The Standard of Care of Engineering Taller, Longer and Lighter

Joshua B. KARDON Joshua B. Kardon, BSCE (1971)

Structural Engineer Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
Troy, NY; MSCE (1998), PhD (2003)
Joshua B. Kardon + Company Civil Engineering, University of
Berkeley, CA, USA California, Berkeley, has maintained
[email protected] a structural engineering design and
consulting practice since 1978 and is
a licensed structural engineer in 8
States.

Summary
When structures fail, questions can arise as to the structural engineer’s role in that failure. Structures
on the cutting edge of engineering technology are no exception. The “Standard of Care” is the
boundary between negligence and non-negligence. In the US, an engineer must have and use skill
and care equivalent to normally competent practitioners in similar circumstances, applying
reasonable diligence and that practitioner’s best judgment. If the “Standard of Care” requires the
engineer to have and exercise the skill and care equivalent to normally competent practitioners in
similar circumstances, yet no one has engineered a similar structure, to whom is the engineer of the
cutting edge structure compared? This paper describes the standard of care of engineers working on
structures beyond the typical. Examples from the public record of performance of cutting edge
structures are briefly described to examine the engineer’s fulfillment of the duty of care.

Keywords: concepts; design; durability; failure; negligence; standard of care; litigation; forensic
engineering; ethics; expert testimony.

1. Introduction: The Standard of Care as the Boundary between Negligence

and Non-negligence
Engineers registered to practice in States of the United States typically have a duty to provide their
services to consumers in a manner consistent with the standard of care of their professions. It is
useful to think of the standard of care as the boundary between a negligent error and a non-negligent
error, and that the boundary is determined in every instance when a jury answers the question, “Was
this engineer negligent?”. Liability, which is the responsibility to pay for damages caused by an
error, arises from negligence. So if an error is determined to be on the non-negligent side of the
standard of care “boundary,” the engineer who perpetrated the error is not liable for damages arising
from that error.

2. Definition from Case Law

A good working definition of the standard of care of a professional, derived from case law (City of
Mounds View [1], Gagne [2], and others), was presented in a standardized jury instruction, Book of
Approved Jury Instructions, 6.37, “The Duty of a Professional” [3], which read:

In performing professional services for a client, a professional has the duty to have
that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable professionals,
practicing in the same or similar locality and under similar circumstances. It is his or
her further duty to use the care and skill ordinarily used in like cases by reputable
members of his or her profession practicing in the same or similar locality under
 similar circumstances, and to use reasonable diligence and his or her best judgment
in the exercise of professional skill and in the application of learning, in an effort to
accomplish the purpose for which he or she was employed. A failure to fulfill any such
duty is negligence.

These instructions require the engineer to bring to bear the learning, skill and care ordinarily
possessed and used by reputable engineers in the same or similar locality and under similar
circumstances. For facilities that are on the cutting edge of structural design—those which are
taller, longer and/or lighter than ordinary structures—there may not be a population of
reputable engineers providing services under similar circumstances. If structural performance
of a cutting edge facility does not meet the expected safety, function, durability or
serviceability, assessing the design engineer’s conformance to the standard of care may not be
based on a comparison of the specific engineering solution to similar facilities by reputable
engineers under similar circumstances.

However, even in those unique, special, or cutting edge projects, the standard of care defined in
case law requires the engineer to employ his or her own best judgment and reasonable
diligence in the exercise of skill and learning [4]. Judgment is the only attribute defined in the
superlative. Diligence is required only to be reasonable. The possession and use of learning,
care and skill is required only to a level equivalent to those levels which are ordinarily used in
like cases by reputable members of the profession.

3. Taller, Longer, Lighter Structures

Because of the nature of cutting edge projects, evaluating an engineer’s services in those projects
should look to that engineer’s own best judgment and that engineer’s application of reasonable
diligence to accomplish the purpose for which the engineer was hired. Well-publicized instances of
structural failures are examined, below, from this perspective.

3.1 Bridges
3.1.1 Tacoma Narrows Bridge, Washington

In 1940, wind-induced oscillations destroyed the brand new Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge.
One hundred years earlier, the dangerous dynamic effects of the wind were known, and suspension
bridge design of that earlier era included measures to counter those effects [5]. Leon Moisseiff, the
engineer for the Tacoma Narrows Bridge superstructure, described as “among the highest authorities
in suspension bridge design” [6], was not thought by many at the time to be negligent. This was in
spite of the fact that normal competence of suspension bridge designers of almost a century earlier
included avoidance of this kind of failure.

Mr. Moisseiff promoted a structural analysis method Josef Melan developed 30 years earlier, the
deflection method that intended to accurately forecast strength and deflection of suspension bridge
structures. Using that deflection method, bridge engineers were able to design light weight, narrow,
long span suspension bridges. Wind was treated as a static load on the roadway, suspenders, main
cables and towers, and the elastic stiffness of the whole assembly was used in the analysis to
calculate deflection.

During the approval process prior to the construction of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, Mr. T. L.
Condron, Supervisory Engineer who reviewed the Washington Toll Bridge Authority application for
the new bridge in 1938, wrote [6]:
 In view of Mr. Moisseiff’s ability and reputation, I hesitate to make any criticism
of the structural design, but from a practical standpoint, I would feel that the
width of this Bridge relative to the length of spans was open to criticism,
particularly, since it is without precedent. The Golden Gate Bridge is the longest
span bridge in the world, and the width of the structure is 1/57th of the span
length. That is the highest ratio of any large bridge that has been built up to date,
so far as I can learn. The proposed Tacoma Narrows Bridge has a ratio of
1/72nd . . . .In view of Mr. Moisseiff’s recognized ability and reputation, and the
many expressions of approval and comment of his methods of analysis of stresses
and deflections in the design of long span suspensions bridges, . . . I feel we may
rely upon his own determination of stresses and deflections.

Engineer Condron was clearly concerned about the slenderness of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge,
based on his own judgment that such a slender bridge might be too flexible. Mr. Moisseiff’s
response to that concern was that his design theories allowed such a slender roadway by flattening
the curvature of, and increasing the tension in the main cables of the bridge. Moisseiff’s calculations,
based on Melan’s deflection theory, showed that “the maximum horizontal deflection has been
determined at 19.9 ft” which Moisseiff judged as acceptable [6].

Mr. Condron’s judgment and Mr. Moisseiff’s judgment differed. In hindsight, when one looks at the
development of suspension bridge forms and details up to the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows
Bridge [7], one can see that Mr. Moisseiff’s judgment was incorrect. This may not mean he did not
bring to bear his own best judgment. However, there still may have been a question concerning his
application of reasonable diligence.

Each suspension bridge Moisseiff designed using the deflection theory was more slender than its
predecessor. Construction workers, and the operators and users of the bridges, noticed the tendency
of the new bridges to oscillate in the wind. The more slender spans exhibited more pronounced
oscillations. Moisseiff may have regarded that response as reasonable and acceptable performance
considering the tradeoff for lightness, economy, and aesthetics. The Tacoma Narrows Bridge was
the most slender suspension bridge built up to that time, and its oscillations, so pronounced that the
bridge was nicknamed “Galloping Gertie” by the ironworkers who felt the oscillations while they
were erecting it. Reasonable diligence on the part of Moisseiff might have led him to appreciate the
shortcomings of his analysis method, and might have allowed him to improve that method to include
dynamic effects of wind.

3.1.2. Millennium Bridge, London

The London Millennium Bridge, a monumental footbridge over the Thames River, allows pedestrian
traffic between St. Paul’s Cathedral and the Tate Gallery [8]. It opened to the public in June of 2000
but was closed three days later because of unacceptable movement of the walkway. Portions of the
walkway moved up to 70 mm (3 in.) laterally at a frequency of about 1 cps. The unacceptable
movement only occurred when the number or density of pedestrians exceeded a critical value.

The engineers who designed the Millennium Bridge took into account the static and dynamic effects
of the environment on the bridge, including wind and the vertical component of pedestrian footfall,
but did not consider the particular loading which led to the unacceptable movement. That loading
arises from the synchronization of the footfalls of a critical number of pedestrians with the natural
horizontal frequency of the bridge. A human footfall exerts both a vertical and horizontal load on a
walkway. The vertical component is about 2/5 of the weight of the person and the horizontal
component is about 1/10 the value of the vertical [8]. The frequency of the applied footfall force
depends on the pace of the pedestrians, which is modified by the density or number of pedestrians. If
the walkway responds constructively with the footfall load and frequency, the critical number of
pedestrians can induce a lateral movement of the walkway that is perceptible to the pedestrians. For
their own comfort, pedestrians then synchronize their footfalls to the responding walkway, thus
increasing the dynamic load they are contributing. They also tend to widen their stance as they walk
on the responding structure, to enhance their own stability, increasing the horizontal component of
the force of their footfalls. As lateral motion increases, pedestrians tend to deviate left and right
from a straight walking path (“a snaking walk” [8]), again for their comfort. This deviation from a
straight path contributes load at a frequency of about half the natural frequency of the bridge, also
adding to the dynamic load.

In their paper highlighting the phenomenon of laterally-induced pedestrian forces, the authors (many
of whom worked at Arup, the engineers who designed the Millennium Bridge) wrote there had been
“little recorded of this phenomenon in the literature” [8]. They cited a 1993 paper describing similar
behavior of a pedestrian bridge in Japan, and acknowledged similar behavior had been observed
occurring at the Solferino footbridge across the Seine in Paris in 1999. They also described similar
behavior observed in 1977 at Queen’s Park Bridge in Chester, originally constructed in 1923, when
that bridge was used by pedestrians observing a rowing regatta beneath it, and they described similar
behavior observed in July of 2000 at the 100-year-old Inter-Provincial road bridge in Ottawa, when
the bridge was occupied by “crowds of pedestrians” after a fireworks display.

A paper written by H. Bachman published by the ASCE in 1992 [9] describes several other instances
of similar behavior of footbridges. It describes the horizontal component of pedestrian footfalls, and
states, in characterizing the performance of a particular footbridge reported in Germany in 1972, that
“the pedestrians synchronized their step with the bridge vibration, thereby enhancing the vibration
considerably.” The paper describes general remedial approaches to correcting the condition and
recommends a design approach to avoid it in the first place.

Evaluating the performance of the engineers who designed the Millennium Bridge, one must take
into consideration the dearth of technical guidance available to the designers. This is, of course, the
normal case in cutting edge structures. It certainly appears the engineers used their best judgment in
their application of engineering analysis and in their development of the engineering design. They
also appeared to have utilized reasonable diligence in accomplishing the engineering tasks they were
hired to do. They don’t appear to be less than reasonably diligent simply because they were unaware
of the Bachman publication. Most significantly, when the problematic behavior of their bridge first
arose, the engineers recognized it as a failure problem they could deal with, and worked diligently to
correct it.

3.2 Buildings
3.2.1 Citicorp Building, New York

Bill LeMessurier was the engineer of record of the 59-story Citicorp building on Lexington Avenue
between 53rd and 54th Streets in Manhattan. The structure incorporated several unique and cutting
edge features, including a tuned-mass damper at the top of the tower to help limit wind-induced
movement that would be uncomfortable for the building occupants, and stacked elevator cabs to limit
the total number of shafts thus increasing the useable area of each occupied floor. The most striking
feature was the absence of corner columns from the ground up to the ninth story. The core of the
structure extended from the ground up, but the exterior frame was absent below the ninth floor
except for columns at the mid-length of each face of the building. The reason for this unusual
configuration was to accommodate a smaller building on the site.

The New York City Code and high-rise structural engineering practices required the building frame
to be analyzed and designed to resist winds perpendicular to each face. Also in keeping with good
engineering practice, LeMessurier considered winds loading the building diagonally (cross corner
winds) but decided, based on his judgment, that the critical loading direction was perpendicular to
the building face.

Well after the building was completed and occupied, LeMessurier reviewed the frame more closely
for adequacy against cross-corner winds. He found, based on that loading assumption, taking into
account a contractor’s field change of a critical detail from welds to bolts, and considering higher
wind load demand from a new wind tunnel analysis, that the building had a small but unacceptable
probability of collapse.

Work to strengthen the building was carried out. The public was not warned of the probability of
collapse, but evacuation plans were developed and were ready to be enacted if a large wind event
was imminent prior to completion of repairs. After the incident, Bill LeMessurier included the error
in the structural design of the Citicorp building, and the repairs in structural engineering courses he
taught at Harvard. In 1995, an article appeared in The New Yorker magazine [10] describing
LeMessurier’s discovery of the error and his and others’ roles in the repairs. After the 1995 article
appeared, LeMessurier received praise for his ethical disclosure of his error and for his efforts in
bringing about repairs.

As in the case of the Millennium Bridge, the engineer of the Citicorp building acknowledged the
error in the structural design as soon as it was made apparent to him, and quickly and effectively
corrected it. LeMessurier’s best judgment during the original design of the tower was not enough to
lead him to perform a detailed cross-corner wind analysis, but he did consider it and decided without
the benefit of computations that it was not critical. One might ask if “reasonable diligence” would
have resulted in a complete wind analysis from every direction. Given the practices of the time, the
Building Code requirements, and the time and economic constraints of the design process,
reasonable diligence appears to have been used during the design process.

There have been critics of LeMessurier’s actions and behaviour concerning the Citicorp project [11],
but they generally rely on hindsight and on the description of the events in the Morgenstern article
[10]. Many of the criticisms have the flavor of ad hominem attacks, characterizing LeMessurier as
self-serving and arrogant. That may or may not have been true of Bill LeMessurier, but it is
irrelevant with regard to his application of his best judgment and reasonable diligence.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

The engineering method is a process that balances time and cost in an environment of changing and
often contradictory constraints and demands. We can’t demand perfection under those conditions.
What one should expect of an engineer is compliance with the standard of care, which includes the
application of that person’s best judgment and reasonable diligence in the exercise of professional
skill and in the application of learning, in an effort to accomplish the purpose for which the engineer
was employed.
The three cutting edge engineering facilities cited above had design flaws. The engineers for each of
them appreciated and responded to the flaws in different ways. The mere fact of an error is not the
determiner of negligence or fault on the part of the engineer. As these projects show, where there is
no population of reputable engineers providing services under similar circumstances, one must
examine the engineer’s judgment and diligence.

Because the definition of the standard of care includes the required use of the engineer’s best
judgment and reasonable diligence, examination of the standard of care is still necessary and
appropriate when assessing and engineer’s performance regarding cutting edge design. In the
absence of similar circumstances, or where a population of similarly skilled and experienced
engineers cannot be examined for comparison, the engineer must still apply his or her own
best judgment and be reasonably diligent in the effort to accomplish the purpose the engineer
was hired. The standard of care is still the measure of an engineer’s performance, and is still
appropriate for evaluating engineers practicing at the cutting edge, such as those who are
engineering taller, longer and lighter structures.

5. References
[1] City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi 263 N. W. 2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978).

[2] Gagne v. Bertran 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P. 2d 15 (1954).

[3] Book of Approved Jury Instruction (BAJI), California Jury Instructions, Civil, West
Publishing Company, St. Paul, MN, January, 1986.

[4] KARDON, J. B., The Standard of Care of Structural Engineers, Doctoral Dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley, May, 2003.

[5] GIES, J., Bridges and Men, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1966.

[6] CONDRON, T. L., Supervisory Engineer, 1938, Appendix IV of Section B, “The Failure of
the Tacoma Narrows Bridge: A Report to the Honorable John M. Carmody, Administrator, Federal
Works Administration, Washington, D. C.,” by Othmar B. Ammann, Theodore von Karman, and
Glen B. Woodruff, Pasadena, California, 1941, Reprinted in the Bulletin of the Agricultural and
Mechanical College of Texas, Texas Engineering Experiment Station, College Station, Texas, 4th
Series, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1, 1944.

[7] SCOTT, R., In the Wake of Tacoma: Suspension Bridges and the Quest for Aerodynamic
Stability. American Society of Civil Engineers, 2001.

[8] DALLARD, P., et al., “London Millennium Bridge: Pedestrian-Induced Lateral Vibration,”
Journal of Bridge Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, Vol. 6, No. 6,
November/December, 2001.

[9] BACHMANN, H., “Case Studies of Structures with Man-Induced Vibrations,” Journal of
Structural Engineering, Vol. 118, No. 3, March, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York,
1992

[10] MORGENSTERN, J., “The Fifty-Nine Story Crisis,” Reprinted from The New Yorker
magazine, May 29, 1995, Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice,
American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, Vol. 123, No. 1, January, 1997.
[11] KREMER, E. “(Re)Examining the Citicorp Case: Ethical Paragon or Chimera?” Arq:
Architectural Research Quarterly, Vol. 6, No 3, pp 269-276, 2002.