CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Uganda’s history since independence in 1962 has been dominated by a series of military
coups and brutal regimes that were responsible for grave and systematic human rights
violations. The first post-colonial president of Uganda was the Kabaka of Buganda, Sir
Edward Muteesa II. Milton Obote, from Northern Uganda and long-time opponent of
autonomy for kingdoms in Southern Uganda, including the kingdom of Buganda, was prime
minister. On 24 May 1966, Obote ousted Muteesa and assumed his offices of president and
commander in chief. Obote further suspended the 1962 constitution, abolished kingdoms
and consolidated his control over the military by eliminating several rivals. 1

The first regime of Milton Obote ended in 1971, when his army commander, Gen Idi Amin
Dada took over power in a coup. Amin lasted for eight years and after his fall in 1979, Prof
Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa had short tenures.2 Uganda held elections in
1980, although disputed; the election ushered in the second rule of Milton Obote. In July
1985, Obote’s army general, Tito Okello Lutwa, overthrew and assumed his position in
government.3 Lutwa’s rule ended in January 1986, when Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the
incumbent, took over power in a coup.4 During these various regimes, rule of law was
suspended and a series of crimes were committed against civilians by both state and non-
state actors. The crimes usually depended on ethnic or regional background, religion and/or
societal status of the victim. The various governments subjected Ugandans to systematic

1
PM Mutibwa Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes (1992) 42 – 64.
2
Mutibwa (n 1 above) 78 – 96.
3
Obote, Amin and Lutwa were all from Northern Uganda and their governments and military largely consisted
of people from Northern Uganda.
4
T Allen & K Vlassenroot ‘Introduction’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and
Reality (2010) 7.

1
violations of human rights including arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings and
torture since independence. 5

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (a Munyankole from western Uganda) and his National Resistance
Army (NRA) seized control of the government in 1986 after nearly five years of bush
warfare, from General Tito Okello Lutwa (an Acholi from Northern Uganda). 6 Museveni’s
army consisted of mostly Banyankole senior and Baganda junior officers, commanding
mostly Baganda veterans and people from western Uganda recruited in the last months of
the war. In other words, Museveni’s power base was a largely southern army replacing the
northern political and military rule known since independence. 7

In the first decade of his rule, many considered President Museveni successful, as he
seemed to follow a more inclusive democratic path by supporting a new political formula to
restore civilian control, rule of law and economic growth. His government created a non-
partisan ‘democratic’ system that many enthusiastically embraced. His army was more
disciplined and responsive to civilian control than its predecessors and he restored
kingdoms that Obote had had been abolished in 1967.8 An elaborate consultative process
led to the 1995 constitution that entrenched rule of law and human rights in its provisions. 9

President Museveni’s government further showed considerable dedication to liberalising

the economy and disciplining expenditures. The economy grew steadily, becoming more
diversified and with a lower percentage of poverty. 10 However, the success of the first
decade of Museveni’s rule was marred in the second decade and many felt he was repeating
disruptive patterns of past presidents. Like them, he has failed to overcome the ethnic,

5 nd
PG Okoth ‘The Military in Transition to Democracy in Uganda’ in P Langseth et al., (eds) (2 ed) Uganda:
Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation’ (1997) 258–265.
6
Allen & Vlassenroot (n 4 above) 6.
7
International Crisis Group ‘Uganda: No Resolution to Growing Tension’ Africa Report No 187 (5 April 2012) 6;
referring to N Kasfir ‘’’Movement’’ Democracy, Legitimacy and Power in Uganda’ in J Mugaju & J Oloka-
Onyango (eds) No Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities (2000) 281.
8
The kingdoms were however, recognised as cultural and not political bodies.
9
BJ Odoki The Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission: Analysis and Recommendations (1993); in this
publication Odoki argues that the Constitution of Uganda must be seen as a ‘human rights charter’ since
human rights serves as the basis for all its provisions.
10
International Crisis Group (n 7 above) 6; newly discovered extensive oil reserves will generate additional
revenue that could stimulate additional development if used properly although to-date Uganda relies heavily
on donor funds.

2
regional and religious divisions that marred Uganda’s politics since independence and he
has increasingly relied on centralisation, patronage and coercion to maintain control. In
addition, the President Museveni’s government has confronted more rebellions in many
regions of the country than his predecessors have, the longest running being the LRA
conflict.11

After the coup by Museveni in 1986, Lutwa’s ousted army and the many civilian supporters
grouped and formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) that led a popular revolt
from Northern Uganda. The UPDA was defeated in 1987 and some of the fighters received
amnesty in accordance with the Amnesty Statute of 1987 that provided for general and
specific pardons to groups that were engaged in rebellion. 12 However, remnants and other
dissidents came together to form the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), led by Alice Auma
‘Lakwena.’ 13 For almost a year, Lakwena maintained the HSM insurgency, coming within 80
kilometres of Kampala, the capital of Uganda, before being defeated and fleeing into exile.14

11
International Crisis Group (n 7 above) 6; other rebel groups that cropped up to oppose Museveni’s rule
include the Uganda Peoples’ Army (UPA) composed of the Iteso and closely allied to the Langi; the West Nile
Bank Front (WNBF) formed by Juma Oris in 1998 and defeated by the NRA with the assistance of the Sudanese
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1998; some remnants thereafter formed the Uganda National Rescue Front
II which operated with Sudanese support in Aringa county in Arua district until it signed a cease fire with the
government in 2002; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) formed in 1996 by puritanical Muslim Ugandans of
the Tablighi Jamaat Sect after a merger with the remnants of the rebel National Army for the Liberation of
Uganda. The ADF rebel group was based in the Rwenzori mountains range along Uganda’s western border with
the DRC and by 1998 had carried out several attacks on civilians leading to large displacement. The group was
defeated in December 2005 with assistance from the Congolese government and the UN Peacekeeping
mission in Congo.
12
The National Resistance Council passed this Statute in 1987; under this Statute, four offences; genocide,
murder, kidnapping and rape were considered to heinous to be included within the ambit of the amnesty. The
Amnesty Statute professed to encourage various fighting groups and sponsors of insurgency to cease their
activities; it in particular targeted Ugandans in exile, many of whom were afraid to return home due to fear of
prosecution. Several people were detained but none was prosecuted for crimes excluded from the ambit of
the Amnesty Statute.
13
Allen & Vlassenroot (n 4 above) 8; see also ‘Northern Uganda Chronology’ Conciliation Resources
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/chronology.php (accessed 14 Nov 2011). ‘Lakwena’ is
an Acholi word meaning prophet and Alice Auma Lakwena claimed to be a prophetess sent by God, possessed
by a spirit that was guiding her for the good of the Acholi people. She claimed that she named her political
grouping the HSM because whatever action the group undertook was under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
For further reading see, R Schlenker Witchcraft and the Legitimisation of the State in Uganda MA Dissertation,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1999) 15-16; H Behrend ‘Alice Lakwena and the
Holy Spirit’ (1999) Ohio University Press 43; R Gersony The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field
Based Assessment of the Civil Conflict in Northern Uganda (1997) 24 – 25; R Doom & K Vlassenroot ‘Kony’s
Message: A New Koine? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda’ (1999) 98 (390) African Affairs 27.
14
‘Alice Lakwena, 51, Dies in Kenyan Refugee Camp’ Daily Nation 19 January 2007; for a long time, there were
talks and negotiations with the government to resettle Alice Lakwena in Uganda but this never happened and
died in Dadaad, a refugee camp in Kenya.

3
In 1988, Joseph Kony, a young relative of Lakwena claimed that the Holy Spirit had anointed
him to continue and complete the work that Lakwena had started. 15 In 1994, Kony’s small
group of rebels came to call itself the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). 16 Like Lakwena, Kony
promised to overthrow President Museveni’s government and to purify the Acholi people
from within. He also claimed that the Holy Spirit had revealed that both goals would be
accomplished through violence.17 Kony’s early campaign was not a particularly significant
affair, although with a small mobile group he maintained a degree of insecurity in
Acholiland. 18 This changed in 1994 when the National Islamic Front (NIF), the military junta
ruling the Sudan, began supporting the LRA in retaliation for the alleged support that
President Museveni’s government was giving to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). 19 The LRA from then on got a sound base in South Sudan were they received training
and weaponry, stepping up operations in Northern Uganda – mainly attacks against the
civilian population. 20

1.2 Consequences of the LRA conflict

The LRA’s central strategy is the abduction of civilians, mostly children. The abducted are
used to carry items looted from raided villages; most are taken to the LRA bases to be
trained as combatants and deployed in the frontline while some others, especially the girls

15
‘Profile: Joseph Kony’ BBC News, 7 Oct 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4320858.stm (accessed 15
Jan 2009); Allen & Vlassenroot (n 4 above) 9; Gersony (n 13 above) 26; Kony claimed that he inherited the
spiritual power from Lakwena and that he was anointed by God to continue with the work she had started. For
a long time, little was known about him. He used spiritualism and biblical revelations to maintain support and
terrorize his forces that are mainly abducted children. While it is clear the LRA is antigovernment, the group
never articulated a coherent political agenda until 2006 Juba peace negotiations when it claimed to be
representative of the people in Northern Uganda that it constantly terrorizes.
16
‘Northern Uganda: The Forgotten War’ Catholic Relief Service 2004
http://icar.gmu.edu/ICC/NorthernUganda.pdf (accessed 15 June 2009).
17
Amnesty International ‘Breaking God’s Commandments: The Destruction of Childhood by the Lord’s
Resistance Army’ AFR 59/001/1997 (1997) 4.
18
Gersony (n 13 above) 6; Acholiland is the area comprised of the original districts of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum;
occupied by the ethnic Acholi; these districts have in recent years been subdivided to include new districts
such as Amuru and Nwoya.
19
Allen & Vlassenroot (n 4 above) 9 – 10; Gersony (n 13 above) 35; Z Lomo & L Hovil ‘Behind the Violence:
Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda’ (2004) 11 Refugee Law
Project Working Paper 5; SPLA was the southern Sudan rebel movement (now in government of the newly
created state of South Sudan) that was fighting for the independence of South Sudan from the Islamic
dominated government in Khartoum.
20
As above; see also CR Soto Tall Grass: Stories of Suffering and Peace in Northern Uganda (2009) 31 – 35.

4
become sexual slaves and/or domestic workers. The abductees are tortured or killed if they
attempt to escape. 21 The World Development Report of 2007 estimates that 66,000 children
have been abducted by the LRA since the conflict began in 1986. 22 In 2003 because of the
increasing number of abductions, tens of thousands of children in Northern Uganda
commonly referred to as ‘night commuters’, travelled miles on foot to towns and city
centres to sleep in bus stations, churches, storefronts and on the street. By 2005, at least
50,000 children made this nightly sojourn.23 Parents who were afraid that the LRA would
attack or abduct their children if they stayed in the villages or IDP camps overnight sent
them to the towns. 24 The children, particularly girls, risked sexual violence and other forms
of abuse; they were attacked on the way to or at their night time sleeping places, as there
was no protection offered during the journey and no supervision in the night. 25

In April 1989, the government ordered the people out of their homes into ‘protected
villages’ or Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps that worsened the crisis. 26 The
government forced nearly two million people from their homes to IDP camps, entire villages
and gardens were razed to the ground to cut off means of subsistence and ensure that

21
P Pham et al., Abducted: the Lord’s Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda (2007) 18;
C Dolan ‘Which Children Count? The Politics of Children’s Rights in Northern Uganda’ in O Lucima (ed)
Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda (2002) 68; Human Rights
Watch Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda (2003) 15(12A) 16 – 28; RE Anderson et
al., ‘Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda’ (2004) World Vision Report 17 – 18.
22
See also Pham et al., (n 21 above) 20; estimate the number of abducted children between 1986 to 2006 at
24,000 to 38,000 children, and suggests that for every three children in the official reception count, ten youth
were actually abducted, suggesting a figure of at least 66,000 abductions in total; see also c Blattman & J
Annan ‘On the Nature and Causes of LRA Abduction: What the Abductees Say’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds)
The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010) 134 – 135.
23
Irin ‘Uganda: When the Sun Sets, We Begin to Worry’ IRIN in-depth - Life in Northern Uganda 5 January 2004
1.
24
As above; Soto (n 20 above) 162 – 186 gives a detailed account of the night commuter phenomena;
Anderson et al., (n 21 above) 19.
25
Soto (n 20 above) 171 – 176; from 22 to 25 June 2003, Acholi religious leaders, most notable, Bishop Odama,
Bishop Nelson Onono-Onweng, Bishop Baker Ochola, and Sheik Musa Khalil of the Acholi Muslim Community,
Fr. Carlos Rodríguez and Fr. Julius Orach spent the nights in the streets with the children trying to highlight
their suffering to the government and the international community. This to some extent highlighted the plight
of the children to the international community but drew a critical response from the government of Uganda
that wanted the international community to believe that the situation was firmly under its control and did not
warrant international scrutiny.
26
O Otunnu ‘Causes and Consequences of War in Acholiland’ in O Lucima (ed) Protracted Conflict, Elusive
Peace initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda (2002) 13; ‘Uganda Chronology’ Conciliation
Resources http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/chronology.php (accessed 21 Jan 2009);
there were at least 59 IDP camps created in the Acholi sub region as of 2006.

5
civilians leave. 27 The IDP camps were overcrowded, and they lacked basic social services like,
education, health, water, and sanitation. Surveys and reports estimated that about 1,000
civilians died per week in the camps from malnutrition, poor sanitation, and fires that often
ravaged the camps. In addition, the confinement of people in the camps without adequate
protection made it easier for the LRA to carry out raids and massacres. 28

One of the most notorious massacres perpetrated by the LRA was carried out at Patongo,
Pader district in November 2002, where the LRA murdered 20 people and the commander
of the group ordered that 2 bodies be dismembered and boiled in a pot in the presence of
survivors. 29 The first massacre perpetrated by the LRA took place in April 1995 in Atyak,
when a team of LRA rebels commanded by Vincent Otti, who was born in Atyak, lined up
more than 200 people on the bank of a river and shot them in cold blood. 30 In July 1996, the
LRA killed at least 150 Sudanese refugees in a succession of attacks in Acholi camp, a
Sudanese Refugee camp in Northern Uganda. In January 1997, the LRA clubbed or hacked to
death at least 400 civilians in villages in Lamwo County. In July 2002, the LRA killed 90
civilians, most of them children in Pajong village, Mucwini, Kitgum district. In October 2002,
the LRA killed at least 120 civilians in Amel village. In February 2004, the LRA killed at least
300 civilians, most burnt to death in Barlonyo IDP camp in Lira district among many other
massacres. A central feature in all these massacres is that the Ugandan army that in 1995
had been re-designated as the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) arrived long after
the LRA had gone.31

27
Soto (n 20 above) 121.
28
Human Rights Watch The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (1997) 29 – 30; A
Mwenda ‘Uganda’s Politics of Foreign Aid and Violent Conflict: the Political uses of the LRA Rebellion in T Allen
& K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010) 55; indicates for instance that in a
camp of 15,000 people, only 14 soldiers were deployed to protect the people and these soldiers were mainly
drawn from the local militia group rather than the mainstream army. Often, the soldiers lived inside the
camps, where the civilian population provided them as a human shield against rebel attacks. The government
put the people in camps and abandoned them.
29
Soto (n 20 above) 20.
30
Gersony (n 13 above) 38; Soto (n 20 above) 33; Vincent Otti was the LRA second in command and one of the
ICC indictees. There is an indication that he was executed on Kony’s orders in 2006 but his death is yet to be
independently verified, more discussion on Vincent Otti and the charges against him is contained in chapter
two and five of this thesis.
31
Soto (n 20 above) 33; Gersony (n 13 above) 39.

6
All these killings resulted in thousands of children being orphaned and heading households,
with only a few able to attend school or find sufficient means for support and protection;
girls were forced into early marriages and prostitution. 32 There was little or no access to
health care, hospitals and health centres were displaced or closed, and those that existed
did not have personnel to operate them. Education was disrupted; schools were closed or
displaced, leaving two generations of citizens in Northern Uganda without basic education. 33

Not only the LRA committed atrocities against civilians; Uganda security agents also
reportedly committed multiple violations of human rights in Northern Uganda, including
summary execution, torture, rape, recruitment of children in armed conflict, and inhuman
conditions of detention in unauthorised detention locations.34 In response to the LRA
conflict, the UPDF carried out three major operations, Operation North, Operation Iron Fist
and Operation Lightening Thunder as discussed below.

1.2.1 Operation North (1991)

The government of Uganda first launched an operation code named ‘Operation North’ in
March 1991. In preparation for the offensive and counterinsurgency the entire Northern
Uganda was locked down, all humanitarian organisations were forced to leave and a media
blackout was imposed. The government allegedly committed serious human rights
violations against civilians during this period, including torture of about three dozen
prisoners in an underground pit in Gulu, extra-judicial killings and detention of 18 prominent
politicians and local leaders among hundreds of other people from Acholi. 35

As part of the operation, the then Minister for the North, Betty Bigombe, created the Arrow
Boys, composed of locally recruited young men mostly armed with bows and arrows as a
form of local defence. 36 The creation of this group led Kony to believe that he had lost the

32
Human Rights Watch (n 28 above) 35.
33
Human Rights Watch (n 28 above) 35 – 36; Otunnu (n 26 above) 13; Dolan (n 21 above) 71.
34
Gersony (n 13 above) 45 – 47; Human Rights Watch (n 28 above) 41 – 47.
35
Allen & Vlassenroot (n 4 above) 11; Human Rights Watch (n 28 above) 41 – 47; Gersony (n 13 above) 31- 32;
Amnesty International ‘Human Rights Violations by the National Resistance Army’ (1991) Amnesty
International AFR59/20/91 10 - 15.
36
Gersony (n 13 above) 31.

7
population support and he blamed civilians for the cooperation with and perceived support
of the government. He therefore escalated the reprisals and intensified killings. 37 The LRA
started mutilating civilians; cutting off hands, noses and ears; padlocking mouths shut
through holes cut in lips, or simply hacking civilians to death with machetes. 38

‘Operation North’ did not succeed in destroying the insurgency, so Betty Bigombe, leading a
delegation of elders and religious leaders from Acholiland initiated the first face-to-face
meeting with representatives of the LRA. 39 The LRA asked for general amnesty for its
combatants and stated that they would not surrender but were willing to return ‘home’.
There were several meetings and protracted negotiations but the parties failed to reach an
agreement. 40

The LRA broke off negotiations on 2 February 1994 and President Museveni in turn gave a
seven-day deadline for the LRA to surrender. 41 These events ended the peace initiative and
led to the retreat of the LRA into South Sudan and the continued attacks against civilians in
Northern Uganda.42 There were several other attempts at peace talks after this, mainly
spearheaded by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) that managed to keep
open a window of communication with the LRA. There was mention of peace negotiations
but neither the LRA nor the government of Uganda committed to it. 43

37
Accord ‘Uganda: Northern Uganda Chronology’ http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-
uganda/chronology.php (accessed 15 April 2011).
38
C Dolan ‘What do you Remember? A Rough Guide to the War in Northern Uganda’ (1986 – 2000) (2000) 33
COPE Working Paper 15.
39
Gersony (n 13 above) 32; states that observers who resided in Gulu at the time indicate that the operation
had a significant impact on the LRA; its military strength significantly reduced and its movement was greatly
curtailed, therefore question why the UDPF did not take that opportunity to destroy the movement.
40
Accord ‘Uganda: Northern Uganda Chronology’ available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/Northern
Uganda/chronology.php (accessed 15 April 2011).
41
RR Atkinson ‘The Realists in Juba? An Analysis of the Juba Talks’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s
Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010) 205; states that the explanation that the government gave for this
abrupt announcement was that the military intelligence of the LRA had contacted the Sudanese government
that had agreed to give the LRA arms and other support.
42
As above; see also CCM Lamwaka ‘Civil War and the Peace Process in Uganda 1986 – 1997’ (1998) 4(2) East
African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 155.
43
T Allen Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (2006) 78; the ARLPI
and other groups kept pushing for peace talks and in May 2004 Betty Bigombe travelled to Sudan to make
contact with the LRA leader, but failed in the endeavour.

8
1.2.2 Operation Iron Fist (2002)

In March 2002, the UPDF launched a massive military offensive code-named ‘Operation Iron
Fist’ against the LRA bases in South Sudan. 44 The government in Khartoum allowed the
UPDF over its borders to hunt down the LRA. The US state department had named the LRA a
‘terrorist group’. This agreement was therefore part of the Khartoum government’s efforts
to broadcast its new status as an engaged member of the international community by
distancing itself from the LRA. The agreement, coupled with the return of the UPDF that had
been deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), created what the Ugandan
government felt was an ideal situation in which to end a conflict that had become an
embarrassment and a political liability. 45

The purported aim of the offensive was to eradicate the LRA insurgency; instead, the LRA
moved bases from South Sudan into Uganda and the conflict in Uganda intensified. The LRA
escalated attacks, abductions, killings, burning, looting and ambushes on vehicles. 46 The LRA
also began to move into areas outside Acholiland, in apparent search for support. However,
when the local populace resisted, they extended the attacks to Northeast and Eastern
Uganda resulting into widespread displacement and suffering in those regions. 47

Following the devastation caused by the ‘Iron Fist’ operation, the LRA conflict gained
unprecedented international scrutiny and involvement. In November 2003, the then United
Nations Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator,
Jan Egeland undertook a field visit to Uganda, bringing attention to the conflict. 48 Total
humanitarian funding increased from 19.5 million US dollars to 56 million US dollars in 2007.

44
‘Uganda-Sudan: No Rapid Solution in anti-LRA Campaign’ Irin Plus News 27 May 2002
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=32074 (accessed 30 May 2011).
45
S Perrot ‘Northern Uganda: A “Forgotten Conflict” Again? Impact of the Internationalisation of the
Resolution Process’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010) 190.
46
Human Rights Watch (n 25 above) 3;
47
Lomo & Hovil (n 19 above) 34 – 35; ‘Uganda: Feature – Hope for Peace in North and End to Suffering’ Irin
News 12 March 2003 http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=42034 (accessed 14 Feb 2008).
48
Perrot (n 45 above) 187; see also ‘Uganda Conflict Worse than Iraq’ BBC News 10 November 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3256929.stm (accessed 16 January 2009).

9
In addition, total official development assistance and aid increased from 817 million US
dollars in 2000 to 1.2 billion US dollars in 2005. 49

In December 2003, President Museveni referred the LRA situation to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) that promptly started investigations. 50 On 14 April 2004, for the first
time, the United Nations Security Council publicly condemned the atrocities committed by
the LRA and expressed concern for the plight of the displaced people.51 In 2005, the ICC
unsealed warrant of arrest against five LRA commanders; Joseph Kony, the LRA leader;
Vincent Otti, the LRA second in command; Okoth Odhiambo; Dominique Ongwen and Raska
Lukwiya who all held senior posts of equal ranks forming the ‘Control Altar’ that represents
the core LRA leadership responsible for devising and implementing LRA strategy. 52 The
warrant of arrest contained general allegations that the LRA were responsible for mass
atrocities against civilians in Uganda.53

Previous attempts to bring international attention to the conflict had been thwarted by the
government of Uganda that repeatedly indicated that the conflict was internal and firmly
within its control. The government claimed that a military victory against the LRA was
imminent and would be achieved in a matter of weeks. 54 It became clearer with passing

49
Perrot (n 45 above) 189; referring to World Bank World Development Indicators Database: Uganda Data
Profile (2007); UNOCHA Financial Track Service: Uganda (2000), (2002) & (2007).
50
‘President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC’ ICC Press
Release ICC-20040129-44.
51
‘Press Statement on Northern Uganda by Security Council President’ UN Security Council Press Release
(SC/8057) AFR/900 14 April 2004 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8057.doc.htm (accessed 10
March 2009); the Security Council has since then monitored the situation of the LRA conflict, for instance in
2006, Security Council Resolution 1653 (Jan 2006) condemned the LRA alongside other rebel forces operating
in the Great Lakes region and called upon the government to renew its commitment to end the conflict and
respond to the humanitarian situation; Security Council Resolution 1663 (March 2006) called upon the
Secretary General to continuously appraise himself of and make recommendations to the Council about the
situation; in May 2007, the Security Council reported that the LRA had not released any children, women or
non-combatants from its ranks and voiced deep concern over the issue. The Security Council report also stated
that government security forces continue to occupy schools in abandoned communities.
52
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Situation in Uganda ‘Public Redacted Version: Warrant of Arrest, Joseph Kony,
Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominique Ongwen and Raska Lukwiya’ ICC- 02/04 (8 July 2005) paras 7, 8 & 9.
53
As above para 5.
54
Perrot (n 45 above) 196; the position of the government was supported by its close allies, the US and the UK
in the Security Council and also by Russia and China that have consistently advocated for non interference in
national sovereignty. Therefore, attempts to place the situation on the Security Council agenda or to mandate
a UN military intervention failed. Uganda continued to convince the UN that a military victory in the LRA
conflict was imminent. Uganda further committed to giving regular updates on the situation in Northern

10
years that the government did not have the ability, or at least the willingness to handle the
humanitarian crisis and to end the conflict. In 2005, the UN Secretary General in a report on
the protection of civilians in armed conflict compared Uganda to Eastern DRC and Darfur
and alluded to the Ugandan lack of adequate and sustained effort to handle the
humanitarian crisis and security for the affected population. The report also pointed out the
forcible displacement of civilians into poorly protected camps without adequate basic social
services that worsened the humanitarian situation. Reports like this, the increased
international focus on the LRA conflict and the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda
was especially embarrassing for the government of Uganda as exactions and business of the
UPDF and other security organs were closely scrutinised.55 This grudgingly led to a renewed
interest in peace negotiations with the LRA.

On 28 June 2006 in an interview aired on BBC, Kony denied committing atrocities and
appeared to call for an end to hostilities; 56 this was in response to an announcement by
President Museveni that he would guarantee the safety of Kony if peace were agreed to by
July 2006. President Museveni pledged to grant Kony total amnesty and call off ICC
investigations if he gave up ‘terrorism’ by that date.57 In June 2006, the government of
South Sudan formally invited Uganda to attend peace talks in Juba - South Sudan.58 Uganda
accepted the invitation to the Juba talks mediated by Riek Machar, the Vice President of
South Sudan. The talks began on 14 July 2006. The then, Internal Affairs Minister, Dr.
Ruhakana Rugunda, leader of the government delegation, stated that his main priority was

Uganda and initiated the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) that gave regular updates to the development
partners and lessened the pressure to put the situation in Northern Uganda on the Security Council agenda.
55
Perrot (n 45 above) 195; this report came out almost at the same time with the ICJ ruling in December 2005
of the UPDF violations in the territories of DRC.
56
This interview was conducted by Sam Farmer of Times (London) and was broadcast live on BBC News
Tonight on 28 June 2006 at 2130BST/2230GMT; during the interview, Kony denied committing atrocities.
Although atrocities committed by the LRA against civilians in Uganda, South Sudan and DRC are well
documented and thousands of civilians, including children who returned over the years from LRA captivity
have given accounts the atrocities committed against them and others while with the LRA. It is interesting to
contrast this BBC story with accounts by Mareike Schomerus who was also present during the interview; M
Schomerus ‘Chasing the Kony Story’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and
Reality (2010) 93 - 112.
57
‘Museveni Pledges to Grant Kony Amnesty’ Uganda Radio Networks 4 July 2006
http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=6351 (accessed 15 Feb 2009).
58
‘Uganda: Government to send Team to Sudan over Proposed LRA Talks’ IRIN News 28 June 2006.

11
to obtain a quick ceasefire. 59 The LRA delegation, led by Martin Ojul, stated that the LRA did
not accept peace talks because they could no longer fight but suggested that the LRA
deemed negotiations as the best way to end the conflict.60

The Juba talks then commenced with an agreed five point agenda including cessation of
hostilities; comprehensive solutions to the problems of Northern Uganda; accountability
and reconciliation; official end of war; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
(DDR) of LRA combatants. 61 On 26 August 2006, the government and LRA representatives
signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Under the agreement, the LRA forces were to
leave Uganda and gather in two assembly areas protected by the government of South
Sudan on the understanding that the UPDF would not attack those areas. By mid September
2006, the LRA had begun gathering in the assembly areas. 62 On 29 June 2007, the two sides
agreed on the principles of how questions of accountability and reconciliation would be
handled. The parties agreed that both formal domestic criminal justice procedures and
traditional justice would play a role. 63 Following this, the government of Uganda through a
Legal Notice created a new Division of the High Court – the International Crimes Division
(ICD) to adjudicate international crimes. 64

The parties signed an accord on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration on 29

February 2008, leaving the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement itself as the last
missing action. The mediator planned several ceremonies for the signing, but Kony
repeatedly failed to appear to sign the deal. 65 Kony demanded that the ICC first drops its
warrant of arrest for the LRA to accept signing of a comprehensive peace deal. He also

59
Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda later became Ugandan representative in the Security Council, following the selection
of Uganda as a non-permanent member. The author conducted an informal discussion with him on his role in
the peace talks on 14 April 2009 in New York where he was based. After 2011 elections, he was appointed as
Minister in the new cabinet.
60
‘Ceasefire First on Kony’s Agenda’ Daily Monitor 15 July 2006 1.
61
Atkinson (n 41 above) 214 - 217.
62
‘Uganda: Most Rebels have left Northern Uganda for South Sudan – army’ IRIN News 26 September 2006.
63
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation clause 3.1.
64
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation clause 2.1; stipulates that national legal arrangement
composed of both formal and non formal measures to ensure justice and reconciliation should be created; the
International Crimes Division was thus created through a Legal Notice in 2008 as the War Crimes Division of
the High Court of Uganda and in 2011 re-designated, the International Crimes Division; Legal Notice No. 10 of
2011, The High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions 2011 clause 3.
65
‘Uganda Rebels Delay Signing Peace Deal’ Reuters 11 April 2008 http://www.france24.com/en (accessed 20
Jan 2009).

12
stated that he was seeking clarifications on the operation of the traditional justice
mechanism and the kind of punishments domestic prosecutions would levy. Kony thereafter
claimed that his negotiating team had misled him on the true nature of the agreement and
suspended them.66

On 11 April 2008, Kony declared in a communiqué that all the signed agreements were
invalid, except the Cessation of Hostilities, which he agreed to extend for five days. This
marked the end to the peace talks. Since the failure of the talks, the LRA carried out several
attacks in South Sudan and the DRC from its new base in Garamba National Park. 67 In one
reported attack in 2008, the LRA killed at least 400 people in a number of villages in the DRC
on and after Christmas day. 68

1.2.3 Operation Lightening Thunder and ‘exportation’ of the LRA conflict

On 14 December 2008, the armed forces of Uganda (UPDF), the DRC Forces Armées de la
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and South Sudan (SPLA) with military and
logistical support from the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Congo (MONUSCO) and
the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) launched a joint military offensive on the LRA. The aim
of the offensive was to root out the rebel group that had become a regional problem. 69 The
military offensive, code named ‘Operation Lightening Thunder’ 70 failed in its stated aim of
rooting out the LRA conflict, instead the LRA rebels scattered across the region, conducting
ruthless reprisal attacks against civilians in South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic. 71

66
‘Uganda Rebels Suspend Talks, Appoint New Team’ the Sudan Tribune 10 April 2008
http://www.sudantribune.com/Ugandan-rebels-suspend-peace-talks,26715 (accessed 20 Feb 2011).
67
‘Congo Terror after LRA Raids’ BBC News 23 Oct 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7685235.stm
(accessed 14 November 2009).
68
‘LRA Rebels Commit New Atrocities’ BBC News 16 Jan 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7834242.stm
(accessed 12 Dec 2009).
69
‘UN unanimously backs offensive against Lord’s Resistance Army’ Reuters 22 Dec 2008
http://www.france24.com/en (accessed 20 Jan 2009); this military offensive was unanimously backed by the
United Nations Security Council that released a statement commending the states in the region for their
increased cooperation and the joint effort made to address the security threat posed by the LRA.
70
Allen & Vlassenroot (n 4 above) 19; this operation was based on a security agreement between Uganda,
Southern Sudan and the DRC that had been negotiated back in June 2008. At the end of August 2008, an
agreement had also been concluded between the members of the Tripartite-plus-One Mechanism (including
DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) to neutralise the LRA.
71
Perrot (n 45 above) 209; ‘Living in Fear after LRA atrocities’ BBC News 28 Jan 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7852086.stm (accessed 20 Dec 2009).

13
Most LRA fighters shifted to the remote Garamba National Park establishing a secure base
from which they now raid the region. 72

The LRA conflict is one of Africa’s longest conflicts and it steadily intensified, spreading from
Acholiland to Eastern and West Nile regions of Uganda to the tri-border area of DRC, South
Sudan and Central African Republic.73 The spread of the conflict is a clear manifestation of
how an internal conflict can easily be ‘exported’ to have repercussions on neighbouring
countries. Indeed, Africa Great Lakes Region has experienced recurrent and devastating
armed conflicts as well as humanitarian crises that sometime spill across borders. In various
parts of the region, the legacy of colonialism, ethnic conflict, weak state structures, and the
illegal exploitation of natural resources have given rise to a vicious cycle of violence,
displacement, and institutional collapse.74

In addition, countries in the region have actively extended military, logistic, economic and
financial support to irregular forces operating in the neighbouring territories, which has led
to suspicion and mistrust among the regional governments. For instance, immediately after
the ICC unsealed the LRA warrant of arrest, the government of Uganda announced its
72
Human Rights Watch ‘CAR/DR Congo: LRA Conducts Massive Abduction Campaign, New Regional Strategy
Needed to Protect Civilians and Rescue Children’ (11 August 2010)
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/11/cardr-congo-lra-conducts-massive-abduction-campaign (accessed
09 Dec 2010); to date, the LRA continue to conduct highly coordinated and ruthless attacks against civilians; a
website administered by the Invisible Children and Resolve ‘The LRA Crisis Tracker’ provides regular updates
on LRA activities in the region, available at http://www.lracrisistracker.com/#updates (accessed 16 July 2012).
73
J Spiegel & J Prendergast ‘A New Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda and the LRA (Strategy Paper)’ Enough
Project 18 May 2008 http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/new-peace-strategy-northern-uganda-and-
lra (accessed 17 Jan 2012).
74
M Mamdani When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2011) 36;
indicating that the genocide in Rwanda finds roots in the invasion of Rwanda by the Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF) (composed of refugees and sons of refugees who fled Rwanda due to ethnic purges by the Hutu
dominated government) from Uganda with support of the NRM government in Uganda. By providing this
support, Uganda exported its first political crisis since coming into power in 1986 to Rwanda; see also ‘Congo
Civil War’ Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo.htm (accessed 22 Nov
2011); ‘Congo War Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a month: Study’ Reuters 22 Jan 2008
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/uscongo-democraticdeathidUSL22280201220080122 (accessed
22 Nov 2011); ‘Evaluating Peace and Security in the DRC and US Policy in the Great Lakes Region’ Africa Faith
and Justice Network http://afjn.org/focus-campaigns/promote-peace-d-r-congo/30-
commentary/788evaluating-peace-and-stability-in-the-rdc-and-us-policy-in-the-great-lakes-region.html
(accessed 22 Nov 2011); indicating that from 1996, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola supported the rebel group,
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo until the overthrow of the then President, Mubotu
Sese Seko. In addition the Congo War (1998 to 2003) drew in eight African Nations including Rwanda, Uganda,
Sudan and twenty five armed groups becoming the deadliest conflict since World War II killing an estimated
3.8 million people; millions displaced and millions sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Uganda,
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.

14
intention to re-enter South Sudan to ‘hunt down’ the indicted LRA leaders and hand them
over to the ICC. 75 Previous incursion of Uganda into South Sudan intensified the conflict in
Uganda and spread it to the eastern part of the country. It also led to unprecedented
number of abductions in the country giving birth to the ‘night commuter’ phenomena.
Uganda also used the execution of arrest warrants as reason to re-enter the DRC, a move
that the Congolese government resisted. 76 The UPDF had prior to this, invaded the DRC with
a stated mission of protecting its borders from the militias in the country but, the Congolese
government later accused them of aggression, massive looting, and atrocities against
Congolese civilians. 77

Nonetheless, the concerned governments put their mistrust and suspicion aside and
together deployed troops to fight the LRA and protect civilians in the affected areas, but
these are too few and ill equipped to provide adequate protection. MONUSCO has also
deployed about 1,000 peacekeepers in the LRA affected areas in north North-Eastern DRC, a
number, which, according to Human Rights Watch, are too few considering the scale and
geographical breadth of the problem, so civilians remain vulnerable to LRA attacks. 78

75
‘US Lawyer to Probe Kony’ the Daily Monitor 5 Feb 2004.
76
’Museveni Wants to Hunt LRA in Congo’ the New Vision 19 June 2006.
77
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) ICJ
(19 Dec 2005) ICJ Reports (2005) 168; the facts in this case were allegations by the DRC that Uganda violated
article 2(4) of the UN Charter and committed acts of aggression against it. In the application, the DRC argued
that such armed aggression had involved among others a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
violations of international humanitarian law and massive violations of human rights. Uganda disputed the
claim and counter claimed that the DRC had committed acts of aggression towards it, when it attacked its
diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa as well as other Ugandan nationals. In the judgment on merits,
the ICJ recognised the complex and tragic situation which had long prevailed in the Great Lakes region and the
suffering by the local populations. The ICJ observed that instability in the DRC had had negative security
implications for Uganda and some other neighbouring states and that by actively extending military, logistic,
economic and financial support to irregular forces operating in the territory of DRC, Uganda had violated the
principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention. The ICJ also
decided that there was credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the UPDF
were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of Congo’s natural resources and that the military
authorities did not take any measures to put an end to these acts. To further demonstrate the complex
situation in the Africa Great Lakes, in less than 2 months after issuing this decision, on 3 Feb 2006, the ICJ
rendered its decision on the preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility raised by Rwanda in the
case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the DRC (New Application: 2002) The Democratic Republic
of Congo v Rwanda).
78
‘CAR/DR Congo: LRA Conducts Massive Abduction Campaign, New Regional Strategy Needed to Protect
Civilians and Rescue Children’ Human Rights Watch 11 August 2010
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/11/cardr-congo-lra-conducts-massive-abduction-campaign (accessed
9 Dec 2010).

15
The LRA maintains its brutal practice that includes; massacres, mutilations, abduction of
civilians, mainly children to serve as soldiers and sex slaves, looting and pillage directed at
civilian populations. These atrocities have led to massive displacement and humanitarian
crisis in a region already devastated by numerous conflicts. 79 Since 2009 the LRA have killed
more than 2000 people, abducted more than 2,500 and displaced over 380,000 in the tri-
border area of South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic though no atrocities have
been perpetrated by the LRA in Uganda since 2006. 80 A worrying development is that the
LRA tucked away in the tri-border of the DRC, South Sudan and Central African Republic is
slipping down the priority list for Uganda. The government redeployed at least two UPDF
battalions from Central African Republic to the volatile Karamoja region of Uganda in July
2010.81 Other competing priorities include Uganda’s engagement with the African Union
Mission in Somalia (ANISOM) where Uganda currently has 4,600 troops and as of April 2011
planned to send 4000 more. 82

A ray of hope to end the LRA conflict and capture its leaders is the initiative by the African
Union (AU) that has set up a regional mechanism aimed at implementing a comprehensive
strategy to address the problems posed by the LRA in the region. 83 Since its launch, the AU
initiative has generated high expectations and hopes in the affected countries and attracted
interest from a number of international partners, including the European Union, the US and
the United Nations. 84 In particular, the US President, Barack Obama in May 2009 signed the
LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. This law promises to renew

79
S Paterno ‘The Uganda LRA Allowed to Plunder’ the Sudan Tribune 12 Feb 2009
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30154 (accessed 23 Nov 2010).
80
Resolve ‘From Promise to Peace: A Blueprint for President Obama’s LRA Strategy’ (September 2010); the
report and statistics are available on the Resolve website www.theresolve.org/the-crisis (accessed 14 March
2011).
81
L Cakaj, ‘Field Dispatch: Disturbing Developments in the Hunt for Kony’ Enough Project (29 June 2010).
82
‘Uganda to Increase its Troops in Somalia’ Hiraan 25 April 2011
http://www.jiraan.com/news2/2011/apr/uganda_to_increase_it_s_troops_in_somalia.aspx (accessed 17 April
2011).
83
‘The African Union Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army’ was adopted by
st
Peace and Security Council of the African Union in its 321 Meeting held on 22 May 2012 in Addis Ababa; see
http://www.peaceau.org/fr/article/321st-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-au-led-regional-
cooperation-initiative-against-the-lord-s-resistance-army-rci-lra?culture=en&changeculture=0& (accessed 09
July 2012).
84
‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalisation of the AU led Cooperation Initiative
th
Against the Lord’s Resistance Army’ African Union, Peace and Security Council 299 meeting in Addis Ababa
Ethiopia (22 Nov 2011) PSC/PR/(CCXCVIX) para 16 & 23; the AU plans to open an office in the region to keep a
close eye on the situation.

16
commitments to assist civilians susceptible to LRA attacks and bring the LRA leadership to
justice by devising an interagency strategy to prevent LRA violence by apprehending LRA
leaders; encouraging defections of mid field commanders; demobilising child soldiers; and
investing in sustainable peace. 85 In addition, in October 2011, the US sent one hundred
‘combat equipped’ troops to Uganda to help and advice forces battling the LRA. 86

Religious and traditional leaders in Uganda have also continued a coordinated effort to
promote dialogue and ensure a peaceful outcome of the conflict. They are acting in
collaboration with religious, traditional and civic leaders in the countries affected by the
conflict. A number of these leaders from the affected countries pooled resources across
borders and in March 2009 formed the Regional Civil Society Task Force. This taskforce is
building on the long experience of Northern Ugandan civil society in dealing with the LRA to
develop a collective peace building capacity. Through shared analysis and experiences, the
Task Force advocates regional solution to the conflict and face-to-face talks with the LRA. 87

The two conflict resolution methods that have been prominent from the start of the conflict
- military solution or a negotiated settlement – are still being pursued. Both mechanisms will
require a sustained commitment and new diplomatic, financial and material resources from
the governments and partners at the regional and international level to coordinate a
successful regional effort to end the LRA conflict. The success of this endeavour will open up
space to address accountability for atrocities perpetrated in the conflict comprehensively.
The first step in ensuring accountability would be to arrest the LRA leadership; prevent the
LRA from continuing to commit atrocities against civilians in the region and end the LRA
insurgency. As a minimum, there is a need to mitigate the effects of the conflict by
enhancing protection of civilians, demobilising and reintegrating members of the LRA forces
and providing increased humanitarian assistance to communities affected by the conflict.

85
Resolve (n 80 above).
86
‘Obama Sends 100 US troops to Uganda to Fight LRA’ New Vision 14 October 2011 1.
87
E Drew ‘Regional Community Peace Building and the LRA Conflict, A Conversation with John Baptist Odama,
Archbishop of Gulu, Uganda’ Conciliation Resources Services http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cross-
border-project/regional-community-peacebuilding.php (accessed 10 Feb 2011); the Task Force faces huge
challenges that include developing relationships across great distances with limited resources, little
infrastructure and multiple language barriers.

17
Nonetheless, the Juba talks ensured calm and stability in the affected areas in Uganda and
the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed in 2007 has set the pace for
accountability pursuits in Uganda.88 The Agreement provides for formal criminal and civil
undertaking, use of traditional justice, truth telling and other national measures of
reparations for victims. 89 Accordingly, in 2008, the government of Uganda through the
Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) established a high level Transitional Justice Working
Group (TJWG) to give effect to the provisions of the Agreement. The TJWG is comprised of
five thematic sub-committees including; international crimes prosecutions; truth and
reconciliation; traditional justice; sustainable funding; and integrated systems.

In line with the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation that calls for wide
consultations with all stakeholders, 90 JLOS started a process of countrywide consultations to
get views on appropriate accountability and reconciliation forums.91 In addition, in 2008,
the government of Uganda through a Legal Notice created the ICD to adjudicate
international crimes and the division is operational. 92 Its first trial began in 2011 against
Thomas Kwoyelo, a former LRA commander captured in the DRC in 2008. 93 The Prosecutor
arraigned Kwoyelo in September 2010 and his trial at the ICD commenced on 11 July 2011
after several delays. In a November 2011 constitutional petition, Kwoyelo challenged his
prosecution as amounting to unequal treatment before the law (Amnesty Act); the
Constitutional Court declared the Amnesty Act constitutional, that Kwoyelo’s prosecution
amounted to unfair treatment and accordingly ordered the ICD to cease his trial. 94 The state
is set to appeal this decision. 95

88
Accountability pursuits were launched by the Justice Law and Order Sector in its Third National Forum held
between 30 July and 1 August 2008 in Entebbe, Uganda, for more see www.jlos.go.ug/ (accessed 09 July 2012).
89
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation clause 3.1.
90
Agreement clause 2.4.
91
JLOS Report Transitional Justice in Northern, Eastern Uganda and some parts of West Nile Region (March
2008); JLOS in addition carried out consultations in eight sub-regions including Buganda, Teso, Bugisu,
Bugwere, Busoga, Karamoja, Acholi, Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro, Lango and West Nile of Uganda.
92
Legal Notice No. 10 of 2011, The High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions 2011 clause 3.
93
Thomas Kwoyelo was detained in the maximum prison of Uganda at Luzira and was in detention for at least
two years before his trial commenced.
94
Thomas Kwoyelo Alias Latoni v Uganda Constitutional Petition No.036/11(Reference) [Arising Out of HCT-00-
ICD-Case No. 2/10] Ruling of the Court at para 625.
95
Further discussion of this case is contained in chapter four of this thesis.

18
Since 2009, the TJWJ has been undertaking a consultative process aimed at a policy on the
operation of traditional justice, truth telling, reparations and reconciliation measures. The
TJWG is also in the process of developing a comprehensive National Policy on Transitional
Justice. 96 The process that began in 2009 has taken a very slow pace. To date there is yet to
be a concerted effort on the part of the government to document, investigate, and provide
victims with access to relevant information concerning the violations they and others in the
region suffered due to the conflict. The government is yet to make progress in the pursuit of
justice regarding the mass atrocities perpetrated in LRA conflict and there has hardly been
any systematic information, outreach or consultation with victims on any development or
planning for reparations mechanisms. 97

1.3 Statement of the problem

Tens of thousands of people were killed, tortured, or maimed during of the LRA conflict.
Millions were (or are still) displaced, confined to areas with little or no basic social services,
many lost property and means of livelihood. The LRA abducted thousands of civilians,
especially children, to serve as soldiers, sex slaves and or domestic workers. Many more are
at risk of abduction and a significant number remain in the LRA ranks. The LRA conflict with
the attendant atrocities, spread from Uganda to South Sudan, DRC and Central African
Republic and at the time of writing, still rages on. The ability of the LRA to cause such
destruction to human life and property for such a long period of time, covering vast
territories, indicates a failure by Uganda and the other regional governments to adequately
protect and fulfil their obligations towards civilians in conflict situations as provided for in
both humanitarian and human rights law regimes.

The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation reached in Juba proposes both judicial
and non-judicial measures for accountability for crimes committed in the conflict. The
96
Interview with Ismene Zarifis Transitional Justice Advisor of JLOS conducted on 24 Feb 2012. The main
complaint by civil society groups is that their involvement in the process is very limited and so is the
consultation with the local population. This was further discussed during a meeting to ensure more civil society
involvement in the process organised by the African Institute for Strategic Research, Governance and
Development hosting representatives from 27 different organisations took place in Kampala on 26 Aug 2011.
97
Uganda Human Rights Commission & United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights ’’The Dust has not
yet Settled’’, Victims View on a Right to Remedy and Reparations: A Report from the Greater North of Uganda
(2011) 61. This is the biggest concern of civil society groups in Uganda today.

19
government has made some progress on the creation of the some structures and some
policies and legislations are in place. However, progress on the ground is slow as the ICC
struggles to secure arrest of the ICC indictees. Uganda referred the LRA situation to the ICC
not because it was ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to prosecute LRA perpetrators but because it had
failed to capture its leadership and because it needed to gain advantage in a conflict that
had became a political liability and embarrassment. However, today, Uganda is still where it
was in 2003 before it made the referral to the ICC, since the underlying question of arrest of
suspects remain outstanding.

The ICD created in 2008 began its first prosecution in 2010 but this came to a standstill due
to the operation of the Amnesty Act. 98 The Amnesty Act, passed in 2000, ensured the
pardon of at least 13,000 LRA fighters, including several commanders responsible for
international crimes committed in the conflict. 99 Part II of the Amnesty Act that granted a
‘blanket amnesty’ to all engaged in armed rebellion against the government of Uganda
lapsed in May 2012 but critical issues remain. For instance, there is still a great concern that
not all persons responsible for international crimes in the LRA conflict will face trial.

The DPP indicates that, he will prosecute just about ten LRA commanders in the ICD.100
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the DPP will prosecute culpable LRA commanders
granted amnesty in the event that the Supreme Court overturns the 2011 Constitutional
Court ruling. It is not clear if all LRA members granted amnesty would be subject to other
non-Prosecutory accountability measures envisaged under the Agreement on Accountability
98
Since its creation in 2008, the ICD started hearing in the case against Thomas Kwoyelo, a former commander
with the LRA for war crimes and domestic crimes committed in Uganda during the conflict. In 2011, Kwoyelo
petitioned the Constitutional Court of Uganda asking it to declare his prosecution unconstitutional arguing that
he is entitled to amnesty under the Amnesty Act. The Constitutional Court agreed and ordered the ICD to
cease Kwoyelo’s trial. The Attorney General has put a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court that may
overturn the decision of the Constitutional Court but for now, prosecution of international crimes by the ICD
has come to a standstill. Further discussion on this case is contained in chapter four and six of this thesis.
99
Some of the high-ranking LRA commanders granted amnesty includes; Brigadier Banya, Onekomon, Sam
Kolo among others. According to Joan Kagezi, the senior principal State Attorney in charge of international
crimes prosecutions, the DPP will not prosecute these individuals despite the overwhelming evidence that they
are responsible for some of the international crimes perpetrated in the LRA conflict. Further discussion on this
is contained in chapter four.
100
For instance, since the capture and detention of Gen Caesar Acellam, one of the LRA five top commanders
in May 2012 by the UPDF, there has been no clarity as to whether he will be prosecuted or not though he did
not apply for amnesty before the lapse of Part II of the Act. According to Joan Kagezi, the senior principal State
Attorney in charge of international crimes prosecutions, the DPP has prepared an indictment for Gen Acellam
but it is not clear if the UPDF will release him to the custody of the ICD. Interview conducted on 6 July 2012.

20
and Reconciliation. There is no clear legal framework on accountability for international
crimes in the LRA conflict that increases the risk that the application of justice will be
selective and biased on the political interests of the government of Uganda. This limits the
ability of Uganda to comply with the principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute
and the effectiveness of the proposed accountability measures to ensure that all
perpetrators of international crimes in the LRA conflict account and that, the victims receive
remedies for harms suffered.

Furthermore, the newly passed International Criminal Court Act of 2010 that domesticates
the Rome Statute and is the most comprehensive national legislation dealing with
international crimes in Uganda will not be used as a basis for prosecution for crimes
committed in the LRA conflict before 2010. In addition, the Agreement on Accountability
and Reconciliation shields state actors, including military personnel that perpetrated
international crimes during the conflict, from measures envisaged under it. 101 The ICC and
the ICD have further not opened any investigations into actions of state actors. Although the
ICC has stated that it will investigate both sides to the conflict, it has not issued warrant of
arrest for state actors, despite the well-documented atrocities perpetrated by the UPDF
during the LRA conflict. The ICD is yet to show inclination to investigate action of state
actors during the conflict. 102

Planning mechanisms, policies and legislations for truth telling, reparations and traditional
justice are lagging behind and the affected population have very little understanding of the
processes or the government’s commitment to the undertakings. In addition, Uganda is
conducting accountability pursuits in isolation, yet other regional states have been (and are

101
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation clause 4.1; provides that state actors will not be subject to
accountability measures envisaged under the agreement. See also S Ntale ‘ICC to Investigate Ugandan Army’
CNN 3 June 2010 http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/03/uganda.army.icc (accessed 15 Nov 2011).
The ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo made this announcement while in Uganda for the ICC Review
Conference citing complaints from several of the affected people and human rights activists alleging that the
Uganda army had committed atrocities during the LRA conflict.
102
Joan Kagezi, the senior principal State Attorney for international crimes prosecution in office of the Director
of Public Prosecutions (DPP), stated that the DPP has no evidence that state actors were involved in the
commission of international crimes, therefore no reason to investigate. Interview conducted in Kampala on 20
Jan 2011. Although atrocities perpetrated by the UPDF in Northern Uganda are well documented, the DPP
claims not to have knowledge of them. Further discussion on the nature of atrocities committed by both the
LRA and the UPDF is contained in chapter two of this thesis.

21
still being) affected by the LRA conflict and the attendant atrocities. Victim groups in DRC,
Central African Republic and South Sudan have not been consulted on appropriate
accountability measures; crimes perpetrated against them have not been investigated and
they will not benefit from reparations programs that may be developed. The government of
Uganda must tackle all these issues if it is to achieve the aims of accountability for atrocities
perpetrated in the LRA conflict.

1.4 Research questions

How can the multiple accountability measures adopted and proposed to address
international crimes committed in the LRA conflict in Uganda be best used to promote
justice, truth and reparations?

Sub-questions:

1. What is the normative framework applicable to the LRA conflict?

2. What is Uganda’s international obligation in regard to atrocities committed in the
LRA Conflict?
3. What is the role of the Amnesty Act and the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation in ensuring accountability for international crimes committed in the LRA
conflict?
4. What is the role of the International Criminal Court in ensuring accountability for
international crimes committed in the LRA conflict?
5. What is the role of the International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda in
ensuring accountability for international crimes committed in the LRA conflict?
6. What is the role for traditional justice in ensuring accountability for international
crimes committed in the LRA conflict?
7. What role can a Truth Commission play in ensuring accountability for international
crimes committed in the LRA conflict?

22
1.5 Definition of terms

Accountability: in law is synonymous to the terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ and

describes the condition of being actually or potentially subject to a legal obligation or the
legal obligation to answer for an act done, and to repair any injury it may have caused.103

There is however, no common definition of the term ‘accountability’ in the context of

conflict, mass atrocities and the aftermath. Several terms are used to explain it and it is
often synonymous to the term ‘transitional justice’ that encompasses mechanisms that can
effect justice, offer reparations to victims, establish a culture of respect of human rights as
well as contribute to reconciliation of societies recovering from conflict. 104

In this thesis, the term ‘accountability’ is used to include mechanisms undertaken both at
the national or international level to ensure justice, truth and reparations in aftermath of
mass atrocities. These specifically include measures that assign individual criminal
responsibility for violations and abuse; impose legitimate consequences for perpetrators
including payment of compensation and public acknowledgment of guilt; truth telling to
generate official historical records; and measures for victim reparations. The focus of this
thesis is on measures proposed in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and
its Annexure or ongoing in Uganda that includes domestic and international prosecutions,
use of traditional justice, truth telling and reparations processes.

International crimes/mass atrocities: are the crimes of serious concern to the international
community as a whole. It includes; the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and crime of aggression as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,105 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and
violations of human rights treaties that obligates states to investigate, prosecute, punish or

103 th
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4 ed) Houghton Miffin Company (2000)
http;//legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/accountability (accessed 13 Feb 2009).
104
Report of the Secretary General The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict
Societies UN Security Council S/2004/616 (24 August 2004) para 8.
105
Rome Statute arts 5, 6, 7, 8 and 8 bis.

23
extradite offenders such as the Convention against Torture. 106 In this thesis, ‘international
crimes’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘mass atrocities’ that characterises such
crimes. 107

Justice: as used in this thesis means, ‘regard for the rights of the accused; for the interests
of victims and for the well-being of society at large.’ 108 This implies the duty of the state to
investigate violations, to prosecute perpetrators and punish them if guilt is established and
rights of victims to receive fair and effective remedies through courts or other
administrative bodies.109

Truth: as used in this thesis encompass facts on the history, patterns and manifestations of
a conflict including details of violations, abuse of human rights and humanitarian law and in
the event of death and disappearance, information on the whereabouts and circumstances
of death of victims. 110

Reparations: as used in this thesis encompasses a range of measures such as rehabilitation,

restitution, compensation, guarantees of non-recurrence and other symbolic measures such
as apologies, memorials and commemorations that may be collective or individual.111

1.6 Objective

The objective of this thesis is to examine the, who, what, when, where, why and how of the
accountability measures proposed for the LRA conflict. The thesis examines how the
multiple accountability measures, both judicial and non-judicial, could be effectively used to
promote justice, truth and reparations. Chapter two examines the applicable international
norms to the conflict while chapter three examines the international legal obligation of

106
Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity’ (Diane Orentlicher) Economic and Social Council E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (8 Feb 2005) B.
107
Chapter two of the thesis further elaborates these terms.
108
Report of the Secretary General (n 80 above) para 7.
109
Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity’ (n 105 above) principle 19.
110
This definition is derived from a reading of clauses 2.2 and 2.3 of the Principle Agreement on Accountability
and Reconciliation and clause 4 of the Annexure.
111
This definition is derived from clause 9 of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation.

24
Uganda. These two chapters, together with the introductory remarks in chapter one, create
a framework for analysis in the chapters that follow. Each proceeding chapter examines a
different accountability measure; its strengths and weaknesses and the challenges and
opportunities that they present. The analysis is the basis for conclusion and
recommendations in the last chapter.

Using lessons learned from other conflict or post conflict states, the analysis of
accountability for international crimes committed in the LRA conflict could inspire short-
term reforms on the functions and roles that the different mechanisms to remain effective.
In the long run, this could serve as lessons learned for other states in the aftermath of mass
atrocities. The target audience is key personnel in the different institutions, policy makers
working on policy and legislation for accountability measures for international crimes in
Uganda, the political leadership in Uganda and other governments in the Great Lakes
region, the LRA and all persons concerned or/and interested in matters of accountability for
mass atrocities.

1.7 Methodology

The author seeks to accomplish these objectives by undertaking an in-depth desk review of
the available literature including a review of primary sources like legal texts and government
periodicals. The thesis also relies on reports undertaken in the last two decades that are a
result of extensive field research relating to accountability mechanisms and impact of the
LRA conflict on civilian population generally. This provides reference material and helps the
study to make a comparison between laws, policies and their effects on ground to make
suggestions for reform.

The thesis further analyses and highlights lessons learnt from accountability processes in
countries such as Sierra Leone, South Africa, Rwanda, Peru, Liberia and Columbia for
comparison of the models to the ones being pursued in Uganda. The lessons learnt in the
situations highlighted also inform the discussion on the LRA conflict and help to generate
analysis, recommendations, and conclusions. This required an extensive review of varied
sources of information ranging from newspapers, to treatises, judgments, periodical

25
literature, commentaries, and other publications relating to accountability for mass
atrocities. Government sources, such as statistics, official statements, or interventions
before the press, are also used. Other reports, statements, and official documents from
international organisations and governments regarding accountability are analysed and
factored in accordingly.

The author also held informal discussions and interviews with victims/survivors of atrocities
in Northern Uganda, politicians, judicial officials, prosecutors, scholars and policy makers to
get a practical insight on accountability processes in Uganda.

1.8 Literature review

As a result of the mounting concern about the LRA conflict and the attendant mass
atrocities, there has been wide international and national media coverage of the conflict as
well as films and documentaries. The most prominent among these are ‘Uganda Rising’ 112;
‘Rebels without a Cause/Journey into Sunset’113and Invisible Children’s ‘Rough Cut’.114 There
is also a growing scholarship as well as advocacy giving various accounts of the conflict; its
history; features; how and why the atrocities occurred and possible resolution measures. 115
Several studies have assessed events in Northern Uganda, before and after independence in
search of the root cause of the conflict that is said to be rooted in the history of ethnic
politics in Uganda dating back to the colonial era.116

112
This documentary focuses on the plight of civilians in Northern Uganda and it won seven awards in Canada,
France, the USA and Norway http://www.ugandarising.com/home.html.
113
Former special advisor to the president at the International Crisis Group, John Prendergast who now co-
chairs the Washington based project – ENOUGH produced this documentary.
114
This documentary was dedicated to the ‘night commuters’ in Uganda
http://www.invisiblechildren.com/media/assests/file/online_media_kit.pdf (accessed 15 July 2011); another
video by Invisible Children ‘Kony2012’ aimed at generating international commitment to capture the LRA
leader Joseph Kony, is the most viewed video in 2012. The video has become a media sensation and attracted
a lot of criticisms from Uganda and abroad for poor portrayal of the conflict.
115
T Allen Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (2006); T Allen ‘War
and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court Intervention’ (2005) Crisis
Research Centre 1 - 100; Citizens for Global Solutions ‘In Unchartered Waters: Seeking Justice Before the
Atrocities Have Stopped’ (2004) http://golbalsolutions.org/files/general/unchartered_waters.pdf among
others.
116
A Branch ‘Exploring the Roots of LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland’ in T Allen &
K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010); C Dolan Social Torture: the Case of
Northern Uganda (2009); S Finnström Living with Bad Surrounding: War, History and Everyday Moments in
Northern Uganda (2008); A Branch ‘Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern

26
The spiritual dimension to the LRA conflict has been a popular focus of the media and has
been subject to academic scholarship that also analysed the political agenda of the LRA and
its military strategies. 117 Some authors have gone as far as seeking the LRA leader’s
comments on these issues. 118 For instance, Green describes his journey up and down the
Nile in the quest to locate and interview Joseph Kony. He provides, a thoughtful and even-
handed exploration of a conflict that has been sensationalised, misunderstood, or ignored
and expounds on why President Museveni might not have wanted to end the war, how
Sudan is involved and how difficult it is to piece everything together. 119 In an
anthropological research, Finnström acknowledges and expounds on the difficulty of
researching during war. He argues that war violates cosmologies as well as people and
opines that, an intercultural understanding of the conflict at issue and of its local
implications provides a framework for dealing with the uncertainties of research in war. 120

Several reports reviewed the humanitarian and security situation of IDPs and concluded that
the government of Uganda and the international community did not do enough to protect
the civilians in IDP camps. 121 Some reports even suggested the dismantling of IDP camps,

Uganda 1986 – 1998’ (2005) 8(2)African Studies Quarterly 1 – 31; C Mbazira, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes
Committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda’ in C Murungu & J Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International
Crimes in Africa (2011).
117
K Titeca ‘The Spiritual Order of the LRA’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth
and Reality (2010); S Finnström Living with Bad Surroundings: War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland,
Northern Uganda (2003); H Behrend ‘War in Northern Uganda: The Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena,
Severino Lukoya and Joseph Kony (1987 – 1997)’ in C. Clapham (ed) African Guerillas (1998); H Behrend Alice
Lakwena and the Holy Spirit: War in Northern Uganda 1986 – 97 (1999); H Behrend ‘Power to Heal, Power to
Kill: Spirit Possession and War in Northern Uganda (1986 – 1994)’ in H. Behrend et al. (eds) Spirit, Possession
Modernity and Power in Africa (1999).
118
M Schomerus ‘A Terrorist is not a Person like me: An Interview with Joseph Kony’ in T Allen and K
Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010).
119
M Green The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa’s Most Wanted (2008).
120
S Finnström ‘In and Out of Culture: Fieldwork in War-torn Uganda (2001) 21 Critique of Anthropology 247 –
258.
121
P Diane ‘Fulfilling the Forgotten Promise: The Protection of Civilians in Northern Uganda’ (Jan 2006) Inter-
Action’s Protection Working Group; W Weeks Pushing the Envelope: Moving Beyond ‘Protected Villages’ in
Northern Uganda United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (March 2002); Foundation for
Human Rights Initiative Northern Uganda: Peace at Last? July – Dec 2006 (2006); C Dolan ‘Views on the
Northern Uganda Conflict from Inside the War Zone’ (2000) COPE Fieldwork Findings; IRIN In-depth: Life in
Northern Uganda: When the Sunsets, we Start to Worry... Humanitarian News and Analysis (Jan 2004);
Amnesty International ‘Uganda: Summary of Human Rights Concerns’ (2003); GL Bramucci ‘Waiting Games:
Growing Up with War in Northern Uganda’ (2003) Associazione Volontari Per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI);
Conciliation Resources ‘Northern Uganda: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’ (2003) Kacoke Madit and
Reconciliation Project; D Westbrook ‘The Torment of Northern Uganda: A Legacy of Missed Opportunities

27
return of the population to their original homes and a search for alternative solutions to the
issue of security of civilians. 122 While other reports give detailed accounts of the most
notorious LRA attacks on villages and IDP camps in Uganda.123 Other commentators
analysed the scale, incidences of abduction, the impact of this, and the conflict on the
populations in Northern Uganda. 124 An increasing amount of literature has also considered
the return and resettlement experiences of children forcefully abducted by the LRA.125
Some specifically focus on the situation and the abuse of females during the war. 126 Annan

(2000) Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution; Refugee Law Project & Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (2 ed) Only Peace can Restore Confidence of the Displaced: Update on the Implementation
of the Recommendation made by the UN Secretary General Representative on IDP’s Following his visit to
Uganda ( Oct 2006); this report investigates progress made in the protection and security of IDPs in Uganda.
The report uses benchmarks set by the UN Secretary General Representative on IDP’s; see also FM Deng ‘The
International Protection of the Internally Displaced’ (1995) International Journal of Refugee Law Special Issue
76; that argues that the problems of internal displacement can only be solved by addressing the root causes,
often embedded in civil wars. The author further argues that only peace can restore the confidence of the
displaced and encourage them to return to their homes and resume normal life and that as long a conflict
prevails, not only will deprivation persist, but respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will remain
elusive.
122
Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative Let my People go! The Forgotten Plight of the People in Displaced
Camps in Acholi (July 2001).
123 th
See for instance; Justice and Reconciliation Project ‘Remembering the Atyak Massacres: April 20 1995’
(April 2007) 4 Justice and Reconciliation Project Field Notes; this report recounts the struggles faced by civilians
in Atyak in Northern Uganda where in one massacre in 1995, the LRA under the command of Vincent Otti killed
over 300 civilians. The report advances recommendations to meet the victims needs of justice; G Opobo et al.,
‘Kill Every Living thing: Barlonyo Massacres’ (28 Feb 2009) Justice and Reconciliation Project Field Notes;
documents the massacre of over 300 civilians in Barlonyo IDP camp in February 2004 by the LRA Okot
Odhiambo indicted by the ICC. The report calls for the prosecution of the responsible LRA leaders and
accountability of the government of Uganda for failing to protect the civilians; Justice and Reconciliation
Project ‘The Mukura Massacres of 1989’ (March 2011) Justice and Reconciliation Project Field Note XII; Justice
and Reconciliation Project ‘As Long as you live, you will Survive: The Omot Massacre’(Feb 2010) Justice and
th
Reconciliation Project Field Note XI; Justice and Reconciliation Project ‘The Lukodi Massacre 19 May 2004’
(April 2011) Justice and Reconciliation Project Field Note XIII.
124
P Pham et al Abducted: The Lord’s Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda (2007);
Amnesty International ‘Breaking God’s Commandments: The Destruction of Childhood by the Lord’s Resistance
Army’ (1997) Amnesty International AFR 59/01/97; World Vision Pawns of Politics: children, conflict and peace
in Northern Uganda (2004); Human Rights Watch The scars of death: Children abducted by the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda (1997); Human Rights Watch Abducted and abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern
Uganda (2003); CR Soto Tall Grass: Stories of Suffering and Peace in Northern Uganda (2009); Human Rights
and Peace Centre & Liu Institute for Global Issues The Hidden War: The Forgotten People, War in Acholi and its
Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda (2003) 22.
125
JN Corbin ‘Returning Home: Resettlement of Formerly Abducted Children in Northern Uganda’ (2008) 32(2)
Disasters 316 – 335; T Allen & M Schomerus A Hard Homecoming: Lessons Learned from the Reception Centre
Process in Northern Uganda (2006); J Annan et al., The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern
Uganda: Findings from the Survey of War Affected Youth (2006); P Phuong et al., Abducted: The Lord’s
Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda (2007).
126
J Annan et al., The State of Female Youth in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey of War Affected
Youth (SWAY) (2008); K Carlson K & D Mazurana Forced Marriage within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda
(2008); S McKay ‘Girls as “Weapons of Terror” In Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean Rebel Fighting Forces’
(2005) 28(5) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 385 – 397; S McKay ‘Reconstructing Fragile Lives: Girls Social
Reintegration in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone’ (2004) 12(3) Gender and Development 19 – 30; S McKay &

28
et al., for instance challenge the conventional notions that women recruited by the LRA are
passive victims, documenting that females play an active role within LRA structures. 127 All
the available literature on the LRA conflict agrees to the deploring humanitarian situation
and failure of the government to protect civilians in Northern Uganda and call for resolution
of the conflict. 128

There were several on an off attempts at peace negotiations between the government of
Uganda and the LRA, and none of these attempts led to a resolution. 129 Some academic
literature investigated the reasons behind the protracted conflict and possible solutions. For
instance Branch argues that the debates regarding a solution to LRA conflict has failed to
take into account the political agency of the Acholi peasantry and their relationship with the
government on the one hand and the LRA on the other. He argues that both the LRA and the
government failed to realise an effective popular mobilisation among the Acholi and
concludes that the solution to end the conflict and violence lies in putting the Acholi
peasantry at the centre of conflict resolution.130

Van-Acker on the other hand argues that the robustness of the LRA conflict indicates that
the forces working against peace outstrip those working for it. 131 While Vinci argues that
Kony and the LRA just prefer to continue to survive as an autonomous entity that is why
peace offers have been not been accepted. 132 Vinci further investigates the LRA's use of
mutilation, abduction, surprise, and unpredictable attacks and concludes that the LRA is

DE Mazurana Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique:
Their Lives During and After War (2004); S McKay et al., Girls Formerly Associated with Fighting Forces and
their Children: Returned and Neglected (2006); G Onyango et al., Girl Mothers of Northern Uganda Conference
on Girl Child Mothers in Fighting Forces and their Post – War Reintegration in Southern and Western Africa:
Bellagio Italy (2005).
127
J Annan et al., Women and Girls at War: “Wives”, Mothers and Fighters in the Lord’s Resistance Army
(2009).
128
Civil Society Organisation for Peace in Northern Uganda Nowhere to Hide: Humanitarian Protection Threats
in Northern Uganda (2004); C Hema ‘Uganda: A Nation in Crisis’ (2007) 37(2) California Western International
Law Journal 277 – 298; Human Rights and Peace Centre and Liu Institute for Global Issues The Hidden War: The
Forgotten People, War in Acholi and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda (2003).
129
CCH Lamwaka ‘Civil War and the Peace Process in Uganda 1986 – 1997 (1998) 4 East African Journal of
Peace and Human Rights 139.
130
A Branch ‘Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and Peasantry in Northern Uganda 1986 – 1998
(2005) 8 African Studies Quarterly 1 – 31.
131
F Van-Acker ‘Uganda and the LRA: The New Order no one Ordered’ (2004) 103(412) African Affairs 335 –
357.
132
A Vinci Armed Groups and the Balance of Power (2009) 99.

29
strategically using these methods to create fear, which acts as a force multiplier to further
its organisational survival and accounts for the protracted conflict. 133

Vinci further argues that although the LRA may have begun its war for instrumental goals,
such creating political change, it replaced these goals with existential motivations. In the
sense that the LRA rebel group fights in order to continue providing security and a vocation
to its members, and that this would be lost by a return to wider society. The author posits
that the factor allowing for this turn from instrumental to existential motivation is that the
LRA has effectively separated itself from wider society and created an autonomous political
community. This in essence implies that LRA members must first reintegrate in the greater
Acholi and Ugandan community before a political settlement can be achieved. 134

Finnström addresses the peculiar concern that the LRA rebels had the Acholi elders’
ceremonial ‘warfare blessing’ that has been interpreted as having turned into a curse on
Acholiland. He interprets the possible ‘warfare blessing’ as a critical event regardless of
whether it exists or not. He argues that the ‘warfare blessing’ can be regarded as the mere
utterance of words or a blessing performed within the framework of the local moral world.
He concludes that as much as the issue of the ‘warfare blessing’ is a lived consequence of
the conflict, it cannot be used as an explanatory model for the cause and protracted nature
of the conflict. 135

Several commentators have expounded on the generous assistance given to the LRA by the
government of Sudan that they argue helped to sustain the conflict. Some have argue that
the LRA was a defacto militia through which Sudan waged war against Uganda in retaliation
to Uganda’s government support of the SPLA. 136 Prunier suggests that there is an

133
A Vinci ‘The Strategic use of Fear by the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (2005) 16 Small Wars and Insurgencies 360
– 381.
134
A Vinci ‘Existential Motivations in the Lord’s Resistance Army’s Continuing Conflict’ (2007) 20(4) Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 337 – 352.
135
S Finnström ‘Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement in Uganda’
(2006) 76 African 200 – 220.
136
M Schomerus ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview’ (2007) Geneva Graduate
Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey (Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Project;
Amnesty International ‘Breaking God’s Commandments: The Destruction of Childhood by the Lord’s Resistance
Army’ (1997) Amnesty International AFR 59/01/97; Human Rights and Peace Centre The Hidden War: The
Forgotten People, War in Acholiland and its Ramification for Peace and Security in Uganda (2003).

30
undeclared war between Sudan and Uganda with DRC used as an external battlefield. He
argues that in the DRC, from the fall of President Mobutu until 2002, proxy guerrilla
organisations either fought each other or fought the armies of their sponsor’s enemy in a
proxy war that morphed into the bigger ‘Congolese’ conflict.137 As illustrated in chapter two
of this thesis, the sustained and continuous assistance given by the government of Sudan to
the LRA between 1994 and 2005, rendered the LRA conflict an internationalised conflict
operating alongside an internal conflict.

Schomerus investigates the military history of the LRA in Sudan and prospects for ending the
conflict 138and other studies analyse how the armed conflict by the LRA affected civilians in
South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic while providing an insight on cross-border
relations. 139 Some authors argue that it was never the interest of the government of Uganda
to resolve the conflict through negotiations, 140 advancing the additional argument that the
conflict is beneficial to the government, as it has kept the army occupied and benefitted
senior army officers economically. 141

As a possible conflict resolution measure, the government of Uganda passed the Amnesty
Act in 2002, granting a blanket amnesty to all who gave up rebellion against it.142 Critics of
national amnesties argue that honouring amnesties promotes a culture of impunity. 143 Yet,

137
G Prunier ‘Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic the Congo (1986 –
1999)’ (2004) 103 African Affairs 359 – 383; G Prunier World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the
Making of a Continental Catastrophe (2009).
138
M Schomerus ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview’ (2007) 8 The Small Arms
Survey: HSBC Working Paper.
139
S Gordon et al., ‘Reluctant Hosts: The Impact of the Lord’s Resistance Army on Communities in Western
Equatorial State, Southern Sudan’ (2007) World Vision; M Schomerus ‘Perilous Border: Sudanese Communities
Affected by Conflict on Sudan-Uganda Border’ (Nov 2008) Conciliation Resources; Invisible Children and
Resolve ‘LRA Crisis Tracker: Annual Security Brief’ (2011) LRACrisisTracker.com.
140
A Branch ‘Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention’ (2007) 12 (2) Ethics and International
Affairs 179 – 198; C Dolan Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda (2009); S Finnström Living with Bad
Surrounding: War, History and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda (2008).
141
A Mwenda ‘Uganda’s Politics of Foreign Aid and Violent Conflict: the Political uses of the LRA’ in T Allen and
K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010); A Branch ‘Exploring the roots of LRA
violence and ethnic politics in Acholiland’ (2010); S Finnström ‘An African Hell of Colonial Imagination? The
Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, Another Story’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army:
Myth and Reality (2010).
142
Amnesty Act (2002) sec 2.
143
K Roth ‘It’s Worth Bringing Tyrants to Justice’ International Herald Tribune 10 Aug 2005; argues that it is
possible to reach a peace agreement without amnesty provisions citing the case of the former Yugoslavian
President Slobodan Milosevic who agreed to end the Bosnian conflict and accept the Dayton Peace Accord

31
several studies explored the role of amnesty in the wider transitional justice processes in
Uganda and cited the need for it.144 Feldman, however, questioned whether the
government should forego justice in order to prevent bloodshed in Northern Uganda.145
While Souaré assesses the justifications for grant of amnesty and conclude that, any peace
agreement should include an amnesty provision. Souaré further argues that the amnesty
provision should include the stipulation that any violation of the peace agreement would
mean the nullification of amnesty guarantees. 146 Chapter three of this thesis investigates
the place of amnesty in international law and finds that unless it contradicts an international
treaty, it is not necessary unlawful. Chapter four specifically investigates how Uganda
applied the amnesty law and finds that its operation of a ‘blanket amnesty’ thwarted
Uganda’s international obligations under treaties that Uganda ratified and domesticated
that require prosecution of international crimes committed in Uganda. 147 The chapter
concludes that the lapse of Part II of the Amnesty Act opens doors to the government to
fulfil its international obligations of investigating, prosecuting and punishing offenders
where guilt is established and ensuring that victims receive the right to an effective remedy.

without obtaining an amnesty, soon after international calls for prosecution; he also argues that the threats of
ICC prosecution forced oppressive leaders in Sudan and the DRC to reform brutal practices in order to avoid
the Prosecutor’s attention; MP Scarf & PR Williams ‘The Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the Peace-
Building Process’ (2003) 35 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 161 – 175; argue that amnesties
do not fulfil the cathartic process of retribution and accountability, but instead leads to acts of revenge. The
authors further argue that the stigmatising effect of unhindered criminal prosecutions works to isolate and
weaken political legitimacy of disruptive actors in the international community.
144
L Mallinder ‘Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty?’ (2009) Working Paper: Beyond Legalism:
Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation Project; R Murphy ‘Establishing a Precedent in Uganda: The
Legitimacy of National Amnesties under the International Criminal Court (2006) 3(1) Eyes on the ICC; B Afako
‘Promoting Reconciliation: A Brief Overview of the Amnesty Process in Uganda’ (Nov 2002) Civil Society
Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda; Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative Seventy times Seven:
The Implementation and Impact of the Amnesty in Acholi (2004).
145
RM Feldman ‘A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in
Uganda’ (2007) 18 Small Wars and Insurgencies 134 – 143.
146
IK Souaré ‘Moving the Ugandan Peace Process from the Dichotomy of Criminal Trials vs Amnesty’ (2008)
17(2) African Security Review 106 – 112; See also the interesting debate advanced by Pensky in M Pensky
‘Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability and the Norms of International Law’ (2008) 1(1-2) Ethics & Global
Politics 1 – 40; arguing that the norm against amnesty is based on a narrowly retributive concept of criminal
justice, yet, a broader norm for democratic accountability would continue to prefer prosecutions over
amnesties in international law but less for the opportunity for deserved retribution but more for the public
enactment of the deliberative procedures associated with the rule of law.
147
For instance, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that were domesticated as the Geneva Conventions Act of
1969 of Uganda and it demands the investigation, prosecution, punishment or extradition of persons
responsible for grave breaches.

32
In 2003, the government of Uganda referred the LRA situation to the ICC. The ICC promptly
took up investigations and in 2004 issued warrants of arrest for the top five LRA leaders.
This ushered in a debate in which some quarters argued for the need for amnesty to end the
conflict and others for justice through prosecutions to end impunity. 148 Several scholars
argued for the value of amnesty as a peace-building tool, stating that the unrelenting
insistence on criminal prosecutions where there is an amnesty in place prolongs a conflict
and exacerbates the suffering of civilians. Newman for instance argues that a restrictive rule
on amnesties would have significant distributive effects in the ongoing project of
international criminal justice. 149

Ssenyonjo on the other hand considers the question of whether a ‘total amnesty’ to
individuals indicted by the ICC is binding on the ICC and found that it does not.150 Moy
argues that the lack of clarity on the question of amnesty in international law leaves some
room for amnesty programs like the one in Uganda to prevail over ICC jurisdiction,
particularly because the charges against the LRA strictly involve war crimes and crimes
against humanity.151 Ssenyonjo further investigates whether amnesty is counterproductive
to the work of the ICC and concludes that those who bear the greatest responsibility for the
crimes committed in the conflict must face prosecutions. On the other hand, he opines that
since 80% of LRA force either are children or abducted, they deserve amnesty. The difficulty
he posits is how to categorise those members that deserve amnesty. 152 Apuuli further

148
P Pham et al., Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in
Northern Uganda (2005); B Afako ‘Reconciliation and Justice: Mato Oput and the Amnesty Act’ in O Lucima
(ed) Protracted Conflict Elusive Peace: Initiatives to end the Violence in Northern Uganda (2002) 64 – 67; L
Hovil and Z Lomo ‘Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict
Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation’ (2005) 15 Refugee Law Project Working Paper; E Baines et al., War
Affected Children and Youth in Northern Uganda: Towards a Brighter Future (2006).
149
DG Newman ‘The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties and a Distributive Problem’
(2005) 20(2) American University International Law Review 293 – 357.
150
M Ssenyonjo ‘The ICC and the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders: Prosecution or Amnesty?’ (2007) 54
Netherlands International Law Review 51 – 80; M Ssenyonjo ‘The ICC and the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders:
Prosecution or Amnesty?’ (2007) 7(2-3) International Criminal Law Review 363 – 710.
151
A Moy ‘The International Criminal Courts Arrest Warrants and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing
the Debate over Amnesty and Complementarity’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 267 – 273.
152
M Ssenyonjo ‘Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and Human Rights Violations:
Between Amnesty and the ICC’ (2005) 10 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 405 – 434.

33
suggests that the top leaders of the LRA must account for the crimes committed in the
conflict, while the abducted and conscripted foot soldiers should be amnestied.153

In furtherance of this debate, MacMillan argues that amnesty and justice are not mutually
exclusive. She argues that in Uganda, because of the risks of prolonged conflict, decades of
authoritarian dictatorship and oppression, increased conflict related deaths and public
opinion in favour of amnesty; amnesty will serve the interests of justice better than
prosecution. She asserts that amnesty and negotiations might be just as effective as
prosecutions in reinforcing to the Ugandan people that their government is finally open to
non-military solutions, responsive to public opinion and accountable for its failures. 154

Rose and Ssekandi looked not only at the Amnesty Act but also examined whether
traditional mechanisms aimed at aiding the process of reintegration and reconciliation in
Northern Uganda are consistent with the goals pursued by the international community
when instituting the ICC of attaining justice and deterring impunity. The authors argue that
justice and reconciliation in Northern Uganda would require more than amnesty and the use
of traditional mechanisms, which respectively work more towards ending the conflict and
fostering reintegration of former combatants than towards justice. 155

Several other authors seized on the potential of Acholi traditional justice and healing
ceremonies as possible accountability and reconciliation measures. 156 Pain, for instance
argues that the way forward to achieve justice and reconciliation in Northern Uganda is to
153
KP Apuuli ‘Amnesty and International Law: The Case of the Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgents in Northern
Uganda (2005) 5 African Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 – 61.
154
KE MacMillan ‘The Practicability of Amnesty as a Non-Prosecutory Alternative in Post Conflict Uganda’
(2007) Policy and Ethics Journal.
155
C Rose & FM Ssekandi ‘The Pursuit of Transitional Justice and African Traditional Values: A Clash of
Civilisations, the Case of Uganda (2007) 1 African Prospects 116 – 136.
156
Refugee Law Project ‘Position Paper on the ICC’ 28 July 2004
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/resources/papers/archive/2004/RLP.ICC.investigations.pdf; L Hovil and JR
Quinn ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’ (2005) 17 Refugee Law Project
Working Paper; L Hovil and Z Lomo ‘Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential
for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation’ (2005) 15 Refugee Law Project Working Paper; JB Odama
‘Reconciliation Process (Mato Oput) among the Acholi Tribe of Northern Uganda’ Commemorative address
st
made during the ceremony for 21 Niwano Peace Prize Award Japan
http://www.npf.or.jp/peace_prize_f/21/speech_e.pdf (accessed 8 July 2010); P Bako ‘Does Traditional Conflict
Resolution lead to Justice? The Mato Oput in Northern Uganda’ (2009) 3 Pretoria Student Review 103; Mato
Oput Project ‘Community Perspectives on the Mato Oput Process: A research Study by the Mato Oput Project’
(October 2009) 10.

34
combine formal amnesty and the performance of the Acholi traditional justice mechanisms
of mato oput (drinking bitter root) and gomo tong (bending spears). 157 Further research on
this matter broadened the range of Acholi rituals that could be used as conflict resolution
measures including lwako ping wang (washing away the tears); mayo kum (cleansing the
body); and tumu kir (cleansing abominable acts) among others.158 Harlacher et al., for
instance, give an in depth exploration of the different traditional justice and healing
ceremonies in Acholi when and how they were performed in the past and the role the
ceremonies are playing in the LRA conflict today. They conclude that symbolic acts of
reconciliation and peace building rooted deep in the past can still have relevance in the
present, even if weapons of war have changed. 159

Several other studies were highly critical of the use of Acholi traditional justice and healing
ceremonies as an accountability measure for crimes committed in the LRA conflict. Some
studies concluded that few people in the affected areas considered the traditional
structures a key priority. 160 Bradbury, for example, noted that the tensions between
traditional leaders over the possible financial benefits and that external support of
traditional practices would be another way to bring the region under the government’s
control without contributing to improved education and economic development.161 Some
studies pointed out that traditional structure in Northern Uganda is weak and fragmented

157
D Pain ‘The Bending of Spears: Producing Consensus for Peace and Development in Northern Uganda’
(1997) International Alert and Kacoke Madit; this report was commissioned by International Alert following the
1997 big meeting (Kacoke Madit) of the Acholi in London. This meeting was a gathering of over three hundred
Acholi from Uganda and the Diaspora, including government ministers, church leaders and LRA
representatives. This meeting was aimed at raising international awareness of the situation in Northern
Uganda and also to generate consensus for peace and reconciliation among the Acholi.
158
E Baines Roco Wat I Acholi: Restoring Relationships in Acholiland: Traditional Approaches to Justice and
Reintegration (2005); T Harlacher et al., Traditional Ways of Copying in Acholi: Cultural Provisions for
Reconciliation and Healing from War (2006).
159
T Harlacher et al., Traditional Ways of Copying in Acholi: Cultural Provisions for Reconciliation and Healing
from War (2006).
160
C Dolan ‘Inventing Traditional Leadership? A Critical Assessment of Dennis Pain’s The Bending of the Spears’
(2000) 13 COPE working Paper; Accord ‘Background papers presented to the conference on peace research
and the reconciliation agenda September 1999’ (1999) 32 COPE working paper.
161
M Bradbury An Overview of Initiatives for Peace in Acholi, Northern Uganda (1999); EK Baines ‘The Haunting
of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda’ (2007) International Journal for
Transitional Justice; JO Latigo ‘Northern Uganda: Traditional Based Practices in Acholi Region’ in L Huyse & M
Salter (eds) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences
(2008); P Acirokop ‘The Potentials and Limits of Mato Oput as a Tool for Reconciliation and Justice’ in S Pamar
et al., (eds) Children and Transitional Justice: Truth Telling, Accountability and Reconciliation (2010).

35
and that many of the traditional leaders were not sure of how to carry out traditional justice
rituals, the studies also question the heritage of some of the traditional leaders. 162

As illustrated in chapter seven of this thesis, the author agrees with the above observations
including the efficacy and challenges to the use of traditional justice. The chapter argues
that traditional justice can only play a positive rule in Uganda’s pursuit of accountability if it
is not fashioned as a national tool for accountability. That is if the use of traditional justice is
limited to the community level and it is not treated as an alternative to other forms of
accountability but rather as a complementary mechanism available to all who desire it.

Nonetheless, in search of a credible national alternative to the ICC investigations, the

tendency to promote the use of traditional justice in Northern Uganda remained unabated.
Quinn for instance explored the use of traditional justice instead of trials and truth
commissions, to bring about societal acknowledgement of what has happened, and offered
ideas as to how these traditional practices might augment the rebuilding process in
Uganda. 163 Quinn further argues that traditional justice mechanisms were not only used
historically, but continue to be used in contemporary society and are therefore relevant as
an accountability measure for Uganda. 164 Murithi also argues that local approaches to peace
building and reconciliation contain valuable lessons for international peacemakers with
respect to rebuilding social trust and restoring communal existence. 165

Letha opined that local contexts must begin to inform western-based approaches to
transitional justice; arguing that without them, external interventions often fail to resonate
with the values, norms and beliefs of victims.166 Other authors have argued that the tension
between ‘traditional’ and ‘western’ forms of justice in Uganda arises from the varied

162
T Allen War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court’s
Intervention (2005); T Allen ‘The International Criminal Court and the Invention of Traditional Justice in
Northern Uganda’ (2007) Politique Africaine 147 – 165.
163
JR Quinn ‘Social Reconstruction in Uganda: The Role of Informal Mechanisms in Transitional Justice’ (2006)
8(4) Human Rights Review 389 – 407.
164
JR Quinn ‘Beyond Truth Commissions: Indigenous Reconciliation in Uganda’ (2006) 4(1) The Review of Faith
and International Affairs 31 – 37.
165
T Murithi ‘Rebuilding Social Trust in Northern Uganda’ (2002) 14 Peace Review 291 – 295.
166
V Letha ‘Abomination: Local Belief System and International Justice’ (Sept 2007) 5 Justice and Reconciliation
Project Field Notes; the author illustrates this point by focusing on the Acholi concept of Kiir - abomination.

36
objectives of the two, premised on the paradigm of retributive justice vis-a-vis the paradigm
of restorative justice. While the former is primarily concerned with accountability and
ensuring that perpetrators do not go unpunished, the latter is concerned with ensuring
restorative justice involving active participation of the victim, the perpetrator and the
community in a process that aims at the restoration of a harmonious relationship between
victim and perpetrator.167 While some quarters supported a resort to traditional justice
because the majority of the LRA rebels were forcefully recruited, some as children, and
forced to commit crimes against people.168

Allen, after an in depth field research, discusses the ICC intervention in the ongoing LRA
conflict, the local political circumstances in which it has opted to operate and the attendant
controversy it has caused, with impressive detail. He agrees with most commentators on
Northern Uganda that rituals of healing are common in Acholi but claims that there is no
widespread enthusiasm for mato oput or other ceremonies performed as accountability
mechanism for crimes committed during the war. He dismisses the role of Acholi traditional
justice generally and mato oput in particular as hardly a unique system of Acholi justice
stating that no such a thing exists. He puts forward a fervent argument for the role of the
ICC in the conflict, arguing that the people in Northern Uganda require the same kind of
conventional legal mechanism as everyone else living in modern states. 169

Allen further argues that aid agencies funded the establishment of ‘traditional’ leaders,
including newly created paramount chiefs for the Acholi, Madi, Iteso and Langi peoples,
with a stake in promoting the use of local rituals in addressing violent crimes. He argues that
the merits of reifying local rituals in a form of semi-official ‘traditional justice’ have been

167
M Maloney & B Harvey ‘Breaking Eggs/Re-building Societies: Traditional Justice as a Tool for Transitional
Justice in Northern Uganda’ (2006) 372 Public Policy and Dispute Resolution 4.
168
L Hovil & JR Quinn ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’ (2005) 17 Refugee Law
Project Working Paper; JB Odama ‘Reconciliation Process (Mato Oput) among the Acholi Tribe of Northern
st
Uganda’ Commemorative address made during the ceremony for 21 Niwano Peace Prize Award Japan,
available at www.npf.or.jp/peace_prize_f/21/speech_e.pdf (accessed 8 July 2010); P Bako ‘Does Traditional
Conflict Resolution lead to Justice? The Mato Oput in Northern Uganda’ (2009) 3 Pretoria Student Review 103;
Mato Oput Project ‘Community Perspectives on the Mato Oput Process: A research Study by the Mato Oput
Project’ (October 2009).
169
T Allen ‘Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (2006).

37
oversold and the dangers under-appreciated. 170 While Quinn considers the role and
influence of Uganda’s religious leaders on the use of traditional practices from the stand
point of the six major faith groups and their consideration of the use of neo-traditional
practice. 171 Quinn further acknowledges that there are power dynamics at play behind and
within traditional practices of acknowledgement in the wider transitional justice framework
in Uganda. She concludes that sometimes, traditional practices are carried out by individuals
who, at first glance appear to be the justifiable wielders of power, may in fact, be abusing
this power. 172

The role of the ICC in the LRA conflict has without doubt been shrouded with legal, political
and practical complexities and subject to numerous debates. Some authors investigate the
circumstances of referral by President Museveni and question if the Uganda case was legally
admissible by the ICC. Some commentators state that the ICC was drawn into the Ugandan
situation by an error of judgment.173 Arsanjani and Reisman for instance argue that the ICC
should never have found the referral by Uganda to satisfy the threshold for admissibility set
out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.174 Happold considers the various policy and legal
issues involved in the ICC referral and the consequent investigations. After examining the
legality of Uganda’s ‘self-referral’ and propriety of the ICC Prosecutor’s criteria for case
selection, he questions the credibility of the ICC and its effectiveness. 175

Clark argues that the ICC opened investigations in Uganda on an unusual ground that
appears to contradict its prosecutorial policies; which is the ‘inability of the government
forces to capture and arrest the LRA leadership’. He argues that in pursuing its first cases in
the DRC and Uganda, the ICC is still struggling to define its identity and purpose and

170
T Allen ‘Ritual Ab(use)? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’ in N Waddell & P Clark (eds)
Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (2008).
171
JR Quinn ‘The Thing behind the Thing: The Role and Influence of Religious Leaders on the use of Traditional
Practices of Acknowledgment in Uganda’ (2010) 8(1) Review of Faith and International Affairs 3 – 12.
172
JR Quinn ‘Power to the People? Abuses of Power in Traditional Practices of Acknowledgment in Uganda’
Penal;-Disputing Ideas in Transitional Justice Canadian Political Science Association; Montreal QB 1 June 2010.
173
A Branch ‘International Justice, Local Injustice’ (2004) 51(3) Dissent Magazine; A Branch ‘Uganda’s Civil War
and the Politics of ICC Intervention’ (2007) 21(2) Ethics and International Affairs 179 – 198.
174
MH Arsanjani & WM Reisman ‘The Law in Action of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) American
Journal of International Law.
175
M Happold ‘The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (2007) 8(1) Melbourne Journal
of International Law 159 – 184.

38
endeavouring to secure the recognition and confidence of the states that back it. This he
argues has led to a situation where the Court sometimes makes inconsistent decisions that
undermine its legitimacy. He concludes that the ICC needs a more systematic process of
case selection, and a clearer view of how to balance contending legal and political concerns,
including the difficult task of addressing government atrocities, if it is to fulfil its mandate
and the hopes of its supporters and populations affected by violence.176

Schabas while investigating the ICC’s first cases argues that from the beginning of its work,
the ICC has taken initiatives aimed at attracting cases for prosecution rather than insisting
that states fulfil their obligation to prosecute as required by the complementarity principle
that is central to the Rome Statute. He further argues that the ICC has been unthreatening
to the states concerned because it has targeted rebel groups rather than pro-government
militias and others associated with the regimes concerned. 177

As illustrated in chapter five of this thesis, the author agrees with the observations of most
of the commentators on the legal, political and practical complexities around the referral to
the ICC and the investigations on only one party to the conflict. The author, however, notes
that the government of Uganda has shown no interest in taking over prosecutions of the
LRA leaders indicted by the ICC and the ICC has shown no inclination to hand over the
prosecutions of these leaders to Uganda. The chapter therefore concludes that the ICC
remains an important accountability forum for atrocities committed in the LRA conflict and
that the ICC must ensure that meaningful processes of national prosecutions, truth telling,
and reparations accompany all its activities, adhering to the notion of complementarity that
is central to the Rome Statute.

176
P Clark ‘Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Uganda’ in N Waddell & P Clark (eds) Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (2008).
177
WA Schabas ‘Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law
Forum 5 – 33; this changed in the Darfur and Kenya situations where the target of the ICC is mainly
government officials though these were not ‘self-referral’ like the first cases of the ICC but referral by the
Security Council and instigated by the ICC Prosecutor himself respectively. Perhaps in the cases of self-referral,
the ICC will refrain from investigating state actors to encourage more referrals.

39
Some quarters however, view the ICC as imposing justice in what is comparable to imposed
aid with all its negativities. 178 Some commentators went as far as arguing that the ICC
process is a neo-liberal imposition of western values of justice in an African context.179
Nouwen and Werner in addition question the representation of the ICC by its advocates as a
legal bastion immune from politics arguing that the ICC is inherently political by making a
distinction between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of the international community, which it
purports to represent. Using original empirical data, the authors demonstrates how in both
Uganda and Sudan warring parties have used the ICC's intervention to brand opponents as
enemies of humanity, and to present themselves as friends of the ICC, and thus friends of
the international community. The authors observe that the ICC Prosecutor has at times
encouraged this friend - enemy dichotomy. They conclude that their observations do not
result in a denunciation of the ICC as a ‘political institution’ but underline that a sound
normative evaluation of the ICC’s activities can be made only when its political dimensions
are acknowledged and understood. 180

The ICC was sore a point during the Juba negotiations mediated by Riek Machar, the SPLA
commander and now vice President of South Sudan. 181 The Juba talks were perhaps the best
chance for a negotiated settlement but stalled several times due to the looming threat of
ICC warrants of arrest. This sparked the peace versus justice debate among scholars and
commentators.182 A Refugee Law Project report defined ‘peace’ as the absence of war and

178
C Dolan, ‘Imposed Justice and the need for Sustainable Peace in Uganda’ presentation to Beyond Juba
Project/AMANI Project, Transitional Justice Training Programme for Parliament arians (2008)
http://www.beyondjuba.org/Conference_presentations/Imposed_Jusitce_and%20the_need_for_Sustainable_
Peace_in_Uganda.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010).
179
A Perkins ‘Justice for War Criminals – or Peace for Northern Uganda?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/katineblog/2008/mar/20/justiceforwarcriminalsorp (accessed 15 June
2010).
180
SMH Nouwen & WG Werner ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and
Sudan’ (2010) 21 (4) European Journal of International Law 941 – 965.
181
S Perrot ‘Northern Uganda: a “forgotten conflict”, again? The Impact of the International Resolution
Process’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010); R Atkinson ‘The
Realist’ in Juba? An Analysis of the Juba Peace Talks’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance
Army: Myth and Reality (2010); S Simonse et al., ‘NGO Involvement in the Juba Peace Talks: The Role and
Dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi’ in T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality
(2010); R Iya ‘Encountering Kony: A Madi Perspective’ T Allen & K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance
Army: Myth and Reality (2010).
182
T Allen War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court’s
Intervention (2005); T Allen ‘The International Criminal Court and the Invention of Traditional Justice in
Northern Uganda’ (2007) Politique Africaine 147 – 165; A Branch The Political Dilemma of Global Injustices:

40
‘justice’ as dealing with the past abuses, argues that there is a clear order in which the two
should happen, that is; peace needs to be secured before justice can be decided upon and
carried out. 183 While other scholars argue that peace and justice are inextricably linked and
can be pursued together. 184 Yet, several others disagreed, arguing that although peace and
justice are complementary in that justice can deter abuses and can help make peace
sustainable by addressing grievances non-violently; the reality of peacemaking sometime
requires a deal with perpetrators that is unavoidable and necessary to prevent further
conflict and suffering.185

Several scholars investigated the extent to which criminal justice should be compromised
for the sake of peace. 186 Hoening argues that from a victim’s perspective, ‘peace without
justice’ may make decidedly more sense than ‘justice without peace’ would. In addition, he
pointed out weaknesses with retributive justice in the context of the ICC, which included its
limited scope and reach - it focuses only on a small number of perpetrators of international
crimes. He argued that justice of this nature will only ‘scratch the surface of the suffering
heaped upon the local population in a war that has lasted two decades’. 187

Southwick suggests that to help maximise the prospects of peace in Uganda, the ICC should
limit its role, applying pressure in a way that reinforces the exit options of amnesty for top

Anti-civilian Violence and the Violence of Humanitarianism, the Case of Northern Uganda (2007); A Branch
‘Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention’ (2007) 21(2) Ethics and International Affairs 179 – 198.
183
L Hovil & JR Quinn ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’ (2005) 17 Refugee Law
Project Working Paper.
184
E Baines ‘Accountability, Reconciliation and the Juba Peace Talks: Beyond the Impasse (2006) Justice and
Reconciliation Project.
185
K Hanlon ‘Peace or Justice? Now that the Peace is being Negotiated in Uganda, will the ICC still Pursue
Justice?’ (2007) 14 Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 295; N Grono & A O’Brien ‘Justice in
Conflict? The International Criminal Court and Peace Process in Northern Uganda’ in N Waddell & P Clark (eds)
Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (2008); M Glasius ‘What is Global Justice and Who
Decides?: Civil Society and Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations’ (2009)
31(2) Human Rights Quarterly 496 – 520; this report discusses the salient sources of debate and controversy
including the perceived selectivity or bias of the ICC, whether the ICC investigations are detrimental to peace-
building efforts, the detachment of the ICC from the lived reality of local populations and victims and
compensation to victims.
186
A Greenawalt ‘Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice and the International Criminal Court’
(2009) 50 Virginia Journal of International Law 108.
187
P Hoening ‘The Dilemma of Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda’ (2008) East African Journal of Peace and
Human Rights 338 – 343; B Chinedu, ‘Implementing the International Criminal Court Treaty in Africa: The Role
of Non-Governmental Organisations and Government Agencies in Constitutional Reform’ in KM Clark (ed)
Mirrors of Justice: Law and Power in the Post Cold War Era (2010) 114.

41
LRA leaders to ensure a negotiated settlement. She further argues that in an ongoing
conflict, even after a state’s invitation to commence investigations; the ICC must
independently analyse what effect its action may have on reducing atrocities and enhancing
the prospects for peace. 188 Southwick further argues that to break the deadlock in the
justice versus peace debate, all parties should carefully consider practical approaches to
provisions of the Rome Statute that would enable suspension of the ICC indictments.189
While Apuuli observes that although the ICC investigations resulted into the issuance of
indictments, the indicted leaders up till now have not been apprehended, yet the warrants
of arrest ended all hopes of a negotiated settlement. 190

Other authors disagree on the impact of the ICC investigations on the Juba negotiations. For
instance, Gardner argues that if applied carefully and with the full use of its provisions for
victims and witnesses protection, the ICC could play a positive role in furthering the
resolution of LRA conflict while laying the groundwork for long-term reconciliation and
stability in the country.191 Pescheke too challenges the view that ICC investigations onto
ongoing conflicts will create an obstacle to peace. She argues that that the impact of the ICC
investigations depends on the dynamics of a particular conflict and is likely to have both
negative and positive effects on a peace process. She concludes that in the Ugandan case,
the impact of the ICC on the peace prospects in reality might be quite limited and contends
further that undue emphasis on the ICC should be avoided otherwise the ICC may unfairly
be made a scapegoat should peace efforts fail. 192

A Human Rights Watch report furthers this argument and demonstrates that a decision to
ignore atrocities reinforces a culture of impunity that may carry a high price. The paper
argues that remaining firm on the importance of justice or at least leaving the possibility of
justice open does not necessarily impede negotiations but can yield short and long-term

188
K Southwick ‘Investigating War in Northern Uganda: Dilemmas for the International Criminal Court’ (2005)
Yale Journal of International Law 105 – 119.
189
K Southwick ‘Uganda: Challenges of Peace and Justice’ Refugee International Bulletin 19 Feb 2008.
190
KP Apuuli, ‘The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for
Northern Uganda’ (2006) 4(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 179 – 187.
191
M Gardner ‘In Unchartered Waters: Seeking Justice before the Atrocities Have Stopped: The International
Criminal Court in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (June 2004) Citizens for Global Solutions.
192
K Peschke ‘The ICC Investigations into the Conflict in Northern Uganda: Beyond the Dichotomy of Peace
versus Justice’ in BS Brown (ed) Research Handbook on International Criminal Law (2011).

42
benefits.193 Indeed, as illustrated earlier in this chapter, the threat of ICC prosecutions is one
of the reasons why the LRA called for negotiations in the first place and during the
negotiation period from 2006 to 2008, atrocities dramatically reduced and the LRA have not
perpetrated any atrocities in Northern Uganda since. However, civilians in the DRC, South
Sudan and Central African Republic now endure the most of LRA brutality despite the
pursuit of justice by the ICC.

Other works have looked at the experiences of the ICC in Northern Uganda. Some scholars
focus on how the office of the Prosecutor attempted to develop a comprehensive approach
in pursuit of his mandate. Brubacher for instance contributes an insider view of the ICC on
the peace versus justice debate and the involvement of international criminal tribunals
within ongoing conflicts. He elucidates on how the ICC Prosecutor attempted to develop a
comprehensive approach in order to pursue his mandate. He concludes that international
criminal courts can contribute to efforts to achieve sustainable peace that includes the re-
establishment of legal order and the rule of law. 194

A movement urging the government of Uganda to seek an end to ICC investigations in the
‘interests of justice’ as provided for in the Rome Statute ensued. 195 In its policy paper, the
office of the ICC Prosecutor indicated that it would be misleading to equate the ‘interests of
justice’ to the ‘interests of peace’ arguing that the Ugandan debate is about ‘interests of
peace.’ 196 The paper states that for cases where a situation should arise whereby ICC
involvement directly threatened peace and stability, the right article to deal with this would
be article 16, which obliges the court to defer an investigation or prosecution for one year
on request of the Security Council by chapter seven resolution.197

193
Human Rights Watch ‘Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace’ (July 2009)
http://www.hrw.org/node/84264 (accessed 15 July 2011).
194
M Brubacher ‘The ICC Investigations of the Lord’s Resistance Army: An Insider View in ‘The Lord’s
Resistance Army’ in T Allen and K Vlassenroot (eds) The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (2010).
195
Interests of Justice are provided for under article 53 of the Rome Statute.
196
Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (September 2007) Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal
Court http://www.icc.cpi.int/NR/rdonlyers/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICC0TPInterestsOfJustice.pdf.
197
UN Security Council Chapter VII Resolutions are those that deal with situations that threatens international
peace and security.

43
While Marong argues that to insist on justice at the ICC irrespective of how that might
impact on the efforts to find durable peace in Uganda, risks defeating the goals of both
peace and justice. The author moves the discussion from the justice versus peace debates
instead arguing on the best forum for prosecutions for crimes committed in the LRA conflict.
She argues, that the appropriate forum must not only be informed by the legal and moral
imperatives of the LRA leadership but must also how it might affect accountability goals
such as peace, victim participation, deterrence and legitimacy of the trial. She concludes
that in theory, domestic trials offer the best prospect of attaining both peace and justice. 198

Beyond the debate on amnesty and the use of traditional justice as an alternative to the ICC,
several other commentators agree on the need for domestic prosecution. Human Rights
Watch in a memorandum enumerates why credible prosecutions of those responsible for
international crimes in accordance to international standards are so important in Uganda.
The memorandum gives detailed benchmarks that would need to be satisfied before any
national alternative to trial by the ICC of the indicted LRA leaders would be adequate or for
any other trial for international crimes committed in the LRA conflict. 199

Other authors argue that trials are far more effective if they are organised in the country
where the crimes occurred with more involvement from local individuals and
organisations.200 To cement this argument, Harris opines that the ICC should add a transfer
mechanism to shift cases back to the courts of national jurisdiction modelled on a similar
rule to that of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.201 While other quarters
questioned the competence and credibility of Ugandan courts to deal with crimes on the
scale committed in the LRA conflict. 202 As illustrated in chapter six of this thesis, Ugandan

198
A Marong ‘Making Complementarity Work: The Case for Uganda-Based Trials of the Lord’s Resistance Army
and Lessons from the Rwanda Tribunal’ (2010) African legal Aid Quarterly 39 – 46.
199
Human Rights Watch ‘Benchmarks for Assessing Possible National Alternatives to ICC Cases Against the LRA’
(May 2007) Human Rights Watch Memorandum; the benchmarks are said to include credible, independent
and impartial investigations and prosecution; rigorous implementation of internationally recognised standards
of fair trial; and penalties on conviction that are appropriate and reflect the gravity of the crime.
200
JM Kamatali ‘From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experiences in Bringing Justice to Rwandans’
(2005) 12 New England Journal of International & Comparative Law 89.
201
GH Harris ‘Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 19(1)
Minnesota Journal of International Law 201 – 239.
202
Amnesty International ‘Uganda: Agreement and Annex on Accountability and Reconciliation falls Short of a
Comprehensive Plan to end Impunity (March 2008) Amnesty International AFR 59/001/2008; ‘Report on the

44
courts and the ICD in particular has the competence to deal with prosecutions of
international crimes perpetrated in the LRA conflict and all issues of concern can be ironed
out by amendments of certain laws, selection of staff with requisite credentials and a robust
outreach. The chapter however, questions whether the executive will allow the ICD to
operate without interference in its activities. The chapter further questions whether the ICD
will investigate crimes committed by state actors as individuals in government have shown
every indication that they do not take lightly any accusation of wrong doing on their part. In
addition, the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, specifically shields state
actors from prosecutions in the forum envisaged. 203

Other mechanisms proposed in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation are

truth telling and reparations processes. Rose argues that truth telling and reparations
processes could play a critical role in Northern Uganda’s transition from conflict to peace.204
Previously, a Refugee Law Project Report analysed the process as provided for in the
Amnesty Act from the perspective of those who have undergone the process, those who
had received, or were expected to receive ex-combatants in their communities. The report
concluded that, despite a number of challenges in its implementation, amnesty is perceived
as a vital tool for conflict resolution and for longer-term reconciliation and peace within the
specific context in which it is operating as it resonates with specific cultural understanding
of justice. The report however, recommended truth telling or admittance of guilt on the part
of former combatants as a measure to ensure reconciliation with the community. 205 Matua
too argues that reform in Uganda requires the full democratisation of the political society
that can be constructed through a truth telling process to overhaul the state. 206

As illustrated in chapter eight of this thesis, the author agrees with these observations and
argue that truth telling process will give Uganda an opportunity to confront it’s past, official

Work of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda’ (12 February 2007) UN Doc
A/HRC/4/49/Add2 para 31.
203
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation clause 4.1.
204
C Rose ‘Looking Beyond and Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Mechanism in Uganda: A Proposal for
Truth Telling and Reparations’ (2008) 28 Boston College, Third World Law Journal.
205
L Hovil and Z Lomo ‘Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2002: The Potential for Conflict
Resolution and Long Term Reconciliation’ (2005) 15 Refugee Law Project Working Paper.
206
M Matua ‘Beyond Juba: Does Uganda Need a National Truth and Reconciliation Process?’ (2007) 13 Buffalo
Human Rights Law Review 401 – 413.

45
denials and imposed silences, and also will provide victims with public validation of their
suffering and that this will make the state’s obligation to provide integral reparations
unquestionable. The chapter however, questions the extent to which individuals with state
authority and the state institutions will give room to a truth telling process to exercise its
powers and publicly question their conduct with a looming threat of prosecutions. The
author further questions whether the NRM government will accept that its rule has been
tarnished by decades of conflict and that state institutions are in need of reform or if it will,
like it has done in the past, set sight to justifying policies, hiding complicity and rejecting
blame.

The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annexure recognised the need
for multiple mechanisms to bring about accountability and reconciliation, in which
traditional justice, reparations and truth telling processes were agreed to as parallel and
complementary to formal justice systems. Consultations on the different processes are
underway, while domestic prosecutions through the newly created ICD have began.
However, challenges to the operation of the ICD are evident. For example, its first trial
against Thomas Kwoyelo, the LRA commander captured in Garamba National Park in 2008
was brought to a standstill due to the operation of the Amnesty Act. In addition, Kwoyelo
was not been charged with crimes against humanity that was perpetrated in the conflict due
to lack of a domestic legislation criminalising such acts prior to March 2010. Human Rights
Watch in a briefing paper therefore questions whether the Amnesty Act will ultimately bar
cases against LRA members. The briefing paper also questions whether the International
Criminal Court Act that implements the Rome Statute in Uganda can be used to prosecute
crimes from the conflict as the law only commences in March 2010. The briefing paper
further stresses the importance of the ICD in pursuing cases involving crimes committed by
both the LRA and the state security organs. 207

Human Rights Watch further expounds on the existing inadequacies in the Ugandan justice
system and the questionable commitment shown by both the LRA and the government of

207
Human Rights Watch ‘Justice for Serious Crimes before National Courts: Uganda’s International Crimes
Division’ (Jan 2012) Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper; this briefing paper also explores the impact of
structural inadequacies within the ICD, such as frequent rotation of staff on and off the Division and the lack of
a witness and victim protection and support scheme.

46
Uganda to serious accountability efforts arguing that the true test ultimately lies not in the
language of the text, but in the rigors of implementation of the Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation. 208 Worden further observes that planning mechanisms
for accountability and reconciliation are lagging far behind fast moving events on the
ground. He suggests that the government and civil society must move now from ideas to
action if they are to be prepared to deliver a form of accountability that is acceptable to
victims of the conflict and that can form the foundation for a lasting peace in Uganda. 209 In
the same tone, Mbazira posits that the Ugandan experience illustrates how perpetrators of
international crimes can elude both international and domestic judicial processes; pointing
out that despite ICC arrest warrants, the international community has failed to affect the
arrest of suspects and that the ICD is idle due to the absence of accused persons. 210

Otim and Wierda on the other hand opine that the early treatment of accountability and
reconciliation dilemmas at Juba set new standards in terms of efforts to meld local demands
and international legal obligations and in terms of the process of soliciting the views of
affected populations. In these respects, they argue that much can be learnt from
experiences in Uganda, regardless of whether the peace process itself succeeds or fails. 211
While Hopwood correctly points out that with or without a concluded peace agreement in
Juba, further violence and unrest may continue in the region if longstanding grievances are
not addressed. He further states that hidden arms caches, unexploded ordinances, and
landmines scattered throughout the region, present a largely unmitigated security threat.212

The parties did not sign a comprehensive peace agreement after the Juba talks. Some
commentators have called for additional negotiations with a new format. Some have urged
the UN Security Council and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council mandate a

208
Human Rights Watch Uganda: The June 29 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and the Need
for Adequate Penalties for the Most Serious Crimes (Jan 2008); Human Rights Watch ‘Analysis of the Annex to
the June 29 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation’ (Feb 2008) 4 Memorandum on Justice Issues and
the Juba Talk.
209
S Worden ‘The Justice Dilemma in Uganda’ (Feb 2008) United States Institute of Peace Briefing Paper.
210
C Mbazira ‘Prosecuting International Crimes Committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda’ in C
Murungu & J Biegon (eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (2011).
211
M Otim & M Wierda ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’ in N
Waddell & P Clark (eds) Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (2008).
212
J Hopwood ‘With or Without Peace: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Northern Uganda’
(Feb 2008) 6 Justice and Reconciliation Project Field Notes.

47
special envoy for LRA-affected areas assisted by the government of South Sudan to
negotiate peace directly with Kony and his commanders.213 Other reports have called for a
better-coordinated military pursuit with assistance of the international community to
bolster the fight against the LRA to ensure the apprehension or elimination of its
leadership.214 Other reports in addition call for a new strategy that prioritises civilian
protection; unity of effort among military and civilian actors within and across national
boundaries; and national ownership to bring the LRA conflict to an end.215

Nonetheless, LRA conflict rages on and the rebels including culpable LRA leaders have been
returning for years to their communities in Uganda and have taken advantage of the
amnesty offered by the government. Accountability, nonetheless, remains a prominent legal
issue with an ever-increasing literature on the subject and this thesis contributes to that.
Most of the available scholarly work focuses on the tension caused by the ICC investigations
on the amnesty process and the peace talks. Other literature concentrates on whether or
not traditional justice processes are appropriate accountability measures; and what the
appropriate forum would be; domestic or international courts. In addition, whether
traditional justice or truth telling and reparations process are what is needed and what
should come first, peace or justice. In this thesis, the author agrees with Quinn who suggests
that in examining the case of Uganda where a myriad of mechanisms have been applied as
transitional measures since Independence, what is required is complementarity not
sequencing as the different measures can work to reinforce each other.216 In addition, the
author takes the view that there is no ‘one size fits all’ when it comes to accountability for
mass atrocities. The thesis therefore gives an in depth consideration to the unique situation
of the LRA conflict and analyses the four different accountability measures underway or
proposed to deal with crimes committed in the conflict; investigating where and how they
can effectively complement each other to promote justice, truth and reparations in Uganda.

213
International Crisis Group ‘The Road to Peace, with or without Kony’ (10 Dec 2008) 146 Africa Report.
214
J Prendergast ‘Let’s make a Deal: Leverage Needed in Northern Uganda Peace Talks’ (Aug 2007) 6 ENOUGH
Strategy Paper; A Benner & J Prendergast ‘Ending the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (Oct 2011) ENOUGH Project;
Resolve From Promise to Peace: A Blueprint for President Obama’s LRA Strategy (6 Oct 2010).
215
International Crisis Group ‘LRA: A Regional Strategy beyond Killing Kony’ (28 April 2010) 157 Africa Report.
216
JR Quinn ‘Chicken and Eggs? Sequencing in Transitional Justice: The Case of Uganda’ (2008) International
Law Journal of Peace Studies 35 – 53.

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1.9 Overview of chapters

Chapter one gives a brief background to the conflict and provides a review of literature that
forms the basis for analysis in the chapters that follows.

Chapter two discusses the international normative standards applicable to the conflict. The
chapter concludes that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed in the LRA
conflict and discusses the specific elements of the crimes committed.

Chapter three gives a description of Uganda’s international obligation in regard to

international crimes. This chapter also examines the place of amnesties in international law
and gives an overview of the different accountability measures, national and international,
judicial and non-judicial.

Chapter four discusses the Uganda Amnesty Act and the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation reached in Juba. This chapter specifically analyses if these two instruments
complies with Uganda’s international obligations.

Chapter five analyses the ICC intervention in the LRA conflict. It critically analyses the hard
questions asked in relation to ICC warrants of arrest, investigations, and response of victim
groups in Uganda. It also looks at the ICC reparations regime and discusses its benefits for
victims of the LRA conflict.

Chapter six focuses on the International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda. It
discusses the laws applicable in the division, questions of jurisdiction, and other
interlocutory matters likely to come before court.

Chapter seven discusses the challenges to application of traditional justice to the crimes
committed in the LRA conflict and gives an overview of the different healing rituals and
traditional justice mechanisms practised among the Acholi of Uganda.

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Chapter eight analyses the features of a truth commission for Uganda. It gives an overview
of the past two investigative commissions in Uganda and uses that and case studies from
other transitional states to highlight potential challenges for a new truth telling and
reconciliation process in Uganda.

Chapter nine considers all the analysis in the preceding chapters to provide conclusions and
recommendations for the thesis.

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