ragna boden

The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia

New evidence from Russian and German archives

Introduction

One of the unsolved riddles of Indonesian history in the twentieth century

is the so-called Gestapu affair and its aftermath. For the murder of six army
generals on the night of 30 September 1965 the Indonesian communists and
President Soekarno were widely held responsible. Indonesian leftists – real
and alleged – were persecuted; hundreds of thousands were killed. The long-
term consequences affected Indonesian domestic as well as foreign policy: the
changeover in government resulted in 30 years of rule by Soeharto; the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) and leftist organiza-
tions were banned; relations with China were severed, those with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were reduced; and ties with Washington
and the Western world intensified.
An important part of the background of the affair, however, remains unre-
solved (Cribb and Brown 1995:98). The process of reappraisal in Indonesia is
still under way. Maybe because of that, or perhaps due to its exposed posi-
tion as a state institution, the Departemen Luar Negeri (Deplu, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) long had on its Internet site not even a hint of the foreign
entanglements occasioned by this affair. That there might be more behind
it, though, was demonstrated by recent discussions on US involvement. In
1990 there was a sharp controversy about the extent to which the CIA in

 Gestapu is the acronym for Gerakan September Tigapuluh, the Indonesian expression for
September 30 Movement.
 See Vickers 2005:171 for an assessment of the Gestapu under Soeharto’s New Order regime.
 http://www.deplu.go.id/2003 (accessed 21-1-2005). Until at least January 2005, under the
heading ‘The communist abortive coup’, the Indonesian communists were blamed for the mur-
der of the gene­rals.

ragna boden took her PhD degree at the University of Marburg and is Akademische Rätin
at the Faculty of History, Historical Institute, Department for East European History, University
of Bochum. Her research interest is the history of international relations. She is the author of Die
Grenzen der Weltmacht; Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Brežnev, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006,
and ‘The atheistic and the Muslim state; Islam as an element of Soviet-Indonesian relations’,
in: Fritz Schulze and Holger Warnk (eds), Insular Southeast Asia; Linguistic and cultural studies in
honour of Bernd Nothofer, pp. 153-62. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006. Dr Boden may be reached
at [email protected].

Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI) 163-4 (2007):507-528

© 2007 Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
508 Ragna Boden

1965 had helped to identify PKI members, who were thereafter imprisoned
and executed by the Indonesian armed forces (Kadane 1990; Martens 1990).
Eleven years later, the publishing of the Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS) volume on the period in question still caused problems for the same
reason: controversy over US involvement in the persecution of Indonesian
communists. A recent article even suggests that Western propaganda had
encouraged the anti-communist riots (Easter 2005). On the other hand, CIA
staff on the spot had blamed the socialist bloc for the killing of the generals
(FRUS 2001: No. 178, p. 376), regarding it as part of a coup d’état against the
military inspired by Soekarno and the PKI. It was typical of East-West ani-
mosity that the US and the USSR blamed each other for any heightening of
tensions on a global scale, especially in Third World countries.
In order to shed light on the events, it is necessary to examine contem-
porary documents. Indonesian government documents on this topic remain
inaccessible for the moment, while the PKI archive exists only in fragmented
form due to the events described here. As to material from abroad, Western
sources have become accessible, although with some limitations. Documents
from European socialist countries were off-limits until about 1990. Only after
the end of the USSR did it become possible to assess the events on the basis
of sources from the global communist network, chiefly from Soviet and East
German files, whereas the Chinese archives remain closed. After the col-
lapse of the USSR, Soviet material from state and party organizations is now
partly open to researchers. These documents have not yet been thoroughly
examined to analyse the events of 1965 in Indonesia. Additional sources can
be found in the files of the former Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands

 See the article by Kadane 1990, and the reply by Martens 1990.
 Apparently, the CIA tried to stop the publication of documents of FRUS 1964-1968, Vol. 26 in
July 2001. See Haubold 2001. While not in their printed version, the FRUS had information about
these incidents on their website until at least March 2006: ‘CIA stalling state department history’,
preface to the FRUS edition, in: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/docIII.pdf
(accessed 20-3-2006). The site was not freely accessible any more, though, when I checked it in
May 2007.
 See the material in: Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG, International
Institute for Social History), Amsterdam, PKI Collection; IISG, Indonesian Exiles of the Left.
 Of special importance are the Archiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP, Archive
of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation) and the Archive of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the post-Stalin period (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Noveishei
Istorii (RGANI), Russian State Archive for Contemporary History).
 Before 1991, the Soviet documents were classified, and since then, interest in the topic by re-
searchers of Soviet policy has waned. See for a discussion during the first decade following the
events, Lev 1966a; Shaplen 1969; Anderson and McVey 1971; Van der Kroef 1972. For more recent
assessments, see Cribb 1990, 2003. Singh (1994:222-36) uses only published material. The first at-
tempt to include Soviet archival documents is Johansen (1999). I would like to thank the author for
providing me with a copy of the manuscript. Johansen concludes that a Soviet entanglement in the
incidents is highly unlikely. For a further discussion of the topic, see also Boden 2006a:327-37.
 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 509

(SED, Socialist Unity Party of East Germany), which was also in contact with
the PKI. This material, reviewed here, should help to elucidate the course
of events as well as the role of foreign actors in this affair, especially socialist
actors.
To provide the necessary background for the interpretation of the docu-
ments, this article first sketches the Indonesian domestic and international
context of the events. It briefly characterizes the Republic of Indonesia’s situ-
ation in the mid-1960s, the constellation of domestic power and influential
foreign relations. The main part of the article is dedicated to a comparison
between official Soviet reactions to the Gestapu events, and pre-Gestapu
unofficial discussions of Indonesian politicians and diplomats with their
Soviet and East German counterparts.

The setting: Indonesia’s domestic and international position

As far as is known, the events of 1965 were related to a struggle for influ-
ence between the major Indonesian power elites: the president, the armed
forces, and the PKI.10 The years 1962-1963 were decisive in this context: this
was when President Soekarno moved closer to the PKI and restructured the
army elite, dismissing anti-communist generals like Abdul Haris Nasution
(Feith 1964:969). Nasution, as former chief of staff of the army, and his fol-
lowers continued their opposition to the PKI as well as to Soekarno’s socialist
line in foreign relations. A first serious clash between armed forces and com-
munists had already taken place in 1948. It had begun as an intra-military
struggle of anti-communists against communists and ended in a persecution
of the latter with thousands of casualties.11 After this so-called Madiun affair,
the army and the navy took a strong anti-communist stand. In terms of man-
power, the armed forces profited from Soekarno’s military campaigns in West
New Guinea and against Malaysia during the 1960s; in 1965 between 300,000
and 400,000 Indonesians were under arms.12 The communists for their part had

 The documents are kept in the Bundesarchiv (GFA, German Federal Archives), in the collec-
tion of Stiftung Archiv Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO, Foundation for
the Archives of the Parties and Mass-Organizations of the German Democratic Republic (GDR))-
Bundes­archiv (BArch, German Federal Archives), and have, to my knowledge, not yet been used
to study the Gestapu events.
10 See Cribb and Brown 1995:97-106; Vickers 2005:156-60. The religious parties were also an

important factor but were generally not associated with the events of 1965. For the triangle, see
especially Feith 1964; McVey 1965b.
11 See for the so-called Madiun affair Kreutzer 1984; Kahin 1970:282-303, who was present in

Indonesia at that time; see also Swift 1989; McVey 1962:70. For the number of casualties, see
Brackman 1963:99; Poeze 2007, see the chapter on diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. I
thank the author for providing me with a copy of this chapter before publication.
12 The figures range from 330,000 (Penders and Sundhaussen 1985:160) to 400,000 (Brackman
510 Ragna Boden

gained from Soekarno’s leaning to the left, his acceptance of Soviet aid, and
his growing understanding with China.13 In 1965 the PKI claimed 3.5 million
members and as many as 20 million followers in its mass organizations.14
The president himself (Hering 2002; Dahm 1969) owed his strong position
in the early 1960s to support and toleration by two of the major groupings
of power, whereas the religious parties turned away from him. He had also
managed, with the help of the armed forces, to push through his programme
of Guided Democracy.15 The programme was inspired by Soekarno’s visits to
Eastern Europe and the People’s Republic of China in 1956. It included the
transfer of more power to the president’s office and away from the elected par-
liament. When Soekarno proclaimed Guided Democracy in 1957, he was faced
with uprisings, most notably in the region of Padang in Central Sumatra, and
was the victim of an assassination attempt. The unrest escalated into a rebel-
lion in early 1958, supported by covert US intervention. These actions were
not admitted officially, but US politicians publicly justified the rebellion as a
legitimate defence against the growth of communism in Indonesia.16 However,
Soekarno prevailed with the help of the Indonesian armed forces. When he had
overcome this crisis he intensified his cooperation with the PKI as well as rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and China. During the following period the ques-
tion was not so much whether Soekarno would choose a capitalist or a socialist
road to development, but which kind of socialism he would introduce.
In foreign policy, following independence Indonesia had initially received
military support from the West. Moreover, the archipelago’s economy was
dominated by Western enterprises such as Standard-Vacuum, Texas Oil, and
Royal Dutch Shell. When Indonesia became one of the driving forces of the
non-aligned movement (Jansen 1966; Soerjono 1964), however, relations with
the West cooled. In 1955 Indonesia hosted the Bandung conference, assembling
all those former colonies that hoped to remain neutral in the Cold War conflict.
In this new function, Soekarno tested his chances of receiving support from
both blocs. On his trip to the US, to Western and Eastern Europe, and to China
in 1956, he did not succeed in getting credit in America, whereas Khrushchev

1963:285). See for the role of the Indonesian armed forces Sundhaussen 1982; Nöbel 1975; for
the way they saw themselves as an important factor of state power see Britton 1973:83-4; McVey
1971a:131-2. See for the beginnings of the army Kahin 1970:140-1.
13 See for the early times of the PKI: Aidit 1956:4-17; Petrus Blumberger 1931:106-28, 351-9; Ka-

hin 1970:70-87; McVey 1965a. Sukma 1999 examines mainly Indonesian-Chinese relations since
1967.
14 ‘Aidit’s expositions to comrade Hager from 10 August 1963’, in SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV A

2/20, 667, no pagination, first page. Varying figures from 1.5 to 2.5 million in: Pauker 1969:276.
15 Feith 1967:325-31; Lev 1966b; Tan 1967; Bunnell 1966. For a Soviet assessment, see Drugov

and Reznikov 1969. For aspects of foreign policy, see Leifer 1983:54-74.
16 See for the 1958 events (and foreign intervention) Kosut 1967:64-75; Roadnight 2002:139-63;

Kahin and Kahin 1995; Dahm 1971:184-6.

 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 511

generously granted $100 million, one of the largest grants of Soviet foreign
aid to a non-communist country at that time. During the following years,
Soekarno and the armed forces received political and – more important – gen-
erous material support from the USSR for their most prestigious (and costly)
projects, especially for the West Irian and the Crush Malaysia campaigns.
During the 1960s, Soekarno became more and more oriented towards China.
Soekarno’s predilection for socialist models seemed to suit the interests
of the PKI, who had contacts with socialist countries through the communist
network. The situation was severely complicated, though, by the Sino-Soviet
rift starting in the late 1950s. The ‘socialist world system’ broke apart because
of disagreement between Moscow and Beijing in matters of ideology, and
above all because of rivalry over leadership of the communist movement
(Lüthi 2004; Westad 2000). The resulting polycentrism caused serious ques-
tions of loyalty in communist parties, and in several cases like India, even
resulted in a split. The PKI leadership under Aidit, Lukman and Njoto have
been trying for years to mediate between the rivals.17 When the split became
obvious, they first took a position of positive neutrality towards Beijing
before fully siding with the Chinese in 1963 (Van Dijk 1972; Ray 1964). Still,
they maintained relations with Moscow as well.
As for Soekarno, he publicly announced his political preferences when he
proclaimed an international Jakarta–Beijing–Pyongyang axis in 1964 (Mackie
2002; Sukma 1995). Whether his openly siding with China and her ally North
Korea was just an extreme variant or a complete break with Hatta’s ideal of
an independent and active foreign policy (bebas-aktif) remains controversial
(Sukma 1995:310). In any case the president did not formally abandon it, nor
did he give up the idea of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO), meaning the
solidarity of the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America as well the socialist
countries and the ‘progressive forces’ in capitalist countries.18
Thus, despite the vivid and varied Soviet-Indonesian relations, Soekarno
finally sided with Moscow’s socialist opponents. Up to that time, bilateral
relations had seen frequent reciprocal visits from the mid-1950s until the
early 1960s of the heads of state and of all kinds of delegations: political,
trade, military, cultural, social and even religious (McLane 1973:83-90). Apart
from that, Jakarta had received generous Soviet support for the above-men-
tioned military ventures and for prestigious projects like the Senayan sports
complex. Soviet observers in Indonesia mostly blamed the Chinese for the
deterioration of relations between Moscow and Jakarta, especially for the
anti-Soviet propaganda and the infiltration of Soviet political and cultural

17 See for instance Aidit’s speech before members of the Indonesian armed forces in 1963, in
SAPMO-BArch DY/30/IV A 2/20, 668, no pagination.
18 All other forces were called the OLDEFO or Old Established Forces. See Modelski 1963.
512 Ragna Boden

organizations in the archipelago.19 The Soviet observers were hoping to win

back the PKI to Moscow because, as they argued, the USSR had more to offer
in terms of aid than China, which was itself a developing country.20
If the contact with Beijing was the main problem in Soviet relations with
Soekarno and the PKI, the armed forces had strong anti-communist traditions.
These remained influential, even though Soekarno replaced the strictly anti-
communist A.H. Nasution as chief of staff of the army by the more moderate
Achmad Yani in June 1963. Despite ideological differences, for strictly prag-
matic reasons the army accepted military support from Moscow on a large
scale. To this end, army general Nasution himself had visited the Soviet Union
several times. In June 1961 he went as a member of a government delegation
together with Soekarno.21 Most of the Soviet assistance to Jakarta was used to
finance Indonesia’s West Irian and Crush Malaysia campaigns, although the
latter was not wholeheartedly supported by Khrushchev. The Soviets were
won over by arguments that the campaigns were part and parcel of the con-
tinuing Indonesian revolution in the domestic sphere, and of Indonesia’s anti-
imperialist struggle in foreign policy. Until 1965, Indonesia used 90 percent of
their Soviet aid for military purposes against 10 percent that was invested in
civil ventures (Boden 2006b:479). This was more than any of Moscow’s other
non-communist beneficiaries received to this end.
Given this international constellation, it is hard to speculate what Moscow
might have regarded as the best option in the event of an internal Indonesian
crisis: siding with Soekarno and the PKI as the USSR’s ‘natural partner’, or
siding with the armed forces who received Soviet material and who opposed
the leaning of the president and the communists to China, which at that time
was already Moscow’s rival.

The events and their aftermath

One of the decisive factors that speeded up Indonesia’s internal struggle for
power was the lasting illness of President Soekarno, which raised questions
about a possible successor. According to a rumour, a group of army generals,
the so-called Council of Generals, had planned a coup d’état for 5 October
1965. This rumour is said to have provoked an attack on the generals, which
might have been intended as a kidnapping but actually culminated in murder
(Cribb and Brown 1995:98). On the morning of 1 October, in a radio broadcast,

19 See the report by the Pravda correspondents M.G. Domogatskii and L.V. Pochivalov, on their
trip to Southeast Asia, 11-4-1963, in RGANI, fond (dossier, fonds; hereafter f.) 5, opis (finding aid,
hereafter op.) 55, delo (file; hereafter d.) 116, ll. 106-42, here list (page; hereafter l.) 106.
20 The adviser of the Soviet embassy in Indonesia, 3-4-1965, in RGANI, f. 5, op. 55, d. 116, l. 168.
21 See for example the article in Pravda, 13-6-1961. For details, see Boden 2006b.
 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 513

a group called the ‘September 30 Movement’ under Colonel Untung claimed

responsibility for the attack on the generals.22 They stated: ‘The Council of
Generals is a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA […]. [T]he Council
of Generals had even planned to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup […].
It was to prevent such a counter-revolutionary coup that Lieutenant Colonel
Untung launched the September 30 Movement which has proved a great suc-
cess.’ (Selected documents 1966:134.) In the afternoon of the same day, a ‘rev-
olutionary committee’ was presented, composed of 45 members, who were
meant to take over government tasks.23 However, the Movement was too weak
to resist the (counter-)attack of the military under General Soeharto and broke
down within two days (Cribb and Brown 1995:101).
Certain signs were said to point to an involvement of Soekarno and the
PKI. These purported signs include the fact that the army officers had been
opposing Soekarno’s policies and his close cooperation with the PKI. This,
such ran the argument, would have been a strong motive for the killing of
the generals. This became the official version for the duration of Soeharto’s
presidency and all the way up to 1998 (Cribb and Brown 1995:100). A strong
argument in favour of Soekarno’s involvement was the fact that Untung,
the leader of the Movement, belonged to the president’s security guard. An
alleged sign of PKI involvement was the list of names which Untung intro-
duced as the ‘revolutionary committee’ of the September 30 Movement. The
list included the names of four members of the PKI and affiliated organiza-
tions (out of 45 committee members).24 Later, on 5 October, the PKI dissociated
themselves from the committee, stating that its alleged participants had been
included without their knowledge as far as PKI members were concerned.25
Furthermore, in the light of the communist uprisings in 1926 and 1948, the
incidents of 1965 seemingly fitted into a certain pattern.
The breakdown of the putsch gave way to a wave of violence against com-
munists and leftists in general, which affected all regions and all social strata.
The excesses lasted until March 1966, with occasional assaults and official
executions taking place until 1969. The violence was fostered by the armed
forces (Cribb and Brown 1995:105), who also held military tribunals and car-
ried out executions. The number of people killed is estimated at several hun-
dreds of thousands, on up to one million (Cribb and Brown 1995:106). As a
consequence, the PKI was wiped out and communism prohibited; leftists like
the famous writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer were imprisoned in camps.

22 ‘Initial statement of colonel Untung’, in Selected documents 1966:134-5.

23 ‘Decree No. 1 on the establishment of the Indonesian Revolution Council’, in Selected docu-
ments 1966:136-7.
24 The list of names is given in Selected documents 1966:140-2.
25 ‘Statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the P.K.I. (October 5)’, in Se-

lected documents 1966:188-9.

514 Ragna Boden

Official Soviet reactions

In order to understand the background of the events from the point of view of
communists in other countries, it is important to look at their official reactions
to the incidents. During the critical period from the murder of the generals
until the execution of PKI leaders Sudisman, Njono and Wirjomartono in Oc-
tober 1968, there were enough public statements from Soviet state and party
officials in the media to fill two volumes (V zashchitu 1967-69). These volumes
comprise texts from the two major Soviet dailies Pravda and Izvestiya, as well
as from Soviet international weekly magazines like New Times (Russian edi-
tion: Novoe Vremya; German edition: Neue Zeit).
The official Soviet version of the Gestapu incidents with regard to the
PKI was very cautious. It ran as follows: ‘In Jakarta, military units under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Untung from President Soekarno’s security
guard have committed an attempted revolt.’ (U. 1965:15). Moscow here fol-
lowed the PKI’s version that the murder of the generals was part of an inter-
nal power struggle within the armed forces and had nothing to do with a
communist putsch (V zashchitu 1967-69, I:32-8).
However, there are signs that the USSR exercised restraint. It is striking,
for instance, that the official reactions began only on 12 October, twelve days
after the generals’ murder.26 This suggests that Moscow adopted a wait-and-see
policy rather than encourage a purported communist coup d’état. Therefore,
in their first public reaction, the Soviet leadership, namely Brezhnev, Mikoyan
and Kosygin,27 appealed to Soekarno to restore order and continue the path of
the Indonesian revolution:

We are sending you and all the friendly people of Indonesia our sincere wishes of
great success to achieve the healthy purposes of the Indonesian revolution and in
the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, in the defence
of peace and security.28

However restrained Moscow was about a possible PKI involvement, they

staunchly held the imperialists responsible for the events. Brezhnev blamed
the incident on an all-embracing aggressive imperialist policy in Asia:

26 Brackman 1969:150-1 mentions a Soviet radio broadcast on 3 October 1965. In the files of the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPSU, however, there are no corresponding documents.
27 After the fall of Khrushchev, Brezhnev became First Secretary of the Central Committee of

the CPSU in October 1964 and changed to the title of secretary-general in April 1966. Kosygin
was chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1964, Mikoyan held the post of chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. These were the three most influential posts in the
Soviet Union, both in theory and in practice.
28 Letter to Soekarno 10-10-1965, printed in Pravda 12-10-1965, here quoted from: V zashchitu

1967-69, I:9-10.
 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 515

The aggressive policy of imperialism increases the danger of war in the whole
world. We see that the situation in Asia is becoming tense. […] The imperialist forc-
es try to use the situation which has now emerged in Indonesia for their own inter-
ests. […] all real friends of Indonesia could only with concern watch the campaign
that has been developing during the last days and which is directed against the
leftist organizations, among them the communist party. The Soviet people highly
appreciate the Indonesian people’s friendship, their struggle against imperialism,
colonialism and neo-colonialism, and attach great importance to the all-round de-
velopment of the cooperation between the USSR and Indonesia. We are convinced
that the unity and the joining together of all healthy, progressive forces answers the
key interests of the Indonesian people, and we hope that neither the domestic nor
the foreign reactionary forces are given the opportunity to destroy this unity and
avert Indonesia from her chosen path and divert her from solving her tasks, which
derive from the Indonesian revolution.29

These were the essentials of the official Soviet position concerning the inci-
dents of 1965 in the period immediately following the murders. Brezhnev al-
luded to a possible influence of foreign powers, but did not specify which
ones he had in mind. Moreover, he emphasized the importance of the Indo-
nesian revolution. What had once begun as a national struggle against the
Dutch and the Japanese occupation, had led to the revolution of 17 August
1945. Brezhnev did not explain if he meant to transfer the term ‘revolution’ to
a socialist sphere as a further struggle within the country.
With the growing repression and finally the mass killings, Soviet com-
mentaries and appeals to stop sounded increasingly helpless: ‘What for and
according to what right are tens of thousands of people being killed?’ asked
Pravda. The explanation: ‘Rightist political circles are trying to eliminate the
communist party and at the same time “eradicate” the ideology of commu-
nism in Indonesia’. (Pravda, 16-2-1966, in: V zashchitu 1967-69, I:42) Concerning
the massacres, Moscow always publicly supported the Indonesian comrades
against the persecution and the PKI leadership against the death sentences.
They stressed that the communists had been falsely accused of the murders
in order to create a pretext to wipe out the PKI: ‘The ultra-reactionary forces
in Indonesia used the attempted putsch to attack the communist party. They
accused the whole party of treason, and created an atmosphere of anarchy
and mass terror throughout the whole country which is directed not only
against the communists but also against all other progressively thinking
people.’ (Antonow 1966.) In addition to that, Mikoyan (1966:4) described the
anti-communist persecution as ‘white terror’, alluding to the Russian civil war
of 1917-1922. He stated: ‘[…] tens and hundreds of thousands of communists
and members of other progressive organizations […] became the victims of a
29 ‘From the speech of comrade L.I. Brezhnev in Kiev on 23 October 1965’, printed in Pravda 24-
10-1965, in: V zashchitu 1967-69, I:11-2.
516 Ragna Boden

bitter class struggle by reactionary forces’. He thus interpreted the Indonesian

situation in socialist terms, as a struggle between the progressive communists
and ‘reactionary forces’, which he again did not name explicitly.
The Soviets were convinced that Indonesian development as an indepen-
dent country was inextricably linked with socialism and that the destruc-
tion of communism was tantamount to the destruction of the Indonesian
revolution (V zashchitu 1967-69, I:43). This is why the Soviet leadership wrote
fervent appeals to prevent the executions of the PKI elite who had survived
the mass killings (V zashchitu 1967-69, II:17-21). But despite Moscow’s efforts,
Sudisman, Njono and Wirjomartono were executed in October 1968.
In summary, one can say that in their public statements the Soviets held
Untung and his group of officers responsible for the murder of the generals.
They also blamed unnamed Indonesian ‘reactionary forces’ as well as foreign
imperialists for the consequences, possibly also for the murder of the generals.
According to Moscow’s version, these had been staged as an excuse to hold
military tribunals against the communists. From these official statements it
does not become clear to what extent Soviet politicians and diplomats might
have known of the plans beforehand and how the events were judged inter-
nally. This is where the archival documents are more promising.

Behind the scenes

The Soviet files show that Moscow’s contacts with the PKI had been intensive
right up to autumn 1965. During the first half of 1965 the Soviet ambassador
frequently held conversations with Indonesian state and party officials.30 Al-
though relations with the PKI were strained due to the Sino-Soviet split, Aidit
tried to make a fresh start with the new Soviet leadership under Brezhnev. He
even welcomed the change because he had strongly disliked Khrushchev, not
only for the way he conveyed de-stalinization to socialist comrades on a global
scale, but also for his coarse manners.31 As far as Soviet relations with Indonesia
were concerned, Aidit recommended ‘to the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries to hold Indonesia firmly in their hands and not to let her go under
any circumstances’.32 This means that at least part of the PKI leadership was
very interested in good relations with the whole socialist world, not just with
Beijing.

30 AVP, f. 091, op. 21, papka (dossier; hereafter pap.) 33, d. 3.

31 Discussions of the Soviet ambassador Mikhailov with Aidit, 2-3-1965, in AVP, f. 091, op. 21,
pap. 33, d. 3, l. 86.
32 Discussions of the Soviet ambassador Mikhailov with Aidit, 8-1-1965, in AVP, f. 091, op. 21,

pap. 33, d. 3, l. 17.

 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 517

It is interesting to see that Aidit spoke very openly about the PKI’s per-
spectives with regard to the immediate future. Concerning the possible
power vacuum after Soekarno, he discussed a possible succession with Soviet
ambassador Mikhailov:

According to the statement of D.N. Aidit, there arises the question who will come
after Soekarno. For the Communist Party neither Nasution nor Chairul Saleh are
acceptable. They [the PKI] support Subandrio. For the PKI, Ali Sastroamidjojo is
not suited either, because he will strengthen the position of the Partai Nasional In-
donesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party), and this is bad for the PKI. D.N. Aidit
said that […] Nasution could be sent abroad, for instance as ambassador to Paris;
A. Yani could stay in office as a counterbalance to Nasution.33

This statement suggests that if the PKI had a part in the incidents of 30 Sep-
tember, they had changed their plans when they attacked Nasution and Yani.
On the other hand, Aidit’s statement might be interpreted as indicating the PKI
was not involved, because they had different plans in case of a takeover of pow-
er. Subandrio might have been an interesting candidate for the USSR because
he had been the first Indonesian ambassador to Moscow (1954-1956) and had
displayed some socialist inclinations at that time. Moreover, he became a PNI
member in 1958 and thus seemed to be acceptable to the nationalists as well.
Only three months before the tragic events, another PKI member gave an
impression of his party’s view of the situation in Indonesia in a discussion with
a foreign comrade. In talks with the GDR’s ambassador, Zain Nasution (not
to be confused with General Abdul Haris Nasution) alluded to ‘a process of a
gathering of the reactionary forces’.34 He did not specify which forces he had in
mind. As to their strength, he estimated that even though they were not strong
enough to carry out a coup d’état, ‘they could cause a lot of trouble’. Again, he
did not go into details as to what implications he saw for the PKI. Referring to
the alleged power vacuum resulting from Soekarno’s illness, he said:

At present, there was no decisive development of the country to the left to be ex-
pected. If Soekarno should at some time not be at the head any more, there would
begin a rapid development to the left. In answer to my [Hertzfeld’s] question if
that meant that Soekarno was the main obstacle for a decisive leftist development,
Nasution said that this was true to a certain extent.

33 Discussions of the Soviet ambassador Mikhailov with Aidit, 8-1-1965, in AVP, f. 091, op. 21,
pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 11-2. At this time, A.H. Nasution was Minister of the Armed Forces, Chairul Saleh
was Third Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister in the Compartment of Development
and Minister of Basic Industry and Mining; Subandrio held the posts of First Deputy Prime Min-
ister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations; Ali Sastroamidjojo was Deputy
Chairman of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly; Yani was Chief of Staff of the Army.
This information is taken from Finch and Lev 1965:54-9.
34 ‘Memorandum about talks with the deputy head of the department for international relations

of the Central Committee of the PKI, comrade Zain Nasution, 30 June 1965’, confidential, 12-7-
1965, by the consul general of the GDR, Hertzfeld, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/20, 667. The
following quotations refer to this document unless stated otherwise.
518 Ragna Boden

Here again, it is uncertain whether the PKI’s statement is evidence of a PKI

initiative for the murder of the generals or not. Zain Nasution explained that
the PKI felt the menace of the ‘reactionary forces’ and their possible inclina-
tion to a putsch. He also argued that Soekarno might stand in the way of a
leftist development of Indonesia. This does at least not support the theory of a
united action of Soekarno and the communists against the generals.
An examination of the further course of discussions faces the problem
that, similar to the gap in the FRUS material, there are very few documents
for the critical period between 23 June and 29 December 1965 in the declas-
sified files of the Soviet foreign ministry.35 The lack of Soviet material may
be attributable to various reasons: either the relevant documents are kept in
another archive (most likely the president’s archive, which is generally inac-
cessible) or they have not yet been classified or even listed among the existing
documents. Moreover, contacts with the PKI might indeed have been inter-
rupted completely. But even in this case it is very likely that somewhere there
exists some material on the internal assessment of the situation by Soviet dip-
lomats or journalists. In the absence of Soviet material, the documents of the
SED provide a substitute with some interesting material on the post-Gestapu
period, because this party was coordinating its official statements concerning
the massacres with the brother parties.36 At that time the SED had connec-
tions with the PKI as well as good relations with the CPSU. Policy behind the
scenes can thus be partly deduced from the German material.
One month after the Gestapu incident, the consul general of the GDR,
Kehr, noted his version of the events and their background, with special refer-
ence to the role of the PKI. He stated that it was not certain whether a ‘gener-
als’ plan’ for a putsch had existed, but that a Czechoslovakian military expert
had overheard a remark General Nasution made to a colleague in which he
reminded him of a forthcoming meeting that dealt with the communists.37
Kehr summarized the background situation as he understood it:

The armed forces realized that the balance between them and the PKI was shift-
ing in favour of the communists. At the same time, the situation was such that
the armed forces had become the main obstacle for the further development of
the communist party and their carrying through of their policy. The PKI feared a
new strike from the armed forces. The history of the anti-communist actions of the

35 The paper edition of FRUS Vol. 26 contains no document of the critical time between 15-30
September 1965. See the transition from No. 141 to No. 142, pp. 299-300. See for the Soviet mate-
rial: AVP, f. 091, op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3. From the RGANI, there are no corresponding documents for
the time in question. It is important to note that the quotation of one of Johansen’s key documents
is misleading (this refers to RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 218, ll. 1ff.).
36 Session of the SED Politburo on 11 January 1966 in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2, 1040, pp.

1-2.
37 ‘On the incidents connected with the movement of 30 September’, Djakarta, 30-10-1965, by the

consul general of the GDR, Kehr, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/20, 1051, 18 pp., here p. 6.
 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 519

armed forces as well as the worsening of the domestic situation caused by the PKI’s
offensive and the other objects mentioned here, made it seem likely that the army
thought the time had come to strike a new decisive blow against the communist
movement in Indonesia for a change in Soekarno’s policy.38

Kehr’s understanding of the situation demonstrates that internally, diplomats

from socialist countries were ready to accept the version of an internal power
struggle between communists and the armed forces as the reason behind the
Gestapu events. The consul general became even more explicit when he sug-
gested who might be the driving force behind the September 30 Movement.
He took into consideration three possible actors:

a. Sukarno himself, who according to one piece of information was absolutely

convinced of the generals’ planned putsch;
b. officers of the armed forces like Omar Dani [sic, Dhani was Commander of the
Air Force] and the head of the Air Force or circles of the lower and middle of-
ficer corps. Untung himself seems to have played only an executive role […];
c. the PKI, when taking into consideration that the whole attitude of the party
displays clear violent and dogmatic traits.39

This text reveals that the German diplomat, although a representative of a

socialist state, dissociated himself from PKI policy on the whole, regardless of
whether the party was involved in the Gestapu events. He even conceded that
he was not sure whether the PKI leadership had been informed of Untung’s
actions (Ibid.:10). Nevertheless, Kehr sharply criticized the Indonesian com-
rades when he said: ‘The PKI has seriously failed in connection with the inci-
dents of 30 September […].’40
Kehr’s harsh criticism of the PKI demonstrates how far the SED was from
supporting the Indonesian comrades’ policy. The consul wrote home openly
that he thought it possible that the version according to which Soekarno
and/or the PKI were involved in the murder of the generals could be true.
He blamed the PKI for their failure to handle the situation appropriately.
Even though the SED often enough expressed a dissenting opinion, on this
topic Kehr’s view very likely concurred with Moscow’s position. Despite the
Soviets’ public support of the PKI, as seen in the official statements above, the
PKI’s siding with Beijing and the occurrences of anti-Soviet propaganda had
naturally weakened Soviet-PKI relations.

38 ‘On the incidents connected with the movement of 30 September’, Djakarta, 30-10-1965, by the
consul general of the GDR, Kehr, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/20, 1051, 18 pp., here pp. 5-6.
39 ‘On the incidents connected with the movement of 30 September’, Djakarta, 30-10-1965, by the

consul general of the GDR, Kehr, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/20, 1051, 18 pp., here p. 8.
40 ‘On the incidents connected with the movement of 30 September’, Djakarta, 30-10-1965, by the

consul general of the GDR, Kehr, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/20, 1051, 18 pp., here p. 8.
520 Ragna Boden

In the turbulent weeks of October, the Soviets seem to have lost contact
with the PKI and obviously also with Soekarno. When the Soviet ambassador
tried to talk to the president in November, he was put off by Subandrio.41 Thus,
the armed forces remained the only power to which Moscow could turn for
discussions of the situation. Consequently, Soviet diplomats contacted General
Nasution, who had escaped the murderers. The new Soviet ambassador,
Sytenko, explained in a talk with the general that the events of 30 September
had come as a complete surprise to the USSR.42 He complained about the ban
of the PKI and the persecution of communists, who had been executed with-
out trial and whose houses were burnt down. Nasution replied that the PKI’s
involvement in the coup d’état was seen as a fact.43 He made clear that in his
opinion the persecution was just what those responsible for the murder of
the generals deserved.44 On the other hand, he explained with regard to the
persecution by the military that the new leadership was different: ‘We are not
anti-communists, we just fight against communist organizations that intend
to instigate a rebellion and to seize power. We discriminate different shades.’45
This could be understood as a signal to Sytenko that the persecution was
directed especially against the PKI and their affiliates, not against communists
in general, and thus would not affect the Soviets.
Therefore it is understandable that Nasution was entrusted with the secu-
rity of Soviet citizens in Indonesia.46 But even the general could not prevent
all attacks. When the Indonesian communists were persecuted, many insti-
tutions associated with them were also assaulted. At first, however, these
aggressions did not concern the USSR. The East German consul general
reported at the end of October: ‘The Soviet specialists continue to work as
usual and the SU embassy knows nothing about any discrimination against
Soviet specialists’.47 Later on, some incidents were reported, but they seem
to have been confined to the searching of houses of Soviet citizens.48 In three
reported cases up to the end of 1965, the houses and personal belongings of
41 Draft of a letter of the Soviet ambassador, no date, in AVP, f. 091, op. 21, pap. 34, d. 14, ll. 80-81.
42 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with general Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,
op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here l. 226.
43 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with general Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,

op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here ll. 220-1.

44 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with general Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,

op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here l. 226.

45 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with general Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,

op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here l. 220.

46 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with general Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,

op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here l. 218.

47 ‘On the incidents connected with the movement of 30 September’, Djakarta, 30-10-1965, by

the consul general of the GDR, Kehr, in SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV A 2/20, 1051, 18 pp., here pp.
16-7.
48 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with General Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,

op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here l. 218.

 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 521

Soviet specialists were searched, probably in order to find evidence about

Indonesian communists.49 Occurrences of this kind were presumably one rea-
son why Soviet consulates did not provide their Indonesian comrades with
refuge. It was argued that if PKI members were to seek asylum in the Soviet
embassy, this would cause ‘serious difficulties’ for the embassy’s work and
would have a negative effect on Soviet-Indonesian relations.50 Their restraint
might be interpreted in two ways: either the Soviets were cautious because
they were unsure to what extent the PKI was still leaning towards Beijing, or
they were above all anxious not to give any reason for strikes at Soviet diplo-
mats. The Soviet concern seems understandable, because some of the Soviet
consulates in distant regions such as Banjarmasin in Kalimantan were indeed
‘protected’ by the Indonesian military of their own accord.51 These measures
were justified as protection against anti-communist riots. It also seems likely
that the military tried to monitor communist institutions and prevent them
from helping PKI members.
A year after the Gestapu events, the Indonesian foreign minister Adam
Malik promised that attacks on Soviet institutions would stop.52 He stressed
that Indonesia wanted to continue friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
Relations, however, were hindered by the massacres. Kosygin reportedly
denounced the attacks in a discussion with Malik in harsh words:

During the political talks, especially Comrade Kosygin condemned the persecu-
tion and executions of the Indonesian communists in a very harsh manner and ex-
plained to the Minister of Foreign Affairs very plainly that through these incidents
the progressive forces have been eliminated in a brutish way. Malik was told that
the domestic anti-communism would consequently lead to the camp of imperial-
ism in matters of foreign policy. On this occasion the Soviet comrades explained
that they did not bring up this question in order to interfere in the domestic affairs
of Indonesia, but that they posed this question in this harsh manner because they
believe that they have a right to do this because the Soviet Union has been help-
ing Indonesia during the last twenty years in every way to achieve the country’s
independence in the struggle against Dutch imperialism and with the liberation
of West Irian. The Soviet Union has granted generous economic aid and political
support for the Indonesian people at all times until recently.53

49 ‘Discussion of Soviet ambassador Sytenko with general Nasution’, 29-12-1965 in AVP, f. 091,
op. 21, pap. 33, d. 3, ll. 215-28, here l. 218.
50 Ponomarev and Gromyko to the Central Committee of the CPSU, 9-11-1965 in AVP, f. 091, op.

21, pap. 34, d. 14, l. 73.

51 ‘Report on the events in Banjarmasin, from 10 to 22 February 1966’, by the staff of the Soviet

consulate, in AVP, f. 91, op. 19, pap. 25, d. 20, ll. 29-36.
52 From the embassy in Moscow: ‘Information on the visit of the Minister of Foreign Relations,

Malik, to the Soviet Union’, Moscow, 26-10-1966, in SAPMO-BAch DY/30/IV A 2/20, 671, no pagi-
nation.
53 From the embassy in Moscow: ‘Information on the visit of the Minister of Foreign Relations,

Malik, to the Soviet Union’, Moscow, 26-10-1966, in SAPMO-BAch DY/30/IV A 2/20, 671, no pagi-
nation.
522 Ragna Boden

This statement left no doubt about Soviet loyalties lying with the PKI, at least
in discussions with Indonesian officials. Operating on an understanding of
the socialist world system as a global, homogeneous phenomenon, Kosygin
defended the Indonesian comrades against the persecution. Similar to Syten-
ko in his talk with Nasution, he demanded a halt to the attacks. But he went a
step further when he insisted that the USSR had a special right to put forward
such a claim. He argued that Moscow had been assisting Indonesia for many
years to defend her independence and that the Indonesian government had
readily accepted Soviet aid. Now Kosygin required a concession with regard
to the treatment of Indonesian communists.
The Soviets were not successful. They could prevent neither the mass
killings nor the execution of the PKI leadership in 1968. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that despite the PKI’s leaning towards China – instead of
towards Moscow – Soviet diplomats and politicians lent the Indonesian com-
munists their support both publicly and in internal discussions with the new
leadership. But they did not go so far as to openly give the comrades asylum
in their embassies. In this, they were very much concerned about their own
security. Soviet citizens and institutions were mostly not attacked in anti-
communist riots, probably due to specific orders from A.H. Nasution, and the
Soviets were anxious to keep it this way.
The surviving PKI members, however, either went into exile to the USSR,
China, Albania and other countries, or they stayed in Indonesia and tried
to rebuild the PKI. As a consequence of the events, unity among PKI mem-
bers and followers was destroyed.54 It was replaced by different schools and
thus followed earlier experiences of other Asian communist parties. The
most influential groups in terms of publicity were the Maoist wing and the
wing oriented towards the Soviet Union, led by Jusuf Adjitorop and Tomas
Sinuraja respectively.55 These groups drew different conclusions from the
Gestapu events and the persecution. They published their respective outlines
for a future programme in the form of documents of ‘self-criticism’, which
referred to the political course of the PKI under Aidit.56 The main differences
between them are whether they favoured armed struggle to get to power, or
a more peaceful way back to legality. While the Maoist document from 1966
stressed the use of partisan tactics, the Moscow wing’s paper, dating from
1967-1968, put forward the idea of a legal way to power. Both documents

54 See on the unity and cohesiveness of the PKI under Aidit in general, Mortimer 1968:347.
55 International Department ‘Information material on the Communist Party of Indonesia’ (prob-
ably 1971) in SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV A 2/20, 1051, no pagination, here pp. 3-4.
56 The Maoist document appeared in Indonesian Tribune 1-1 (1966) which was published in Alba-

nia, the pro-Soviet paper in Party Life (July-Sept. 1967), a journal based in New Delhi – according
to Mortimer 1968:349 – and/or in Tekad Rakjat (April 1968) – according to Van Dijk 1972:59. McVey
1971b:36, note 24, gives slightly different data on the publication of the documents. In this paper
I am following Van Dijk 1972:54-63.
 The ‘Gestapu’ events of 1965 in Indonesia 523

criticized not only the ‘reactionary forces’ in Indonesia, meaning the Soeharto
regime, but also the opposing part of the surviving PKI. The Maoist paper
verbally attacked ‘modern Khrushchevist revisionists’, whereas the exiles
oriented towards the USSR condemned the violent tactics of the pro-Beijing
Indonesian communists (Erklärung 1970:275). Moscow’s followers even iden-
tified a third wing of the PKI which had adopted a kind of middle course
between the positions outlined above. It was labelled ‘Marxist-Leninist’, like
the other Moscow wing of the PKI.57 In 1969 those PKI members who lived
in exile in the Soviet Union even founded a ‘foreign committee’ (CL PKI) in
Moscow, headed by the above-mentioned Tomas Sinuraja.58 Measures of this
kind perpetuated the split within the surviving PKI and for a long time hin-
dered a strengthening of Indonesia’s exiled leftist forces.

Conclusion

Even though Cribb and Brown (1995:98) may be right in stating that ‘We shall
never know for certain what plans the PKI and Soekarno were making during
these months [preceding October 1965]’, Russian and German sources shed
some light on the background of the events and the extent of Soviet involve-
ment. They reveal that Aidit shared his ideas about a post-Soekarno Indonesia
with the Soviet ambassador in early 1965. At this time he did not allude to any
plans for any assassinations whatsoever. With regard to Soekarno, the PKI
seems to have considered the president not leftist enough, even in 1965.
The documents in question also show the conflicting attitudes towards
the PKI by the communist parties close to Moscow’s line. The GDR diplomat
Kehr, for instance, was convinced that PKI involvement in the Gestapu events
was plausible and not even unlikely. He criticized not so much the party’s
possible involvement as such, but the PKI’s handling of the whole situation,
which he regarded as absolutely inadequate. This can be taken to mean that
he was not necessarily against a coup d’état undertaken by the PKI, but
against a violent coup with devastating consequences. Nevertheless, the SED
as well as the CPSU staunchly supported the PKI in their public statements
after Gestapu. At least in public, they demonstrated unanimous solidarity
with the Indonesian comrades.
Concerning the question whether Moscow was involved in the incident,
the archival material we have at the moment still makes direct involvement
of the Soviet Union seem unlikely. The documents from Moscow and Berlin

57 International Department ‘Information material on the Communist Party of Indonesia’ [prob-

ably 1971] in SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV A 2/20, 1051, no pagination, here p. 4.
58 International Department ‘Information material on the Communist Party of Indonesia’ [prob-

ably 1971] in SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV A 2/20, 1051, no pagination, here pp. 3-4.
524 Ragna Boden

do not indicate any concrete Soviet influence on the incidents, neither before,
during, nor after 30 September 1965. On the contrary, the documents reveal
that the Soviets and their East German allies were unprepared, despite the
information they got from the PKI in the first half of 1965, and that they had
no plans for how to deal with the situation. While the question of foreign
influence from China and the United States remains open to some extent,
Moscow most likely had no active part in the coup d’état in Indonesia.

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Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam

Partai Komunis Indonesia Collection
Indonesian Exiles of the Left Collection

Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Noveishei Istorii, Moscow

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