172 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

KOW LIANG TIANG A

v.

PP

COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA B

AHMAD MAAROP JCA
MOHAMED APANDI ALI JCA
BALIA YUSOF WAHI J
[CRIMINAL TRIAL NO: J-05-151-2008]
30 MAY 2011 C

CRIMINAL LAW: Murder - Conviction and sentence - Appeal against

- Conviction based on circumstantial evidence - Whether circumstantial
evidence sufficient to prove murder - Penal Code, s. 302
D
EVIDENCE: Circumstantial evidence - Securing conviction on - Conduct
of appellant - Facts in issue - Consistency of police reports made - Blood
samples taken - Whether cumulatively proved appellant’s guilt in murder
- Evidence Act 1950, ss. 7, 8(2), 14, 35 - Penal Code, s. 302

This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court E

convicting the appellant of murder and sentencing him to death
pursuant to s. 302 of the Penal Code. The appellant’s wife (‘the
deceased’) was found dead with multiple stab wounds at their
matrimonial home in Tampoi. On that fateful day, the appellant
together with his son of tender age and with Down Syndrome, F
had driven to his sister’s (‘SP5’) house in Skudai at the wee hours
of the morning where he confessed to have had a ‘serious quarrel’
with the deceased. He left the child under SP5’s care to be sent
to an orphanage. SP5 then narrated the appellant’s quarrel to her
sister in law, who in turn, gathered the rest of her family members G
at the appellant’s house in Tampoi that same morning where the
deceased was later found. During trial, the appellant, in his written
statement, claimed that he was under the influence of drugs and
denied the fact that he had killed the deceased. In the absence
of direct evidence, the prosecution relied on the circumstantial H
evidence namely: (i) the appellant’s visit to his sister’s house and
the conversation he had with her; (ii) the consistency of two
police reports, ie, the first report lodged by the deceased’s family
members upon finding the house locked in Tampoi whereas, the
second was subsequently lodged by SP5 in Skudai; (iii) a blood- I
stained scissor that was bent at the end of the blade with a
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 173

A broken handle; (iv) a T-shirt and shorts with traces of blood

stains; (v) the appellant’s injuries found on his right hand palm
when he was arrested; (vi) the chemist’s report; and (vii) the post-
mortem report. Having analysed all the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and after giving due evaluation, it was concluded that
B the prosecution had proven a prima facie case against the appellant
and hence, the conviction and sentence. In his appeal, the
appellant submitted the following: (i) the circumstantial evidence
was insufficient to secure the conviction; (ii) there were gaps in
the prosecution’s case, ie, with regards to the blood samples of
C the appellant and that of the deceased; and (iii) the conduct of
the appellant as explained by him raised two versions of the
alleged offence.

Held (dismissing the appeal)

D Per Mohamed Apandi Ali JCA:

(1) The circumstances that led to the making of two police

reports gave a very strong inference that the appellant had
committed the offence. The appellant was the last person to
have been with the deceased. Both reports were made hours
E
after the appellant went to his sister’s house and the contents
were substantively the same and, thus, should have been
admitted as evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act 1950
(‘the Act’). (paras 3 & 10)
F (2) It was irrational to indicate that the appellant was under the
influence of drugs having driven his motor lorry to SP5’s house
in Skudai. Moreover, his arrangement with SP5 to send his
son to an orphanage following his quarrel with the deceased
indicated that it was not a temporary measure but a drastic
G one. The conduct of the appellant in calling his sister, driving
to his sister’s house, refusing to report to the police despite
being advised by his sister, handing over his son to be kept at
an orphanage and staying at a “Rumah Tumpangan” were
relevant within the meaning of s. 8 (2) of the Act. The
H “serious” quarrel prior to the commission of the offence
between the appellant and the deceased was another strong
strand of evidence within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act.
(para 10)

I
174 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

(3) The broken scissors could have caused the injuries to the A
appellant’s right hand palm probably at the force of how it
was used. The police report lodged by the arresting officer
corroborating the appellant’s injury was not challenged neither
was his testimony cross-examined and, thus, constituted the
connection between the appellant and the murder weapon. B
(para 10)

(4) There was evidence to show that the t-shirt and shorts with
traces of blood found in a pail in the house belonged to the
appellant. The chemist report confirmed that the blood stains C
on the scissors, t-shirt and shorts was the blood type of the
deceased. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem
confirmed that the scissors could have caused the multiple and
penetrating wounds found on the deceased. (para 10)
D
(5) The bent and broken scissors, the injuries to the appellant’s
right hand palm, the deceased blood stains on the appellant’s
clothing were all revealing facts that formed the strands of
circumstantial evidence within the criteria set out in s. 7 of the
Act linking the appellant to the murder. (para 10)
E
(6) The police arriving at the crime scene had to break open the
door to gain entry as it was locked. There was also no sign
of forced entry into the house and, thus, eliminated the
existence of any other persons being involved in the crime.
(para 10) F

(7) The evidence showed that the blood samples were properly
named, labelled and were in relation to this criminal
investigation. Therefore, there was no issue for lack of clear
evidence as to who took the blood samples of the deceased G
and the appellant. There were no gaps in the prosecution’s
case as claimed by the appellant that gave rise to any
reasonable doubt. (para 10)

(8) The circumstantial evidence was sufficient and strong enough

H
to sustain the finding of the appellant’s guilt. The cumulative
evidence though circumstantial, had irresistibly pointed to the
one and only conclusion that it was the appellant who had
caused the injuries to the deceased resulting in her death. All
the elements for the offence of murder as defined under
I
s. 302 of the Penal Code had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. (para 12)
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 175

A Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes

Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi

menyabitkan perayu dengan kesalahan pembunuhan dan
menjatuhkan hukuman mati ke atasnya menurut s. 302 Kanun
B Keseksaan. Isteri perayu (‘simati’) ditemui mati dengan beberapa
kesan tikaman di kediaman mereka di Tampoi. Pada hari simati
meninggal, perayu bersama-sama dengan anak kecilnya yang
mengalami masalah down syndrome, telah pergi ke rumah kakaknya
(‘SP5’) di Skudai pada waktu awal pagi di mana beliau telah
C mengaku bahawa telah berlakunya pergaduhan serius di antara
beliau dan simati. Perayu telah meninggalkan anaknya dengan SP5
untuk dihantar ke rumah anak yatim. SP5 telah menceritakan
perkelahian perayu kepada adik iparnya, yang kemudiannya,
mengumpulkan seluruh ahli keluarganya di rumah perayu di Tampoi
D pada pagi yang sama di mana kemudiannya simati dijumpai mati.
Semasa perbicaraan, perayu, di dalam kenyataan bertulis beliau,
mendakwa bahawa beliau berada di bawah pengaruh dadah dan
menafikan bahawa beliau telah membunuh simati. Dalam ketiadaan
keterangan terus, pihak pendakwaan telah bergantung kepada
E keterangan ikut keadaan iaitu (i) lawatan perayu ke rumah adiknya
dan perbualan mereka; (ii) ketekalan dua laporan polis iaitu laporan
pertama yang telah dibuat oleh ahli keluarga simati apabila
mendapati rumah perayu dan simati di Tampoi dikunci manakala
laporan kedua yang kemudiannya dibuat oleh kakak perayu di
F Skudai; (iii) gunting yang berlumuran darah yang bengkok pada
akhir bilah dengan pemegang yang patah; (iv) kemeja t dan seluar
pendek yang mempunyai kesan-kesan darah; (v) kecederaan-
kecederaan yang terdapat di tapak tangan kanan perayu apabila
beliau ditahan; (vi) laporan ahli kimia dan (vii) laporan post
G mortem. Setelah menganalisis dan menilai semua keterangan yang
telah dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan, kesimpulan dibuat
bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah membuat kes prima facie terhadap
perayu dan, oleh itu, sabitan dan hukuman. Dalam rayuannya,
perayu telah berhujah bahawa (i) keterangan ikut keadaan tidak
H mencukupi untuk mendapatkan sabitan; (ii) terdapat jurang-jurang
dalam kes pendakwaan iaitu berhubungan dengan sampel-sampel
darah perayu dan simati dan (iii) kelakuan perayu seperti yang
telah diterangkan olehnya telah membangkitkan dua versi kesalahan
yang didakwa.
I
176 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

Diputuskan (menolak rayuan) A

Oleh Mohamed Apandi Ali HMR:

(1) Keadaan yang membawa kepada pembuatan dua laporan polis

memberi satu inferens sangat kuat bahawa perayu telah
melakukan kesalahan yang didakwa. Perayu adalah orang B
terakhir yang berada dengan simati. Kedua-dua laporan dibuat
beberapa jam selepas perayu telah pergi ke rumah kakaknya
dan kandungan adalah sebahagian besarnya sama dan, oleh
itu, sepatutnya dimasukkan sebagai keterangan di bawah s. 35
Akta Keterangan 1950 (‘Akta’). C

(2) Ia adalah tidak rasional untuk menunjukkan bahawa perayu di

bawah pengaruh dadah kerana beliau telah memandu motor
lori ke rumah SP5 di Skudai. Lagipun, susunannya dengan SP5
untuk menghantar anak lelakinya ke rumah anak yatim selepas
D
pergaduhannya dengan simati menunjukkan bahawa ia bukan
langkah sementara tetapi satu langkah drastik. Kelakuan perayu
apabila perayu menelefon kakaknya, memandu ke rumah
kakaknya, keengganannya melaporkan ke pihak polis walaupun
telah dinasihatkan oleh kakaknya, menyerahkan anak lelakinya
E
untuk dijaga oleh rumah anak yatim dan menginap di rumah
tumpangan adalah relevan mengikut pengertian s. 8(2) Akta.
Pergaduhan “'serius”' sebelum pelakuan kesalahan itu di antara
perayu dan simati adalah satu lagi bebenang keterangan yang
kuat mengikut pengertian s. 14 Akta.
F
(3) Gunting patah mungkin telah menyebabkan kecederaan kepada
tapak tangan kanan perayu mengikut tenaga bagaimana ia telah
digunakan. Laporan polis yang telah dibuat oleh pegawai yang
melakukan tangkapan menyokong kecederaan perayu itu tidak
dicabar begitu juga testimoni beliau tidak diperiksa balas dan, G
oleh itu, merupakan perhubungan di antara perayu dan senjata
pembunuhan.

(4) Terdapat keterangan yang menunjukkan kemeja T dan seluar

pendek yang mempunyai kesan-kesan darah ditemui di dalam H
baldi di dalam rumah kepunyaan perayu. Laporan ahli kimia
mengesahkan bahawa kesan-kesan darah atas gunting, kemeja
T dan seluar pendek adalah jenis darah si mati. Doktor yang
menjalankan post mortem mengesahkan bahawa gunting yang
disebut kemungkinan besar telah menyebabkan pelbagai luka I
dan tembusan yang terdapat pada simati.
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 177

A (5) Gunting bengkok dan patah, kecederaan pada tapak tangan

perayu, kesan-kesan darah simati atas pakaian perayu adalah
pendedahan fakta-fakta yang membentuk bebenang-bebenang
keterangan ikut keadaan dalam kriteria yang dinyatakan di
dalam s. 7 Akta menghubungkan perayu kepada pembunuhan.
B
(6) Polis yang tiba di tempat kejadian terpaksa memecah buka
pintu untuk dapat masuk kerana ia dikunci. Juga tiada tanda-
tanda pecah masuk ke dalam rumah dan, oleh itu, ia
menghapuskan kewujudan mana-mana orang lain yang terlibat
C dalam jenayah itu.

(7) Keterangan menunjukkan sampel-sampel darah dinamakan dan

dilabelkan dengan betul dan berhubungan dengan siasatan
jenayah ini. Oleh itu, tiada isu kekurangan keterangan yang
jelas mengenai siapa yang mengambil sampel-sampel darah
D
simati dan perayu. Tidak terdapat jurang-jurang di dalam kes
pendakwaan seperti yang dituntut oleh perayu yang
menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan munasabah.

(8) Keterangan ikut keadaan adalah memadai dan cukup kuat

E untuk mengekalkan dapatan kebersalahan perayu. Keterangan-
keterangan terkumpul walaupun adalah mengikut keadaan, ia
menunjukkan satu-satunya kesimpulan bahawa ia adalah perayu
yang telah menyebabkan kecederaan-kecederaan kepada simati
mengakibatkan kematiannya. Semua unsur-unsur kesalahan
F pembunuhan seperti yang ditakrifkan di bawah s. 302 Kanun
Keseksaan telah dibuktikan melampaui keraguan munasabah.
Case(s) referred to:
Chan Chwen Kong v. PP [1962] 1 LNS 22 HC (refd)
Eng Sin v. PP [1974] 1 LNS 33 FC (refd)
G
Legislation referred to:
Evidence Act 1950, ss. 7, 8(2), 14, 35
Penal Code, s. 302

For the appellant - Gobind Singh Deo; M/s Gobind Singh Deo & Co
H
For the respondent - Fatnin Yusuf DPP

[Appeal from High Court, Johor; Criminal Trial No: MT3-45-28-2006]

Reported by Melanie Murthy

I
178 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

JUDGMENT A

Mohamed Apandi Ali JCA:

Introduction

[1] The appellant was found guilty of the offence of committing B

murder of his wife and was accordingly sentenced to death by the
High Court. The appellant’s appeal is naturally against the
conviction and sentence.

[2] The charge against the appellant reads as follows: C

Bahawa kamu pada 4.11.2005 antara 2.00 pagi dan 3.40 pagi di
rumah No. 02-45 B, Jalan Mawar 4, Taman Tampoi Indah 2,
Tampoi, di dalam daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul
Ta’zim, telah melakukan kesalahan membunuh dengan
menyebabkan kematian ke atas SHAM YOKE PENG, NO. K/P: D
680131-05-5426, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan
yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.

Facts Of The Case

[3] It is not in dispute that the evidence adduced against the E

appellant were circumstantial evidence. There was no direct
evidence. The circumstantial evidence as unfolded at the trial are
as follows:

(a) On 4 November 2005 in the wee hours, at 3.45am the F

appellant drove to his sister’s house in Taman Universiti,
Skudai Johor. He went with his son, of tender age and who
was of down syndrome. He drove a motor lorry from Tampoi
to Skudai. Upon arrival at his sister’s house he told his sister
(Kow Ee Luang, SP5) that he had a ‘serious’ quarrel with his G
wife (the deceased) at their matrimonial home in Tampoi.
Appellant then left his child with Kow Ee Luang for her
custody and he then left the house.

(b) SP5 then contacted her sister in law, Sham Yoke Ying (SP7)
H
and narrated to her about the appellant’s quarrel with his wife
and asked SP7 to come and fetch her, to go to the
appellant’s house in Tampoi. This conversation took place at
about 4am of the same morning.

(c) SP7, in turn called her brother, Sham Yee May, SP6. This I
took place at about 5am, the same morning.
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 179

A (d) SP7 with her husband, Cheng Swiss Kim (SP9) together with
SP6 and SP6’s wife then went to the appellant’s house at
Taman Tampoi Indah 2 in Tampoi. This was about 6am of
the same morning. At the house, Sham Yee May, SP6 and
SP9 tried to enter the house but it was locked. They all then
B proceeded to Balai Polis Tampoi where SP5 then lodged a
police report. This took place at about 6.30am on the same
morning. The first information report was made by the police
personnel on duty, L/Cpl. Mohd. Yusuf bin Latip (SP1) vide
Tampoi Report No. 016124/05 (P4). Anyway SP5’s own
C police report was subsequently lodged; vide Skudai Report No.
014961/05 (P5). All police investigations in the case were
made pursuant to the police report P4.

(e) Upon receiving the police reports P4 and P5, the I.O. ASP
D Ashmon (SP12) went to the crime scene on 4 November
2005 at 8.30am. Earlier the police had to break the door in
order to enter the house. They found the deceased, Sham
Yoke Peng lying on a bed. Amongst other items, the police
recovered a blood-stained scissors, a T-shirt and shorts with
E blood stains from the house. The scissors was bent at end of
the blade and the handle was broken. It was produced and
marked as exh. P8A. The T-shirt and shorts with blood stains
were marked as exhs. P10A and P11A respectively.

(f) The appellant was arrested by Insp. Juna bin Yusof (SP4) in
F
Room No. 8, Rumah Tumpangan Orchid, Jalan Penang,
Taman Kota Kulai, Kulai, at 8.45pm on 5 November 2005.
Upon examination by SP4, it was found that the appellant
had injuries on the palm of his right hand.
G (g) A post-mortem on the deceased, Sham Yoke Peng, was
conducted by Dr. Shahidan Mohd. Noor (SP4) on
6 November 2005. Cause of death was due to: (i) “soft tissue
injuries” and (ii) “multiple stab and penetrating wounds”.

H (h) All exhibits recovered in the course of police investigations

were sent to the chemist, Jayasilan (SP11) for analysis. It was
disclosed that the deceased’s blood was of type “B” and that
the appellant’s blood was of type “O”. The chemist reports
were tendered and marked as exhs. P28 and P35.
I
180 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

Findings By The High Court A

[4] The learned trial judge wrote a lengthy ‘speaking’ grounds of

judgment. The judge had correctly analysed all the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and after giving due evaluation he
concluded that the prosecution have proved a prima facie case at B
the end of the prosecution’s case. He concluded by stating:
Setelah menilai keterangan-keterangan yang ada di hadapan
mahkamah, mahkamah membuat penemuan positif bahawa
terdapat keterangan-keterangan ikut keadaan yang jika dilihat
secara keseluruhan dan digabungkan adalah mencukupi bagi C
membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap pertuduhan yang
dikemukakan terhadap OKT.

[5] The learned trial judge had sufficiently cautioned himself of

the fact that the evidence against the appellant were circumstantial
D
evidence.

[6] The appellant elected to give evidence from the dock, by

giving a written statement, which reads as follows:
Nama saya Kow Liang Tiang (no. kad pengenalan: 641216-01- E
5245). Saya adalah tertuduh di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi (3)
Johor Bahru, Perbicaraan Jenayah No. MT(3) 45-28-2006. Saya
menyatakan bahawa pada malam 3.11.2005, saya sudah 3 hari
tidak tidur sebab saya makan banyak dadah “ice”. Saya juga
makan ubat tidur jenis “Domicom” 10 biji. Lepas itu saya sudah
tidak sedarkan diri. Selepas itu, saya dengar anak saya nama Kia F
Fu menangis dan kejut saya. Selepas bangun, saya bawa Kia Fu
ke rumah kakak saya nama Kow Ee Luang suruh hantar anak
saya ke rumah anak yatim. Selepas itu saya pergi ambil barang
dengan lori. Sebelum ini saya selalu keluar malam naik lori. Saya
sangat sayang isteri saya dan saya tidak bunuh isteri saya. Saya G
menafikan pertuduhan di atas. Sekian sahaja kenyataan saya.

[7] The appellant did not call any witness for his defence.

[8] At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge make the
following findings and conclusion: H

Selepas meneliti pernyataan OKT bersama-sama dengan

keterangan lain di hadapan mahkamah, mahkamah memutuskan
bahawa pembelaan OKT tidak menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan
munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan kerana:
I
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 181

A (i) mengikut keterangan ASP Ashmon bin Bajah (SP12),

pegawai penyiasat kes ini, bahawa beliau telah membuat
pemeriksaan di dalam rumah kejadian tetapi tidak menjumpai
sebarang botol minuman keras, dadah atau racun. Sekiranya
OKT mengambil dadah jenis “ice” dan ubat tidur
“Domicom”, sudah tentu ia akan ditemui oleh SP12;
B
(ii) keterangan OKT bahawa beliau mengambil dadah jenis “ice”
dan ubat tidur jenis “Domicom” adalah “a recent invention”.
Peguambela terpelajar tidak pernah langsung mengemukakan
kepada saksi-saksi pendakwaan semasa mereka disoal balas
C mengenai perkara ini. (Lihat kes Wong Swee Chin v. PP
[1981] 1 MLJ 212);

(iii) tidak ada kemungkinan orang lain memasuki rumah tersebut

pada hari kejadian kerana mengikut keterangan SP6 dan SP9,
pintu rumah tersebut berkunci. Pihak polis yang pergi ke
D rumah tersebut selepas SP2 membuat laporan polis (Eks. P5)
terpaksa memecahkan pintu rumah tersebut. SP12 juga
mengesahkan bahawa “tiada tanda-tanda rumah itu
dipecahkan masuk dari balkoni dan pintu belakang”;

(iv) OKT langsung tidak memberi penjelasan mengapa T-shirt

E dan seluarnya mempunyai kesan darah kumpulan “B” dan
mengapakah beliau telah pergi ke rumah kakaknya di waktu
pagi hari (jam 3.45 pagi) dan memaklumkan kepada SP5
bahawa beliau telah bergaduh “serious” dengan si mati dan
meminta SP5 menghantar anaknya yang terencat akal ke
F rumah anak yatim. Begitu juga OKT gagal untuk memberi
penjelasan mengapakah beliau melarikan diri dan pergi ke
rumah tumpangan selepas kejadian ini. Di samping itu
tangannya juga terdapat kesan-kesan luka yang tidak diberi
sebarang penjelasan;

G (v) pihak pembelaan tidak mencadangkan bahawa anak OKT

yang terencat akal telah melakukan pembunuhan terhadap si
mati. Pada masa itu anak tersebut berumur 9 tahun. Oleh
kerana tiada orang lain pada masa kejadian melainkan OKT
dan anak terencat akal tersebut, berdasarkan semua
keterangan ikut keadaan yang terdapat dalam kes ini, adalah
H
munasabah untuk diputuskan bahawa OKT adalah orang
yang bertanggungjawab melakukan pembunuhan tersebut.
Kecederaan yang dialami oleh si mati juga mengukuhkan
kesimpulan tersebut. OKT juga tidak mengatakan si mati
telah membunuh diri (“suicide”).
I
182 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

At the end he concluded as follows: A

Oleh itu, di akhir kes pembelaan, adalah menjadi penemuan

spesifik mahkamah ini bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya
membuktikan kesnya tanpa keraguan yang munasabah terhadap
OKT dan selaras dengan S. 182A(1) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah,
B
mahkamah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan dengan
kesalahan tersebut.

All of the above indicated a conclusive finding of facts by the

learned trial judge.
C
Argument By Counsel At The Appeal Stage

[9] The learned counsel for the appellant in his submissions

concentrated on three main contentions:

(a) That the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to secure the D

conviction;

(b) That there are gaps in the prosecution’s case, namely with
regards to the blood samples of the appellant and that of the
deceased; and E

(c) That the conduct of the appellant as explained by the

appellant has given rise to two versions of the alleged offence.

Our Findings And Conclusion

F
[10] Upon perusal of the appeal records and after hearing the
respective submissions, we made the following findings in respect
of the main contentions of the appellant:

(a) The circumstances leading to the making of the police reports

G
(P4 and P5) do gave a very strong inference of the
commission of the offence by the appellant. The police reports
were made hours after the appellant went to his sister’s house
at 3.45am on 4 November 2005 which was shortly after the
quarrel the appellant had with his deceased wife. It is also
H
noted that the contents of P4 is substantively the same with
that in P5. The said police reports must have been admitted
under the provisions of s. 35 of the Evidence Act 1950.

In such circumstances the appellant is the last person to be

with the deceased. The above evidence read with the I
evidence that the appellant drove a motor lorry from his house
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 183

A in Tampoi to his sister’s house in Skudai could not reasonably

indicate that he was under the influence of drugs, as claimed.
Furthermore, his intimation to his sister that his son was to
be sent to an orphanage, clearly indicates that such
arrangement was not a temporary measure, following his
B quarrel with his wife. The most reasonable inference is that he
had knowledge of what had happened to his wife to merit
such drastic action.

When the appellant was arrested at a Rumah Tumpangan in

C Kulai on the next day, his right hand palm was injured. This
fact is to be seen in the light of facts that the alleged murder
weapon, in the form of a pair of scissors, had a broken handle
and that the blade was bent. The scissors must have been
used with such force that the end of the blade was bent, and
D that in the course of which, it must have caused the injuries
to the right hand palm.

The existence of any other person that could possibly be

involved has been eliminated by the fact that prior to the
arrival of the police at the scene the house was locked. When
E
the police came, they have to break-down the door in order
to gain entry. There is also no sign of any other forced entry
into the house.

Besides recovering the blood-stained scissors the police also

F recovered a T-shirt and shorts with traces of blood stains in a
pail in the house. There is evidence to show that the T-shirt
and shorts are those of the appellant. The chemist later
confirmed that the blood stains on the scissors, T-shirt and
shorts is that of type “B”, which was the blood type of the
G deceased. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem
confirmed that the scissors (P8A) could have caused the
multiple and penetrating wounds found on the deceased.

(b) On the issue of gaps in the prosecution’s case, ie, the lack of
H clear evidence as to who took the blood samples of the
deceased and the appellant, we find that there are not such
gaps. On the other hand, there are evidence to show
otherwise.

I
184 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

Upon closer scrutiny of the appeal record, it dawned upon us A

that the issue raised here revolved around two particular
exhibits, namely the envelope marked “H4” and its contents
(which is exh. P20) and the envelope marked “H8” and its
contents (which is exh. P24). SP11, the chemist testified as
follows (at p. 39 of the record of appeal): B

Pada tarikh 7.11.2005, saya bertugas di Jabatan Kimia

Johor sebagai Ahli Kimia di Seksyen Serologi/ Kriminalistik.
Pada tarikh tersebut, pada jam 2.08 petang, saya telah
menerima 14 sampul surat (masing-masing bertanda “M1”
C
hingga “M4”, “H3” hingga “H8”, “E1” hingga “E4” dan
2 bungkusan plastik (masing-masing bertanda “H1” dan
“H2”) dan kesemuanya bermeteri “POLIS DIRAJA
MALAYSIA 641” daripada ASP Ashmon bin Bajah.

and SP11 explained what were in the envelopes marked “H4” D

and “H8” respectively. He said (at p. 42 of the record of
appeal):
Kelapan, saya telah memeriksa sampul surat “H4” dan
mendapati di dalamnya satu botol kaca universal (berlabel
‘SHAM YOKE PENG’) berisi specimen darah. Setelah E
dianalisis, saya dapati botol kaca tersebut mengandungi
‘specimen’ darah manusia kumpulan “B” dan tidak
mengandungi dadah atau racun kebiasaaan dalam ‘specimen’
darah tersebut. (Menggunakan kaedah 1 hingga 4 seperti
pada sampul surat “M1”); F

and
Kedua belas, saya telah memeriksa sampul surat “H8” dan
mendapati di dalamnya satu peket plastik berisi satu tiub
plastik (berlabel “KOW LIANG TIANG”) berisi ‘specimen’ G
darah. Setelah dianalisis, saya dapati tiub plastik tersebut
mengandungi ‘specimen’ darah manusia kumpulan “O”.
(Menggunakan kaedah 1 hingga 4 seperti pada sampul surat
“M1”).

On the blood sample of the appellant, SP11 (at p. 46) has this H
to say:
Saya tidak diminta oleh pegawai perubatan untuk
menjalankan ujian mengesan kehadiran racun, alkohol atau
dadah dalam sampel darah OKT. Pegawai perubatan
I
tersebut ialah Dr. D. Danalashmi.
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 185

A From the above it is clear that the blood sample of the

appellant was taken by one Dr. D. Danalashmi.

It must also be borne in mind that all the exhibits recovered

and tendered at the trial, were in relation to the investigation
B of this particular murder and not to any other case. This can
be seen in the evidence of the Investigating Officer, ASP
Ashmon, SP12, where (at pp. 50-51 of the record of appeal)
it was recorded as follows:
Saya juga ada hantar barang-barang kes ke Jabatan Kimia.
C
Barang-barang kes yang dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia ialah
sebanyak 16 item barang kes, iaitu “M1”, “M2”, “M3”,
“M4”, “H1”, “H2”, “H3”, “H4”, “H5”, “H6”, “H7”,
“H8”, “E1”, “E2”, “E3”, “E4”.
D Mahkamah: Semuanya ditunjuk kepada saksi satu persatu dan
dicamkan.

Dikemuka dan ditanda sebagai Eks. P11, Eks.

P10, Eks. P15, Eks. P16, Eks. P17, Eks. P18,
Eks. P19, Eks. P20, Eks. P21, Eks. P22, Eks.
E
P23, Eks. P24, Eks. P8, Eks. P25, Eks. P26 dan
Eks. P27.

Mahkamah: Eks. D8A ditunjuk kepada saksi. Dicamkan.

Dikemuka dan ditanda sebagai Eks. P8A.

F
Eks. ID11A ditunjuk kepada saksi dan dicamkan.

Dikemuka dan ditanda sebagai Eks. P11A.

Eks. ID10A ditunjuk dan dikemuka kepada saksi.

G
Dikemuka dan ditanda sebagai Eks. P10A.

Barang-barang kes dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia pada

7.11.2005, jam lebih kurang 1408 hrs.

H Barang-barang kes diserahkan kepada En. Jayasilan a/l

Sinnathurai.

The chemist reports (exh. P28 and P35) also clearly indicated
that the reports were made in relation to Tampoi Report
16124/05, which is the first information report lodged by
I
L/Cpl. Mohd. Yusuf bin Latip, SP1. Tampoi Report 16124/05
186 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

was produced and marked as exh. P4. SP10, Sgt Anwar who A
was in charge of exhibits confirmed that all the exhibits were
in relation to the police report P4. SP10’s evidence was
recorded (at p. 36 of the record of appeal) as follows:
Apabila saya ambil alih tugas, saya telah diserahkan dengan B
barang kes bersabit Tampoi Report 16124/05. Barang-
barang kes yang diterima:

1) 16 sampul bersil Jabatan Kimia JB(FOR) 2752/05-0

bertanda “M2”, “H2”, “M3”, “M1”, “M4”, “H1”,
“E1”, “E2”, “E3”, “E4”, ”H3”, “H4”, “H5”, “H6”, C
“H7” dan “H8”; dan

2) 6 bungkusan bersil Jabatan Kimia JB(FOR)2800/05-0

bertanda “M5”, “M6”, “M7”, “M8”, “M9” dan “M10”.

Mahkamah: Semua barang kes di atas ditunjuk kepada saksi D

satu persatu dan dicamkan.

Apabila saya menerima barang-barang kes

tersebut, kesemuanya berada dalam keadaan baik
dan bersil Jabatan Kimia.
E
Semasa menerima barang-barang kes, saya ada
buat semakan dengan Buku Daftar.

Mahkamah: Sesalinan Buku Daftar ditunjuk dan dicamkan.

In support of his submission on this issue, the learned counsel F

for the appellant relied solely on the Federal Court case of Eng
Sin v. PP [1974] 1 LNS 33. However the facts therein can
be distinguished from that of this appeal. In Eng Sin, the gap
surfaced after it was discovered that the blood sample was not
labelled. In our case today from the evidence, as amply quoted G
above, the blood samples were properly named and labelled
and that they were in relation to this particular criminal
investigation. As such there is no gap that can give rise to any
reasonable doubt.
H
(c) On the issue of the conduct of the appellant, it has been
explained in finding (a) above. Furthermore, to our mind, the
conducts of the appellant in calling his sister; driving to his
sister’s house; refusing to report to the police despite being
advised by the sister; handing over his son to be kept at an I
orphanage and lastly of staying away at a Rumah Tumpangan,
are relevant within the meaning under illustration (i) in s. 8(2)
of the Evidence Act 1950.
 [2011] 9 CLJ Kow Liang Tiang v. PP 187

A As discussed earlier, the bent and broken scissors, the injuries

to the appellant’s right hand palm, the deceased’s blood-stains
on the appellant’s T-shirt and shorts are all tell-tale facts that
formed the strands of circumstantial evidence within the
criteria set out in s. 7 of the Evidence Act 1950. The
B “serious” quarrel, prior to the commission of the offence,
between the appellant and the deceased, was another strong
strand of evidence, within the meaning of s. 14 of the
Evidence Act 1950.

C According to SP4, Dr. Shahidan Mohd. Noor, the cause of

death was multiple stab and penetrating wounds. SP4 also
testified that the scissors (exh. P8A) could have caused the
wounds. The scissors was broken at the handle and that
could have caused the injuries to the appellant’s right hand
D palm. The injury to the palm, which is corroborated by the
police report lodged by the arresting officer, SP3 was never
challenged. There was no cross-examination of SP3’s
testimony. This constitutes the nexus between the appellant
and the murder weapon. The discovery of the deceased’s
E blood on the clothing’s of the appellant (namely on exhs.
P10A and P11A) is another damning piece of evidence linking
the appellant to the murder.

[11] In evaluating the evidence adduced, we are mindful of the

words of Thomson CJ in Chan Chwen Kong v. PP [1962] 1 LNS
F
22 to the effect that:
… what has to be considered is not only the strength of each
individual strand of evidence but also the combined strength of
these strands when twisted together to make a rope. The real
G question is: is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner?

[12] Having so cautioned ourselves, we find that the

circumstantial evidence are sufficient and strong enough to sustain
the finding of guilt of the appellant. The cumulative evidence,
though circumstantial, has irresistibly point to one and only
H
conclusion that it was the appellant who had caused the injuries
to the deceased and that such injuries were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. We are satisfied that all
the elements for the offence of murder as defined under s. 302 of
the Penal Code, have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
I
188 Current Law Journal [2011] 9 CLJ

[13] In the circumstances, we are unanimous that the findings A

and conclusion by the learned trial judge should not be disturbed,
as it was based on actual evidence and corroborated by material
particulars by inference reasonably and properly drawn from other
evidence adduced at the trial.
B
[14] For the above reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The
appeal is therefore dismissed and that the conviction and sentence
imposed by the High Court is hereby affirmed.