
But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom
he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in
whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of
motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that,
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an
hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was a
direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that
the evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his
wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the
deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out.
The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but that he was defending himself from his
enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reversing the judgment appealed from, the court finds that
the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be
confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof
finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos and Butte, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 126283. May 28, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN ESTEPANO,

RODNEY ESTEPANO and RENE ESTEPANO, accused-appellants.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Ruben, Rodney and Rene, all surnamed Estepano, were convicted as charged for the
crime of murder. The conviction was mainly based on the testimony of Florencio Tayco that on 16 April 1991,
at around ten o'clock in the evening, he was on his way home in Barangay IV, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,
with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. Enroute, they met Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound.
At this juncture, Lopito started to talk to Dominador while he and Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo
appeared and without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a "guinunting." Ruben who was
armed with a cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit in hacking Enrique.
On the other hand, the appellants interposed the defense of alibi. They also questioned the credibility of
Florencio Tayco. cdasia
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, who of the witnesses to disbelieve or whose testimonies to accept. Verily, findings of the
trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, which is not true in the
present case.
With respect to the defense of alibi, the Court agreed with the trial court that it must fall. Well
entrenched is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by
the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all
and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness.
However, with respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen
(13) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. A scrutiny of the records shows that the
prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant Rene Estepano acted with discernment. The testimony of
prosecution witness Florencio Tayco only attempted to establish, as it did, Rene's presence at the crime scene
and his supposed participation in the killing of Enrique Balinas.
RUBEN ESTEPANO and RODNEY ESTEPANO were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder
while RENE ESTEPANO was ACQUITTED in the absence of proof that he acted with discernment. cdasia

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; BEST UNDERTAKEN BY TRIAL COURT. — The
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses
and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the
entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, who of the
witnesses to disbelieve or whose testimonies to accept. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, which is not true in the present case.
2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; INHERENTLY WEAK AND VIEWED WITH DISFAVOR. — Well entrenched is the rule that
alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility
with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness.
 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBLE AND TANGIBLE PROOF OF PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT LOCUS CRIMINIS IS
INDISPENSABLE. — For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for accused-appellants to prove that they were
somewhere else when the crime was committed. They must likewise demonstrate that they were so far away
that they could not have been present at the place of the commission of the offense or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission. They were not able to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at
the locus criminis considering the proximity of the places where they alleged to be and the place where the
victim was murdered. For alibi to be believed, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was committed, and the concerted acts of the accused to obtain a
common criminal objective signify conspiracy. In the case at bar, the overt acts of accused-appellants in taking
turns in hacking Enrique Balinas clearly and adequately established conspiracy. It can be inferred therefrom that
they acted in unison in the pursuit of their common criminal design which was to kill the victim Enrique Balinas.
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial court was
correct in finding accused-appellants Ruben Estepano and Rodney Estepano guilty of murder as the killing was
attended by treachery. The evidence shows that they suddenly and unexpectedly attacked the victim while the
latter was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was talking to Dominador Estepano.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — There was treachery because the following requisites concurred: (a) the
culprits employed means, methods or forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure their
safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which meant that no opportunity
was given the latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously chosen.
7. ID.; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; A PERSON OVER NINE YEARS OF AGE AND UNDER FIFTEEN IS
PRESUMED TO HAVE ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT. — With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano,
the records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under
Art. 12, par. (3), of The Revised Penal Code, a person over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) is exempt
from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with discernment. The minor referred to here is presumed
to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted
otherwise.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION FAILED TO REBUT PRESUMPTION; CASE AT BAR. — Clearly, the prosecution
did not endeavor to establish Rene's mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not in any way attempt to show his discernment. He was merely
asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein.
Accordingly, even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the
prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive
indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity
to incriminate him.
9. ID.; MURDER; CIVIL LIABILITY; HEIRS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. — Finally, the heirs are likewise
entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, and the absence of documentary evidence
to support a claim therefor does not prevent recovery of such damages. The testimony of Marietta Balinas, the
victim's wife, on the earning capacity of her husband is enough to establish the basis for the award. CTcSIA

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

ENRIQUE BALINAS was stabbed and hacked to death for which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben,
Rodney, Dante and Rene, all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Rodrigo died during the trial
and before judgment could be rendered. Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case
was archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only Ruben, Rodney and Rene
were found guilty. Accordingly, the three (3) were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas in the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and P9,500.00 for
actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 1
The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio Tayco. He narrated that
on 16 April 1991, at around ten o'clock in the evening, he was on his way home in Barangay IV,
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. Enroute, they met
Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound. At this juncture, according to Florencio, Lopito
started to talk to Dominador while he and Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and without
any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a "guinunting." 2 Ruben who was armed with a cane
cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit in hacking Enrique. While this
was happening, Dominador told his companions, "You better kill him!" 3

Lopito Gaudia confirmed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten o'clock in the evening, while he was
walking home with Enrique Balinas and Florencio Tayco, they saw Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking
compound near the house of Junior Vasquez. While he was talking to Dominador he saw two (2) persons,
both naked from the waist up, pass by. He recognized one of them to be Rodrigo Estepano. Soon after, he
heard a couple of "splashing sounds and a ring," which made him turn around. As he did, he saw Rodrigo
withdrawing his bolo from the neck of Enrique. He also saw another person, who was armed with a cane
cutter, standing near the fallen Enrique. He asked Dominador why Rodrigo hacked Enrique and Dominador
replied that that was "the result of intense hatred." He then hurriedly left for home. On the way he met
some military men and told them about the incident. The military men assured him that they would report
the matter to the police authorities. 4
Dominador Estepano gave his own version of the incident. According to him, on 16 April 1991, at
around ten o'clock in the evening, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They were about to eat
supper when he heard Enrique Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the
window and saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground Rodrigo hastily fled. There was
no other person in the vicinity. He then went down his house where the victim was and saw the latter's
firearm. He picked it up and when Chief of Police Balquin arrived, he turned over the firearm to him. 5
Robert Hautea 6 and Luz Cuepas, 7 both residents of Barangay IV, corroborated the testimony of
Dominador. aisadc
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around
ten o'clock in the evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City attending to his wife who
earlier underwent a caesarian operation. 8 Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they were at
home sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only thirteen (13) years of age then, testified that
he came to know about the incident that same night when his mother awakened him to inform him about
it. 9 Rodney, on the other hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed Enrique Balinas. 10
The crux of this appeal of Ruben, Rodney and Rene is that the trial court erred: (a) in giving
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco; (b) in finding the existence of
conspiracy in the commission of the crime charged; and, (c) in finding them guilty of murder. 11
On the first assigned error, accused-appellants argue that the trial court accorded too much
credence to the testimony of Florencio Tayco notwithstanding that some substantial points of his
testimony were not corroborated by Lopito Gaudia who was also present at the crime scene. Florencio
maintained that aside from Rodrigo, the other Estepanos, Dante, Rodney, Ruben and Rene, also attacked
Enrique. Lopito, on the other hand, asserted that he saw Rodrigo with only one companion at the time of
the incident. 12
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by
the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, who of the witnesses to disbelieve or whose testimonies to accept.
Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted, 13 which is not true in the present case.
The clear and convincing testimony of Florencio Tayco positively points to accused-appellants as
the killers of Enrique Balinas. Florencio testified that he was only two arms length away from the
victim 14 as well as from the assailants. 15 Thus, it was unlikely that he could not have recognized the
latter considering that he was a resident of the place and thus familiar more or less with the faces of its
townsfolk. He was positive in identifying Rodrigo as the person who first stabbed Enrique in the stomach
with a bolo, 16 followed by Ruben, Dante, Rodney and Rene, each hacking the victim one after the other
while the victim was already lying down. 17 He was also positive in identifying the respective weapons
used by the malefactors. 18 As there was no indication that Florencio was moved by any improper motive,
the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony must be given full faith and credence. 19
Florencio's account, in a way, was bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Quintin Napoles, the physician
who made a post mortem examination on the body of the victim. His findings revealed:
"Multiple hack wounds left face and neck with fracture of cervical vertebrae; stab
wound left anterior chest and right posterior lumbar region, non-penetrating. Dead on
arrival." 20
On the basis of his medical findings, Dr. Napoles opined that there could have been more than one
kind of weapon used in killing the victim — one sharp pointed and another sharp bladed. 21
It is undisputed that both Florencio Tayco and Lopito Gaudia were present at the crime scene when
the incident happened. However, as clearly shown by their testimonies, it was only Florencio who saw the
entire incident. What Lopito witnessed was only that which transpired when he turned around upon
hearing some noise. Naturally, their impressions on the incident would vary. In other words, the alleged
conflicting testimonies between the two eyewitnesses as claimed by accused-appellants are more
imagined than real. 22
With respect to the defense of alibi, we agree with the trial court that it must fall. Well entrenched
is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the
courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all
and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness. 23
Appellant Ruben Estepano would impress us that in the evening of 16 April 1991 he was at the
provincial hospital attending to his wife who had a caesarean operation, and never left the hospital until
the following day. However, he did not introduce evidence that his wife was actually admitted in the
hospital and that she was discharged therefrom only on 17 April 1991 to prove that he was not at the
scene of the crime when the incident happened. 24 The other appellants, Rodney and Rene, on their part,
testified that they were asleep when the incident happened. These testimonies are not sufficient to
outweigh their positive identification by one of the prosecution witnesses.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for accused-appellants to prove that they were somewhere
else when the crime was committed. They must likewise demonstrate that they were so far away that they
could not have been present at the place of the commission of the offense or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. 25 They were not able to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at
the locus criminis considering the proximity of the places where they alleged to be and the place where the
victim was murdered. For alibi to be believed, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable. 26
On the second issue, accused-appellants contend that there was no solid ground to establish
conspiracy among them because their identities as authors of the crime were not proved by clear and
convincing evidence, and that their participation in the crime was not sufficiently established in the light of
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 27
We do not agree. The factual findings of the trial court, through the credible testimony of
prosecution witness Florencio Tayco, clearly established their identities as the assailants as well as the
participation of each of them, not to mention the weapons used for the attack. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed, 28 and the concerted acts of
the accused to obtain a common criminal objective signify conspiracy. 29 In the case at bar, the overt acts
of accused-appellants in taking turns in hacking Enrique Balinas clearly and adequately established
conspiracy. It can be inferred therefrom that they acted in unison in the pursuit of their common criminal
design which was to kill the victim Enrique Balinas. 30
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants Ruben Estepano and
Rodney Estepano guilty of murder as the killing was attended by treachery. The evidence shows that they
suddenly and unexpectedly attacked the victim while the latter was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was
talking to Dominador Estepano. There was treachery because the following requisites concurred: (a) the
culprits employed means, methods or forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure
their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which meant that no
opportunity was given the latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously chosen. 31 The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed on them in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 32
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen (13)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under Art. 12, par. (3), of The Revised Penal
Code, a person over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) is exempt from criminal liability unless it is
shown that he acted with discernment. The minor referred to here is presumed to have acted without
discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted otherwise. 33
A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant
Rene Estepano acted with discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco only
attempted to establish, as it did, Rene's presence at the crime scene and his supposed participation in the
killing of Enrique Balinas. Thus —
Q: Aside from Ruben Estepano alias "Texas" and Dante Estepano who helped in attacking
Enrique Balinas, were there other persons involved or helped aside from these two?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many more (who) helped?
A: Rodney Estepano and Rene Estepano.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What is (sic) the weapon used by "Texas" (Ruben)?
A: Cane cutter (espading).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How about Rene?
A: Bolo. 34
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene's mental capacity to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not in any way attempt
to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16
April 1991 and whether he participated therein. 35 Accordingly, even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he
would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
discernment on his part by virtue of his age. 36 The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this
regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.
The damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim must be modified. The
P100,000.00 granted by the trial court for moral damages must be REDUCED to P50,000.00 considering
that the purpose for such award is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate them for the injuries to their
feelings. Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, an additional award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of Enrique Balinas must also be given. 37
Finally, the heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
and the absence of documentary evidence to support a claim therefor does not prevent recovery of such
damages. 38 The testimony of Marietta Balinas, the victim's wife, on the earning capacity of her husband is
enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life expectancy of Enrique
Balinas applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality is as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the
age of the deceased). 39 Since Enrique was 34 years of age at the time of his death, 40 then his life
expectancy was 30.66 years.
At the time of his death, Enrique was earning P2,000.00 a month as househelper of a certain Dr.
Sancho 41 so that his annual income was P24,000.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as
reasonable and necessary living expenses to arrive at his net earnings. Prescinding from the foregoing, we
deduce that his net earning capacity was P367,920.00 computed as follows:
net earning life gross reasonable
capacity (x) = expectancy x annual less & necessary
income living
expenses
x = 2 (80-34) x [24,000.00 - 12,000.00]
 –––––––
3
= 30.66 x 12,000.00
= P367,920.00
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO and
RODNEY ESTEPANO are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are accordingly sentenced
each to reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of their victim
Enrique Balinas y Gran the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P9,500.00 as actual damages and P367,920.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused-appellant RENE ESTEPANO is ACQUITTED in the absence of proof that he acted with
discernment; consequently, his immediate RELEASE from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained
for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report
to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Estepano, G.R. No. 126283, [May 28, 1999], 367 PHIL 209-222)
 NIEL F. LLAVE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

CALLEJO, SR., J p:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape was filed
with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen
(15) but acting with discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS
y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law. 3
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City. 4 One of their children,
Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994. 5 In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base
Elementary School in Pasay City 6 and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m. 7
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby
church. 8 Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually start selling
at 6:30 p.m. 9 Next to Teofisto's residence was a vacant house. 10
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her
clothes and proceeded to her mother's store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container with the
unsold quail eggs. 11 Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw
petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There
was a little light from the lamp post. 12 She resisted to no avail. 13 Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the
cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top
of her. 14 She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her. 15 She felt pain and cried. 16 She was
sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time. ESCacI
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl's cries. He rushed to the place and
saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter
fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened. 17 She told her father
about the incident. 18 Her parents later reported what happened to the police authorities. 19 Debbielyn told
the police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist. 20
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their house to get his
barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house. 21 He rushed to the place
and saw petitioner, naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her anus. 22 The
girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, "Hoy, bakit ginawa mo 'yan?" 23 Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on
and fled. 24 Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting arrived. 25 Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to
the police investigator regarding the incident. 26
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house. His daughter,
Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house by petitioner. 27 He
rushed to the place and found her daughter crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that she
had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then left. 28 He then looked for petitioner and found
him at his grandmother's house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall. 29 On September
25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue,
Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she interviewed the victim who told her "Masakit ang pepe
ko," "Ni-rape ako." 30 Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the child, and found no injury on the
hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora. 31 There was also a fresh
abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 o'clock position near the anal opening. 32 She declared that the findings
support the theory that blunt force or penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign
body 33 ) was applied to the perineal area 34 not more than six or seven days before. 35 The abrasion could
have been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the external
genitalia; 36 neither did she find any other injury or abrasion on the other parts of the victim's body. 37 She
concluded that her findings were consistent with the victim's claim that she was sexually abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002, Marilou Santos
arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been raped by petitioner who was then in his
aunt's house at Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him and Barangay
Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into custody, and they did as they
were told. 38
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that the abrasions in the
perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of the victim. 39 She explained that the
distance between the anus and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters. 40 The abrasion was located
at 1/4 of an inch from the anal orifice. DICSaH
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High School. 41 He had
been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and received awards such as Best in
Mathematics. 42 He also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of Completion from the
Philippine Air Force Management Information Center. 43 He denied having raped the private complainant. He
declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice in
the carinderia 44 and he saw her on his way back. 45 He also met his father, who asked him what he had done
to their neighbor. He was also told that the victim's father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him. 46 He
did not ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in
going to his aunt's house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunt's
house. 47 Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunt's house and brought him to
the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with
rape. 48
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn. 49 While confined at the Pasay City Youth
Home during trial, he had a crush on "Issa," a young female inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about
half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left arm. 50
Nida Llave testified and identified her son's Certificate of Live Birth, in which it appears that he was born
on March 6, 1990. 51 She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn
Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had raped the private
complainant. She went to their house to look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who threatened to
kill her son. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where
petitioner had hidden for a while. 52
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt
of the . . . Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant
towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant]
against her will and consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor,
he cannot be meted with the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of
minority, this Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1)
day to Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00). 53
The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner pushed the victim
towards the vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered
petitioner's declaration that he had been a consistent honor student. 54
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in his Brief as appellant
therein:
 I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE MEDICAL REPORT ON THE
FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTER'S
FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY
HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. 55
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the complaining witness the amount of P50,000 by way of moral damages and P20,000 by
way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 56
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration, 57 contending that the prosecution failed to adduce
proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion in
a Resolution 58 dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment, his
conduct during and after the "crime" betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant
does not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made.
As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the
accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his grandmother's house intimates that he knew
that he did something that merits punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient
of several academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is]
possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to distinguish, better at
least than other minors his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally
reprehensible. 59
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before this Court:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF
AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
ARGUMENTS
I
 THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH
THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
II
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
III
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
IV
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.
V
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
VI
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 60
The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1) whether he was
deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the private
complainant, and if in the affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the crime; (3) whether
the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to the
private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation before
the Information against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material points. He
points out that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his penis to the point that
she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillo's report stating that there was no evidence of injury on the
victim's external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the victim's testimony and that of Dr. Castillo's
report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual basis of conviction
for consummated rape. Moreover, the victim's testimony lacks credibility in view of her admission that, while
she was being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the street. Besides, petitioner avers, an
abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the body through the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists
that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her testimony before the
trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not
understand the meaning of the word "rape" and its Filipino translation, "hinalay," and that the genital
examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latter's parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud's testimony has no probative weight because and had an ill-motive
to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house rented by
Teofisto demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victim's parents to complain against him,
as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected to an inquest
investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the
Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the absence of external injuries
does not negate rape; neither is it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is
consummated if there is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence is not
necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice for
conviction of consummated rape. When the victim testified that she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all
that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated. Petitioner's evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of
Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her parents
would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofisto's proddings.
 The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and after the rape based on
the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape
incident, he is presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of proving that
he acted with discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence
presented by the prosecution to show that he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be
exempt from criminal liability.
Petitioner's arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows:
"the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited by law,
is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong" (People v.
Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age, he must
discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No.
75256, January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes
that "discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it
means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging
whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, which may be known and should be determined by
considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his
attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act,
but also after and even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v. Doquena,
supra).
In the instant case, petitioner's actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as
his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the
prosecution's witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly
thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against him and that private
complainant's father was looking for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the
Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmother's house that petitioner came out in the
open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly
conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he
committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if he was not least aware
of the moral consequences of his acts, he would have immediately confronted private
complainant and her parents and denied having sexually abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a
consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This allegation
further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The
fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor student
further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and
thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age could, which conduct is right
and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although appellant was still a minor of twelve years
of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be denied that he had the
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. This is important in
cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused. In
expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: "The
second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because .
. . the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability" (Guevarra v.
Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page 482).
 The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner
was being held for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with
discernment before, during and after the rape incident. For a boy wanting in discernment
would simply be gripped with fear or keep mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the
nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be exempted from criminal
liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment. 61
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on the peri-anal skin and not
in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration
on the female organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with discernment
but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not enough evidence to prove that he acted with
discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner's contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular preliminary
investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested without
a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for
a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided
for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification 62 of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the Information,
petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Information was filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed
a petition for bail. 63 Petitioner's failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within five days from
finding out that an Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such
preliminary investigation. 64
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private complainant as charged in
the Information. In People v. Morata 65 the Court ruled that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if
the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that the
rape was consummated. 66
From the victim's testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioner's penis touched the middle part
of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of the extent of the
penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the stage of
consummation. 67 She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house
and ordered her to lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then mounted her
and inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 o'clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go to school from
12:00 o'clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R. Higgins, Maricaban,
Pasay City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was selling
quail eggs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail eggs
past 6:00 p.m.?
A: My mother asked me to bring home something.
Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home?
A: The things she used in selling.
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
A: Totoy pulled me.
Q: Pulled you where?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.
Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house?
A: He told me to lie down on the cement.
Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, what happened
next?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did he do to you?
A: He kissed me on my lips.
 Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips, what did you
do?
A: I cried.
Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your vagina and
kissed you on your lips. What happened next?
A: Somebody heard me crying.
Q: Who heard you crying?
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?
A: Totoy ran away.
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my parents.
Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Yes, Sir. 68
On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
ATTY. BALIAD:
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his penis inside
your vagina? cHITCS
A: I was lying down.
Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time?
A: He placed on top of me.
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?
A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir. 69
When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an anus, the victim
declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated that the penis of petitioner penetrated
her vagina, thus, consummating the crime charged:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or "Totoy"
inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your "pepe"?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
 A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in
your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any
part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir. 70
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainant's
genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter's testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The
absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl
as in this case. 71 According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of stretching and reverting to its
original form. 72 The doctor testified that her report is compatible with the victim's testimony that she was
sexually assaulted by petitioner:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or "Totoy"
inserted his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your "pepe"?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in
your vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any
part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination propounded on the
report that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the
evening of September 24, 2002, she was sexually abused and that on the following day,
September 25, you interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and
in binocular (sic) "masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako," would your findings as contained
in this Exh. B and C be compatible with the allegation if the minor victim that she was
sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.
Court:
What is your objection?
 Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor who made the
complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:
The answer were provided. . . .
Court:
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint of the
minor. Overruled. Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the Provincial and Final
Report mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of these two exhibits
there appears to be a signature above the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D.,
whose signature is that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir. 73
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainant's anal orifice could have been
caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person
inserting his erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this
abrasion could have been caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the
vagina touch the portion of the anus where you find the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged perpetrator is a 12-
year-old minor?
A: I only found it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male person can
have erection?
A: Even infants have an erection. 74
Petitioner's contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into testifying is barren
of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner
and remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by the indefatigable counsel of the
petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven-year old Grade II pupil, could have
woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true. 75 The Presiding Judge of the trial court
observed and monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and found her testimony
credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record and its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances of substance were overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We
have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are
inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability
but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is
not true. 76
 Neither do we lend credence to petitioner's claim that the charge against him is but a fabrication and
concoction of the private complainant's parents. Indeed, petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that the
spouses had no ill-motive against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn
and you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any reason
why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse?
A: I don't know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn's
parents, spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any reason as
to why they would file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor. 77
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter before she testified.
No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment
of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her
life if the charge is not true. 78
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had been assaulted by petitioner,
Domingo tried to locate the offender and when he failed, he and his wife reported the matter to
the barangay authorities. This manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for his
delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by does not negate
the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be committed
by the roadside and even in occupied premises. 79 The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from
committing the odious act. 80 In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private complainant
near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime was being
committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to prove
the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony,
standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible. Corroborative testimony is not
essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator. 81 Thus, even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the
testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting the
conviction of petitioner.
Teofisto's testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused the demolition
of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement
to the police investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed
the crime being committed by the petitioner. 82 In the absence of proof of improper motive, the presumption
is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 83
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had carnal knowledge
of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial court's ruling.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and
under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the
exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. 84 On the other hand, discernment is the mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the
accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. 85 The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness.
 In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile
of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts.
When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to
escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother's house to avoid being
arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even received
awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz
bee contest. 86 At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doqueña, 87 the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with discernment in
raping the victim under the following facts:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the
crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of
Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain
of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has
this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this
case. 88
The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and proved by the People; hence, the
award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is
DELETED. aADSIc
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
||| (Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, [April 26, 2006], 522 PHIL 340-368)
 [G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999.]

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA

PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City (Syvel's),
while the private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. While Criselda and her child
Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's, a terrible accident happened, which caused the life of the six-year old
Zhieneth. She was pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter structure which collapsed. Fourteen
days later, Zhieneth died at the hospital, which was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Private respondents
filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages,
P300,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss income and
exemplary damages. Petitioners, however, denied any liability for the injuries and consequent
death of Zhieneth. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees in their favor. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the preponderance of the
evidence favored petitioners. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the
appealed judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. It
also declared Zhieneth, who was below seven at the time, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort.
The appellate court then awarded private respondents P99,420.86 as actual damages, representing
hospitalization expenses. It denied the award for funeral expenses for lack of proof. Instead, compensatory
damages were awarded for the death of Zhieneth. Petitioners sought the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
decision and the reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court. EHTSCD
The Supreme Court ruled that the tragedy which befell Zhieneth was no accident and her death could
only be attributed to negligence. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record revealed that it was not durable. Criselda should
be absolved from any contributory negligence. The petition was denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES. ACCIDENT AND NEGLIGENCE; DISTINGUISHED. — An accident pertains to an

unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance,
event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE. — The test in determining the existence of negligence
is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, (37 Phil. 809 [1918]) thus: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY; EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE; PART OF RES GESTAE,
DEFINED. — The testimony of witness Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed (and should be
admitted as) part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus: Part of res gestae.
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.
 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — All that is required
for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling
event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who
testified in court. Under the circumstances, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in
extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED
ON APPEAL; EXCEPTIONS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — It is settled that when the issue concerns the
credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court,
which is in a better position to determine the same. The trial court has the distinct advantage of actually hearing
the testimony of and observing the deportment of the witnesses. However, the rule admits of exceptions such
as when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. In the instant case, petitioners
failed to bring their claim within the exception.
6. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION; CHILDREN BELOW NINE YEARS OLD, CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED TO BE
INCAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; CASE AT BAR. — Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we
apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old incapable of contributory
negligence. In his book, (I Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 70-71 [1993]), former Judge Cezar S. Sangco
stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption
from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown
that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or
incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under
our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. SDIACc

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the
reversal of the 17 June 1996 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the
resolution 2 denying their motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15 January 1992
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners
to pay damages and attorney's fees to private respondents Conrado and Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar. cdasia
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager,
and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she
felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter
ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.
ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. 3
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day
ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries
she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May
1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old. 4
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The provisional medical
certificate 5 issued by ZHIENETH's attending doctor described the extent of her injuries:
Diagnoses:
 1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due to blunt injury
2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to laceration, (L) lobe liver
3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls
4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum
5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal
6. Contusion, lungs, severe
CRITICAL
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses 6 which they had incurred.
Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral
damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent
death of ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too,
was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her.
Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor
collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees. The other petitioners likewise raised
due care and diligence in the performance of their duties and countered that the complaint was malicious for
which they suffered besmirched reputation and mental anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and
an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in their favor. Cdpr
In its decision 7 the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the
preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter
on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. It believed petitioners' witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH clung
to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her
stomach. In contrast, none of private respondents' witnesses testified on how the counter fell. The
trial court also held that CRISELDA's negligence contributed to ZHIENETH's accident.
In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the counter was situated at the
end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered as an attractive
nuisance. 8 The counter was higher than ZHIENETH. It has been in existence for fifteen years. Its structure was
safe and well-balanced. ZHIENETH, therefore, had no business climbing on and clinging to it.
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as errors of the trial court its findings that: (1) the
proximate cause of the fall of the counter was ZHIENETH's misbehavior; (2) CRISELDA was negligent in her
care of ZHIENETH; (3) petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of the counter; and (4) petitioners
were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH.
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive presumption
that a child below nine (9) years is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at six (6) years
old, was already capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically impossible for her to have propped
herself on the counter. She had a small frame (four feet high and seventy pounds) and the counter was much
higher and heavier than she was. Also, the testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo Gonzales,
who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center
belied petitioners' theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked
by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "[N]othing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just
fell on me." 9 Accordingly, Gonzales' testimony on ZHIENETH's spontaneous declaration should not only be
considered as part of res gestae but also accorded credit.
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have let
go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH's death, was
petitioners' negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
 On the other hand, petitioners argued that private respondents raised purely factual issues which could
no longer be disturbed. They explained that ZHIENETH's death while unfortunate and tragic, was an accident for
which neither CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could entirely be held faultless and blameless. Further, petitioners
adverted to the trial court's rejection of Gonzales' testimony as unworthy of credence.
As to private respondent's claim that the counter should have been nailed to the ground, petitioners
justified that it was not necessary. The counter had been in existence for several years without any prior accident
and was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they acted without fault or
negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the matter. In fact, the criminal case 10 for homicide through
simple negligence filed by private respondents against the individual petitioners was dismissed; a
verdict of acquittal was rendered in their favor.
The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed
judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter
was shaped like an inverted "L" 11 with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper
portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective,
unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause
the counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the
management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern.
The Court of Appeals faulted the petitioners for this omission, and concluded that the incident that befell
ZHIENETH could have been avoided had petitioners repaired the defective counter. It was inconsequential that
the counter had been in use for some time without a prior incident.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of the
incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years
could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not be made to
account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong
or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the nearby
counter. LLjur
The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioners. It found them biased
and prejudiced. It instead gave credit to the testimony of disinterested witness Gonzales.
The Court of Appeals then awarded P99,420.86 as actual damages, the amount representing the hospitalization
expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the hospital's statement of account. 12 It denied an
award for funeral expenses for lack of proof to substantiate the same. Instead, a compensatory
damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of ZHIENETH.
We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, 13 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the lower court is SET ASIDE and
another one is entered against [petitioners], ordering them to pay jointly and severally unto
[private respondents] the following:
1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages for the death of Zhieneth Aguilar, with legal
interest (6% p.a.) from 27 April 1984;
2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for hospitalization expenses incurred; with legal interest (6%
p.a.) from 27 April 1984;
3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees; and
5. Costs.
Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in
the Court of Appeals' resolution 14 of 16 July 1997.
Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision and the reinstatement of the
judgment of the trial court. Petitioners primarily argue that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the
factual findings and conclusions of the trial court. They stress that since the action was based on tort, any
finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents would necessarily negate their claim for damages,
where said negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. The injury in the instant case was the
death of ZHIENETH. The proximate cause was ZHIENETH's act of clinging to the counter. This act in turn caused
the counter to fall on her. This and CRISELDA's contributory negligence, through her failure to provide the proper
care and attention to her child while inside the store, nullified private respondents' claim for damages. It is also
for these reasons that parents are made accountable for the damage or injury inflicted on others by their minor
children. Under these circumstances, petitioners could not be held responsible for the accident that befell
ZHIENETH.
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was already separated from Syvel's at the time he
testified; hence, his testimony might have been tarnished by ill-feelings against them.
For their part, private respondents principally reiterated their arguments that neither ZHIENETH nor
CRISELDA was negligent at any time while inside the store; the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals are substantiated by the evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales,
who heard ZHIENETH comment on the incident while she was in the hospital's emergency room should receive
credence; and finally, ZHIENETH's part of the res gestae declaration "that she did nothing to cause the heavy
structure to fall on her" should be considered as the correct version of the gruesome events.
We deny the petition.
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to
negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents
for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care
while inside the store premises.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. 15 It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." 16
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 17 Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." 18
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs
when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which
could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. 19
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark
case of Picart v. Smith, 20 thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. 21
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only
be attributable to negligence. LLjur
We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the incident and accompanied
CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital:
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the child was being
treated?
A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the doctor asked the
child "what did you do," the child said "nothing, I did not come near the counter and
the counter just fell on me."
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN)
You want the words in Tagalog to be translated?
ATTY. BELTRAN
Yes, your Honor.
COURT
Granted. Intercalate "wala po, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta bumagsak." 22
 This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed (and should be admitted as)
part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a
physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. 23 All that is required for their admissibility as
part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the
declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court.
Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in
extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly,
petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-
wrapping counter proved their negligence, thus:
Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at the second floor, will you please describe
the gift wrapping counter, were you able to examine?
A Because every morning before I start working I used to clean that counter and since it is not
nailed and it was only standing on the floor, it was shaky.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon on [sic] May 9,
1983?
A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was standing beside the verification counter. And
since the top of it was heavy and considering that it was not nailed, it can collapsed at
anytime, since the top is heavy.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what did you do?
A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic] shaky and since Mr. Maat is
fond of putting display decorations on tables, he even told me that I would put some
decorations. But since I told him that it not [sic] nailed and it is shaky he told me "better
inform also the company about it." And since the company did not do anything about
the counter, so I also did not do anything about the counter. 24 [Emphasis supplied]
Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated the testimony of Gonzales, thus:
Q Will you please described [sic] to the Honorable Court the counter where you were assigned
in January 1983?
xxx xxx xxx
A That counter assigned to me was when my supervisor ordered me to carry that counter to
another place. I told him that the counter needs nailing and it has to be nailed because
it might cause injury or accident to another since it was shaky. LibLex
Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at the second floor on February 12, 1983,
will you please describe that to the honorable Court?
A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really in good [sic] condition; it was shaky. I told her
that we had to nail it.
Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir.
Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you told her that the counter was shaky?
 A She told me "Why do you have to teach me. You are only my subordinate and you are to
teach me? And she even got angry at me when I told her that.
xxx xxx xxx
Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if any, did Ms. Panelo or any
employee of the management do to that [sic]
xxx xxx xxx
Witness:
None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only nailed the counter after the accident
happened. 25 [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger
posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the
safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus,
as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
father of a family.
On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra, petitioners failed to establish that the former's
testimonies were biased and tainted with partiality. Therefore, the allegation that Gonzales and Guevarra's
testimonies were blemished by "ill feelings" against petitioners — since they (Gonzales and Guevarra) were
already separated from the Company at the time their testimonies were offered in court — was but mere
speculation and deserved scant consideration.
It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will not as a
general rule disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to determine the same. The
trial court has the distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and observing the deportment of the
witnesses. 26 However, the rule admits of exceptions such as when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it
overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the
result of the case. 27 In the instant case, petitioners failed to bring their claim within the exception.
Anent the negligence ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine
(9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, 28 former Judge Cezar S. Sangco
stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine
and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine
but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. [Emphasis supplied]
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter,
no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if
that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the
counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence 29 on record reveal
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top
laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. 30
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. 31 CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let
go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from
her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. 32 The time and distance
were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress
upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the
counter just fell on her.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. LibLex
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
|||
 [G.R. No. 75256. January 26, 1989.]

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; INTENT DEFINED. — The word "intent" has been defined as:
"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge
as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS
Intent p. 1103.) It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two.
2. ID.; ID.; DISCERNMENT, CONCEPT. — We have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of
the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise: "The discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over
nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right
and wrong . . ." (Emphasis Ours) p. 583
3. ID.; ID.; DISCERNMENT AND INTENT, DISTINGUISHED. — It is clear that the terms "intent" and
"discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person,
the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person
ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air
rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but
below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
4. ID.; ID.; BASIC REASON BEHIND ITS EXACTMENT. — In further outlining the distinction between the words
"intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
5. ID.; ID.; INTELLIGENCE, PRESENCE OR ABSENCE, VITAL TO APPRECIATION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY. — "The
second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts
to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the
law exempts (him) from criminal liability." (Emphasis Ours) "Intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the case of People vs.
Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 (1939). It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes
"intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct
element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETAINED AS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN CULPA. — In evaluating felonies committed
by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and
negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential
element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with
intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he
must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of
age but below fifteen may be held liable for a said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase
"Any person . . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
7. ID.; SECTION 2(3) OF P.D. 1508, CONSTRUED. — The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed
(People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano,
116 SCRA 415). The same principle applies in constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which the law defining the
offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal
liability must now considered.
8. ID.; P.D. 1508, NOT JURISDICTIONAL. — The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has
not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been
corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in
Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of
the City Court of Legaspi, Branch I, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to
resolve, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein a resolution dated 17
September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his bestfriend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and
three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle
cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor.
In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate
death.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and
because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless
Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:
". . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with
discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or
avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause
to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling,
oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one
TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pallet, causing injuries which
directly caused his untimely death; . . ." (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds: cdphil
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A
LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGES AND THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied
upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been represented
during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petitioner, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to
the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes
"intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that
case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment
should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism
in saying that:
"If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that
the accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or
cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent
contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or
constitute a legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a
quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We
agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused. LibLex
The word "intent" has been defined as:
"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including
such knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with
which a person acts." (46 CJS Intentp. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in
Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is
his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . ." (italics Ours) p.
583

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's
act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person
may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may
cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as
petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then
he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him,
and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the
basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of
the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because
. . . the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability." (Emphasis
Ours)
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a
criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt.
However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it
could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that
(they) acted with discernment." 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo
actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited
case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or
connotes "intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a
distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For
him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act.
Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a said Article would reveal such
fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person . . ." without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non
distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos. LLjur
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law,
he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence
preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:
"That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the formation that she
. . . 'with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one
Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the Penaranda River and as a consequence thereof
Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the
idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of publishing her
victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis Ours)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and discernment." What We
meant was that the combines effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the
part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend
that since the information now in question alleged "discernment," it in effect alleged "intent." The former may
never embrace the idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies
activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him
should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2 (3). He submits that considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance
due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher
than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional medium as prescribed in
Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito,
72 Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 415). The
same principle applies in constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
"xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; . .
."(emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
"The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty
provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in
particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability." 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing
Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the later should be
considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must now considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the
case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol Vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is
not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary
Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for
trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RICHARD O. SARCIA, respondent.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

On automatic review is the decision 1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias
"Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape 3 committed against AAA, 4 and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by
the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl.
After almost four (4) years, AAA's father filed a complaint 5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-
appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao,
Albay upgraded the charge to rape. 6 The Information 7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. 8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and
Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-
appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro,
Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay. ASCTac
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9 finding the accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the
accused-appellant. 10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's Brief 11 on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief 12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 13 modifying the pertinent provisions of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court
in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court", the case was
transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote
the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y
Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount
of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review,
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
 On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review. 14
In our Resolution 15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief 16 on April 7, 2006. Having
failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its
supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her
cousin] and [her father]. EAHcCT
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY
THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of
Saling Crisologo's house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and underwear. He also
removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then,
he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant made an up-
and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part
and said "aray". She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA's cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them,
witnessed appellant's dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house
of [AAA's] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA's] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking
about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on
her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo
where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA's cousin] approached
[AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her
cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she
feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a
grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA's cousin]
came to their house and told [AAA's] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-
and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA's mother], however did not say anything. At that
time, [AAA's] father was working in Manila. ICESTA
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified
that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination
on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the
result of [AAA]'s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health
officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said
medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]'s medical findings are as follows: "negative
for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa,
vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scars" means, in layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or
wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have
 been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an
object like a medical instrument or penis". 17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doña Tomasa,
Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAA's] parents, because
sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know
[AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as
an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the
Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas
and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred
residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is
from barangay Doña Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan,
his mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut
land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when
they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994
to 1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play
basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa about 1 kilometer away
from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns
taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls . . . and was most surprised
when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latter's place which
is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of
Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case
for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation
of [AAA's] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA's] rape charge
against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He
was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he
already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister,
Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail.
He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing
and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove he
did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was
ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA's] mother, is also related to his father,
[AAA mother's] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the
lending of money by his father to the AAA's family as the motive for the latter to file the rape
case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan,
Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay
against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of
said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits
relative to said case. 18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were
inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and time of the commission of the
offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they filed the
said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by said
Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000". Accused-
appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAA's father in filing the said case for rape.
Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or
intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound". TAIDHa
 In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA's and her
cousin's testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time of the incident,
while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house
of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull
motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAA's testimony that when
accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin
returned to AAA after telling the latter's mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA
crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and
(4) the cousin testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that
there were only four of them who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details
and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency
in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in
fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with
perfect faculties or senses. 19 The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn
the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it
was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of
how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the
rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were
barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court
proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and
inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the
atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy. 20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA's inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996
was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false testimony,
for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot
discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. 21 In People v. Purazo, 22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime
of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time
or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we
already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element
of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even
if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the
proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided
it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing
of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima, 23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or
time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime
is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time
as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In
previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until
October 15, 1994", "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter", "sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. TcSaHC
In this case, AAA's declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was explained
by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15,
1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense
cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month
 and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA's] sworn statement
mention the month and date but only the year. 24
Likewise, witnesses' credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against accused-
appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant's claim that the only reason why this case was
filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case
of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000".
The rape victim's delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge
nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and
the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma 25 we even
considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victim's father as understandable and
not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other
circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in
the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA's parents to
immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainant's father in the latter's testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife told you
that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during that
time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were able
to save enough amounts, we filed the case. 26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that
he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12
years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a
conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve. 27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows:
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no
showing of any scar or wound". The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the
victim's sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of
rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. 28 What is important is that AAA's
testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused. CAaSHI
Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled
that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.
Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended
party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants' defense of denial
and alibi. 29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA
due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly
reached the following conclusion:
. . . True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the instant case against
the accused, but the Court believes [AAA's] parents finally decided to file the rape case
because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that
what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually
ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the
testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a girl of
complainant's age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had she not been truly
subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless,
cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true. 30 Parents
would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and
humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter's
transgressor punished accordingly. 31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
 The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now
the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 32 was the governing
law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of
death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age
of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and
proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January
16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree
with the CA's conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68 (2) 33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he
admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial
court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996". Since the
prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain
that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the
attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused,
it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance
on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age. 34 CAcEaS
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. 35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in
case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances". The issue now is whether the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence
here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of
the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in order.
Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification", which is included in the civil
liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. — Indemnification for consequential
damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor 36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained
in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and
aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory
damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being
based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue
unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court
believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow
the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized
by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount
of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis
Supplied) ASTDCH
 The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature.
In San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 37 we held:
. . . Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
(25 C.J.S. 815). 38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages
are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of
the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly
considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appellant could have been eighteen at
the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather
than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart
from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the
compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this
Court took in People v. Candelario, 39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of
damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral
damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the
presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome 40 and People v. Quiachon 41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because
of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing
the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to
Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states: SHTaID
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the
attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 . . . Also, in rape cases, moral damages are
awarded without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the
victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court's
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to
current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense
is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which
is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered
moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof,
...
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because,
following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
 the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court
declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression
of the displeasure or the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity".
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether
the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary
damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant's right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to
the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner. 42 Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages,
are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 43 aCcSDT
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be
maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to
the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape.
Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is increased to P75,000.00 44 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased
to P30,000.00. 45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of
his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July
14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down
by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-
1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. 47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years
of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. — Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and
who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense
for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. . . .
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this
case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt. ETDHaC
 Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes to distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the
child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. 48 The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with
the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic
principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. 49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish
and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of
a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations 50 on Senate Bill No. 1402
(Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with,
or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the
child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration.
Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. . . . (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied
even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said
child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. SHaIDE
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the
suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. 51 However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to
appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate
disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law. 52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; 53 and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the
amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award
of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the
court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, accused-
appellant.

PERALTA, J p:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision 1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment 2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant
Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act (RA) 9165. CEDScA
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report
from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2)
pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-
buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw
the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet
of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-
buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police
officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S.
Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also
pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the
ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3)
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request
was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets
containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the two
(2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally
received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination
revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder;
and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-
10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell
zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). 3
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
 possess zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). 4
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment 6 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in
Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y
Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). ScCDET
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y
Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug,
weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated
September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen
Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5
and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He
also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an
accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place.
However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was
successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your
buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that
Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated
this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for
possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request
for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
 Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there
should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer. TSIEAD
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys,
approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the
suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the pre-
arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was
no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to
the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The
poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was
already given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone
or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights
and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to
witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust
operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso
bills as marked moneys. 8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of
the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 9 From the
above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as
well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the
manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted. AHECcT
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white
crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in
possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of
suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the
result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the
marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is
positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder. .
. . 10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending
drug peddlers and distributors. 11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. 12 In People v. Roa, 13 this Court had
the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement
before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section
86 14 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related
matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua
non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 15 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may
rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA. 16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes 17 is quite
instructive:
In People v. Ganguso, 18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a
prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust
team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case,
the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there
was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held
in People v. Tranca, 19 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that
time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. 20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.
This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. 21 cHSIAC
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant
is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an
incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the
arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant
was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements
are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22
 As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him.
However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable
doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your
possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found
another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that
no money was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested
by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for
ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the
said powder?
A: Yes, sir. 23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence. 24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of
custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who
signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-
bust operation. SECATH
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1)The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. 25 Its non-compliance will not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 26 What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 27 In this particular case, it
is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact
that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not
in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody
had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation
of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights
and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to
witness the search of the suspect. CAIaDT
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials.
Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of P100.00
peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the
marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets
of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did you
do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory. 28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item
which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking 29 of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as
reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting,"
or contamination of evidence. 30
 Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the
effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the
buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision
on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend
the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 31 and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 32 the laws that were applicable
at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus: AaEDcS
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. — Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and
who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense
for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. . . .
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia 33 that while Section 38 of RA
9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of
the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The
provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot
and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its
jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice
of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years
old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the
appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows
the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of
Article 192 of P.D. 603. 34
 Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: 35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training
Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165,
the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 36 of the same law. A violation
of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is
provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can
now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon, 37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the
penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines
as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special
laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder,
and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the
minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider
the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of
the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the
Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application
to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in
the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of
the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be
invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from
the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in
this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the
Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
xxx xxx xxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code
as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and
the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one
or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not
have been contemplated by the legislature. SDECAI
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in
some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts
shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime
consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in
degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in
Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists
 of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor,
destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or
two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of
fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees,
in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower
than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the
second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty,
and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy
rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. 38
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority 39 can now be appreciated in fixing
the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. 40 The
ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty
(reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance off minority. Therefore, a
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen
Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's
conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Velasco, Jr., Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
US vs. Caballeros

MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years
of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger,
because, without having taken part in the said crime as principal or as accomplices, they took part in the burial
of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed
to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by
the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the
only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness
says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who
killed the Americans, but that he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that
when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of
the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the
corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9,
art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged
against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the
execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi,
as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did
not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when
the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division
of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not
be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the
defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another
witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made
through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission.)
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be
one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is
not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according
to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the
defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered,
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
US vs. Exaltacion

TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an information
charging Liberate Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they,
subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a
rebellion against the Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan
Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the statute
in the case made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath that the
two defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a
number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, a so-called general of bandits, situated at a place
called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and
3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they
were exhibited to them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said
documents under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of
the Philippines; that this statement was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence
of Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same
facts, stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson that they had sighed the said documents under fear of
death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been captured. The witness Casas, the municipal
president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in place of the former president, Don Tomas
Testa, who was kidnaped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog,
and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry-out the
superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother
country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed the said documents and alleged that they did
so under compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco
was captured in the fields one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to
him, who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they
compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place called
Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been unable to pay the
$300 which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato
Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as
policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and
there compelled him by threats of death to sign the document now on page 2 of the record; that, thereupon
they allowed him to go upon promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Eivera
saw him while on the road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were
released they presented themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and
subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they
had been captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon of whom the last
two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported
to him what had happened to him all testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of the
accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness
Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by the accused,
is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by
the judgment of the court below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnaped by brigands who belonged to the
Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve
them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the
defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut.
Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the bandits is
corroborative of their testimony, and is the best demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not
overcome by the trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant
Tanchinco nor the fact that Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on
which he appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been established at
the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the
defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of
the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his information and guidance. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
 ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and the
innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme Court may
conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful reexamination convinces this Court that an "accident"
caused the victim's death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses create a reasonable doubt
on appellant's guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February
28, 2001 Decision 2 and the October 30, 2001 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 18759.
The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 5 of Iloilo
City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed
CA Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the
[Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects." 6
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill,
and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then
provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which directly
caused the death of said victim thereafter." 7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent's version of the facts as follows:
"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Concepcion, Iloilo. aSDHCT
"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the
Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place
in the municipality in December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen
passed by the Concepcion Elementary School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together
party with other School Administrators. When his wife asked him, 'Why will you be arrested?'
[H]e answered '[Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even going there in
order to find out the reason for my arrest.'
"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine
Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along
with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.
"Later that day, about a little past 2 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police
sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to
come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa:
'Let's go to the investigation room.' The investigation room is at the main building of the
compound where the jail is located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail
door and walked towards the investigation room.
 "At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was
hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle
of the gun protruding from the holster.
"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation
room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was
seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two
(2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed
petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not
provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine
Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary
to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo
Jabonete, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City,
conducted an autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
'Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
'Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by
sutures, surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from
anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially backwards from left to
right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space into thoracic cavity, perforating
thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing punched out
fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges,
modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From
right heel (2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm.
on its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms.
From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into
penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas
and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially upwards, edges,
sutured, back, left side, level of 9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline,
110.0 cms. From left heel. . . .
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest
and abdomen. EIcTAD
'REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.'
"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on . . . Balboa's body were
gunshot wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left
nipple and exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards
from left to right. As to the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the
nozzle of the gun was probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and the gun
must have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located
immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally
upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed
the gun's nozzle to the right side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance points
of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0 centimeters." 8
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them from
the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to
the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:
"Erna Basa:
". . . [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the
afternoon; at about past 2 o'clock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she
heard some noise and exchange of words which were not clear, but it seemed there
was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas
Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she was inside the room and one meter
away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters away
from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly
pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled
the gun. . . .
"Eden Legaspi:
". . . [A]s early as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside
the investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 o'clock that
same afternoon while there inside, she heard a commotion outside and she remained
seated on the bench; when the commotion started they were seated on the bench and
after the commotion that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened
the door and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun and
immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place where she was
seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two men fall down . . .
"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company then attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the
investigators of their outfit; about 2 o'clock or past that time of January 4, 1990 he got
Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he was already holding
the door knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of a sudden
he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas
Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by the police of
Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked
the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the
stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster
attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was holding the doorknob with his right
hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away from him, suddenly
approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his gun
with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right
hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of
the gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his
gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his
gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right
hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its
holster as both of them held the gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after
the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the
attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from
its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already
loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it
fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun,
while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they
were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the
latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of them was stronger; after
Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying 'stop that' and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching;
sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun,
and said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when
his gun was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.

"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case

that happened during the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that
case in the town of San Dionisio and that case involves other persons who were also
detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to invite and interrogate
Balboa but who denied any robbery case; . . . [I]t was after he took his lunch that day
when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took Balboa from
the stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the
investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty meters, more
or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the
 commanding officer, officer of the operations division and that of the signal division; his
gun was in its holster when the victim tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed
that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the hand of the victim was on
top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun; that the entire
handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell whether
the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from the
tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his gun
was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed them and
probably reported the incident to their commanding officer; he was not able to talk to
Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his commanding officer came
some five to ten minutes later and took away his gun he did not tell him anything.
"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of Tomas Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings
respecting which he made an autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds on
the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory medially downward, while the
second one is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory somewhat going upward;
at the same time of his examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-
shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any
powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by
him to be powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the
pocket of the jacket of the victim." 9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful in his
attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the
gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went off; it was petitioner
who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found
on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a grappling for the
gun. EDATSC
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of Balboa
resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes, 10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is not prone to
accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of its
mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly
handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the
revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional because pressure on the trigger
was necessary to make the gun fire." 11
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:
"[Petitioner's] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been
shot only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice,
thereby establishing [petitioner's] determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the
imagination, even assuming without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should
not have been followed by another shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that
[petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two different and distant parts of the
body, inflicted from two different locations or angles, means that there was an intent to cause
the victim's death, contrary to [petitioner's] pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an
oft-repeated principle that the location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the
victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the incident. . . . 12
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had miserably
failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion of the
trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the commission of the
crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate court in this manner:
". . . [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public
official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing
 his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position,
then there is no abuse of public position.' (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant
case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when
the former fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public
position of the [petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial court's
finding that the said aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his public
position to commit the crime cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no
mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. . ." 13
Hence, this Petition. 14
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Court's consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioner's
conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to convict the
petitioner, in contrast to petitioner's overwhelming evidence to support his
theory/defense of accident. EacHSA
"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of
the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the
petitioner was in full control of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner
and Balboa were both holding the gun in forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each
other.
"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor general’s observation that the
fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioner's determined effort to
kill the victim.
"IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented when
it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of
petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling
ensued.
"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioner's reaction to the incident
when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly
argues against his claim of accidental shooting.
"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in
determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot
at the victim when the same was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-defense
are inconsistent.
"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages." 15
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa
was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are conclusive. 16 Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But where some
facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn the erroneous
conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question of
innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:
 "Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
'4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intent of causing it.'"
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the
fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled. 17 Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident, courts must take into account
the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings
to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very
moment the shots were fired?

Petitioner Not in Control

of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident
firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon of
January 4, 1990 as follows:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That
commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion
which you heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be
understood. ACETID
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you were
inside the investigation room as part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking
somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this case?
Am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw both
of them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It was
Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the possession
of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboa's hand was also there. Both
of them were holding the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. At first they were not directly facing each other. DSAEIT
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were
grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would touch
each other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was released from
its holster and then there was an explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the
gun was turning.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the
one holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir. cCSDaI
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was then
that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the handle of
the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front of
Sgt. Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoy's right and Balboa's left
sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards
each other.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun and the
right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held by
Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the gun with his
right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same hand holding
the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore whose
hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, 'Daw duha na sila nagakapot', what you really mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have
previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoy's right hand was still on the
handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like
this(witness illustrating by showing his right hand with her left hand over her right hand
as if holding something. The thumb of the left hand is somewhat over the index finger
of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its holster
and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand. IEaHSD
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up to
the time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand
of Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to
grab the handle of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away from
him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using his left hand
to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir." 18
 The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle.
The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those
attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was categorically asserted
by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged — his
right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It would
be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release
the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the left hand
of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead us to the
conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun." 19
Release of the Gun's Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless
released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence showed that
the weapon fired and hit the victim — not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only mean
that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This conclusion appears to be non
sequitur.

It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied
grappling for the weapon — though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds — was fierce and vicious.
The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the course
of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired. STaIHc
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim
that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the
.45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question, explained how the
disputed second shot may have been brought about:
". . . Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic
pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns
immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in
succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of
the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going
downward from left to right thus pushing Balboa's upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa
was still clutching petitioner's hand over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the stomach
with the bullet going upward of Balboa's body as he was falling down and releasing his hold on
petitioner's hand . . ." 20
Thus, the appellate court's reliance on People v. Reyes 21 was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it over to the
victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun accidentally
fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic
pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes. 22 Unlike a
revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when
possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all frontal,
the appellate court rejected petitioner's claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that "if
there was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side . . . each other, the wounds
thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead to an inference that the victim was
shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta." 23
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise
moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the existence
of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
 In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes
inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun,
the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when
the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of the
tragic scuffle shows that the parties' positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither
definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the
gun was turning." 24
xxx xxx xxx
"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were
grappling for the possession of the gun force against force." 25
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
". . . The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First,
because the position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or
persons holding the gun when it fired. This is especially true when two persons were grappling
for the possession of the gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case . . .
"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the
victim during the grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise:
when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the knocking
power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the
gun, Balboa pulling the gun down as he was going down. When the gun went off the second
time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboa's body was going upward because his
upper body was pushed downward twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we
separated from each other. This sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were
grappling over the gun and were moving very fast . . ." 26
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due
care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault
or no intent to cause the injury. 27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time
of the incident, petitioner was a member — specifically, one of the investigators — of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of
his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the
latter's cell for a routine interrogation. cdll
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the
law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a
detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service
gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his
working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not
testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while being
fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster,
the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots — all of which led to the death of the
victim — were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of
petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter's culpability.
Petitioner's Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident was
indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was "dumbfounded," according to
the CA; was "mum, pale and trembling," according to the trial court. These behavioral reactions supposedly
point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been
calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was
looking at his companion's bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected of one in a state of shock at events
that had transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa,
he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend
oneself from imminent danger. 28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against
any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties' attempts to
possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner — an
exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code — a further discussion of whether
the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. DORIA
AQUINO, J p:

In L-26188 defendant Francisco Doria appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, convicting him of illegal possession of a firearm and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
of one (1) year to five (5) years and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos plus costs (Criminal Case No. U-440).
In L-26189 defendants Francisco Doria and Bartolome Lazarte appealed from the decision of the
same court, convicting them of murder, sentencing Doria to "life imprisonment" and Lazarte to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, and
ordering each of them to indemnify the heirs of Martin Pasuquin (Pasuquen) in the sum of six thousand
pesos plus costs (Criminal Case No. U-401).
In L-26190 defendant Bernabe Lazarte appealed from the decision of the same court, convicting him
of frustrated murder, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional and to indemnify Manuel Pasuquin (Pasuquen) in the
sum of two thousand pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus costs (Criminal Case
No. U-402).
The evidence for the prosecution, as shown in the record and as summarized by the trial court and
the Solicitor General, may be restated as follows:
The dramatis personae in this case, namely, the victims, the brothers Manuel Pasuquin and Martin
Pasuquin, and their brother-in-law, Antonio Reyes, as well as the accused Francisco Doria, the brothers
Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte, their uncle, Filemon Lazarte, and their friend Rodolfo Fernandez,
all resided in the vicinity of Malong Street in the poblacion of Alcala, Pangasinan. They were
neighbors. Doria, the stepfather of Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte, stayed with them in the same
house. Filemon Lazarte lived in his house at the corner of Malong and Funston Streets (Sketch, Exh. B in
Criminal Case No. U-401; Exh. D in Criminal Case No. U-402).
The assault presently to be recounted have their background in the smoldering enmity
between Doria and the Pasuquin brothers. Certain incidents had strained their relations to the breaking
point. At one time in 1957 Doria suspected Martin Pasuquin of having stolen his cassava. In September,
1957 Doria charged Martin Pasuquin with having stolen his bananas. The case was amicably settled by the
chief of police. In February, 1958, Martin Pasuquin was again charged by Doria with having allegedly stolen
the latter's palay. Martin was acquitted. In May, 1959 Doria denounced Martin to the police for having
stolen his plow. On the night of November 24, 1959, Bernabe Lazarte, Doria's stepson, was mauled. Manuel
Pasuquin was suspected to be one of the maulers.
It was thus expectable that the tension between Doria and the Pasuquin brothers would erupt in
some manifestation of violence.
At about seven o'clock in the morning of November 26, 1959, Martin Pasuquin and Manuel Pasuquin,
together with their brother-in-law, Antonio Reyes, and six companions named Alfredo Dilan, Rudy Cacabilos,
Ernesto Gambol, Berting Baldomero, Bernardo Tadeo, and Villamor Ferrer went to Bersamin, a barrio of
Alcala, to cut grass as fodder for their carabaos. They rode in five bullcarts following one another. Manuel
Pasuquin rode in the first cart.
As they passed the corner of Malong and Funston Streets, Filemon Lazarte, who chanced to be
stationed at the window of his house, saw the passing bullcarts. When the Pasuquin brothers were nearing
the place where they were to cut grass in Barrio Bersamin, they espied in the distance a carromata
(carretela) following them. It was driven by Doria, its owner. His passengers were Bartolome Lazarte,
Bernabe Lazarte, Filemon Lazarte and Rodolfo Fernandez (who was not on speaking terms with Martin
Pasuquin since July, 1958).
When the Pasuquin brothers and their companions reached their destination and when they were
about to un-hitch their carabaos, the carromata stopped near them. Doria and his group alighted from
the carromata. Thereupon, Bernabe Lazarte and Rodolfo Fernandez approached Manuel Pasuquin who was
sitting on the edge or rim of his bullcart. Fernandez immediately disabled Manuel Pasuquin by holding his
hands at the latter's back while Bernabe Lazarte with a sharp pointed bolo (Exh. E or 9 in Criminal Case No.
U-402 and Exh. G in Criminal Case No. U-401) stabbed Manuel twice, first, at the right side of his abdomen
and, second, at the right flank located below the last rib along the posterior axillary line. During the assault,
Manuel Pasuquin was not able to say anything. He "was surprised"
 Almost simultaneously, Doria and Bartolome Lazarte approached Martin Pasuquin who was sitting
on the edge or rim of the cart of Antonio Reyes, about three or five meters from Manuel. Reyes stood beside
the cart about one meter from Martin. As Doria asked Martin where he was going to cut
grass, Doria forthwith shot Martin pointblank at the latter's face with a paltik gun (Exh. A and A-1 in Criminal
Case U-400 and Exh. C and C-1 in Criminal Case U-401). Instinctively, Martin stood up to jump out of the cart
but Bartolome Lazarte struck him with a long bolo called panabas, hitting him in his right arm (Exh. F or 8 in
Criminal Case U-401). In spite of his injuries, Martin was able to jump out of the cart and run away, but Doria.
Bartolome Lazarte and Filemon Lazarte chased him and, on overtaking him, repeatedly stabbed him (see
sketch, Exh. F in Criminal Case No. U-402). Martin Pasuquin sustained several mortal wounds and died on
the spot where he had collapsed. The scythe used by Doria in cutting the throat of Martin is Exhibit E
(Criminal Case No. U-401).
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Fernandez, armed with a bolo, attacked Antonio Reyes who, after parrying the
blow, ran away.
Doctor Juanita Santos Estacio, the town's municipal health officer, examined the body of the
deceased twenty-two year old Martin Pasuquin, in the town puericulture center at around one-thirty in the
afternoon of November 26th. She found the following wounds:
"I.HEAD
1. Lacerated wound, chin right. Wound is 1-1/2 inches long, 1 inch wide and 1/2 inch
deep.
2. Shotgun wounds (5 in number) produced by small pellets of lead — located at
forehead left temporal region, left bare of nose, left cheekbone and base of left ear.
II. NECK
1. Wound, lacerated, front of neck. It is 4 inches long, 3 inches wide and 2 inches deep,
exposing some muscles, tendons and blood vessels.
III. TRUNK
1.Wound, lacerated, epigastric region. Wound is skin deep, 1 inch long by 1/2 inch wide.
2. Wound, punctured, epigastrium. It is 1-1/2 inches long, 3/2 inch wide and about 5
inches deep running inwards.
3. Wound, punctured, lumbar region, right. It is 1 inch long, 1/2 inch wide and 3 inches
deep running outward and laterally.
4. Wound, punctured, abdomen — right. It is 1 inch by 1/2 inch by 1 inch deep — located
1/2 inch below the right coastal arch.
IV. EXTREMITIES
A — Right upper extremity:
1. Wound lacerated — 4 inches by 2-1/2 inches arm upper thirds lateral side.
2. Wound lacerated — 4 inches by 3 inches by 2 inches forearm, upper thirds, medial
side.
3. Wound, lacerated, palm — bases of 4th and 5th fingers; size of wound is 2 inches by
1 inch by 1/2 inch.
B — Left upper extremity:
1. Fracture, compound, forearm, lower third. left. Open wound is 4 Inches long gaping,
exposing bone, muscles, tendons and blood vessels." (Exh. A. Criminal Case No. U-401.)
The doctor opined that Martin Pasuquin died due to loss of blood and to shock as a consequence of
the cutting of the blood vessels.
Doctor Estacio also attended to the sixteen-year old Manuel Pasuquin at about ten o'clock in the
morning of November 26th. Her findings were as follows:
A. Preliminary Findings:
1. Patient is pale, conscious, complaining of pain at the abdomen.
 2. There's profuse bleeding of wound at abdomen staining his clothes.
B.Physical Examination:
1. Wound, punctured abdomen — right. Wound is located at right side of abdomen 2
inches below the coastal arch. It is 1 inch long, 1/3 inch wide and about 4 inches deep going
inwards and medially.
2. Wound, punctured — right, flank located below the last rib along the posterior
axillary line. It's about 1/2 inch long, 1/3 inch wide and 1 inch deep.
It takes about 2 weeks for the 2nd wound to heal barring complications and about 1
month for the 1st wound depending on treatment and complications. (Exh. A in Criminal Case
No. U-402.)
Doctor Crisofero P. Cabangon, who operated on Manuel Pasuquin, described his abdominal wound
thus:
"Wound stab lateral, hypochondriac region with laceration of liver; massive hematoma
of transverse mesocolon; shock, secondary to massive abdominal hemorrhage." (7 tsn Abalos.)
Doctors Estacio and Cabangon were of the opinion that the wounds of Manuel Pasuquin were serious
and sufficient to cause his death. He was given blood transfusion at the San Carlos General Hospital. He
would have died were it not for the operation or timely medical attendance.
On that same morning or immediately after the tragic occurrence, Bartolome Lazarte surrendered to
the police. He delivered to the guard the pointed bolo and the panabas. He confessed to the police that he
had killed Martin Pasuquin (25 tsn Rollolazo).
Doria visited Bartolome Lazarte in prison. He was arrested on that occasion. He was investigated by
Manuel Castro, a private of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). He signed a statement sworn to before the
justice of the peace wherein he admitted that he had fired his twelve-gauge paltik gun in the morning of the
incident. The chief of police also investigated him on that same day. He admitted to that police officer that
he was the owner of the paltik gun and ammunition. He had no license to possess the same.
As a result of the prompt investigation conducted by the police and the Constabulary, sworn
statements were executed on that same date, November 26th, by Rudy Cacabilos, Alfredo Dilan, Villamor
Ferrer and Antonio Reyes (Exh. 10, Criminal Case No. U-402). In substance, they stated that Doria, Bartolome
Lazarte and Filemon Lazarte killed Martin Pasuquin while Bernabe Lazarte wounded Manuel Pasuquin with
the help of Rodolfo Fernandez. The police recovered the paltik gun, one bolo and two scythes.
On the basis of the eyewitnesses' affidavits and the medical certificates, three complaints dated
November 26, 1959 were filed by the chief of police in the justice of the peace court of Alcala:
One complaint was for illegal possession of a firearm against the twenty-eight year old Doria (Econg).
The second complaint was for murder against Doria, Bartolome Lazarte (Roming) and Filemon Lazarte for
the killing of Martin Pasuquin. The third complaint was for frustrated murder against Bernabe Lazarte
(Bening) and Rodolfo Fernandez (Ruding). (Criminal Cases Nos. 418, 419 and 420).
The appellants waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The cases were elevated to
the Court of First Instance, where the special counsel of the fiscal's office filed three informations: (1) an
information against Doria for illegal possession of a revolver, twelve-gauge paltik, and one round of
ammunition, in violation of section 2692, in relation to section 878, of the Revised Administrative Code and
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and Republic Act No. 4 (Criminal Case No. U-400); (2) an
information charging Doria, Bartolome Lazarte and Filemon Lazarte with the murder of Martin Pasuquin,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation (Criminal Case No. U-401), and (3) an information for
frustrated murder against Bernabe Lazarte and Rodolfo Fernandez qualified also by treachery and evident
premeditation in connection with the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin (Criminal Case No. U-402). The three
cases were tried jointly. The trial court rendered one decision.
Filemon Lazarte died of pulmonary tuberculosis on November 19, 1962, or eight days after he signed
his confession (Exh. 1). As to him the case was dismissed. Rodolfo Fernandez was acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt.
In this appeal, the appellants, through Manuel M. Crudo, their counsel de oficio, argue that the trial
court erred (1) in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which were allegedly
vitiated by contradictions and inconsistencies; (2) in admitting the alleged hearsay, irrelevant, incompetent
and immaterial testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; (3) in disregarding the evidence for the defense
such as the medical certificate as to the injuries of Francisco Doria (Exh. 2) and the supposed dying
declaration of Filemon Lazarte (Exh. 1); (4) in basing Francisco Doria's conviction for illegal possession of a
firearm on his sworn statement which was not voluntarily executed; (5) in holding that the chief of police
regularly performed his duties; (6) in holding as improbable that only one assailant inflicted thirteen wounds
on the Pasuquin brothers; (7) in discrediting Filemon Lazarte's admission that he alone assaulted the
Pasaquin brothers; (8) in not giving the defense the benefit of the doubt; (9) in not acquitting
Francisco Doria and Bartolome Lazarte of murder; (10) in not acquitting Bernabe Lazarte of frustrated
murder, like Rodolfo Fernandez, and (11) in not holding that it had not acquired jurisdiction because there
was not preliminary investigation conducted by the special counsel who filed that informations.
Appellant's last assignment of error raises a jurisdictional or procedural issue which should first be
resolved. They note that the special counsel did not certify under oath in the three informations that the
accused were "given a chance to appear in person or by counsel" at the corresponding preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal. They contend that the trial court "had not acquired jurisdiction to try
the three cases". They invoke Rule 112 of the 1964 Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by state
attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. — Except where an investigation
has been conducted by a judge of first instance, municipal judge or other officer in accordance
with the provisions of the preceding sections, no information for an offense cognizable by the
Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal, or state attorney, without
first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him
or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. If the accused appears the
investigation shall be conducted in his presence and he shall have the right to be heard, to
cross-examine the complainant and his witnesses, and to adduce evidence in his favor. If he
cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the fiscal the investigation
shall proceed without him.
This fiscal or state attorney shall certify under oath in the information to be filled by him
that the defendant was given a chance to appear in person or by counsel at said examination
and investigation.
Appellants' contention is untenable. The epigraph and opening exclusionary clause of section 14
shows that it applies only to the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal or state attorney (See Sec.
1687, Revised Administrative Code; Republic Acts Nos. 732 and 6180 and Presidential Decree No. 77 dated
December 6, 1972). It does not apply to the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace,
now municipal judge.
Moreover, section 14 is a new provision of the 1964 Rules of Court. It is not found in the 1940 Rules
of Court which were in force in 1959 when these three cases arose.
As already noted, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace of Alcala.
The defendants waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The special counsel of the fiscal's
office based the informations on the record of the preliminary investigation elevated by the justice of the
peace to the Court of First Instance. It was not incumbent upon the fiscal to conduct another preliminary
investigation. On the basis of that record, "he may forthwith file the information in the Court of First
Instance" (People vs. Pervez, 110 Phil. 214, 218; People vs. Reginaldo, L-15960, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA
1307; People vs. Mapa, L-15345, May 26, 1962, 5 SCRA 95).
Appellants' assignment of errors revolve around the issue of credibility. Their theory is that the
deceased Filemon Lazarte single-handed]y killed Martin Pasuquin and wounded Manuel Pasuquin and that
they merely witnessed the encounter between Filemon and the Pasuquin brothers. That theory is based on
Filemon's handwritten statement in the dialect dated November 1, 1962, or about three years after the
incident. In that statement Filemon declared:
"I would like to declare before I die that my co-accused had no participation in the killing
because I was the one who killed Martin and wounded Manuel.
"Yes, sir, it was all my fault. They do not have any participation when I killed Martin and
also Manuel" (Exh. 1 and 1-A).
The appellants characterize Filemon's confession as a "dying declaration".
 That characterization is not correct. Filemon's confession that he alone killed Martin Pasuquin and
wounded Manuel Pasuquin is an admission against his penal interest. It is not the dying declaration
contemplated in section 28, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Sec. 31, Rule 130, 1964 Rules of Court)
which constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 28 refers to the "declaration of a dying person,
made under a consciousness of an impending death", which "may be received in a criminal case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death".
The declaration of Filemon Lazarte does not deal with the cause and circumstances surrounding his
death. It refers to the killing of Martin Pasuquin and the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin. Filemon Lazarte was
not the victim whose death is the subject of inquiry in these cases. He was one of the assailants. He did not
die as a consequence of the wounds sustained in the incident. He died of tuberculosis (Exh. 3, 4 and 7, pages
181, 216 and 261 Criminal Case No. U-400).
The trial court branded appellants' theory as "utterly incredible". The Solicitor General dismissed it
as "unnatural", "possible only within the realm of fantastic fiction" and, therefore, "obviously a fabrication".
The justification for such superlative epithets is that Martin Pasuquin sustained ten lacerated and
punctured wounds in the head, neck, trunk and arms and five gunshot wounds in the neck, while Manuel
Pasuquin had two wounds. It seems unbelievable that one person could have inflicted all those wounds in
an encounter with two antagonists, considering that the fight transpired in a matter of minutes. Appellants'
theory is negated by the fact that Bartolome Lazarte surrendered immediately after the killing.
Moreover, no motive had been established as to why Filemon Lazarte would be the only person to
assault the Pasuquin brothers. Doria testified that he could not tell why Filemon Lazarte fought the Pasuquin
brothers (10 t.s.n October 2, 1967). On the other hand, it is obvious that lie collaborated with Doria and his
nephew, Bartolome Lazarte, in killing Martin Pasuquin because Doria, who was in a way his relative by
affinity, wanted to chastise Martin for the wrongs supposedly committed by Martin against Doria.
One circumstance which shows the irrationality of appellants' theory is that if, according to them,
they saw Filemon Lazarte fighting the Pasuquin brothers, it was quite strange that they did not bother to
succor Filemon. He was the uncle of Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte, being the brother of their
father. He should be close to Doria who is the stepfather of his nephews. Yet Doria and the Lazarte brothers,
according to their theory, did not help Filemon at all. He did not sustain any wound.
The appellants point to certain contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Manuel
Pasuquin and Antonio Reyes.
For example, the appellants alleged that the testimonies of Reyes and Manuel Pasuquin do not agree
on the number of bullcarts, the time when the bullcarts arrived at Bersamin, the place where Martin
Pasuquin was positioned at, the time he was shot by Doria, and the question uttered by Doria before he
assaulted Martin.
Those inconsistencies refer to trivial and minor details that do not impair the credibility of Reyes and
Manuel Pasuquin. The discrepancies signify that the two witnesses did not deliberately pervert the truth in
their narrations. The discordances in their testimonies on collateral matters heighten their credibility and
show that their testimonies were not coached nor rehearsed (People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26,
1973; 6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 138-141).
It was Doria who made inconsistent declarations. Aside from admitting at first that he was the owner
of the paltik revolver (Exh. A) and later denying that it was his property, Doria committed a flagrant
contradiction which reveals the fabricated nature of his defense. When he testified on February 10, 1965,
he made it appear that he went to Barrio Bersamin to cut grass (82 tsn Abalos). That testimony was
corroborated by Rodolfo Fernandez, Bartolome Lazarte and Bernabe Lazarte (92, 98, 111 tsn. Abalos).
But when Doria testified on October 2, 1967 (his testimony had to be retaken because of the loss of
the stenographic notes of his testimony on direct examination), he declared that he went to Barrio Bersamin
to buy pigs (2 tsn). The discrepancy is not minor. It refers to a vital detail of Doria's defense. It shows his
deliberate distortion of the truth. The prosecution established that Doria and his companions went to Barrio
Bersamin on that fateful morning of November 26, 1969 for the sole purpose of assassinating the Pasuquin
brothers. Doria did not buy any pigs. Neither did he and his companions cut grass.
The Court has painstakingly scrutinized the evidence. It is convinced that the culpability of the
appellants for the killing of Martin Pasuquin and the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin has been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
 Appellant Doria contends that credence should have been given to the medical certificate dated
November 27, 1959, that he suffered contusions with hematoma in the neck and abdomen (Exh. 2), as proof
that he was maltreated while under custody. He claims that he admitted ownership of the paltik gun, as
indicated in his sworn statement, because he was under duress. Doctor Estacio testified that the contusions
described in the medical certificate could possibly have been self-inflicted. The chief of police and the
Constabulary soldier, who investigated Doria, denied that the latter was maltreated. Doria did not complain
to the justice of the peace, before whom his statement was sworn to (page 2, Record of Criminal Case No.
400), that he was maltreated. The circumstance that in his statement he did not admit that he shot Martin
Pasuquin is an indicium of its voluntariness.
The crime of illegal possession of a firearm, imputed to Doria, was proven beyond reasonable doubt
by his written confession and his oral admission to the chief of police that he used the paltik revolver (Exh.
A). He was not able to produce any license or permit for its possession (People vs. Ramos, 62 O. G. 6326; 8
SCRA 758). The chief of police testified that Doria was not among the residents of Alcala who held licenses
to possess firearms.
No license may be issued for a paltik revolver (People vs. Fajardo, L-18257, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA
494). The admission of the accused that he had killed a person with an unlicensed firearm is sufficient
evidence to prove the offense of illegal possession of a firearm (People vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 195).
The crime of illegal possession of a firearm (which is not a rifle, etc.) is "punished by imprisonment
for a period of not less than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and
a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the court"
(Sec. 2632, Revised Administrative Code). A conviction carries with it "the forfeiture of the prohibited article
or articles to the Philippine Government" (Sec. 2692, Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 4).
In Criminal Case No U-400, now L-26188, the indeterminate penalty of one year to five years and a
fine of one thousand pesos, imposed on Doria by the trial court, should be modified as to the minimum
range, which should be one year and one day. (See Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225).
The informations for murder and frustrated murder in the other two cases qualify the offenses with
the aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation. The trial court found that there was
premeditation in the killing of Martin Pasuquin and in the wounding of Manuel Pasuquin It held that the
sudden attack on the Pasuquin brothers was treacherous.
In Criminal Case No. U-402, now L-26190, the assault made by Bernabe Lazarte on Manuel Pasuquin
while the latter's hands were held behind his back by Rodolfo Fernandez was treacherous because Bernabe
Lazarte and his companion employed a form of aggression tending to insure the execution of the crime
without any risk to themselves arising from any defense which Manuel Pasuquin might have made (Par. 16,
Art. 14, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Oracion and Lambino, 18 U.S. 530; People vs. Zosimo Gonzales, 92 Phil.
1078; U.S. vs. Valdez and Gamit, 40 Phil. 876; People vs. Carandang, 54 Phil. 503; U.S. vs. Feria, 2 Phil. 54).
Treachery absorbs the abuse of superior strength employed by Lazarte and Fernandez.
The crime committed against Manuel Pasuquin is frustrated murder because Bernabe Lazarte
performed all the acts of execution which would have consummated the killing. It was not consummated
due to a timely medical attendance, a circumstance independent of Lazarte's will (Art. 6, Revised Penal
Code).
The trial court found that Bernabe Lazarte was only thirteen years old when he committed the crime
on November 26, 1959. He acted with discernment. Inasmuch as he had long passed the age of sixteen years,
he is no longer entitled to a suspended sentence (Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code; People vs. Estefa, 86
Phil. 104; People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 125). But he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority or a two-degree reduction of the penalty (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code).
The indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court is correct insofar as the minimum penalty of
six months of arresto mayor is concerned. It is one day short as to the maximum range, which should be four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, instead of four (4) years and two
(2) months only (Art. 248, in relation to art. 61 and the table facing art. 76, Revised Penal Code).
As recommended by the Solicitor General, that part of the trial court's judgment, that Bernabe
Lazarte should serve subsidiary imprisonment for the indemnity of two thousand pesos in case he is
insolvent, should be eliminated. Republic Act No. 5465, which took effect April 21, 1969, amended article
39 of the Revised Penal Code by abolishing the subsidiary imprisonment for the indemnity.
 In Criminal Case No. U-401, now L-26189, the crime committed by Francisco Doria and Bartolome
Lazarte is murder qualified by treachery. They perpetrated a deliberate and sudden aggression on Martin
Pasuquin which insured the consummation of the killing without any risk to themselves. Treachery may be
appreciated in a sudden frontal assault (People vs. Nobie, 77 Phil. 193).
As in L-26190, abuse of superiority is merged with treachery. As no mitigating circumstances and
generic aggravating circumstances can be appreciated with respect to Doria, he should be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code). "Life imprisonment" is not a correct term
(People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58).
The trial court properly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant Bartolome Lazarte. He is entitled to an indeterminate sentence The penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor maximum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum imposed on him by the trial
court, is within the proper range.
However, the indemnity imposed on Doria and Bartolome Lazarte should he raised to twelve
thousand pesos.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is modified as follows.
(a) In Criminal Case No. U-400, now L-26188, for illegal possession of a firearm, the minimum range
of the penalty should be one (1) year and one (1) day. The paltik revolver and ammunition (Exh. A and C) are
forfeited to the Government.
(b) In Criminal Case No. U-401, now L-26189, for murder, the indemnity is raised to P12,000. The
penalty imposed should be designated as reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment.
(c) In Criminal Case No. U-402, now L-26190, for frustrated murder, the maximum range of the
indeterminate penalty imposed on appellant Bernabe Lazarte should be four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional maximum The provision for subsidiary imprisonment is eliminated.
In other respects the judgment of the lower court in the three cases is affirmed with costs against
appellants Francisco Doria, Bernabe Lazarte and Bartolome Lazarte. So ordered.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonlo A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente
P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.

DECISION

AQUINO, J p:

This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs
(Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old
former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at
liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided.
On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in
the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary
occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing
the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the
floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on
Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He
shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before
his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic) Alberio did not sleep
anymore that night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed.
He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom
she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the
body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were
not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical
intervention", the burns would "cause death", she said. She explained that, because there was water in the
burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating "burn"
as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by
Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure
to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning
of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder. 1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who
should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements which
were part of the res gestae. 2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the municipal jail on
guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames.
With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a
doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the
municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a complete liar",
testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not
know how it happened to be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out
the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the
evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It
observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he was
"belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility of Alberio,
pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should be noted
that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there
was no police investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might
explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated
by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas are
compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is:
who should be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the advantage
of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a
searching scrutiny of the whole record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa
del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). "Conforme a dicha
doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicas
del lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones
concomitantes (la falta de medicos para asistir al herido); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el ttanos,
la pulmon!a, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th
Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the
cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim
with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in
the course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from
which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to
warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result
in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not
receive proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil.
54). In the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been
properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical
care could not be attributed to the wounded man the person who inflicted the wound was responsible for
the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440). 3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14,
Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because
of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined The prisoner was under his custody.
"The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial
leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened
 democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must
at the same time just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse of the police." (U. S. vs. Pabalan,
37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal code). It is manifest
from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him
may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell.
When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of
his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium
period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Zaldivar and Fernandez, JJ ., concur.
Fernando, J ., concurs with the qualification set forth in the observation of Justice Barredo.
Antonio, J ., did not take part.
|||
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL, accused-
appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Enrique S. Empleo for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

For stabbing Alfredo Senador from behind, done in a sudden and unexpected manner while the latter
was sitting close to the ground and while his attention was focused on the ongoing cara y cruz game,
Elbert Callet was convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In
this appeal, Callet reiterated his self-defense theory. DTISaH
The Court ruled that the version of the appellant did not inspire belief. The incident happened in plain
view of many witnesses at the flea market. Appellant claimed he was with a certain Guale and one Sonny Boy
at that time. Yet, nobody corroborated his story. Indeed, his narration on how the victim "attacked" him was
improbable. In the witness chair, he admitted that the victim was bigger than him and that his left hand was
restrained by the victim. It was thus incredible how he could pull out his knife from his right side, with the use
of his left hand, raised that knife high enough to hit the shoulder of the victim and inflicted an 11-cm. deep
wound upon him. Equally incredulous was the claim that after being injured, the victim still tried to approach
and attack him, hence, he had to retreat. The accused's uncorroborated plea of self-defense cannot be
entertained, especially when it was, in itself, extremely doubtful. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT IMPAIRED BY BLOOD RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN THE WITNESS AND THE VICTIM; CASE AT BAR. — The fact that Lecpoy is a son of the victim would not
necessarily make him untrustworthy. This Court has ruled that "(b)lood relationship between a witness and the
victim does not by itself impair the credibility of witnesses. On the contrary, relationship may strengthen
credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit. The
earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and
prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime." Significantly, there is no showing that this young
eyewitness has any ill motive to testify falsely against the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; AFFIANT SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY THE
CHANGES IN THE AFFIDAVIT, IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR PROOF THAT HE CONFIRMED IT. — [W]e note that
Lecpoy and Eduardo did not countersign the superimposition in the subject affidavit. In the absence of clear
proof that they confirmed the change, they should not be bound by it.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; ELEMENTS. — In self-defense, the
burden of proof rests upon the accused. Thus, he must present clear and convincing evidence that the following
elements are present, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. IEaCDH
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED WHEN IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL. — The incident happened
in plain view of many witnesses at the flea market. He even claimed he was with a certain Guale and one Sonny
Boy at that time. Yet, nobody corroborated his story. Indeed, his narration on how the victim "attacked" him is
improbable. In the witness chair, he admitted that the victim was bigger than him and that his left hand was
restrained by the victim. It is thus incredible how he could pull out his knife from his right side, with the use of
his left hand, raise that knife high enough to hit the shoulder of the victim and inflict an 11-cm. deep wound
upon him. It is more probable that the victim was sitting down when the accused attacked him from behind as
the prosecution witnesses testified. Equally incredulous is the claim that after being injured, the victim still tried
to approach and attack him, hence, he had to retreat. The accused's uncorroborated plea of self-defense cannot
be entertained, especially when it is, in itself, extremely doubtful.
5. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. —
The evidence failed to prove evident premeditation. Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) the time when
the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. The records show that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence
to prove these elements.
6. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; ELUCIDATED. — Treachery or alevosia exists when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; STABBING FROM BEHIND, DONE IN A SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED MANNER, PRESENT IN
CASE AT BAR. — The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of the victim to murder. The
stabbing was from behind, done in a sudden and unexpected manner while the victim was sitting close to the
ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot, and while his attention was focused on the on-going cara y
cruz game. Clearly, the victim was not able to defend himself from the mode of attack. DSTCIa
8. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial
court also correctly credited the accused with voluntary surrender to mitigate his liability. Voluntary surrender
requires that the offender had not been actually arrested; that he surrendered himself to a person in authority
or to the latter's agent; and that the surrender was voluntary. The records reveal that the accused ran toward
the municipal building after the stabbing incident. On his way to the municipal building, he admitted to Barangay
Tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog that he stabbed the victim. Although he did not immediately turn over his
weapon to them for fear of retaliation from the victim's relatives, he did so as soon as they reached the
municipal building. Undoubtedly, the conduct he displayed was spontaneous as it shows his interest to give
himself up unconditionally to the authorities, thus saving the State the trouble and expenses necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. —
The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong. We are not persuaded. The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is
weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is
inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without
giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he
must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. aHTCIc
10. ID.; MURDER; PROPER PENALTY. — As the killing was attended by treachery, the accused is liable for
the crime of murder. The prescribed penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua against the accused.
11. ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIABILITY; P50,000.00 AS CIVIL INDEMNITY. — The civil indemnity awarded in favor of
the legal heirs of the victim, Alfredo Senador, in the amount of P50,000.00 is in accord with the Court's current
policy.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

The accused, ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 30. The crime was allegedly committed as follows: 1 TCSEcI
"That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 15, 1996,
at Barangay Tambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
ALFREDO SENADOR with the use of a knife with which the said accused was then armed and
provided, thereby inflicting upon said victim the following injury, to wit:
 A stab wound measuring two (2) cm. in length, 0.3 cm. in width and eleven (11)
cm. in deepness located at the left side of the trunk, about two (2) cm. above the left
clavicular bone. The wound was directed downward and slightly to the right.
which injury or wound caused the death of said ALFREDO SENADOR shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code."
When arraigned on June 11, 1997, the accused pled "not guilty." 2
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Rogelio Kho, Lecpoy Senador, Eduardo Perater, Manuel
Gabonales and Francisca Senador. For the defense, the accused, Elbert Callet, PO3 Roy
Balasabas, Barangay Captain Dominador Calijan and Nilo Callet testified.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 15, 1996, at 5:00 p.m., the victim, Alfredo
Senador, his 12-year old son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater were at the flea market
of barangay Tambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. There were many people in the vicinity. Some were
playing cara y cruz while others were playing volleyball.
Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a cara y cruz game. Alfredo sat
close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and
on a stone, respectively.
Out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left
shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to
walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo
died shortly thereafter.
Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. At 5:00 p.m., he saw people running away
from the place where there was a cara y cruz game. Next, he saw Alfredo and the accused. Alfredo was soaked
in blood while the accused was running towards the basketball court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him.
Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The accused was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel
helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of bringing Alfredo to the hospital
when he saw blood oozing from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died.
Dr. Rogelio Kho, Municipal Health Officer at Tayasan, autopsied the body of Alfredo on September 16,
1996. The doctor found a stab wound on the left shoulder of Alfredo, near the base of the neck. He opined that
the victim died due to "severe hemorrhage and irreversible shock due to stab wound." 3
The defense gave a different account of the stabbing incident.
Allegedly, at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After two (2)
games, he stopped playing. It was past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played
volleyball. While watching the game, he was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredo's elbow. He asked Alfredo
why he hit him. Alfredo retorted, "Are you angry?" Next Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it. He
pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his third victim if he would get
angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out a hunting knife from his waist, he (the accused) managed to stab him
first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal hall to surrender.
Dominador Calijan, the Barangay Captain of Tayasan, happened to be at the basketball court near the
scene of the crime. He encountered Alfredo along the road after the stabbing incident. Alfredo had a stab wound
on the lower nape. Calijan asked Alfredo who stabbed him and the latter gave the name of the accused. He
directed his barangay tanods to arrest the accused.
Barangay tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog were able to catch up with the accused three (3)
kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He was still holding the hunting knife and refused to surrender it
for fear that the relatives of Alfredo would retaliate. The barangay tanods escorted him to the municipal hall.
Along the way, they asked him why he stabbed Alfredo. The accused replied that he could not help it and that
everything happened too fast. Upon reaching the municipal hall, the accused surrendered the hunting knife. He
was turned over to PO Roy Balasbas for investigation.
After the trial, the accused was found guilty of murder. The fallo of the trial court's decision 4 states:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELBERT CALLET Y SABANAL guilty beyond a scintilla
of doubt for the crime of MURDER penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, taking
into account the mitigating circumstance and voluntary surrender without any aggravating
 circumstance, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory
penalties provided under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is ordered to pay the legal heirs of Alfredo Senador the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death.
Costs against the accused."
Hence, the appeal. The accused contends that: 5
"1. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED KILLED THE VICTIM WITH TREACHERY;
2. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE;
3. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT INTEND TO COMMIT SO GRAVE
A WRONG."
We affirm. The conviction of the accused is clearly supported by the evidence.
Two (2) eyewitnesses positively identified the accused, Elbert Callet, as the one who fatally stabbed the
victim, Alfredo Senador. Eyewitness Lecpoy Senador testified as follows: 6
"(PROS. HERMOSA):
Q: About that time 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on September 15, 1996, where were you and
your companions situated or stationed since you said you were particularly at the flea
market?
xxx xxx xxx
A: We were in Tambulan.
Q: In what particular place were you at the flea market?
A: In the place where there was a "cara y cruz".
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What were you and your father as well as Eduardo Perater doing at that moment at 5:00
o'clock on September 15 at the place where there was a game of "cara y cruz"?
A: We were looking at the "cara y cruz".
Q: While you were looking at the "cara y cruz" game, do you recall if there was an unusual
incident that happened?
A: Yes, there was.
Q: What was this unusual incident that happened?
A: My father was stabbed.
Q: Who stabbed your father?
A: Elbert Callet.
Q: Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago?
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where was Elbert Callet in relation to your father when he stabbed your father? IaAEHD
A: At the back of my father.
Q: What was the position of your father when he was stabbed by the accused?
A: He was sitting.
Q: Where was your father hit if you know?
 A: Left shoulder.
Q: What happened after Elbert Callet stabbed your father?
A: My father walked.
Q: Towards what place?
A: Towards the area where there was a volleyball game.
Q: And what eventually happened to him?
A: He fell down.
Q: And then, what happened after he fell down?
A: We carried him to a place where there was a mango tree.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened or what transpired after you brought your father towards the mango
tree?
A: My father died.
Q: After stabbing your father, what did Elbert Callet do if he did anything?
A: He ran away.
Q: What did he use in stabbing your father?
A: Hunting knife."
(Italics ours)
Another eyewitness, Eduardo Perater, testified as follows: 7
"(PROS. HERMOSA):
Q: All right, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, can you recall if there was an
unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, there was.
Q: What was that unusual incident?
A: There was a stabbing incident.
Q: Who was stabbed?
A: Alfredo Senador.
Q: Who stabbed Alfredo Senador?
A: Elbert Callet.
Q: The same Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago in the courtroom?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the position of Alfredo Senador when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?
A: He was sitting down.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us the manner how Alfredo Senador was sitting down at
the time when he was stabbed by the accused in this case?
A: (Witness in squatting position, he was sitting with his buttock on his right foot).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where was Elbert Callet situated when he stabbed Alfredo Senador?
A: At the back of Alfredo Senador.
 Q: Was there any argument between Alfredo Senador and Elbert Callet before Alfredo
Senador was stabbed?
A: There was none.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many times did Elbert Callet stab Alfredo Senador?
A: Only one (1). SHADEC
Q: Was Alfredo hit when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?
A: Yes.
Q: In what part of the body of Alfredo Senador was hit?
A: In the left shoulder.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened after Alfredo Senador was hit by the stabbing of Elbert Callet?
A: He stood up.
Q: What did Elbert Callet use in stabbing Alfredo Senador?
A: A hunting knife.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What about Elbert Callet, what did he do after stabbing Alfredo Senador?
A: He ran away.
Q: What did he do with his knife which he used in stabbing Alfredo Senador?
A: He carried it with him."
(Italics ours)
We give full faith and credit to the testimonies of Lecpoy and Eduardo. Their testimonies were vivid with
details. They were clear and consistent with each other.
The accused laments that Lecpoy Senador is a biased witness, being a son of the victim. We are not
convinced.
The fact that Lecpoy is a son of the victim would not necessarily make him untrustworthy. This Court has
ruled that "(b)lood relationship between a witness and the victim does not by itself impair the credibility of
witnesses. On the contrary, relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative
to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not
served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the
crime." 8 Significantly, there is no showing that this young eyewitness has any ill motive to testify falsely against
the accused.
To be sure, even without the testimony of Lecpoy, the testimonies of Eduardo Perater and Manuel
Gabonales would suffice to convict the accused. They are disinterested witnesses. 9 Their identification of the
accused as the assailant is beyond question.
Still assailing the credibility of the eyewitnesses, the accused points out that in the joint affidavit 10 of
Lecpoy and Eduardo, it was stated that the victim was "standing with his back facing Elbert Callet." However,
they contradicted their affidavit when they testified at the trial that the victim was "sitting, with his buttocks
resting on his right foot."
The cited inconsistency will not exculpate the accused. We quote with approval the following
observations of the trial court: 11
". . . In the instant case, the direct and candid testimonies of eyewitnesses Lecpoy
Senador and Eduardo Perater clearly showed that the killing of Alfredo Senador was attended
by treachery. Alfredo Senador was sitting with his buttocks on his right foot watching the game
of "cara y cruz" when Elbert Callet who was at the back of the victim stabbed him using a nine
(9) inch hunting knife hitting him near the base of his neck. The victim . . . was not in a position
 to defend himself from the accused who deliberately and consciously positioned himself at the
back of the unsuspecting victim to ensure the accomplishment of his evil desire without risk to
himself. The location of the stab wound at the left side of the trunk about two (2) centimeters
from the base of the neck and four (4) centimeters above the left clavicular bone with a
deepness of eleven (11) centimeters directed downward and slightly to the right also suggests
that the accused deliberately and consciously selected that part of the human body to ensure
the instantaneous death of the victim. Although the counsel of the accused tried to discredit
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses by pointing that in their joint affidavit dated 20
September 1996 Lecpoy Senador and Eduardo Perater stated that Alfredo Senador was
"standing" when he was stabbed, the said discrepancy could not in any way affect the
categorical, candid, consistent and straightforward declaration of the said eyewitnesses made
in open court that Alfredo Senador was sitting when he was stabbed by the accused.
Discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness
stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses (People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19). This is because
it is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit being taken ex parte is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate (People vs. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493). Moreover, as noted by this
Court the word "standing" was superimposed after the original typewritten word was erased
using a snopic (sic) or white substance." (Italics ours) AcHEaS
In addition, we note that Lecpoy and Eduardo did not countersign the superimposition in the subject
affidavit. In the absence of clear proof that they confirmed the change, they should not be bound by it.
The accused invokes self-defense for his acquittal. In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the
accused. Thus, he must present clear and convincing evidence that the following elements are present, to wit:
(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 12 The accused failed to discharge this task.
The accused alleged that he and the victim had hunting knives during their encounter. After the victim's
elbow hit the left side of his body, the victim grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it with his right arm. A verbal
exchange ensued between them and then the victim, using the left arm tried to unsheathe the knife that was
tucked at his left side. However, the victim was not able to pull out the knife because it got entangled with his
shirt tucked in his pants. In defense, the accused allegedly pulled out his own knife that was tucked in the right
side of his waist using his left arm and stabbed the victim on the left shoulder. He then retreated and left as the
victim was still trying to approach him. 13
The version of the accused does not inspire belief. The incident happened in plain view of many
witnesses at the flea market. He even claimed he was with a certain Guale and one Sonny Boy at that
time. 14 Yet, nobody corroborated his story. Indeed, his narration on how the victim "attacked" him is
improbable. In the witness chair, he admitted that the victim was bigger than him and that his left hand was
restrained by the victim. 15 It is thus incredible how he could pull out his knife from his right side, with the use
of his left hand, 16 raise that knife high enough to hit the shoulder of the victim and inflict an 11-cm. deep
wound upon him. It is more probable that the victim was sitting down when the accused attacked him from
behind as the prosecution witnesses testified. Equally incredulous is the claim that after being injured, the victim
still tried to approach and attack him, hence, he had to retreat. The accused's uncorroborated plea of self-
defense cannot be entertained, especially when it is, in itself, extremely doubtful. 17
The Information charged that evident premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the
crime. The evidence failed to prove evident premeditation. Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 18 The records show that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence
to prove these elements.
Treachery or alevosia exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 19
The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of the victim to murder. The stabbing
was from behind, done in a sudden and unexpected manner while the victim was sitting close to the ground,
with his buttocks resting on his right foot, and while his attention was focused on the on-going cara y
cruz game. 20 Clearly, the victim was not able to defend himself from the mode of attack.
 The trial court also correctly credited the accused with voluntary surrender to mitigate his liability.
Voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been actually arrested; that he surrendered himself to
a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and that the surrender was voluntary.
The records reveal that the accused ran toward the municipal building after the stabbing incident. On
his way to the municipal building, he admitted to Barangay Tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog that he
stabbed the victim. Although he did not immediately turn over his weapon to them for fear of retaliation from
the victim's relatives, he did so as soon as they reached the municipal building. Undoubtedly, the conduct he
displayed was spontaneous as it shows his interest to give himself up unconditionally to the authorities, thus
saving the State the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 21
The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong. We are not persuaded.
The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon
used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused
used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend
himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefor,
without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. 22
As the killing was attended by treachery, the accused is liable for the crime of murder. The prescribed
penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death. 23 In view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua against the accused.
The civil indemnity awarded in favor of the legal heirs of the victim, Alfredo Senador, in the amount of
P50,000.00 is in accord with the Court's current policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from, finding the accused, ELBERT CALLET, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12995, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and
to pay the legal heirs of the victim, ALFREDO SENADOR, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay
the costs, is AFFIRMED. aTCADc
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER CAÑA LEONOR, accused-
appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Rodolfo P. Orticio for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Christopher Leonor was charged with robbery with homicide. He was accused of divesting cash and a
Titus watch from dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco and for stabbing her, resulting to her death. The Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the victim the following: death indemnity, actual
damages, and attorney's fees. Accused-appellant urged the Supreme Court to modify the judgment by
convicting him of homicide only and to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary
surrender, and voluntary confession.
The Supreme Court found no mitigating circumstance in this case. Lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds.
The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act. The
push and "bad words" delivered by the victim to the accused did not justify retaliation with a knife. There was
nothing on record which can lead to conclude that there was voluntary surrender; neither was there a voluntary
confession. The dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco established not only that a robbery was committed, there
being violence and intimidation against her, but that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of that robbery.
The Supreme Court modified the penalty of the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua, there being no
evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the lower of the two indivisible penalties was imposed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES OF A WITNESS; TESTIMONIES IN OPEN COURT ARE

SUPERIOR TO AFFIDAVITS TAKEN EX PARTE; CASE AT BAR. — Galeno's failure to mention in his sworn statement
that money and a wristwatch were retrieved from CHRISTOPHER does not negate his claim to that effect,
because he later stated that fact in his testimony. The settled rule is that testimonies in open court are superior
to affidavits taken ex parte. That Interia inserted the stolen items in the Police Referral does not diminish the
truth of the allegation of robbery, since it appears that the intercalation was intended to make the Referral
accurate. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; THE TRIAL JUDGE IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO DECIDE QUESTIONS THEREOF;
RATIONALE; EXCEPTION IN CASE AT BAR. — The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of
the highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court
in passing on the credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result of
the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better
position to decide questions of credibility, since he has personally heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the charge and the penalty
imposed, the Court spared no effort to meticulously review the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER
had indeed committed the offense charged and the prosecution's evidence proved it beyond reasonable doubt.
3. ID.; ID.; DYING DECLARATION; ELEMENTS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Most crucial for the
prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando Tarlengco, the victim's father, because he stated the most
incriminating piece of evidence — the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco. While, generally, a witness can testify
only to those facts which are derived from his own perception, a recognized exception thereto is the reportage
in open court of the declaration of a dying person made under the consciousness of an impending death where
that person's death is the subject of inquiry in the case. To be admissible, a dying declaration must (1) refer to
the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant's death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper influence; (4)
be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant
must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify. Dr. Tarlengco's dying
declaration complied with the above requisites. She talked about the incident which led to her condition. The
declaration was a first-hand account of the incident, bereft of opinion or conjecture. The account was made in
a criminal case where her death was part of the subject of inquiry. And, most important, she was convinced that
she was about to die.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; CONVICTION THEREOF CAN ONLY BE TRUE IF THE
ROBBERY ITSELF WAS PROVED AS CONCLUSIVELY AS ANY OTHER ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME; PRESENT
IN CASE AT BAR. — CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of evidence, therefore,
shifted to him; he had to prove a justifying or exempting circumstance to avoid criminal liability. He miserably
failed to do so. The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr. Tarlengco by reason or on the
occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person. One could be convicted of
robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element of
the crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things, constitutes robbery. Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph
Sumalbar identified the items recovered from CHRISTOPHER as belonging to Dr. Tarlengco. These testimonies
indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal property belonging to Dr. Tarlengco, consistent with the disputable
presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act. While CHRISTOPHER denied that Dr. Tarlengco's watch and money were
recovered from him, the independent and corroborative testimonies of police officer Galeno and guard Baguilod
prove otherwise. The trial court found the testimonies of these two witnesses more credible, and this Court
sees no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also pointed out that the intercalation of stolen
items in Interia's referral report to the Prosecutor indicated the fabrication of robbery charges against him. But
the intercalation was sufficiently explained as an honest mistake, especially considering that Interia had
specified in the report, in an entry appearing before the intercalation, that the charge against CHRISTOPHER
was robbery with homicide. It is indisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengco's belongings. The
unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner
of the articles was deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption
becomes one of robbery. The prosecution proved in this case that there was violence and intimidation in the
taking of Dr. Tarlengco's property.
5. ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; WHEN NOT PRESENT; CASE AT BAR. — The Court find no
mitigating circumstance in this case CHRISTOPHER claims that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as
the act committed; that there was sufficient provocation by the offended party immediately preceding the
offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced in him passion and obfuscation: that
he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority; and that he voluntarily confessed having committed
homicide. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the accused
used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs of the victim, as in this case. The provocation
sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act.
6. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The
penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no evidence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances against or in favor of CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be
imposed, without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court, likewise believes that the awards
in favor of Dr. Tarlengco's family of moral damages of P2 million and attorney's fees of P500,000 are excessive.
Thus, reduce them to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively. DaESIC

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C .J p:

In the decision 1 of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque,
Branch 274, found accused-appellant Christopher Caña Leonor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000 as death indemnity; P44,318 as actual damages; P2 million as moral damages; and P50,000 as attorney's
fees. cdasia
CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information 2 whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
 That on or about the 15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain and against the will of complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by
means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of said complainant did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest her cash money worth P900.00 and
Titus wrist watch valued at an undetermined amount, belonging to said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on the occasion
of the said Robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without justifiable reason,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said Ma. Teresa
Tarlengco, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds which caused her death.
At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered a plea of not guilty. 3
It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos Building in General Santos Avenue, Bicutan
Extension, Parañaque City, at around 11:30 a.m., CHRISTOPHER stabbed dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco,
which wound ultimately led to her death. That much is admitted by CHRISTOPHER. The prosecution and the
defense differ, however, in the circumstances surrounding the incident.
The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1 Luis F. Galeno, PO3 Mateo Interia, Dr. Ravell
Ronald Baluyot, Dr. Edgardo de Guzman, Dr. Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr. John Enrique Franco, Fernando
Tarlengco, Geraldine Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst. Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray. The defense
presented CHRISTOPHER, Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato Leonor, and Alexander
Pagubasan.
The Office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the evidence for the prosecution as follows:
In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by profession,
was at her clinic at the third floor of the Hermanos Building, Bicutan, Parañaque, Metro Manila,
when a man entered and inquired about the cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco
quoted her professional fee, the man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor, said
that he would come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came back[,] and Dr.
Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was preparing her dental instruments
when Leonor barged in and demanded money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was]
on the table. On hearing this, Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, grabbed her watch and ran away.
Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the clinic and saw the man running out of the building. Dr.
Tarlengco shouted for help.
Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting, "tulungan
ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng taong iyon." Baquilod noticed that Dr. Tarlengco was referring to
the man "running out of the building, coming from upstairs." Baquilod chased Leonor up to
Daang Hari Street where he was joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted
by people running after a person with bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod caught up
with Leonor, Baquilod grabbed Leonor's hand and took therefrom a Titus wristwatch and P900
cash. When queried, Leonor readily answered, "Sir, hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko
lang ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko." Leonor was brought to the Parañaque Police Block
Station. PO3 Interia who was instructed to investigate proceeded to Dr. Tarlengco's clinic,
where they saw, among other[ ] [things], a bloodied balisong (fan knife) at the ground floor of
the Hermano's building. Baquilod turned over the watch and money he took from Leonor to
Interia. Thereafter, Galeno and Interia returned to the police station where they were
interrogated.
Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Center where she
underwent an emergency operation for a stab wound on her chest. After the operation, Dr.
Tarlengco's father, with the doctor's permission, was allowed to talk to his daughter inside the
operating room. Although Dr. Tarlengco was gasping for breath, she spoke to her father, viz:
Q So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the Operating Room? What did she say,
if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A She said that this man pretended to be a patient.
Q And what else did she say?
 A He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and then she said, "Dad, when I quoted
my price, he said that he would come back and left in a hurry."
Q What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A "After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit down first at my Waiting Area because
I [had] to still prepare the instruments needed."
Q Then, what happened after that?
A She said, "while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad, this man barged in. He demanded
for my money. I told him it [was] on my table. And after telling that, Dad, he stabbed
me and then he grabbed my watch and he [ran] away" and she said, "I struggled Dad,
to come out of the clinic and when I was on the porch, I saw this man coming [sic] out
of the building. I shouted for help, I said "Saklolo, saklolo, sinaksak ako ng taong iyan.
Hulihin ninyo."
Q Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that incident, Mr. Tarlengco?
A After that, in tears, she said that "Dad, I don't know, why inspite of getting my money this
man stabbed me" and I was numbed at that point of time, I [could not] talk anymore, I
[could not] tell anything to her anymore, I just combed her hair with my fingers.
Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room where she subsequently died.
Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who conducted the post-mortem
examination of the deceased, testified that Tarlengco's stab wound on the chest could have
been caused by single bladed "fan" knife.
Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr. Tarlengco while reviewing for the
BAR Examination, owned a Titus watch similar to that of her sister. Both watches were given to
them by another sister Cecille. On the morning of May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco
strap the watch on her wrist. Geraldine, likewise, saw her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, place in her
wallet one 500-peso bill and four 100-peso bills, after showing the same to Geraldine, who
earlier was teasing her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, that the reason why she did not buy the dress she
wanted to buy at Cinderella's was because she had no money. If only to prove her sister
Geraldine wrong, Dr. Tarlengco showed her money which she took from her wallet. 4
Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim, testified that he got to talk with Dr. Tarlengco
at the hospital. He asked Dr. Tarlengco what happened, and she answered that a man posing as a patient held
her up and stabbed her. 5
Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengco's fiance, testified that when he learned about his fiancee's killing, he
immediately went to the crime scene and, thereafter, to the Block 7 police station where he confronted the
suspected killer, Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the latter, thus:
Q And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the cell of this suspect?
A I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I found this man without any shirt on
and he was sitting at the corner and he was trying to avoid me and I asked him. "Bakit
mo ginawa iyon?" Sabi niya, "hindi ko po naman gusto. Kailangan ko lamang ang pera."
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else did he say, if any?
A While I was shouting at him, "Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak mo pa. Bakit mo ginawa iyon?"
"Hindi ko po naman gusto iyon, mahuhuli na po ako," sabi niya. ''Mahuhuli na po ako
kaya ginawa ko iyon."
Q Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if any?
A And he told me that he needed the money. 6
SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the statement of Dr. Tarlengco's father and
executed a Referral 7 to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal for CHRISTOPHER's inquest. Interia reported in the
referral that CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with homicide but forgot to state the property stolen
from Dr. Tarlengco. After Mr. Tarlengco reminded Interia of the stolen items, the latter intercalated into the
referral a reference to P900 and a Titus wristwatch forming part of the evidence against CHRISTOPHER. 8
Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the impact of her daughter's death, viz.:
Q In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco, did your family incur any
expenses?
A Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we are having up to this time. You
know, up to this time, we kept on weeping. My father, the grandfather of my daughter,
was shocked and in anguish, he also succumbed to death in less than two months,
because of what this evil person [had] done to us. My work was affected. My wife's
work is affected. There are times when we are at home, we don't know what to do
anymore. We are in total misery. I don't know why this was done to us by the devil
deeds of this person has done to us [sic]." 9
In relation to Dr. Tarlengco's death, her family spent P8,718 for hospital expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500
charged by Funeraria Malaya where she was brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250 paid to Manila
Memorial, Inc.; P5,000 for the masses held for Dr. Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for the food served to the
guests at Dr. Tarlengco's wake. 10
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995, at about 6:00 a.m., he left his town
Calauag, Quezon, and boarded a Jam Transit bus bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan knife in his pocket. He
was to fetch his family for the town fiesta to be held on 25 May 1995. His head and two of his molar teeth were
then aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound for Bicutan Extension. 11
Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his aching teeth pulled. He found Dr.
Tarlengco's dental clinic at the third floor of a certain building in General Santos Avenue. He asked Dr. Tarlengco
how much an extraction cost, and was told that the fee was P150 per tooth. CHRISTOPHER negotiated a charge
of P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco rejected the offer. CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for another
dentist, but before he could make his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco stopped him and agreed to charge
P100 per extraction. CHRISTOPHER was made to sit on the dental chair as Dr. Tarlengco prepared the
instruments for the extraction. Just as she was about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she changed her
mind and would charge P150 per tooth pulled. CHRISTOPHER pushed away Dr. Tarlengco's hand, which angered
her. She castigated and cursed CHRISTOPHER for asking for an extraction without being able to pay for it. 12
As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco cursed and pushed him, at which
moment he blacked out. 13 He then sensed that the dentist was in pain, and he saw blood spurting. He realized
that he had stabbed the dentist. In shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost the grip on his fan knife, and ran out
of the clinic and out of the building. When he looked back at the clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help.
A security guard, with his shotgun aimed at CHRISTOPHER, ran after the latter. 14
CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he came across Police Officer Galeno, who
grabbed him by the hand and asked what happened. He replied, "Sir, nakadisgrasya ako." 15 Galeno warded off
the pursuing security guard who insisted on apprehending CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought CHRISTOPHER to
Block 7, Parañaque Police Station, and later, to the Police Headquarters along the Coastal Road in Parañaque.
Four policemen, including PO3 Interia, took turns in mauling and kicking him, and one policeman even took
money from his wallet. Also, his clothes were confiscated. 16
During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, but denied that he
had taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from the victim. He was surprised when later, he was informed by
Assistant Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray that he would be charged with robbery with homicide, not
homicide only. 17
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHER's uncle, revealed that at about noon of 15 May 1995, while he
was at home, he received a telephone call from CHRISTOPHER saying that he had stabbed someone. When he
asked CHRISTOPHER why he stabbed someone the latter answered, "Aburido ako, Kuya Ding, aburido ako" ("I
am troubled, Kuya Ding, I am troubled"). 18
Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHER 's father, testified that he went to see his son at his detention cell but
could hardly recognize him because he was bloodied. He remembered that CHRISTOPHER complained of
toothache before he left for Manila. 19
Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three hours before the former took the stand.
Unassisted by any "dental aid" or nurse, he determined that two of CHRISTOPHER's teeth were due for
extraction 20 and, at the condition they were in, were probably aching as early as a year before. Citing his
experience, Dr. Besa claimed that people complaining of toothache are usually irritable, although he admitted
that none of his patients complaining from a toothache has ever killed a person or even brought a fan knife to
his clinic. In fact, he never heard of any patient with a toothache who killed a dentist. He recalled one instance
when a patient boxed him after he unintentionally hurt the patient while pulling a tooth. LLjur
These were the evidence before the trial court which merited CHRISTOPHER's conviction. CHRISTOPHER
urges us to modify the judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and not of robbery with
homicide, and (2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary
confession.
CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are fraught with inconsistencies
and contradictions, and are therefore obvious concoctions and manufactured evidence. He points out that
Baquilod failed to mention in his sworn statement, given to the police immediately after the incident, that he
retrieved a Titus wristwatch and P900 worth of peso bills from CHRISTOPHER. Baquilod likewise testified that
Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help because she was stabbed; she made no mention of having been robbed. Then,
too, SPO1 Galeno stated in his sworn statement that Dr. Tarlengco was only stabbed.
CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod, Galeno, Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu
Guray that he admitted to them on separate occasions his commission of the offense charged are inadmissible
because the admission was not in writing, was not made with the assistance of a counsel, and was not preceded
by a warning as to the consequences of the admission. In any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence.
Additionally, he stresses the possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she caused the filing against him of the
information for robbery with homicide.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General refutes CHRISTOPHER's claims, asserting that the robbery
was duly and satisfactorily established by the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father, corroborated by
the testimonies of Baquilod and Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim that she was robbed when she
shouted for help from her clinic's balcony is of no moment, since she later told Dr. Franco and her father of the
complete events that transpired. Galeno's failure to mention in his sworn statement that money and a
wristwatch were retrieved from CHRISTOPHER does not negate his claim to that effect, because he later stated
that fact in his testimony. The settled rule is that testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex
parte. That Interia inserted the stolen items in the Police Referral does not diminish the truth of the allegation
of robbery, since it appears that the intercalation was intended to make the Referral accurate.
The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of the highly revered dicta in our
jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility
of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence
that have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result of the case. The reason therefor is founded
on practical and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide questions of credibility,
since he has personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. 21 Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to
meticulously review the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER had indeed committed the offense
charged and the prosecution's evidence proved it beyond reasonable doubt.
CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of evidence, therefore, shifted to
him; he had to prove a justifying 22 or exempting 23 circumstance to avoid criminal liability. He miserably failed
to do so.
The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr. Tarlengco by reason or on the occasion
of a robbery 24 with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person. One could be convicted of robbery
with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.
The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person or by using force upon things, constitutes robbery. 25
Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered from CHRISTOPHER as
belonging to Dr. Tarlengco. These testimonies indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal property belonging to
Dr. Tarlengco, consistent with the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. 26 While CHRISTOPHER denied
that Dr. Tarlengco's watch and money were recovered from him, the independent and corroborative
testimonies of police officer Galeno and guard Baquilod prove otherwise. The trial court found the testimonies
of these two witnesses more credible, and we see no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also
pointed out that the intercalation of stolen items in Interia's referral report to the Prosecutor indicated the
fabrication of robbery charges against him. But the intercalation was sufficiently explained as an honest mistake,
especially considering that Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before the intercalation,
that the charge against CHRISTOPHER was robbery with homicide.
It is indisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengco's belongings. The unexplained possession
of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was
deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of
robbery. 27 The prosecution proved in this case that there was violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr.
Tarlengco's property.
Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando Tarlengco, the victim's father, because
he stated the most incriminating piece of evidence — the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco. While, generally,
a witness can testify only to those facts which are derived from his own perception, 28 a recognized exception
thereto is the reportage in open court of the declaration of a dying person made under the consciousness of an
impending death where that person's death is the subject of inquiry in the case. 29 To be admissible, a dying
declaration must (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant's death; (2) be made under
the consciousness of an impending death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of
improper influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry;
and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify.
Dr. Tarlengco's dying declaration complied with the above requisites. She talked about the incident
which led to her condition. The declaration was a first-hand account of the incident, bereft of opinion or
conjecture. The account was made in a criminal case where her death was part of the subject of inquiry. And,
most important, she was convinced that she was about to die; thus:
Atty. Revilla:
Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw her inside the operating
room?
Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, "Dad, I have a feeling I can no longer endure this."
Atty. Revilla:
Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were talking to her, Mr. Tarlengco?
A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep herself awake, and in my
desire to help her awake, I asked her what happened.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Revilla:
Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating room, after that, Mr. Tarlengco?
Witness Tarlengco:
A On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping and complaining of pain and
gasping for breath. . . . 30
Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to be her patient demanded money from
her. After she surrendered her money to him, the latter stabbed her and took her watch as she lay injured.
The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was committed, there being violence and
intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of said robbery.
Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case, CHRISTOPHER claims that he did not intend to
commit so grave a wrong as the act committed; that there was sufficient provocation by the offended party
immediately preceding the offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced in him
passion and obfuscation; that he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority; and that he voluntarily
confessed having committed homicide.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the accused used
a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs of the victim, 31 as in this case.
 The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory
act. 32 The events which led to the stabbing were described by CHRISTOPHER as follows:
Q Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anaesthesia, you said Dra. Tarlengco
changed the price from P100.00 to P150.00. Then, you parried her hand. Is that correct?
A Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]
Q What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?
A The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.
Q When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at the dental chair? Right?
A Opo.
Q After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you, right?
A No, sir. I just said "why did you change the price?" and I stood up. That was the time she
cursed me.
Q When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an instrument?
A No, Sir. She just got mad.
Q Did she slap you on your face?
A No, Sir. She just pushed me.
Q And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body?
A No, Sir.
Q And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body?
A She just told me bad words. 33
CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and "bad words" justify retaliation with a knife. Such claim is
undeserving of belief and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
prior provocation by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation as, according to him, he
momentarily blacked out and instantly found his fan knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengco's chest. To be blinded by
passion and obfuscation is to lose self-control, 34 not consciousness. Moreover, courts cannot appreciate
passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that there was causes naturally tending to produce such
powerful excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control. 35 As we discussed earlier, the events
leading to the stabbing precluded any natural tendency to produce a powerful excitement in CHRISTOPHER.
CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in authority or to any other person. While
he was being pursued by Security Guard Baquilod, he intentionally went to where there were many people,
presumably to confuse Baquilod. Fortunately, Police Officer Galeno was able to grab him by the hand and
prevented him from further eluding justice. There is nothing in the record which can lead us to conclude that
he surrendered to anyone.
Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating circumstance contemplated
by law is a plea of guilty made spontaneously and unconditionally in open court before the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. 36 CHRISTOPHER made no such plea.
What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The penalty for robbery with homicide
is reclusion perpetua to death. 37 There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or
in favor of CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, 38 without the benefit of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 39 We likewise believe that the awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengco's family of
moral damages of P2 million and attorney's fees of P500,000 are excessive. We reduce them to P50,000 and
P25,000, respectively. cdlex
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque in Criminal Case No.
95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAÑA LEONOR is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as indemnity
for death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as attorney's fees, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO ESPINA, accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Romeo Espina was in the house of Eufronia Pagas to represent his father in a meeting
to prepare for a wedding celebration. Among those present in the said gathering were accused-appellant's
brother, Rogelio Espina, and the deceased, Romeo Bulicatin, who were having a drinking spree. When accused-
appellant arrived, Bulicatin asked him to buy 3 bottles of wine, to which he acceded. Late that same afternoon,
Bulicatin again demanded another bottle of wine from accused-appellant. The latter, however, refused,
prompting Bulicatin to urinate on accused-appellant. This infuriated accused-appellant, but instead of assaulting
Bulicatin, he turned his back and walked away because he knew that Bulicatin always carried a knife. Later that
evening, while Bulicatin, Rogelio and Samson Abuloc were still having a drinking spree at the store of Eufronia
Pagas, they heard accused-appellant calling Bulicatin from outside. The trio came down from the house. Rogelio
went down first, followed by Samson and Bulicatin. When Rogelio reached the ground, accused-appellant told
him to drop down, while Samson also dropped himself to the ground when he saw accused-appellant about to
draw his firearm. Bulicatin was still at the stairway and when he turned his back towards accused-appellant, the
latter shot him, hitting him at the back. Accused-appellant fired two more shots at him. On the way to the
hospital, Felix Celmar asked Bulicatin what happened to him and the latter answered that he was shot by
accused-appellant. He died at the hospital. Two informations were filed against accused-appellant. One, for the
crime of murder, and another for Illegal Possession of Firearms. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty to both charges. Thereafter trial followed. The trial court rendered the assailed decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for the crime of Murder and Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court did not err in giving credence to the version of the prosecution. The facts and
circumstances alleged to have been overlooked by the trial court were not material to the case and would not
affect the disposition thereof. The treachery employed by accused-appellant in shooting the victim was a
circumstance that qualified the killing to murder. Such being the case, treachery could not be offset by a
mitigating circumstance. The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in
immediate vindication of a grave offense. Accused-appellant was urinated on by the victim in front of the guests.
The act of the victim, which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated accused-appellant, came within the purview
of a "grave offense" under Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. With one generic mitigating circumstance and no
aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty imposed by the Court was an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ASSESSMENT THEREOF BEST UNDERTAKEN

BY TRIAL COURT; RATIONALE. — [I]t is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. In the case
at bar, the trial court did not err in giving credence to the version of the prosecution. The facts and circumstances
alleged to have been overlooked by the trial court are not material to the case and will not affect the disposition
thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE; PART OF RES GESTAE; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The
alleged dying declaration of the victim should not have been admitted as an ante mortem statement,
considering that the prosecution failed to show that the subject declaration was made under the consciousness
of an impending death. Prosecution witness Celmar testified that on the way to the hospital, the victim told him
that it was accused-appellant who shot him. Though the victim eventually died two days after he was shot, there
is nothing in the records that would show that the victim was under the impression that he was going to die.
However, the declaration of the deceased pointing to accused-appellant as the culprit is admissible as part of res
gestae. Having been made shortly after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, the victim
evidently had no opportunity to contrive. Furthermore, the delay of Felix Celmar in revealing the declaration of
accused-appellant does not make Celmar's testimony unworthy of belief. Delay in revealing the identity of the
perpetrator of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where such witness
gives a sufficient explanation. In the case at bar, such delay was amply explained by the witness. Celmar testified
that it took him four months to reveal what he knew because he thought he would not be utilized as witness
for the prosecution. Moreover, after the incident, he had to leave for his work in Albay.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENCE THEREOF QUALIFIES THE
KILLING TO MURDER. — Likewise, the trial court erred in treating alevosia merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance, moreso in offsetting the same by the generic mitigating circumstance of having committed the
crime in immediate vindication of a grave offense. The treachery employed by accused-appellant in shooting
the victim is actually a circumstance that qualified the killing to murder. Such being the case, treachery cannot
be offset by a mitigating circumstance.
4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ACTING IN IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF GRAVE OFFENSE;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted
in immediate vindication of a grave offense. As the evidence on record show, accused-appellant was urinated
on by the victim in front of the guests. The act of the victim, which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated accused-
appellant, came within the purview of a "grave offense" under Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant.
5. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — As to the imposable penalty, the applicable provision is Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, the crime having
been committed on September 30, 1992. Thereunder, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. With one generic mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance to offset
it, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. cDTaSH

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran, Branch 47, in Criminal
Case Nos. 8194 and 8155 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder qualified by Illegal Possession of
Firearms under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294; and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 and the costs.
The information for the crime of murder alleged:
That on or about the 30th day of September, 1992, in the municipality of Tubigon,
province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused without justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior
strength, the accused being then armed with a short firearm and without giving opportunity to
the victim to defend himself, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Romeo Bulicatin, with the use of said firearm, hitting the latter on the
vital part of his body resulting to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
deceased. DIETcH
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken advantage of by
the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. 2
For Illegal Possession of Firearms, the information stated:
That on or about the 30th day of September, 1992, in the municipality of Tubigon,
province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, with intent to possess firearm and ammunition did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally keep, carry and have in his possession, custody and control
a short firearm and ammunition without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to
possess the said firearm and ammunition from competent authority, which firearm and
ammunition were carried by the accused outside of his residence and used by him in
 committing the crime of Murder of which one Romeo Bulicatin was the victim; to the damage
and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. Acts committed contrary to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1866. 3
Upon arraignment on June 27, 1994, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges; 4 thereafter
trial followed.
The facts as adduced by the prosecution are synthesized in the People's Brief, thus —
In the afternoon of September 30, 1992, the members of an association locally known
as the "ripa-ripa" went to the house of Eufronia Pagas located at sitio Batic, Tan-awan, Tubigon,
Bohol for their scheduled contribution to a fund intended for a wedding celebration. (p. 3,
August 23, 1996, TSN; p. 3, January 21, 1997, TSN) Among those present thereat were Romeo
Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina, Samson Abuloc who were having a drinking spree and playing
"chikika", a card game. (p. 4, May 9, 1995, TSN).
When accused-appellant arrived, Romeo asked three (3) bottles of "kulafu" wine from
him and he acceded by buying three (3) bottles of "kulafu" wine from the store of Eufronia
Pagas. Later on, at around 4:00 of that afternoon, Romeo again demanded another bottle of
"kulafu" wine from accused-appellant but this time, the latter refused to give in to the demand.
(p. 4, January 21, 1997, TSN) Romeo then proceeded to where accused-appellant was playing
cards and without any warning, urinated on the latter and clipped him under his (Romeo) arms.
(p. 4, August 23, 1996, TSN) Accused-appellant got angry. He however did not engage Romeo
in any altercation but instead turned away and went home. (p. 5, May 9, 1995, TSN) DCAHcT
Later on in the evening, at about 9:00 p.m., while Romeo, Rogelio and Samson were still
having a drinking spree at the store of Eufronia Pagas, they heard accused-appellant calling
Romeo from outside, saying, "Borgs, get out because I have something to say." The trio came
down from the house. Rogelio went down first, followed by Samson and Romeo (pp. 5-6, ibid.)
When Rogelio reached the ground, accused-appellant told him to drop down while Samson also
dropped himself to the ground when he saw accused-appellant about to draw his firearm. At
that juncture, Romeo was still at the stairway and when he turned his back towards accused-
appellant, the latter shot him, hitting him at the back. Romeo ran away but he was chased by
accused-appellant who fired two (2) more shots at him. (p. 5, March 19, 1996, TSN; p. 7, May
9, 1995)
Samson ran away from the scene of the incident and upon reaching the house of Poloy
Concha, he saw Romeo outside the house asking for help. Samson asked some of residents to
help him bring Romeo to barangay Cawayanan. (pp. 14-15, March 19, 1996, TSN) They loaded
Romeo in a rattan cradle and upon reaching the said barangay at about 3:00 o'clock of the
following morning, they transferred him to the vehicle owned by a certain Emiliano Fucanan.
From the said barangay, Romeo was taken to the house of Mayor Placing Mascarinas in
Poblacion, Tubigon, Bohol where he was transferred to the ambulance which took him to the
Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital in Tagbilaran City. On the way to the hospital, Felix Celmar
asked Romeo what happened to him and the latter answered that he was shot by accused-
appellant. (pp. 4-8, July 29, 1996, TSN) Romeo was brought to the emergency room and
underwent operation. He however died at about 5:00 p.m. of October 2, 1992, due to septic
shock irreversible, generalized peritonitis, gunshot wound, perforating ileum. (pp. 7 & 11, June
18, 1996, TSN) 5
The defense presented four witnesses, namely: Rogelio Espina, Dr. Harold B. Gallego, Maximiano Dormal
and accused-appellant himself.
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Maximiano Dormal may be summarized as follows:
At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 30, 1992, accused-appellant was in the house of
Eufronia Pagas to represent his father in a meeting to prepare for a wedding celebration. Among those present
in the said gathering were accused-appellant's brother, Rogelio Espina and the deceased, Romeo Bulicatin who
were having a drinking spree. When accused-appellant arrived thereat, Bulicatin asked him to buy 3 bottles of
"kulafu" wine to which he acceded. At around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, Bulicatin again demanded
another bottle of "kulafu" wine from accused-appellant. The latter, however, refused to obey, prompting
Bulicatin to urinate on accused-appellant. This infuriated accused-appellant, but instead of assaulting Bulicatin,
he turned his back and walked away because he knew that Bulicatin always carried a knife. When accused-
appellant was about 12 meters away from the house of Eufronia Pagas, Bulicatin pursued him. Accused-
appellant tried to evade Bulicatin but the latter caught up with him and stabbed him on his side. Consequently,
accused-appellant sustained a deep punctured wound but was fortunately able to escape until he passed out. 6
At around 6:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day, Maximiano Dormal who was then on his way home, saw
accused-appellant wounded and lying on the ground. Recognizing the latter, Dormal immediately informed and
accompanied accused-appellant's parents who lost no time in bringing him to the hospital. 7
On the other hand, defense witness Rogelio Espina (Rogelio), declared that in the afternoon of
September 30, 1992, he was in the house of Eufronia Pagas, having a drinking spree with Romeo Bulicatin and
Samson Abuloc, while his brother, herein accused-appellant, was playing cards. At around 3:00 o'clock p.m., he
saw Bulicatin approach accused-appellant and forthwith urinated on him. Thereafter, Bulicatin grabbed
accused-appellant under his arms but the latter was able to extricate himself from the hold of Bulicatin and ran
away. Rogelio wanted to follow accused-appellant but was prevailed upon by Bulicatin to stay. They then
continued their drinking spree until 9:00 o'clock p.m. When they were about to go home, Rogelio heard
somebody calling Bulicatin, saying — "Get out, Borgs, as I have something to tell you." According to Rogelio, he
is certain that the voice was not that of accused-appellant. When they decided to go home, he was the first one
to go downstairs, followed by Samson Abuloc, and then by Bulicatin. Upon reaching the ground, Rogelio heard
a gunshot and immediately scampered away without looking back to see who was shot. He claimed that it was
only two days after the incident that he came to know who the victim of the shooting incident was. He added
that from the house of Eufronia Pagas, he directly went home where he was told by his mother that accused-
appellant was stabbed and was brought to the hospital.
On August 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, the Court finds the accused, Romeo Espina, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, for the crime of Murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and sentences him to suffer the straight penalty
of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the inherent accessory penalties provided by
law, there being a mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense committed on the
accused; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Romeo Bulicatin, in the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, this appeal on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISINTERPRETED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOME FACTS OR
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE APPEARING IN THE RECORD IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED.
II
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED. 9
In particular, accused-appellant points to the following facts and circumstances that had been allegedly
overlooked by the trial court, to wit —
1) The resolutions of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon, Bohol in Criminal
Case Nos. 1245 and 1246 to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence that accused-
appellant had committed the crimes charged;
2) The non-presentation of Eufronia Pagas (the owner of the house where the victim
and his companions had a drinking spree), despite being listed in the information as one of the
witnesses for the prosecution.
3) The testimony of prosecution eyewitness Samson Abuloc, that he does not know Felix
Celmar who claimed to be one of the persons asked by the former to help him bring the victim
to the hospital.
4) The incredibility of the testimony of Samson Abuloc as regards his having identified
accused-appellant through his voice and the type of firearm used by the latter in shooting the
 victim as well as his having seen the victim being hit at the back by the first gunshot fired at
him by accused-appellant;
5) The fact that at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of September 30, 1992, accused-
appellant was found by one Maximiano Dormal lying wounded and groaning near a pathway
leading to the latter's house; and
6) The length of time that elapsed before Felix Celmar revealed that the victim told him
that accused-appellant was the one who shot him." 10
Accused-appellant makes capital of the November 23, 1992 Resolutions 11 of the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Tagbuin-Clarin Bohol, which found the evidence against accused-appellant to be insufficient after
conducting the preliminary investigation. We note, however, that said resolutions were reversed and
superseded by the February 2, 1993 Omnibus Resolution 12 of the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, who,
after conducting a re-investigation of the instant case, found probable cause to hold accused-appellant for trial
and accordingly filed the corresponding informations against accused-appellant.
Moreover, the basis of the investigating judge in declaring insufficiency of evidence does not appear to
be substantial. Pertinent portion of said resolution reads:
Upon the foregoing facts, the court finds and is satisfied that the offense complained of
has been committed, but there is insufficiency of evidence that the herein accused
Romeo Espina committed the crime for the simple reason that according to the declaration of
Eufronia Pagas who is an unbiased witness as compared to the declaration of Samson Abuloc
who was a close barcada of the victim, the herein accused Romeo Espina was not in her house
where the drinking spree was held from 6:00 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 30,
1992. 13
Clearly, the fact that Eufronia did not see accused-appellant in her house between 6:00-9:00 o'clock in
the evening of September 30, 1992, does not in any way contradict or refute the claim of the prosecution that
accused-appellant left the house of Eufronia at around 4:00 in the afternoon after being urinated on by the
victim and thereafter returned at about 9:00 p.m. and shot the victim outside the house of Eufronia.
Then too, the non-presentation of Eufronia Pagas as a prosecution witness is not damaging to the case
of the prosecution. In Eufronia's affidavit, she declared that after Rogelio Espina, Samson Abuloc and the
deceased went out of her house, she heard three gunshots but bothered not to go outside because of
fear. 14 Evidently, Eufronia Pagas is not an eyewitness and her testimony would not do much for the
prosecution. At any rate, it is the prosecution's prerogative to determine who should be presented as witnesses
on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity. 15 Hence, its choice of witnesses can not be successfully
challenged by accused-appellant.
Whether or not prosecution witness Samson Abuloc knew Felix Celmar who claimed to be one of the
persons asked by the former to help him bring the victim to the hospital, is of no consequence. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, it is possible that Felix Celmar, a resident of another barangay, is not known
by name to Abuloc, especially so since their meeting on that fateful day was only casual. TcSAaH
Neither do we find improbable the testimony of Samson Abuloc that he recognized the voice of accused-
appellant. Being a friend and a second cousin of accused-appellant, he is expected to be familiar with his voice.
So also, we find no reason to doubt the testimony of Abuloc that he was able to identify the pistol used by
accused-appellant as well as witnessed the stabbing of the victim at the back. Not only was Abuloc only three
to four meters away from accused-appellant, 16 the prosecution was likewise able to establish that the
moonlight illuminating the locus criminis afforded the witness a clear view of the shooting incident. 17 The
Court has previously held that the light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give
ample illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another. 18 Under the circumstances, therefore,
Abuloc could not have failed to recognize accused-appellant who is not only his "barkada" but a second cousin
as well.
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, the trial court did not overlook his contention that he could
not have committed the offenses charged because at around 4:00 o'clock p.m. of September 30, 1992, he was
unconscious due to a stab wound. In fact, the trial court treated the same as a defense of denial and alibi.
Indeed, these defenses cannot prevail over the categorical and positive identification of accused-appellant by
prosecution witness Abuloc who was not shown to have any ill motive to testify falsely against him. 19
 Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. 20 In the case
at bar, the trial court did not err in giving credence to the version of the prosecution. The facts and circumstances
alleged to have been overlooked by the trial court are not material to the case and will not affect the disposition
thereof.
The alleged dying declaration of the victim should not have been admitted as an ante mortem statement,
considering that the prosecution failed to show that the subject declaration was made under the consciousness
of an impending death. Prosecution witness Celmar testified that on the way to the hospital, the victim told him
that it was accused-appellant who shot him. Though the victim eventually died two days after he was shot, there
is nothing in the records that would show that the victim was under the impression that he was going to die.
However, the declaration of the deceased pointing to accused-appellant as the culprit is admissible as part of res
gestae. Having been made shortly after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, the victim
evidently had no opportunity to contrive. 21 Furthermore, the delay of Felix Celmar in revealing the declaration
of accused-appellant does not make Celmar's testimony unworthy of belief. Delay in revealing the identity of
the perpetrator of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where such witness
gives a sufficient explanation. In the case at bar, such delay was amply explained by the witness. Celmar testified
that it took him four months to reveal what he knew because he thought he would not be utilized as witness
for the prosecution. Moreover, after the incident, he had to leave for his work in Albay.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court appreciated the special aggravating circumstance of use
of unlicensed firearm, pursuant to P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Considering the penalty
provided for in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, in view of the suspension of the imposition of the death
penalty then, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The third paragraph, Section 1, of R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997), amending P.D. No.
1866, provides that "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be used as an aggravating circumstance." This amendment, however, cannot be applied
in the present case. It bears stressing that when the offenses at bar were perpetrated on September 30, 1992,
the unlicensed firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet a special aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide. Not being favorable to the accused, the amendatory provision cannot be applied to
accused-appellant, lest it acquires the character of an ex post facto law. 22
Likewise, the trial court erred in treating alevosia merely as a generic aggravating circumstance, more so
in offsetting the same by the generic mitigating circumstance of having committed the crime in immediate
vindication of a grave offense. The treachery employed by accused-appellant in shooting the victim is actually a
circumstance that qualified the killing to murder. Such being the case, treachery cannot be offset by a mitigating
circumstance. TESICD
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate
vindication of a grave offense. As the evidence on record show, accused-appellant was urinated on by the victim
in front of the guests. The act of the victim, which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated accused-appellant, came
within the purview of a "grave offense" under Article 13, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, this
mitigating circumstance should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant.
As to the imposable penalty, the applicable provision is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its
amendment by R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, the crime having been committed on September 30, 1992.
Thereunder, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. With one generic
mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-
appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. cACHSE
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos.
8194 and 8195 finding the accused-appellant Romeo Espina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay the heirs of Romeo Bulicatin the
sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and to pay the costs.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EPIFANIO DIOKNO and
ROMAN DIOKNO, defendants-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; CIRCUMSTANCES MODIFYING CRIMINAL LIABILITY; ABUSE OF

SUPERIOR STRENGTH. — The circumstance of abuse of superior strength, qualifying the crime of murder,
which the trial court found to have been proven, has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In
the case of United States vs. Devela (3 Phil., 625), this court said that "the mere fact that the number of the
assailants is superior to that of those attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superiority."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION. — Neither is the existence of the other circumstance
qualifying murder, that is, evident premeditation, proven beyond a reasonable doubt because, even
assuming that both the accused went to San Pablo, Laguna, each carrying the knife used by him in attacking
Y.H., it being customary for the people of said province to carry it, it cannot be inferred with certainty from
the mere fact that they carried knives that their intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the deceased
in order to kill him.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — In order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating
circumstance or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident, that is, the intention to kill must be
manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. It is not enough
that it arose at the moment of the aggression.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. — The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of
article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, that is, immediate vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may
be taken into consideration in favor of the two accused. There was no interruption from the time the offense
was committed to the vindication thereof. The herein accused belong to a family of old customs to whom
the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance
of the peace and tranquillity of the home and at the same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds
of the members thereof.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware
of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a
stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit
the crime with which they are charged, as held by the Supreme Court of Spain in similar cases in its decisions
of February 3, 1888, July 9, 1898, February 8, 1908, May 25, 1910, July 3, 1909, and in other more recent
ones.

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J p:

EPIFANIO Diokno and Roman Diokno appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the accused
Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno guilty of the crime of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt,
and sentences each of them to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs of the suit. "It is so ordered."
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the
court a quo in its judgment in question, to wit:
"1. The lower court erred in accepting Exhibit E as evidence.
"2. The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit K as evidence.
"3. The lower court erred in not acquitting the appellant Roman.
"4. The lower court erred in sentencing the appellant Epifanio to reclusion perpetua."
The following facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt during the trial:
 The deceased Yu Hiong was a vendor of sundry goods in Lucena, Tayabas. At about 7 o'clock in the
morning of January 4, 1935, Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year, invited the
latter to go with her. Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but he told Salome that her father was angry with
him. Salome answered him: "No matter, I will be responsible." At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of said
day, Yu Hiong and Salome Diokno took an automobile and went to the house of Vicente Verina, Salome's
cousin, in Pagbilao. As they found nobody in the house, they went on their way up to San Pablo, Laguna.
On January 5th or 6th of said year, Roman Diokno telegraphed his father Epifanio Diokno, who was in
Manila, informing him that Salome had eloped with the Chinese Yu Hiong. On the morning of January 7,
1935, Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno went to San Pablo, Laguna, in search of the elopers. Having been
informed that the latter were stopping at the house of Antonio Layco, they went there. Upon arriving near
the house, the saw Yu Hiong coming down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them, he ran upstairs and they
pursued him. As the Chinese found the door of the house locked, he shouted that it be opened for him. At
that moment, he was overtaken by the accused who carried knives locally known as balisong, of different
sizes. Yu Hiong fell on his knees and implored pardon. In that situation Roman Diokno stabbed him with
the knife in the back and later in the left side. Epifanio Diokno also stabbed him once. Yu Hiong fell on the
landing of the stairs in the balcony, and there he was again stabbed repeatedly. Then Roman Diokno said:
"Enough, father." Yu Hiong lost consciousness. Juan Alcantara, who lived on the same street, Hermanos
Belen, in front of Antonio Layco's house, saw the accused pursue Yu Hiong and fired shots for the police to
come. Upon hearing the shots, municipal policeman Francisco Curabo appeared and found Yu Hiong pale
and lying on the landing of the stairs. He then asked who had wounded the Chinese and the accused
Epifanio Diokno answered that it was he. The policeman took the knife (Exhibit C) which
Epifanio Diokno carried in his right hand and brought him to police headquarters. Roman Diokno had left
before the policeman arrived and he was not located until after three days. The municipal president of San
Pablo, Laguna, also went to the scene of the crime, found the Chinese almost unconscious and questioned
him, putting down his answers in Exhibit E. The Chinese was brought to the provincial hospital of San Pablo
where he was examined by Drs. David Evangelista and Manuel Quisumbing, who found that he had five
incised wounds in different parts of the body, one of them at the back and about three and a half inches
long, piercing the pleura and penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung about an inch, which wound was
necessarily mortal and which caused the death of the victim. On January 8, 1935, while the said Chinese
was in a serious condition in the hospital, he made a statement telling how he was attacked by the accused
(Exhibit K).
The accused, testifying as witnesses in their own behalf, stated that they had not gone to San Pablo
together on the day in question; that when Roman Diokno arrived, his father Epifanio Diokno was coming
down the stairs of Antonio Layco's house with a knife in his hand; that Epifanio Diokno told his son Roman
to go home and tell their relatives what had happened; that when Epifanio Diokno overtook Yu Hiong on
the landing of the stairs of Antonio Layco's house, he asked Yu Hiong whether he was willing to marry his
daughter; that the Chinese answered him in the negative and at the same time tried to take something
from his pocket; that as Epifanio knew that Yu Hiong carried a revolver, he feared the Chinese might harm
him; he became obfuscated, drew his knife and knew not what happened afterwards.
The first question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in
admitting as evidence Exhibit E, consisting in the investigation conducted by the municipal president of
San Pablo in the same place where Yu Hiong had fallen a few minutes before, at about 1.30 p.m. on
January 7, 1935, and wherein Yu Hiong, answering the questions asked by said municipal president, stated
that it was Roman Diokno and Epifanio Diokno who had wounded him.
It is argued by the defense that said document Exhibit e should not be admitted on the ground that
some words had been altered and because it has not been proven that the declarant had a sense of
impending death.
It does not appear that said document was altered after it had been signed, but on the contrary,
municipal president Jacinto Peñaflor, upon being cross-examined by the defense, declared that he neither
erased any word nor put another in its place after said document had been finished.
The fact that Yu Hiong failed to state that he had given up all hope of life, in answering the
municipal president's questions, does not make his declaration inadmissible. It is enough if, from the
circumstances of the case, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of mind
(People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182). In the present case, Yu Hiong was semiconscious as a result of the
wounds received by him and, consequently, he could not have the hope to live when he made his
declaration immediately after he was mortally wounded. But even if the document Exhibit E were not
admissible as an ante mortem declaration, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae because it was made
under circumstances so proximate to the incident that it may be considered as a part thereof. (People vs.
Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971; People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil., 601.).
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, untenable.
With respect to the second assignment of alleged error consisting in that the court a quo erred in
admitting Exhibit K as an ante mortem declaration of Yu Hiong, because it does not appear that when the
declarant made it he was aware of impending death and that he did not die until three days after making
it, all that has been said relative to Exhibit E, which is the subject matter of the first assignment of alleged
error, may be repeated in connection with said Exhibit K, in the sense that it is admissible as an ante
mortem declaration. Furthermore, when the deceased made the declaration Exhibit K, he complained of
great difficulty in breathing and of being very ill. The fact that he did not die until three days later neither
implies that he had no sense of impending death when he made his declaration because he did not
improved thereafter but became worse until he died; nor detracts from its character of an ante
mortem declaration because what gives the declaration such character is the declarant's conviction, upon
making it, that he is not going to live (U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14).
The third assignment of alleged error consists in the failure of the court a quo to acquit the
appellant Roman Diokno.
The testimony of the eyewitnesses Juan Alcantara and Antonio Layco, corroborated by the
different dimensions of the wounds which, according to Dr. Manuel Quisumbing, were caused by two
instruments of different sizes, and the ante mortem declarations (Exhibits E and K) of the deceased, leave
no room for doubt that Roman Diokno cooperated with his father and stabbed the deceased Yu Hiong with
a knife in different parts of the body. Furthermore, the deceased stated in his ante mortem declaration
(Exhibit K) that it was Roman Diokno who inflicted the necessarily mortal wound in his back, which caused
his death.
We find the fourth assignment of alleged error well founded. The circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, qualifying the crime of murder, which the trial court found to have been proven, has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of United States vs. Devela (3 Phil., 625), this
court said that "the mere fact that the murder of the assailants is superior to that of those attacked by
them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority." In this case we
have the photographs of the body of the deceased (Exhibits D and D-1) showing that he had a strong
constitution; but there is no evidence of the physical constitution of the accused Epifanio Diokno and
Roman Diokno. Therefore, we cannot determine whether or not said accused were physically stronger
than the deceased and whether or not they abused such superiority.
Neither does this court find the existence of the other circumstance qualifying murder, that is,
evident premeditation, proven beyond a reasonable doubt because, even assuming that both the accused
went to San Pablo, Laguna, each carrying the knife used by him in attacking Yu Hiong, it being customary
for the people of said province to carry it, it cannot be inferred with certainty from the mere fact that they
carried knives that their intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the deceased in order to kill him. In
order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating circumstance or as a qualifying
circumstance, it must be evident, that is, the intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been
planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. It is not enough that it arose at the moment
of the aggression.
Therefore, there having been neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation, the
crime committed by the accused is simple homicide.
The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, that is,
immediate vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may be taken into consideration in favor of the
two accused, because although the elopment took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th
of said month and year, the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her
marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was
committed to the vindication thereof. Our opinion on this point is based on the fact that the herein
accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a
grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and tranquillity of the home and at the
same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the members thereof.
The presence of the sixth mitigating circumstance of said article 13, consisting in having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, may also be taken into
consideration in favor of the accused. The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he
became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them,
was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and
led them to commit the crime with which they are charged, as held by the Supreme Court of Spain in
similar cases in its decisions of February 3, 1888, July 9, 1898, February 8, 1908, May 25, 1910, July 3, 1909,
and in other more recent ones.
The seventh circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, consisting in having surrendered
himself immediately to the agents of persons in authority, should also be taken into consideration in favor
of the accused Epifanio Diokno.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court concludes that the accused are guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide defined and punished in article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty prescribed therein being reclusion temporal in its full extent. Three mitigating circumstances
must be taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno and two in favor of the accused
Roman Diokno, with no aggravating circumstance, thus authorizing the imposition of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law (reclusion temporal in its full extent), or prision mayor in its full extent, in
the period that this court deems applicable, which is the medium period in this case, in accordance with
the provisions of article 64, rule 5, that is eight years and one day of prision mayor.
Both accused should be granted the benefits of the indeterminate sentence provided in Act No.
4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, which prescribes a penalty the minimum of which shall be taken from
that next lower to prision mayor, or prision correccional of from six months and one day to six years.
Taking into account the circumstances of the case, the indeterminate penalty to which each of said
accused must be sentenced is fixed at from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, crediting each with one-half of the time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment (art. 29, Revised Penal Code).
Wherefore, this court declares the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno guilty of the crime
of homicide and sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty from two years and one day
of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, crediting them with one-half of the
time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos and Imperial, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Diokno, G.R. No. 45100, [October 26, 1936], 63 PHIL 601-615)
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE. — During a

fiesta, the accused, a man 70 years of age, asked on Patobo for some roast pig. Patobo's answer was; " There
is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." With this as the provocation, a little latter while the
said Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax,
causing death the following day. The lower court took into consideration the mitigating circumstance that
the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony.
The offense which the accused was endeavoring to vindicate would to an average person be considered as
a mere trifle. But since to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the but
of a joke in the presence of so many guests, it is proper to give the defendant the benefit of this mitigating
circumstance.
MALCOLM, J p:

A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos, Province of
Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and
ten, proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was; "
There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as
explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up behind
him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course not interfere with the
findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating circumstance
was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the
felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this circumstance
was rightly applied. The there was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of
Patobo to the accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is
more uncertain. The supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que arañaba a todo el mundo,"
"ladrones," and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating
circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the same court has held the
words "tan ladron eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of October 22, 1894.) We
consider that these authorities hardly put the facts of the present case in their proper light. The offense
which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be considered as a mere
trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the but of a joke in
the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower court very properly gave defendant
the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree of the
penalty provided for the crime of murder.
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years four
months and on day of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REO DALIMPAPAS PAJARES, RAMON
KAPQUIAN LONGKOP, GERRY LAODENEO PAJARES and LITO MONCADA BALADAD, accused-
appellants.

SYLLABUS

REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; RULE AND EXCEPTION; APPLICATION IN CASE
AT BAR. — In the ultimate analysis, the questions raised by accused-appellants turn upon the credibility of
witnesses. We have steadfastly upheld the rule that, on matters of credibility of witnesses, the assessment made
by the trial court must be accorded great respect by appellate courts unless the trial court has disregarded,
ignored or overlooked certain facts or circumstances of weight and significance, which if taken into
consideration would alter the outcome of the case. The credibility of witnesses has always been the area of
responsibility of the trial court and its findings and conclusions on the matter are respected and given great
weight by the appellate courts. The trial court's findings on the matter may only be disregarded by this Court if
there are facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which would substantially alter
the results of the case; where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and where the inferences
of the trial court from the facts are manifestly absurd or impossible (People vs. Acuram, 209 SCRA 281, 288–289
[1992]) Combing through the record the court finds no such fact or circumstance which would in the least
warrant a reversal of the findings of the trial court, which must, therefore, be respected.
MELO, J p:

Accused-appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide in an Information
reading as follows:cdasia
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 1990 in the Municipality of Teresa, province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding with one
another with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away two (2) wrist watch[es] and cash
amounting to P1,500.00 belonging to Alfredo R. Rosales and Norma T. Rosales to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P1,500.00; that on the occasion
of the aforesaid robbery, in pursuance of their conspiracy, with intent to kill and armed with a
dagger, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Alfredo R. Rosales on the right portion of his body thereby inflicting to the latter mortal stab
wounds which directly caused his death.

(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial, the court a quo convicted the accused in a decision dated June 13, 1991, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court find[s] the accused REO PAJARES y Dalimpapas, RAMON
LONGKOP y Kapquian, GERRY PAJARES y LAODENEO and LITO BALADAD y Moncada GUILTY of
the Crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294, (paragraph 1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. llcd
They are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Alfredo Rosales in the amount
of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P2,800.00), Philippine Currency, the value of the
unrecovered stolen cash money and two Seiko wrist watches.
They are further ordered to pay jointly and severally as reimbursement of the autopsy,
funeral and burial expenses incurred in the amount of Sixteen Thousand Pesos (P16,000.00),
and lastly to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Alfredo Rosales, as indemnity,
in the amount of P50,000.00.

(p. 21, Rollo.)

All convicted accused have interposed the instant appeal and although they do not submit an
assignment of errors in their brief, it can be gathered from their discussions that they assail the findings of
fact of the trial court as contrary to the evidence.
 A scrupulous evaluation of the evidence on record readily discloses that the following statement of
the facts of the case presented by the Office of the Solicitor General is fully supported by the evidence:
At around 12:50 o'clock in the afternoon of September 3, 1990, while the deceased
Alfredo Rosales and his wife Norma were walking along an alley on their way home in Sitio
Malalim, Bulak, Teresa, Rizal, the four (4) appellants suddenly came out of a nearby bamboo
grove and surprised the said couple (p. 3, tsn, Mar. 12, 1991). Without uttering any word,
appellant Reo Pajares immediately stabbed Alfredo at the back which caused the latter to fall
down on the grass (Ibid.). Then, appellants Gerry Pajares and Ramon Longkop approached
Norma (who was seven (7) months pregnant at that time) and pointed their knives at the left
and right (sic) side of her stomach (Ibid.). Immediately thereafter, Gerry Pajares divested her of
her "Seiko 5" wristwatch, while Longkop took away the P1,500.00 cash money in her possession
(p. 5, tsn, Ibid.) LLjur
In the meantime, the other appellant Lito Baladad held the two hands of the injured
Alfredo, and again, Reo Pajares stabbed the said victim at the left side of his body, after which,
Baladad took away Alfredo's "Seiko 5" wristwatch (pp. 4–5, tsn, Ibid.).
After their assailants had run away, Norma was able to ask for help from a Barangay
Tanod who assisted her in bringing her fatally injured husband to the hospital (p. 6, tsn, Ibid.).
Shortly after arriving at the Morong General Hospital, Alfredo died on that same fateful day of
September 3, 1990 (Ibid.; Exh. "A").
Acting on the request for autopsy examination by the Station Commander of the Rizal,
INP District III in Teresa, Rizal Emmanuel Aranas, a Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police stationed at the Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
performed the postmortem examination on the body of the deceased (pp. 12–14, tsn, Mar. 13,
1991), and thereafter prepared Medico-Legal Report No. M-1551-90 (Exh. "K") which contains
the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in early stage of decomposition.
There is a tattoo mark at the proximal 3rd of the right arm and a thoracostomy incision
at the right coastal region, measuring 2 x 0.4 cm., 17.5 cm. from the anterior midline
with 3 stitches applied.

TRUNK:
1) Stab wound, chest, measuring 1.5 x 0.5 cm., 8 cm. right of the anterior
midline, with 2 stitches applied, 11.5 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards
and medialwards, fracturing the 5th right thoracio rib, lacerating the middle and lower
lobes of the right lung.
2) Stab wound, right lumbar region, measuring 2.5. x 0.5 cm., 4.5 cm. from the
posterior midline with 2 stitches applied, 3 cm. deep, directed anteriorwards, slightly
downwards and lateralwards, lacerating the underlying soft tissues.
Stomach is 1/4 full of partially digested food particles consisting mostly of rice
and the rest of the visceral organs are grossly unremarkable.

Conclusion:
Cause of death is hemorrhage as a result of stab wounds of the trunk. (Exh. K-4
and K-5)
(pp. 3–7, Appellee's Brief.)
Accused-appellants assail the testimony of prosecution witness Norma Rosales, the wife of the
deceased victim, maintaining that her testimony creates a doubt that a robbery took place. In support of
their contention, accused-appellants point out to a portion of her testimony where she testified that the
wristwatch forcibly taken from her belonged to her brother. Said portion of her testimony does not in any
way detract from her testimony. Whether or not the watch violently taken from her belonged to her or to
her brother is totally immaterial. The essential fact elicited from her testimony was that the watch she was
wearing was forcibly taken from her. cdll
 Further, accused-appellants deride the testimony of Norma Rosales identifying the money laid
down at the table at the Municipal Hall by the police, consisting of a P10 and a P5 bills as the money taken
by accused-appellants from her husband. Accused-appellants maintain that Norma Rosales merely
presumed that the money bills were the ones taken from her husband by accused-appellants. Again, we
find nothing in her questioned testimony that would impair her credibility. Whether or not only P15 was
taken from the deceased is wholly immaterial. The crucial thrust of her testimony is that she saw accused-
appellants take money from her mortally wounded and helplessly fallen husband. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable that the arresting police officers would substitute the money bills they found in the
possession of accused-appellants with other bills. The record does not show that the arresting police
officers did so.
In the ultimate analysis, the questions raised by accused-appellants turn upon the credibility of
witnesses. We have steadfastly upheld the rule that, on matters of credibility of witnesses, the assessment
made by the trial court must be accorded great respect by appellate courts unless the trial court has
disregarded, ignored or overlooked certain facts or circumstances of weight and significance, which if
taken into consideration would alter the outcome of the case. cdasia
The credibility of witnesses has always been the area of responsibility of the trial court
and its findings and conclusions on the matter are respected and given great weight by the
appellate courts. The trial court's findings on the matter may only be disregarded by this Court
if there are facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which would
substantially alter the results of the case; where the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; and where the inferences of the trial court from the facts are manifestly absurd or
impossible. Cdpr

(People vs. Acuram, 209 SCRA 281, 288–289 [1992])

Combing through the record we find no such fact or circumstance which would in the least warrant
a reversal of the findings of the trial court, which must, therefore, be respected. cdasia
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is HEREBY AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Pajares, G.R. No. 101229, [January 20, 1995], 310 PHIL 361-366)
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARANDE COLINA ADLAWAN @
RANDIE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is an appeal from the June 23, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. DU-3463, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay the heirs
of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P18,850.00 as actual damages and the costs.
The Information against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about the 15th day of November, 1992, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, with deliberate
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shot Nequito Ortizano with a revolver, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wound at his vital portion which caused his death soon thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon arraignment on March 31, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. 3 Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The prosecution's account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At dawn of November 15, 1992,
the deceased, together with prosecution witnesses Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco, and a certain
Oliver Bonayan, were inside a fenced disco area in Sitio Oril, Mandaue City. At 2:00 a.m., Benjamin Basubas
and Quirino Cinco were alerted by a commotion outside. When they rushed out, they saw the deceased
raising his hands in front of accused-appellant, who was then in the company of Barangay Tanod Jerry Diaz
and Jet Bonita. Likewise present was accused-appellant's father, Barangay Tanod Crispulo Adlawan, who
was lying on the ground unconscious. Prosecution witnesses Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco stood
approximately one meter away from the deceased. All of a sudden, accused-appellant drew a gun from his
waist, pointed it at the deceased, saying, "this is the one." 4 He immediately fired the gun, hitting the
deceased on the chest. The latter staggered toward the direction of Benjamin Basubas. He was able to hold
on to a deaf-mute bystander, but fell on a shallow canal and landed on his belly with his head resting on the
bank of the canal. Accused-appellant followed the deceased, turned the latter's head and delivered a fatal
shot hitting him above the right ear. Thereafter, accused-appellant surrendered the gun to a group of
Barangay Tanod. 5
The Necropsy Report shows the postmortem findings and the cause of death of the victim, thus:
II. Pertinent Findings:
1. Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 0.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., located at the left parietal region 4
cm. above the right ear. The entrance wound has an inverted periphery. The bullet slug went
thru the brain tissues and pierced thru the right parietal bone, where the slug was embedded
and extracted at the scalp of the right parietal region. SHECcD
2. Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 0.5 cm., located at the left supraclavicular at the medial
part, with inverted periphery and contusion, collar. The bullet slug went downward and
backwards hitting the upper lobes of the left and right lungs and exited thru the inferior
border of the right scapula. The exit wound measures 1 cm. x 1 cm. with irregular everted
edges.
Gunshot Wounds Number 1 and 2 resulted to a massive hemorrhage of the brain, the
left and right lungs.
III. Cause of Death:
SHOCK, IRREVERSIBLE. Secondary to Massive Hemorrhage due to Multiple Gun Shot
Wounds. 6
 On the other hand, the defense averred that at around 2:00 in the morning of November 15, 1992,
while accused-appellant was inside a fenced disco area in Sitio Oril, Mandaue City, he heard somebody
shouting and when he turned to the source of the disturbance, he saw his father, lying on the ground
unconscious and with a bloodied face. Accused-appellant dashed to his father whom he thought was already
dead. As he tried to lift him, he saw the deceased about 2 1/2 arm's length away, holding a gun and told
him, "Do you want to follow your father?" 7 Thereafter, accused-appellant lunged at the deceased, twisted
his hand, forcing the muzzle of the gun to be pointed at the deceased's chest. Suddenly, the gun went off,
causing the deceased to fall in a canal. Accused-appellant was able to get hold of the gun and again fired at
the deceased. Thereafter, he fled and hid in Manila 8 until January 23, 1997, when he finally decided to
surrender to Mayor Alfredo M. Ouano and P/Supt. Rolando Borres. 9
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the herein accused ARANDE COLINA ADLAWAN @ RANDIE guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, the said accused is hereby sentenced to
undergo the indeterminate penalty by imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the legal heirs of Nequito
Ortizano the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos by reason of his death, P18,850.00
as actual damages, and to pay the costs. cIaCTS
The accused, being a detention prisoner, shall be credited in the service of his
sentence full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED. 10
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE ATTENDANCE OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, AND
THE RECORDS WILL SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ONLY OFFERED TO PLEAD GUILTY
TO THE LESSER OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE.
II.
ANENT HERETO, THE COURT A QUO ERRED TO APPRECIATE (sic) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
WILLINGNESS TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE LESSER OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE AS A
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
III.
FURTHER TO THIS, ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS INDEED GUILTY, THE
COURT A QUO FAILED TO LIKEWISE APPRECIATE THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF RELATIVE WHICH WAS
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.
IV.
IN APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING
GREATER WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME LACK CREDIBILITY AND CANNOT SUSTAIN A CONVICTION
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
V.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES OF P18,850.00 TO THE HEIRS OF
THE VICTIM NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME WERE NEVER DULY PROVEN. 11
The appeal has no merit.
The task of assessing the conflicting versions of the defense and the prosecution is a matter best
determined by the trial court who had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor
and deportment on the witness stand, and therefore could better discern if such witnesses were telling the
truth or not. Hence, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility of witnesses must be
respected. 12
After a careful and thorough review of the testimony of prosecution witnesses Benjamin Basubas
and Quirino Cinco, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in giving credence to their declarations
which were given in a direct, positive and straightforward manner. Moreover, the defense failed to show
that the prosecution witnesses had improper motive to give a false narration of the circumstances
surrounding the death of the deceased. aScITE
Likewise, the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, depriving the victim of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. 13 At the time accused-appellant fired the
first shot, the deceased was unarmed and had his hands raised. The deceased was therefore in no position
to put up any defense such as would present a risk to accused-appellant. Moreover, the second shot fired
by accused-appellant clearly foreclosed any doubt as to the attendance of treachery. When he turned the
head of the deceased before he fired the second shot, accused-appellant was manifestly determined to have
a better shot at the head of the deceased who was already lying helpless on the ground.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense cannot be appreciated in favor of
accused-appellant. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. 14 From the version of the prosecution, which the Court finds credible, the deceased did not
commit any unlawful aggression towards accused-appellant. On the contrary, it was accused-appellant who
was the aggressor when he shot the deceased who was unarmed and raising his hands.
In the same vein, the circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is unavailing. It is settled that
a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has
ceased. 15 In the instant case, accused-appellant was not justified in attacking the deceased as the latter
had his hands raised and was no longer poised to attack accused-appellant's father at the time he was shot.
Furthermore, the acts of the deceased immediately prior to the shooting did not constitute unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. It must be such as to put in real peril the life
of the person defending himself and not a mere imagined threat. 16 In his direct testimony, accused-
appellant did not categorically declare that the deceased was aiming the gun at him, or about to shoot him.
Right after he allegedly heard the deceased's remark, "Do you want to follow your father," he immediately
lunged at him, twisted the gun toward his chest and fired. Clearly, therefore, there was no real peril to the
life of accused-appellant. In People v. Escoto, 17 we held that the mere apprehension that the supposed
aggressor would shoot the person invoking self-defense is not justified. Failing to discharge the burden of
proving unlawful aggression, accused-appellant's claim of incomplete self-defense cannot prosper.
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of accused-appellant. To be considered a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender must be
spontaneous. The conduct of the accused, and not his intention alone, after the commission of the offense,
determines the spontaneity of the surrender. In People v. Mabuyo, 18 we held that the surrender is not
spontaneous where it took the accused almost nine months from the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against him before he presented himself to the police authorities. With more reason then that we should
not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the case at bar since it took accused-
appellant more than three years from the issuance of the warrant of arrest on September 23, 1993 before
he finally decided to surrender on January 23, 1997.
Nevertheless, the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation should be appreciated to
mitigate accused-appellant's criminal liability. The requisites of this mitigating circumstance are: (1) that
there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 19
In the case at bar, accused-appellant thought his father whose face was bloodied and lying
unconscious on the ground was dead. Surely, such a scenario is sufficient to trigger an uncontrollable burst
of legitimate passion. His act, therefore, of shooting the deceased, right after learning that the latter was
the one who harmed his father, satisfies the requisite of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation under Paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for Murder at the time of the commission of the offense is Reclusion Temporal in its
maximum period to Death. There being one mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, and no
 aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period, i.e., Reclusion
Temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum sentence shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period and the minimum shall be taken from the next lower penalty, which
is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Hence, accused-appellant should be meted the
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
As to accused-appellant's civil liability, we agree with the accused-appellant that the award of
P18,850.00 as actual damages to the heirs of the deceased lacks basis. In lieu of actual damages, the heirs
of the deceased are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00. Temperate damages are
awarded where pecuniary loss is proved but not the amount thereof. 20
Moral Damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should likewise be awarded for the emotional suffering
of the deceased's heirs. 21
The wife of the deceased testified that her husband, a 29-year old driver and spray man at the time
of his death, was earning P100.00 daily. 22 Using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, 23 the loss of
his earning capacity should be computed as follows:
Net = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income (GAI) - Living expenses
Earning [2/3 (80-age at death)] (daily wage) x 261 (No. of (50% of GAI)
Capacity working days in a yr.)]
= 2/3 [(80-29)] x [(P100.00 x 261)] - 50%
= 2/3 (51) x P26,100.00 - 13,050.00
= 34 (P13,050.00)
= P443,700.00
Hence accused-appellant should be ordered to pay the amount of P443,700.00 for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. DU-3463, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay in addition to the P50,000.00 death indemnity and the
costs, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as temperate damages and the amount of
P443,700.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.

Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.

SYLLABUS

1. MURDER; "ALEVOSIA;" PREMEDITATION; PENALTY. — Where the act of causing the violent death
of a woman has already been qualified by the specific circumstance of treachery (alevosia), if premeditation
is also present therein it can only produce the effect of a generic aggravation circumstance which, together
with another of the same class, required the imposition in the maximum degree of the penalty which the
law fixes for the crime.
2. ID.; LOSS OF REASON AND SELF-CONTROL. — The causes which produce in the mind loss of reason
and self-control, and which lessen criminal responsibility, are those which originate from lawful sentiments,
not such as arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions; therefore, in the present case it is not
proper to consider that mitigating circumstance 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code was present.

DECISION

TORRES, J p:

For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-
American, and Agustinal Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang,
Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907,
Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separating from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Lues
Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a
corporal in the Army who then went to live with her in the said house.

On the 21st of December following, at about 7.30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier
named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her
room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked
the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation, Current
approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I not tell you
to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want
to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused
then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when he said
this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching
his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself
behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in
the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in
a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and
wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. The latter immediately fled from the house and gave
himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a few
minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks and fired a shot at Agustina, the said
chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges
out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the
cartridges to chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings
were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of
September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be executed according to
the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has
been submitted to this court for review.
 The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the crime of
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a
violent death, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and roughly
attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while
the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a conversation,
in which she was concerned, between her aggressor and a third person, and after usual and customary
words had passed between her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred that
means, manners, and forms were employed in the attack that directly and specially insured the
consummation of the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might have been offered by the
victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place where she
was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations
which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith
and conclusively establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully convicted
author of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized
him, he fell backward but managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again the
said corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just
as Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace Current,
Edward Robinson, Luez Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their respective declarations, especially with that of
the second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as
shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached the accused in order to take his weapon away
from him which he succeeded in doing after a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the
house. Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in the breast and caused her death was not due to an
accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of the aggressor with intent to deprive the
victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence of other
aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the deceased should be taken into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstance appears
proven from the testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery,
the circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is,
however, manifest and evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused. According to the
testimony of Charles Gatchey and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the former to be absent from
the canteen where he was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his
mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who
was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while
the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was lying on the table on which were also several loaded
cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding
that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and when the accused went to bed
apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when called, the witness left him. On the day after
the crime the police found on a table in the culprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a
piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due
reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his
perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and
well — prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he
entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim , in what appeared to be
a proper manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquillity,
doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had
planned to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstance is present, not
even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit, loss of reason and self-control
produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which
arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the
law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided,
however, that the death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event of a
pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless
the same be expressly remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
||| (U.S. v. Hicks, G.R. No. 4971, [September 23, 1909], 14 PHIL 217-222)
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO DELA CRUZ and FELIX
SORIANO, defendants-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. MURDER; "ALEVOSIA." — When three persons insistently and tenaciously pursue another and
upon overtaking him the two who were in the lead illtreat and stretch him out on the ground while the third
aggressor, who arrived later, inflicts upon him two serious wounds, from the effects of which he died then
and there, he not being able to either defend himself or escape, the crime committed is murder, and the
three aggressors are all directly liable, inasmuch as had the deceased not been stretched out and held on
the ground, the one who alone inflicted the mortal wounds would perhaps not have been able to have
assaulted him as described, nor have succeeded in the attack, as he came up a short while after the victim
had been caught by the other assailants.
TORRES, J p:

On the night of August 1, 1909, Pedro de la Cruz, a sergeant of Scouts, Felix Soriano, and another
man, afterwards found to be Alejo Root, both Scouts, went to the house of the Chinaman, Juan Marquez;
the two first named entered the house and inquired for two individuals, mestizos with mustaches who,
they said, had insulted Sergeant Cruz. These two men sought were Primo Avedillo and Cirilo Enriquez and
they had been in the said house a few moments before. The landlord's daughters, Elena and Valentina
Marquez, told the searchers that Avedillo and Enriquez had already gone, so the said Cruz and Soriano left,
accompanied by Alejo Root, who had not entered but remained on the lot, in search of the said mestizos.
When the appellants and the said Root arrived at the sitio of Talon-Talon of the district of Zamboanga,
they found, between 11 and 12 o'clock that night, several individuals who were giving a serenade in front
of the house of Eugenio Iturralde, and one of the soldiers then inquired of his countrymen, there
assembled, which of them had insulted the first sergeant of the company of Scouts, and he was told that
none of those present had done so; thereupon, while Pedro de la Cruz stepped back a few steps, the
soldier Alejo Root came face to face with the mestizo Primo Avedillo, who was then leaning with his arms
against the fence of the lot on which the house stood, and immediately gave him a heavy blow on the
mouth with his fist. On account of this assault Avedillo started to run and Cirilo Enriquez followed him,
dispersing at the same time the other parties who were assembled there for the serenade; the latter, on
account of the suddenness of the assault, were unable to observe how it occurred nor what else
happened, for three of them, Juan Candido, Tomas Francisco, and Pablo Candido, present during the
disorder, on seeing the blow given to Avedillo, started to run, and Cirilo Enriquez alone stated that, on
running behind the deceased, he saw the three Scout soldiers, one of them Sergeant Cruz, catch Avedillo,
and that, while two of them held him fast and struck him, the other stabbed him to death with a weapon
with which he was provided. In fact, according to the examination and autopsy made on the following day
by Dr. J. B. Clayton, of the military medical corps, the body of the deceased bore three wounds, one near
the eighth rib, which slightly injured the stomach and severed a few veins, including a large one which
could not be exactly determined on account of the coagulation of blood; another, three inches and a half
deep, near the fifth rib, which pierced the pericardium and the left ventricle of the heart and must have
caused instant death; and the third wound, a bruise, on the upper lip, produced by a blow with a clenched
fist. The two wounds first described were inflicted with a dagger or like weapon.
For the foregoing reasons, after the preliminary examination by the justice of the peace court, the
assistant fiscal of the Moro Province, on the 28th of September of the same year, filed an information with
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, charging Pedro de la Cruz, Felix Soriano, and Alejo Root with the
crime of murder, and, this cause having been instituted, the court, upon the evidence adduced at trial,
rendered judgment on November 12 following, convicting the accused of the crime of homicide and
sentenced them to the penalty of seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, to pay jointly
and severally an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, to the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to the payment of the costs. From this judgment Pedro de la Cruz and Felix Soriano alone
appealed.
The facts above related, which were duly proved in the present cause, constitute the crime of
murder, provided for and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the deceased, Primo
Avedillo, died a violent death in consequence of two serious wounds, one of them necessarily fatal, at the
hands of one of his three assailants, while he was stretched out on the ground and was being maltreated
and held fast by the other two, who prevented him from moving, which situation was taken advantage of
by the third assailant, who with a dagger or like pointed weapon assaulted the victim and inflicted upon
him the said wounds, one in the stomach and the other in the breast. The second wound penetrated the
pericardium and a ventricle of the heart. At the time of the assault the said Avedillo was unsuccessful in
defending himself, or even so much as freeing himself and escaping from his three assailants, for he had
been running from the moment he received the blow in the mouth delivered by his slayer, and when the
other two overtook him they held him fast and stretched him out on the ground and did not leave him
until he died from the wounds; wherefore, it is undeniable that, in the killing of the unfortunate victim
Avedillo, there entered the specific and qualifying circumstance of treachery, which determines the crime
of murder, because the assailants employed ways and means conducive directly to assure the
consummation of the common purpose of depriving the deceased of his life, without any risk whatever to
themselves, such as could have arisen from any defense which the assaulted party might have made, but
who was then completely helpless and, since the beginning when he was struck by the accused who
afterwards stabbed him with a dagger, had not shown the slightest intention nor made any action
whatever to resist or to defend himself from the unjust and uncalled for assault.
The defendants, Pedro de la Cruz and Felix Soriano, pleaded "not guilty" and denied the charge; but
notwithstanding their exculpatory allegations, absolutely devoid of proof, it was shown that the
said Cruz and Soriano tenaciously pursued the deceased, Primo Avedillo, and, as soon as they overtook
him, held him fast, illtreated him and threw him to the ground, at which moment, and while still held by
them, the other soldier, Alejo Root, arrived and with the dagger which he carried, leaped upon the
deceased and wounded him in the breast and in the stomach; all of which was witnessed by Cirilo
Enriquez, who was also running behind the deceased, Avedillo, and although the other witnesses, Juan
Candido, Pablo Candido, and Tomas Francisco, did not see the assault, because they ran away in view of
the fact that the sergeant and the two soldiers who went with him were maltreating everybody, yet they
saw the appellants pursue Avedillo, who was afterwards killed. Besides these facts, it is established that
the said appellants, Cruz and Soriano, were those who, with Alejo Root, appeared at the place where the
deceased and others were playing musical instruments, illtreated them and then pursued them, only
overtaking Primo Avedillo, and that on this occasion they were looking for a mestizo with a mustache who,
they said, had insulted the first sergeant, their purpose being undoubtedly to punish the former or avenge
the latter.
Although Alejo Root did not appeal from the judgment rendered in this cause, in view of the fact
that, in incriminating his codefendants, Cruz and Soriano, he at the same time confessed to his having
attacked the deceased and wounded him with a dagger, such statements undoubtedly tend to prove that
his said two codefendants actually pursued the deceased, Avedillo, and afterwards overtook him, and that
while they held him fast, stretched out on the ground as he was, Root leaped upon the assaulted man and
wounded him with a dagger; from all of which testimony it is concluded that the three defendants acted
together in common accord with unity of purpose and action in order to attack the deceased.
It is true that it was Alejo Root alone who inflicted the two wounds upon the deceased, but had
the latter not been held fast on the ground by the defendants, Pedro de la Cruz and Felix Soriano, who
were the first to overtake and hold him, perhaps Alejo Root would not have succeeded in getting at him,
nor in assaulting him, as described, inasmuch as he was following his codefendants.
It is to be noted that, as antecedents of the criminal act, the three defendants went together in
their quest for the party who they claimed had insulted the first sergeant of their company, and thus they
went to the house of Juan Marquez, and, as they did not find the said party there, they continued their
search with intentions which doubtless were neither peaceable nor lawful, and then together approached
several persons who were playing musical instruments, whom, without any cause whatever, they
illtreated, on which occasion Root struck the deceased, Avedillo, a blow on the mouth, and the latter, as
well as others, the musicians, on running away without defending themselves, were pursued by the
appellants determinedly until they overtook Avedillo and held him fast and laid him out on the ground; in
this situation Alejo Root, who came immediately behind his two coaccused, took part in the assault. The
two appellants, therefore, are unquestionably coperpetrators of the murder, as they took a direct part in
the commission of the crime which was consummated by their participation, inasmuch as, had they not
caught, held, and stretched out on the ground the deceased, Primo Avedillo, perhaps the latter might have
been able to escape out of the reach of the said Root, who apparently was the only one of the aggressors
who was armed.
 No extenuating nor aggravating circumstance attended the perpetration of the crime, wherefore
the penalty for murder should be imposed upon them it its medium degree.
Wherefore, it is our opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, Pedro de
la Cruz and Felix Soriano, as coauthors of the crime of murder, should be sentenced, each of them, to the
penalty of cadena perpetua, to the accessory penalties 2 and 3 prescribed by article 54 of the Penal Code,
to pay an indemnity of P1,000, jointly and severally with Alejo Root, to the heirs of the deceased, and,
each of them, a third part of the costs of first instance and one-half of those of this second instance. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO CRISOSTOMO, accused-
appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose Ma. Abola for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEATH CERTIFICATE; PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF CAUSE OF DEATH. —
In this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes issued by said municipal health officer in the regular
performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; CONSTRUED. — There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, method or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUDDENNESS OF ATTACK, NOT SUFFICIENT; REQUISITES. — The suddenness of the
attack does not, of itself, suffice to support the findings of alevosia. There must be evidence that the mode
of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself or retaliate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE MET IN CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the appellant admitted
that he had a previous altercation with the victim wherein he was hit by the deceased with a bottle because
of certain differences they had in a billiard hall although he claimed to have resumed friendly relations with
the victim thereafter. Nevertheless, at the time of the incident, the appellant went through the motion of
inviting the victim to join him in a drinking spree which the victim declined and then suddenly, without any
ceremony, he shot the victim while his (the victim's) back was turned. The appellant used a gun, a lethal
weapon to insure his design to kill the victim. He fired at him at a short distance aiming at a vital spot of his
body. The victim was unarmed. From the environmental circumstances of the case, alevosia has been fully
established.
5. ID.; ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE; INTOXICATION. — Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
said felony. Otherwise when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
6. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; REQUISITES. — The requisites of
voluntary surrender are: (a) that the of fender had not actually been arrested; (b) that the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (e) that the surrender was voluntary.
7. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILTY; REQUISITES. — The requisites of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession
of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
GANCAYCO, J p:

On Christmas day, December 25, 1967, between 6:00 and 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Sto. Rosario,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, while Eugenio Crisostomo was passing near the house of Romeo Geronimo, he met the
latter and invited him to have a drink in the place of a friend. Romeo declined the offer. Suddenly Eugenio
rushed towards Romeo who was then standing near a store facing the street with his back towards Eugenio
and shot him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one (1) meter. The bullet entered about two (2)
inches below the axilia (armpit) and came out on the right side of the chest about one (1) inch to the
sternum. Romeo fell to the ground mortally wounded while Eugenio ran away. By-standers who were near
the place such as Delfin Lopez, Ernesto Trillana, Apolonio Santos and Manuel Tamayo and others who were
all friends of both the victim and assailant came to the aid of the fallen victim and brought him to the Reyes
Hospital at the Poblacion of Hagonoy where the doctor pronounced the victim dead upon arrival. Thus, they
brought the victim's body to his home.
An information for murder was filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First instance (CFI) of
Bulacan against Eugenio Crisostomo charging him of the crime of murder as follows:
 "That on or about the 25th day of December, 1967, in the municipality of Hagonoy,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Eugenio Crisostomo, armed with a firearm and with intent to kill one Romeo Felipe
Geronimo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation
and treachery, attack, assault and shoot the said Romeo Felipe Geronimo with the firearms he
was then provided, hitting the latter on the chest, causing serious physical injuries thereon,
which directly caused the death of the said Romeo Felipe Geronimo."
After the arraignment wherein accused entered a plea of not guilty and again during the trial, the
accused signified his intention to withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of murder and to substitute
it with a plea of guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that he be allowed to prove the mitigating
circumstances. The same plea was made by the accused after the prosecution had rested its case but the
fiscal did not agree. Thus the court denied the petition. LLphil
A decision was rendered on March 28, 1969 convicting the accused of the offense charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds the accused
EUGENIO CRISOSTOMO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, punished
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without any modifying circumstance and hereby
sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the law; to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00); and to pay the costs."
Not satisfied therewith the accused now interposed this appeal alleging that the court committed
the following assigned errors:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS ADMITTED
HAVING KILLED ROMEO GERONIMO, INSTEAD OF LIMITING ITS FINDING TO THE TRUE EXTENT
OF HIS ADMISSION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT KILLED ROMEO GERONIMO. INSTEAD OF FINDING THAT
NO EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS TO THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF DEATH. THERE HAVING
BEEN NO AUTOPSY PERFORMED ON THE BODY OF ROMEO GERONIMO.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD ACTED WITH
TREACHERY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED
TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DRUNKENNESS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S OFFER TO
PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF HOMICIDE (THE TRUE CRIME COMMITTED IF ONE HAD IN
FACT BEEN COMMITTED) AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WITH THE
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PRESENCE OF TWO ORDINARY MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE."
Under the first assigned error appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that he admitted
having killed the victim.
 Testifying in his defense the appellant claims that at the time of the incident when he saw the victim
he played a joke on him by drawing his gun from his waist and pointing the same to the victim but the gun
suddenly went off, its bullet hitting the victim. Taken by surprise he fled. cdll
No doubt from the said version of the appellant he effectively admitted having shot the victim Romeo
Geronimo. In fact he fled from the scene of the crime upon realizing the gravity of what he had committed.
It is clear that it was that single shot that felled the victim which was the immediate cause of his death.
Indeed, during the trial and as late as after the prosecution had rested its case, the appellant offered
to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty of the lessor offense of homicide but
the prosecution refused to agree with his proposal.
Under the second assigned error the appellant claims that as no autopsy was performed on the body
of the victim the prosecution has not established the actual cause of death of the victim. He contends that
the death certificate of the victim (Exhibit A) to which he offered no objection is admissible only to establish
the fact of death not the cause of the death of the victim. He further avers that the testimony of Dr. Juan
Santos who examined the body of the victim but did not perform an autopsy shows that he did not qualify
as an expert witness; and even if he were an expert witness there was no basis for him to render an opinion
as to the cause of death of the victim. Further, appellant alleges that Dr. Santos mentioned two (2) wounds
of different sizes but otherwise with exactly identical characteristics from which the possibility may be
deduced that the victim may have been shot twice, the second time by a person other than the appellant.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
Dr. Santos, who was then the municipal health officer of Hagonoy, Bulacan, categorically testified
that the cause of death of the deceased was a through and through gunshot wound which was caused by a
bullet. 1 Although he may not be an expert witness, as a physician and health officer he is certainly qualified
to give an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim. He externally examined the body of the deceased
on the same night of the incident and found no other sign of external violence except the gunshot
wound. 2 Under such circumstances, one need not be an expert to render an opinion that the said gunshot
wound was the cause of death of the victim.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Dr. Santos pointed out the difference between the two
(2) wounds on the body of the victim in that the left axilla wound was only 2.5 millimeters, while the right
chest wound was 8 millimeters in diameter; that the former was round while the latter was oval; and that
the former was deep while the latter was shallower. He denied that the wounds were of identical
appearance. 3 Dr. Santos emphasized that the left axilla wound is the point of entry of the bullet while the
right chest wound is its point of exit and that the said wounds were caused by one bullet. The trajectory of
the bullet was from the left axilla to the right chest. 4 The speculation of the appellant that the victim may
have been shot twice is thus totally without basis.
The death certificate and the notes issued by Dr. Santos after his external examination of the body
of the victim establish the cause of death of the deceased contrary to the contention of the appellant. 5 In
this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes issued by said municipal health officer in the regular
performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim. 6
Moreover, the said death certificate is not only confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Santos and by two
(2) eyewitnesses Manuel Tamayo and Delfin Lopez who stated that they saw the appellant rush at the victim
and suddenly shoot him; that the victim fell down after he was hit; and that they brought him to the hospital
but the doctor pronounced him dead on arrival. These two witnesses are mutual friends of both the
deceased and the appellant so that their testimonies are free from any suspicion of bias or prejudice.
The appellant assails the findings of the court a quo that he acted with treachery in the commission
of the offense as a third assigned error. He contends that while it may be true that he suddenly attacked the
victim, it does not appear that he had consciously adopted the mode of attack intended to facilitate the
perpetuation of the offense without risk to himself. In fact appellant claims that he was drunk and as such
he could not have reflected on the special means of the execution of the act. cdrep
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 7
The suddenness of the attack does not, of itself, suffice to support the findings of alevosia. 8 There
must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible
or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. 9
 In the present case, the appellant admitted that he had a previous altercation with the victim wherein
he was hit by the deceased with a bottle because of certain differences they had in a billiard hall although
he claimed to have resumed friendly relations with the victim thereafter. 10 Nevertheless, at the time of the
incident, the appellant went through the motion of inviting the victim to join him in a drinking spree which
the victim declined and then suddenly, without any ceremony, he shot the victim while his (the victim's)
back was turned. The appellant used a gun, a lethal weapon to insure his design to kill the victim. He fired
at him at a short distance aiming at a vital spot of his body. The victim was unarmed. From the environmental
circumstances of the case, alevosia has been fully established. 11
Under the fourth assigned error appellant alleges that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of drunkenness. He asserts that he had been drinking from one o'clock in the afternoon on that Christmas
day and that he had been drunk five (5) times in his entire life so that it is not habitual.
Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender committed a felony in a state of intoxication,
if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise when habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The allegation of the appellant that he was drunk when he committed the offense is self-serving and
uncorroborated. Besides, appellant admitted that at that time he was only dizzy, 12 and that he was on the
way to another drinking spree. Obviously he had not drunk enough. He remembers the details of the
shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he imbibed and the persons who were with him.
He realized the gravity of the offense he committed so he fled and hid from the authorities. He sought
sanctuary in the chapel of Sto. Rosario, boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and took a La Mallorca bus
to Manila. All these are acts of a man whose mental capacity has not been impaired.
As the fifth assigned error appellant argues that he should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender stating that although he hid himself from the authorities for ten (10)
days, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities thereafter upon the advice of his parents.
The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) that the of fender had not actually been arrested; (b)
that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (e) that the
surrender was voluntary. 13
The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution that while in hiding, upon the
advise of his parents, he voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was detained in the municipal jail
of Hagonoy. 14 The Court agrees that the appellant is entitled to this mitigating circumstance. However, he
cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of
homicide as invoked under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession
of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. 15
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
only after some evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the
prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating. 16
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the seventh assigned error where the appellant claims that
he should be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance is consequently without merit.
The offense committed is the crime of murder as the killing was qualified by
treachery. 17 Considering that the commission of the offense is attended by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months, and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The indemnity
for the death of the victim is increased to P30,000.00. cdll
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and indemnity, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-
appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, of the crime of parricide
and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellant during the trial admitted in court that he
killed his wife because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the killing took place, his
mind was totally blank and he did not know what he was doing. He also claimed that he was insane at the time
of the incident. In this appeal, accused-appellant did not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting his
defense of insanity. He argued that he should be meted a lower penalty because at the time of the incident, he
was suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time, which would have caused him to commit the
crime.
The Supreme Court did not appreciate in appellant's favor the mitigating circumstance of illness. The
Court ruled that the fact that appellant remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident,
from the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it showed that he was in full control
of his mental faculties. However, the Court reduced the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to reclusion
perpetua. The Court ruled that the crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by
the mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties,
the application of the lesser or greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. In the present case, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was justified.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER; NEGATED BY THE FACT
THAT HE REMEMBERED THE VITAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE GHASTLY INCIDENT, FROM THE TIME
OF THE KILLING UP TO THE TIME HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE HOSPITAL; SAID FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT HE
WAS IN FULL CONTROL OF HIS MENTAL FACULTIES. — For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender
to be appreciated, the law requires the presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2) such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness
of his acts. Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the
claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the accused that
his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his
mental condition at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant,
nor on mere presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing. On the
other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed. First, he remembered killing
his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to
commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and he remembered being
brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from
the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his
mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of his
will-power. On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by accused-
appellant.
2. ID.; ID.; PASSION AND OBFUSCATION; NOT ESTABLISHED; CLAIM IS BUT A MERE AFTERTHOUGHT TO
WHITTLE DOWN APPELLANT'S CRIMINAL LIABILITY. — Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion
and obfuscation to mitigate his criminal liability. In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, the following elements should occur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
moral equanimity. The foregoing elements were not proved to be present in instant case. In fact, during
accused-appellant's testimony, he even stated that he was not jealous of his wife. As correctly observed by the
Office of the Solicitor General: "In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced the
alleged passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not account how he killed his wife nor did he
explain the cause why he was prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for applying to
him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause which produced it has not been
established." All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions regarding his wife,
aggravated by his illness made it possible for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down
his criminal liability. Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will generally not be
disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence
considering that it observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial. In the case at bar,
the trial court was able to observe the behaviour of accused-appellant and it stated that his recollection of the
details surrounding the killing is so impeccable that only a person in his right mind can make it.
3. ID.; PARRICIDE; DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA;
NO AGGRAVATING OR MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE KILLING. — Thus, the trial court was correct
in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that: "Any person who shall kill his father, mother
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death." The crime of parricide,
not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater penalty
depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In this case, the information for parricide
against accused-appellant did not allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the
prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance. Likewise, no mitigating circumstance is
appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
ROMERO, Acting C.J p:

Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 dated April 15, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo,
La Union, Branch 32, 2 in Criminal Case No. A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P21,730.00 as actual expenses.
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant with the crime of parricide
reads as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo Tomas,
Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with the intent to and being then armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the said
weapon one FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a result of which his
said wife suffered fatal injuries which directly caused her death immediately thereafter, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to law." 3
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion Javier Panit and Alma Javier,
daughters of the victim and accused-appellant, and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were legally married on
December 18, 1954. 4 In their forty-one years of marriage, they begot ten children. Accused-appellant and
Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier. 5
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three o'clock in the morning, Consolacion Javier Panit, who
lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting "Arayatan
dac ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she heard her mother scream for help,
Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her sister, Alma who, weeping, told her that their parents were
quarrelling. Alma, at the time of the incident was living in her parent's house. Consolacion and Alma then
proceeded to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about seventy to eighty meters away from their
parents' house. The three then proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless
body of his mother and his father, accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then ordered
Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their father to the hospital. At this point, Manuel informed her sisters that
their mother was dead and that their father confessed to him that he killed his wife and thereafter allegedly
stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their bedroom, drenched in her own blood. 6
 Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband, Fernando, and her son,
Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help. 7
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police Station in La Union, testified
in the investigation he conducted with SPO4 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza regarding the incident of
June 15, 1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas
because accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The police authorities then proceeded to accused-
appellant's house in Brgy. Tugod, Sto. Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered
with blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children, Pacho testified that Manuel told him that his father
confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then surrendered to him the bolo covered with blood which was found in
the bedroom. The bolo was allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. 8 The medical findings
indicated that the victim suffered from multiple injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body. 9
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in their bedroom with the
use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A" and
which he used in wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed his wife because he could
not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he
did not know what he was doing. 10 He claims that he was insane at the time of incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April 15, 1997 rendered a decision
finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused, Eduardo Javier y
Basin is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to pay the heirs of the victims the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual
expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED." 11
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty,
considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and
obfuscation. 12 While accused-appellant does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting his defense
of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a lower penalty because at the time of the incident, he was
suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man,
aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-appellant cannot claim the
mitigating circumstance of illness in the absence of a medical finding to support his claim. Accused-appellant
cannot likewise be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the absence of sufficient
evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as defense the exempting
circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court rejected this defense of insanity for failure of the defense to
prove that accused-appellant was indeed insane at the time of the incident. The defense never presented any
medical record of the accused-appellant, nor was a psychiatrist ever presented to validate the defense of
insanity. Equally important, the defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances
of illness and passion and obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had been suffering from insomnia
for around a month, thus leading him to commit an act beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The
defense went on to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial sleep loss to support his
contentions. 13
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the
presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and
(2) such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. 14
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove the
claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the accused that
his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was presented regarding his
mental condition at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant,
nor on mere presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-
appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed. First, he
remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he
remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in killing his wife; and
he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the
ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was
in full control of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering from an illness that diminished
the exercise of his will-power. On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance
alleged by accused-appellant.
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to mitigate his criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements
should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and
(2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 15 The foregoing
elements were not proved to be present in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he even
stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
"In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced the alleged
passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not account how he killed his wife nor
did he explain the cause why he was prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable
basis for applying to him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause
which produced it has not been established." 16
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions regarding his wife,
aggravated by his illness made it possible for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down
his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will generally not be disturbed by
the appellate court because it is in the best position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence considering that
it observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial. In the case at bar, the trial court
was able to observe the behaviour of accused-appellant and it stated that his recollection of the details
surrounding the killing is so impeccable that only a person in his right mind can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of parricide under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:
"Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory death penalty
but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser
or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 17
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not allege any aggravating
circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the prosecution was able to prove any aggravating
circumstance. 18 Likewise, no mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-
appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the accused-appellant, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court
as one of civil indemnity instead of as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No.
A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff , vs. TOMAS NAVASCA, FLORENCIO GERALDES, LORENZO
SOBERANO and MANUEL MARQUEZ, defendants.

PER CURIAM p:

On December 18, 1962, Tomas Navasca, Florencio Geraldes, Lorenzo Soberano and Manuel Marquez
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide committed by a band before the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch III (Criminal Case 7712), the information reading as follows:
"That on or about March 17, 1959, in the Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above mentioned accused, all armed
with deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, and with
intent to gain and by means of force upon things and violence against persons, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take, steal and carry away the sum of One Thousand
Eight Hundred (P1,800.00) Pesos belonging to Go So alias OWA, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter in the aforesaid amount, and on the same occasion thereof, and in pursuance of
said conspiracy, the above mentioned accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and shoot said GO SO alias OWA, thereby inflicting
upon him injuries which caused his death."
Before arraignment, the commitment of the accused Tomas Navasca to the National Mental Hospital
was ordered and proceedings against him suspended after the court had adjudged him as suffering from
mental disorder, on the strength of the report and recommendation of a court-appointed doctor (Exhibit
"A"), and after the court had satisfied itself "that he cannot understand the nature of the proceedings to be
conducted against him."
Due trial proceeded against the remaining accused, and on January 7, 1966, the court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in conformity to Art. 294, paragraph 1 in relation to Art. 296 of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused FLORENCIO GERALDES and MANUEL MARQUEZ are hereby
sentenced each of them to the supreme and extreme penalty of death.
"The Court holds the view that (each of) the accused:
'. . . has proven himself to be a dangerous enemy of society. The latter must
protect itself from such enemy by taking his life in retribution for his offense as an
example and warning to others. In these days in rampant criminality it should have a
salutary effect to the criminally-minded to know that the Courts do not shirk their
disagreeable duty to impose the death penalty in cases where the law so
requires. People v. Carillo, No. L-2043, Feb. 28, 1950; 85 Phil. 611.'
"Relative to accused Soberano, although he was not actually present at the time of the
killing of the deceased Owa, for he was then acting as guard, yet, he is as much liable as his
other co-accused, considering the following authorities:
xxx xxx xxx
"Considering however accused Lorenzo Soberano's act of testifying for the prosecution
and revealing voluntarily in Open Court, the sordid details of this crime, the Court considers
this a mitigating circumstance in his favor similar to a plea of guilty, that is a mitigating
circumstance of 'similar analogous nature', and, hence, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
"All the accused are likewise ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the offended
parties in the sum of P1,800.00 and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
GO SO alias OWA in the amount of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
pay the costs proportionately.
"Considering further that the accused Navasca is presently mentally ill and uncertain as
to when he shall regain his sanity the case against him is ordered archieved to be retrieved
 immediately as soon as the accused regained his sanity and in a position to stand trial for this
crime."
By reason of the penalty imposed, this case is now before us on automatic appeal.
From the extra-judicial admission (Exhibit "B") and testimony of Lorenzo Soberano, the following
facts can be gathered.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 17, 1959 on his way home after buying DDT for his
corn, he saw his co-accused sitting on the road by the river at Bo. Rizal: Manuel Marquez holding a
thompson, Tomas Navasca armed with a pistol and Florencio Geraldes carrying a carbine. He bought tuba
as requested by Navasca and after the same was consumed by Navasca and Geraldes, he was invited to go
with the group to serenade. On their way, as they passed the house of a certain Primo, the latter was slapped
by Navasca and threatened with a 45 cal. pistol should he not consent to go with the group to rob. Out of
fear, he did not refuse and as they reached the house of their intended victim, he was given a hunting knife
by Navasca and told to stand guard outside the house. From where he stood, he heard gunshots coming
from the house, after which his companions went out of the same and they altogether fled.
From the account of Mrs. Josefa Delejeros, widow of Go So, the following transpired inside their
house which led to the robbery and death of her husband.
At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of March 17, 1959, she was having dinner with her husband Go
So at their house in Curbada, Bansalan, when three persons armed with "short" and "long" "articles" entered
their house, ordered them to go upstairs and directed her husband to open a trunk where their money was
kept. Go So gave the money amounting to P1,800.00 to the men, after which the man with the "short article"
fired at Go So many times. The "long articles" were not used. After shooting the victim, the men fled, and
her husband was brought to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital where he died as a result of "gunshot wound
through and through, with involvement of abdominal organs" and severe, secondary hemorrhage (Exhibit
"C"). The witness further testified that because of fear, she could neither identify the armed men who shot
and robbed her husband, nor remember their size and height (t.s.n. January 13, 1965, p. 85).
From the records of the case, the vital link between the accused and the crime consists in the extra-
judicial confession of Florencio Geraldes (Exhibit "A") and the extra-judicial admission (Exhibits "B" & "B-1")
and testimony of Lorenzo Soberano in court. Notably, both Geraldes and Soberano repudiated their
respective statements, claiming that their so-called statements were prepared by the police and that they
were compelled to affix their signatures thereto after they had been maltreated, and, in the case of
Soberano, after he had, in addition, been promised freedom. LLphil
After a meticulous study of the records and mature deliberation, it is unnecessary for us to discuss
the question squarely raised by Geraldes regarding the voluntariness and truth of his statement (Exhibit
"A"), for it is our view that even without the extra-judicial statement of Geraldes, the extra-judicial statement
and testimony of Lorenzo Soberano in open court, corroborated by the other evidence for the prosecution,
suffice to justify the affirmance of the conviction of all the accused by the trial court.
We cannot sustain the argument of Lorenzo Soberano that his statement was prepared by the Chief
of Police and that he affixed his thumbmark thereto after he had been maltreated and promised freedom
because there are certain characteristic features in his statement that refute his claim of involuntariness. To
cite a few: If it be true that the police prepared his statement, it would not contain details which are
inconsistent with the details mentioned in the extra-judicial confession of Geraldes. But inconsistencies do
exist between the statements of Geraldes and Soberano. Thus, said Geraldes:
"Q. Where and when the robbery was planned? (sic)
"A. I do not know sir. But when they were on their way to the house of GO SO ALIAS
OWA, they passed in my house and invited me to join them." (Exhibit "A").
On the other hand, Soberano stated that even before he knew of the plan to rob and even before they
started on their way, Florencio Geraldes was already with the group of Navasca, Marquez and another
person whom he did not know.
"Q. Would you please relate to the investigator the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime?
"A. Yes, sir. At about 3.00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 17, 1959, I went to the
poblacion of Bansalan, to buy DDT. On my way home, I saw Maning Marquez,
 Tomas Navasca and Florencio Geraldes sitting on the side of the creek in barrio
Rizal." (Exhibit "B").
Another reason which argues against the involuntariness of Soberano's statement is that it contains
details which only he could distinctly know such as his previous conviction for the theft of a plow and the
number of years of his sentence. Besides, Soberano complained of the maltreatment and the alleged
inducement only after he had previously testified and had been convicted by the trial court. Heretofore, this
Court has held that these features in an extra-judicial admission are proofs not of involuntariness and falsity
but rather of voluntariness and truth. 1
The paramount consideration, however, which, to our mind, weighs heavily in favor of the
voluntariness and truth of Soberano's admission and testimony in court is the significant fact that he took
the witness stand as witness for the prosecution notwithstanding the severe admonition by the trial judge
of the consequences of his testimony. Verily, the trial judge had painstakingly advised and informed the
accused of his rights as an accused and could not be indicted for dereliction of his duties as judge, as shown
by the following portion of the transcript:.
"QUESTIONS BY THE COURT :
"COURT:
"Q. You are one of the accused in this case?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. As an accused in this case, under the constitution, you cannot be compelled to
testify for the prosecution. Do you understand that?
"A. Yes, your Honor.
"Q. Do you also understand that under the Constitution if you remained silent and do
not testify, your silence will not be taken in any way against you?
"A. Yes, your Honor.
"Q. Now, the Fiscal desires to present you as one of the witnesses for the prosecution
against you and your other co-accused. Do you know that?
"A. Yes, your Honor.
"Q. And you know you have every right under our law to refuse?
"A. I cannot refuse, your Honor. What I will do is to tell the truth.
"Q. Do you understand that .. do you know that anything you say during this time
maybe taken against you?
"A. Never mind, if it will be taken against me, but I will do so to tell the truth.
"Q. Does the Court understand that you waived the right granted to you by our
constitution under our law and not incriminating yourself? (sic)
"A. What I will do, sir, is only to tell the truth.
"Q. Now, were you promised any reward or money by the Fiscal for the act which you
are about to do?
"A. No, your Honor.
"Q. So, you are aware of the consequences of what will happen to you if you testify and
notwithstanding that you assure this Court that you are waiving your right not to
testify against yourself?
"A. I will just tell the truth. sir." (t.s.n. January 13, 1965, pp. 96-98).
No more express waiver of the right of not testifying against oneself can be had than what Soberano
had done in the trial court. His statements clearly indicate an awareness and understanding of the
consequences of his testimony, yet, notwithstanding, he insisted, as in fact he did testify against himself and
his co-accused. Nor can it be suspected that his act of testifying was prompted by his belief that, in doing so,
he would be released, for, in his own words:
 "Q. Now, when you affix your thumbmark on Exhibit 1, thereof, you understand the
impression that you would be discharge from this case. Is that correct? (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
"COURT:
The import of the question Mr. Fiscal is the answer of the witness that he was not
promised any reward by the Fiscal. So, by this question he want to show that he was testifying
now for the prosecution precisely of the promise that he will be released in this case if you file
the Motion to Dismiss. That is the point. Let the witness answer. (sic).
"A I did not believe that I will be discharged. But, what I did was to tell the truth." (t.s.n.
January 14, 1965, p. 138).
The subsequent retraction by Soberano of his extra-judicial statement and his testimony in court
regarding the same cannot detract from its truth and voluntariness, considering that his retraction came,
not at the trial — for he affirmed the truth of the contents of his statement at the trial — but only after he
had been convicted and sentenced, together with some of his co-accused. Nor was the denial of the motion
for new trial which was filed by his counsel on the ground of the retraction by Soberano of his testimony in
court, an improvident act by the trial judge, for, time and again, it has been held by this Court that retraction
of previous testimony is not a ground for new trial. 2
The testimonies of two witnesses for the prosecution fortify the finding that the extra-judicial
statement of Soberano was voluntarily made. Thus, Chief of Police Alfonso Gomez testified that the
questions therein were asked and answered in the Visayan dialect which Soberano speaks and understands
and later on translated into English. Municipal Judge Hermenegildo Cabreros testified that when Soberano
was brought before him to subscribe to his statement, he asked the said accused if he understood English
and upon receiving a negative reply, he read the document in the Cebu-Visayan dialect. Thereafter, he asked
the accused if he understood what were read to him and if they were correct, to which the accused gave his
affirmation. In addition, the finding of the trial court as to the earnestness and fidelity of the prosecuting
fiscal as against the accusation of the accused that he was promised freedom by the same fiscal — a finding
which will not ordinarily be disturbed by the appellate courts in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary
— is determinative of the unreliability and incredibility of the grounds relied upon in the motion for new
trial and retraction of his testimony by Soberano.
Having allayed all fears as to the involuntariness and falsity of Soberano's testimony, we now proceed
to correlate the same with the other evidence for the prosecution.
The testimony of Soberano that Navasca, Marquez and Geraldes and another person whom he could
not identify were armed with a .45 cal. pistol, a thompson, a carbine and a bolo, respectively, when they
went up into the house of the victim, is corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Josefa Delejeros, the wife of
the victim and only eyewitness to the commission of the crime, when she testified that three men armed
with "short and long articles" entered their house at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening (exactly the same
time that Soberano said they reached the house of their intended victim) and proceeded to accomplish their
criminal scheme. From the testimony of Soberano and Mrs. Delejeros, the identities of the three men with
'short and long articles" have thus been established (t.s.n. January 13, 1965, pp. 79-80; 110-114).
The testimony of Soberano that the fatal weapon was a .45 cal. pistol is corroborated by Mrs.
Delejeros when she stated that the man with the "short article" fired at her husband but the "long articles"
were not used (t.s.n. January 13, 1965, p. 112; p. 84).
The ensnaring net of collective responsibility was cast with the admission of Soberano that he was
armed with a hunting knife as he stood guard outside the house of Go So while his companions perpetrated
the crime inside the house. Take this together with the testimony of the lone eyewitness — Mrs. Delejeros
— that the three men who entered their house were armed with "short and long articles" which Soberano
himself described as a .45 cal. pistol, a thompson and a carbine, and there converges into sharp focus the
responsibility appertaining to a band without having to consider the statement of Soberano that one of the
men was armed with a bolo, for it suffices to establish the existence of a band that more than three armed
men take part in the commission of a crime.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly established that the members of the band committed the
crime of robbery on the occasion of which a homicide was committed, thus classifying the crime as one of
robbery with homicide. It has also been established that the aggravating circumstance of band attended the
commission of the crime and none of the members thereof attempted to prevent the same. The state of the
evidence for the prosecution being such, we now assay the defense of the accused. cdrep
The defense of all the accused is anchored on the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession of
Florencio Geraldes (Exhibit "A") and the extra-judicial admission of Lorenzo Soberano (Exhibits "B" & "B-1")
on the ground that these were obtained by force and promise of freedom and hence, involuntary. As we
have mentioned earlier, it does not behoove this Court to determine the voluntariness or involuntariness
of both extra-judicial statements, it being enough that other evidence adduced at the trial fulfill the required
quantum of evidence to convict the accused. Likewise, we have found that the extra-judicial statement of
Soberano contains the indicia of voluntariness and his testimony in the court as prosecution witness negates
the suspicion of a promise of freedom. Woven together with the other evidence of the prosecution, the
pattern for the crime has thus been formed, and the claim of Soberano as to the involuntariness of his
admission as well as that of his testimony must fall.
The crime established by the evidence for the prosecution is robbery with homicide attended by the
aggravating circumstance of band. In the case of People vs. Apduhan, 3 we held that if the crime of robbery
with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be robbery with homicide with the
aggravating circumstance of band and not robbery in band with homicide.
The penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. The crime having
been committed by a band, all the members thereof are liable for each of the assaults committed, 4 unless
any one of them attempted to prevent their commission. No evidence was adduced by any of the accused
that he had attempted to prevent the commission of the crime, hence all must be held liable for the crime
of robbery with homicide. There being one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance to
offset the same in the case of Florencio Geraldes and Manuel Marquez, the penalty of death was correctly
imposed on them. The act of testifying for the prosecution, without previous discharge, by Lorenzo Soberano
should be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to a plea of guilty, hence there
exist in the case of Lorenzo Soberano, one mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance which
offset each other. Consequently, Lorenzo Soberano was properly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Considering the length of time that has elapsed from the time the accused Tomas Navasca was
committed to the National Mental Hospital, the Director of the said hospital should now conduct a full-
blown examination of the mental state of the said accused for the purpose of determining his mental
capacity to stand trial, and thereafter submit the proper report and recommendations to this Court. cdll
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo finding Florencio Geraldes, Manuel Marquez and Lorenzo
Soberano guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing Florencio Geraldes and Manuel
Marquez to the supreme penalty of death and Lorenzo Soberano to reclusion perpetua, is hereby affirmed.
All the accused are ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Go So alias Owa in the amount
of P1,800 representing the money stolen and the increased amount of P12,000 5 as indemnity for the death
of Go So alia Owa. The Director of the National Mental Hospital is hereby directed to conduct without delay
of full-blown examination of the mental state of the accused Tomas Navasca for the purpose of determining
this mental capacity to stand trial, and thereafter submit the proper report and recommendations to this
Court. Costs against the appellants.
 EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31, 1999, and resolution, dated
November 22, 1999, of the Court of Appeals, 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
25, Maasin, Southern Leyte, 2 finding petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs. caCSDT
The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of Southern
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal
and carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand
Pesos (P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to his damage
and prejudice in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution established the following facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon its birth on
March 10, 1984. The cow remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave
the care and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then
to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2, 1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until
March 14, 1986 when it was lost. 4 It appears that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took
the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However,
when he came back for it at past 9 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone. He
found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal. 5
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal from petitioner's
wife, but they were informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at
that time barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the two went to Florentino's
house. On their way, they met petitioner who told them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow
himself. Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his father's house, where Maria recognized the cow.
As petitioner's father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day
so that they could talk the matter over with his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of
Malitbog, Southern Leyte. 6 As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation.
Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He
presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to
support his claim (Exh. B). 7
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal treasurer,
in which the cow was described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing
of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on the right and left back, and at the
base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4). 8 All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the
same one they had taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex and its color. Gardenio described
the cow as black in color, with a small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the
middle of the forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks located near the
base of its forelegs and the hindlegs. 9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an agreement which he had with
Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which
petitioner would get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in question was
his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow, however, was lost on December 2, 1985.
Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3,
1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1). 10
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had seen the cow at Pilipogan,
under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986
to see whether the cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him and brought
it, together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta. 11 Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but
Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso so that they could determine the
ownership of the cow. 12 As Narciso did not come the following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he told
his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later,
Florentino and Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation. 13
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985 14 and a
statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurer's office of the municipality of Padre Burgos, to
the effect that he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of petitioner
Exuperancio Canta on February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5). 15 The statement was executed at the preliminary
investigation of the complaint filed by petitioner against Narciso. 16
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal treasurer, who stated that
petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos
(Exhs. E, E-1 and 2). 17 On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27,
1985. 18
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is
indubitable that it was accused Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow away without the
knowledge and consent of either the owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio Agapay. DcCHTa
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth
considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut forty
(40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but separated by a hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming
ownership. He, however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on February 27,
1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin
Telen, a janitor at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town.
On rebuttal Franklin Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even categorically
declared that it was only on March 24, 1986 that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal
Hall of Padre Burgos, when he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow,
and not on February 27, 1985. Franklin Telen testified thus:
"Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle was issued by you
on February 27, 1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)"
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less than the
Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN, September 29, 1992, pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why would he lie
on its registration? And why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin Telen to antedate its registry?
It is clear that accused secured a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning
and manipulation (Exhs. A & B) only after the act complained of in the instant case was
committed on March 14, 1986. His claim of ownership upon which he justifies his taking away
of the cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other hand, the complainant has shown all the
regular and necessary proofs of ownership of the cow in question. 19
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt his criminal intent in taking the disputed cow.
 First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites the following
circumstances to prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question would suckle to the
mother cow, thus proving his ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985 in his name, and found that they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking it, and later to the
police authorities, after a dispute arose as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P.D. No. 533.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things. EIDaAH
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods
or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without
violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. 20
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to Narciso
Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that
it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the
custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding
the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking
Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner
adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his
intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission
of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle which petitioner presented
to prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin Telen, the janitor in the municipal treasurer's office, admitted that
he issued the certificate to petitioner 10 days after Narciso's cow had been stolen. Although Telen has previously
executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted that
he antedated it at the instance of petitioner Exuperancio Canta, his friend, who assured him that the cow was
his. 21
Telen's testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal treasurer of Padre Burgos that
no registration in the name of petitioner was recorded in the municipal records. Thus, petitioner's claim that
the cowlicks found on the cow tally with that indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle has no
value, as this same certificate was issued after the cow had been taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay.
Obviously, he had every opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the certificate would tally with that
existing on the cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the police authorities does not
prove his good faith. He had already committed the crime, and the barangay captain to whom he delivered the
cow after taking it from its owner is his own father. While the records show that he filed on April 30, 1986 a
criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as
a countercharge to a complaint earlier filed on April 16, 1986 against him by Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question would suckle to the mother
cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien cows. 22 Hence, the fact that the cow suckled to the mother
cow brought by petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the mother cow.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of Ownership is "not in order," it
does not necessarily follow that he did not believe in good faith that the cow was his. If it turned out later that
he was mistaken, he argues that he committed only a mistake of fact but he is not criminally liable.
 Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership is not only "not in order." It is fraudulent, having been antedated
to make it appear it had been issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such
fraudulent certificate and made use of it negates his claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he took the
cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the custody of its caretaker cannot save him from the consequences
of his act. 23 As the Solicitor General states in his Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified the identity
and/or ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio Agapay, who is
petitioner's cousin TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner, however, did not do so despite the
opportunity and instead rushed to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner had committed a
mistake of fact he is not exempted from criminal liability due to his negligence. 24
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and permission of its
owner. If he thought it was the cow he had allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement
of his claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that "The true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property." What petitioner did in this case was to take the law in his own hands. 25 He
surreptitiously took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act belies his claim of
good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the finding of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb
their findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two respects. IaHAcT
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to
voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has
not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3)
the surrender is voluntary. 26 In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested.
In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been
repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally
to the authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require. 27 In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos
to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover
the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be
considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied §1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." However, as held
in People v. Macatanda, 28 P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of
the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In
fact, §10 of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this
Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision
mayor in its maximum period. DcSEHT
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORO RODIL, defendant-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

PC Lt. Masana and Floro Rodil, herein accused who is a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and an
officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines had an altercation in a restaurant because of the
former's confiscation's of the latter's gun. Angered by Lt. Masana's refusal to return his gun, Rodil suddenly
drew his dagger and attacked Lt. Masana who tried to parry the stabs. Lt. Masana was hit on the chest and
the stomach causing his death. The Chief of Police who was then present during the stabbing
grabbed Rodil and arrested him. When charged and tried for murder, the accused admitted the killing but
justified the same with self-defense. The lower court found the accused guilty and sentenced him to death.
On automatic review, the Supreme Court held that: (a) the accused's claim of self-defense is not
justified since it appears that he initiated the aggression which resulted in the death of the victim; (b) the
prosecution's claim that the killing was qualified by treachery is incorrect because the attack was made by
the accused on the spur of the moment and the victim had tried to defend himself by warding off the stabs;
(c) the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be applied because the accused is inferior both
in rank and social status to the victim; (d) the aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to public
authority should likewise be appreciated since the accused attacked his victim in the presence of a chief of
police; and (e) consequently, there being no qualifying circumstance and present two aggravating
circumstances without any mitigating circumstance, the crime committed is only homicide for which the
accused should serve an indeterminate prison term of from 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, in addition to civil indemnities, damages and costs awarded by the
lower court.
Judgment modified.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE

REQUIRED; ACCUSED MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS
OF THAT OF THE PROSECUTION; RATIONALE. — Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven
by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs. Libed, 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs.
Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solana, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473, 477; People vs.
Paras, 50 Phil. 149, 152; People vs. Berio, 59 Phil. 533, 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover,
to prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, if could not be disbelieved after the accused had
admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarra,
25 SCRA 491, 496; People vs. Solana, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs.
Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 772). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that,
having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the
crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED NOT ENTITLED THERETO WHERE HE INITIATED THE AGGRESSION WHICH
RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. — In the case at bar, the accused claims that after he refused to
give his ID to the deceased because the same was his and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with
the handle of his (deceased's) gun. We cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could have provoked
or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the
accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been
taken away from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use
force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way
to comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an
unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the incident happened, he being then
on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing. We are, therefore, inclined to believe that it
was the accused who had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased
refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned to him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the
accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased
resulting in his death.
 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED'S CLAIM THAT THE VICTIM WAS THE AGGRESSOR IMPROBABLE, THE SAME
BEING CONTRARY TO THE NATURAL COURSE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. — The record reveals that the deceased
was a right-handed person. It also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the
accused were facing each other. If it was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the
accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right earlobe? We find that
this particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his
gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location
of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other,
and it appearing that they were both right handed, the blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would
perforce land on the left, and not on the right side of the body of the recipient of the blow. We, therefore,
reject such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course of natural behavior.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELAY IN INVOKING SAME DESTROYS CREDIBILITY OF THE CLAIM. — It was only on
July 8, 1971, after the lapse of more than two and one-half (2½) months that the accused claimed self-
defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite. If the
accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief of Police at the first
opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked him why his head and face were
bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for
stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made before the municipal judge of Indang,
Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was
committed on April 24,1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an
afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses, PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose
testimony as peace officers, in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort
the truth, must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
5. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY (ALEVOSIA); NOT PRESENT WHERE ATTACK ON
THE VICTIM WAS MADE ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT. — After a thorough analysis of the pertinent
portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses. We can only conclude that the
assailant and the victim were indeed face to face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not
treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force
he used in warding off the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing
injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the
spur of the moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery
(People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused made any
preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same time
impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 111 Phil. 738). Neither does
it show that the accused employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to
himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance of his three
companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused
and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment
when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the
victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the
latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show
the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE PRESUMED; CONCLUSIVE PROOF THEREOF REQUIRED. — Alevosia is not
to be presumed, but must be proved a conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil.
670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].
7. ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; HOMICIDE WITH ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN AUTHORITY;
INFORMATION CHARGING SAME MUST ALLEGE THAT THE ACCUSED HAS KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON
ATTACKED WAS AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN AUTHORITY, OTHERWISE THE ATTACK COULD BE CONSIDERED
ONLY AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE AS IN THE CASE AT BAR. — While the evidence definitely
demonstrated that the appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was
an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact
that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in
authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while
the latter was in the performance of his official duties, . . . ." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires
the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in
the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven,
would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the
victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being
"in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. [2], Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as
an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, . . ." (Par. 3, Art. XIV,
Revised Penal Code).
8. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; DISREGARD OF RANK; APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — The
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim,
PC Lt. Masana, identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-
Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
9. WORDS AND PHRASES; RANK; PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING. — The term "rank" should be
given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or standing as a grade in the
armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the British Language Unabridged, p. 1881);
or to a graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which
said officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition,
Walter A. Shoemaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction
conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in reference to the other officers in matters of
privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments as
in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official
standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade, including its
grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p.
100).
10. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; DISREGARD OF RANK; JURISPRUDENCE. —
Thus, disregard of rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil, 92 SCRA 89,
105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service
Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, February 13, 1975), the murder by
a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469, 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706,709), the
murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder of a city chief of
police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167); assault upon a 66-year old
District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreon, CA 52 OG
7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil.
597, 606-607), and the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT WHENEVER THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN OFFICIAL AND SOCIAL STATUS
BETWEEN THE OFFENDER AND THE OFFENDED PARTY. — As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then
of the Court of Appeals, those "generally considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well
as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition
between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert
M.A.—The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109). The difference in official or social status
between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.
12. ID.; ID.; DISREGARD OF RANK AND CONTEMPT OF OR INSULT TO PUBLIC AUTHORITY; CANNOT
BE APPRECIATED IN A CHARGE OF MURDER WITH ASSAULT AGAINST AN AGENT OF A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CONSIDERED WHERE THE CHARGE IS MURDER ONLY. — If the accused herein were
charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not
merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public
authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of
assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant
is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.
13. ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT OF OR INSULT TO, PUBLIC AUTHORITY; APPRECIATED WHERE THE OFFENDER
ATTACKED HIS VICTIM IN THE PRESENCE OF A CHIEF OF POLICE; CASE AT BAR. — The aggravating
circumstance of contempt of, or insult to public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised
 Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar. The evidence of the prosecution clearly
established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he was taking his lunch in the same
restaurant when the incident occurred. As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who
embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him
to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even then a the town chief of police,
although he now claims that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was
not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
14. ID.; REVISED PENAL CODE; PUBLIC AUTHORITY CONSTRUED; INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY. — While it may be true in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-
158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317); and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term
public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public
authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is
not justified by the employment of the term public authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and
152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid
three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should comprehend only person in authority. The lawmaker
could have easily utilized the term "person in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much
the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 152. The lawmaker must have intended
a different meaning for the term public authority, which may however include, but not limited to persons in
authority.
15. ID.; ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY THEREFOR WHERE TWO AGGRAVATING AND NO MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE EXIST. — With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the
appellant should therefore be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal, the penalty
prescribed for homicide.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting in part:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; CONTEMPT OF OR INSULT TO PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES; NOT CONSIDERED IN CASE AT BAR; REASONS. — In this case, the offended party, Lt. Masana
of the Philippine Constabulary is not a public authority nor a person in authority as these terms are defined
by Article 152, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code for he is not directly vested with jurisdiction, that is power
or authority to govern and execute the laws or to hear and decide a cause; he is a mere agent of a person in
authority as defined by Article 152, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he being a member of the Philippine
Constabulary which is a government military agency in charge of the maintenance of public order and the
security of life and property. In fact, the Decision itself calls him an agent of a person in authority. And even
if Lt. Masana were a person in authority, this aggravating circumstance cannot be taken into account
because it is he himself who is the offended party.
2. ID.; ID.; INSULT OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE TO THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF
HIS RANK; REQUIREMENT NOT COMPLIED WITH, IN CASE AT BAR. — It is not the existence alone of rank of
the offended party that determines the presence of this aggravating circumstance. There must be a
difference in the social condition of the offender and the offended party. In the case at bar, the difference
in the social condition and rank of the victim, a Lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary, and that of the
accused, who is a member of an anti-smuggling unit and an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the
Philippines, is not of such a degree as to justify consideration of disrespect of rank due to the offended party
as an aggravating circumstance.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; IMPOSABLE PENALTY IN THE ABSENCE OF AGGRAVATING AND
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. — In the case at bar, the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its
medium period, and the accused should be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment ranging
from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
MAKASIAR, J p:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary.
Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00,
to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.
The information alleges:
 "That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent
to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo
Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.
"Contrary to law."
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana,
together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, and Patrolman Felix
Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2, 3, t.s.n.,
Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw,
through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their
attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana, then in civilian clothing, accompanied
by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after
identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of
answering the question of Lt. Masana, appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun.
PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt.
Masana. After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2 ) meters
from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After
the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled
out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after
signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt.
Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling the latter that they would talk
the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up,
appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on
the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp.
10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971) Cdpr
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate
table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana, stood
up to assist Lt. Masana; but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking
his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced
and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant.
Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite
(p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20,1972), while the
companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several
hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr.
Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy
of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits
"D" and "D-1" (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
"Postmortem findings.
"General:
"Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity
over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips are pale. There
is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the
anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied. There are surgical incisions in the left and
right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm.
from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each,
respectively.
"TRUNK:
 "(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards and slightly upwards, passing
superficially between muscles and tissues.
"(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards and to the left,
lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
"(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm., just left of the anterior midline,
96 cm. above the heel, 11 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and to the left,
perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric vessels, grazing the liver,
perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the right lung.
"(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
"UPPER EXTREMITIES:
"(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by
0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
"(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
"Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
"There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the
stomach.
"There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
"REMARKS:
"Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic
hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the stomach, gastric
vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung."
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a restaurant
near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong,
Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three
persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo
Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt.
Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his
table. The accused accepted the invitation, so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased
offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their
conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused
informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then
asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did
by showing his ID card, Exhibit "1", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-
Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971) cdphil
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted
that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it
back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his ID card to Lt. Masana, the latter got mad and, in an angry
tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (p. 71, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender
his ID to Lt. Masana. Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with
its handle two (2) times. Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to
hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak"
and stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant
(pp. 74, 75, 79, Ibid)
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to
surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite.
The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt.
Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). Thereupon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to
accompany the accused to the municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite,
accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal building
is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought
back by the Indang policeman to the municipal building, where he was detained for two days before he was
picked up by the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121st PC Headquarters in
Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n.,
Jan. 20, 1972)
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.
I
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence (People vs. Libed, 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11,
17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473, 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149,
152; People vs. Berio, 59 Phil. 533, 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove
justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted the
killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarra, 25 SCRA 491,
496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58
Phil. 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 772). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted
the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he
establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. cdphil
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana, who
committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he
refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his and
he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive
how this refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the
aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no
longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of authority,
like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked,
or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed
by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was
unarmed when the incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian
clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who
had every reason to be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his
plea that his gun be returned to him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms.
Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the accused, not the
deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his
death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third blow.
This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the scar
produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID, thus —
"Court
"Q. Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86, 88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971]
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in
his medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
"Injuries: (1) lacerated wound, 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt. ear lobe.
 (3) contusion, right mastoid area" [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec.]
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It
also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were facing each
other. If that was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the accused, holding the
gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and on his right ear lobe? WE
find that this particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle
of his gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the
location of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists
were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both right-handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the
blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right side of
the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same being
contrary to the natural course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the
victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head
on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head. prLL
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal
building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that
he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his
return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal building
of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this
time, he did not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed
Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971, after the lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2)
months that he claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal
judge of Indang, Cavite (p. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would
surely have so informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police,
who allegedly asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not
tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the
accused made before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an
exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not
deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward
testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, both
disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of any showing as
to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr.
Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident
between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the knife
from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault
upon an agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established by
the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance
to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon him mortal wounds on the
chest and stomach . . . Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an
unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself before
the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's brief)
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil.
475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190)
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following testimony
of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
"COURT.
"Q What is the truth?
 "A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo Masana, Masana
parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on the edge of a table; that is why he sustained
an injury and blood oozed from his head" (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; italics supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUÑOZ.
"Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a table, and you saw
blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
"A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally bumped his head on
the table.
"Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the extent that he bumped
his head on the table?
"A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana already stabbed?
"A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed?
[Pp. 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1922; emphasis added]
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the
prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to face
when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was able to ward
off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the attack was so strong
that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical
treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of the
attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158,
167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to
insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same time impossible or hard for the victim to defend
himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 111 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738).
Neither does it show that the accused employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing
without risk to himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance of his
three companions, two of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation between the
accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the
moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed
the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was
the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly
show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be
proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in
the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make (Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code) prcd
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in
civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the
complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that
the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault,
the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack
and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, . . ." Such an
allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex
crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in
the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying
circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying
this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be
considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of/or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. [2], Art.
XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, . . ." (Par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code)
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend,
injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs.
Villaseñor, 35 SCRA 460 [1970]; People vs. Rellin, 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear, et al., 35 Phil. 626[1916])
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly
allege in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority
does not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it can be
implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the information for
Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as follows:
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss Ester
Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as
such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion therefor, by then
and there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss
the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstances of having committed it inside the school building and during school classes.
"Contrary to law."
And the ruling of the Court was:
"Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,.
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance'(See. Art. 148, Revised Penal Code)
"By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), `teachers, professors, and persons charged
with the Supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall
be deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148.' This special
classification is obviously intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the
performance of their official duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on
the ground that there is no express allegation in the information that the accused had
knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
"Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew
that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It
matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a
person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse
non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic
laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity."
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information
for Direct Assault reads:
"That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of
Polillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
 above named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose Astejada, each of
whom was armed with a piece of wood, except Paulo Coralde, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias, a
councilman of barrio Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said
councilman was engaged in the actual performance of his duties."
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
"Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the information
that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that such fact was known to
the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari but
the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations: LLphil
"The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that `(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want of factual
finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been based.'
"It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information was
deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct assault that the
accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by the person attacked viz.
that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in authority under Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear, 35 Phil.
626; People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. II, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225]
"What was held in People vs. Balbar, 21 SCRA, 119, 1123, cited by the fiscal is that it is
sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of authority, held by
the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then engaged in the performance of
her official duties, and that it is not necessary to allege further that the accused also knew that
such position was that of a person in authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
'Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew
that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It
matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a
person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse
non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic
laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.'
"Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual findings as per
the trial judge's own disavowal, it is patent that the fiscal's proper course is not the present
petition but the refiling of a valid information against respondents-accused, as herein indicated.
"ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling of a valid
information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated" (italics supplied)
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant
case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the latter and does not
allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a
person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that
the victim, PC. Lt. Masana, identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social
position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS
458); or to the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others
(Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to
the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in
reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to
determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third
Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100)
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil, 92 SCRA 89,105-
106, July 30, 1979),the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission
by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his
teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469, 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a
municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder of a city chief of police by the
chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge
of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreon, CA 52 OG 7644), the killing
of a Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606-607), and
the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953)
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally considered
of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore,
whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, this
aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946
Ed., p. 109) LLpr
The difference in official or social status between the P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-
smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent
of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or
contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance
is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in
the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged
with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;.
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for
the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen.
Mariano Castañeda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide for
the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero, supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City
Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to public authority under paragraph 2 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang
was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from
behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And
appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he went
to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not alleged in the restaurant during
the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150,157-158), People vs. Siojo
(61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority refers
to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but merely
an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such ruling since it is not justified by the
employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person
in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended
reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should
comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in
authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase
in Articles 148 and 152. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority,
which may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is
a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in
authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil.
228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil. 640), as well as a nurse, a
municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R,
May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al., O.G.S. 11 p. 24)
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he
is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to
prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned
officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically
mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads and supervises the entire police
force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality, which
is patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area
the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited. LibLex
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should therefore
be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal, the penalty prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE
THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO
SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR AS
MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas City)
and MARIO N. AUSTRIA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Manuel A. Conti for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent Austria was charged with falsification of public official document. Out of the
eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the first three witnesses were notified of the date of the
arraignment and pre-trial. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the case because none of the three
witnesses appeared before it when the case was called for pre-trial. The public prosecutor filed a motion
for reconsideration of said order, but the same was denied. The People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for the nullification of the orders of the trial court. The CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court were mere errors of judgment which
are not correctible by a writ of certiorari. The appellate court also stated that a reinstatement of the
criminal case will place the private respondent in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial court acted without jurisdiction
when it dismissed the case merely because none of the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for
the pre-trial. Under R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998), the absence during pre-trial of any witness
for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the
complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-
trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is,
however, not required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court.
It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in
the Information for the State appeared for pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the public
prosecutor appeared for the State.
The Court also ruled that the CA erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case will place private
respondent in double jeopardy. When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The trial court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before
the trial court amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to
a second jeopardy. cTESIa

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 (THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1998);
ABSENCE DURING PRE-TRIAL OF ANY WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, NOT A VALID GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
OF A CRIMINAL CASE. — Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed
in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid
ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the
presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of
the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his
counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial,
the same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor
is vested with authority to consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF STATE TO PROSECUTE CASE AND PROVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED FOR
CRIME CHARGED SHOULD NOT BE DERAILED BY CAPRICIOUS DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AT THE INITIAL PRE-TRIAL
STAGE; CASE AT BAR. — The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely
because none of the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial. The State, like the accused
is also entitled to due process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court dismissing the criminal case deprived
the State of its right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is, therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is
of no effect. By its ruling, this Court is not abetting or even glossing over the failure of the three witnesses of
the prosecution to appear at the initial pre-trial of the case. Said witnesses may be cited by the trial court in
contempt of court if their absence was unjustified. Undue delay in the prosecution of the case should not also
be condoned. But the right of the State to prosecute the case and prove the criminal liability of the private
respondent for the crime charged should not be derailed and stymied by a precipitate and capricious dismissal
of the case at the initial pre-trial stage. To do justice to private respondent and injustice to the State is no justice
at all. Justice must be done to all the parties alike.
3. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; REQUISITES. — The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case will place
the private respondent in double jeopardy. This Court ruled in Saldana vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that: "When
the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433
[Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA
1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]). . . . Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra.).
. . . Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon
a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the
right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of
the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." CTHDcS
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61535
(SP) dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for the nullification of the Order 2 dated August 1,
2002 and the subsequent Order 3 denying the motion for reconsideration issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 84 of Batangas City in People vs. Mario Austria, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10766.
On February 22, 2000, an Information 4 was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Batangas City
against Mario N. Austria for falsification of public official document. The Information reads:
That on or about June 2, 1999 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, he being the Officer-in-
Charge Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail located at Brgy. Cuta Bilibid, Batangas
City, and taking advantage of his official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-
Expendable Property, a public/official document of the Office of the Provincial Warden of
Batangas, by stating in said memorandum receipt dated June 2, 1999 that Colt MKIV Series '80
Government Model, Pistol Cal. .380 SN-26917 with 40 rounds of ammunitions, is a provincial
government property duly registered with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, Batangas PNP
Command, Kumintang Ilaya, Batangas City, and issued to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, Civilian Agent, for
his own use in connection with the performance of his official duties and functions, when in
truth and in fact said statements are absolutely false when he has the legal obligation to
disclose the truth, as said firearm is not a property of the Provincial Government of Batangas;
that it is not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Units of Batangas PNP Command,
Batangas City and Camp Crame, Quezon City; and that Alberto Tesoro is not an employee of
the Provincial Government of Batangas, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The following were listed in the Information as witnesses for the People of the Philippines, and their
respective addresses/places of station/assignment were also indicated therein:
1. SPO3 Gaudencio C. Aguilera, Malvar Police Station, Malvar, Batangas;
2. SPO2 Simplicio M. Bejasa, -do-
3. PG2 Sofronio Vicencio, c/o Provincial Jail, Brgy. Cuta Bilibid, Batangas City;
 4. SPO4 Benjamin Geron, Batangas Provincial Police Office, Camp Malvar, Kumintang Ilaya,
Batangas City;
5. PCI Franklin Moises, Mabanag, -do-

6. PCI Jonathan Viernes Ablang, -do-

7. PCI Edwin G. Nemenzo, Firearms and Explosives Unit, Camp Crane (sic), Quezon City — RE:
Verification dated September 30, 1999.
8. P/Inspector Anacleta Cultura, PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV, Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba, Laguna — RE: Document Examination Report No. DE-014-99 dated October
29, 1999;
9. Miguel C. Malvar III, General Services Office, Batangas Capitol, Batangas City;
10. Augusto M. Claveria, Office of the Provincial Administrator, Batangas Capitol, Batangas
City
11. Personnel Officer, Office of the Provincial Governor, Batangas Capitol, Batangas City — RE:
Appointment of Mario N. Austria as OIC, Provincial Warden from January 1999 to June
2, 1999;
xxx xxx xxx 5
The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial on August 1,
2000. 6 Apparently, out of the eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the first three witnesses were
notified of said arraignment and pre-trial. When the case was called for pre-trial, the trial court discovered that
none of the three witnesses who were allegedly earlier notified by the court was in attendance. On motion of
the accused and over the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case
for failure of said witnesses to appear before it. The bail bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty
was thereby cancelled. The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, contending that
the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it dismissed the case simply because three of its witnesses
who were notified failed to appear at the initial pre-trial. The public prosecutor asserted that it had eleven
witnesses but only three were subpoenaed by the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of the case
was not authorized under Republic Act No. 8493. 7 The trial court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the public prosecutor.
The trial court posits that under R.A. No. 8493 pre-trial is mandatory and the presence of the
complaining witnesses is likewise required during the trial for the parties to participate in the plea bargaining
and stipulation of facts during said proceedings. If the complaining witnesses are absent, the principal purpose
of the pre-trial cannot be achieved. It was incumbent on the public prosecutor to procure the attendance of its
witnesses for the pre-trial but this, he failed to do. The trial court stated that there were instances in the past
when the public prosecutor manifested to the trial court that it had no witness for the pre-trial and moved for
the dismissal of criminal cases. The trial court contended that if the dismissal of the case was precipitate, it was
the fault of the public prosecutor and not the trial court: IDESTH
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated August 1, 2000
which dismissed this case during the arraignment and pre-trial due to the non-appearance of
the complaining witnesses, namely SPO3 Gaudencio C. Aguilera and SPO2 Simplicio M. Mejasa
as well as Sofronio Vicencio, despite notice. Material witness Sofronio Vicencio who had to
identify the alleged falsified document also was not present for the reason that he was already
not connected with the Batangas Provincial Jail where he used to be a provincial jailer. He could
not be contacted anymore.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8493 provides, Mandatory Pre-trial in Criminal Cases. In
all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall,
after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
 (c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expiditious (sic) trial.
It is evident that the presence of the complaining witnesses is likewise mandatory
because they have to participate in the plea bargaining and the stipulation of facts.
Upon motion of the accused on the ground that the presence of the complaining
witnesses is likewise mandatory and that the accused is entitled to speedy trial, the Court was
compelled to dismiss the case. Said dismissal is neither capricious and precipitate. The
prosecution must likewise endeavor to secure the presence of its complaining witnesses or any
witnesses by any form of communication such as telephone, telegram, or letter. That is the
essence of vigorous and adequate prosecution. In fact prosecutors must interview their
witnesses before the trial or before the hearing in Court. There were instances in the past when
the trial prosecutor manifested to the Court that it had no witnesses and moved for the
dismissal of the case during arraignment and pre-trial. Experience showed that in such cases,
prolonging the case was an exercise in futility. If it was precipitate, then the prosecution had
committed it. 8
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, for
the nullification of the orders of the trial court. The People alleged that the trial court acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the case
and denying its motion for reconsideration. DTIcSH
On April 3, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the ground that
the errors committed by the trial court were mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a writ
of certiorari. The appellate court also stated that a reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10766 will place the
private respondent in double jeopardy.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed Criminal Case
No. 10766 simply because three witnesses of its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-trial of the
case. In fact, R.A. 8493 does not contain any provision which mandates a trial court to dismiss a criminal case
for failure of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the pre-trial.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the
Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid ground
for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence
of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of the
accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. 9 It is enough that the accused is represented by his
counsel.
Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial,
the same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor
is vested with authority to consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely because none of the
witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial. The State, like the accused is also entitled to due
process in criminal cases. 10 The order of the trial court dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its
right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is, therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of no
effect. 11 By its ruling, this Court is not abetting or even glossing over the failure of the three witnesses of the
prosecution to appear at the initial pre-trial of the case. Said witnesses may be cited by the trial court in
contempt of court if their absence was unjustified. Undue delay in the prosecution of the case should not also
be condoned. But the right of the State to prosecute the case and prove the criminal liability of the private
respondent for the crime charged should not be derailed and stymied by a precipitate and capricious dismissal
of the case at the initial pre-trial stage. To do justice to private respondent and injustice to the State is no justice
at all. Justice must be done to all the parties alike. Not too long ago this Court ruled in Dimatulac vs. Villon: 12
 The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice."
He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade.
Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred
ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate
with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal
case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not
unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party
to due process of law.
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged
must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice;
and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the
party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.

The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case does not place the private
respondent in double jeopardy. This Court ruled in Saldana vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 13 that:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29,
1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20
SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process
raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37
SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial
of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA
78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision
rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy
(Serino vs. Zosa, supra.).
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as
that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated
the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of
the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
and the Orders of respondent Regional Trial Court, (Annexes "A", "C", and "E" of the petition,) are SET ASIDE.
Respondent Regional Trial Court is ordered to REINSTATE People vs. Mario Austria, Criminal Case No. 10766 in
the docket of the court.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACITO STO. TOMAS, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CUEVAS, J p:

At about ten o'clock in the evening of May 23, 1967, tragedy struck at the residence of the GRULLAS
situated in the municipality of Donsol, Sorsogon. After the smoke of gun fire had cleared, two (2) persons
were found dead inside the house of the Grullas bathed in their own blood, namely: SALVACION GRULLA,
wife of the herein accused-appellant who lay prostrate on the floor at the sala; and appellant's mother-in-
law CONSOLACION BELMONTE VDA. DE GRULLA who appeared seated motionless on a chair with her body
reclining on a table. The third victim NATIVIDAD GRULLA, younger sister of Salvacion, nearly escaped death
but likewise suffered gunshot wounds necessitating hospitalization for almost a month. LibLex
As an aftermath of the aforesaid shooting incident, three Criminal Cases were filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon-Branch III, against appellant PACITO STO. TOMAS. One for PARRICIDE
under Criminal Case No. 22, for the death of Salvacion Grulla; another one for MURDER under Criminal Case
No. 23, for the death of appellant's mother-in-law Consolacion Belmonte Vda. de Grulla; and the third one
for FRUSTRATED MURDER under Criminal Case No. 29, for the near fatal shooting of Natividad Grulla,
appellant's sister-in-law.
After trial, following a plea of NOT GUILTY entered upon arraignment, accused was convicted and
thereafter sentenced as follows:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 22: to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Salvacion Grulla in the amount of P15,000.00; plus P10,000.00 by way of
moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 23: to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years as the
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of deceased
Consolacion Vda. de Grulla in the amount of P15,000.00; and to pay P10,000.00 as moral
damages plus P5,000.00 as punitive damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 29: to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as the minimum of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as the maximum; and to
indemnify Natividad Grulla, in the amount of P700.00 as actual damages; P10,000.00 as moral
damages; and P5,000 as punitive damages; plus P10,000.00 as additional actual damages for
loss of scholarship grant."
From the aforesaid judgment, accused ventilated an appeal to this Court, seeking the reversal of his
aforesaid conviction on the ground that the trial court allegedly erred —
I
IN HOLDING THAT SALVACION GRULLA IS THE WIFE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT;
II
IN FINDING THAT NATIVIDAD GRULLA WITNESSED THE SHOOTING OF SALVACION GRULLA AND
CONSOLACION VDA. DE GRULLA;
III
IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ACCOMPANIED THE SHOOTING OF NATIVIDAD GRULLA;
IV
IN FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE;
V
IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DWELLING IN THE IMPOSITION
OF PENALTIES;
VI
 IN FINDING THAT NATIVIDAD GRULLA SUFFERED PERMANENT DEFORMITY FROM THE INJURY WHICH
COULD HAVE CAUSED HER DEATH;
VII
IN AWARDING DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF IN SUPPORT
THEREOF; and
VIII
IN CONVICTING APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The prosecution's version of the incident in question as summarized by the Solicitor General runs
thus —
"On May 23, 1967 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Natividad Grulla, then a 19-year old
girl, was engrossed in reading the Illustrated Classics in her bedroom at the Grulla residence in
Dansol, Sorsogon (pp. 19, 21, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). Also then at home, were her nephews, Fidel,
Pacito, Jr., and Roberto, her sisters, Blesilda and Salvacion, her mother Consolacion Grulla, a
niece, Alma and their maid Avelina Bordeos (p. 34, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968). A brother, six to, was out
of the house at that time, while two other brothers Samuel and Alfredo, were asleep in the
house of Natividad's grandmother located at the back of their residence (p. 38, tsn, ibid).
Between 10:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock that same evening, Salvacion Grulla's husband,
Pacito Sto. Tomas arrived by car and knocked at the front door of the Grulla residence and upon
hearing the knocking, Natividad proceeded to the front door to open it but Pacito had walked
towards the back door and knocked upon it, (p. 4, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968). Pacito's wife, Salvacion,
proceeded to meet him in the kitchen. Once inside, Pacito asked his wife to go with him,
together with their children, and rushed the maid to get their things packed for Legaspi City.
Natividad saw the couple talking in the sala. (p. 5, tsn, ibid.).
Awakened by Pacito and Salvacion's conversation, Consolacion Grulla, Salvacion and Natividad's
mother, came out of her bedroom and joined the spouses in the sala. There, Pacito asked his mother-in-
law's permission to bring his wife and children to Legaspi City. Speaking in the dialect, Consolacion Grulla
replied, "Pacito, my daughter cannot go with you to Legaspi because she does not want to live with you. She
can no longer endure the sufferings she is undergoing because of your jealousy." Pacito, however, retorted,
"May, I cannot talk over this thing with you any longer and I would like Vacion to go with me to Legaspi." (p.
5, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968) After which, he turned to his wife and asked her whether she was going with him, but
she answered that she could not do so because their youngest child Blesilda, then only seven months old,
was with fever (p. 36, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968; p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968).
Later, while Natividad was already in her room she heard a series of gunshots that caused her to
stopped reading, and she went out her room to see Pacito firing at her sister (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968; pp. 6,
34 and 35, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). After the series of gunshot by Pacito, Natividad then saw her mother seated,
motionless, on a chair about three meters from Pacito, her body reclining on a table, while her sister lay
prostrate on the floor (pp. 29, 31-33, tsn. Dec. 5, 1968; p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968). Then, in response to
Natividad's call of "Manay", Mrs. Sto. Tomas raised her head slightly but was apparently too weak to rise (p.
27, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968; p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968). Natividad pleaded with Pacito to spare Salvacion's life telling
him that the latter would go with him to Legaspi. But her pleas merited no more than an expression of
"Hmmm" from Pacito who began to reload his revolver (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27,1968).
At this juncture, Natividad suddenly remembered that her sister had told her, sometime in the past,
that Pacito had threatened to kill all the members of the Grulla family (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968). Scared by
this recollection, Natividad thought of escaping, and forth with returned to her bedroom, her back now
towards the accused, her hands raised in a gesture of surrender. As she entered her room she heard
gunshots again, and she turned around to find out at whom the accused was firing, but as she did so, she
felt her left arm go numb (p. 34, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968, p. 7, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968; p. 47, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). She saw
her left arm bleed and tried to support it with her right hand, but Pacito shot her once more, this time hitting
her right forearm (p. 35, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968). Frightened to death, she ran through the front door, shouting
for help at the top of her voice (p. 35, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968; p. 7, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968; p. 42, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969).
Upon reaching a doromon tree some ten meters away from her house, she met Reynaldo Masanque and
Hospicio Pasibi, who were on their way to find out the cause of the successive gunshots that they had heard
while conversing in the park near the municipal building.
 Natividad thereupon requested Reynaldo Masanque to go to her mother and sister, telling him that
they had been shot and so Masanque complied, and ran towards Natividad's house (pp. 5, 16-20, tsn, March
31, 1970). Upon reaching the door of the Grulla residence, Masanque saw Pacito Sto. Tomas inside, his right
hand holding a gun and his back towards the door Masanque likewise saw Salvacion lying on the floor and
Consolacion leaning against a table (pp. 6-7, tsn, ibid). Afraid that he might be shot if he were seen by Pacito,
Masanque left immediately and he overtook Natividad Grulla near the house of Mr. Barios, her arms being
held by Hospicio Pasibi (pp. 10, 11, tsn, ibid). Upon reaching the corner of Calle Tres Marias, they met Sixto
Grulla, a brother of Natividad, who had also been alarmed by the shots he heard. Sixto went with them to
the municipal building, and on the way, Natividad unfolded to him the tragic incident (p. 11, tsn, March 31,
1970; p. 16, tsn, April 1, 1970)." 1
On the other hand, appellant's version of the incident tends to show that it was his wife Salvacion
Grulla who accidentally shot his mother-in-law, the deceased Consolacion Belmonte Vda. de Grulla.
Summing up his evidence, it appears that he went to Donsol, Sorsogon on the fatal day in question in order
to fetch his wife Salvacion Grulla and their children for purposes of bringing them to Legaspi City since he
will have to be confined in a hospital on the following day upon orders of his doctor. Upon reaching his wife's
place, he knocked at the back door near the kitchen. Salvacion opened the door. Right then and there,
appellant told her to get ready for Legaspi City with their children. Salvacion refused to leave for Legaspi City
and ignored appellant's plea. Appellant then entered the room occupied by his mother-in-law, Consolacion,
to get the suitcase containing his children's clothes. Consolacion was awakened and learning of appellant's
purpose in going to their place, she angrily cursed the latter. Appellant then reiterated and explained to his
mother-in-law, (Consolacion) his purpose in fetching his wife and children. A verbal altercation thereafter
ensued between them during which time, accused-appellant branded his mother-in-law as
"kunsintidora." cdphil
Angered by the harsh and discourteous words of the appellant, Consolacion grabbed both hands of
the latter from behind and while struggling to free himself from his mother-in-law, Salvacion grabbed
appellant's Magnum 357 revolver from the latter's shoulder holster, and when Salvacion saw accused kicking
her mother, she fired the gun hitting the appellant at the lower mandible dislocating his mandible and
shattering completely his pharynx. The force of the gun fire lifted the appellant, forcing him to fall by his
side on the floor bleeding and gasping for breath. Salvacion fell on her knees beside the fallen body of
accused-appellant and in a moment of self-recrimination uttered out of fear. "I pulled the trigger of the gun
when I saw you kicked my mother. I did not do it purposely, Cito" referring to the appellant, Accused-
appellant then succeeded in reaching for the gun held by his wife Salvacion. Salvacion warded him off and
called her mother for help. Salvacion, Consolacion and appellant then began grappling for the gun. In the
process, the gun went off hitting Consolacion who was thrown backward into a chair. Still, accused-appellant
and Salvacion continued to grapple for the possession of the gun until both of them fell on the floor with
Salvacion falling on top of the appellant. As they continued grappling near a table, the gun again exploded.
Finally, Salvacion slowly relaxed her hold on the gun and said "I am hit, Cito", and thereafter fell on the floor.
Later, accused-appellant heard a noise coming from the room of Natividad Grulla, sister of Salvacion. Afraid
that someone was trying to gain entrance into the bedroom, accused-appellant instinctively reloaded his
gun and fired in the general direction of the bedroom where the noise came from. The noise stopped and
suddenly Natividad crying, came out of the bedroom across the sala. 2
As will be noted, appellant denies any liability for the death of Salvacion (his deceased wife),
Consolacion (his mother-in-law), and the near fatal shooting of Natividad (his sister-in-law), claiming that
the death of the two (2) aforementioned victims was purely accidental, the firing of his gun that hit them
being brought about by Salvacion's grappling with him for the possession thereof. Disputing this claim,
however, and totally demolishing the veracity of said assertion, are the injuries sustained by the deceased
as shown by the post mortem examination conducted upon their cadavers. Salvacion Grulla suffered four
(4) gunshot wounds: one on the posterior aspect of her neck; another one on the chest; a third one on the
left abdominal region; and a fourth one on the right forearm. 3
Mrs. Consolacion Grulla on the other hand, likewise sustained four (4) gunshot wounds: — one on
the left face just below the cheekbone; a second one on the left side of the neck; a third one on the left
cheek at the level of the second rib; and a fourth one at the back left side of her body. These multiple gunshot
wounds sustained by the two (2) aforementioned victims conclusively negate the theory espoused by the
appellant — that the shooting was merely accidental. On the contrary, they were mute but vivid testimonials
of the manner by which they were inflicted — indicating that both Salvacion and Consolacion were
deliberately fired upon by the appellant thereby sustaining those various gunshot wounds resulting in their
death. cdrep
 The same holds true with regards to Natividad. That she was intentionally fired upon by the appellant
is clearly established by her clear and straightforward testimony which do not appear to have been dented
despite rigorous and rigid cross-examination. Natividad testified that the exchange of words between
appellant and his wife Salvacion at their sala awakened her. Coming out of her bedroom, Natividad joined
the spouses (appellant and Salvacion) and her mother Consolacion in the sala. The incident was preceded
by appellant's plea upon Consolacion to allow Salvacion to go with him to Legaspi City since he was going to
enter the hospital the following day. Consolacion told appellant that her daughter Salvacion is no longer
willing to go and live with him because of the untold miseries and sufferings she has undergone at his hands
brought about by appellant's jealousy. Turning upon his wife (Salvacion) appellant also got a negative
answer. Besides, Salvacion told appellant that their daughter Blesilda was suffering from high fever at the
time.
As the heated exchange of words went on between appellant on the one hand and Consolacion and
Salvacion at the other, and while Natividad was returning to her bedroom, a series of gunshots rent the air.
She then turned around and saw appellant firing at Salvacion. As she stepped back into their sala, she saw
accused holding his revolver. 4 She also saw her mother Consolacion about three meters away from the
appellant already reclining on a table totally motionless. Natividad called her but there was no answer.
Consolacion was already dead. cdll
Natividad continued pleading to the appellant to spare the life of his sister Salvacion telling him that
the latter will now go with him to Legaspi City. Natividad's plea, however, fell or deaf ears. Frightened that
appellant may now vent his ire or her and already panicky at the time, she rushed back to the bedroom with
her hands raised in gesture of surrender. As she was entering her room she again heard gunshots. She turned
around to see whom the accused was firing at only to find out that she was already hit at her left arm which
was profusely bleeding at that time. She tried to support it with her right arm, but the accused again fired
at her this time hitting her at her right forearm. She lost no time running out of the house passing by their
front door to escape from the appellant, simultaneously shouting for help.
Examined and treated by Dr. Adan R. Eva of the Albay Provincial Hospital on that same night, she was
found to have suffered 5 gunshot wounds at the posterior lateral side, middle third left forearm; another
gunshot wound with lacerated edges on the posterior surface of her left elbow; a third gunshot wound with
lacerated edges on distal 1/5 posterior surface left arm; and a compound fracture of the left forearm.
Testifying on the said injuries, Dr. Eva stated that the injury of the left forearm which penetrated
through and through, causing a compound fracture comminuted with bone fragments which necessitated
an operation could have caused the death of the patient were it not for the timely surgery because
complications could have arisen and tetanus would have set in.
That appellant's gun which had finally been determined to be a Magnum 357 revolver was fired
intentionally appeared further corroborated by the empty shells found at the sala of the Grullas' residence.
Chief of Police Salvatierra responding to the report of the shooting incident, found ten (10) empty shells on
the floor of the sala of Mrs. Grulla's house. Inspecting the Magnum revolver of the appellant, he found inside
its chamber one empty shell and another live bullet. Considering that the revolver's chamber could
accommodate only six (6) bullets at a time and as admitted by the appellant himself, the gun was reloaded
after being emptied. If the first shot was accidental, why was there a necessity to reload the said gun? Would
that not be inviting more trouble that could lead to more disastrous consequences? If his version is true, he
should have thrown that gun away to prevent a repetition of it being fired by accident. But that is not what
he did. His reloading of that gun destroys and unravel the falsity of his concoction. To subscribe with
appellant's claim of accidental shooting will be gullibility at its highest. LibLex
The trial court found Natividad Grulla to be a very credible witness. Her testimony appeared positive,
categorical and unequivocal despite rigid and thorough cross-examination. She has never wavered much
less vacillated at any time throughout the entire course of her testimony.
As aptly observed by the trial court —
"A careful analysis of Natividad's testimony gives out the revealing fact that she saw something
else, and this was the horrible spectacle of her helpless sister being fired at pointblank by the
accused. Natividad stuck to this statement, making no mention whatsoever, however, that she
saw the accused doing the same to an equal beloved if not a far dearer individual in the person
of her mother whom she saw at the same moment seated motionless. This unembelished
testimony of Natividad, who could have so easily pointed an accusing finger at the accused as
having been likewise seen by her firing at her mother, exudes nothing less than the untarnished
 truth of what she actually saw and spoke of. If her purpose in declaring forthright that she
actually saw accused Pacito Sto. Tomas firing at Salvacion was none other than to falsely
implicate him, how easily could she have done the same insofar as the incident concerned her
mother!"
We can do no less in according her the same credence since the record is bereft of any circumstance
of note that will negate His HONOR's findings and conclusions. 6
In view thereof, We find no merit in appellant's assignment of error nos. II, III, VI and VIII.
In Criminal Case No. 22, accused-appellant was charged with and convicted of PARRICIDE the victim
being his wife Salvacion Grulla. Appellant, however, contends that ever assuming he could be made liable
for the death of Salvacion yet his conviction for parricide is erroneous, his marriage to the latter being null
and void since he is previously married to a certain Prima Patanao wayback in 1943. In support of his
aforesaid claim, he presented Prima Patanao who testified or this alleged marriage. He also introduced a
xerox copy of this alleged marriage certificate 7 with Patanao. Upon objection however, by the prosecution,
the trial court rejected said xerox copy since admission thereof violates the best evidence rule.
We agree with His Honor's ruling, the same being well taken. Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the
contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made
evidence by law;
e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole."
None of the aforesaid circumstances appeared proven by the defense evidence that will sufficiently
warrant admission of the xerox copy in question. The uncorroborated testimony of Patanao hardly sufficed
to overthrow the legality of appellant's marriage to the deceased Salvacion Grulla.
Anent appellant's submission that the trial court erred in considering dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance, we find the same bereft of any legal support. There is no dispute that the place where the
crimes herein involved were committed is the house of Consolacion Grulla. It is there where she lives with
her daughter, Natividad Grulla (the other victim) and where Salvacion Grulla was temporarily staying in order
to escape from the brutalities of the appellant brought about by the latter's jealousy. The fact that
Salvacion's stay in the said place may be considered as a temporary sojourn adds no validity to appellant's
stance on this point. As we earlier held in People vs. Galapia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is
present when the appellant killed his wife in the house occupied by her other than the conjugal home.
Similarly, dwelling is aggravating where the offended party was raped in a boarding house rented by her. 9
Appellant also questions the trial court's findings that Natividad Grulla suffered permanent
deformity 10 by reason of the injuries sustained by her. Furthermore, he also asserts that no treachery
attended the shooting of Natividad. A review of the evidence on record, however, clearly indicates that
Natividad was fired upon by the appellant while she was entering her bedroom with her back turned against
the appellant. It was while she was running away with her arms raised in surrender that accused fired at her.
Treachery therefore clearly attended the attack made upon her. 11
With respect to the questioned deformity, it was indubitably shown that she is now permanently
mained. Her left arm became shorter than her right arm as a result of the gunshot wound sustained by her.
All hope of her left arm being restored to its normal length had been totally foreclosed. In short, her present
condition is beyond medical repair. By reason thereof, she is now exposed to public ridicule aside from
having spent some P700.00 for her hospitalization. She also lost the chance of a lifetime to better her future
in the form of a scholarship grant by the Insular Life Assurance Corporation amounting to P10,000.00. The
two (2) bullets pumped into her body from the gun of the accused deprived her of a better tomorrow and
total loss of the monetary value of said scholarship grant to which she is rightfully entitled to.
 Aside from parricide, accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of MURDER for the death of her
mother-in-law Consolacion Vda. de Grulla. The Information in this case 12 alleged evident premeditation as
the qualifying circumstance. We, however, found no evidence on record proving the existence of said
circumstance. Consolacion was fired upon while arguing with the appellant, the latter having probably
blacked-outed when he thereafter squeezed the trigger of his gun aimed at Consolacion. There is likewise
no evidence on record showing the manner by which he was attacked and or fired upon by the appellant.
Hence, appellant may be liable only for Homicide. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
A. In Criminal Case No. 22:
Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Salvacion Grulla in the amount of P30,000.00 plus P10,000.00 moral damages; and costs.
B. In Criminal Case No. 23:
To an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal as the maximum; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Consolacion Vda.
de Grulla the amount of P30,000.00 plus P10,000.00 moral damages and costs.
C. In Criminal Case No. 29:
To 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
the maximum; to indemnify Natividad Grulla in the following amounts: P700.00 covering actual damages;
P20,000.00 by way of moral damages plus P10,000.00 representing value for the loss of the scholarship grant
and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, De la Fuente * and Alampay, JJ., concur
|||
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. APOLONIO APDUHAN,
JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants, APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-
appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM. — A perceptive

analysis of the provisions of Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code reveals that said article is exclusively linked
and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of Article 295 on robbery in band, as the
latter article, in turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Article 294. Consequently,
although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance under Article 296, as amended
by Republic Act No. 12, it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to robbery with homicide, described and
penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294.
2. ID.; ID.; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; ABSORPTION IN CIRCUMSTANCE OF "BAND". — The
withdrawal by the prosecution of the circumstance of abuse of superiority alleged on the ground that since
the offense of robbery was committed by a band, the element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, was ill-advised, since the circumstances of band and abuse of
superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts.
3. ID.; ID.; DWELLING; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. — The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating
in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, since this class of robbery, could be committed without
the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home.
4. ID.; ID.; NOCTURNITY. — Nocturnity is aggravating when, as in the case at bar, it was purposely
and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent their being
recognized or to insure unmolested escape.
5. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; INTOXICATION. — Under Article 15, intoxication is mitigating
when it is not habitual or intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to
be mitigating the accused's state of intoxication must be proved. In the case at bar, the accused merely
alleged that when he committed the crime charged, he was intoxicated although he was not used to be
drunk. This self-serving statement stands uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of merit.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; PLEA OF GUILTY; ADMISSION OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. — While an
unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all the material facts
alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein recited.
7. ID.; SENTENCE; RECOMMENDATIONS OF CLEMENCY; PLEA OF GUILT. — There is no compelling
reason to justify the recommendation that the accused's death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment
for conceding that his plea was "spontaneous" and "insistent", such manifestation of sincere repentance
cannot serve to obliterate the attendant aggravating circumstances which reveal the accused's criminal
perversity.
8. ID.; ID.; USE OF FIREARM TO COUNTERACT RESISTANCE. — The trial court's observation that there
is "the possibility that the firearm was used in order to counteract the resistance of the deceased" is no
justification at all for executive clemency, for to employ a firearm in subduing the lawful resistance of
innocent persons is a criminal act by any standard.
9. ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY; COURT'S DUTY TO WARN ACCUSED OF EFFECT. — While justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
CASTRO, J p:

This is an automatic review of the judgment rendered on August 30, 1961 by the Court of First
Instance of Bohol (Judge Hipolito Alo presiding) convicting Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to death and "to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the amount
of P6,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the other deceased Norberto Aton in the same amount of
P6,000.00 . . ."
 On August 2, 1961 the accused Apduhan, then represented by Atty. David Ocangas, together with
his co-accused Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson, both represented by Atty. David Tirol, pleaded not guilty
to a second amended information which recites:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior, Rodulfo
Huiso and Felipe Quimson of the crime of Robbery With Homicide, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in
the municipality of Mabini, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused and five
(5) other persons whose true names are not yet known (they are presently known only with
their aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy, Angel-Angi, Romeo and Tony) and who are still at large
(they will be charged in separate information or informations as soon as they are arrested and
preliminary proceedings in Crim. Case No. 176 completed before the Justice of the Peace
Court), all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other deadly
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means of violence, the dwelling house of
the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling house of their
children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the said
dwelling house, the above-named accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack,
hack and shoot Geronimo Miano and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who
happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the said two (2) persons
physical injuries which caused their death; and thereafter the same accused and their five (5)
other companions, did take and carry away from said dwelling house cash money amounting
to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Honorato
Miano and Geronimo Miano, to the damage and prejudice of the said Honorato Miano and
Geronimo Miano, and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of Three Hundred
Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00) with respect to the amount robbed, and also to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of deceased Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton by reason of the death
of these two persons.
"Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. I, of the Revised Penal Code
with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with the
use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating circumstances, as
follows:
"1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties
without any provocation from the latter;
"2. That nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the
crime; and
"3. That advantage was taken of superior strength, accused and their
companions, who were fully armed, being numerically superior to the offended
parties who were unarmed and defenseless."
When the case was called for trial on August 9, 1961, Atty. Tirol informed the court a quo that he
was appearing also for Apduhan, but only as counsel de oficio. In view of this manifestation, the trial court
appointed Atty. Tirol as counsel de oficio for the said accused. Forthwith, Atty. Tirol manifested
that Apduhan would change his former plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The record discloses that after
the trial judge had repeatedly apprised Apduhan of the severity of the offense for which he was indicted and
the strong possibility that the capital penalty might be imposed upon him despite a plea of
guilty, Apduhan persisted in his intention to plead guilty with the request, however, that the death penalty
be not imposed. Then after hearing the arguments of Provincial Fiscal Jesus N. Borromeo and Atty. Turol on
the effect of Articles 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code on the case at bar, the trial judge advised the
herein accused anew that he could be sentenced to death notwithstanding his projected plea of guilty, but
the latter reiterated his desire to confess his guilt on the specific condition that he be sentenced to life
imprisonment. Eventually, however, Apduhan desisted from pleading guilty and let his previous plea stand
on record after further warnings that he faced the grave danger of being sentenced to death in view of the
circumstances of his case. But the aforesaid desistance was merely momentary as it did not end the
accused's equivocation on the matter of his plea. After a five-minute recess requested by Atty. Tirol in order
to confer with the accused, the former informed the court a quo that his client would insist on entering a
plea of guilty. The following appears on record:
 "Atty. D. TIROL:
"Your Honor, please, I had a conference with the accused and apprised him with the situation
of the case and after hearing our appraisal he manifested that he will insist on his
entering a plea of guilty, Your Honor. I made it clear to him that we are not forcing him
to enter the plea of guilty.
"COURT (To accused Apolonio Apduhan, Jr.):
"Q. Is it true that you are withdrawing your plea of not guilty?
"A. I will just enter the plea of guilty.
"Q. Have you been forced to enter the plea of guilty by your lawyer?
"A. No, Sir.
"Q. And why do you said 'I will JUST enter the plea of not guilty?
"A. I have proposed to enter the plea of guilty even before.
"Q. Now the Court warns you again. Are you conscious of the fact that notwithstanding your
plea of guilty the court may impose upon you the penalty of death?
"A. I will just enter the plea of guilty, at the discretion of the Court.
"Q. Even with all those dangers mentioned by the Court to you?
"A. Yes, Sir." (t.s.n. pp. 23-25)
Subsequently, the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel de oficio resumed their oral arguments
regarding the effect on the instant case of Articles 295 and 296, particularly the use of unlicensed firearm as
a special aggravating circumstance under the latter article. Also discussed were the existence and effect of
the alleged mitigating and aggravating circumstances. All of these points will be later analyzed.
When the lower court subsequently reviewed the proceedings, it found that the accused's plea of
guilty was ambiguous. Hence, on August 30, 1961, the case was reopened with respect to Apduhan, and on
said date the latter entered a categorical plea of guilty, as evidenced by the record:
"COURT (To Accused Apduhan, Jr.):
"The Court reopened this case because after a review of the proceedings it found that your
plea was not definite. In answer to a question of the Court you simply said 'I will just
enter the plea of guilty'. The court wants to know whether you enter the plea of guilty
of the crime charged in the second amended information.
"ACCUSED APDUHAN:
"I enter the plea of guilty.
"COURT (To same accused Apduhan):
"Q. Therefore, you admit that you have committed the crime charged in the second
information?
"A. Yes, Your Honor.
"Q. Is it necessary for you that the second amended information be read again?
"A. No more; it is not necessary.
"Q. Do you want that the second amended information be read to you again?
"A. No more, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 50-51)
On the same day, the court a quo rendered its decision, the pertinent dispositive portion of which
reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court renders judgment finding accused
Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. alias Junior guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide,
punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal code, in relation to Article 296 of the same Code,
as amended, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of death."
 Considering that Apduhan had voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, then the only aspect of
the case properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty imposed by the court a quo. In this
respect, the appreciation of the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance (Art. 296) in
fixing the appropriate penalty for robbery with homicide (Art. 294[1]) committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms, and the interplay and counter-balancing of the attendant mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, would determine the severity of the penalty imposable.
The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a discussion of the interrelation among articles
294, 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code. For this purpose the said articles are hereunder quoted:
"ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
"2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or
on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of 263 shall
have been inflicted.
"3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
"4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery
shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or
when in the course of the execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not
responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of
said article 263.
"5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period on other cases." (As amended by Rep. Act 18.)
"ART. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a
band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. — If the offenses mentioned in
subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have been committed in an
uninhabited place or by a band, or by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or
airship, or by entering the passengers' compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the
passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or
alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by
the maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by Rep. Act Nos. 12 and 373.)" (Italics
supplied)
"ART. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. — When
more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the commission of
the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall
be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the
criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed firearm.
"Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band,
shall be punished as principal of any assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that
he attempted to prevent the same (As amended by Rep. Act No. 12)." (Italics supplied)
The afore-quoted Art. 294 enumerates five classes of robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons and prescribes the corresponding penalties. The case at bar falls under Art. 294(1) which defines
robbery with homicide and fixes the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of Art.
295 are committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum periods. The
circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of Art. 294.
Consequently, Art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones
graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery which are
described in Art. 294(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be punishable under Art . 295,
but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under art. 14 of the Code. 1 Hence, with the present
wording of Art. 295 2 there is no crime as "robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with homicide is
committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under
Art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated above, would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.
Article 296, as quoted above, defines "band", creates the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by the members of the band. The
ascertainment of the definite function and range of applicability of this article in relation to Articles 294 and
295 is essential in the disposition of the case at bar.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appears to have accorded validity to the Provincial
Fiscal's contention that in robbery with homicide committed by a band, the use of unlicensed firearm must
be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance pursuant to Art. 296. Thus convinced, the trial judge
stressed in his decision that "under the express mandate of the law, we cannot escape the arduous task of
imposing the death penalty." Subscribing to the said position, the Solicitor General adds that the "penalty
for robbery under the circumstances mentioned in Articles 294, paragraph 1, and 296 of the Code is the
maximum of reclusion perpetua to death, or the supreme penalty of death. This is mandatory."
On the other hand, Atty. Alberto M. Meer, the accused's counsel de oficio in the present review,
contends that the use of unlicensed firearm, if ever appreciated in the case at bar, must be considered a
generic aggravating factor which "may be offset by the existence of mitigating circumstances to that the
penalty to be imposed should be the penalty of reclusion perpetua."
Both the foregoing contentions are untenable.
After a perceptive analysis of the provisions of Art. 296, we reach the considered opinion that the
said article is exclusively linked and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of Art.
295 on robbery in band, as the later article in turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4, 5 of Art.
294. Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance under art.
296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to robbery with homicide,
described and penalized under paragraph 1 of Art. 294.
As previously stated, Art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in subdivisions
3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
proper penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately following provisions of Art. 296 define the term "band,"
prescribe the collective liability of the members of the band, and state that "when any of the arms used in
the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the
malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law." Viewed from the
contextual relation to Articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned in the above-quoted portion of
the latter article logically means the crime of robbery committed by a band, as the phrase "all the
malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the corresponding penalty
provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three subdivisions of Art. 294 which
are all encompassed within the ambit of Art. 295. Evidently, therefore, Art. 296 in its entirety is designed to
amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to be found but in Art. 295 in relation
to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to justify the imposition of the maximum of the maximum
period of the proper penalty, it is a condition sine qua non that the offense charged be robbery committed
by a band within the contemplation of Art. 295. To reiterate, since Art. 295 does not apply to subdivisions 1
and 2 of Art 294, then the special aggravating factor in question, which is solely applicable to robbery in
band under Art. 295, cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under
Art. 294( 1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms.
The legislative intent of making Art. 296 corollary to art. 295 with respect to robbery in band was
unmistakably articulated by Congressman Albano in his sponsorship speech on H. B. No. 124 (subsequently
enacted as Rep. Act No. 12, amending among others, Articles 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code). Said
Congressman Albano:
"Article 296 as a corollary of Article 295 would change the definition heretofore known
of the term 'band' under the law. The purpose of this amendment is to inject therein the
element of aggravation, when any member of the band carries an unlicensed firearm . . ." 4
 The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was initially applicable
to all the subdivisions of Art. 294 since the said Rep. Act No. 12 also amended Art. 295 to include within its
scope all the classes of robbery described in Art. 294. With the then enlarged coverage of Art. 295, Art. 296,
being corollary to the former, was perforce made applicable to robbery with homicide (Art. 294[1]). Thus,
in People vs. Bersamin, 5 this Court, in passing, opined:
"The use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance applicable only in
cases of robbery in band (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3, Republic Act
No. 12)."
In the said case, this Court, declared in effect that in robo con homicidio the use of unlicensed firearm is
not a special aggravating circumstance when the said offense is not committed by a band. Inferentially,
had the robbery with homicide in Bersamin been perpetrated by a band, the use of unlicensed firearm
would have been appreciated. This implied pronouncement would have been justified under Art. 296 in
relation to Art. 295, as amended by Rep. Act 12. But the aforesaid inference lost all legal moorings in 1949
with the enactment of Rep. Act 373 which excluded subdivisions 1 and 2 of Art. 294 from the coverage of
Art. 295. Since Art. 296, as repeatedly emphasized above, is corollary to Art. 295, the diminution of the
latter's scope correspondingly reduced the former's extent of applicability. In other words, the passage of
the foregoing amendment did not only jettison the first two subdivisions of Art . 294 from the periphery of
Art. 295 but also removed the said subdivisions (which pertain, inter alia, to the offense of robbery with
homicide) from the effective range of Art. 296.
Notwithstanding that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm cannot be
appreciated in the instant case, we are constrained, in the final analysis, to observe that the imposition of
the death penalty on the accused Apduhan would appear to be a logical legal consequence, because as
against the attendant mitigating circumstances the aggravating circumstances numerically and qualitatively
preponderate.
After Apduhan had pleaded guilty, the defense counsel offered for consideration three mitigating
circumstances, namely, plea of guilty, intoxication, and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
Subsequently, however, the defense withdrew the last mentioned mitigating circumstance after the
prosecution had withdrawn the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The following
manifestations appear on record:
"FISCAL BORROMEO:
"In fairness to the accused, because the crime charged is robbery in baud (the case at
bar is actually robbery with homicide), it is natural that in robbery in band there is
already abuse of superior strength, so we will just withdraw that superior strength.
"COURT (To Atty. D. Tirol):
What do you say now?
"ATTY. D. TIROL:
"Such being the case, we will not insist on presenting evidence in support of our
contention that the accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong.
"COURT:
"Moreover, by the mere use of firearm accused cannot claim that he did not intend to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed. So now you withdraw your petition that
you be allowed to present evidence to that effect?
"ATTY. D. TIROL:
Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 47-48)
Thus, only two alleged mitigating circumstances remain for consideration.
Anent the plea of guilty, we believe that under Art. 13(7) its appreciation in the case at bar is beyond
controversion.
However, apropos the alternative circumstance of intoxication, we find no evidence on record to
support the defense's claim that it should be considered as a mitigating factor. This absence of proof can be
attributed to the defense's erroneous belief that it was not anymore its burden to establish the state of
intoxication of the accused when he committed the offense charged since anyway the prosecution had
already admitted the attendance of the said mitigating circumstance on the ground that the State did not
have strong evidence to overthrow the accused's claim of non-habituality to drinking. The record discloses
the following pertinent discussion:
"COURT (To Fiscal Borromeo):
Do you agree, Mr. Fiscal, that the non-habitual intoxication of the accused be also
taken into account in his favor as a mitigating circumstance?
"FISCAL BORROMEO:
"We have no evidence exactly to know at this time that the accused was intoxicated,
but his affidavit states that before the commission of the crime they took young
coconuts and there is no mention about the taking of any liquor, so that, as it is now,
we are constrained to object.
"COURT (To the Fiscal):
"But do you have evidence to counteract that allegation?
"FISCAL BORROMEO:
"We do not have any evidence to counteract that,
"COURT (To the Fiscal):
"But do you admit the attendance of that circumstance?
"FISCAL BORROMEO:
"With that manifestation we submit because actually we do not have evidence to
counter-act that he was a habitual drinker.
"COURT (To the Fiscal):
"But do you prefer to admit that mitigating circumstance or you need that evidence be
presented to that effect?
"FISCAL BORROMEO:
"Inasmuch as we do not have strong evidence to contradict that circumstance, in
fairness to the accused, we would rather submit.
"COURT (To the Fiscal):
The attendance of the mitigating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication?
"FISCAL BORROMEO:
Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 7-9) (Italics supplied)
From the above proceedings in the trial court, it would appear that what the prosecution actually
intended to admit was the non- habituality of the accused to drinking liquor, not as a matter of fact, but due
to the State's inability to disprove the same. The prosecution apparently did not concede
the actual intoxication of the accused. We are of the firm conviction that, under the environmental
circumstances, the defense was not relieved of its burden to prove the accused's actual state of intoxication.
Otherwise, to appreciate the attendance of a mitigating factor on the mere allegation of the accused,
coupled with the dubious acquiescence of the prosecution, would open wide the avenue for unscrupulous
and deceitful collusion between defense and prosecution in order to unduly and unjustly minimize the
penalty imposable upon the accused.
The last paragraph of Art. 15 of the Code provides:
"The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same
is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is
habitual or intentional it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." (Italics supplied).
Under the foregoing provision, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or intentional, that
is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to be mitigating the accused's state of
intoxication must be proved. 6 Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, 7 then, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional. 8
In People vs. Noble 9 the defendant testified that before the murder he took a bottle of wine and
drank little by little until he got drunk. The policeman who arrested the accused testified that the latter
smelled wine and vomited. The Court held that the evidence presented was not satisfactory to warrant a
mitigation of the penalty. Intoxication was likewise not competently proved in a case 10 where the only
evidence was that the defendant had a gallon of tuba with him at the time he committed the crime.
In the case at bar the accused merely alleged that when he committed the offense charged he was
intoxicated although he was "not used to be drunk." 11 This self-serving statement stands uncorroborated.
Obviously, it is devoid of any probative value.
To recapitulate, the accused has in his favor only one mitigating circumstance: plea of guilty. As
aforementioned, the defense withdrew its claim of "lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong" and failed
to substantiate its contention that intoxication should be considered mitigating.
While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all
the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances therein recited. 12 The
four aggravating circumstances are (1) band; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime; and (4) abuse of superior strength.
The circumstance of abuse of superiority was, however, withdrawn by the prosecution on the ground that
since the offense of robbery with homicide was committed by a band, the element of cuadrilla necessarily
absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. We believe that said withdrawal was ill-advised
since the circumstances of band and abuse of superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts. The
element of band is appreciated when the offense is committed by more than three armed malefactors
regardless of the comparative strength of the victim or victims. Hence, the indispensable components
of cuadrilla are (1) at least four malefactor and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed. On the other hand,
the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their collective strength to
overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims. Hence, in the latter aggravating factor, what is taken
into account is not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed, but their relative physical
might vis-α-vis the offended party.
Granting, however, that the withdrawal was valid, there still remain three aggravating circumstances
which render inutile the solitary extenuating circumstance of plea of guilty. The prosecution does not need
to prove the said three circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by
his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof. 13 Hence, we will not belabor our discussion of the
attendant aggravating circumstances.
The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of
persons, 14 like the offense at bar. The rationale behind the pronouncement is that this class of robbery
could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent
only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass
and robbery in an inhabited house. 15 This Court in People vs. Pinca, 16 citing People vs. Valdez, 17 ruled
that the "circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed,
because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with
homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it without the necessity of violating or scaling the
domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows
greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm. 18
Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate
the commission of the crime 19 or to prevent their being recognized or to insure unmolested
escape. 20 Nocturnidad must concur with the intent and design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic
impunity afforded by the darkness of night. 21 In the case at bar, the affidavit (exh. 1-1) of the
accused Apduhan shows that he and his co-malefactors took advantage of the nighttime in the perpetration
of the offense as they waited until it was dark before they came out of their hiding place to consummate
their criminal designs.
In his decision, the trial judge recommends to the President of the Republic the commutation of the
death sentence which he imposed on the accused to life imprisonment. The Solicitor General supports this
recommendation for executive clemency.
We find no compelling reason to justify such recommendation. Contrary to the trial judge's
observation, the accused's plea of guilty was far from "spontaneous" and "insistent". It will be recalled that
his initial plea was one of not guilty. Later, he changed his plea but with the persistent condition that he be
sentenced to life imprisonment, not death. It was only after much equivocation that he finally decided to
"just" plead guilty. Because his plea was still ambiguous, the court a quo had to reopen the case to ascertain
its real nature. Conceding, however, that his plea was "spontaneous" and "insistent," such manifestation of
sincere repentance cannot serve to obliterate the attendant aggravating circumstances which patently
reveal the accused's criminal perversity.
It appears from a cursory reading of the decision under review that the trial judge also anchored his
recommendation on the ground that there is "the possibility that the firearm was used in order to counteract
the resistance of the deceased." This is no justification at all for executive clemency. Firstly, the above
observation is a mere conjecture — in the language of the presiding judge, a "possibility." Secondly, even
granting that the said observation relates to the actual happening, to employ a firearm in subduing the lawful
resistance of innocent persons is a criminal act by any standard.
Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must hasten to commend the trial judge,
the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilty
by the accused Apduhan, notwithstanding that the latter was already represented by a counsel de oficio and
hence presumed to have been advised properly. Judge Alo made sure that the accused clearly and fully
understood the seriousness of the offense charged and the severity of the penalty attached to it. When the
accused proposed to confess his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned him that the death penalty might be
imposed despite his plea of guilty. As aforementioned, when it appeared that Apduhan's plea of guilty was
ambiguous, Judge Alo reopened the case to determine with definitiveness the nature of his plea.
The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan pleaded guilty with full knowledge
of the significance and consequences of his act, recommends itself to all trial judges who must refrain from
accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges
are duty bound to be extra solicitors in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
As a final commentary on the criminal conduct of the accused herein, it must be emphasized that
the instant review was delayed for several years because he escaped from the New Bilibid Prisons on June
17, 1963, less than six months after he was committed to the said penitentiary. He was recommitted on July
10, 1964 with a new mittimus from the Court of First Instance of Leyte for robbery in band in criminal case
10099, for which he was sentenced to serve a prison term of from 8 years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day
commencing on October 31, 1963. 22 His recommitment was reported to this Court only on July 5, 1966.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, for failure to secure the required number of votes, the
penalty of death cannot be legally imposed. The penalty next lower in degree — reclusion perpetua —
should consequently be imposed on the accused.
ACCORDINGLY, with the modification that the death sentence upon Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. by the
court a quo is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the judgment a quo is affirmed in all other respects, without
pronouncement as to costs.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE alias "TONY
MANOK" and REYNALDO ARVISO Y REBELLEZA alias "RENE BISUGO", defendants-appellants.

Wenceslao B. Trinidad for appellants.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Adolfo
J. Diaz for appellee.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of April 17, 1969 by the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, which
found the accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to the death penalty.
The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs. Corazon
Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that at the time of the incident,
she resided at Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. She lived at Pasay City for about five months before moving to
another dwelling at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. While residing at Pasay City, she conceived a child and
during this period, it was not unusual for her, accompanied by her husband, to step out of the house in the
wee hours of the morning. They set out on these irregular walks about five times.
During her residence at Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty times.
Sometimes her brother would stay instead at their parents' house at Muntinlupa, Rizal. He usually spent his
weekends in his residence at Bo. Balubad, Porac, Pampanga. Apolonio and her husband were very close to
each other; whenever Apolonio paid them a visit, he usually slept in the house and sought their help on
various problems.
Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw
Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's Place at M.
de la Cruz Street, Pasay City. In her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police executed on November
3,1968, Corazon surmised that her husband must have been painting the town red in ("nag good time") in
that same place. Upon learning this information from her husband, Corazon obtained permission to leave
the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her brother. At that time, she had not been aware that Apolonio
was in Pasay City; she had been of the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. She went to fetch him
because she wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. In explaining the rationale for her
noctural mission, she employed in her sworn statement the following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay
meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi mabuti."
On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a group
of about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She recognized the
two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother; in fact, she knew them before the incident
by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo," respectively.
Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp
instrument. Later, in the course of giving her sworn statement before the Pasay City police on November 3,
1968, Corazon positively identified Antonio and Reynaldo, who were then at the office of the General
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, Pasay City Police Department. She also stated that if she saw
the other members of the group again, perhaps she could likewise identify them. At the trial, Corazon
likewise pointed out the two accused. During the incident, she exerted efforts to identify the other group
members, taking care to conceal herself as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek cover.
When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group
catch up with her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, while others boxed him.
Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left behind. He was
sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long knife. Corazon
was not able to observe where Antonio later fled, for she could hardly bear to witness the scene.
When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a pool
of his own blood. The incident threw her in a state of nervous confusion, and she resolved to report the
incident to her younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street, Pasay City. Her sister in turn decided to break
the news to their father at Muntinlupa.
Subsequently, Corazon learned that the police authorities were searching for her brother's
gangmates for having killed him. She also learned that the suspects were in hiding. On the same day —
October 19, 1968 — accompanied by her family, she went at 2:00 p.m. to the Police Department to inquire
about her brother's corpse. They were directed to the Funeraria Popular, where an autopsy was held.
Sometime later, on November 1, 1968, she transferred residence to Quezon City.
Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. testified that he conducted a postmortem examination on the cadaver of the
decedent Apolonio, and that he prepared the corresponding Necropsy Report. Dr. Cueva found that the
deceased suffered 22 stab wounds in the different portions of his hips; in the front portion of the chest and
neck; in the back portion of the torso; and in the right hand. He testified that the wounds sustained by the
deceased brought about a massive hemorrhage which caused death. He also testified that it is possible that
the instrument marked as Exhibit "B" could have been used in inflicting the multiple stab wounds sustained
by the deceased, except the stab wounds on the neck.
Both the accused took refuge in the defense of alibi. Antonio Garcia claimed that at that time of the
incident — starting with the chase and ending with the victim's death — in the morning of October 19, 1968,
he was at a place called Pacita's Canteen which adjoins Bill's Place at M. de la Cruz Street. Reynaldo Arviso
claimed that in the evening of the preceding night (October 18, 1968) he went on a drinking spree with his
friends at Pacita's Canteen. He went home at 10:30 p.m. and slept up to 7:00 a.m. of October 19, 1968. From
7:00 a.m. of that day, he performed his duties as a bus conductor by calling for passengers near Pacita's
Canteen.
The trial court pinpointed the issue as revolving around the identity of the persons who participated
in the killing of the deceased. It banked on the testimony of the witness, Corazon Dioquino, who positively
identified the accused as participants in the attack. Noting that "the defense did not even attempt to present
any evil motive on the part of the witness," the court concluded that "the two accused took part in the
perpetuation of the crime charged." It gave short shrift to the defense of alibi presented by the two accused,
noting that, by their own admission, the two accused were residents of the vicinity of the crime.
In respect of the circumstances attending the crime it said:
But considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime; superior strength; and
treachery, which three aggravating circumstances had been sufficiently established by the
prosecution, the same cannot be offset by said voluntary surrender to a person in authority of
his agent, plus the uncontested fact that deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. suffered no less than
22 stab wounds, convincing evidence of the apparent criminal perversity of the accused, the
court, therefore, has no alternative but to impose the supreme penalty.
And rendered judgment as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused, Antonio Garcia y Cabarse
and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder
under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged under Article 248, of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged in the information, and considering the aggravating circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, each one of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.
The two accused are further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Apolonio
Dioquino, Jr. in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, jointly and severally;
and to pay their proportionate share of the costs."
In their Brief, the accused contended that the lower court erred: in not considering nighttime and
superior strength as absorbed in treachery: in finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance despite
absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was purposely sought to insure the execution of the crime; in
finding superior strength as an aggravating circumstance despite absence of evidence to sustain such a
finding; in finding treachery as an aggravating circumstance despite absence of evidence to that effect; in
not stating the qualifying circumstance of the alleged crime; in holding that the accused Reynaldo Arviso
stabbed and hit the victim when there is no evidence as to the participation of the said accused Arviso in the
execution of the alleged crime; and in failing to consider the material inconsistencies, prejudice and other
circumstances in the uncorroborated testimony of the only eyewitness, rendering said testimony not worthy
of belief.
 The assignment of errors by the accused is anchored on their attempt to discredit the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution, a function which, if successfully undertaken, would totally obliterate the
nexus between the accused and the crime. The defense vigorously maintained that the testimony of the
only eyewitness is a fabrication, and that she was in fact absent from the scene which she described in both
her sworn statement and in her testimony at the trial.
The defense asserted that Corazon Dioquino's testimony was riddled by material inconsistencies. The
defense sought to capitalize on the discrepancy of a sketch made by Corazon and the sketch made by Pasay
City Electrical Engineer Jaime Arriola. Corazon's sketch shows Juan Sumulong Elementary School to be right
in front of P.C. Santos Street; while Arriola's sketch shows that the school is about 135 meters from the
corner of the street. The defense contended that the discrepancy was a deliberate falsehood on the part of
the witness.
Corazon testified that she was near the corner of P.C. Santos Street when she saw her brother under
chase in front of the school, and that she met the group in front of the school in a matter of five seconds,
more or less. The defense assailed her testimony on this point as incredible on the ground that the distance
between the point where she saw her brother being chased, up to the point where she met them, is 135
meters, and no human being can cover that distance in five seconds. Moreover, Corazon testified that she
was 20 meters away from the place where the accused caught up with her brother. Again, the defense
criticized her testimony in this respect by pointing out that the true distance is 175 meters.
The defense insisted that Corazon's sketch of the locale of the crime (Exhibit "1") constitutes "the
high point of falsity of her testimony." The defense sought to substantiate this claim by arguing that from
her sketch, it appears that she never crossed paths with her brother or his pursuers. The witness testified
that she saw her brother at the point which is four to five meters from the corner of P.C. Santos Street. Yet
she also testified that she saw the incident from 20 meters. The witness claimed she hid after hearing the
shot at a point which is 170 meters from the scene of the crime. The defense argued that she could not have
covered the distance in such a short time, and that this belies her claim that she was only 20 meters from
the scene of the crime. The defense pointed out that Arriola's sketch (Exhibit "2") shows that the school is
135 meters from the scene of the crime, and the point where the witness claimed she viewed the crime is
170 meters from the scene of the crime, thus giving the lie to her claim that she was 20 meters away.
The alleged inconsistencies in Corazon's testimony — which the defense makes much of — are not
irreconcilable with the physical facts. At the outset, it should not be overlooked that Corazon was testifying
as an eyewitness to the traumatic incident by which her brother met a violent death at the hands of a mob.
Naturally, Corazon can not be expected to deliver a testimony which passes microscopic scrutiny and
scrupulous armchair analysis of the facts, conducted under circumstances far removed from the turbulence
and emotional color of the event as it actually transpired. Al contrari, if Corazon's testimony were
meticulously accurate with respect to distance covered and the time taken to negotiate it, an impartial
observer would wonder whether such exactitude were not the product of previous rehearsal, if not of
fabrication. In times of stress, the human and is frequently overpowered by the ebb and flow of emotions
in turmoil; and it is only judicious to take into consideration the natural manifestations of human conduct,
when the physical senses are subdued by the psychological state of the individual.
Corazon was a resident of Pasay City for only about five months. She testified that she is not familiar
with the streets along M. de la Cruz Street. Moreover, Corazon did not categorically testify that she covered
the distance of 135 meters in five seconds. More accurately, she testified that she walked for a period of
from five to ten seconds, more or less. Put in this way, the period was sufficient to allow her to negotiate
the distance. Moreover, Corazon did not stay rooted to one spot while the incident was taking place, but
surreptitiously edged her way up to Magtibay Street, which is closer to the place of the killing.
The defense also claims that the delay which Corazon allowed to transpire, before reporting the
crime to the authorities and giving her sworn statement (on November 3, 1968), is indicative of fabrication.
The killing took place before dawn of October 19, 1968. In the afternoon of the same day, Corazon and her
family went to the Police Department to inquire about the remains of her brother. Corazon already knew
that the police were taking steps to round up the killers. She incurred no fault in waiting until the culprits
were arrested before confronting them and giving her statement. It would have been the better part of legal
procedure if she had given her statement earlier; but since she was only a 22-year old housekeeper at that
time, she can not be held to a higher standard of discretion.
The defense further contends that the failure to present Corazon's husband in court indicates that
Corazon was not actually at the scene of the crime at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. If the defense felt that the
husband had a contribution to make in the cause of truth, there was nothing which prevented them from
compelling his process by summons. This they failed to do; and their omission should not be taken to reflect
adversely on the prosecution, who evidently believed that the husband's testimony was unnecessary.
Finally, the defense claims that it was unnatural for Corazon, after viewing her brother's body, to
proceed to her sister's house one kilometer away, instead of returning to her own house, which was just a
block or so away. It is not unnatural for a witness to a gruesome event, to choose to confer with a person
bound to her by ties of consanguinity, even if such a conference necessitates that she traverse a longer
distance. The exercise of judgment, on the spot, should not be gauged by reason applied in hindsight with a
metrical yardstick.
The next major burden which the defense undertook to assume was to contend that the accused
Reynaldo Arviso is innocent because there is no evidence as to his participation in the execution of the crime.
It is claimed that there is absolute absence of evidence to show that Reynaldo was a direct participant and
that the only evidence against him is that he was seen pursuing the victim. However, the finding of
Reynaldo's guilt stems, not from his direct participation in the criminal execution, but from his participation
in the conspiracy to kill the deceased. His participation in the conspiracy is supported by Corazon's testimony
that he and Antonio were the leaders of the pack following closely at the heels of the victim.
It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design. A concerted assault upon the victim by the defendants may
indicate conspiracy. (PP v. Monroy & Idica, L-11177, Oct. 30, 1958, 104 Phil. 759). Conspiracy exists if, at the
time of the commission of the offense, the defendants had the same criminal purpose and were united in
its execution. (PP v. Datu Dima Binahasing, L-4837, April 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 902). Those who are members of
the band of malefactors by which a murder is committed and are present at the time and place of the
commission of the crime, thus contributing by their presence to augment the power of the band and to aid
in the successful realization of the crime, are guilty as principals even if they took no part in the material act
of killing the deceased. (US v. Abelinde, No. 945, Dec. 10, 1902, 1 Phil. 568; People v. Carunungan, L-13283,
Sept. 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 534). To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient that the malefactors have acted in concert, pursuant to the
same objective. (PP vs. San Luis, L-2365, May 29, 1950, 86 Phil. 485).
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must
be proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose
to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven (PP v.
Colman, L-6652-54, Feb. 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 6). A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement
of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. (PP v. Barredo, L-2728, Dec. 29, 1950, 87 Phil. 800).
Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution. (PP v. Carbonel, L-
24177, March 15, 1926, 48 Phil. 868; PP v. Danan, L-1766, March 31, 1949, 83 Phil. 252).
When a group of seven men, more or less, give chase to a single unarmed individual running for his
life, and they overtake him and inflict wounds on his body by means of shooting, stabbing, and hitting with
pieces of wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not detract from their status as conspirators that there
is no evidence of previous agreement, it being sufficient that their wills have concurred and they labored to
achieve the same end. llcd
The defense submits that the failure of the lower court to specify the qualifying circumstance in the
crime of murder is violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We find no such infirmity. Since the
principle concerned is readily understood from the facts, the conclusion and the penalty imposed, an express
specification of the statute or exposition of the law is not necessary." (People vs. Silo, L-7916, May 25, 1956,
99 Phil. 216). In the absence of a specification by the trial court, the defense surmised that the qualifying
circumstance in this case is evident premeditation; but the defense argued that evident premeditation was
not shown. We agree. Under normal conditions, conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation. But in the
case of implied conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of proof as to
how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that
it can not be determined if the accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment
dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had
the opportunity for reflection and persisted in executing his criminal design. (PP v. Custodio, L-7442, October
24, 1955, 97 Phil. 698; PP v. Mendoza and Sinu-ag, L-4146 and L-4147, March 28, 1952, 91 Phil. 58; PP v.
Yturiaga, L-2816, May 31, 1950, 86 Phil. 534; PP v. Lozada, No. 46998, Nov. 16, 1940, 70 Phil. 525; PP v. Upao
Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957, 101 Phil. 1226; PP v. Sakam, No. 41566, Dec. 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27; PP v. Peralta,
L-19069, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP v. Pareja, L-21937, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693).
Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be qualified
by treachery, which is alleged in the information. But the defense argued that treachery was not present.
We are so convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully
proven. (US v. Asilo, No. 1957, Jan. 30, 1905, 4 Phil. 175; US v. Arciga, No. 1129, April 6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110;
PP v. Durante, No. 31101, Aug. 23, 1929, 53 Phil. 363; PP v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027).
Where the manner of the attack was not proven, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt,
and the crime should be considered homicide only. (Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec, 80 Phil. 424).
In People vs. Metran(L-4205, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 543). The aggravating circumstances of aid of
armed men, abuse of superiority, and nocturnity, were considered as constituting treachery, which qualified
the crime as murder, since there was no direct evidence as to the manner of the attack. However, in this
case we believe that the correct qualifying circumstance is not treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here we
are confronted with a helpless victim killed by assailants superior to him in arms and in numbers. But the
attack was not sudden nor unexpected, and the element of surprise was lacking. The victim could have made
a defense; hence, the assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no showing when the intent
to kill was formed, it can not be said that treachery has been proven. We believe the correct rule is found
in People vs. Proceso Bustos (No 17763, July 23, 1923, 45 Phil. 9), where alevosia was not appreciated
because it was deemed included in abuse of superiority.
We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which made
this finding on parallel facts. Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where four persons
attacked an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commenced and treachery was not
proven, the fact that there were four assailants would constitute abuse of superiority. (People vs. Lasada,
No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912, 21 Phil. 287; US v. Bañagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10, 1913, 24 Phil. 69). However, the
information does not allege the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority; hence, this circumstance
can only be treated as generic aggravating. (People v. Acusar, L-1798, Dec. 29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490; People v.
Beje, L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil. 1052; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184).
The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed
at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. Is this
basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14, Provides that it is an
aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate
the commission of the offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance:
the objective test under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense;
and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative.
In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely
sought the cover of nighttime. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to determine whether
nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the course
of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited
by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading
the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their identity because of the darkness and the relative
scarcity of people in the streets. These circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and we find that
nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with
the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be
readily identified.
The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying circumstances was proved; hence, the
killing can not be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime of homicide, which is punished
by reclusion temporal. It is not controverted that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities;
they are therefore entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone mitigating
circumstance, offset by the two generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority and nocturnity,
produces the result that in the crime of homicide, one aggravating circumstance remains. prLL
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby modified in that the two accused,
Antonio Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, are sentenced to undergo an indeterminate
imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 18 years as maximum, but in all other respects affirmed. SO
ORDERED.
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.

SYLLABUS

1. MURDER; ALEVOSIA; INTENT. — The fact that the victim of a treacherous murder was not
predetermined does not affect or alter the nature of the crime, when the criminal intent which was carried
out was to kill the first two persons whom the aggressor should meet at the place where he intended to
commit the crimes.
2. ID.; MONEY, REWARD OR PROMISE; PREMEDITATION. — Even though in a crime committed upon
offer of money, reward, or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, it must be borne in mind that the
latter is not inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, they being
independent of each other, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an
offer of money, reward, or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — This case, wherein the accused made up his mind to kill two
undetermined persons, the first whom he should meet on the way, in compliance with the inducement of a
third persons, is entirely different from that of a criminal who, intending to kill a particular person, deprives
of his life a person other than the object of his criminal act; both deeds are equally punishable, but they are
different and are differently dealt with by the penal law.
TORRES, J p:

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a
Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly
received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in
the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded
man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro
Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter
was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the
same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The
Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up
in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the
Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record
not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging
Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the
evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the accused to the
penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The
case has been submitted to this court for review.
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was committed on the person of the
Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on
the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about
to start for the door of the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a
result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable, not
only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and
falling to the ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in
the attack the violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery (alevosia),
one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article as calling for the greatest
punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime
herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come
from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to
go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to
avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was
successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured
he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to
carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he
concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town,
attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him, immediately after
attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the
ground and as he was about to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once;
he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted
author of the crime in question has been unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted
by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a
matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that
account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed
many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any
motive or reason whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of
civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people
who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities
in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened a number of times in towns
where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime
so committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of
article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and
premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has already
been qualified as committed with treachery because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obey the
order given him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the
promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with
the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own violation and with the knowledge that he would inflict
irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of the life without any reason whatever,
well knowing that he was about in commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and
the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to
commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that the might be caught and punished in
the act of committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order
and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and
thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received
from the said datto, he was about to carry our, and to that end provided himself with weapon, concealing
it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of
two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did
there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant hi perverse deed. The fact that the
arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first
encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the
circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury
are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of
the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime
is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment,
before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed is manifestly evident. Even
though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes
present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the
two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money,
reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being
independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon
by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm
intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial
whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and
voluntarily executed it.

The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United
States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was
rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different from the case
where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object
of his criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two
persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature,
conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being
without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the
nature of the concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to
neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed with costs, provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in
accordance with the provisions of Acts Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted
he shall likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
||| (U.S. v. Manalinde, G.R. No. 5292, [August 28, 1909], 14 PHIL 77-83)
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUEENE DISCALSOTA y JUGAR, appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Sueene Discalsota y Jugar was convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. On automatic review, appellant
contended that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery.
The Supreme Court held that appellant is only guilty of the crime of homicide, and not murder.
According to the Court, the circumstances qualifying a crime such as murder are not to be presumed, but
must be established by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. The Court
stressed that the essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the
determination to commit the crime until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.
Hence, the lower court erred in holding that evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder. The
Court also held that treachery was not established in the case at bar. The mode of attack adopted by
appellant was not without risk to himself; neither was it sudden. When he began his menacing approach,
he was visible to the victim and the latter's companions. Appellant was out in the open and thus at risk
from any defense which the group might make. The presence of such risk and the existence of amble
opportunity for the victim to escape or defend himself negated treachery.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; THE SPAN OF LESS

THAN ONE HOUR COULD NOT HAVE AFFORDED APPELLANT FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR MEDITATION AND
REFLECTION ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRIME HE COMMITTED; CASE AT BAR. — It is settled that
qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing evidence
as conclusively as the killing itself. "[F]or evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as
clear as the evidence of the crime itself of the following elements thereof, viz: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow himself
to reflect upon the consequences of his act." In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation
are present. As found by the RTC, the time appellant determined to commit the crime was when he
started shouting at the victim and the latter's companions: "You, there, get out and we will kill you!" By
staying outside the house and following the victim's companions when they came out, he manifestly
indicated that he clung to his determination. As for the third element, the prosecution evidence shows
that appellant started shouting outside Mrs. del Rosario's house at 3:30 p.m. When the victim's group left
the house, it was not yet dark; it was only past four o'clock in the afternoon. The police received
information on the stabbing incident at 4:30 p.m. on the same day. It took less than an hour from the time
appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to the
time he stabbed the victim. The span of less than one hour could not have afforded the former full
opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime he committed. The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection on
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment. Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to commit the crime
until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the lower court erred in holding
that evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder. aDIHCT
2. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR WHERE THE VICTIM HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO
ESCAPE OR DEFEND HIMSELF AND THE MODE OF ATTACK ADOPTED BY APPELLANT WAS NOT SUDDEN AND WAS
NOT WITHOUT RISK TO HIMSELF. — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods, or forms of attack that tend directly and specially to insure the execution
of the crime without risk arising from the defense that the offended party might make. "For treachery to exist,
two essential elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted." Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conclusively as the killing itself. In the present case, the victim had the opportunity to escape or to defend
himself. Before he and his group left the house of Mrs. del Rosario, they had already been forewarned of violent
aggression from appellant, whose words and stance while outside the house made its imminence clear. The
mode of attack adopted by appellant was not without risk to himself; neither was it sudden. When he began his
menacing approach, he was visible to the victim and the latter's companions. Appellant was out in the open and
thus at risk from any defense which the group might make. The presence of such risk and the existence of ample
opportunity for the victim to escape or defend himself negated treachery.
PANGANIBAN, J p:

Without any proven qualifying circumstance, a killing constitutes homicide which is punishable
by reclusion temporal, not death. Where the attack was made openly and the victim had ample opportunity to
escape, treachery cannot be appreciated.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision 1 dated September 28, 1998, issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City (Branch 53), finding Sueene Discalsota y Jugar guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows: CDcHSa
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Sueene Discalsota, alias Ronnie de la Peña,
GUILTY of the crime of Murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 7659, of Herbert Suarnaba. Applying Art. 63, of the Revised Penal Code,
paragraph 2, No. 1, on the application of indivisible penalties, which provides that whenever
'there is present only one aggravating penalty, the greater penalty shall applied,' and there is
no mitigating circumstance. The Court hereby imposes upon the accused Sueene Discalsota the
penalty of DEATH.
"The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00,
as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as actual expenses for the
wake and funeral, and costs." 2
The Information 3 against appellant reads as follows:
"That on or about the 24th day of January, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without any justifiable cause
or motive, being then armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
assault, attack and stab with said weapon one HERBERT SUARNABA Y CATALAN, thereby
inflicting upon the person of the latter the following wounds:
'I.W. 4 cm, left posterior lumbar area, level of L2 L4 penetrating
Retroperiton[e]al Cavity completely transacting left kidney, inferior pole, penetrating
abdominal cavity completely transacting pancreas, body, perforating posterior surface
of Stomach, pundus with massive gastric spillage.
'Cause of Death: Hypovolemic Shock 2°
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death."
When arraigned on July 9, 1997, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, 4 pleaded "not guilty." 5 In
due course, the former was tried by the RTC which found him guilty of murder. cDCHaS
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise: 6
"At about 1:00 P.M. of January 24, 1996, the victim, Herbert Suarnaba, 16 years old,
along with his neighborhood friends, Jenny Aplaza (17 years old), Pedro Ramos (17 years old)
and Rowell Lavega (17 years old) left 6th Street, Bacolod City and went to Plaza Mart, a
shopping mall, where they loitered for about an hour or two. They decided to visit their friend,
'Novieboy' del Rosario, who used to be their neighbor at Purok Pag-asa but who ha[d] since
transferred to Libertad Baybay. They took [a] jeepney and arrived there at around 3:00 P.M.
They proceeded to the inner portion of the barangay, passing by several houses [o]n a footwalk
to the house of 'Novieboy' del Rosario. They were welcomed by the latter and [they] then
listened to music on the tape recorder. When 'Novieboy's' mother arrived, she offered them
'chorizo' (sausage) which she brought with her from Kalibo.
"While peacefully enjoying themselves, they were suddenly startled by shouts coming
from a group of men outside the house. Looking out, they saw about nine (9) men with their
leader shouting: 'Gua kamo dira, kay pamatyon ta kamo! Nga-a nagsulod-sulod kamo diri sa
amon teritoryo? Gua kamo dira kay pamatyon ta kamo! (You there, get out and we will kill you!)
The four (4) teen-agers were terrified since they did not know the men who were threatening
them. Nor did they know of any grudge or misunderstanding between their group and the men
outside. They then called Mrs. Del Rosario ('Novieboy's' mother) who advised them not to go
out of the house and called for the police. However, after waiting for some time, no police
assistance came. Mrs. Del Rosario then went out and returned with four (4) barangay tanods.
The tanods entered the house and talked to the teen-agers and assured them that no harm
would come to them and that there would be a police 'Bac[k]-up' waiting for them at the road.
The group was then escorted out of the house by the tanods and were accompanied by two (2)
of them and Mrs. Del Rosario towards the footpath leading to the main road. It was already
dusk by that time. The men threatening them were still outside when they went out of the
house and they followed the group. When the group reached the main road, no police 'Bac[k]-
up' was in sight but Mrs. Del Rosario remained with them. Cdpr
"There was a single 'trisikad' (pedicab) outside and the four (4) boarded it. Since the
pedicab could only accommodate two (2) persons inside, Rowell Lavega stood on the rail at the
back of the pedicab while the victim sat in front.
"The pedicab had not left when Rowell saw a man running towards them from the
footwalk. He was about 50 meters away when Rowell first saw him. The four jumped out of the
pedicab when Mrs. Del Rosario and the people there shouted at them to run. Despite efforts
by the barangay tanods to stop him, the man rushed headlong towards Rowell and the victim.
He was about to strike at Rowell when Mrs. Del Rosario pushed Rowell to run. When Mrs. Del
Rosario fell down as if to faint, the victim helped her stand up. Mrs. Del Rosario then told the
victim to run and he ran around the pedicab more than a foot long. While the victim was
running away trying to escape, the man holding the knife caught up with him and thrust his
knife at the fleeing victim who was hit at the back. The victim fell and crawled, while gasping
for breath, and he managed to enter a house pleading for help. aTHCSE
"Rowell saw what happened to his friend and wanted to help him but could not because
the attacker was still there. After seeing the victim fall down, bloodied, his attacker ran towards
the interior of the barangay. Meanwhile, Pedro, Jenny and Rowell ran as fast [as] they could
because the companions of the attacker also came rushing out of the footwalk and were
charging at them with drawn knives. They escaped being hurt when they sought refuge in the
house of a friend at the opposite side of the basketball court. Mrs. Del Rosario fainted upon
seeing the attack on the victim.
"Pedro and Rowell recognized the attacker as the one who earlier shouted at them
while they were still inside the house of Mrs. Del Rosario. They stayed for about an hour inside
the house of their friend where they sought refuge and there they learned that the man who
chased them and struck the victim was known by the nickname, 'Yawa' and is also known as
Ronnie de la Peña although his real name is Sueene Discalsota. Much later, when the police
finally came and investigated them, Pedro was shown pictures of the suspects and he picked
out the picture of accused-appellant. cDHCAE
"Louie Gregorio, a reluctant witness who testified only on pain of arrest for contempt
of court, declared that he was a 'live-in' partner of Nieves del Rosario; that while resting at the
house of Nieves del Rosario around 4:00 P.M. of January 24, 1996, he confirmed that the victim
and three (3) others were at the house and that no untoward incident happened while they
were inside the house. Several minutes after the boys were escorted out of the house by four
(4) barangay tanods, he learned that a stabbing incident happened outside and when he went
out to investigate, he saw accused-appellant running towards the house of his girlfriend. He
was only about five (5) armslength from accused-appellant who was carrying a bloodied long
knife which he did not even bother to conceal. He heard accused-appellant shouting, 'Naigo ko
 gid!' (I got him). He also confirmed that Ronnie de la Peña is the same accused-appellant Sueene
Discalsota.
"The victim was rushed to the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital. He was
still alive when the police and his mother arrived. However, he was already breathing heavily,
in a critical condition, and could no longer respond. A few minutes later, he was pronounced
dead by the doctor.
"Dr. Hildegard B. Madalag conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim and
submitted a Report of his findings (Exhibit D). He confirmed his findings in open court and
further testified that upon examination, he found the kidney of the victim completely
'transacted' or totally cut. The knife's entry point was at the back, a direct and straight thrust
which went through three (3) vital organs — pancreas, stomach and the kidney, causing
'massive gastric spillage.' He gave the cause of death in the Certificate of Death (Exhibit E) as
'Hypovolemic shock.'
"Despite lack of cooperation from the residents of the area where the incident
happened, the police authorities were able to arrest accused-appellant on the identification of
Pedro Ramos and Rowell Lavega." 7
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office narrated appellants' version of the incident as follows: 8
"SUEENE DISCALSOTA, denied that he was [the] one who stabbed and killed Herbert
Suarnaba. He testified that in the afternoon of January 24, 1996, he was in their house at Purok
Kingfisher, Libertad Baybay, Bacolod City, from 3:00 to 5:00 P.M. He was tending their store
where he acted as cashier. His companion thereat were older sister Aileen and younger sister
Yvette. He never left their store even after 5:00 P.M. When his mother Lilia Discalsota arrived
from the Central Market she took over the chores in the store. He only learned that there was
a stabbing incident on the following day (January 25, 1996).
"He learned that he was charged [with] Murder on April 7, 1997, when he was arrested
by policemen in the house of his wife, Christina at Purok Tulihaw, Brgy. 16, Bacolod City. He
was surprised when the policemen presented a warrant for his arrest. The policemen told him
that he was involved in a murder case in Libertad, Baybay, Bacolod City in January 1996. He did
not want to go with the policemen, but it was a certain Tiyo Erwin who prevailed upon him to
go with the arresting officers. He was then brought to Bac[k]-up I and later to headquarters. He
was subsequently detained at the 'Lock-up'.
"He further testified that he [did] not know Louie Gregorio, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He [did] not know whether Louie Gregorio [was] the common law husband of
Nieves del Rosario but he met her only at the City jail, when she visited her common-law
husband Marcial Flores, in January 1998. Marcial Flores [was] his neighbor at Libertad, Baybay.
"Discalsota also denied leaving Libertad, Baybay, Bacolod City after the incident. He was
there on January 25, 1996, and he was even able to leave their house that day. He continued
staying in their house . . . until April 1996. Eventually their house was demolished in 1997 and
his family transferred to Tangub. He nevertheless, remained in the area and stayed with his
wife at her house in Purok Tulinaw, which was just about 30 meters away from the house of
Nieves del Rosario.
"He denied membership [in] any fraternity, much less U-2. He declared that 'Yawa,' . . .
Ming, Michael Bartolo, Da-dan, were not his neighbors, but admitted they were residents of
the place. These persons are members of Red-O fraternity. He denied knowing Ulysses
Tonggoy. He admitted knowing . . . Alfonso one of the CVO's mentioned by prosecution's
[witness] Alfonso de la Cruz. He mentioned that he [was] not 'Yawa' but one Stephen.
"EVETTE DISCALSOTA corroborated the testimony of Suenne Discalsota. She testified
that she was tending their store the whole day of January 24, 1996. Her companions thereat
were her brother, Sueene[;] and sister, Aileen. Their store opened at 7:00 A.M. and closed on
that particular day, at 9:00 P.M. her brother Sueene never left the store from 7:00 A.M. to 9:00
P.M. Sueene was then acting as the cashier of their store.
 "She also testified that she did not know that her brother Sueene was charged in court.
When her brother was arrested she went to the police station and inquired why Sueene was
detained and she was told he had a case. She then told the police that on the day the alleged
stabbing was committed Sueene was not able to leave the house the whole day." 9
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that appellant had positively been identified by the prosecution witnesses as the culprit
responsible for the death of Herbert Suarnaba. It gave no credence to the denial and alibi proffered by appellant.
It also appreciated evident premeditation and treachery as qualifying and aggravating circumstances,
respectively, and thus sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us. 10
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the trial court with the following alleged errors:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the information despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
"II
The trial court erred in imposing the death penalty upon the accused-appellant." 11
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Preliminary Matter
Appellant no longer questions the finding of the RTC that he stabbed and killed Herbert Suarnaba.
However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case to review. Thus, we shall still pass upon the matter.
The prosecution witnesses were one in identifying appellant as the person who had wielded a knife and
stabbed the victim. Appellant had nothing to offer in his defense but an alibi corroborated by his two sisters. A
careful scrutiny of the records shows no reason to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses and to overturn the
court a quo's finding that they were credible.
Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance. 12
Also, the RTC was correct in disregarding the alibi of appellant. As it aptly ruled, his "defense of alibi
crumbles in the face of the positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses as being present in
the scene of the crime." 13
First Issue:
Evident Premeditation and Treachery
Appellant contends that evident premeditation should not have been appreciated by the trial court as a
qualifying circumstance.
It is settled that qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed, but must be established by clear and
convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. 14
"[F]or evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the
evidence of the crime itself of the following elements thereof, viz: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has
clung to his determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act." 15
In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation are present. As found by the RTC, the time
appellant determined to commit the crime was when he started shouting at the victim and the latter's
companions: "You, there, get out and we will kill you!" By staying outside the house and following the victim's
companions when they came out, he manifestly indicated that he clung to his determination.
 As for the third element, the prosecution evidence shows that appellant started shouting outside Mrs.
del Rosario's house at 3:30 p.m. 16 When the victim's group left the house, it was not yet dark; 17 it was only
past four o'clock in the afternoon. 18 The police received information on the stabbing incident at 4:30 19 p.m.
on the same day. It took less than an hour from the time appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as
manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to the time he stabbed the victim. The span of less than one
hour could not have afforded the former full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of
the crime he committed.
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment. 20
"To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient
in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its
warning." 21
Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until its
execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. 22 Hence, the lower court erred in holding that
evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
No Treachery
Appellant also argues that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods, or forms of attack that tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 23
"For treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the said means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted." 24 Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. 25
In the present case, the victim had the opportunity to escape or to defend himself. Before he and his
group left the house of Mrs. del Rosario, they had already been forewarned of violent aggression from appellant,
whose words and stance while outside the house made its imminence clear. The mode of attack adopted by
appellant was not without risk to himself; neither was it sudden. When he began his menacing approach, he
was visible to the victim and the latter's companions. Appellant was out in the open and thus at risk from any
defense which the group might make. The presence of such risk and the existence of ample opportunity for the
victim to escape or defend himself negated treachery.
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
In his Brief, appellant further claims to have been a minor at the time of the commission of the crime.
This matter was, however, not raised during the trial. Furthermore, in his direct examination held on June 11,
1998, he stated for the record that he was a 20-year old married man. Hence, we cannot agree to appreciate
minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant may be convicted of homicide only. Considering further
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal should
be in the medium period 26 and encompassed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. ITEcAD
Damages
We affirm the RTC's award of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages. However,
the grant of actual damages should be reduced to P10,890, since this is the only amount duly supported by a
statement of account and receipts. "To justify an award of actual damages, it is necessary to prove with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party, the actual amount of loss." 27
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide and is SENTENCED to
an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor medium as minimum to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. The grant of civil indemnity and moral damages is AFFIRMED, but
that of actual damages is reduced to P10,890. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||
 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; "ALEVOSIA" [TREACHERY]. — The qualifying circumstance

of alevosia essential to the crime of murder was found to be present in the case at bar not only because of
the sudden and unexpected manner in which the fatal assault with a deadly weapon was begun against the
defenseless victim, but also because of the peculiar conditions under which the offense was finally
consummated.
2. ID.; ID.; "ALEVOSIA IN ACT OF CONSUMMATING CRIME. — Even though a deadly attack may be
begun under conditions not exhibiting the feature of alevosia, yet if the assault is continued and the crime
consummated with alevosia, such circumstance may be taken into consideration as a qualifying factor in the
offense of murder.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — An assault was begun suddenly and unexpectedly by the firing of a
pistol by the accused at his victim, who was unarmed. As the latter attempted to flee he was pursued by the
accused and driven to take refuge in a closet, where he called aloud for help. The accused then tried to force
open the door but was unable to do so, owing to the resistance of the deceased from within. The accused,
however, judging the position of the deceased from the cries emitted, fired his pistol in the direction thus
indicated. The bullet passed through the panel of the door and, entering the head of the deceased, produced
death. Held: That the final attack was characterized by alevosia and the crime perpetrated was murder even
though the attack had not been originally begun with alevosia.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; TWO CRIMES COMMITTED IN ONE ACT; ARTICLE 89 OF THE PENAL CODE. —
Where the accused entered the office of the provincial governor where the latter was engaged in the
exercise of his official functions and slew him under conditions constituting murder, it is held that two crimes
were committed, namely, murder and assault upon a person in authority, and that the penalty prescribed
for murder should be imposed in its maximum degree, in accordance with section 89 of the Penal Code.
5. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL. — A trial court cannot be put in error for
refusing a continuance where there is nothing to indicate that the accused was in fact prejudiced in the
making of his defense by the action taken.
6. ID.; PERSONAL QUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGE. — The fact that the judge before whom the
accused was tried on a charge of murder had attended the funeral of the murdered man does not render
the judge incompetent to sit.
7. ID.; WITHDRAWING PLEA OF NOT GUILTY; DEMURRER. — Permission to withdraw the plea of not
guilty in order to interpose a demurrer to the complaint in a prosecution for murder is properly denied
where the complaint appears to be sufficient.
8. ID.; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES BEFORE FISCAL. — Held: Under
the circumstances stated in the opinion, that the trial court committed no error in denying the motion of
the accused to compel the production in court of written statements made by witnesses for the accusation
when examined by the provincial fiscal under the authority of section 1687 of the Administrative Code.
9. EVIDENCE; IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS; PROOF OF CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT. — Where an
attorney desires to impeach a witness of the adversary by proof of contradictory statements, he should, in
the cross-examination of such witness, lay a basis for the introduction of the contradictory proof by asking
the witness if he did not, at a time and place specified, make certain statements different from those
testified to by him.
10. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ASSESSORS; CONSULTATION OF JUDGE WITH ASSESSORS. — Although
the record in the case at bar did not show that the assessors who took part in hearing the case had been
consulted by the trial judge, it was nevertheless held that the irregularity was immaterial. The statute does
not require that the opinions of the assessors shall be reduced to writing except where their conclusions
differ from those of the judge; and, where the record is silent, it is to be presumed that the functions of the
assessors were properly performed and that they agreed with the findings of the court.
STREET, J p:

This cause has been brought to the Supreme Court upon an appeal prosecuted by Jose I. Baluyot
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, convicting him of the crime of
murder, committed August 3, 1918, upon the person of Conrado Lerma, governor of said province, and
sentencing him to undergo the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.
At the general election which was held on June 6, 1916, Conrado Lerma was elected governor of
the Province of Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was the accused, Jose I. Baluyot, who
came out third in the race. As a result of this contest a feeling of personal rancor was developed in the
mind of Baluyot against his successful competitor, and during the two years which followed the accused
became fully imbued with the idea that Governor Lerma was persecuting him.
In the year 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the
offense of estafa in connection with a loan of money which had been negotiated at the Philippine National
Bank. This proceeding had been tried and in the early days of August, 1918. was pending decision by the
judge who tried the case.
Upon the organization of the National Guard, Baluyot had been commissioned as captain in that
body, and owing possibly to the pendency of the accusation for estafa and its damaging effects upon his
reputation, he had been asked to resign from the position of captain in the National Guard and although
he had not resigned when the act which gave occasion to this prosecution occurred, he had apparently
been temporarily relieved from duty with that organization pending investigation.
The misfortunes above mentioned, as well as others of a minor character, were attributed by
Baluyot to the machinations of Governor Lerma, all of which served to foment and increase his feeling of
enmity towards the latter.
On August 2, 1918, the defendant left the city of Manila and went to the town of Orion, in the
Province of Bataan, taking with him a revolver. Early on the following day, August 3, he shipped to Manila
from Orion a piano belonging to his wife, and at 8 a. m., went to Balanga, the capital of the Province,
arriving at the recorder's office in the provincial building at about 9 o'clock a. m., where he inquired for
Governor Lerma.
He was told that the governor had not arrived, but was expected later. The accused accordingly
determined to wait in the recorder's office, which served as a sort of anteroom to the office of the
governor. At about 11 o'clock a. m. the governor arrived. He and the accused greeted each other in a
friendly manner by shaking hands; and the governor, upon being informed that Baluyot had called to
confer with him, invited Baluyot into his office. Baluyot hesitated, having noted the presence of another
caller and asked if the latter did not have a prior right to an interview. The governor said that Baluyot
should enter first, which the latter accordingly did. The governor and the accused remained alone in the
former's office for 3 or 4 minutes, whereupon it occurred to Governor Lerma that the interview might be
more extended than he had expected, and he accordingly requested that Baluyot should withdraw long
enough for the governor to confer with one Antonino Aranjuez, the other caller to whom reference has
already been made. Baluyot accordingly withdrew into the recorder's office and told Aranjuez that the
governor wanted to see or talk to him. Aranjuez then went in and had a conference with the governor for
a few minutes about the appointment of the former as chief of police for the municipality of Limay. When
Aranjuez came out Baluyot said that it was now his turn and again entered the governor's office.
The evidence shows that at the time Baluyot reentered the governor's office the latter was sitting
behind his desk in an ordinary office chair. Baluyot approached the desk and upon reaching a position
directly in front of the governor spoke certain words which were heard, though not distinctly, by persons
in the recorder's office, Antonino Aranjuez merely heard the accused call out "governor,' while Gregorio de
Guzman understood Baluyot to be asking the governor for his revolver. The accused himself testified that
his reference to the revolver was intended to admonish the governor to prepare for a mortal combat and
he says that the words spoken were these:
"BALUYOT. It appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre.
"GOVERNOR LERMA. No sir; mine is 32.
"BALUYOT. So is mine. Be prepared because one of us must die."
The accused gives a color to this conversation which seems to us somewhat unnatural, and his
statement as to what occurred, especially with reference to the length of time that elapsed after he
entered the governor's office until the first shot was fired, is wholly lacking in verisimilitude. What really
occurred, as the lower court found, and as the testimony of the witnesses in the recorder's office slows, is
that the first shot was fired within a few seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office and that the
interval which elapsed was scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the governor's desk The
inference is conclusive that, immediately upon asking the governor about his revolver, and discovering
that he was unarmed, Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired.
In the testimony given by Baluyot himself a circumstance is mentioned which appears to us
important in this connection. He says that while he was sitting in the recorder's office, awaiting the arrival
of Governor Lerma, Paulo Venegas, a guard attached to the provincial jail, came up and after speaking in a
low voice with the recorder, entered the office of the governor and presently emerged, bringing a revolver
and some cartridges. Baluyot noticed that the revolver was discharged and remarked to the person having
it in hand that an unloaded revolver is less useful even that a cane. The guard replied that he was not the
person charged with loading it, but was going to take it out to be cleaned, whereupon he disappeared
carrying the revolver with him. This act of carrying away of the revolver from Governor Lerma's office was
especially noticed by Baluyot and naturally from this he must have supposed that the revolver seen by him
was a weapon commonly kept in the governor's office. The still further inference was obvious Baluyot that
the governor upon arrival would be unarmed in his office, unless he should- possibly bring a revolver upon
his person
This circumstance shows ;that the words which Baluyot directed to Governor Lerma immediately
before the fatal attack were intended to discover whether Governor Lerma was in fact unarmed. Upon
discovering that Governor Lerma did not have his revolver at hand, the accused at once drew his own
weapon and fired. Baluyot therefore knew Governor Lerma to be unarmed and practically defenseless, and
it is plain that the attack was not begun until the assailant was fully assured upon this point.
The bullet first fired by Baluyot entered in the frontal region of the right shoulder blade of
Governor Lerma and inflicted a wound of minor importance, passing through the aforesaid part of the
body and penetrating the back of the chair in which the governor was sitting. Passing on from the chair,
the ball entered the wall of the office building, but was so far spent that it did not penetrate deeply.
Instead it merely made a circular hole in the wall of moderate depth and rebounded, falling on the floor.
The line of direction followed by the ball indicates that the accused directed the shot in somewhat
downward direction and that Governor Lerma was in all probability reclining backwards in the chair at the
instant the shot struck him.
The governor immediately arose. His free action was impeded by the table in front, and by the
walls of the office behind and on either side, since his table was in a corner of his office. His exit was
further obstructed by a small book stand on his immediate right. His only convenient direction of escape
was, therefore, in the direction to his left by way of the space between the left corner of his desk and the
wall nearby. This direction the governor accordingly took, directing himself towards a passageway in the
wall a few feet from his desk leading into a corridor. When the governor had cleared the desk so as to
leave a free space between himself and his assailant, the distance which separated them was only a few
feet. Baluyot meanwhile turned somewhat to his right and advanced slightly in the direction taken by
Governor Lerma.
The latter desiring to make good his escape, started to run in the direction aforesaid, and Baluyot,
raising his revolver, again fired. The ball struck Governor Lerma in the region of the right shoulder blade
and passed through the body an inch or two from the wound made by the first shot. The firing of the
second shot was seen by Antonino Aranjuez, whose attention had been attracted by the noise of the first
shot. Being then seated at a desk in the recorder's office near the door leading into the governor's office,
this witness immediately arose upon hearing the first shot, and having arrived at a point in the governor's
office wherestood a screen, occluding direct vision from the door to the governor s desk, he placed himself
at the side of the screen and was thus able to see the scene then being transacted It was at this instant
that Baluyot, with his arm extended fired the second shot at his fleeing victim. The governor at this
moment had his right hand raised to his already wounded shoulder and was running in a direction away
from his assailant rather than towards him. Immediately upon seeing this shot fired, Aranjuez, instead of
intervening to save the governor, as would have been becoming, turned and fled to obtain succor.
Bonifacio Mencias, the sanitary official, who examined the wounds of Governor Lerma, says that
both of the first two wounds were made by bullets which entered from the front. This is obviously true as
to the first, but as to the second there seems to be room for doubt. The inspection made by the doctor
may have been superficial, and his opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference from his
information as to the general features of the tragedy. At any rate he does not state any particulars from
which it could clearly be discovered that the second shot entered from the front. The witness Aranjuez
makes it clear that as the matter presented itself to his eye, the governor was fleeing with his right side,
rather than his front, exposed to Baluyot This witness says that the governor's face was turned in the
direction of his flight, though he thinks the governor could have seen what Baluyot was doing. In this view
the second shot should apparently have entered from behind.
The point we consider of little importance, inasmuch as it is obvious that Baluyot was the aggressor
throughout and that the second shot was fired at an unarmed man whose only purpose was to effect an
escape to a place of safety Whether at the instant this shot was fired Governor Lerma may have had his
body turned so as momentarily to confront his assailant, moving away sidewise, can have no bearing upon
the qualification and character of the crime. The testimony of Baluyot to the effect that as soon as
Governor Lerma emerged from behind the table the two engaged in a hand to hand struggle is
preposterous in the extreme.
After the second shot was fired, Governor Lerma continued his flight along the corridor and,
instead of attempting to pass out to the right into the recorder's office, which would have exposed him to
the danger of another shot while passing through the open space, he took refuge in a closet at the end of
the corridor. Once within, he shut the door and placed himself in a position to obstruct the entrance of his
pursuer, who vainly attempted to open the door.
The governor then began to call aloud for help, and Baluyot, judging the position of the governor's
head from the direction of the sound thus emitted, fired his revolver in the direction indicated. The bullet
passed through the panel of the door and struck Governor Lerma in the forward part of the head near and
above the right temple. It passed downwards and came out through the left eye, loosening the eyeball in
its socket. This wound was necessarily fatal, though not instantly so; and the governor evidently lost
consciousness at once. Baluyot, feeling the movement of the body within the closet, opened the door
without resistance. As he did so the body of Governor Lerma shot forward out of the closet, as if in an
attitude to embrace the slayer, who drew backwards, and the body fell prone on the floor. In this position
it remained and was found prostrate a few minutes later by persons who came upon the scene. Death
ensued in about two or three hours, without recovery of consciousness.
Baluyot, immediately after the tragedy, stepped over to a window of the room overlooking the
public square and, calling to a squad of Constabulary, who were directing themselves to the provincial
building, indicated that they should come up. At the same time he threw his revolver to the ground, with
three empty shells and others that had not been discharged. Upon the arrival of the Constabulary he
surrendered without resistance.
The offense committed in this case exhibits features markedly similar to those which characterized
the crime which was the subject of prosecution in United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530); and the offense
here committed was properly qualified by the trial judge as murder, in which was present the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. The presence. of this element is easily and in our opinion irrefutably indicated in
the conditions and manner both of the original attack and of the final act by which the offense was
consummated.
With reference to the manner in which the attack was begun, the proof shows that access was
gained by Baluyot to the governor's office upon the pretext that he desired a friendly interview; and
although the strained relations existing between the two, owing to their political antagonisms was
appreciated by both, there was nothing in the situation to warn the governor of impending trouble. The
fact that Baluyot had already been called into the office upon the governor's first arrival and had
withdrawn for a few moments to permit another person to have an interview was also calculated to put
the governor off his guard at the moment Baluyot reentered the office. Being seated in a reclining chair,
and hemmed in by obstacles which prevented him from reaching his assailant, it is plain that the unarmed
governor could make no effectual defense against a person armed with such a deadly weapon as a
revolver. It is obvious also that the means and methods thus deliberately selected by the assailant were
intended to insure the execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party could make.
We need not detain ourselves to analyze the conditions which existed when the second shot was
fired, and we pass on to the third, with the single observation that the entire assault from the beginning
must be considered continuous and that the second shot was fired while the victim was endeavoring to
flee to a place of safety. The presence of alevosia in the firing of the third shot seems to be too patent to
permit of controversy. The victim in his effort to escape had been driven to take refuge in the closet, and
with the door shut, it was impossible for him to see what his assailant was doing or to make any defense
whatever against the shot directed through the panel of the door. It was as i the victim had been bound or
blindfolded, or had been treacherously attacked from behind in a path obscured y the darkness of night.
 Even supposing that alevosia had not been present in the beginning of the assault, it would be
necessary to find this element present from the manner in which the crime was consummated. In United
States vs. Elicanal (3 Rep., 209) Justice Moreland said:
"This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting
in the death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found-
present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend
himself. While the writer of this opinion formerly held the view that, where there is no
treachery in the attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery
which Will qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow
was struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, nevertheless, the court having held so
frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established."
There was present in the offense in question the generic aggravating circumstance that said
offense was committed in a place where public authority was engaged in the discharge of duty. (Subsec.
19, art. 10, Penal Code.) There is no discernible difference at this point between the present case and that
of United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530, 533), in which this aggravating circumstance was declared to be
present.
The trial court also found that the crime in question was characterized by the further aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. Certain items of proof which tend strongly to show the presence
of this element may be briefly mentioned. It was testified by one Pedro Magajes, a friend of the accused,
that on July 14, 1918, Baluyot in the course of a conversation with Magajes exhibited ill-feeling against
Lerma and said that Lerma would pay for the misfortunes that were befalling him (Baluyot). Domingo
Lintag, compadre of the accused, testified that on the Friday in the month of August, prior to the
commission of the crime in question, he saw the defendant in Orion; that when he and the defendant
shook hands the latter squeezed his hand tightly and said, "Parece ser que esta es la ultima vez que vamos
a dar la mano" [may be that this will be the last time we will shake hands]. This remark is especially
noteworthy, since it shows that the accused contemplated some occurrence which would have grave
consequences to him. On the morning of August 3, the day on which the crime was committed, the
accused asked more than one person if they thought. he was in Bilibid, intimating that a false rumor to this
effect had been maliciously circulated by his arch-enemy, Governor Lerma. This shows clearly that the
mind of the accused was fixed upon Lerma as the supposed author of his wrongs.
No very satisfactory explanation is given by the accused as to the reason for his trip to Orion and
especially to Balanga; and the conclusion is irresistible that he was carried to the latter place by a thirst for
vengeance. Furthermore, the conduct of the accused in the next day or two succeeding the commission of
the crime was that of a person stimulated by a feeling of gratification over the successful accomplishment
of a, fixed purpose, not the conduct of one effected by grief over the fatal results of a sudden and
unexpected altercation. At no time did he exhibit any sign of regret for the act committed. The conclusion
reasonably to be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that the accused, for several days prior to the
perpetration of this murder, had determined to seek an interview or encounter with Governor Lerma
regardless of consequences. It is impossible to say at what moment the determination to take life became
a fixed resolution. The design to kill was probably entertained when the accused went in the early morning
of August 3 to the governor's office, and the putting of this resolution into effect was at once determined
upon when the accused found that the governor was unarmed. In order to constitute the element of
known premeditation in the crime of murder it is not necessary that the slayer should have prefigured in
his mind all of the details of the crime or determined upon the exact moment when he should carry his
purpose into effect. It is enough that the determination to take life should have been formed for a period
sufficiently long to allow the actor time to reflect coolly upon the character and the consequences of the
act, the accomplishment of the crime being left to some suitable opportunity such as chance or design may
present.
It is thus manifest that the conclusion of the trial court that the offense was characterized by
known premeditation is by no means without support in the evidence. Nevertheless, as an express ruling
on this point is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, we concede to the accused the benefit of the
possible doubt, and we accordingly refrain from making any express findings as to the presence of said
element.
It is contended in behalf of the accused that the crime in question was qualified by two extenuating
circumstances, namely, first, that it was committed under "an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation" (art. 9, subsec. 7, Penal Code), and, secondly, that "the offender had
no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed." (Art. 9, subsec. 3, Penal Code). This
contention rests upon certain statements found in the testimony of the accused and which, in our opinion,
are discredited by other evidence. Baluyot states that he began his first interview with Governor Lerma on
August 3 by saying that he wished Diputado [delegate] Reyes of Bataan could have been present as there
were certain things which he wanted to say in the presence of them both. Baluyot then stated that there
was no doubt that Governor Lerma had won in the political contest and that it was also undeniable that in
all his own misfortunes the governor had played an important and direct part. The governor, according to
Baluyot, thereupon replied: "viene usted con la misma queja, Sr. Baluyot, pero no somos enemigos? Si
fueramos amigos, menos mal; y usted en nuestro lugar hubiera hecho lo mismo como usted ha hecho con
mi compadre Velez que acaba de ser separado de la Guardia Nacional." [You come with the same
complaint, Mr. Baluyot, but, are we not enemies. If we were friends, not quite so bad. If you were in our
place you would have done the same as you have done with my friend (compadre) Velez who has just
been discharged from the National Guard.] Baluyot says that in reply to this he protested that he had
nothing to do with the separation of Captain Velez from the National Guard At this Juncture the governor
suggested that the interview was going to be somewhat lengthy and requested that Baluyot should yield
his turn for a few minutes until the governor could have a short interview with Aranjuez Thereupon the
interview was interrupted in the manner already stated, Baluyot withdrawing for a few moments into the
recorder's office.
Baluyot says that, when he was readmitted into the presence of the governor, he seated himself in
the same chair in front of the governor's desk where he had been seated before, and the conversation was
resumed. This conversation according to Baluyot was of the following tenor:
"GOVERNOR LERMA. Where do you say you are going to, Mr. Baluyot.
"BALUYOT. I am thinking of going to Cebu and residing herefor some time with my
brother-in-law.
"The GOVERNOR. But you will not be able to do so very soon, perhaps until after
several months.
"BALUYOT. That is not true. On my return to Manila I'll prepare for my trip and go to
Cebu.
"The GOVERNOR. I believe you will not be able to carry that out, because Judge
Concepcion will detain you.
"BALUYOT. Why ?
"The GOVERNOR. Well, Judge Concepcion has sentenced you for estafa to four
months, and I don't know how many days; truly that is a good idea, to change location, a
location so full of people as Cebu where nobody knows you perhaps you may be able to cheat
better."
Baluyot says that, upon being informed by Governor Lerma that Judge Concepcion had rendered
judgment against him in the estafa case condemning him to prison, he lost his head, as he was in high
hopes of being acquitted in that prosecution. He accordingly, at the close of the foregoing words imputed
to Governor Lerma, rose from his chair and used the words which we have quoted in a former part of this
opinion with reference to the calibre of Governor Lerma's revolver, at the same time unbuttoning his coat
and producing his own weapon.
Even supposing that the conversation between the accused and Governor Lerma was exactly as
stated by Baluyot, the language used by Governor Lerma was not such as could have produced passion and
obfuscation in Baluyot sufficient to constitute the mitigating circumstance defined in subsection 7 of
article 9 of the Penal Code. It is to be noted, however, that no such conversation as that above transcribed
could possibly have taken place in the interval between the reentrance of Baluyot into the governor's
office and the time when the words addressed to the governor about the revolver were heard in the
recorder's office. From the testimony given by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales, Antonino Aranjuez and
Gregorio de Guzman, we consider it to be irrefutably established that the first shot was, fired within nine
or ten seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office and that the interval which elapsed was
scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the governor's desk.
The mind of an unbiased person must also be impressed with the inverisimilitude of imputing to
Governor Lerma knowledge of a judgment rendered by a court in the City of Manila against Baluyot of
which Baluyot was ignorant, for under section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sentence in such a
proceeding as that then pending against this accused must be pronounced in the presence of the
condemned person, and if Baluyot had in fact been convicted he himself would have been among the first
to learn of it. It is highly improbable that Governor Lerma would have been guilty of conduct so
unbecoming as to have engaged in bantering a political enemy over a matter so delicate, when Judgment
had not in fact been pronounced. Our conclusion is that Baluyot's account of the words which passed
between him and Governor Lerma immediately prior to the firing of the first shot must be rejected as
false.
The contention that the accused had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed
rests upon the statement of Baluyot that the third shot was accidentally discharged from his revolver while
he was attempting to push open the door of the closet in which the Governor had taken refuge. This
pretension is hardly deserving of serious notice, as it is refuted not only by the circumstantial evidence
bearing upon this phase of the tragedy but also by an admission made by Baluyot on August 5 in
conversation with Eusebio Reyes, reporter of a Manila newspaper. In this conversation Baluyot stated that
he pursued the deceased to the door of the closet and, having observed from the cries emitted by
Governor Lerma that the latter was seated behind the door, he (Baluyot) discharged his pistol in the
direction where he divined the governor to be. We have no doubt as to the truth of this admission, and it
is a complete refutation of the suggestion that the discharge of the revolver was accidental.
What we have thus far said suffices to demonstrate that in slaying Governor Lerma, the accused
was guilty of murder with at least one aggravating circumstance and that the penalty for murder was
properly imposed in its maximum degree. It is, however, further insisted in the brief of the Attorney-
General that in reality two crimes were committed by the accused in the same act, namely, murder and
assault upon a person in authority. Under this conception of the case also the penalty for murder should
be imposed in its maximum degree under article 89 of the Penal Code.
We agree with the Attorney-General upon the proposition that the same act in fact resulted in this
case in the perpetration of two crimes. That the homicide is to be characterized as murder we have
already determined; and it is undeniable that, an attack was in the same act made upon a person in
authority while exercising the duties of his office, as charged in the complaint, since the deceased was, as a
provincial governor, an authority within the meaning of article 249 of the Penal Code. These
considerations in our opinion supply an additional irrefutable basis for the imposition of the death penalty
by the trial Judge, though his decision did not discuss this aspect of the case.
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of so much of the appeal as is concerned with the
commission of the offense and its legal qualification under the law. Other questions, however, are raised
relative to the conditions under which the case was called to trial and the manner in which the prosecution
was conducted in the Court of First Instance. In this connection various errors of law are imputed, in
separate assignments, to the action of the Hon. Carlos Imperial, who acted as judge in the court below.
In the first specification of error the appellant alleges that "he was not given ample opportunity to
defend himself," because the court denied his attorney's last request for a continuance. Upon this ground
the appellant seeks to secure from this court, if not a reversal of the judgment, at least an order for a new
trial. The assignment of error is in our opinion without merit. It appears in evidence that on August 3,
1918, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the court of the justice of the peace charging the accused
with the crime of murder. On the 5th, he appeared and waived the right to be defended by an attorney
and requested that the "expediente" be sent to the Court of First Instance as soon as possible. On the 9th,
an information was filed in the Court of First Instance, whereupon Manuel Banzon, a regularly admitted
member of the bar, was appointed by the court as attorney de officio for the defendant upon the latter's
request, and he was duly arraigned, entering a plea of not guilty. On that date the attorneys for the
Government asked that the trial be set for the 12th, but the counsel for the accused requested that it be
set for the 15th, which petition was granted. After the case was called for hearing on the 15th, the court
received a telegram from Vicente Sotto, then a member of the bar in Manila, stating that he had been
employed by the family of the accused and asking that the hearing be postponed until the following
Monday. The attorneys for the Government objected to this request but the court, nevertheless,
postponed the hearing until the following day, and Sotto was immediately notified by telegram of that
order. Sotto at once departed for Balanga and was present in court when the case was called for trial the
next morning Banzon was authorized by the court to retire from the case only with the defendant's
consent and after Sotto had made his appearance and taken charge of the case.
From the foregoing statement it is seen that the accused was at all times represented before the
court by a competent attorney, and no fact is adduced which would enable us to say that he was in any
wise embarrassed in the making of his defense by the action of the court in setting the case for trial on
August the sixteenth and proceeding with it on that day. It cannot be permitted that a trial court should be
put in error for refusing a continuance when there is nothing whatever to show that the accused was in
fact prejudiced by the action taken. Where a continuance is sought on the ground of want of preparation,
an affidavit should ordinarily be filed showing in what respect the applicant is not ready and that he has
made reasonable exertions to prepare for trial without success, or some good reason for not making such
exertions. (13 Cor. Jur., 183.) Nothing of the kind was done in this case; and when Sotto actually appeared
in court and assumed the duties of attorney for the accused, no application for a continuance of any sort
was really made. On the contrary the attorney was content merely to cause a note to be made in the
record to the effect that he respectfully protested against the telegram which the court had sent to him
the day before notifying that the cause was set for trial on the 16th. No statement whatever was made
showing why further delay was necessary. The action taken by the court was in our opinion in no wise
prejudicial and was therefore not erroneous.
In United States vs. Lao Chueco (37 Phil. Rep., was held that "when an accused is obliged to come
to trial without having the opportunity to cite his witnesses it cannot be said that he is given the
opportunity to be tried completely, fully and impartially as the law prescribes, and a new trial will be
ordered." But in that case the accused was deprived of the opportunity to subpoena his witnesses,
whereas in the case at bar neither the accused nor his attorney informed the court that there was any
witness that they wanted to be cited. It does not appear even now that there was any essential witness
whom he could have presented had not the case been tried on August 16th. When the accused was
arraigned on August 9 the court told him that, if he had any witness that he wanted the court to subpoena,
he should so inform the court as soon as possible in order that the trial of the case might not be delayed.
The second assignment of error raises a question which is addressed to the personal qualification
of his Honor, Carlos A. Imperial, to preside at the hearing of this case. The exception to the trial judge was
based on the fact that the latter had attended the funeral obsequies of Governor Lerma, which had been
characterized by marked manifestations of public grief and sympathy. This fact was relied upon as showing
that Judge Imperial was biased and could not be relied on to try the accused with rectitude, justice, and
impartiality. The judge, however, did not accede to this suggestion and proceeded with the trial as already
stated. There is in our opinion no merit in the assignment. No prejudice on the part of the judge is in fact
shown, and the record by no means bears out the assumption that the judge was in fact in any wise
biased.
Furthermore, the objection raised is not based upon any of the grounds of disqualification stated in
section 8 of Act No. 190. This section expressly enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which a judge
or justice of the peace is disqualified from acting as such, and the express enumeration of these cases
excludes others. Such is the tenor of the decisions of this court in the cases of Perfecto vs. Contreras (28
Phil. Rep., 538), and Joaquin vs. Barretto (25 Phil. Rep., 281). In the case last cited it was held that extreme
delicacy was no ground for disqualifying a judge from trying a case. The decisions just cited are civil cases
but in the absence of express provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the analogy is of value.
In the third assignment it is imputed as error that the court at the hearing denied a motion of the
attorney of the accused to withdraw the plea of not guilty previously entered by him in order to permit a
demurrer to be filed to the information. The attorney did not disclose to the court the ground on which he
proposed to base his demurrer, and as the information appears to be sufficient, it is evident that this
motion was merely dilatory, and the court committed no error in refusing to accede thereto. The action of
the trial court in passing upon an application of this character is largely discretionary and is not subject to
review except where the judicial discretion appears to have been abused.
The fourth specification is addressed to the supposed error of the court in refusing to compel the
provincial fiscal to produce in court at the request of the attorney for the accused certain written
statements which had been made by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales, Gregorio de Guzman, and Antonio
Aranjuez in a preliminary inquiry conducted by the fiscal preparatory to this prosecution. It appears that
after the witnesses above mentioned had been examined in court for the prosecution, they were turned
over to the attorney for the accused and were by him fully cross-examined. Later, when the giving of
testimony for the prosecution had been concluded, the defense proceeded to introduce sundry witnesses
who were examined in due course. After four had thus testified, and immediately before the accused was
placed upon the stand in his own behalf, his attorney made the request that the declarations or
statements above referred to should be produced. The attorney for the prosecution objected on the
ground that one party cannot be compelled to produced evidence in favor of the other. The court was of
the opinion that the written declarations the production of which was sought were of a privileged nature
and accordingly overruled the motion. We are of the opinion that the court was not in error in refusing to
compel the production of the documents in question. They were not original or independent evidence of
such a character as to give the accused an unqualified right to compel their production, and no proper
basis was laid in the cross-examination of the witnesses who had made those statements to justify their
production with a view to the impeachment of the declarants. The request was of course based upon the
supposition or expectation that if the statements of the witnesses before the fiscal were produced, they
might be found to contain something different from what was contained in their testimony given in court.
We know of no rule of practice which sustains the contention of the appellant The statements in
question were not the sworn declarations of witnesses taken in conformity with the requirements of
section 13 of General Orders, No 58, and which are commonly attached to the "expediente" transmitted
by the committing magistrate to the Court of First Instance. In the case at bar the preliminary examination
before the committing magistrate was waived by the accused, and the declarations of the witnesses for
the prosecution were therefore not taken before the magistrate. The declarations referred to were, on the
contrary, taken in an investigation conducted by the fiscal under the authority of section 1687 of the
Administrative Code. This section authorizes the fiscal, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into
the matter of any crime or misdemeanor for the purpose of instituting or carrying on a criminal
prosecution. It is expressly declared that this section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal
to act as a justice of the peace in any preliminary investigation. The proceeding here contemplated is of an
administrative character, and the information thereby acquired is intended for the use of the fiscal in the
conduct of the prosecution. Such declarations therefore pertain to the official file in the office of the public
prosecutor and are not subject to production at the mere request of the attorney for the accused where
no ground therefor had been laid.
In order that we may not be misunderstood, as well as for the purpose of clarifying the practice in
such matters, a few words may here be properly said in respect to the proper mode of proceeding in a
case where a party wishes to get before the court contradictory statements made by a witness who is
testifying for the adversary party. For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a
certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially
different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when
cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make
such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that
delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the
benefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On
the other hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right
to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to
produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of
cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the
American courts "laying a predicate" for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost
universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory
statements are not admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in
the discretion of the court.
We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or otherwise, made it
appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named had made statements in their
declarations before the fiscal materially at variance with their statements in court and that the production
of said declarations was necessary or even desirable, in the interests of justice, the court would have had
ample power to order their production. No such showing, or intimation, was made in this case; and the
attorney who made the motion was merely angling at random to discover something that might prove to
be favorable to his client. To put a court in error for refusing to entertain such a motion would encourage
frivolous delays and tend to embarrass the speedy and proper administration of justice.
The last assignment directed to supposed error of law in the action of the trial court is to the effect
that the judge made his decision without hearing the assessors who acted at the trial. In this connection it
appears that at the request of the accused two assessors were appointed in accordance with the
provisions of sections 153-161 of Act No. 190, which provisions were extended to criminal causes by Act
No. 2369 of the Philippine Legislature. The record does not show that the assessors in the case before us
were in fact consulted by the judge, and the decision of the court makes no mention of them. We are of
the opinion that, the irregularity, if such it be, is immaterial. The functions of the assessor are purely
advisory, and the responsibility for the decision rests exclusively with the judge. The statute does not
require that the opinions of the assessors shall be recorded except where two or more assessors are of the
opinion that the court's findings of fact are wrong. In the silence of the record it is to be presumed not only
that the functions of the assessors were properly performed but that they agreed with the findings of the
court. This presumption is borne out in the case before us by the circumstance that after the records of
the case had been sent up to this court, the clerk of court of Bataan forwarded as part of said records
certifications signed by the assessors who had sat in the case, stating that they had read the decision
rendered by the court and that they concurred in the findings of fact made therein. It is not necessary that
the record should affirmatively show that the judge consulted the assessors before making his decision, as
in the absence of a showing to the contrary it is to be presumed that he did so.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that, in the view sustained by the majority of the
members of this court, no material error was committed by the trial judge either in the mode of
conducting the trial or in the qualification of the crime and fixing the penalty attendant thereupon.
However, as one of the Justices of this court is not in accord with the majority with regard to the propriety
of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty imposed must, in conformity with the requirements
of Act No. 2726 of the Philippine Legislature, be reduced from death to cadena perpetua with accessory
penalties prescribed in article 54 of the Penal Code. As thus modified the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J., was not present at the argument, and did not take part in the disposition of the case.
Moir, J., voted with the majority of the court for the absence at the time of the promulgation of
this opinion his name does not appear signed thereto. (Sgd.) C. S. ARELLANO.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun
Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic Arroyo of
Sto. Niño, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.

SYNOPSIS

At past midnight on 28 September 1996, while Five Star Passenger Bus with plate No. ABS-793 bound
for Bolinao from Manila was travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, two felons announced a hold-up
and thereafter divested the passengers of their money and valuables and the bus conductor of his collections
of the fares of the passengers. On the occasion of the robbery, the two felons shot to death SPO1 Jose C. Manio,
Jr. despite the latter's pleas for mercy. Rodolfo Cacatian, the bus driver, and Romulo Digap, the bus conductor,
identified Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan as the perpetrators of the crime. The two accused were
charged, tried and subsequently found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and were each sentenced
to death. In rendering judgment against the two accused, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and rejected accused's defense of alibi.
Hence, this automatic review.
Among others, accused-appellants assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They contended
that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify them as the perpetrators of the crime charged.
The Court found the contention of accused-appellants unmeritorious. It held that it is the most natural
reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe
the manner in which the crime was committed. Here, the Court found that both prosecution witnesses had a
good look at both appellants before, during and after they staged the robbery and before they alighted from
the bus. The evidence on record showed that Romulo stationed himself by the door of the bus located in the
mid-section of the vehicle. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the passengers' seat near the center aisle,
while Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter or so from Romulo. Romulo, Juan and Victor were,
therefore, near each other. Moreover, Juan had a face-to-face encounter with Romulo because he had divested
the latter of his collection of the fares from the passengers. After shooting SPO1 Manio, Jr. at the rear portion
of the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was standing and gave their instructions to him. Rodolfo,
on the other hand, looked many times on the rear, side and center view mirrors to observe the center and rear
portions of the bus before and during the robbery, Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor stage the robbery and kill
the victim with impunity. Thus, the Court held that the trial court committed no error in convicting appellants
of robbery with homicide. Nevertheless, it modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. According to the Court,
although treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide
was killed by treachery, the same cannot be appreciated against appellants because it was not alleged in the
information. aITDAE

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-
EXAMINE THE WITNESSES; MAY BE WAIVED EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY; ACTUAL CROSS-EXAMINATION NOT
NECESSARILY REQUIRED BUT MERELY AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE IF
DESIRED. — The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due process.
It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However,
the right has always been understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an
opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. What is proscribed by statutory norm and
jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. The right is a personal one and may
be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to
himself alone. If by his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the
witnesses against him, his right to cross-examine is impliedly waived. The testimony given on direct examination
of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ALLEGED DENIAL OF THE RIGHT. — Juan
and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered its decision to allow
them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was rendered against them by the trial
court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order
of the trial court dated January 20, 1998 declaring that they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It
was only on appeal to this Court that Juan and Victor averred for the first time that they were deprived of their
right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to do so. The doctrine of estoppel
states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking
when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard
to speak when he should be silent.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IT IS THE MOST NATURAL REACTION OF VICTIMS OF
VIOLENCE TO STRIVE TO SEE THE APPEARANCE OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME AND TO OBSERVE THE
MANNER IN WHICH THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED. — The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that
Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify them as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial
court, thus: . . . . The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan
and Victor suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he and Rodolfo
failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery was taking place. The Court has
held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance
of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime was committed.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLANATION OF HOW ONE HAS
COME INTO POSSESSION OF STOLEN EFFECTS BELONGING TO A PERSON WOUNDED AND TREACHEROUSLY
KILLED, HE MUST NECESSARILY BE CONSIDERED THE AUTHOR OF THE AGGRESSION AND DEATH OF THE SAID
PERSON AND OF THE ROBBERY COMMITTED. — Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on
October 25, 1997 in Tarlac, Tarlac, Juan was in possession of the identification card of the slain police officer.
Juan failed to explain to the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into possession of said
identification card. Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio,
Jr. In People v. Mantung, we held: . . . [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest
gave rise to a legal presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, '[I]n the absence of an explanation of how
one has come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must
necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and of the robbery
committed on him.' IcaHCS
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; NO LAW OR POLICE REGULATION REQUIRING A POLICE LINE-UP FOR
PROPER IDENTIFICATION IN EVERY CASE; CASE AT BAR. — While police investigators did not place Juan and
Victor in a police line-up for proper identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that
absent such line-up, their identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide
was unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every
case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such
identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. In this case, there is no evidence that
the police officers had supplied or even suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as
the perpetrators of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; ELEMENTS. — The Court finds that the trial court
committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery with homicide. . . . To warrant the conviction of
Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was burdened to prove the confluence of the following
essential elements: . . . (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein
used in a generic sense, was committed . . . .
7. ID.; ID.; INTENT TO ROB MUST PRECEDE THE TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE. — The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life. In robbery with homicide, so long as the intention of the felons was to rob,
the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
8. ID.; ID.; COMMITTED EVEN IF THE VICTIM OF ROBBERY IS OTHER THAN THE VICTIM OF THE HOMICIDE.
— Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion of or by
reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. All
the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on September 9,
1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, et al. We see, therefore, that in order to
determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and
January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, pp. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal
speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907;
April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration
(Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, pp. 501-502).
9. ID.; ID.; ALL THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN THE ROBBERY WILL BE HELD GUILTY THEREOF ALTHOUGH
THEY DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE HOMICIDE, UNLESS IT APPEARS THAT THEY ENDEAVORED TO PREVENT THE
HOMICIDE. — Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery
with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide. In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor
conspired and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and valuables
and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity on the
occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty as principals by direct participation of the felony
of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. aIETCA
10. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the
felony of robbery with homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
11. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS. — The Court agrees with the trial court
that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPRECIATED EVEN IF VICTIM WAS WARNED OF THE DANGER TO HIS LIFE WHERE HE
WAS DEFENSELESS AND UNABLE TO FLEE AT TIME OF THE INFLICTION OF THE COUP DE GRACE; CASE AT BAR.
— Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was
defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim
suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right
breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were
armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life.
When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim
was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his
family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his
fellowmen.
13. ID.; PENALTIES; TREACHERY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE PROPER PENALTY. — Article 62, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances
shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime
specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty
therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. Under paragraph 2 of the
law, the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a
degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. Treachery is not an element of robbery
with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in
defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not
inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
 14. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY INCREASES THE PENALTY FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE ABSENT
ANY GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE. — In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime
against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is
applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a
crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance. ASHaDT
15. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY SHALL BE APPRECIATED AGAINST ALL THE FELONS WHO HAD KNOWLEDGE OF
THE MANNER OF KILLING OF VICTIMS OF HOMICIDE. — Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, provides that circumstances which consist
in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or
mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act
or their cooperation therein. The circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons
participating in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the means employed. The latter has a direct
bearing upon the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of the commission
of the crime or of their cooperation thereon. Accordingly, the Spanish Supreme Court held in its Sentencia dated
December 17, 1875 that where two or more persons perpetrate the crime of robbery with homicide, the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated against all of the felons who had knowledge of the
manner of the killing of victims of homicide.
16. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY CANNOT AGGRAVATE THE PENALTY FOR THE CRIME IF NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION EVEN IF PROVEN DURING THE TRIAL. — Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated
against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads: Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.
— The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in the
Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because it is more favorable to the
accused. Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate the
penalty for the crime.
17. ID.; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; CIVIL LIABILITY OF ACCUSED. — Since the penalty imposed on Juan
and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having
testified on the factual basis thereof. Considering that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled
to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig that the retroactive
application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should not impair the right of the
heirs to exemplary damages which had already accrued when the crime was committed prior to the effectivity
of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly and severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount of
P30,000.00 as actual damages, the prosecution having adduced evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs
are not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by them during the wake as such expenses are not supported by
receipts. However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00.
The service firearm of the victim was turned over to the Evidence Custodian of the Caloocan City Police Station
per order of the trial court on October 22, 1997. The prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to
prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However,
in lieu of actual damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P3,000.00.
18. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; LOST EARNING CAPACITY; COMPUTATION. — The heirs are likewise entitled
to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on
August 25, 1958. He was killed on September 28, 1996 at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly salary as a
member of the Philippine National Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs
are entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim computed, thus:
Age of the victim = 38 years old
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the victim at the time of death)
= 2/3 x (80-38)
= 2/3 x 42
 = 28 years
Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months
= P8,065.00 x 12
= P96,780.00
Living Expenses = 50% of Gross Annual Income
= P96,780.00 x 0.5
= P48,390.00
Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual
Income-Living expenses]
= 28 x [P96,780.00 - P48,390.00]
= 28 x P48,390.00
= P1,354,920.00
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously. The Supreme Court of
Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision 1 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering
them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual
and moral damages and to pay to Five Star Bus, Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts
The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus
bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan.
Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile,
Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were
wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets. 2 Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in
the middle row of the passengers' seats, while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside
Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at the rear portion
of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number
769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors
installed atop the driver's seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers
of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was travelling along
the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced
a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror towards the passengers' seat and saw Juan and Victor
armed with handguns. Juan fired his gun upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit
and fired his gun upward. Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and
valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The felons then went to the
place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr.
brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898. 3 Juan and Victor took the identification card of the police
officer as well as his service gun and told him: "Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and
papatay sa iyo." The police officer pleaded for mercy: "Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako." However,
Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side
of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan then moved
towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the
bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng
manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito." Victor and Juan further told Rodolfo that
after they (Victor and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he (Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and
not report the incident along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow their instructions,
he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga
where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.
 When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the incident
to the police authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral parlor where Dr. Alejandro
D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of
the police officer. The doctor prepared and signed an autopsy report detailing the wounds sustained by the
police officer and the cause of his death:
"Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance
wounds and 6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located on his right side. An entrance (0.5 cm
x 0.5 cm.) located infront of the right ear exited at the left side just below the ear lobe. Another
entrance through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput with an
opening of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came out. Another fatal bullet entered
at the upper right cornea of the sternum, entered the chest cavity pierced the heart and left
lung and exited at the left axillary line. Severe hemorrhage in the chest cavity came from the
heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets entered the right side and exited on the same side. One
entrance at the top of the right shoulder exited at the medial side of the right arm. The other
entered above the right breast and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall travelling below
muscles and subcutaneous tissues without entering the cavities. Lastly another bullet entered
above the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above the right inguinal line.
Cause of Death:
Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and
injury to the heart and left lung caused by multiple gunshot wounds." 4
Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported the
robbery and gave their respective sworn statements. 5 SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his wife Rosario Manio
and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin and P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the
slain police officer. 6 Manio, Jr. was 38 years old when he died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month. 7
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the team
leader of Alert Team No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at the police checkpoint
along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time, the Bambang-Concepcion bridge was closed to traffic
and the police officers were tasked to divert traffic to the Sta. Rosa road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab
without any plate number on its front fender came to view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who
turned out to be the accused Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his identification card. Juan told Meneses that he
was a policeman and handed over to Meneses the identification card of SPO1 Manio, Jr. and the money which
Juan and Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist on September 28, 1996. 8 Meneses became suspicious
when he noted that the identification card had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the latter
had a new pay slip. Juan could not produce any. He finally confessed to Meneses that he was not a policeman.
Meneses brought Juan to the police station. When police officers frisked Juan for any deadly weapon, they
found five live bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The police officers confiscated the ammunition. In
the course of the investigation, Juan admitted to the police investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo,
staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus and are responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel,
Bulacan. Meneses and Ferrer executed their joint affidavit of arrest of Juan. 9 Juan was subsequently turned
over to the Plaridel Police Station where Romulo identified him through the latter's picture as one of those who
robbed the passengers of the Five Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1 Manio, Jr. on September 28,
1996. In the course of their investigation, the Plaridel Police Station Investigators learned that Victor was a
native of Laoang, Northern Samar. 10 On April 4, 1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and
Victor Acuyan with robbery with homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Information
reads:
That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed
with firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with one (1)
necklace and cash in [the] undetermine[d] amount of one SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said undetermine[d] amount; that
simultaneously or on the occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused by means of violence and
intimidation and in furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and shoot with the service
 firearm of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which
resulted (sic) the death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.
Contrary to law. 11
On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang, Northern Samar and
had him incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro Osorio, their counsel de parte, Juan
and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After
the prosecution had rested its case on August 26, 1998, Juan escaped from the provincial jail. 12 The trial court
issued a bench warrant on September 22, 1998 for the arrest of said accused-appellant. 13 In the meantime,
Victor adduced his evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he worked as a
tire man in the vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by Tony Boy Negro. On one occasion,
Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered Victor to sell a tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn
over the proceeds of the sale to Ilarde. The latter hated Victor for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished
and after two months of employment, Victor returned to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On
September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his friends, Joseph Iringco
and Rickey Lorcio were having a drinking spree in the house of Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the
three left the house of the barangay captain and attended the public dance at the town auditorium. Victor and
his friends left the auditorium at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that he never met
Juan until his arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in said provincial jail was
Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star Bus and the killing of
SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the proceeds of the sale of the latter's
tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte. 14 However, he no longer adduced
any evidence in his behalf.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of death and ordered them to pay
P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim and to pay the Five Star Bus Company the
amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and hereby sentences both to suffer the supreme penalty of
Death and to indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the amount of P300,000.00
as actual and moral damages and to pay the Five Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual damage.
SO ORDERED. 15
Assignment of Errors
Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO DIGAP, DRIVER
AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY
THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND KILLED ONE PASSENGER THEREOF AT
AROUND 3:00 O'CLOCK IN THE EARLY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. 16
The Court's Verdict
Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a reversible
error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of the crime charged. They
aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with
and terminate his cross-examination of the said witness through no fault of his as the witness failed to appear
in subsequent proceedings. They assert that even if the testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be
considered, the two witnesses were so petrified during the robbery that they were not able to look at the felons
and hence could not positively identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. They argue that the
police investigators never conducted a police line-up for the identification of the authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis for their claim
that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully cross-examine Rodolfo. The
Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. 17 It is a statutory
right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused
has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always
been understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise
the right to cross-examine if desired. 18 What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the
absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. 19 The right is a personal one and may be waived expressly or
impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. 20 If by his
actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his
right to cross-examine is impliedly waived. 21 The testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record. 22
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the presentation
by the prosecution of its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and December 5, 1997, both at 9:00
a.m. 23 Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November 18, 1997. The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith
commenced his cross-examination of the witness but because of the manifestation of said counsel that he
cannot finish his cross-examination, the court ordered the continuation thereof to December 5, 1997. 24 On
December 5, 1997, Rodolfo did not appear before the court for the continuation of his cross-examination but
Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim did. The prosecution presented her as witness. Her testimony was
terminated. The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the cross-examination of Rodolfo on January 20,
1998 at 8:30 a.m. 25 During the trial on January 20, 1998, Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants' counsel
was absent. The court issued an order declaring that for failure of said counsel to appear before the court for
his cross-examination of Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived their right to continue with the cross-examination of
said witness. 26 During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor appeared but did not
move for a reconsideration of the court's order dated January 20, 1998 and for the recall of Rodolfo Cacatian
for further cross-examination. It behooved counsel for Juan and Victor to file said motion and pray that the trial
court order the recall of Rodolfo on the witness stand. Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and supinely
wait for the prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the recall of said witness. Indeed, the Court held
in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:
xxx xxx xxx
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party
who wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the
intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a
renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move
to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to
schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure
that his deponents are cross-examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to
his opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the
burden of the case on plaintiff's shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in
the instant proceedings. 27
The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the non-availability of
the other witnesses of the prosecution. 28 On March 31, 1998, the prosecution presented Dr. Alejandro
Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial on April 17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and
Victor failed to appear. The trial was reset to June 3, 19 and 26, 1998. 29 The trial scheduled on June 3, 1998
was cancelled due to the absence of the counsel of Juan and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty.
Roberto Ramirez as counsel for accused-appellants. 30
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and Victor. The prosecution
rested its case after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally offered its documentary evidence.
The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. 31 On November 11, 1998, Juan and Victor
commenced the presentation of their evidence with the testimony of Victor. 32 They rested their case on
January 27, 1999 without any evidence adduced by Juan.
 Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered its
decision to allow them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was rendered against
them by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the
nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1998 declaring that they had waived their right to
cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this Court that Juan and Victor averred for the first time that
they were deprived of their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to
do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity
will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he
ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent. 33
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify them
as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:
As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on
September 28, 1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo
Cacatian, bound to Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes or
so later, when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the North
Expressway, the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up.
Simultaneously with the announcement of a hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan,
meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the back. Both then went on to take the money
and valuables of the passengers, including the bus conductor's collections in the amount of
P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the back telling him in the vernacular
"Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." They pointed their
guns at him and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their victim. After the
shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the front portion of
the bus behind the driver's seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how
easy it was to kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon reaching
the Mexico overpass of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The driver
drove the bus to the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the
investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a
policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of the Caloocan City Police Department.
The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and
conductor, respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus. 34

The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan and Victor
suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he and Rodolfo failed to
have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery was taking place. The Court has held in
a catena of cases that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime was committed. 35 Rodolfo and Romulo
had a good look at both Juan and Victor before, during and after they staged the robbery and before they
alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows that when Juan and Victor boarded the bus and while the
said vehicle was on its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself by the door of the bus located in the
mid-section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the
passengers' seat near the center aisle while Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter or so from
Romulo. 36 Romulo, Juan and Victor were near each other. Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of
the fares from the passengers. 37 Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. After shooting SPO1
Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was standing and gave their
instructions to him. Considering all the facts and circumstances, there is no iota of doubt that Romulo saw and
recognized Juan and Victor before, during and after the heist. 38 Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side
and center view mirrors to observe the center and rear portions of the bus before and during the robbery.
Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor stage the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the firing of the gun?
A Yes, sir.
Q And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still said bad words before saying the
hold-up?
A After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.
Q Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up you do not have any idea that you
will encounter that nature which took place, is that correct?
A None, sir.
Q Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the route of Manila to Bolinao that
was your first experience of hold-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your total attention is focus in front of the
road, correct, Mr. witness?
A Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and the rear view mirror, sir.
Q Before the announcement there was no reason for you to look at any at the rear mirror
correct, Mr. witness?
Court:
Every now and then they usually look at the side mirror and on the rear, that was his
statement.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q I am asking him if there was no reason for him. . . .
Fiscal:
Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no mention.
Court:
Every now and then.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr. witness?
A I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror once in a while, sir.
Q How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?
A Four (4), sir.
Q Where are these located?
A Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view mirror, sir.
Q The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?
A Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.
Q One of them is located on the left and the other on the right, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You only look at the side mirror when you are going to over take, Mr. witness?
A No, sir.
Q Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?
A In the center, sir.
Q What is the purpose of that?
A So that I can see the passengers if they are already settled so that I can start the engine, sir.
Q What about the remaining mirror?
A Rear view mirror, sir.
Q What is the purpose and where is it located?
A The rear view is located just above my head just to check the passengers, sir.
Q So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has the same purpose?
A They are different, sir.
Q How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?
A The center mirror is used to check the center aisle while the rear mirror is for the whole
view of the passengers, sir.
Q If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you will never see any passengers,
correct, Mr. witness?
A None, sir.
Q If you will look at your center mirror you will only see the aisle and you will never see any
portion of the body of your passengers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Seated passengers?
A It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.
Q If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top portion of the head of your
passengers, correct?
A. Only the portion of their head because they have different hight (sic), sir.
Q You will never see any head of your passengers if they were seated from the rear mirror
portion, correct, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your passengers were actually sleeping?
A Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were not, sir.
Q But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said every now and then you are using your
mirror? It is only a glance, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able to identify any person on the basis of
any of your mirror, correct?
A If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize him, sir.
Q You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by glancing, as a driver, Mr. witness by
your side mirror?
A Not all glancing, there are times when you want to recognize a person you look at him
intently, sir.
Q The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly of the safety of your passengers on
board, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your mirror to identify the person
particularly when you are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour?
A I do that, sir.
Q How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any of these mirror before getting back
your eyes into the main road?
A Seconds only, sir.
Q When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr. witness that you can do to fix your eyes
on any of your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes into the main road?
A Two seconds, sir.
Q At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at about 70 kilometers you were glancing
every now and then on any of your mirrors at about two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you heard the announcement of hold-up your natural reaction is to look either at
the center mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate your speed upon the
announcement of hold-up?
A No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular "alalay ka lang, steady ka lang."
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Steady at what speed?
A 70 to 80, sir.
Q What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses along North Expressway?
A 60 kilometers, sir.
Q Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is what you know within the two (2) years that you are driving? Along the North
Expressway?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were at the precise moment, Mr. witness, you were being instructed to
continue driving, you were not looking to anybody except focus yours eyes in front of
the road?
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q That's what you are doing?
A During the time they were gathering the money from my passengers, that is the time when
I look at them, sir.
Q For two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at within two seconds, Mr. witness you
said you are nakikiramdam?
A The rear view mirror, sir.
Q The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?
A Ordinary bus, sir.
 Q And at what time your passengers, most of your passengers were already sleep (sic), Mr.
witness?
A Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers were still sleep (sic), sir.
Q And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr. witness?
A The lights were on, sir.
Q While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was still on, Mr. witness, at the time of the
trip.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced and then when you look for two
seconds in the rear mirror you were not able to see any one, you were only sensing
what is happening inside your bus?
A I saw something, sir.
Q You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only see inside when you are going to look
at the mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is the only thing that you see every now and then, you said you were looking at the
mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness at the rear mirror during the entire
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up?
A There were many times, sir.
Q The most that you can remember, please inform the Honorable Court? During the
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A I cannot estimate, sir.
Q How long did the alleged hold-up took place?
A More or less 25 minutes, sir. 39
When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan after the robbery,
he described the felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could identify the robbers if he see them
again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up sa
minamaneho mong bus?
S: Halos magkasing taas, 5'4" o 5'5" katam-taman ang pangangatawan, parehong
nakapantalon ng maong nakasuot ng jacket na maong, parehong naka rubber
shoes at pareho ring naka sumbrero.
9. T: Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay makikilala mo pa sila?
S: Makikilala ko po sila. 40
When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo spontaneously pointed to and identified
Juan and Victor:
Fiscal:
(to the witness)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up inside the bus and who fired the gun
are they inside the Court room (sic) today?
A Yes, ma'am.
 Q Point to us?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and when asked his name answered Victor
Acuyan and the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his name answered Juan
Gonzales. 41
For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor as the culprits
when asked by the prosecutor to identify the robbers from among those in the courtroom:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how does (sic) the robbing took place?
A They announced a hold up ma'am, afterwards, they confiscated the money of the
passengers including my collections.
Q You said "they" who announced the hold up, whose (sic) these "they" you are referring to?
A Those two (2), ma'am.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your Honor.
Court:
(to both accused)
What are your names?
A Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.
Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he just said
Juan Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can change, Your
Honor. 42
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in Tarlac, Tarlac, Juan
was in possession of the identification card 43 of the slain police officer. Juan failed to explain to the trial court
how and under what circumstances he came into possession of said identification card. Juan must necessarily
be considered the author of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. In People v. Mantung, 44 we held:
. . . [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise
to a legal presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, '[I]n the absence of an explanation of
how one has come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and
treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death
of the said person and of the robbery committed on him.'
While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper identification by
Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up, their identification by Romulo
and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was unreliable. There is no law or police regulation
requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could
still be proper and reliable identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the
witness by the police. 45 In this case, there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied or even suggested
to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators of the robbery and the killing of
SPO1 Manio, Jr. IcAaSD
The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor
The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery with
homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, reads:
 Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. — Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was burdened to prove
the confluence of the following essential elements:
. . . (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent
to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the
crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. . . . 46
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. 47 In robbery with homicide, so long as the
intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In People v.
Barut, 48 the Court held that:
In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with
homicide "cuando con motivo o con ocasión del robo resultare homicidio". "Basta que entre
aquel este exista una relación, meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el homicidio se cometa
como medio de ejecución del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intención de matar, el delito existe
según constanta jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte
sobreviniere por mero accidente, siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasión
del robo, siendo indiferente que la muerte sea anterior, coetánea o posterior a éste" (2 Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14th Ed. P. 872).
Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion of or
by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on September
9, 1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, et al. 49
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in
2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the
accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886;
October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889
— see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with
homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent
the homicide. 50
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired and
confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and valuables and Romulo
of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity on the occasion of
the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery
with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death.
The Proper Penalty
The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with homicide,
defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with reclusion perpetua. Under Article
63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons should be meted the supreme penalty of death when the
crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any
mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not specify in the decretal portion of its decision the aggravating
circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime mandating the imposition of the death penalty.
However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the body of the decision of the trial court that it
imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on the
occasion of or by reason of the robbery:
xxx xxx xxx
The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human
life. After stripping the passengers of their money and valuables, including the firearm of the
victim, they came to decide to execute the latter seemingly because he was a police officer.
They lost no time pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at him and,
in a derisive and humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the trigger, that they were rather
sorry but they are going to kill him with his own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired
point blank at the hapless policeman who was practically on his knees begging for his life.
Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that killing
a man is like killing a chicken ("Parang pumapatay ng manok"). Escote, in particular, is a class
by himself in callousness. . . . . 51
The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There
is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. 52 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim
was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of
the coup de grace. 53 In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right
ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one
above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and
then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at
close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work.
Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim
example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance
in robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be appreciated against Juan and
Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has ruled over the years 54 that treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito
especial complejo) and at the same time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible). 55 However, this
Court in two cases has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which
is appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. 56 It held in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape precisely because
robbery with rape is a crime against property. 57 These rulings of the Court find support in case law that in
robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery
being the main purpose and object of the criminal. 58 Indeed, in People vs. Cando, 59 two distinguished
members of this Court advocated a review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance
in robbery with homicide. They opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all,
in People vs. Bariquit, 60 this Court in aper curiam decision promulgated in year 2000 declared that treachery is
applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in People vs. Cando that treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide,
treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This Court
opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year in People vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not in full
accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only in crimes against
persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code. 61 Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion
that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. 62 However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is
of a different view. 63 He says that treachery cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar
as the killing is concerned, citing the decisions of this Court in People vs. Balagtas 64 for the purpose of
determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery.
 It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force in Spain, as
amended by the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines. The Penal Code of 1887 in the
Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the Revised Penal Code, which was enacted and published
in Spanish. In construing the Old Penal Code and the Revised Penal Code, this Court had accorded respect and
persuasive, if not conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing
the 1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870. 65
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and the Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870 of Spain which reads:
Art. 10 . . . 2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete
cualquiera de los delitos contra las personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la
ejecucion que tiendan directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona, que
proceda de la defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. . . .
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of Spain
and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the words "las personas" (the
persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Revised Penal Code, the words "the person" are
used.
Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as enumerated
in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Supreme Court of Spain
has consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide, classified as a crime against property. Citing
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Cuello Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says
that despite the strict and express reference of the penal code to treachery being applicable to persons,
treachery also applies to other crimes such as robbery with homicide: 66
Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla en
los que no perteneciendo a este titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo
con homicidio, y en el homicidio del Jefe del Estado que es un delito contra la seguridad interior
del Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los delitos contra las personas
no es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en el homicidio, pues como su
concurrencia lo cualifica lo transforma en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en el homicidio
consentido (art. 409), ni en la riña tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en el infanticidio (art. 410). . . . . 67
Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra personas) and also
in robbery with homicide (robo con homicidio). 68
"Contra las personas. — Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los
delitos provistos desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con homicidio,
atentario, a la vez que contra la propriedad, contra la persona."
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying
circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated September 11, 1878, the
word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic sense. 69
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty
for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which
in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime
and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty. 70 Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating
circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.
 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the
penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in
the crime to such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially
punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing
the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery
should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the
proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with homicide. The high court
of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since
treachery is not a constitutive element of the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime,
without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court
of Spain was not impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property.
Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of robbery with homicide as a crime against property is
irrelevant and inconsequential in the application of treachery. It further declared that it would be futile to argue
that in crimes against property such as robbery with homicide, treachery would have no application. This is so,
the high tribunal ruled, because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is
not only an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):
. . . que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni es constitutiva del delito complejo de
robo y homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no pueda cometerse, sin que quepa arguir
que en los delitos contra la propiedad no debe aquella tener aplicacion, porque cuando estos
son complejos de los que se cometen contra las personas, no solo se ataca a la propiedad, sino
que se ofende a estas. . . . 71

In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide,
the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent
crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide"
and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a
special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the victim of robbery
is killed with treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide:
. . . que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en matar a un
conocido suyo, compañero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron cautelosamente los carros que
guiaban, en uno de los cuales iba el interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que conducia a un
aljibon, y al llegar a este, valiendose de engaño para hacer bajar a dicho interfecto, se lanzaron
de improviso sobre el, tirandolo en tierra, robandole el dinero, la manta y los talegos que
llevaba, y atandole al pie una piedra de mucho peso, le arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados
estos hechos, no cabe duda que constituyen el delito complejo del art. 516, num. I, con la
circunstancia agravante de alevosia, puesto que los medios, forma y modos empleados en la
ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus autores,
procedente de la defensa del ofendido. 72
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim
of homicide is killed by treachery.
 On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, 73 provides that circumstances which
consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate
or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the
act or their cooperation therein. The circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the
persons participating in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the means employed. The latter has a
direct bearing upon the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of the
commission of the crime or of their cooperation thereon. 74 Accordingly, the Spanish Supreme Court held in
its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that where two or more persons perpetrate the crime of robbery with
homicide, the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated against all of the felons who
had knowledge of the manner of the killing of victims of homicide, with the ratiocination that:
. . . si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un homicidio simple con motivo ú ocasión del
robo para la imposicion de la pena del art. 516, num. I, no puede sere ni aun discutible que,
concurriendo la agravante de alevosia, se aumente la criminalidad de los delincuentes; siendo
aplicable a todos los autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es circunstancia que afecte a la
personalidad del delincuente, de las que habla el art. 80 del Codigo penal en su primera parte,
sino que consiste en la ejecusion material del hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a
cabo, cuando de ellos tuvieron conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el concierto
previo y con las condiciones establecidad en la segunda parte del citado articulo. 75
Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the
same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedures which reads:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged
in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to
the accused. 76 Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate
the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with homicide, Juan
and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Juan and Victor
The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The court did
not specify whether the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the victim, moral damages and
the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP. The Court shall thus modify the awards granted by
the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are entitled
to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the factual basis thereof. 77 Considering that treachery
aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court
held in People vs. Catubig 78 that the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary damages which had already accrued
when the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly and
severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages, the prosecution having
adduced evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs are not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by them
during the wake as such expenses are not supported by receipts. 79 However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00. 80 The service firearm of the victim was turned
over to the Evidence Custodian of the Caloocan City Police Station per order of the trial court on October 22,
1997. 81 The prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in the
amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However, in lieu of actual damages, the bus company
is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P3,000.00. 82
 The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on record
shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September 28, 1996 at the age of 38.
He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the Philippine National Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual
salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs are entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of
the victim computed, thus:
Age of the victim = 38 years old
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the victim at the time of death)
= 2/3 x (80-38)
= 2/3 x 42
= 28 years
Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months
= P8,065.00 x 12
= P96,780.00
Living Expenses = 50% of Gross Annual Income
= P96,780.00 x 0.5
= P48,390.00
Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-
Living expenses]
= 28 x [P96,780.00 - P48,390.00]
= 28 x P48,390.00
= P1,354,920.00
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan are hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes
on each of them the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost earnings, P30,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the Five Star Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said
corporation is awarded the amount of P3,000.00 as temperate damages. IDAaCc
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO A. CARATAO, appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Appellant was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Edgardo Bulawin. He interposed the
defense of self-defense to exculpate himself, but the trial court did not appreciate the same. Consequently, the
trial court found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court ruled that at the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful
aggression committed against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand
on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person
claiming self-defense. In the case at bar, the unlawful aggression was convincingly established to have emanated
from appellant, and not from the victim. Appellant having failed to discharge the burden of establishing his
defense, his conviction necessarily follows on the basis of his admission of the killing.
The Court further ruled that the killing in the case at bar was not attended by treachery for failure of the
prosecution's evidence to prove the presence of the second element, namely, that appellant deliberately
adopted the mode of attack. However, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court held that the crime committed is
homicide, not murder.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF EVIDENCE; SHIFTS ON THE ACCUSED CLAIMING SELF-
DEFENSE. — [W]here an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability,
he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction
would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. This is known as a shift in the burden of the evidence,
and as a result thereof the person claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecution's. Furthermore, on appeal, appellant must show that the court below
committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; ELEMENTS. — To prove self-defense,
the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the victim committed unlawful aggression
amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there
was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any
provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim's aggression.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION DETERMINES THE APPRECIATION OF SELF-
DEFENSE. — At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed
against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. Unlawful aggression
refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-
defense.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES ARE ENTITLED
TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN THE ABSENCE OF ILL MOTIVE TO FALSELY TESTIFY AGAINST ACCUSED. — [W]here
there is no evidence that the principal witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motives, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. HCSAIa
5. ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES IN THE NARRATION OF WITNESSES ON
MINOR DETAILS OF THE CASE. — There may have been inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution
witnesses on minor details, but these do not affect the weight of their testimonies, as these cannot be expected
to be uniform to the last details. In fact, a perfectly dovetailing narration by different witnesses could mean that
their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on
material points.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS THEREON BY TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — As to
who between the prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be believed, the trial court's assessment enjoys
a great amount of respect for the reason that the trial court has the advantage of observing the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testify, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded. In the present case, appellant
failed to point out any arbitrariness on the part of the trial court.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS. — Treachery is present when
two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. In the case
at bar, the first element was established by the fact that appellant suddenly attacked from behind the
unsuspecting and unarmed victim who was then astride his motorcycle. However, we find the prosecution's
evidence insufficient to sustain the finding of the presence of the second element, namely, that appellant
deliberately adopted the mode of attack.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE APPRECIATED WHEN KILLING IS DONE AT THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT; CASE
AT BAR. — [C]hance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, or those that
were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the
accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack. In the present case, it appears from the evidence
that appellant's grudge against the victim was brought about only moments before the attack, when the latter
ignored his repeated pleas for rice. As observed by the trial court, the sight of the victim leaving the compound
without heeding appellant's request must have worsened his anger. In his testimony, appellant admitted that
at that moment, he "forgot himself." Further, he explained that it was then customary for him to bring a knife
for his own safety, in defense against lawless elements in their area at the time. It was thus only by chance and
not by plan that he attacked the victim the way he did. The stabbing was evidently a result of a rash and
impetuous impulse of the moment arising from what appellant perceived to be an unjust act of the victim, rather
than from a deliberated action. Hence, as the killing was done at the spur of the moment, treachery cannot be
appreciated.
9. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; ELEMENTS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
— [W]e find the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender present in the case at bar. To benefit an
accused, the following requisites of this circumstance must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually
been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. In the present case, based on SPO4 Capablanca's testimony, appellant's surrender at the station
immediately after the incident was spontaneous, showing his intent to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities. He expressly acknowledged having killed the victim, surrendered his knife, and allowed himself to
be detained in prison.
10. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES, CIVIL INDEMNITY AND MORAL DAMAGES, AWARDED IN
CASE AT BAR. — [W]e affirm the award of actual damages in the amount of P22,050, as these are duly
substantiated by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake and
burial of the victim. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is likewise sustained, pursuant to
controlling case law. However, we increase the award of moral damages to a more reasonable amount of
P30,000, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
11. ID.; ID.; INDEMNIFICATION FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY, HOW COMPUTED. — [T]he heirs of the
victim are also entitled to indemnification for the loss of the latter's earning capacity. In a recent case, we
explained how to arrive at the amount of this indemnity, thus: "The following factors should be considered in
determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would have
otherwise lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed
using the formula adopted in the American Combined Experience Table of Mortality: 2/3 x (80 — age at death).
The rate of loss is arrived at by multiplying life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses. The net earning is ordinarily pegged at fifty percent of the gross earnings."
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Evidence on record reveals that the victim died at the age of 41, and
that he was earning an annual gross income of P37,432 from his employment with NALCO. The widow's
testimony regarding the victim's income from his sideline cannot be considered for lack of the necessary
unbiased proof. Thus, applying the above-cited formula, appellant should pay the victim's heirs P486,616 as
shown by the following computation: 2/3 [80 — 41 (age at the time of death)] =26 (life expectancy) 26 x [P37,432
x 50% (annual net income)]= P486,616.
AZCUNA, J p:

Sergio A. Caratao appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libertad, Butuan City, Branch
3, in Criminal Case No. 5143, dated December 22, 1995, finding him guilty of murder, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings of facts and law, with the
attendan[ce] of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the court finds the accused Sergio
A. Caratao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code. Republic Act No. 7659 defining heinous crimes was not yet passed and effective at
the time of the commission of the crime. Accused Sergio A. Caratao is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided for in Art. 41,
Revised Penal Code. Further, the knife used in the commission of the crime is hereby declared
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Edgardo "Tado" Bulawin, the following:
(1) P50,000.00 — for the death of Edgardo "Tado" Bulawin;
(2) P22,050.00 — as actual damages; and —
(3) P20,000.00 — as moral damages.
And also to pay the costs. 1
On July 21, 1992, appellant was charged under an amended information, thus:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1992, at, more or less, 4:20 o'clock in the evening,
at Nalco Commissary Compound, Hill Top Village, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-name[d] accused, armed with a
bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery and with
cruelty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Edgardo
Bulawin, thus inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code). 2
Upon his arraignment on August 11, 1992, appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. 3 Trial thereafter ensued and the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
The prosecution relies on the eyewitness accounts of Martin Sugala, Eugenio Agudera and Roberto
Mangmang. The widow of the deceased, Moreta Bulawin, testified to prove civil damages. Their testimonies are
summarized below.
Martin Sugala, a rice dispatching checker employed with Nasipit Agusan Lumber Company (NALCO) at
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, testified that at around 4:00 p.m., appellant and his wife entered the commissary
canteen of NALCO. Appellant's wife approached Sugala and told him that her husband was angry. Sugala asked
appellant about this. Appellant replied, saying that he was not given additional rice vale by the victim Edgardo
"Tado" Bulawin, NALCO's rice vale issuer. After checking that there was extra rice available, Sugala assured
appellant that he would give him an additional 25 kilos.
Shortly thereafter, Sugala saw the victim walk out of the canteen. Sensing that appellant was about to
rush to the victim, the witness restrained him and said, "Do not do anything harsh because we are all brothers
here, anyway I am giving you [an] additional 25 kilos of rice." He placed his arm around appellant and
accompanied him to the issuing area for the additional rice. Upon reaching the issuing area, he first checked the
rice being issued to two employees. After this, he noticed that appellant was no longer near him. Through the
canteen's screened windows, he next saw appellant standing one meter behind the victim, who was then
already astride his motorbike. About 5 meters from Sugala's position, the victim's motorbike was facing towards
the exit gate, with its engine already running. 4 At that moment, he saw appellant attack the victim from behind:
Q. What did you observe next?
 A. When I saw that Sergio Caratao was already about 1 meter away from the back of Edgardo
Bulawin, I shouted to him saying "Bay, your rice is ready." At that moment, I saw that
the left hand of Caratao was on the shoulder of Bulawin and his right hand was on the
side of Bulawin. I thought he only boxed the latter.
Q. Aside from thrusting his hand at the side of Bulawin, what else if any did you see Caratao do
with his hand?
A. When the right hand was on the side of Bulawin, it was retracted very fast and I saw that
that hand was holding a knife, and [that he] immediately made another thrust towards
here. (witness pointing to his nose)
ATTY. GONZALES:
With the permission of the Court, may we request the witness to re-enact what [he] actually
saw, and we request the jail guard to act as the victim.
COURT:
Okay.
INTERPRETER:
(Jail guard Meode being requested to act as Edgardo Bulawin and the witness as accused
Sergio Caratao.)
(Edgardo Bulawin made an initial stance as if riding on a motorcycle with both hands on the
handle bars of the motorcycle.)
ATTY. GONZALES:
Q. Where was Caratao when you first saw him, how far was he?
A. This distance, [S]ir. (witness demonstrating a distance of about 1 meter from the back of
Bulawin)
Q. Then re-enact what you saw.
A. After I shouted "Bay, your rice is ready," I saw Sergio Caratao, in a simultaneous action, place
his left hand on the left shoulder of Bulawin and the right hand of Caratao on the right
side of Bulawin. When Sergio Caratao withdrew his right hand from the right side of
Bulawin, I saw that the right hand has a knife in it, and a second thrusting motion was
made towards the face of Bulawin. After that, Bulawin got off from his motorcycle and
ran towards the cemented road. Sergio Caratao remained standing on the place of the
incident still holding that knife, and after that, Caratao and his wife went home. 5
Sugala also recalled seeing many people at the scene of the incident, such as some NALCO employees,
security guards, and outsiders who buy rice from the canteen called the blackmarketers. 6
Roberto Mangmang, canteen dispatcher of NALCO, corroborated Sugala's testimony. He testified that in
the afternoon of April 27, 1992, while walking from the canteen towards the gate, he saw the victim in a
squatting position, tinkering with his motorbike. 7 Shortly thereafter, on his way back to the canteen, at around
4:20 p.m., he saw appellant behind the victim who was already astride his motorbike facing the gate, with his
hands on its handle bars. From a distance of one and a half meter, he witnessed appellant put his left hand on
the victim's left shoulder and thrust his right hand on the victim's right side. Immediately thereafter, appellant
made another thrust at the victim's face. At that point, Mangmang saw that appellant was holding a dagger,
and he later heard somebody shout, "Do, run!" The victim then ran out through the gate towards the hospital,
while appellant ran home. Mangmang followed the victim and saw his intestines bulging and coming out. He
then brought the victim to the nearby hospital aboard a tricycle. 8 He testified having seen many employees in
the area at the time of the incident, whom he could not identify. 9
Eugenio Agudera, the security guard of NALCO, testified that on April 27, 1992, he likewise saw the
stabbing incident four meters away from the guardhouse by the gate of the canteen. At around 4:15 p.m., he
witnessed appellant sneak from behind the victim who was astride his motorcycle, and stab the victim's right
side with a knife. Immediately thereafter, appellant delivered a second blow, with a slashing motion across the
victim's mouth. Upon seeing this, he shouted, "Run, Do!," directed at the victim. The victim then ran out towards
the highway through the gate, while clutching his stomach as it bled profusely. 10 Agudera also confirmed the
presence of those who witnessed the incident such as Clemente Felias, Roberto Mangmang, Dino Macabugto,
Martin Sugala and the blackmarketers. 11
Moreta Bulawin, wife of the victim, testified that she saw her husband in St. Christopher Hospital around
4:30 p.m. with stab wounds on his right stomach and upper lip, and a cut across his right cheek. 12 Shortly
thereafter, the victim was transferred to Butuan Doctors' Hospital, where he expired. She presented her
husband's death certificate to prove his age at the time of death, 13 and his latest income tax return to prove
his annual gross income of P37,432. 14 She testified that she spent more than P30,000 for hospital and funeral
expenses, some of which were supported with receipts. 15
The defense presented four witnesses, namely, appellant, Nancy Sotis, Delia Peramide, and SPO4
Bienvenido Capablanca. HCSDca
Taking the witness stand, appellant Sergio Caratao admitted stabbing the victim, but interposed self-
defense to exculpate himself. He testified that on April 27, 1992, at around 4:00 p.m., he was with his wife at the
NALCO Commissary Canteen, where the victim was then on duty as rice vale issuer. He requested the victim for
his rice vale. The victim told him to wait. Appellant hence waited nearby for around ten minutes, while the victim
issued rice to others. Appellant thereafter kept begging the victim for his turn, telling him "Do, give me my rice
because I have nothing to eat for supper," but the victim made no reply. Despite repeated pleas, he was not
given any rice. Upon seeing the victim leave the issuing area, he kept silent and walked away. He went to his
wife and told her that he was unable to get rice. His wife then left.
Shortly thereafter, appellant also left to go home. On his way out, he saw the victim getting his
motorbike. He approached the victim, who at that point was already mounted on his motorcycle, holding the
handle bars, with the engine already running. As appellant stood one meter away from the victim, along the
right side of the motorcycle, he asked, "Do, how about my rice?" The victim answered, "That is no longer my
problem. Why are you forcing me?" Appellant persisted with his pleas, and the victim angrily answered back,
"Are you forcing me?" Immediately thereafter, the victim punched appellant's face with his right fist and said,
"You are always like that, you are forcing me." Appellant was thrown backward, and the victim moved his
motorbike forward, hitting appellant's left thigh near the groin. Appellant then held the victim's right hand, and
when the victim tried to break free, he twisted it. Thereafter, with a knife on his right hand, he stabbed the right
portion of the victim's belly. In retaliation, the victim punched appellant with his left fist, hitting appellant's
mouth. The victim thereafter ran, while appellant remained standing for about ten minutes. He later followed
the victim to the gate, and saw the victim from afar boarding a tricycle alone. Appellant went home to get his
tricycle and immediately drove to the municipal hall, where he voluntarily surrendered. 16
In his testimony, appellant denied seeing any guard at the guardhouse at the time of the incident. He
saw Mangmang only, inside the canteen, 17 and denied hearing anyone shout "Run, Do!" 18 On his way out of
the gate after the stabbing, he noticed only one person in the compound, a woman sitting under the jackfruit
tree at the corner by the gate, whom he does not know. He recalled seeing other people outside the gate of the
canteen, whom he could not identify. 19 On cross-examination, however, he confirmed the presence of Agudera
outside the said gate. 20
Nancy Sotis, a blackmarketer who frequented the NALCO canteen, testified that she was seated under a
jackfruit tree by the gate of the canteen the whole day of April 27, 1992. 21 At about 4:00 P.M., from a distance
of four meters, she saw the victim astride his motorcycle, with its engine already running. Appellant then
approached the victim and stood in front of the latter, a little obliquely to the right. She saw appellant utter
something to the victim, which she did not hear because of the sound of the engine. She looked away, and when
she glanced back at their direction, she saw the victim punch appellant in the face with his right hand. Appellant
then thrust something near the victim's abdomen. Upon seeing appellant pull out a knife from the victim's
abdomen, she shouted to the people outside the fence of the canteen. When she looked back, he saw the victim
raise his right fist towards appellant's face. Appellant then stabbed the victim's face with his knife. The victim
thereafter alighted from his motorcycle and walked towards the gate, holding his bleeding abdomen.
The people outside the fence were about to meet and assist him, but they later turned back when they saw
appellant following the victim. 22
Sotis testified that there was nobody near the victim and appellant at the time of the incident. 23 She
denied seeing Mangmang, 24 but confirmed that Sugala was then inside the canteen. 25 She admitted having
seen in the morning a security guard at the guardhouse, by the name of Felias, but was uncertain as to his
presence from noontime onwards. 26 She denied seeing any guard at the gatepost at the time of the
incident, 27 but admitted seeing Agudera approach the victim when the latter was about to go out of the
gate. 28
 Delia Peramide, a blackmarketer like Sotis, testified to rebut the statement of prosecution eyewitness
Mangmang, who declared that he brought the victim to the hospital aboard a tricycle. She narrated that in the
afternoon of April 27, 1992, while she was in line for consultation inside St. Christopher Hospital, she heard
someone shout, "Doctor, there is an emergency." She ran to look outside, and saw a tricycle parked outside the
hospital, about 20 to 25 meters away from where she stood. She saw the driver, and a bloodied person curled
up on the passenger's seat, whom she later recognized as Tado Bulawin. 29 She declared that when she saw the
victim in the tricycle, Mangmang was not with him. She saw Mangmang in the hospital only after 15 minutes,
when he was on his way to the emergency room to visit the victim. 30
SPO4 Bienvenido Capablanca, chief of the operations division of Nasipit PNP Station, testified that at
about 4:30 p.m. of April 27, 1992, appellant, looking cool and composed, arrived at the station and told him,
"Sir, I voluntarily surrender myself because I have killed somebody." Appellant identified the victim as a certain
"Tado," and also surrendered his knife. 31
For its rebuttal evidence, the prosecution recalled Roberto Mangmang and presented a new witness,
Clemente Felias.
Roberto Mangmang, the prosecution eyewitness who testified earlier, added that the victim never
boxed appellant, nor did he try to run over the latter with his motorcycle prior to the stabbing, contrary to
appellant's claim. 32
Clemente Felias, the NALCO security guard whose shift was previous to that of prosecution eyewitness
Agudera, testified that throughout his tour of duty from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., he never saw defense eyewitness
Sotis within the compound. He also testified that he, too, witnessed the incident, and declared that it was not
true that the victim punched appellant before the stabbing. 33
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's version of the incident. It found that the victim's
indifference to appellant's repeated pleas for rice must have angered appellant to the point of attacking the
victim upon seeing the latter about to leave without heeding his request. It rejected the plea of self-defense for
appellant's failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It upheld the presence of treachery,
but ruled out the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty, for lack of evidence.
Hence, this appeal.
In his brief, appellant submits the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF THE
DECEASED WAS ATTENDED BY [THE] JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II. THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
MURDER BY TREACHERY.
III. THE LOWER COURT ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT. 34
In his first and third assignment of errors, appellant assails the trial court for giving credence to the
prosecution's evidence and disregarding his claim of self-defense.
The settled rule is that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. 35 This is known as a shift in the
burden of the evidence, and as a result thereof the person claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's. 36 Furthermore, on appeal, appellant must
show that the court below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence. 37
To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the victim
committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person
claiming self-defense; (2) that there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate
and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. 38
At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed against
appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. 39 Unlawful
aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming
self-defense. 40 The admission of appellant in his testimony that he stabbed the victim makes it incumbent upon
him convincingly to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the
use of deadly force. 41 In the case at bar, appellant tried to prove that the unlawful aggression emanated from
the victim, who punched him in the face and hit him in the thigh with his motorbike, without provocation on his
part. This the trial court found unconvincing, thus:
Under the situation where Tado Bulawin was in a riding position on his motorcycle,
holding its handle bars, ready to start the engine, the court finds it incredible for him to be the
unlawful aggressor. Instead, Sergio Caratao's being made to wait and make repeated requests
or pleas for his vale of rice must have moved him to be the unlawful aggressor thereby inflicting
stab wounds on the victim Tado Bulawin. For the circumstance of self-defense to be
appreciated, it must be shown that the compulsion is of such character that the accused is left
with no opportunity to escape or self-defense [sic] in equal combat (People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA
71). And this is not the set-up in the case at bar. The prosecution version merits belief and
credence beyond reasonable doubt. 42
We agree with the foregoing finding of the trial court. Appellant's account of the circumstances of the
attack does not inspire belief.
First, according to appellant's testimony, after an exchange of words, the victim punched him in the face,
and thereafter hit his left thigh with his motorcycle. Appellant held the victim's hand, twisted it and stabbed the
latter in the abdomen. The victim then punched appellant in the mouth with his left fist. After this, the victim
ran away. Noticeably, in this narration, nowhere did appellant mention that he stabbed the victim for the second
time in the face. This is in conflict with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and even of the defense
witness Sotis, who all narrated that appellant stabbed the victim in the mouth. Appellant's account, moreover,
does not jibe with the physical evidence showing the victim's injuries below the nose and across the cheek. 43
Second, on cross-examination, appellant missed the part where the victim allegedly hit his left thigh with
the motorcycle, testifying that after the first punch, he immediately stabbed the victim. 44 Interestingly,
defense witness Sotis also made no mention of this important portion, 45 rendering it highly dubious.
Third, we agree with the trial court's observation that the circumstances of the victim's alleged assault
on appellant is not credible, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, his contention that Tado Bulawin while still in that riding position boxed him
and that Tado Bulawin let run his motorcycle pushing forward hitting accused on his thigh also
do not inspire belief because accused Sergio Caratao was positioned at the right side of the
motorcycle, not in front, and if at all Tado Bulawin boxed him in that riding position, the
motorcycle could have probably fallen down. But [there was] no proof that it did fall. 46
xxx xxx xxx
We further observe that in their relative positions, appellant had more freedom of action than the victim
who was riding his motorcycle. Moreover, it is hardly believable that the victim in that position would have
the strength to punch appellant in the face with his left fist, after being stabbed in his right abdomen. All
the eyewitness accounts showed that, after being stabbed, the victim left his motorcycle and walked away
while clutching his bleeding abdomen with both hands. 47
Fourth, we note that as between appellant and the victim, appellant had more hatred to harbor arising
from the fact that the victim refused to give him his rice vale. He thus had more motive to do harm than the
victim. On the witness stand, he reasoned that he stabbed the victim, not to repel the victim's attack, nor out
of fear for his life, but specifically because he "lost his temper." 48
Fifth, we note that appellant's plea of self-defense is rendered doubtful by the fact that he invoked it for
the first time only upon taking the witness stand for his defense. When he surrendered at the police station, he
only reported that he had killed a certain "Tado," but never raised self-defense to exculpate himself. Records
also show that appellant waived his right to a preliminary investigation and submission of counter-
affidavits. 49 We have ruled that an appellant's failure to inform the police upon his surrender that he acted in
self-defense is fatal to his defense. 50 A righteous individual will not cower in fear but rather unabashedly admit
the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were morally justified in so doing. A belated plea suggests that it is
false and only an afterthought made as a last-ditch effort to avoid the consequences of the crime. 51
 Appellant tried to obtain corroboration from Sotis and Peramide to prop up his defense and to assail the
prosecution's testimonies. The account of Sotis, however, was put to question by the rebuttal testimony of
Felias, whom Sotis admitted to having seen on the day of the incident. Felias in his testimony denied seeing her
under the jackfruit tree near the guardhouse, or anywhere within the compound on that day. Peramide's
testimony, on the other hand, failed to cast doubt on the testimony of prosecution witness Mangmang, as it
was established that when she saw the tricycle where Mangmang claimed to have ridden going to the hospital,
it was already parked. It therefore does not render false Mangmang's claim that he brought the victim to the
hospital, as he could already have alighted from the vehicle by the time Peramide saw it.
Moreover, appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive against him, which
would have moved them falsely to implicate him. On the contrary, he admitted on cross-examination that
prosecution witness Sugala is his friend. 52 Prosecution witness Mangmang further testified that appellant was
his neighbor in their younger days, and that appellant's brother is his friend. 53 It is worth reiterating that where
there is no evidence that the principal witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motives, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 54
All told, no matter how appellant tried to cast doubt on the veracity of the testimonies of the
prosecution, we find the prosecution witnesses to be more credible than those of the defense. There may have
been inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses on minor details, but these do not affect the
weight of their testimonies, as these cannot be expected to be uniform to the last details. 55 In fact, a perfectly
dovetailing narration by different witnesses could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and
rehearsed. 56 What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points. 57
Furthermore, even assuming that appellant succeeded in weakening the prosecution's evidence, such
will not suffice to exculpate him. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence, and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of
responsibility for the killing. 58
Finally, the question whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of
fact. 59 The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution worthy of belief. As to who between the
prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be believed, the trial court's assessment enjoys a great amount
of respect for the reason that the trial court has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as
they testify, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded. 60 In the present case, appellant failed to point
out any arbitrariness on the part of the trial court.
Thus, we find that the court a quo was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution. The
unlawful aggression was convincingly established to have emanated from appellant, and not from the victim.
Appellant having failed to discharge the burden of establishing his defense, his conviction necessarily follows on
the basis of his admission of the killing. 61
This brings us to appellant's second assignment of error on the finding of treachery.
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that
such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without
danger to his person. 62 In the case at bar, the first element was established by the fact that appellant suddenly
attacked from behind the unsuspecting and unarmed victim who was then astride his motorcycle. However, we
find the prosecution's evidence insufficient to sustain the finding of the presence of the second element,
namely, that appellant deliberately adopted the mode of attack.
Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the
spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by
treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack. 63 In the
present case, it appears from the evidence that appellant's grudge against the victim was brought about only
moments before the attack, when the latter ignored his repeated pleas for rice. As observed by the trial court,
the sight of the victim leaving the compound without heeding appellant's request must have worsened his
anger. 64 In his testimony, appellant admitted that at that moment, he "forgot himself." 65 Further, he
explained that it was then customary for him to bring a knife for his own safety, in defense against lawless
elements in their area at the time. 66 It was thus only by chance and not by plan that he attacked the victim the
way he did. The stabbing was evidently a result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from
what appellant perceived to be an unjust act of the victim, rather than from a deliberated action. 67 Hence, as
the killing was done at the spur of the moment, treachery cannot be appreciated. 68
 Furthermore, we find the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender present in the case at bar. To
benefit an accused, the following requisites of this circumstance must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has
not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender
was voluntary. 69 In the present case, based on SPO4 Capablanca's testimony, appellant's surrender at the
station immediately after the incident was spontaneous, showing his intent to submit himself unconditionally
to the authorities. He expressly acknowledged having killed the victim, surrendered his knife, and allowed
himself to be detained in prison.
In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide, not
Murder. 70 The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal.
Considering the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period, pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the aforesaid Code. 71 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
appellant's sentence will consist of a minimum that is anywhere within the full range of prision mayor, and a
maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in its minimum period. We hereby fix it to be from eight
(8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Coming now to the matter of damages, we affirm the award of actual damages in the amount of P22,050,
as these are duly substantiated by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the
death, wake and burial of the victim. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is likewise sustained,
pursuant to controlling case law. 72 However, we increase the award of moral damages to a more reasonable
amount of P30,000, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 73
Finally, we rule that the heirs of the victim are also entitled to indemnification for the loss of the latter's
earning capacity. In a recent case, we explained how to arrive at the amount of this indemnity, thus:
The following factors should be considered in determining the compensable amount of
lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would have otherwise lived; and (2)
the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed using the
formula adopted in the American Combined Experience Table of Mortality: 2/3 x (80 – age at
death). The rate of loss is arrived at by multiplying life expectancy by the net earnings of the
deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily pegged at
fifty percent of the gross earnings. 74
Evidence on record reveals that the victim died at the age of 41, 75 and that he was earning an annual
gross income of P37,432 from his employment with NALCO. 76 The widow's testimony regarding the victim's
income from his sideline cannot be considered for lack of the necessary unbiased proof. 77 Thus, applying the
above-cited formula, appellant should pay the victim's heirs P486,616 as shown by the following computation:
2/3 [80 – 41(age at the time of death)] = 26 (life expectancy)
26 x [P37,432 x 50% (annual net income)]= P486, 616 78
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Appellant Sergio A. Caratao is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence of
from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity, P30,000
as moral damages, P22,050 as actual damages and P486,616 as indemnity for the victim's loss of earning
capacity. The decision under review is AFFIRMED in all other respects. Costs de oficio. AcTHCE
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMELITO SITCHON y TAYAG, accused-
appellant.

SYNOPSIS

After the prosecution had rested its case, accused Emelito Sitchon changed his plea of not guilty to a
plea of guilty to the crime of murder for beating to death, Mark Anthony Fernandez, the two-year old son of his
common-law wife. The trial court then convicted him of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review.
The Court agreed with the trial court that the killing in this case was attended by treachery. It is beyond
dispute that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up
a defense, is treacherous. However, the Court discerned no intention on the part of appellant to commit so
grave a wrong against his victim. Appellant's intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When
appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the victim to the
hospital. His plea of guilt did not mitigate his criminal liability because he changed his plea only after the
prosecution had rested its case and just when he was about to testify. Sadly, his efforts were for naught. Thus,
this Court sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; INCURRED BY ANY PERSON COMMITTING A FELONY ALTHOUGH
THE WRONGFUL ACT DONE BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE INTENDED; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — That
appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from liability. Article 4 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any "person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The rationale of the rule is
found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.) Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts
of the latter's body, the accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries. Assuming,
therefore, that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for
the death of the victim caused by such injuries. AICTcE
2. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; APPRECIATED IN KILLING OF MINOR CHILDREN WHO
COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO PUT UP A DEFENSE. — The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor children
who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is treacherous.
3. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Evident premeditation is absent.
For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided
to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient
lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of
his act. The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
4. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CRUELTY; NUMBER OF WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM IS
NOT A TEST FOR DETERMINING CRUELTY. — The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is
whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not
necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person
or corpse. The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer
slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of the
criminal act which he intended to commit. The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a test for determining
whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed
inflicting injuries upon the victim. The inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not
by any sadistic bend but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
6. ID.; ID.; DRUG ADDICTION NOT CONSIDERED AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; CASE AT BAR. —
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating circumstances, which work to reduce the
accused's penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to consider "any other circumstance of a similar nature and
analogous to those" mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances nor
Article 15 on alternative circumstances, however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly, the
Court cannot consider appellant's drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed and no person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them.
7. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PLEA OF GUILTY; UNAVAILING WHEN THE ACCUSED CHANGED HIS
PLEA ONLY AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAD RESTED ITS CASE. — Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt
mitigates his criminal liability. On this matter, the Court said in People vs. Ramos: "To effectively alleviate the
criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on
the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more than explicit
than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the
court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made
after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a
mitigating circumstance." As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just
when he was about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing.
8. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; ELUCIDATED. — For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these
elements must be established: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that
the surrender by "spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and
expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him. HASDcC
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary
surrender. While he claimed that he "surrendered" to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he
did not detail the circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom
he surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the latter. PO3 Javier's
testimony that he "learned" of appellant's alleged surrender is hearsay and does not serve to corroborate
appellant's claim.
10. ID.; ID.; OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court, however, discerned no intention on the part of appellant to commit so
grave a wrong against his victim. Appellant's intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When
appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the victim to the
hospital. Sadly, his efforts were for naught.
11. ID.; MURDER; PROPER PENALTY. — In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, the killing of the victim is qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
by reclusion perpetua to death. The murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong and there is no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be imposed upon the appellant.
12. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; P50,000 AS CIVIL INDEMNITY AWARDED IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant is liable
for civil indemnity of P50,000.00 without proof of damages. Moral damages that are recoverable for the mental
anguish or emotional distress suffered by the heirs of the victim cannot be awarded here as the prosecution did
not present any evidence to justify its award.
KAPUNAN, J p:

For beating to death the two-year old son of his common-law wife, accused-appellant
Emelito Sitchon y Tayag was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
His case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellant was charged in an information stating:
That on or about June 12, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MARK ANTHONY
FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 1/2 years old, by then and there mauling and clubbing him
on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick,
approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
 CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the above charge. 2 However, before testifying in his own defense on
June 4, 1998, appellant admitted that he killed the victim and changed his plea to guilty. 3
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's eight-year old
brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima Francisco, a forensic chemist of the same agency.
Appellant lived in the second floor of a three-square meter house located at 2001 Batangas Street,
Tondo, Manila. His neighbor of two months, Lilia Garcia, resided in the first floor of the same house.
At about 10:00 in the morning of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of the house attending to her children
when she heard the sound of a boy crying. Curious, Lilia went up the stairway, her children in tow. The open
door of the upper floor allowed Lilia to witness appellant beating two-year old Mark Anthony Fernandez. From
a distance of less than three arms' length, Lilia saw appellant hit various parts of the boy's body with a piece of
wood, about 14-1/2 inches in length and 2-1/2 inches in diameter. Appellant also banged the head of the boy
against the wooden wall.
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down the house to bring
him to the hospital. The two-year old was "already black" and no longer moving. 4
Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky. According to
Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Appellant, whom Roberto called Kuya Chito, thus
beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a "2x2" piece of wood. Roberto could not do anything to help his brother
because he was afraid Kuya Chito might also beat him up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, his
little brother, who could barely talk, was not crying anymore. 5
Roberto identified the two pieces of wood 6 that appellant allegedly used in beating the victim. He also
identified the T-shirt 7 that Macky wore when he died.
A certain Alice Valerio from the Galang Medical Hospital informed PO3 Paul Dennis Javier that a boy had
been admitted there. When PO3 Javier went to the hospital, he found the boy already dead. He observed that
the child had wounds on the left middle finger, the right index finger and both feet. The child also had lacerations
in the upper lip and contusions all over his head and body.
PO3 Javier proceeded to appellant's house at No. 2001, Batangas Ext., Tondo, Manila. Human feces and
fresh blood splattered the floor. PO3 Javier recovered from the house the broken wooden sticks, the steel
hammer, 8 which were allegedly used to beat up the boy, as well as a bloodstained white T-shirt.
PO3 Javier then went to the house of appellant's sister in Del Fierro St., Tondo, who informed him of
matters relative to appellant's identification. Thereafter, the police conducted a search operation in Cavite
where appellant's mother lived but they did not find him there. Later that afternoon, PO3 Javier learned that
appellant had surrendered to Station 3 of their district.
The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned over to PO3
Javier a brown belt which appellant allegedly also used in beating the victim. Roberto Fernandez, the victim's
brother, had given the belt to the staff member. 9
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem examination of the
victim's body on June 12, 1996 at 4:40 p.m. He found that the boy had suffered many injuries, including three
wounds at the head and the anterior chest, which could have been inflicted with the use of blunt objects such
as a piece of wood or a fist. The child could have been dead three to four hours, or not more than eight hours,
prior to the postmortem examination. Dr. Lagonera concluded that the victim died of "bilateral pneumonia
secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries" or complication of the lungs due to said injuries. 10 The autopsy
report of Dr. Lagonera shows that Mark Anthony Fernandez sustained the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Multiple old scars, forehead.
2. Healing lacerated wound, left forehead.
3. Healed lacerated wound, above the left eyebrow, measuring 1.2 x 0.2 cm.
4. Healed linear abrasions, left cheek.
 5. Lacerated wound, extending up to the mucous membrane of the upper lip, measuring 2 x
0.3 cm.
6. Contussion (sic), left temporo-parietal region, measuring 6 x 5 cms.
7. Healing lacerated wound, left zygomatic region, measuring 0.5 x 0.3 cm.
8. Contussion (sic), left jaw, measuring 1.5 x 1 cm.
9. Contussion (sic), right anterior thorax, measuring 17 x 12 cms.
10. Contussion (sic), right anterior forearm.
11. Lacerated wound, tip of the forefinger, right.
12. Old scar, upper 3rd, right anterior thigh.
13. Contussion (sic), right lower leg, above and below the knee measuring 9 x 5 cms.
14. Contussion (sic), left lower leg, above and below the knee, measuring 13 x 6 cms.
15. Hematoma, big toe, under the nail bed, right.
16. Contusso-abrasion, dorsum of the left foot, measuring 6 x 2 cms.
17. Contussion (sic), left posterior thorax, measuring 17 x 6 cms.
18. Contussion (sic), right postero-lateral thorax, extending up to the right lumbar region,
measuring 13 x 6 cms.
19. Contussion (sic), right posterior forearm, measuring 24 x 8 cms.
20. Contussion (sic), left posterior forearm, measuring 22 x 7 cms.
21. Healing abrasion, right buttocks, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm.
22. Plucked finger nail, left middle finger, with hematoma of the nail bed.
23. Posterior hand, both swollen.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Presence of left sub-aponeurotic hematoma, temporo-parietal region and over the mid-
occipital region.
2. Hematoma over the sternum and pectoralis muscles.
3. Both lungs showed patchy and confluent consolidations.
4. Small amount of rice porridge was recovered from the stomach. 11
Felicisima M. Francisco, NBI forensic chemist, conducted an examination to determine the presence and
"grouping" of human blood found on the steel hammer, the wooden sticks, and the T-shirt that were sent to his
office by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. of the Western Police District in Manila. 12 She prepared
Report No. B-96-941 stating that Specimen No. 1 or the steel hammer, was positive for human blood "but
insufficient for blood group." Specimen Nos. 2 (the broken wooden sticks) and 3 (the white T-shirt) were also
positive for human blood "showing reactions of Group A." 13
Only appellant, 40, a sidewalk vendor, testified for the defense. As stated earlier, appellant admitted
killing the two-year old victim, the son of his "live-in" partner. He and the boy's mother had lived together for
two years before the incident, starting when the boy was about a year old. He claimed he enjoyed a harmonious
relationship with his partner and that he killed the boy only because he was under the influence of shabu,
marijuana and Valium 10 at that time. Appellant professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had
also taken drugs two weeks before the incident.
On June 12, 1996, appellant came upon Macky playing with his feces, scattering them all over the pillow,
the bed sheets and the curtains. Appellant scolded the boy, "Putang ina ka Macky! Bakit mo ikinalat ng ganyan
ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para hugasan!" Appellant got hold of Macky but the boy struggled to
free himself from appellant's grasp. Appellant, still reeling from the Valium 10 he had just taken, became so
angry that he picked up a broom with a wooden handle, and hit the boy. Appellant did not realize that he had
hit Macky hard until he saw the boy sprawled on the floor, breathing with difficulty. He dressed Macky and
brought him to the Galang Medical Center at the corner of Abad Santos Avenue and Tayabas Street, Manila. He
prayed to God that nothing serious would happen to the boy.
A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. Appellant pleaded to the lady doctor to do all she can to
save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the child, the doctor told appellant
that she could not do anything more — Macky was dead. The same day, appellant surrendered to the police.
He was brought to the Homicide Section at 3:00 p.m.
Explaining his change of plea, appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He reiterated
that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other. He was a drug dependent
and, in fact, had been confined at the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center. He said he was conscious when the
incident happened but he simply did not realize that he had hit the child hard with the broom's wooden handle.
He denied having hit the boy with a hammer or having banged his head against the wall. He hoped the trial
court would be lenient with him because of his voluntary surrender. He prayed that the court would not impose
upon him the death penalty. 14
Nevertheless, on July 3, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to
pay the costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the victim Christina Tabora,
moral and nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, plus death
compensation in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from this date
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 15
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony Fernandez.
Appellant's guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and Roberto Fernandez, who both
saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further corroborated by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr.
Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima Francisco, as well as the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in
open court admitted beating the poor child, which beating resulted in the latter's death.
That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from
liability. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any "person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The
rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who
is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). 16
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latter's body, the
accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries. 17 Assuming, therefore, that
appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for the death of the
victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. 18 It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could
not be expected to put up a defense, is treacherous. 19
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the prosecution
must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that
he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act. 20 The prosecution failed to establish any of these
requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating cruelty as an
aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing
another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or
scoffed at his person or corpse. 21 The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in
making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the
consummation of the criminal act which he intended to commit. 22 The sheer number of wounds, however, is
not a test for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime. 23
 The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The inordinate
force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend but rather by the drugs that
diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor General defends
this ruling, contending that appellant's habitual drug addiction is an alternative circumstance analogous to
habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same
is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is
habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating
circumstances, which work to reduce the accused's penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to consider "any other
circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those" mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same
Code on aggravating circumstances 24 nor Article 15 on alternative circumstances, 25 however, contain a
provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider appellant's drug addiction as an
aggravating circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought within
their terms who is not clearly within them. 26
Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal liability. On this matter, this Court said
in People v. Ramos: 27
To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made
at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the
timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made
after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea
considered as a mitigating circumstance.
As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he was just about
to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing.
The trial court credited appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be established: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his
surrender was voluntary. 28 It is sufficient that the surrender be "spontaneous and made in a manner clearly
indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for
and capturing him." 29
Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he "surrendered"
to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the circumstances like the time and
place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom he surrendered. He did not indicate if the person
was a person in authority or an agent of the latter. PO3 Javier's testimony that he "learned" of appellant's alleged
surrender is hearsay and does not serve to corroborate appellant's claim.
The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong against
his victim. Appellant's intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When appellant realized the
horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the victim to the hospital. 30 Sadly, his
efforts were for naught.
In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the killing of the victim is
qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to death. The
murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and there
is no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed upon
appellant. 31
Appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00 without proof of damages. 32 Moral damages that
are recoverable for the mental anguish or emotional distress suffered by the heirs of the victim cannot be
awarded here as the prosecution did not present any evidence to justify its award. 33
 WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y Tayag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, as defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Mark Anthony Fernandez civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Sitchon y Tayag, G.R. No. 134362, [February 27, 2002], 428 PHIL 82-98)
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 EDUARDO ANCHETA Y
RODIGOL, accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

The accused-appellant herein was originally charged with homicide and frustrated homicide for the
death of Julian Ancheta, his own brother, and injury to Jonathan Aromin. However; upon reinvestigation the
charge was amended to murder and frustrated murder. The trial court, giving credence to the prosecution
witnesses, found the accused guilty of both charges. For the crime of murder, the accused was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and for the crime of frustrated murder he was sentenced to a straight penalty. The
defense of accused-appellant was that the death of Julian and the injury sustained by Jonathan were caused by
accidental gunshots which occurred when he and the deceased grappled for the gun. Thus, he claimed that in
the absence of intent to kill the victims, he could not be convicted of homicide or murder. Hence, this appeal
before the Supreme Court.
The decision of the trial court was modified. The Supreme Court found the accused-appellant guilty of
both homicide and frustrated homicide and was sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. The Court affirmed
the factual findings of the trial court on the presence of "intent to kill," but found that the killing and shooting
of the victims were not qualified by treachery. CAHaST

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; SUBJECT TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN
ABSENCE OF DUBIOUS REASON OR IMPROPER MOTIVE. — Jonathan Aromin categorically and positively
identified accused-appellant as the person who pursued and shot him at close range. This Court has no reason
to doubt his testimony for even accused-appellant admitted that he and the witness were in good terms prior
to the incident. Neither does this Court have any ground to question the veracity of Leonila Lopez's testimony
that she saw accused-appellant shoot Jonathan Aromin as there was no proved ill motive on her part. Thus,
where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why prosecution witnesses should
testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, such testimonies are worthy of full
faith and credit. Besides, it has been an established rule that unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of
substance and value, which if considered might affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb
the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. We find no reason to
deviate from this well-entrenched principle.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; NOT APPRECIATED WHEN NO
PARTICULARS ARE SHOWN AS TO MANNER BY WHICH AGGRESSION COMMENCED. — While it was established
that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses never saw how the killing started.
Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see the commencement of the assault and the
importance of such testimonies cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor
established from mere suppositions. And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the
aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed,
treachery can in no way be established. Hence, without the existence of treachery accused-appellant can only
be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939. ADCTac
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Neither was treachery established in the
shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment
of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b)
the means or method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Both these circumstances must be
proved as indubitably as the crime itself. In the case at bar, however, there is no sufficient proof to establish
with certainty that accused-appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means of executing the crime
against Jonathan Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was already aware of the danger as he saw accused-appellant
carrying a gun and heard two (2) gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a wall. Thus, there could be
no treachery since prior to the attack the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life and even managed to
flee, albeit unsuccessfully. Consequently, accused-appellant can only be convicted of frustrated homicide
in Crim. Case No. C-44940.
4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; REQUISITES; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
— For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance the following requisites must concur:
(a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and, (c) the surrender was voluntary. All these requisites were present in this case as PO3 Feliciano Almojuela
confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the day after the incident, accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up
and his service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be appreciated in his favor. DcAaSI
5. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY. — Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period the range of which is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
shall be taken from the minimum of the imposable penalty while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Article 50 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Thus, in Crim.
Case No. C-44940, there also being one (1) mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period, the range of which is from six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.
BELLOSILLO, J p:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Caloocan City finding SPO1 accused-
appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and of Frustrated Murder
in Crim. Case No. 44940. 1
SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol 2 was originally charged with Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-
44939 and Frustrated Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44940. However, upon motion of private complainant, a
reinvestigation was conducted and the Informations were amended to charge the accused with Murder in Crim.
Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in Crim Case No. C-44940.
In the amended Information for Murder, it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
one Julian Ancheta y Rodigol on the left temple, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which
injuries caused the victim's death." 3 On the other hand, in the amended Information for Frustrated Murder it
was alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with a gun one Jonathan Aromin y Cardinez on the
right cheek, thus performing all the acts of execution which would constitute the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein
accused, that is, due to timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered to the victim." 4
During trial, the main witness for the prosecution, Jonathan Aromin, testified that on the night of 2
September 1993 he and his neighbor Julian Ancheta went to the house of the accused who lived just across
them. 5 Julian told Jonathan to knock on the door first but when no one answered Julian did the knocking
himself. 6 When the accused opened the door, Jonathan immediately noticed that SPO1 Ancheta was armed
with a gun. Intimidated, Jonathan began to move away. 7 As he left the house of the accused, Jonathan suddenly
heard two (2) shots which prompted him to hide behind the nearest wall. But when he looked back the accused
SPO1 Ancheta was already aiming his revolver directly at his face and without hesitation shot him at close
range. 8 Stunned by the gunshot wound, Jonathan momentarily blacked out but soon regained consciousness
when his neighbor, Leonila Lopez, came to his aid and rushed him to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center. 9 At the hospital, the slug that pierced his right cheek was removed from his left shoulder and was
subsequently released on 7 September 1993. 10
Leonila Lopez narrated that her house was right across the house of the accused, separated only by a
narrow alley. 11 At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 2 September 1993 while she was preparing dinner, she
was startled by the sound of two (2) gunshots coming from the house of the accused. She immediately told her
children to go inside and as she was about to close her windows she saw Jonathan Aromin running towards her
house, followed by the accused. She then saw the accused shoot Jonathan Aromin on the right cheek. After the
accused left, she helped the hapless victim and brought him to the hospital. 12 She was approximately a meter
away when she witnessed the shooting. 13
 Virginia Ancheta, wife of Julian Ancheta, testified that she and her deceased husband had two (2)
children and that she incurred P54,200.00 as funeral expenses for his burial. 14
Dr. Roberto Garcia, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, testified that he autopsied the body of
Julian Ancheta on 3 September 1993. Julian sustained three (3) gunshot wounds. One (1) bullet pierced the back
of his left forearm and exited in front thereof, another entered the rear left portion of the neck and exited
through the right rear portion thereof, while the fatal bullet pierced the front portion of the left ear without an
exit wound. 15 However, although Dr. Garcia concluded that three (3) bullets hit the deceased, he did not
discount the possibility that the three (3) wounds could have been caused by only two (2) bullets as the left arm,
being a movable part of the body, might have been in the way when the bullet exited through the neck of the
victim. 16
Police Officer 3 Feliciano Almojuela of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP Station, Caloocan
City, claimed that in the early morning of 3 September 1993 he received a report of a shooting incident at Block
36, Phase 3-F-1 Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City. 17 Upon reaching the crime scene he was informed that the slain
victim was S/Sgt. Julian Ancheta of the Philippine Air Force and the suspect was the deceased's brother SPO1
Eduardo Ancheta. When he learned that another victim was confined at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center he went there and found Jonathan Aromin in critical condition. Thinking that the victim might not survive
he immediately interviewed him and took an "ante-mortem" statement. 18 In the afternoon of the same day,
the accused voluntarily surrendered himself as well as his service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan
City. 19 At around 11:00 p.m., PO3 Almojuela brought the accused to the hospital where the latter was positively
identified by Jonathan Aromin as the assailant. 20
Dr. Abraham Gonzales, the resident physician at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, testified that
he was on duty on 2 September 1993 when Jonathan Aromin was admitted. Upon examination he observed
that the victim sustained a gunshot wound on the right portion of his jaw and no exit wound was
visible. 21 During treatment, the lead slug was recovered from the left side of the neck or from the "trapicious
muscle." 22 He added that were it not for the timely medical intervention Jonathan Aromin would have died. 23
In his defense, the accused claimed that on the night of 2 September 1993 he was sleeping at home with
his wife and son when he was awakened by the sound of someone banging on his door. 24 After a brief silence
he heard him say: "Pare buksan mo ito." Sensing danger, the accused took his gun from under his pillow and
ordered the person to identify himself. But the stranger just kept on banging the door and insisted that it be
opened. 25 When he finally opened the door, he saw his brother Julian Ancheta and his neighbor Jonathan
Aromin. Upon seeing them, he inquired as to why his brother addressed him as "pare" but instead of answering,
Julian Ancheta angrily asked him why he was holding a gun. 26 To appease his brother, the accused lowered his
pistol and explained that the gun was only for protection as he had no idea who was banging his door in the
middle of the night. He then invited them into the house, but when he turned around his brother suddenly
grabbed his hand from behind to disarm him. 27 As they grappled, the gun accidentally fired twice and the next
thing he saw was his brother sprawled on the ground and Jonathan Aromin was nowhere to be found. He never
knew what actually happened to Jonathan Aromin as his back was turned against him when the gun went off. 28
Confused by the startling events, the accused just took his family to the house of his wife's cousin. His
wife then convinced him to spend the night with them and postpone his surrender until the next day. 29 At
around 6:00 o'clock p.m. 30 of 3 September 1993 he surrendered at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. After
being taken into custody, PO3 Almojuela brought him to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where Jonathan
Aromin identified him as the perpetrator. 31
On 26 March 1999 the trial court, giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, found the accused guilty
of both charges. 32 In Crim. Case No. C-44939, the accused was found guilty of Murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P54,200.00 as actual and compensatory damages and the costs. In Crim. Case No. C-44940 the accused was
found guilty of Frustrated Murder and was sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He was also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin
P30,000.00 as moral damages and the costs. 33
Accused-appellant, in his brief, raises two (2) points: First, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt as the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish that he intended to kill
Julian Ancheta and Jonathan Aromin. Second, the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him of murder and
frustrated murder since there was no proof that the killing was attended by evident premeditation or
treachery. 34
 The defense of accused-appellant is that the death of Julian Ancheta and the injury of Jonathan Aromin
were caused by the accidental gunshots which occurred when he and the deceased grappled for the gun. Thus,
absent any intent to kill the victims, he could not be convicted of homicide or murder.
However, the evidence presented proves otherwise.
The autopsy of Julian Ancheta reveals that he sustained three (3) bullet wounds: one (1) in the rear of
the left forearm, another on the left rear portion of his neck and the most fatal one, on the front portion of his
left temple.
On the other hand, Jonathan Aromin sustained a gunshot wound on his right cheek which would have
caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention. Based on the number of bullet wounds and
the location of the injuries sustained by the victims it is quite impossible to believe that such wounds were
caused by two (2) accidental gunshots which ensued while the accused and the deceased wrestled for the gun.
On the contrary, the location of the injuries proves that accused-appellant intentionally shot his own brother to
death and thereafter shot the eyewitness at point blank to permanently silence him.
Further, Jonathan Aromin categorically and positively identified accused-appellant as the person who
pursued and shot him at close range. This Court has no reason to doubt his testimony for even accused-appellant
admitted that he and the witness were in good terms prior to the incident. 35 Neither does this Court have any
ground to question the veracity of Leonila Lopez's testimony that she saw accused-appellant shoot Jonathan
Aromin as there was no proved ill motive on her part. Thus, where there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a heinous crime, such testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 36 Besides, it has been an
established rule that unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value, which if considered
might affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the
trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. 37 We find no reason to deviate from this well-entrenched principle.
But although we affirm the factual findings of the trial court on the presence of "intent to kill," we believe
that the killing of Julian Ancheta and the shooting of Jonathan Aromin were not qualified by treachery.
While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses never
saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see the
commencement of the assault and the importance of such testimonies cannot be overemphasized considering
that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere suppositions. 38 And where no particulars are
shown as to the manner by which the aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death
of the victim began and developed, treachery can in no way be established. 39 Hence, without the existence of
treachery accused-appellant can only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939.
Neither was treachery established in the shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions must concur
for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. 40 Both these circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. 41
In the case at bar, however, there is no sufficient proof to establish with certainty that accused-appellant
deliberately and consciously adopted the means of executing the crime against Jonathan Aromin. Furthermore,
the victim was already aware of the danger as he saw accused-appellant carrying a gun and heard two (2)
gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a wall. 42 Thus, there could be no treachery since prior to the
attack the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life and even managed to flee, albeit
unsuccessfully. 43 Consequently, accused-appellant can only be convicted of frustrated homicide in Crim. Case
No. C-44940.
It must be noted that the testimonies of the witnesses show that accused-appellant surrendered himself
on 3 September 1993 at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance the following requisites must concur: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested;
(b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and, (c) the surrender was voluntary. 44 All these
requisites were present in this case as PO3 Feliciano Almojuela confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the day
after the incident, accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up and his service firearm at the PNP Station in
Caloocan City. 45 Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.
Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There
being one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in
its minimum period the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the minimum of the
imposable penalty while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Article 50 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Thus, in Crim.
Case No. C-44940, there also being one (1) mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period, the range of which is from six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court appealed from convicting accused-appellant SPO1
Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in Crim. Case No. C-
44940, is MODIFIED.
In G.R. No. 138306 (Crim. Case No C-44939), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol is found
guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years eight (8) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Julian Ancheta P50,000.00
as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus the costs.
In G.R. No. 138307 (Crim. Case No. C-44940), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol is
found guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years two
(2) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum to six (6) years four (4) months
and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin
P30,000.00 as moral damages plus the costs. SIacTE
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, accused-
appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant was convicted of rape aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime and ignominy by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In this appeal,
appellant sought the reversal of his conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. Appellant also assailed
the decision of the trial court in considering the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and ignominy. The
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of the crime charged, but lowered the penalty therein imposed
to reclusion perpetua. The Court found no compelling reason to conclude that the trial court had erred in giving
due weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant. The Court upheld the trial court's finding that
nighttime aggravated the commission of the offense. Appellant abducted his victim, brought her to an
abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of the sleeping
world. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy was correctly appreciated by the lower court against appellant
in ordering the complainant to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus and thereafter
ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Court, however, lowered the
penalty of death imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. According to the Court, while it is
uncontroverted that appellant was armed with a bolo to realize his criminal objective, said circumstance could
not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the case at bar because it was not alleged in the information
as to make the offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred "qualified rape" punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. EAICTS

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NO COMPELLING REASON TO SUFFICIENTLY

PERSUADE THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT. — The testimony of the complainant about the incident is
straightforward, categorical, and relatively free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to
sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial court has erred in giving due weight and credence to
the testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence adduced to show that the complainant has had any
ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the
familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the test of credibility, for it is said that no woman in her
right mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the
humiliation concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless the story were true.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; APPELLANT'S "SWEETHEART THEORY" REJECTED; NO DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE OF ANY SORT, LIKE A LETTER OR A PHOTOGRAPH OR ANY PIECE OF MEMENTO, WAS PRESENTED TO
CONFIRM A ROMANTIC LIAISON BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE COMPLAINANT. — The "sweetheart
theory" of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy, often resorted to as a last ditch
effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a
photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant
and the complainant. It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved
for petty reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz: "This Court cannot accept
the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were sweethearts, for such a claim defies
rationality, let alone common sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the
manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to
vindicate the outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in
stabbing and hacking him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger the way she did."
3. ID.; ID.; PENALTY OF DEATH IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT LOWERED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA;
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF USE OF DEADLY WEAPON NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. — In the case
at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to realize his criminal
objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the
crime of rape for not having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the offense fall under
the jurisprudentially referred "qualified rape" punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Simple rape is
punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion
perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in "all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."
4. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; NIGHTTIME; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR; APPELLANT HAS
SPECIALLY TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE COVER OF DARKNESS TO FACILITATE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
WITHOUT BEING RECOGNIZED. — Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk
and ending at dawn. The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise. By and of itself, nighttime would
not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage
of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from capture. As an
ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it is duly proved although not
alleged in the Information. The Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the
cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-appellant has
abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her,
assured of the stillness of a sleeping world. The Court has long held that this aggravating circumstance can be
considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from
his illegal act.
5. ID.; ID.; IGNOMINY; SEXUAL POSITION EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT CONSIDERED IGNOMINIOUS. — With
respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina, appellant
ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her
to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case
of People vs. Saylan, where this Court said: "The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant
used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also 'the same position as dogs
do' i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because 'The studies of many experts
in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation.' This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not
otherwise." Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating circumstance
any means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The
circumstance, it is said, "pertains to the moral order [and] adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime." ICAcTa
VITUG, J p:

Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting 1 accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two
aggravating circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death. LexLib
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:
"That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
upon the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and consent." 2
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision under review,
thus:
"The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon,
he performed a physical examination and medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez
for alleged rape. Upon physical examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on
the mandibular area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia
majora and minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or
a normal appearance as a result of several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He
submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit 'A').
"The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information
who testified that on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the
residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, a man whom she had not seen
before suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put
his hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted,
but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the
man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go
to a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told to
undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced
and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted
his penis into her vagina. After inserting the man's penis to her vagina, she was told to lie face
down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis into her anus. After inserting the
man's penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face up. All these acts of the man hurt
her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part.
After the man had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to
go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a rest and at the
same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying that 'lahat ng nirape ko ay
pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong.' All the time the man was inserting his penis
and fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: 'tulungan po ninyo ako,'
but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife
at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke. She suddenly grabbed the
bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and
ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the
persons she met that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With,
soldiers, they went to the place where she was raped. They found the man lying down still alive.
The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to be accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo.
Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened to her to the police;
and was brought to the NBI Medico-Legal Officer for examination.
"On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked
as housemaid, she went to her friend's house named Patrick because she brought mongo and
because she and Patrick's wife Inday, are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the
evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle Verde,
Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep at Patrick's house. Earlier that
evening, at 9:00, she saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other
persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her
son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In entering the house
were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard
her because they were sleeping and at the same time the accused placed his hand on her
mouth. She was really afraid because she was boxed on her chest and accused was holding a
bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the garage, which was not lighted, she was
told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also undressed himself. While accused
was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her sweetheart. She even said, why
will I hack him if he is my sweetheart. LexLib
"The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Women's Desk Unit, Makati
Police Station who testified that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita
Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to
the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the
Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she
conducted an investigation. Based on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that
when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a
man standing beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to
go outside, instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the
fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down
in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way
to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape Nita Fernandez.
Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth because they were sweethearts.
"Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at
AFOVAI Village, Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma
together with many other laborers, somebody told him that his wife was waiting for him in the
 house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 o'clock that evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua;
and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of
Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After
opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an angry
mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was late. He
explained that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was,
he will call her by phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they
talk outside as she was ashamed with the neighbor, and they will disturb the child who was
sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and Nita went to a vacant house,
owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in the vacant house, it was closed, so
they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that,
he was surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez
will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez concocted the story of rape because of fear that
he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.
"On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of
General Romeo Icarma (the house where he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence),
since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita
Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became
sweethearts in February 1995. They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle
Verde. They only meet during Nita's day off. He has been at Nita's place of work, but he used
to call then at her telephone numbers which are 6326062 and 6356060. They used to see each
other at Gen. Icarma's place where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when the incident in question
happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarma's place because they were told
to leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters away
from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because Nita does not know the
workers in Gen. Icarma's house, Nita left and went to the house of Captain Pascua, just at the
back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy Abella told him
that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascua's
place, he met Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his wife
Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child who were all awake, except the child. Although
Ablon was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablon's house, he brought Nita to the
house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and ashamed
to stay at Ablon's house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in Ablon's place, saying that instead
of sleeping at Ablon's place, she prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go
back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if anything happens to her, her
daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita to Gen.
Icarma's house because it is crowded and the Colonel's house is just 20 meters from Captain
Pascua's house. They went to the Colonel's house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the
wall, he was carrying 'banig, pillow and blanket,' and did not notice that Nita was carrying a
knife. Nobody live in the Colonel's house and was closed. They slept in the terrace of the house
on a cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When
hacked, he just said 'aray'. The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left
and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen knife. When the Military Police arrived, he
was no longer at the Colonel's house because he went to another house, where he slept. After
he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military
Police. He did not leave the colonel's house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his wounds,
he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him,
he said that it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and pushing her on her chest
when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file a
complaint against Nita for hacking him." 3
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:
"WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00,
plus the costs of the suit." 4
 Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the imposition of the
death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that —
"I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE. llcd
"II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY." 5
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have been
previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people, each testifying on the
same incident but making a clearly discordant testimony. Since only the participants could directly testify on the
sexual congress here conceded to have taken place, extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective
declarations of the complainant and the accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over
the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import
employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the findings of the court which has heard the evidence
except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or misappreciated which if properly
taken into account can alter the outcome of the case. 6 Regrettably for accused-appellant, no such exceptive
instances of possible oversight are perceived or evident in this case.
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court and by this
Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question.
"Prosecutor Manola:
"Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995
at around 12:00 o'clock midnight?
"A At Fort Bonifacio.
"Q What city or municipality?
"A I do not know but it must be here sir.
"Q Meaning Makati City?
"A Yes sir.
"Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
"A I was sleeping in my friend's residence.
"Court:
"Q What is the address of that friend's residence at Fort Bonifacio?
"A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.

"Q Why were you there at that time?

"A Because I always go there and my son's residence is beside the house of my friend sir.
"Court: Proceed fiscal:
"Pros. Manola:
"Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI Fort
Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
"A There was sir.
"Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
"A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a
man who entered the house where I was sleeping.
"Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
"A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.
"Q What else happened after that?
"A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I will
not obey him he will be going to kill me sir.
"Q After that what transpired next Mrs. Witness?
"A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
"Q Did you climb over the fence?
"A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
"Q Were you able to go over the fence?
"A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
"Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?
"A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
"Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
"A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took off
my clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.
"Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?
"A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.
"Q Did you obey him?
"A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
"Court:
"Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused for
you to undress?
"A Yes sir.
"Prosecutor Manola:
"Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that
vacant house and to undress why did you follow this instruction?
"A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
"Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
"A He like to rape me sir.
"Court:
"Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
"A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
"Prosecutor Manola:
"Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
"A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
"Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
"A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
"Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
"A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and then he inserted his penis
to my vagina sir.
"Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs.
Witness?
"A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
"Q After that what happened next Mrs. witness?
"A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my private
parts going in and out sir.
"Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
"A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
"Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person according
to you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private part?
"A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
"Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
"A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
"Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
"A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not want
me to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.
"Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be
able to recognize him?
"A Yes sir I could recognize him.
"Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is inside?
"Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and when asked
his name answered as Rolando Alfanta.
"Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando
Alfanta uttered the words 'lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may
magsumbong' what happened next Mrs. Witness?
"A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest.
"Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
"A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in the
chest sir.
"Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
"A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
"Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness? LexLib
"A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the
soldiers were.
"Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
"A Yes sir.
"Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
"A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
"Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you
you have killed a person what happened next?
"A We went to the person who raped me sir.
"Q And did you see him there?
"A Yes sir.
"Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped?
"A The soldiers sir.
"Q Did you find this person who raped you?
"A Yes sir.
"Q What was he doing?
"A He was lying down sir.
"Q What happened after that?
"A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
"Q Who brought him to the hospital?
"A The ambulance of the soldier.
"Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with
what you have just narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?
"A I could remember.
"Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
"A Yes sir.
"Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutor's office consisting
of two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?
"A Yes sir I could recognize this.
"Q Is that your statement"
'A Yes sir.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"Q Now this bolo which according to you you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see
this bolo again would you be able to recognize it again?
"A Yes sir.
"Prosecutor Manola:
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is
presented by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.
"Court:
"Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the accused
did you bring it also?
"A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
"Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
"A Yes sir.
"Q How did you ask for help?
"A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
"Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?
"A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.
"Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
"A None sir.
"Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private part?
"A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir.
"Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina?
"A He forced that to insert it.
"Q Forced it to where?
"A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
"Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
"A Yes sir I feel it sir.
"Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
"A I do not know him.
"Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
"A I saw him around 7:00 o'clock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the house
of my friends where I was sleeping.
"Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?
"A Only me sir.
"Prosecutor Manola:
"Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the
knife how many times have you stabbed him with the knife?
"A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
"Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo you
hacked him how many times have you hacked him?
"A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill me.
"Prosecutor Manola:
That will be all for the witness.
"Court:
Cross-examination.
"Atty. Manalo:
With the permission of the Honorable Court.
"Court:
Proceed.
"Atty. Manalo:
"Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend at
AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
"A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
"Q Were you sleeping in one room?
"A I was sleeping in the sala sir. prLL
"Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?
"A It was closed but it was not locked.
"xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you could
already at the house of your employer?
"A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.
"Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your
friend?
"A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
"Q By the way what time did you go there?
"A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
"Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
"A 6:30 sir.
"Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isn't?
"A Yes sir.
"Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place isn't?
"A Three rides sir.
"Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were sleeping
at the time the place where you were sleeping or the place of the room where the
owner of the house were sleeping?
"A First it is the sala where he passed.
"Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked placed
in that door like a wood?
"A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
"Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?
"A Patrick sir.
"Q And how are you related to Patrick?
"A His wife is my friend sir.
"Q What is the name of his wife?
"A Inday sir.
"Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your friend
Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?
"A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he
placed his hands on my mouth sir.
"Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were you
boxed by the accused on the chest?
"A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him.
"Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
"A Yes sir.
"Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on her
mouth.
"Q Was it strong?
"A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.
"Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
"Q How about on the chest?
"Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
"A It was not too strong sir.
"Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?
"A Yes sir.
"Q Where?
"A I fell on the ground down.
"Q Where were you boxed by the accused?
"A Outside sir of the house.
"Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that
correct?
"A Yes sir.
"Q And you followed him?
"A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was afraid
because he was holding a bolo sir.
"Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?
"A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.
"Q Was it lighted the place?
"A None sir.
"Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
"A Near sir.
"Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?
"A Yes sir.
"Q How big?
"Prosecutor Manola:
Immaterial your honor.
"Atty. Manalo:
To test the credibility, your honor.
"Court:
Answer
"A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.
"Atty. Manalo:
"Q And then you lie down?
"A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.
"Q Was he still holding the bolo?
"A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
"Q How did you see him?
"A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and he
was holding the bolo.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
"A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
"Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
"A He was molesting me sir."
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?
 "A 9:00 o'clock in the evening sir. Cdpr
"Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
"A I saw him that he was passing.
"Q Where were you at the time?
"A I was seating by the window sir." 7
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward, categorical, and relatively free
from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the
trial court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence
adduced to show that the complainant has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-
appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the
test of credibility, 8 for it is said that no woman in her right mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private
parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless
the story were true. 9
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been lived-in
partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at the porch of the house
of a certain Air Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the victim that evening. In his
appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation,
considering that: (a) in the house where the victim was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at
least three persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couple's son)
who could have responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the house was purposely left
unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come in to the house, and (c) when the victim was made to
climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The "sweetheart theory" of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy, often
resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any
sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic liaison
between accused-appellant and the complainant. The latter testified:
"Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
"A No sir.
"Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
"A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
"Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned because
your sweetheart was then womanizing?
"Prosecutor Manola:
Misleading your honor.
"Atty. Manalo:
I am on cross-examination your Honor.
"Court:
Answer.
"A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
"Atty. Manalo:
"Q Really?
"A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir." 10
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for petty reasons.
The trial court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:
 "This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez
were sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they
were sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and
hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate the
outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in
stabbing and hacking him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger
the way she did." 11
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the house where
victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already close to midnight when the incident
occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by then apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to
the effect that accused-appellant immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on
her mouth and threatened to kill her if she dared refuse to yield to his demands. Understandably, the victim
was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed into submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of the
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the offense and not by any kind of hard
and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect the victim to act with equanimity of disposition and to have
the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat made by accused-appellant. 12
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted accused-appellant
to have a chance to see her during the late evening indeed should deserve scant consideration. The so-called
love angle was properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of concrete evidence to establish any such
relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb a fence, it
should be enough to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the
intruder who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and while inside the abandoned and enclosed
house, she could not have done any much better since she was all the time within striking distance of the bolo-
wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
ignominy. LLpr
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. 13 The
law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise. 14 By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating
circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or it
facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from capture. 15 As an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the
Information. 16 The Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of
darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted
his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured
of the stillness of a sleeping world. 17 The Court has long held that this aggravating circumstance can be
considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from
his illegal act. 18
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina,
appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he
ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor General correctly
invoked the case of People vs. Saylan, 19 where this Court said:
"The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also 'the same position as dogs do'
i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because 'The studies of
many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and
often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.' (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the
sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise." 20
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating circumstance any
means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The
circumstance, it is said, 21 "pertains to the moral order [and] adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime."
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
 "1. By using force or intimidation;
"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death." 22
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to realize
his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be considered as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape 23 for not having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to make
the offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred "qualified rape" punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
In People vs. Garcia, 24 the Court declared:
"One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments
thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death penalty, that is, when
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by reason or
on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a
homicide is committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a special
complex crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered
as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees, and
not merely as aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty but do
not increase it to a higher degree. The original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments
of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered
only as aggravating circumstances (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934]; People vs. Jovellano,
et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17,
1994, 229 SCRA 289; People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA
309.) since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368
[1912]; People vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 73464,
August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged
with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned." 25
Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still
be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in "all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty therein
imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise ordered to be
paid by accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00
by way of indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial court.
SO ORDERED. cda
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO Z. DIZON, accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Appellant was charged with robbery with rape committed against Arlie Rosalin. Evidence for the
prosecution disclosed that about 9:30 p.m., appellant, armed with a fan knife, robbed Arlie of her jewelries and
cash and raped her inside a basketball court shielded by the high walls of the surrounding houses. He bit the
victim's nipples and vagina, banged her head on the hood of the taxi and on the wall, and forced her to put his
foul-smelling penis into her mouth. Appellant pleaded not guilty and interposed alibi. He was, however,
identified by the victim who declared that she was able to identify appellant by the mole on his cheek and his
body smeared with tattoos and that she took a good hard look at appellant's face every time they passed a well-
lit place and when she was forced to sit on top of him during the sexual act. The trial court convicted appellant,
considered cruelty and uninhabited place as aggravating circumstances and sentenced him to death. He was
ordered to pay the victim P200,000 moral damages. Hence, this appeal assailing the ruling of the trial court, his
identification and appreciation of the aggravating circumstances.
The Court ruled that alibi cannot prevail over clear and positive identification; that testimony, in the
absence of improper motive to falsely testify against accused, is credible; that cruelty is present where appellant
not only raped the victim but also subjected her to various dehumanizing indignities and subjected her to
unwarranted physical abuses; that a place may be considered uninhabited not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility
of the victim receiving some help. In the case at bar, aside from being dark, the basketball court was shielded
from public view by the high walls of the surrounding houses; and that ordinarily, rape victims are awarded a
minimum of P50,000 moral damages. The trial court was correct in ordering appellant to pay his victim P200,000
moral damages where the victim after being robbed and raped was subjected to unnecessary physical harm and
indignities.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED IN THE CASE

AT BAR, SUFFICIENT. — Appellant finds it unbelievable that private complainant was able to recognize him
"when she did not even touch his penis and test it for the presence of bolitas during his identification at the
Muñoz market." Private complainant did not have to do that. She was able to recognize appellant because of
his mole on the cheek and his body smeared with tattoos, and more importantly, because she repeatedly gazed
at appellant's face every time they passed a well-lit place on their way to the basketball court. She was also able
to take a good hard look at appellant's face and body while she was forced to sit on top of him during an
unwanted sexual act at the basketball court. This only shows that private complainant had ample opportunity
to behold the appellant so that she was able to positively identify the appellant as the one who robbed her and
sexually abused her.
2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER CLEAR AND POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED. — It is an
elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the appellant as the very
person who committed the crime.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE; REQUISITE OF PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY, NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In
order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. This, appellant miserably failed to do. It
was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the crime scene in Project 7, Quezon City,
considering that he claimed to have been a mere tricycle ride away in his house in San Jose del Monte, Quezon
City around the time of the commission of the crime.
4. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ABSENCE OF IMPROPER MOTIVE TO FALSELY TESTIFY AGAINST
ACCUSED RENDERS TESTIMONY CREDIBLE. — Considering all the foregoing, the trial court did not err in giving
full faith and credence to the testimony of private complainant. This, especially since appellant has not even
imputed any ill motive on the part of private complainant to testify falsely against him. Where there is no
evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the
accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.
 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURTS' APPRAISAL THEREOF ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT. — The matter of
assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial court who
had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, and to assess their
credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the records. Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on
the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would affect the result of the case. There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CRUELTY; CONSTRUED. — The term "cruelty" often
conjures bloody and gory images which are conspicuously absent in this case. However, as correctly pointed out
by the trial court, "the appreciation of cruelty, as an aggravating circumstance, is relative. It depends upon the
crime committed. As long as the wrong done in the commission of the offense is deliberately augmented and
that such wrong is not essential for the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose of the offender, the same could
be considered as aggravating. The nature of the wrong or the number thereof is immaterial."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST FOR CRUELTY TO BE APPRECIATED. — The trial court's pronouncement finds support
in a long line of jurisprudence. As held in People vs. Basao, People vs. Lacao, People vs. Ilaoa, People vs. Alban,
and other cases, the test of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong
by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering, or
outraged, or scoffed at his person or corpse. Where the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, inflicted on
the victim unnecessary physical and moral pain, with the intention of deliberately and inhumanly intensifying
or aggravating the sufferings of the victim, cruelty is present.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Tested against the foregoing yardstick, the element
of cruelty undoubtedly attended the commission of the crime in this case. As recounted by private complainant,
appellant not only raped her, but subjected her to various dehumanizing indignities, such as making her fondle
and put his foul-smelling penis in her mouth, forcing her to admire his bolitas, and demanding that she assume
embarrassing and indelicate positions. Furthermore, he viciously slammed her head against the hood of the taxi,
banged her head against the wall, and slapped her hard in the face whenever she failed to answer any of his
questions. All these wrongs were no longer necessary insofar as appellant's purpose of raping private
complainant was concerned. By subjecting her to these unwarranted physical and moral abuses on top of raping
her, appellant deliberately and inhumanly augmented her pain and sufferings, thus, committing cruelty.
9. ID.; ID.; UNINHABITED PLACE; HOW DETERMINED. — Whether or not a place may be considered
uninhabited is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or
not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASKETBALL COURT SHIELDED BY HIGH WALLS OF SURROUNDING HOUSES IS AN
UNINHABITED PLACE. — The situation is no different in the case at bar. Appellant precisely sought the solitude
of the basketball court to ensure that private complainant would not be able to call for, and receive, any help.
Aside from being cloaked by the darkness of the night, the basketball court was a relatively isolated place,
shielded from the public view by the high walls of the surrounding houses. Private complainant could have
screamed at the top of her lungs and nobody still would have heard her. Without a doubt, therefore, the trial
court properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place against appellant.
11. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; P200,000 AWARDED TO RAPE VICTIM AS MORAL DAMAGES; REASON. — The
trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim P200,000.00 as moral damages. Ordinarily, the victims of
rape are awarded a minimum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the factual circumstances of the case
at bar calls for a stiffer penalty. After robbing and raping the victim, appellant subjected the victim to physical
harm like biting her nipples and vagina; banging her head on the hood of the taxi and on the wall; and subjecting
her to indignities like holding and massaging his penis and worst of all, forcing her to put his foul-smelling penis
into her mouth. The trial court was correct in ordering the appellant to pay his victim the amount P200,000.00
as moral damages for all of these repulsive acts and P9,500.00 as actual damages for the money and valuables
taken from her.
12. ID.; ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES GRANTED TO RAPE VICTIM. — We also hold
that the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such
indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different jural foundations. Furthermore, under Article
2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Hence, We find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
proper. CEIHcT
 DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219,
in Crim. Case No. Q-97-71910, finding Renato Dizon y Zuela guilty of Robbery with Rape, attended by two
aggravating circumstances, imposing upon him the penalty of Death and ordering him to pay complainant Arlie
Rosalin P9,500.00 for actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
Culled principally from the testimony of private complainant, the facts of the case are as follows:
On July 7, 1997, around 9:30 p.m., private complainant Arlie Rosalin, then a 21-year old engineering
student from Dinalupihan, Bataan, alighted from a bus as it stopped by a small bridge along EDSA just before
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. 2 Seconds later, she heard someone call out "Miss!" and when she turned her
head around, she found appellant behind her. 3 Appellant suddenly seized her, pointing a fan knife to the side
of her neck, and announced a holdup. He then told her to face the railing of the bridge and asked for her wallet
and jewelry. Terrified, private complainant complied. Still not content, though, appellant got her backpack,
warning her that should he find another wallet inside, he would kill her and throw her over the bridge as he had
done to his other victims. 4
After appellant stripped her of her valuables, appellant instructed private complainant to walk with him
along EDSA and pretend that they were a couple. 5 They crossed Roosevelt Avenue, passed the Muñoz market,
then headed for Project 7. Private complainant could not ask for anyone's help because, all the while, appellant
had his arm around her and a knife pressed to her side. 6 Appellant further frightened her by telling her that he
had already killed many people. 7 Scared as she was, however, private complainant would furtively look at
appellant's face whenever they passed a lighted place, vowing to herself that should she ever be able to escape,
she would remember him and have him arrested. 8
After walking for some time, they finally reached a dark and empty basketball court. 9 There, appellant
ordered private complainant to remove her pants and underwear. Private complainant could not do anything
but follow appellant's orders since he was holding her at knifepoint. Besides, even if she screamed, nobody
would hear her. 10
Appellant kissed private complainant on the lips, neck, and breasts, which he also mashed. 11 He
likewise bit her nipple at least three times, as well as the right side of her back and vagina. 12 Unable to control
his lustful urges any longer, he forced her to bend forward over the hood of a taxi and, in this position, forcefully
penetrated her vagina with his organ. 13
After satisfying himself in this fashion, appellant ordered private complainant to hold and massage his
penis which, he boastfully informed the latter, carried bolitas. 14 He then forced her to put his foul-smelling
penis into her mouth, which sickened her to the pit of her stomach. 15
Still not done with her, appellant forced private complainant to lie on the ground. 16 Private complainant
could not fight off any of appellant's demands, because whenever she tried to resist, and whenever she failed
to answer any of his questions, he would bang her head on the hood of the taxi, slam her head on the wall, or
slap her hard in the face. 17
After appellant pushed private complainant to the ground, he went down on her and proceeded to ravish
her all over again. 18
Though admittedly spent by now, appellant still refused to let go of private complainant. Instead, he
made her sit astride over him, and to make sure she would not be able to escape, held her tightly by the hair
with both hands. 19 When private complainant balked at inserting his organ inside of hers, appellant removed
one hand from her hair and groped in the dark. 20 Sensing that he was reaching for his knife and would finally
kill her, private complainant struggled with all her might and broke free from appellant's hold. She scampered
to her feet, grabbed her pants, and ran as fast as she could away from appellant. 21
Soon, private complainant found a store that was about to close. She barged in, informing
the people that she had been raped, and pleaded for their help. However, the owner of the store did not want
to get involved. Instead, he reminded her to wear her pants, then referred her to the barangay. 22
When a barangay officer arrived, he accompanied her back to the basketball court, where they were
able to recover her shoes, underwear, and appellant's black cap. 23 Since appellant was no longer around,
private complainant just gave a description of him: he was dark, 5'3" to 5'4" in height, and with a body covered
with tattoos from the waist down. 24 Private complainant was then brought to the police station where her
statement was taken. 25
About three days later, the barangay informed private complainant that they already had a suspect who
matched appellant's description. Accompanied by policemen, among others, she went to the vicinity of the
Muñoz market, where appellant was reportedly working as a tricycle dispatcher. 26 After some anxious
moments of searching in the crowd, private complainant finally caught sight of appellant and pointed him out
to her companions. 27 One of the police officers accosted appellant and asked him if he knew private
complainant. 28 Upon seeing her, appellant pulled out the same fan knife he had earlier used on her. 29 He was
not quick enough, however, because the police officers were able to disarm him. Appellant was then handcuffed
and brought to the police station. 30
In an Information 31 dated July 14, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor Mercedes D. Penamora charged
appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 7th day of July, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with intent to gain, by means of force and violence against and/or intimidation
upon person did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the person of one ARLIE
ROSALIN y NICDAO in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned
while said complainant was walking along the sidewalk of EDSA, Muñoz, this city after alighting
from a passenger bus, said accused suddenly appeared and embraced complainant and at knife
point announced a hold-up and then and there rob, took and carted away the following items,
to wit:

One necklace w/pendant P300.00

Two (2) gold rings 5,000.00
One bag pack containing
Assorted clothes 2,000.00
One (1) paper bag (bench)
Containing stuff toys 200.00
Perfume 1,000.00
Cash 1,000.00
all in the total amount of P9,500.00, Philippine Currency, all belonging to said ARLIE
ROSALIN y NICDAO, to her damage and prejudice and on the occasion of the robbery, accused
with lewd designs and with force and intimidation and with use of a knife undressed said
complainant and put himself on top of her and have carnal knowledge with said ARLIE
ROSALIN y NICDAO against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of
the said ARLIE ROSALIN y NICDAO.
"Contrary to law."
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on August 7, 1997, with the assistance of Atty.
Donato A. Mallabo. 32 Trial proceeded in due course. The prosecution presented as witnesses the victim herself,
Arlie Rosalin; SPO1 Cristopher Hael, a police officer assigned at the Baler Police Station who testified on the
circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused; PO1 Emelito de la Cruz, the police investigator; and Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes, the PNP medico-legal officer who conducted the examination on Arlie Rosalin.
The appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. Appellant's testimony was not corroborated by any
other witness. His testimony consisted mainly of denials of his involvement in the crime being imputed against
him. He averred that as a tricycle dispatcher, he used to work from 7:00 o'clock to 11:00 o'clock in the morning
and from 2:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that on the evening of July 7, 1997, he was just at home
resting; that he was at work when he was arrested and when he was brought to the police station, he was
beaten up; that he told the police that he had nothing to do with what happened to the complainant and that
he saw her for the first time only when he was arrested; that he did not know of any reason why she singled
him out and filed a case against him; and that when he was brought to the fiscal, he again denied the charges
against him.
On July 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with rape under paragraph one, Article 294
 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, attended by two aggravating
circumstances, the Court hereby sentences him (1) to suffer the penalty of Death; (2) to
indemnify complainant Arlie Rosalin in the amount of P9,500.00 as actual damages; (3) to pay
her P200,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) to pay the costs.
"Let the records of the case be transmitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
"SO ORDERED."
Appellant impugns the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:
"1. The lower court erred in convicting the accused when in truth and in fact he was not
positively identified by the victim.
"2. The lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and
uninhabited place against the accused.
"3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with rape in violation of Art. 294, Par. 1 (should be par. 2) of the Revised
Penal Code." IcDCaT
We affirm the trial court's decision.
Being interrelated, appellant's first and third assigned errors, which boil down to a question of credibility
of the private complainant, will be discussed jointly.
In assailing the credibility of the private complainant, appellant puts the following in issue:
First, appellant states that he has only two hands; hence, it was impossible for him to remove his pants,
restrain private complainant, and hold a fan knife all at the same time.
Second, appellant points out an alleged inconsistency between private complainant's account of rape
and her alleged refusal to escape her rapist despite opportunity to do so.
Third, appellant argues that he was not positively identified by private complainant because somebody
had to tell her where he was when she and the police went out to look for him at the market place in Muñoz.
We find appellant's arguments to be untenable.
On the first point, it is not impossible for appellant to undress while holding his victim and a fan knife at
the same time. On direct examination, the private complainant testified thus:
"Q When he raped you did he remove his pants?
"A Yes, ma'am he removed his pants.
"Q When he removed his pants, did you run?
"A No, Ma'am because he was holding me and the knife was pointed at me.
"Q When he was holding you and the gun (sic) was pointing (sic) at you how did he remove
his pants?
"A Like this, ma'am . . .
"COURT INTERPRETER
Witness holding the right wrist of the Interpreter using the left hand. The witness
demonstrating that the accused was using his right hand holding the knife while
unbuttoning his pants and every time she would resist the accused would point the
knife at her." 33
Countless cases of rape have been committed in a similar fashion. We quote the pertinent portions of two
such cases:
". . . When she saw her father naked, she got scared and did not move. Because of her
refusal, her father poked a three-cantos knife at her neck and he undressed her by pulling down
her skirt and her panty until they were removed from her body. Her father then told her to sit
up and when she did, he pulled her t-shirt off her head. She cried and her father threatened to
kill her if her cries will be heard by others." 34
 ". . . The accused awakened Mergena upon arriving from a drinking session with his
brothers, pointed a knife at her and ordered her to stand up. When she refused to obey, he
pulled her up. He removed his short pants, then with a knife still pointed at her, removed her
skirt and made her lie down. He removed her panty and his underwear, separated her thighs
and inserted his penis into her vagina while fondling her breast. This entire time his left hand
was holding the knife." 35
On the second point, that private complainant could have escaped her captor with facility is something
easier said than done. Private complainant was a terrified captive, held fast at the wrist by appellant while the
latter, using his other hand, unbuttoned his pants, stopping only to brandish his fan knife at private complainant
whenever she showed the least sign of resistance. Overcome with fear, it is understandable why she was not
able to escape at that moment.
On the third point, contrary to appellant's assertion, private complainant was able to identify appellant
as her assailant. While somebody did point out to private complainant and her companions that they had
already passed the person they were looking for, this was understandable because the place where they were
searching was crowded. The failure to see is not the same as failure to recognize which is what is crucial in
identification. Nobody prodded her to point to appellant. Nobody told her that he was the malefactor. What is
important is that it was private complainant herself who had provided appellant's description and who, without
assistance, eventually picked him out from the crowd as the person who robbed and raped her.
Appellant finds it unbelievable that private complainant was able to recognize him "when she did not
even touch his penis and test it for the presence of bolitas during his identification at the Muñoz market."
Private complainant did not have to do that. She was able to recognize appellant because of his mole on the
cheek and his body smeared with tattoos, and more importantly, because she repeatedly gazed at appellant's
face every time they passed a well-lit place on their way to the basketball court. 36 She was also able to take a
good hard look at appellant's face and body while she was forced to sit on top of him during an unwanted sexual
act at the basketball court. 37
On cross-examination, private complainant testified thus:
"Q So much so that because his hands were placed around your neck and the knife was
pressed in your body, practically, you were closing your eyes, you just believed
whatever he tells (sic) you?
"A Everytime we would pass by a lighted area, even if I was scared, I would look at him, sir.
"Q But as much as possible, because you were scared and you were already angry, you would
not like to see the face of that stranger, right?
"A No, sir, because I was really trying to memorize the face." 38
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Why were you interested in the face of that stranger?
"A So that in case I would be able to escape, I would have him arrested." 39
And on re-direct examination, private complainant testified:
"Q Are you very sure that it was the accused now in this case who actually sexually abused
you?
"A Yes, ma'am I am sure.
"Q Why are you so sure?
"A Because I could see his face everytime I passed by a lighted area, ma'am (witness
crying)." 40
This only shows that private complainant had ample opportunity to behold the appellant so that she was able
to positively identify the appellant as the one who robbed her and sexually abused her.
In the light of this positive and direct evidence of appellant's culpability, the trial court correctly
discarded his defense of denial and alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and
positive identification of the appellant as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to
justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a)
he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. 41 This, appellant miserably failed to do. It
was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the crime scene in Project 7, Quezon City,
considering that he claimed to have been a mere tricycle ride away in his house in San Jose del Monte, Quezon
City around the time of the commission of the crime.
Considering all the foregoing, the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the testimony
of private complainant. This, especially since appellant has not even imputed any ill motive on the part of private
complainant to testify falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part
of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of
a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 42
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed
by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying,
and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the records. Hence, the court a
quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there
is a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart
from this rule. 43
On the second assigned error, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstances
of cruelty and uninhabited place against appellant. SITCcE
Indeed, the term "cruelty" often conjures bloody and gory images which are conspicuously absent in this
case. However, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, "the appreciation of cruelty, as an aggravating
circumstance, is relative. It depends upon the crime committed. As long as the wrong done in the commission
of the offense is deliberately augmented and that such wrong is not essential for the accomplishment of the
ultimate purpose of the offender, the same could be considered as aggravating. The nature of the wrong or the
number thereof is immaterial." 44
The trial court's pronouncement finds support in a long line of jurisprudence. As held in People vs.
Basao, 45 People vs. Lacao, 46 People vs. Ilaoa, 47 People vs. Alban, 48 and other cases, the test of cruelty is
whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not
necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering, or outraged, or scoffed at his person
or corpse. Where the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, inflicted on the victim unnecessary physical and
moral pain, with the intention of deliberately and inhumanly intensifying or aggravating the sufferings of the
victim, cruelty is present.
Tested against the foregoing yardstick, the element of cruelty undoubtedly attended the commission of
the crime in this case. As recounted by private complainant, appellant not only raped her, but subjected her to
various dehumanizing indignities, such as making her fondle and put his foul-smelling penis in her mouth, forcing
her to admire his bolitas, and demanding that she assume embarrassing and indelicate positions. Furthermore,
he viciously slammed her head against the hood of the taxi, banged her head against the wall, and slapped her
hard in the face whenever she failed to answer any of his questions. All these wrongs were no longer necessary
insofar as appellant's purpose of raping private complainant was concerned. By subjecting her to these
unwarranted physical and moral abuses on top of raping her, appellant deliberately and inhumanly augmented
her pain and sufferings, thus, committing cruelty.
Finally, appellant claims that the generic aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot be
appreciated against him since the basketball court where he supposedly brought his victim cannot be considered
an uninhabited place. Appellant cites private complainant's testimony that the basketball court was near a
highway and surrounded by houses.
We are not convinced.
Whether or not a place may be considered uninhabited, is determined not by the distance of the nearest
house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility
of the victim receiving some help. 49 In People vs. Desalisa, 50 the crime was considered as having been
committed in an uninhabited place because the killing was done during nighttime, and many fruit trees and
shrubs obstructed the view of neighbors and passersby. Similarly, in the case of People vs. Damaso, et al., 51 the
court, notwithstanding the close proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to the national
highway and some houses, still considered the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place because the killing
was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and
passersby. The situation is no different in the case at bar. Appellant precisely sought the solitude of the
basketball court to ensure that private complainant would not be able to call for, and receive, any help. Aside
from being cloaked by the darkness of the night, the basketball court was a relatively isolated place, shielded
from the public view by the high walls of the surrounding houses. 52 Private complainant could have screamed
at the top of her lungs and nobody still would have heard her. Without a doubt, therefore, the trial court
properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place against appellant.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 provides:
"ARTICLE 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. —
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."
In the case at bar, two (2) aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the robbery with rape,
thus the trial court correctly imposed on the appellant the penalty of death.
The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim P200,000.00 as moral damages. Ordinarily, the
victims of rape are awarded a minimum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the factual circumstances
of the case at bar calls for a stiffer penalty. After robbing and raping the victim, appellant subjected the victim
to physical harm like biting her nipples and vagina; banging her head on the hood of the taxi and on the wall;
and subjecting her to indignities like holding and massaging his penis and worst of all, forcing her to put his foul-
smelling penis into her mouth. The trial court was correct in ordering the appellant to pay his victim the amount
P200,000.00 as moral damages for all of these repulsive acts and P9,500.00 as actual damages for the money
and valuables taken from her. We also hold that the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, as it is
mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different
jural foundations. 53 Furthermore, under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 54 Hence, we find an
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. TIDHCc
Four Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional
and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 in
Crim. Case No. Q-71910 finding appellant Renato Dizon y Zuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with rape under paragraph one, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, attended
by two (2) aggravating circumstances, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay victim Arlie
Rosalin P200,000.00 as moral damages; and P9,500.00 as actual damages, with the MODIFICATION that he shall
further pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let certified copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forwarded
without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Dizon, G.R. No. 134802, [October 26, 2001], 420 PHIL 447-466)