Handbook of

Military
Administration

DK3629.indb 1 11/7/07 8:28:49 AM

 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

A Comprehensive Publication Program

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

EVAN M. BERMAN
Huey McElveen Distinguished Professor
Louisiana State University
Public Administration Institute
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Executive Editor

JACK RABIN
Professor of Public Administration and Public Policy
The Pennsylvania State University—Harrisburg
School of Public Affairs
Middletown, Pennsylvania

1. Public Administration as a Developing Discipline,

Robert T. Golembiewski
2. Comparative National Policies on Health Care, Milton I. Roemer, M.D.
3. Exclusionary Injustice: The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence,
Steven R. Schlesinger
5. Organization Development in Public Administration, edited by
Robert T. Golembiewski and William B. Eddy
7. Approaches to Planned Change, Robert T. Golembiewski
8. Program Evaluation at HEW, edited by James G. Abert
9. The States and the Metropolis, Patricia S. Florestano
and Vincent L. Marando
11. Changing Bureaucracies: Understanding the Organization before
Selecting the Approach, William A. Medina
12. Handbook on Public Budgeting and Financial Management, edited by
Jack Rabin and Thomas D. Lynch
15. Handbook on Public Personnel Administration and Labor Relations,
edited by Jack Rabin, Thomas Vocino, W. Bartley Hildreth,
and Gerald J. Miller
19. Handbook of Organization Management, edited by William B. Eddy
22. Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and American Public
Administration, edited by Jack Rabin and James S. Bowman
23. Making and Managing Policy: Formulation, Analysis, Evaluation,
edited by G. Ronald Gilbert
25. Decision Making in the Public Sector, edited by Lloyd G. Nigro
26. Managing Administration, edited by Jack Rabin, Samuel Humes,
and Brian S. Morgan
27. Public Personnel Update, edited by Michael Cohen
and Robert T. Golembiewski

DK3629.indb 2 11/7/07 8:28:50 AM

 28. State and Local Government Administration, edited by Jack Rabin
and Don Dodd
29. Public Administration: A Bibliographic Guide to the Literature,
Howard E. McCurdy
31. Handbook of Information Resource Management, edited by Jack Rabin
and Edward M. Jackowski
32. Public Administration in Developed Democracies: A Comparative Study,
edited by Donald C. Rowat
33. The Politics of Terrorism: Third Edition, edited by Michael Stohl
34. Handbook on Human Services Administration, edited by Jack Rabin
and Marcia B. Steinhauer
36. Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law and Values, Second Edition,
John A. Rohr
37. The Guide to the Foundations of Public Administration,
Daniel W. Martin
39. Terrorism and Emergency Management: Policy and Administration,
William L. Waugh, Jr.
40. Organizational Behavior and Public Management: Second Edition,
Michael L. Vasu, Debra W. Stewart, and G. David Garson
43. Government Financial Management Theory, Gerald J. Miller
46. Handbook of Public Budgeting, edited by Jack Rabin
49. Handbook of Court Administration and Management, edited by
Steven W. Hays and Cole Blease Graham, Jr.
50. Handbook of Comparative Public Budgeting and Financial Management,
edited by Thomas D. Lynch and Lawrence L. Martin
53. Encyclopedia of Policy Studies: Second Edition, edited by
Stuart S. Nagel
54. Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law, edited by
David H. Rosenbloom and Richard D. Schwartz
55. Handbook of Bureaucracy, edited by Ali Farazmand
56. Handbook of Public Sector Labor Relations, edited by Jack Rabin,
Thomas Vocino, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller
57. Practical Public Management, Robert T. Golembiewski
58. Handbook of Public Personnel Administration, edited by Jack Rabin,
Thomas Vocino, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller
60. Handbook of Debt Management, edited by Gerald J. Miller
61. Public Administration and Law: Second Edition, David H. Rosenbloom
and Rosemary O’Leary
62. Handbook of Local Government Administration, edited by
John J. Gargan
63. Handbook of Administrative Communication, edited by
James L. Garnett and Alexander Kouzmin
64. Public Budgeting and Finance: Fourth Edition, edited by
Robert T. Golembiewski and Jack Rabin
67. Handbook of Public Finance, edited by Fred Thompson
and Mark T. Green
68. Organizational Behavior and Public Management: Third Edition,
Michael L. Vasu, Debra W. Stewart, and G. David Garson
69. Handbook of Economic Development, edited by Kuotsai Tom Liou
70. Handbook of Health Administration and Policy, edited by Anne Osborne
Kilpatrick and James A. Johnson

DK3629.indb 3 11/7/07 8:28:50 AM

 72. Handbook on Taxation, edited by W. Bartley Hildreth
and James A. Richardson
73. Handbook of Comparative Public Administration in the Asia-Pacific
Basin, edited by Hoi-kwok Wong and Hon S. Chan
74. Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration, edited by
Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. Steel
75. Handbook of State Government Administration, edited by
John J. Gargan
76. Handbook of Global Legal Policy, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
78. Handbook of Global Economic Policy, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
79. Handbook of Strategic Management: Second Edition, edited by
Jack Rabin, Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley Hildreth
80. Handbook of Global International Policy, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
81. Handbook of Organizational Consultation: Second Edition, edited by
Robert T. Golembiewski
82. Handbook of Global Political Policy, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
83. Handbook of Global Technology Policy, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
84. Handbook of Criminal Justice Administration, edited by
M. A. DuPont-Morales, Michael K. Hooper, and Judy H. Schmidt
85. Labor Relations in the Public Sector: Third Edition, edited by
Richard C. Kearney
86. Handbook of Administrative Ethics: Second Edition, edited by
Terry L. Cooper
87. Handbook of Organizational Behavior: Second Edition, edited by
Robert T. Golembiewski
88. Handbook of Global Social Policy, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
and Amy Robb
89. Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective, Sixth Edition,
Ferrel Heady
90. Handbook of Public Quality Management, edited by Ronald J. Stupak
and Peter M. Leitner
91. Handbook of Public Management Practice and Reform, edited by
Kuotsai Tom Liou
93. Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management, edited by
Ali Farazmand
94. Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration:
Second Edition, edited by Ali Farazmand
95. Financial Planning and Management in Public Organizations,
Alan Walter Steiss and Emeka O. Cyprian Nwagwu
96. Handbook of International Health Care Systems, edited by Khi V. Thai,
Edward T. Wimberley, and Sharon M. McManus
97. Handbook of Monetary Policy, edited by Jack Rabin
and Glenn L. Stevens
98. Handbook of Fiscal Policy, edited by Jack Rabin and Glenn L. Stevens
99. Public Administration: An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis, edited by
Eran Vigoda
100. Ironies in Organizational Development: Second Edition, Revised
and Expanded, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski
101. Science and Technology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, edited by
Tushar K. Ghosh, Mark A. Prelas, Dabir S. Viswanath,
and Sudarshan K. Loyalka

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 102. Strategic Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations,
Alan Walter Steiss
103. Case Studies in Public Budgeting and Financial Management:
Second Edition, edited by Aman Khan and W. Bartley Hildreth
104. Handbook of Conflict Management, edited by William J. Pammer, Jr.
and Jerri Killian
105. Chaos Organization and Disaster Management, Alan Kirschenbaum
106. Handbook of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Administration
and Policy, edited by Wallace Swan
107. Public Productivity Handbook: Second Edition, edited by Marc Holzer
108. Handbook of Developmental Policy Studies, edited by
Gedeon M. Mudacumura, Desta Mebratu and M. Shamsul Haque
109. Bioterrorism in Medical and Healthcare Administration, Laure Paquette
110. International Public Policy and Management: Policy Learning Beyond
Regional, Cultural, and Political Boundaries, edited by David Levi-Faur
and Eran Vigoda-Gadot
111. Handbook of Public Information Systems, Second Edition, edited by
G. David Garson
112. Handbook of Public Sector Economics, edited by Donijo Robbins
113. Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union,
edited by M. Peter van der Hoek
114. Nonproliferation Issues for Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Mark A. Prelas and Michael S. Peck
115. Common Ground, Common Future: Moral Agency in Public
Administration, Professions, and Citizenship, Charles Garofalo
and Dean Geuras
116. Handbook of Organization Theory and Management: The Philosophical
Approach, Second Edition, edited by Thomas D. Lynch
and Peter L. Cruise
117. International Development Governance, edited by Ahmed Shafiqul
Huque and Habib Zafarullah
118. Sustainable Development Policy and Administration, edited by
Gedeon M. Mudacumura, Desta Mebratu, and M. Shamsul Haque
119. Public Financial Management, edited by Howard A. Frank
120. Handbook of Juvenile Justice: Theory and Practice, edited by
Barbara Sims and Pamela Preston
121. Emerging Infectious Diseases and the Threat to Occupational Health
in the U.S. and Canada, edited by William Charney
122. Handbook of Technology Management in Public Administration,
edited by David Greisler and Ronald J. Stupak
123. Handbook of Decision Making, edited by Göktuğ Morçöl
124. Handbook of Public Administration, Third Edition, edited by Jack Rabin
125. Handbook of Public Policy Analysis, edited by Frank Fischer,
Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney
126. Elements of Effective Governance: Measurement, Accountability
and Participation, edited by Kathe Callahan
127. American Public Service: Radical Reform and the Merit System,
edited by James S. Bowman and Jonathan P. West
128. Handbook of Transportation Policy and Administration,
edited by Jeremy Plant

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 129. The Art and Practice of Court Administration,
Alexander B. Aikman
130. Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public
Administration, Ali Farazmand and Jack Pinkowski
131. Handbook of Globalization and the Environment, edited by
Khi V. Thai, Dianne Rahm, and Jerrell D. Coggburn
132. Personnel Management in Government: Politics and Process,
Sixth Edition, Norma M. Riccucci and Katherine C. Naff
133. Handbook of Police Administration, edited by Jim Ruiz
and Don Hummer
134. Handbook of Research Methods in Public Administration,
Second Edition, edited by Kaifeng Yang and Gerald J. Miller
135. Social and Economic Control of Alcohol: The 21st Amendment
in the 21st Century, edited by Carole L. Jurkiewicz
and Murphy J. Painter
136. Government Public Relations: A Reader, Mordecai Lee
137. Handbook of Military Administration, edited by
Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson

Available Electronically

Principles and Practices of Public Administration, edited by

Jack Rabin, Robert F. Munzenrider, and Sherrie M. Bartell

PublicADMINISTRATIONnetBASE

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 Handbook of
Military
Administration

Edited by
Jeffrey A. Weber
East Stroudsburg University
East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

Johan Eliasson
East Stroudsburg University
East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the

Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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 CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487‑2742
© 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

No claim to original U.S. Government works

Printed in the United States of America on acid‑free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

International Standard Book Number‑13: 978‑1‑57444‑558‑9 (Hardcover)

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Library of Congress Cataloging‑in‑Publication Data

Weber, Jeffrey A.
Handbook of military administration / Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978‑1‑57444‑558‑9 (alk. paper)
1. Military administration‑‑Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Eliasson, Johan. II.
Title.

UB146.W43 2007
355.6‑‑dc22 2007022402

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

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and the CRC Press Web site at
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 Dedication

To Dr. Jack Rabin, who encouraged the editors of

this book and was a teacher, mentor, and
friend who will be missed

ix

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DK3629.indb 10 11/7/07 8:28:51 AM
 Contents

Preface........................................................................................................ xxiii
Contributors................................................................................................. xxv

Chapter 1
Introduction.................................................................................................1
Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson
References.....................................................................................................8
Chapter 2
Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers: The
Countervailing Patterns of American Military
Administration....................................................................................9
Darrell W. Driver
The Military as a Profession: The Rise and Struggles of Autonomous
Professionalism...........................................................................................11
The Military as a Public Bureaucracy: Rational Structures and
Principle Agents..........................................................................................16
Article I.  The Military as a Public Institution: The Long Shadow of
the Citizen-Soldier Ideal.............................................................................20
Conclusion..................................................................................................24
References...................................................................................................26
Chapter 3
Military Administration 1850–1900. ...................................................31
Heidi Amelia-Anne Weber
References.................................................................................................. 42

xi

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 xii  n  Contents

Chapter 4
Reshaping the Defense Enterprise. ......................................................47
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense .
Review 2006
Toward a New Defense Enterprise..............................................................49
Governance Reforms..............................................................................50
Senior Leadership Focus....................................................................50
Aligning Authority and Accountability through Joint
Capability Portfolios..........................................................................52
Managing Joint Task Assignments.....................................................53
Driving Business Transformation......................................................53
Managing Risks and Measuring Performance
Across the Enterprise.........................................................................54
Additional Governance Reforms........................................................54
Management and Work Reforms...........................................................55
Improving Defense Acquisition Performance.....................................55
Managing Supply-Chain Logistics.....................................................56
Transforming the Medical Health System (MHS).............................57
Summary...............................................................................................57
Developing a Twenty-First Century Total Force.........................................58
Reconfiguring the Total Force................................................................59
A Continuum of Service.........................................................................59
Building the Right Skills....................................................................... 60
Joint Training................................................................................... 60
Language and Cultural Skills............................................................61
Training and Educating Personnel to Strengthen Interagency
Operations.........................................................................................61
Designing an Information Age Human Capital Strategy.......................62
National Security Personnel System.......................................................63
Achieving Unity of Effort.......................................................................... 64
Why a New Approach Is Essential........................................................ 64
Strategic and Operational Frameworks...................................................65
Strengthening Interagency Operations...................................................65
Learning from the Field.................................................................... 66
Complex Interagency Operations Abroad......................................... 66
Complex Interagency Operations at Home........................................67
Working with International Allies and Partners.................................68
Transforming Foreign Assistance.......................................................70
Strategic Communication..................................................................72
Summary....................................................................................................72

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 Contents  n  xiii

Chapter 5
Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1990 to 2005.....................................................................................75
Richard Meinhart
Introduction...............................................................................................75
Chairman’s Responsibilities........................................................................76
Strategic Challenges, Culture and Structure...............................................78
Strategic Planning System Changes............................................................79
1989 Status.............................................................................................79
1990 Change......................................................................................... 80
1993 Change......................................................................................... 80
1997 Change..........................................................................................81
1999 Change..........................................................................................81
The 2005 System....................................................................................81
Strategic Planning Products........................................................................82
Assessment.............................................................................................83
Vision.................................................................................................... 84
Strategy..................................................................................................85
Resources...............................................................................................86
Plans......................................................................................................87
Chairman’s Legacy......................................................................................87
General Colin L. Powell (1989–1993)....................................................87
General John M. Shalikashvili (1993–1997)..........................................88
General Henry Hugh Shelton (1997–2001)............................................89
General Richard B. Myers (2001–2005)................................................ 90
Conclusion..................................................................................................91
Notes..........................................................................................................93
Chapter 6
The Leviathan’s Bit: The U.S. Defense Budget..................................99
Jeffrey A. Weber
Introduction...............................................................................................99
Overview of a Public Budget....................................................................100
The U.S. Constitution and the Defense Budget........................................101
The Federal Budget...................................................................................102
The Federal Government Budget Documents......................................102
The Federal Government Budget Process.............................................103
The Defense Budget..................................................................................106
The Defense Budget Process.................................................................107
Historical Overview of PPBES.............................................................107
The PPBES Process...............................................................................112

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 xiv  n  Contents

Planning..........................................................................................113
Programming.................................................................................. 114
Budgeting........................................................................................ 115
Execution......................................................................................... 117
The Defense Budget Network.............................................................. 119
Conclusion................................................................................................120
References.................................................................................................121
Further Readings......................................................................................123
Chapter 7
Human Capital: DoD’s National Security Personnel System
Faces Implementation Challenges.............................................125
Government Accountability Office
Background..............................................................................................125
The Initial NSPS Design Process..............................................................126
Employees Covered by NSPS....................................................................126
DoD’s Employee Unions...........................................................................127
Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and Transformations.....127
NSPS Design Process Evolved into a Phased Approach.............................128
Top DoD and OPM Leadership Drives Human
Capital Transformation............................................................................130
Guiding Principles and Key Performance Parameters Steer the
Design Process..........................................................................................132
Team Established to Manage the NSPS Design and
Implementation Process............................................................................133
Ambitious Timeline and Implementation Goals Established....................134
Communication Strategy Not Comprehensive.........................................136
NSPS Design Process Has Involved Employees........................................137
DoD Faces Multiple Challenges in Implementing NSPS..........................139
Early Implementation Challenges........................................................139
Later Implementation Challenges.........................................................140
Conclusions..............................................................................................142
Notes........................................................................................................142
Chapter 8
The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager (TSM)
Abrams..............................................................................................145
John M. Shay, Seth T. Blakeman and Hank Hughes
Setting the Stage for TSM: Formation of TRADOC and M1 Abrams
Tank......................................................................................................... 145
The System Needs a Parent: Formation of TSM.......................................147

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 Contents  n  xv

Army Transformation: Evolution of TRADOC and TSM

CBRS and DOTLMS...............................................................................147
Battle Labs................................................................................................149
New Requirements System.......................................................................149
Integrated Concept Teams........................................................................150
Army Transformation Initiative................................................................ 151
The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System........................... 152
TSM Function and Method...................................................................... 153
TSM Abrams Day-to-Day Activities.........................................................154
Termination of TSM Abrams and Formation of TCM
Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)....................................................156
Summary.................................................................................................. 157
References.................................................................................................158
Chapter 9
Private Military Companies. ................................................................ 161
Matthew Armstrong
Introduction............................................................................................. 161
Terms and Taxonomy...............................................................................163
History.....................................................................................................164
The U.S. Experience.................................................................................168
Reasons for Use........................................................................................170
Legal Frameworks..................................................................................... 176
International Accountability.....................................................................179
Administration.........................................................................................181
Conclusion................................................................................................184
References.................................................................................................188
Chapter 10
Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation.........................................191
Charles R. Miller
Introduction............................................................................................. 191
Basic Argument........................................................................................192
Realist and Liberal Foundations of the U.S. Army....................................193
Grand Strategy and Defense Policy...........................................................194
What Is Doctrine?....................................................................................195
Why Does Doctrine Change?...................................................................196
Necessary Distinctions..............................................................................196
Hypotheses...............................................................................................199
Findings....................................................................................................201
Review of Outcomes from BOP Baseline Predictions...........................202
Too Many Fluctuations........................................................................207

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 xvi  n  Contents

American Exceptionalism?.................................................................. 209

Operationalization of Strategy................................................................. 209
Threatening Signals..............................................................................210
Foot Dragging...................................................................................... 211
The Downside of Culture.....................................................................212
Losing Touch with the People..............................................................213
Positive Connotations............................................................................... 214
Conclusion................................................................................................ 215
Notes........................................................................................................216
References................................................................................................. 217
Chapter 11
Military and Homeland Security........................................................221
Risa A. Brooks
Introduction.............................................................................................221
The Scenario.............................................................................................223
Reasons for Change..................................................................................224
Turning Soldiers into Policemen...............................................................225
Politicizing the Military........................................................................... 228
Compromising Values.............................................................................. 230
What Is To Be Done?...............................................................................232
Notes........................................................................................................233
References.................................................................................................235
Chapter 12
Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness........237
Suzanne C. Nielsen
Introduction.............................................................................................237
Civil–Military Relations and Military Effectiveness.................................239
The Classics..........................................................................................239
Dependent Variables of the Civil–Military Relations Literature...........243
Military Effectiveness...........................................................................247
Challenges................................................................................................249
Conclusion................................................................................................250
Notes........................................................................................................251
References.................................................................................................251
Chapter 13
Application of the Military for Countering Nonstate
Terrorist and Guerilla Networks................................................255
Matthew R. McNabb
Genealogy of U.S. Military Counterterrorism..........................................257

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 Contents  n  xvii

“General Warfare” as an Instrument of Military Counterterrorism..........265

Imperfect Warfare and Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW)..............................................................................................267
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC)..........................267
Targeted Strikes...................................................................................267
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)............................................................269
Law Enforcement Support....................................................................269
Nonkinetic Considerations.......................................................................270
Detention and Adjudication.................................................................270
Intelligence...........................................................................................272
“Hearts and Minds”.............................................................................273
Information Operations (IO)...............................................................275
How Things Changed after 9/11...............................................................275
Other Countries’ Experiences...................................................................276
Colombia............................................................................................ 277
Israel.................................................................................................... 277
The Future of Military Counterterrorism..................................................278
References................................................................................................ 280
Chapter 14
Military Leadership and Culture.........................................................283
Randall Miller and Saundra J. Reinke
Leadership............................................................................................... 284
What Is Leadership?............................................................................ 284
A Short Tour of Leadership Theories....................................................285
Can Leadership Be Taught?................................................................. 286
Military Leadership Models................................................................ 288
Leadership and Power..........................................................................290
Leadership and Ethics..........................................................................291
Conclusion...........................................................................................292
Military Culture.......................................................................................292
Is There One “Military Culture?”.........................................................293
Pressures on Military Culture..............................................................295
The Military as “Social Lab”................................................................297
Conclusion................................................................................................297
References.................................................................................................298
Chapter 15
The Profession of Arms and the Management of Violence.........301
Saundra J. Reinke and Randall Miller
The Profession of Arms.............................................................................302
What Is a Profession?...........................................................................302

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 xviii  n  Contents

The Professional Military Ethic........................................................... 304

The Civil–Military Gap...................................................................... 306
Conclusion...........................................................................................307
The Management of Violence...................................................................307
Laws of Armed Conflict...................................................................... 308
Justified Killing? Or War Crime?................................................... 308
The Case of Abu Ghraib................................................................. 309
“Friendly Fire”......................................................................................310
Combat Stress...................................................................................... 311
Residual Impact of Violence.................................................................313
Prevention....................................................................................... 314
Conclusion................................................................................................ 314
References................................................................................................. 314
Chapter 16
Regional Defense Policy: The European Security and
Defense Policy................................................................................ 317
Johan Eliasson
Introduction to the ESDP......................................................................... 318
Strategy and Command Structure........................................................320
European Security Strategy.............................................................320
Terrorism.........................................................................................321
Other Committees...............................................................................324
Capabilities...............................................................................................326
Headline Goals....................................................................................326
Headline Goals Updated......................................................................327
The Armaments Industry as It Relates to Capabilities..........................333
Links to NATO Assets to Improve Capabilities...................................336
The Military Culture................................................................................337
Brusselization.......................................................................................338
Operations to Date Using Parts or All of the Command..........................339
Problems............................................................................................. 340
Conclusion and Future Developments......................................................341
Note......................................................................................................... 343
References................................................................................................ 343
Chapter 17
Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. ........................................347
MaryBeth Peterson Ulrich
Introduction.............................................................................................347

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 Contents  n  xix

Backdrop for Reform: NATO Enlargement and the New Security

Realities................................................................................................... 348
The Impact of 9-11 on the Continued Importance of CEE Defense
Transformation.........................................................................................349
Slovakia: Slovak Republic Force 2010.......................................................352
Background Leading to Reform...........................................................352
Scope of Current Reform Effort...........................................................354
The Role of National Security Documents...........................................354
Drafting the Plan: The Importance of Leadership, Process, and
Players..................................................................................................356
An Overview of SR Force 2010.............................................................358
Key Elements of SR Force 2010............................................................358
Economic Assumptions...................................................................358
Force Structure and Modernization.................................................359
Supporting Programs: Personnel Reform.........................................359
Supporting Programs: Leader Development and Military
Education....................................................................................... 360
Supporting Programs: Sustaining and Stationing........................... 360
The Czech Republic: The Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of
the Czech Republic...................................................................................361
Background Leading to Reform...........................................................361
Scope of the Current Reform Effort.....................................................362
The Role of National Security Documents...........................................363
Drafting the Plan.................................................................................363
An Overview of the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the
Czech Republic....................................................................................365
Key Elements of the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of
the Czech Republic............................................................................. 366
Economic Assumptions.................................................................. 366
Force Structure and Modernization................................................ 366
Supporting Programs: Personnel Reform.........................................367
Supporting Programs: Leader Development and
Military Education..........................................................................367
Supporting Programs: Sustaining and Stationing........................... 368
The Way Ahead: Implementation and Preliminary Conclusions.............. 368
Conclusion................................................................................................369
Note..........................................................................................................370
References.................................................................................................370

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 xx  n  Contents

Chapter 18
Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations................373
Bartosz Hieronim Stanisławski
Introduction.............................................................................................373
Context.....................................................................................................375
Mexico......................................................................................................377
Chain of Command.............................................................................377
Structure and Organization of the Mexican Armed Forces..................379
The Mexican Army and Air Force....................................................379
The Mexican Navy..........................................................................380
Related Facts and Developments..........................................................381
Colombia..................................................................................................381
Chain of Command.............................................................................381
Structure and Organization of the Colombian Armed Forces..............381
The Colombian Army......................................................................381
The Colombian Navy......................................................................383
The Colombian Air Force................................................................384
Related Facts and Developments..........................................................384
Venezuela..................................................................................................385
Chain of Command.............................................................................386
Structure and Organization of the Venezuelan Armed Forces..............386
The Venezuelan Army......................................................................386
The Venezuelan Navy......................................................................386
The Venezuelan Air Force................................................................389
The Venezuelan National Guard......................................................389
Related Facts and Developments..........................................................390
Brazil........................................................................................................390
Chain of Command.............................................................................391
Structure and Organization of the Brazilian Armed Forces..................391
The Brazilian Army.........................................................................391
The Brazilian Navy..........................................................................393
The Brazilian Air Force....................................................................394
Related Facts and Developments..........................................................394
Other Selected Latin American States.......................................................396
South America.....................................................................................396
Peru.................................................................................................396
Chile................................................................................................397
Argentina.........................................................................................398
Central America.................................................................................. 400
The Caribbean Basin............................................................................401

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 Contents  n  xxi

Conclusion................................................................................................403
References................................................................................................ 404
Bibliography............................................................................................ 406
Chapter 19
National Defense: People’s Republic of China.............................. 409
Hans Stockton
Introduction............................................................................................ 409
Overview..................................................................................................410
Military Doctrine.....................................................................................413
The People’s Liberation Army...................................................................414
Command and Control............................................................................ 415
Force Structure.....................................................................................416
China’s Defense Spending........................................................................421
Civil–Military Relations and the PLA as a National or Party Army........ 422
Conclusion............................................................................................... 424
References.................................................................................................425

Index............................................................................................................429

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DK3629.indb 22 11/7/07 8:28:53 AM
 Preface

The purpose of this handbook is to bring together original chapters and other
material that address and analyze the basic issues and components of the United
States military administration and provide an international comparative perspec-
tive. Although the United States military produces numerous “handbooks” by
highly competent authors, none of the currently available manuals address the
breadth of the subject matter here while simultaneously providing an international
comparison.
Open the first issue of Public Administration Review and you will find multiple
articles addressing the administration of the United States military. Today it has
gone out of favor and is not a subject of study. The military is the largest governmen-
tal bureaucracy in the United States. The administrative changes that have occurred
in the military throughout the nation’s history are responsible for some of the major
changes that have occurred in public administration. Today, the administrative
changes produced by the Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century are respon-
sible for implementing some of the leading administrative reforms in the areas of
personnel management, public budgeting and financial management, contracting,
and planning. Despite the major public administration changes being brought about
by the Department of Defense, which impact more public employees than any other
changes, the public administration academic community appears to be mute, or at
least not publishing in the main journals or presenting papers at the annual confer-
ences. It is time for public administration to stop ignoring military administration.
Hopefully, this volume is a start in reintroducing this neglected area of study.
Noticeable in this regard is that all across the globe government reforms of the
military have often mimicked reforms attempted in civilian administrative bodies.
The quest for greater efficiency and effectiveness, higher productivity and techno-
logical sophistication in the public sector has frequently found reception among
those charged with reforming the military, even if military personnel, like civilian
bureaucrats, have sometimes fought to preserve set routines and protect ingrained
interests. Governments across the globe have decided to reform their military,
making them technologically more sophisticated, increasingly flexible, leaner and
more efficient. The similarities in goals and responses only strengthen the need

xxiii

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 xxiv  n  Preface

to examine the transformation in the military in the context of studying public

administration.
The wide area of subject matter included in this volume covers: historical per-
spectives, an overview of defense transformation, planning, budgeting, personnel,
weapon systems management, doctrine development, military–civilian relation-
ships, professional education, professional ethics, and overviews of the military
administration in the European Union, the Czech Republic, China, and Latin
America.
The revolution in military affairs, first adopted as a reform process in the United
States, has spread globally, though varying by country and region, with its resem-
blance to American reforms being influenced by national military culture, history,
economic situation, and the regional security situation. A comparison of military
administration, including policy goals, decision, rules, and culture sheds light on
how traditional allies, regional friends, and a rising international power (China) are
modernizing and reorganizing their military.
Many people labored to complete this project. As with so many books in the
Public Administration and Public Policy Series, the initial idea for this project came
from Jack Rabin. Jack was an incubator of numerous thoughts and ideas and he
encouraged so many to accomplish more than they could conceive. Despite his own
health problems and difficulties, he never ceased to inquire about the state of the
book and encourage us to completion. We deeply regret his passing and recognize
this work would not have been possible if it wasn’t for him.
We also would like to thank our contributors who present, analyze, and explain
the organization, procedures, and processes, as well as reform efforts, of the U.S.
military administration and that found in regions and countries around the world.
We apologize to those who waited a couple of years due to unexpected delays in this
work. We thank all of them for their efforts. Additionally, we also thank two gradu-
ate assistants at East Stroudsburg University, Jehan Johnson and Jenna Becker, for
their tremendous assistance in formatting chapters and general proofreading.
Also, we would like to thank Rich O’Hanley, the publisher of Auerbach Pub-
lications, for accepting this volume and being willing to make it a reality. Finally,
we are grateful for the work of Catherine Giacari, project coordinator, and Jay
Margolis, project editor, at Taylor & Francis. They patiently put up with our missed
deadlines and made tremendous behind-the-scenes efforts to make this volume
possible.
Ultimately the responsibility for this volume lies with us as editors and authors,
and we welcome any comments and feedback that can help improve future
editions.

Jeffrey A. Weber
Johan Eliasson

DK3629.indb 24 11/7/07 8:28:54 AM

 Contributors

Matthew Armstrong, M.A.  Annenberg School for Public Diplomacy,

University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California

Seth Blakeman  Major, U.S. Army, TRADOC Systems Management for M1A2
Office, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Risa A. Brooks, Ph.D.  Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Darrell W. Driver, Ph.D.  Major, U.S. Army, Social Sciences Department,

United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

Johan Eliasson, Ph.D.  Political Science Department, East Stroudsburg

University, East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania

Hank Hughes  Captain, U.S. Army, TRADOC Systems Management for

M1A2 Office, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Matthew R. McNabb, M.A.  Department of War Studies, King’s

College, London, United Kingdom

Richard Meinhart, Ph.D.  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Charles R. Miller, Ph.D.  Colonel, U.S. Army, United States Southern

Command, Miami, Florida

Randall Miller, Ph.D.  Augusta State University, Augusta, Georgia

Suzanne C. Nielsen, Ph.D.  United States Military Academy, West Point,

New York

xxv

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 xxvi  n  Contributors

Saundra J. Reinke, DPA  Political Science Department, Augusta State

University, Augusta, Georgia

John Shay  Colonel, U.S. Army, TRADOC Systems Manager for M1A2
Abrams, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Bartosz Hieronim Stanislawski, Ph.D.  Maxwell School of Citizenship and

Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York

Hans Stockton, Ph.D.  University of St. Thomas, Houston, Texas

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Ph.D.  Department of National Security and

Strategy, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Heidi Amelia-Anne Weber, Ph.D.  Essex County College, Newark, New Jersey

Jeffrey A. Weber, Ph.D.  Political Science Department, East Stroudsburg

University, East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania

DK3629.indb 26 11/7/07 8:28:54 AM

 Chapter 1

Introduction

Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson

Military operations have constantly dominated current events over the past twenty
years. Since 1979, the United States military has deployed with increasing fre-
quency, which significantly increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
operations span the continuum from war to humanitarian relief. The U.S. military
has 450,925 military personnel engaged in global operations in Iraq, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Germany, Poland,
Philippines, Columbia, South Korea and Japan, just to name a few of the 163
nations with ongoing operations. Additionally, the U.S. military dominates the
oceans and air space globally as it seeks to support the ever-growing number of
operations. This support is provided not only to U.S. forces, but also to United
Nations peacekeepers and the military of other nations.
These global military operations are managed on a day-to-day basis by history’s
largest bureaucracy, the Department of Defense (DoD). There are 1.3 million men
and women on active duty and another 1.1 million serving in the National Guard
or Reserve. The forces are supported by 669,281 civilian personnel. Additionally,
DoD cares for over 2 million retirees and military personnel’s families. All of this
is accomplished with a budget of approximately $500 billion.
Although the conduct of war is the subject of vast literature, administrative
aspects of military operations is often lacking. After all, who can become excited
about human resource management, budgeting and finance, procurement, and
training and development, when one has the lure and challenge of defeat and vic-
tory in combat? Yet, the seemingly mundane and boring administrative tasks are
what makes it possible to field an effective fighting force.

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   n  Handbook of Military Administration

The human resource management systems are what enables the military to
recruit, train and field the personnel who win on the battlefields. The budgeting
and finance systems are what makes it possible to purchase the weapon systems,
food, materials and, most importantly, pay the troops, provide benefits and take
care of them if they are injured or in retirement. Training and development pro-
vides our fighting forces with the knowledge, skills and abilities they need to win
on the battlefield, conduct operations other than war and to take care of each other
and their families. Procurement provides our military with what it needs, when it
needs it.
Furthermore, despite the continual argument by some that nation building is
not the job of the military, the U.S. military has often found itself engaged in
just such efforts throughout its history. The historical frequency with which the
military has engaged in humanitarian or nation-building operations makes it sur-
prising that it does not rise in prominence in military doctrine. Consequently, the
U.S. military often finds itself conducting public administration operations and
relearning lessons from previous operations.
In short, the public administration systems of the DoD are the vital organs and
body of the entire military. The conduct of war and operations other than war are
the actions or activities of that body. For too long, people who have studied the
military have focused on the activities and actions of the body, and have ignored
the body itself. This Handbook of Military Administration is an attempt to capture
the essence of the public administration of the U.S. military and offer a brief com-
parison to other nations’ military administrations.
It is our hope and desire that this volume may serve to generate an interest by
others in military administration, both as an academic field and as a manner of
public service. General George Patton is often quoted as saying that one cannot
administer his way to victory on the battlefield. Although I agree that is true in
the heat of battle, I contend that Patton could not have achieved or won anything
were it not for the public administrators and their organization and systems which
placed Patton on that battlefield and provided him with the tools he needed for
victory. Additionally, it was the vast administrative systems and processes which,
after World War II, enabled the Marshall Plan to become a reality. The intent of
this book is not to promote a bureaucratic mentality over a warrior ethos, but to
show that the administrative systems are critical to enabling that warrior ethos to
flourish and win on the battlefield.
Because of the lack of attention given to military administration, it is essential
to identify this subject matter. Military administration encompasses the functions
of planning, organizing, staffing, financing, training, equipping, maintaining and
caring for the military bureaucracy. Interestingly, military administration is larger
than the actual combat units, typically the ratio is three to one. Overlaid on the
different functions of military administration are the concepts of professionalism,
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. Because the stakes are so high in terms
of the loss of life and at times the survival of the nation, the military administrative

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 Introduction  n  

systems have come under repeated scrutiny. Scandals have focused attention on
specific administrative functions for brief periods, which have spurred reform com-
missions or study groups to recommend reform in whatever is the latest trend of
the period.
The study of administrative systems utilizes a range of decision-making, orga-
nizational and sociological models or frameworks. Decision-making models focus
on the processes used for reaching conclusions, whether sequential or concurrent.
Organizational models are used to examine the structures and systems that operate
to transform inputs into outputs. Finally, sociological models emphasize the influ-
ence of the societal norms, mores and believes regarding professional standards and
ethics, organizational standards and practices, and placement in society.
The DoD has a well-established administrative system. Its historical develop-
ment is incremental, but is punctuated with intermitted periods of dramatic change.
One of these periods is 1850 to 1900, in which the Civil War produced dramatic
administrative changes that would play out over the next few decades. Changes in
the organization of the general staff and the adapting of administrative systems to
support a large national military all were given birth during this period.
The next major period of change occurred as the result of World War II, when
the U.S. military would become global in nature and be involved in large-scale
humanitarian operations. The current administrative systems were born during
that time and are still in the process of maturing. The DoD was established in 1947
and it has been a constant struggle between the civilian leadership and the military
on the meaning of operating as one military system (jointness) and what it means
to actually function as the first global military power.
Over the years, systems have developed, such as the Joint Planning System,
by which the military focuses itself on the national priorities as established by the
civilian leadership; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System,
which seeks to integrate the financial management systems with the plans, pro-
grams and operations of DoD; and the National Security Personnel System is the
latest effort to organize the approximately 659,000 civilian personnel. Additionally,
one of the difficult tasks is the timely procurement of weapon systems to ensure
supremacy on the battlefield. Part of this involves military systems managers, who
for a short time in their career manage the development, procurement and mainte-
nance of a specific weapon system.
A unique aspect of U.S. military administration is the business of contracting
out different aspects of security operations, such as security for service contrac-
tors. This has given rise to private military companies. What the relationship of
these private companies is to the military and how they operate under the rules of
engagement are all areas of concern for military administration.
Development of professional training and the imparting of professional values
and ethics is a primary concern of training and development. The military profes-
sion is guided by a sense of what it means to serve. Concepts of duty and honor
permeate the profession, combined with a mission-oriented and “get the mission

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   n  Handbook of Military Administration

accomplished” attitude. Selfless leadership, with a service-oriented mindset, are

some of the values the profession has sought to generate over time.
The U.S. military functions as a global organization. Consequently, it interacts
with other countries’ militaries. Having a familiarization with the administrative
systems of other countries is essential. As with most areas of social and scientific
development, defense structures, organizations and the cultures that underlie, and
often shape, military operations change, most often in response to external devel-
opments. Most governments agree that they should be adapting to a world where
the enemy’s location, character (a state or a terrorist cell) and strength are highly
unpredictable. Such adaptation entails maximizing use of information-gather-
ing technology, through satellites or aerial surveillance, and boosting the ability
to project power (through missiles, bombers or the rapid deployment of troops
and armor) across long distances. The chances of aerial dogfights or naval battles
between roughly matched forces are receding; ships and aircraft are more likely to
be needed to support a multipronged intervention on land. The environment for
such intervention could be extremely hostile, with no friendly ports or land bases
and every likelihood of adversaries who are using ballistic missiles, or chemical and
biological weaponry.
American cooperation with allies around the world depends on political will,
but, in practice, these new scenarios also require compatible equipment. America
is ahead of all others, including Europe, in adapting to these new challenges. This
is not only because of its forces’ global reach, but also because the sheer size of its
defense budget provides great leeway in requesting and choosing weapon systems.
The Pentagon is still buying traditional weapon platforms, such as ships, subma-
rines and tanks—even when there seems little reason to do so, besides appeas-
ing political lobbies and maintaining the military–industrial base. But at the same
time, it has adopted the rhetoric of the so-called “revolution in military affairs”
that promises to use information technology to provide commanders with almost
perfect knowledge of the battlefield.
All across the globe governments have decided to reform their military, mak-
ing them technologically more sophisticated, increasingly flexible, leaner and more
efficient. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) has spread, though varying by
country and region, with its resemblance to American reforms being influenced by
national military culture, history, economic situation and the regional security situ-
ation. A comparison of military administration, including policy goals, decision,
rules and culture, sheds light on how traditional allies, regional friends and a rising
international power (China) are modernizing and reorganizing their military.
In the case of traditional allies in Europe and elsewhere (e.g., Canada and Aus-
tralia), transnational as well as transatlantic armaments, R&D and procurement
are slowly improving compatibility and interoperability between countries; incom-
patibility due to divergent technology and training hampered cooperation in the
theater (Afghanistan 2002–2007 and Iraq 2003–2006 are examples). European
and American defense planners have largely abandoned old Cold War assumptions

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 Introduction  n  

about the nature of conflicts, and are now rethinking strategy to meet the new
threat environment. So is the defense industry. The big American firms have con-
solidated into five; European firms have been slower, but British Aerospace (BAe)
and the European Aerospace and Defense Company (EADC), and Italian Finmec-
cia are healthy and valuable European competitors to American companies’ com-
petitive edge in many areas. This new arms industrial map is thus both the result of
new priorities and required weapons, and an influence on allocation of R&D and
procurement funds.
The European Union (EU) is an influential international economic force with
both positive (development aid, loans, free-trade agreements, potential membership)
and negative (embargo, tariffs, withdrawal of aid) means of economic influence;
means that are frequently effective in promoting political goals, such as regional
stability, democracy and human rights. However, it has not always proven sufficient
The inability of EU members to present common positions and deal adequately
with the wider and more diverse set of security threats (humanitarian crises, migra-
tion, ethnic conflicts, civil war and various types of terrorist activities) that have
come to dominate after the cold war—wreaking havoc also on the European conti-
nent—has contributed to the ubiquitous idiom of the EU being “an economic giant
but political pygmy.” This has further contributed to criticisms of the paradoxical
nature of the union: striving for a strategic impact on Europe and elsewhere without
any specific strategy; aspiring to be a powerful international actor without aspiring
to become a supra-state; favoring strong Atlantic links, but also autonomous insti-
tutions and even independence; and aspiring to prevent and manage crises without
acquiring the means to do so (Zielonka, 1998a, 11; 1998b). The development of
military capabilities is meant to strengthen the EU’s political and economic clout,
and as America’s longest and closest ally, Europe’s endeavors are of great interest to
policy makers, as well as military personnel in the United States.
Prior to 1998 the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) consisted
largely of rhetoric of future goals, with few common developments or actions and
no military dimension. A consensus among the EU’s largest states in late 1998 trig-
gered febrile activity and intense focus on developing capabilities to carry out EU-
led military and civilian crisis-management operations. The development of the EU
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is intended to strengthen all aspects related to
the security of the EU and enhance its role in international affairs. Notwithstand-
ing some setbacks and remaining problems, this process has come remarkably far
in a very short time, and it continues to deepen and widen. There are now perma-
nent EU military structures, an operational chain of command, and an emerging
Europe-wide military culture; this on a continent where states turned their guns
on each other twice in the last century. The EU has managed to secure a perpetual
peace among its members, and military cooperation will further cement this inte-
gration process.
Enhancing Europe’s military capabilities is thus meant to replace grand rheto-
ric of European aspirations, diminishing discrepancies between declarations and

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   n  Handbook of Military Administration

empirically verifiable assets and skills. The discerning reader will ask why the focus
is on the EU’s military structure, organization and culture rather than individ-
ual member states. After all, Britain, France in particular, but also Spain, Italy,
Poland and Germany all remain respectable military powers, with the first two
capable of carrying out elaborate and extensive military operations around the
world (in addition to possessing nuclear weapons). Furthermore, the EU’s com-
mon decision-making structure that applies to trade, labor and certain areas of
asylum and immigration does not apply to military matters; European countries
remain sovereign on defense and military issues. Most European countries have
large standing armies, some have conscription and several European countries
have large defense industries. However, along with economic and political inte-
gration, common external borders and the dismantling of internal borders, per-
ceived common threats, skyrocketing costs for national defense along with political
resistance to increase defense budgets, and the market-driven consolidation of the
armaments industry, have promoted closer defense cooperation across Europe. The
RMA, which began in the United States in the mid-1990s, has belatedly taken root
throughout Europe, and is furthering the realization that European states cannot
continue undertaking military reforms or operations independently, but need to
cooperate and consolidate resources. This includes everything from R&D to pro-
curement, military training and operations. Based largely on the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) standards (which are based on United States stan-
dards), training procedures are being harmonized, cross-national brigades bearing
the EU flag are in place, and discussions of a future common European army have
gained momentum. As of 2007, there have been several military operations with
pooled multinational resources operating under common EU command.
In Chapter 16, Johan Eliasson looks at the endeavors of the United States’ clos-
est allies and specifically the developing European Union Security and Defense
Policy. The organizational structure, capabilities, operations and nascent European
defense culture are explained, before some of the many remaining challenges in
creating common policies and military standards are highlighted. The European
Security Strategy, a European Security Solidarity Clause, and Military Capability
and Action Plans are signs of real political will to improve military capabilities.
Different military cultures constitute a hurdle in operations. Southern European
military commanders, though skilled in tactics, often assume a laissez-faire attitude
toward strict civilian control over military policy and related protocol, whereas
their Nordic and German peers—due, respectively, to neutrality and constitutional
restrictions on the military up to 1999—have been criticized for displaying the
opposite tendencies, mainly due to their lack of experience with extra-territorial
military operations (Interviews of Military Staff, 2001). The military headquar-
ters in Brussels, Belgium, with its military committees and staff, supported by a
military college, is a significant source of an emerging European security culture,
and European as well as NATO–EU military exercises ensure harmonization of
administrative structures.

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 Introduction  n  

While Eliasson looks at the European level, MaryBeth Peterson Ulrich, in

Chapter 17, looks at reforms and military administration in two EU and NATO
member countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The East Central European
states have faced different obstacles vis-à-vis their Western peers. Following the
demise of the Soviet Union, East European states had to either purge their mili-
tary of corrupt and complacent military staff (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, Poland) or
start from scratch (the Baltic states, Slovak Republic). Reiterating the desire, and
need, for the United States to have close allies in a new and challenging security
environment, the chapter emphasizes the extent to which domestic reforms have
progressed. Although both countries are shown to have undertaken serious reforms
and now contribute to EU and NATO operations, Ulrich argues much remains
to be done—training of officers, creation of specialized units and improving effi-
ciency in civil–military relations. She specifically argues that Slovakia, after many
years of stagnation and lack of political willingness to undertake serious doctrinal,
strategic and organizational reform, in 2001 embarked upon a holistic and radical
reformation process where the end goal is complete interoperability with NATO
military members and organizations by 2010. Recognition of its initial success was
Slovakia’s accession to NATO in 2004, the same year it joined the EU. Slova-
kia continues to have problems organizationally, the Ministry of Defense and the
military’s General Staff still have difficulties working together, even as a new 2005
planning, programming and budgeting system is slowly easing cooperation and
improving efficiency.
The Czech Republic, although admitted to NATO in 1997 (largely for geo-
political reasons), long remained woefully lacking in military preparedness. The
strict hierarchical system left over from the communist era inhibited comprehen-
sive strategic and organizational reform. U.S. Defense Department assessments and
NATO reports gave negative evaluations of Czech capabilities in 2001. This year
the Czechs decided to embark on a restructuring to a smaller and more efficient
military, assisted by American consultants; a reform that has begun improving
bureaucratic efficiency and military capabilities.
Interestingly, reforms in both countries are argued to have been shaped more by
their NATO membership and accompanying action plans than EU’s military inte-
gration. At the same time, both countries have military staff stationed in Brussels,
working alongside other EU and NATO member states’ military staff. As argued
in Eliasson’s chapter (16), the EU’s security ambitions, carried forth in common
military planning and exercises—which are based on NATO’s standards—as
well as the socialization process that occurs in any structured institutional setting
(Checkel, 2001; Pierson, 1996, 2000; Stone-Sweet, Fligstein and Sandholtz, 2001),
will promote further harmonization in all EU states.
Two regions with long histories of American involvement and of contempo-
rary importance are Latin America and Asia. In Chapter 18, Bartosz Stanislawski
explains similarities and differences in the military administration among the major
states in Latin and South America. The chapter’s main focus is on the organization

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   n  Handbook of Military Administration

and culture of the armed forces in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, which
are discussed in detail, but there are also informative sections on other select coun-
tries in both Latin and South America. The main countries of interest were chosen
due to their importance to the United States and their military potential. The return
to democracy in the 1990s throughout the region has meant a normalization of the
military. The armed forces are now mostly under civilian control, with structural
and functional divisions between the branches, and, like many other countries’
forces, peacekeeping has become a main part of many Latin and South American
states’ military duties. At the same time, there are problems of transparency, vis-
ible in reluctance among military officers to have public insight into the military.
The latter is largely a combination of the armed forces having historically been the
most stable and autonomous of state organizations, and, during dictatorial rule,
also one of the most unaccountable. These cultural legacies have hindered more
rapid improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. Stanislawski also notes some of
the peculiarities to the region, one being that armed forces in, for example, Chile
own private companies whose income helps finance arms acquisitions; another that
armed forces take part in law enforcement operations (e.g., in Colombia).
The fastest rising power in the East is China, a nuclear-armed state with the
world’s largest standing army. Hans Stockton, in Chapter 19, provides a compre-
hensive introduction to the military structure, goals and culture of this rapidly
rising Asian power. The RMA “with Chinese characteristics” is a twist on reform
that is of interest to outside analysts, as it helps explain the long-term intentions of
Chinese policy makers, and the problem facing the Chinese military.

References
Checkel, J. 2001, January 11. International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe.
ARENA Working Papers [Online]. www.arena.uiono/publications (Accessed May 1,
2007).
Pierson, Paul. 1996. “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Anal-
ysis,” Comparative Political Studies 29:123–163.
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change,”
Governance 13(4):486–501.
Stone-Sweet, A., N. Fligstein and W. Sandholtz. 2001. The Institutionalization of Europe.
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Zielonka, J. 1998a. Explaining Euro-Paralysis. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Zielonka, J. 1998b. Paradoxes of European Foreign Policies. The Hague: The Kluver Law
International.

DK3629.indb 8 11/1/07 2:25:26 PM

 Chapter 2

Professionals, Bureaucrats
and Citizen Soldiers:
The Countervailing
Patterns of American
Military Administration

Darrell W. Driver

One of the central difficulties in studying military administration is determining

the nature of the thing being studied. That is, in terms of its basic character, what
kind of organization is the military most like? And what kind of work does military
service most resemble? Approaches in the literature have generally provided differ-
ent answers. For one view, the military is a profession. The complexity of military
work in the modern era has resulted in the necessary specialization and profes-
sionalization of military activity, where the development of and proficiency in a
body of “military” expert, abstract knowledge is the sine quo non of success on the
contemporary battlefield (Huntington, 1957, 1963; Snider, Nagl and Pfaff, 1999;
Snider and Watkins, 2000). Others focus on the military’s formal organization
as a large public bureaucracy, with Weberian ideal-typical structures of author-
ity, uniform regulations and defined paths for promotion (Feaver, 1998, 2005).
Finally, still other approaches emphasize the military’s status as a national public

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 10  n  Handbook of Military Administration

institution, highlighting the military’s relationship to the social and political char-
acter of American society (Bachman, Blair, and Segal, 1977; Moskos, 2001). This
chapter critically reviews these three approaches to the study of military organiza-
tions: their differing conceptions of military work, their origins in distinct episodes
of political development and their response to the changing military requirements
of the post-Cold War security environment. In so doing, the following central
arguments are made.
First, each of these models forward differing conceptions of military work, with
diverging interpretations of what constitutes accountability, how best to achieve
effectiveness and on what basis democratic legitimacy might be derived. The pro-
fessional model locates accountability in self-policing internal norms of behavior,
the bureaucratic model in hierarchical principle–agent relationships, and the pub-
lic institutional model in the military’s social and ideological representativeness.
Effectiveness in the professional model is best achieved by granting autonomy
to military professionals to develop means-focused expert knowledge and make
means-based decisions in military operations. Bureaucratic and public institutional
models introduce the subjective and ultimately political nature of measuring effec-
tiveness. In the former, the judgment lies with the principle. In the latter, the judg-
ment is a more complicated process of political contestation and societal validation.
Finally, legitimacy for the military profession is a product of its ability to render
relevant, responsive and effective service to the state client through the application
of expert instrumental knowledge. Bureaucratic renderings find legitimacy more
strictly in the degree of responsiveness of agents to principles down the chain of
command. Expert domains are less important; what matters is the unbroken path
of democratic legitimacy that is achieved by eliminating “shirking” from the prin-
ciple–agent hierarchy. Public institutional models locate the idea of legitimacy in
social representation, the degree of the military’s embeddedness in American soci-
ety, and the military’s fealty to broader national purposes and ideals.
Second, from citizen-soldier traditions of the early republic to neutral profes-
sional and rational organizing impetuses of early twentieth century America, the
present conceptions of military work have their progenitors in important episodes
of American political development and civil–military tradition. Citizen-soldier tra-
ditions underpin public institutional renderings, and the late nineteenth century

 These are pure types that have been combined in various ways. For instance, Peter Feaver
acknowledges the utility of the professional model in examining the changing character of the
“military craft” or in understanding the attitudes and beliefs of those who choose the military
vocation. However, for questions of accountability, Feaver contends that principle-agent mod-
els are required (Feaver, 1996). Among professional approaches, Samuel Huntington (1957)
provides a closed systems approach, arguing that military effectiveness requires insulation
from social influences. Conversely, Morris Janowitz (1971, 1973) understands the military as
an open system, whose effectiveness is dependent on its ability to adapt to social changes and
requirements.

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  11

trends toward centralization, expert authority and rationalization variously inform

present-day professional and bureaucratic approaches.
Third, Cold War patterns of mission certainty, jurisdictional clarity and set-
tled doctrine have been replaced by the expanding military responsibilities of the
post-Cold War period, prompting adjustments and renegotiation in each of these
approaches. Professional conceptions are wrestling with the inability to specify
professional military jurisdiction; bureaucratic understandings are strained by the
increasing potential for agent shirking in more open-ended missions; and public
institutional approaches are closely monitoring a military that is smaller, more
technology centric—and by some accounts—less connected to American society.
Finally, and most importantly, no single model completely accounts for the
often countervailing expectations and requirements in which the military finds
itself fully enmeshed. The tensions this poses for military public servants, how-
ever, may be unavoidable, given the cross pressures of accountability, the political
nature of effectiveness, and the multiple criteria for legitimacy American democ-
racy requires of its military.

The Military as a Profession: The Rise and

Struggles of Autonomous Professionalism
“The modern officer corps,” according to Samuel Huntington (1957, 7), “is a pro-
fessional body and the modern military officer a professional man.” For Hunting-
ton, this meant more than the common language distinction between professionals
(those who were full-time practitioners of an occupation, usually for pay) and ama-
teurs (those who only dabbled in the occupational tasks, usually unpaid). It was
taken to describe a “special type of vocation” or “higher calling” that made its
members distinct from other vocations. This, of course, was a normative claim of
special social worth, which Huntington rooted in the relatively static criteria of
expertise, corporateness and responsibility (Huntington, 1957, 8). In his explana-
tion, expertise was derived from extended education and experience in a significant
area of human endeavor. Corporateness implied a consciousness of unity among
the practitioners as distinct from the laypersons in society. Finally, responsibility
meant the use of expertise and corporate consciousness in ways that are broadly
beneficial to society, such that misuse results in the loss of the professional moniker.
This latter criterion sought to answer the longstanding problem of civilian control
and democratic legitimacy by defining the problem away. A professional military
could be counted on to remain responsive to civilian authority, and the profes-
sionalism of the military depended on autonomy within a clear “management of
violence” jurisdiction. A civil–military bargain was, thus, forwarded: in exchange
for military professional autonomy, the military would yield goal-setting and ends-
based decisions to civilian authorities. In this way, the military professional ideal

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 12  n  Handbook of Military Administration

was both a model for the development of a more effective military and a theory of
democratic civil–military relations.
There are, perhaps, no claims more central to twentieth century American
civil–military relations and professional officer self-concepts than these. With
Huntington as their most cogent advocate, what he labels the “objective theory”
of civil–military relations was, in essence, an affirmation of the politics–admin-
istration dichotomy emerging from Progressive Era development of the American
administrative state. Indeed, as historians trace the roots of American military pro-
fessionalism to their beginnings, the power of Progressive Era arguments for the
clear division of political and administrative function looms large in the American
military professionalization story. The argument, according to Progressive reform-
ers like Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow and Herbert Croly, was that assigning
administrators “clear cut responsibility […would] insure trustworthiness” (Wilson,
1887), and that rational efficient governance in the new administrative state meant
that democracy would work on Election Day. From the results, the elected repre-
sentatives would determine the will of the state. That will had then to be carried
out in a neutral, efficient and professional manner in order for the democratic loop
to be completed. As Frank Goodnow put it:

Political functions group themselves naturally under two heads, which

are equally applicable to the mental operations and the operations of
self conscious personalities. That is, the action of the state as a political
entity consists either in operations necessary to the expression of its
will, or in operations necessary to the execution of the will. (Goodnow,
2003, 9)

Contemporary military reformers, like Army Colonel Emory Upton and Sec-
retary of War Elihu Root, were not isolated from these new arguments (Karsten,
1972; Gates, 1980; Skowronek, 1982). Military reformers of the Upton and Root
ilk—what Peter Karsten called “armed progressives”—sought to carve out a sphere
of professional jurisdiction that would protect military autonomy from political
encroachment (Karsten, 1972). This civil–military dichotomy viewed the political
and military domains as separate spheres of action where elected civilian leaders
could simply prescribe a goal and neutral military experts would decide on the
means to accomplish that goal. As Elihu Root would remark of important 1903
War Department reforms and the question of military responsibility and civilian
control:

It will be perceived that we are providing for civilian control over the
military arm, but for civilian control to be exercised through a single
military expert of high rank, who is provided with an adequate corps of
professional assistants to aid him in the performance of his duties, and

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  13

who is bound to use all of his professional skill and knowledge in giv-
ing effect to the purposes and general directions of his civilian superior,
or make way for another expert who will do so. In this way it is hoped
that the problem of reconciling civilian control with military efficiency
with which we have been struggling for so many years will be solved.
(Root, 1903, 258)

Thus, as military professionalization could be founded on a separate sphere of mili-

tary expertise, citizen-soldier traditions that emphasized civil–military merging
saw their first effective challenge.
The most interesting aspect, however, of the politics-administration dichotomy
and its corollary the civil–military dichotomy is not so much their dual births in
Progressive Era administrative orthodoxy, but the post-World War II demise of
the former and strengthening of the latter. No sooner had the argument for a clear
administrative–political separation reached its high-water mark in the 1937 Report
of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (popularly referred to
as the Brownlow Report, for committee chairman Louis Brownlow), observers of
American public administration began leveling fundamental criticisms at the pros-
pect of a clearly defined and apolitical administrative domain (e.g. Appleby, 1945,
1949; Long, 1949; Fesler, 1974; Mosher, 1982; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).
Herbert Simon and Dwight Waldo typified the range of these assaults. Intent
on instilling in the social sciences the same rigor that characterized the physical
sciences, Simon (1947) criticized the existing principles of politics–administra-
tion separation as being empirically unfounded. He labeled the “scientific” prin-
ciples that were supposed to guide neutral administrative experts as little more
than contradictory aphorisms that must be discarded if administration was ever to
achieve true scientific rigor. Leveling more fundamental attacks on the orthodoxy,
Dwight Waldo (1948) dismissed beliefs in distinct jurisdictions for administrative
and political decision making, arguing that all administrative action was funda-
mentally political. The belief that neutral experts could simply execute the will of
elected officeholders according to a set of scientific principles that yielded “one best
way” was fallacious. As administrative decisions inevitably reflect normative com-
mitments, the hope of justifying a new scientific public administration as separate
from politics and deserving of insulated autonomy within a given jurisdiction was

 Here again, note the similarity between the language employed by the Brownlow Report and
that of Elihu Root in his 1903 efforts to justify the consolidation of army control with the
newly created Army General Staff: The effectiveness of the executive assistant positions “in
assisting the president will, we think, be directly proportional to their ability to discharge
their functions with restraint … They should be men in whom the president has personal con-
fidence and whose character and attitude is such that they would not attempt to exercise power
on their own account. They should be possessed of high competence, great physical vigor, and
a passion for anonymity.” (emphasis added) (Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick, 1937)

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 14  n  Handbook of Military Administration

not reconcilable with democratic principles. Determination of public policy could

not be held as conceptually or practically distinct from the execution of that pol-
icy. Nevertheless, as a vibrant assault on the established administrative orthodoxy
unfolded in the broader field of American public administration, mid-twentieth
century military professionalism became increasingly defined by the separation
assumptions.
By the time Samuel Huntington (1957) had reworked separation assumptions
into a comprehensive theory of military professionalism and civil–military rela-
tions, Cold War circumstances had lent clarity to the military’s functional domain
in ways unparalleled by earlier periods of American military history. Nation build-
ing and constabulary missions on the American frontier were long since gone, so
too were policing missions in the Philippines, Cuba, and on the Mexican–Ameri-
can Border and domestic recovery missions, like the running of the New Deal’s
Civilian Conservation Corps (Killegrew, 1960; Wong and Johnson, 2002). In their
place, the army, in particular, prepared for the looming task of sustained combat
operations in a large-scale conflict, probably against the Soviet Union and prob-
ably on the plains of Europe. Never before had the army’s functional jurisdiction
been so clearly specified. It was a clarity that fit well with civil–military dichotomy
assumptions. It was also one that would not survive the end of the Cold War and
the subsequent proliferation of military missions beginning to challenge the mili-
tary’s separation orthodoxy.
By the end of the Cold War, military professional self-concepts rested firmly on
the idea of a unique realm of military expertise over which military professionals
exercised near-complete means-focused autonomy. Nevertheless, as the post-Cold
War years got underway, a central difficulty for the existing model was in defining
exactly what military professional expertise and jurisdiction should entail. Charles
Moskos and his co-authors count fifty-four military operations carried out by West-
ern countries between 1991 and 1999 (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000). The
United States contribution alone includes such tasks as drug interdiction, restoring
domestic order, peacekeeping, infrastructure development, disaster relief and rescu-
ing foreign nationals, along with traditional combat operations. The static model of
military professionals operating exclusively in the management of violence sphere
would have to be revised.
For this revision, research on military professionalism turned to the sociology of
professions for a more dynamic, constructivist account of professional jurisdictional
change and stasis (Snider, Watkins, and Matthews, 2002; Snider and Matthews,
2005). In the rendering adopted from Andrew Abbott (1988), professions compete
for jurisdictional sovereignty, control over expert knowledge and, as a result, social
legitimacy. The lesson was that the military, like other professions, needed to secure
its jurisdictional boundaries and control the attendant expert knowledge; at the
same time, it must ensure that this jurisdiction does not become inflexible and irrel-
evant. Professional success, then, depends on the ability to maintain jurisdictional
control over client-relevant expert knowledge, not simply expert knowledge alone.

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  15

Though the “turf war” model of professions has helped the Army to think about
the ways in which its professional jurisdiction is changing and might change in
the future, it continues to embrace the orthodox lexicon of boundaries and juris-
dictions at a time when such clarity appears increasingly unlikely. Changes have
extended military responsibilities into areas where other organizations are carrying
out similar and overlapping efforts. Internally, the military has been called on to
exhibit greater interservice integration in missions where old service jurisdictions
are increasingly blurred (Thie et al., 2005). Externally, the call for greater inter-
agency and multinational cooperation (Clark, 2001), increased competition from
the private sector (Avant, 2005) and the overlapping efforts of nongovernmental
and governmental organizations have all served to confuse the lines of military
responsibility (Weiss, 1999).
The separate model of military professionalism, thus, forces the military
to decide between stark alternatives when it considers future military roles and
responsibilities. First, it can resist acceptance of missions outside of some clearly
delineated military sphere. This risks rendering the profession irrelevant to the
security needs of the state, which increasingly calls on the military for an expand-
ing list of nontraditional tasks. Or, second, the military can expand the scope of its
jurisdiction to include all of the potential tasks that might be required. The latter
has been the tact of recent army doctrine that calls for embracing “the full range of
military operations across the spectrum of conflict, from sustained land dominance
in wartime to supporting civil authorities during natural disasters and consequence
management” (Department of the Army Headquarters, 2001). The problem with
this approach, as Richard Lacquement worries, is that it provides “limited practical
utility as a doctrine for a profession. It glosses over too much. It lacks boundaries”
(2005, 214). Without clear boundaries, the worry is that specifying even abstract
bodies of knowledge is not possible. The goal, then, has been to try and strike a
balance between overly narrow and overly broad conceptions of military jurisdic-
tion and its attendant expert knowledge. Here, an error too far in either direction
could result in military officers being “seen either as irrelevant to the needs of the
policy-maker, or as having dubious professional credibility” (Nielsen, 2001, 219).
In the end, the military’s continued inability to settle on a defined and manageable
set of boundaries for its professional jurisdiction has posed a central challenge for
the future of the military profession. It is a challenge that may yet untether future
military professional models from the conceptual moorings of strict civil–military
dichotomy assumptions.
For instance, as task differentiation and jurisdictional permeability across
the security continuum have rendered boundary concepts problematic, the army
has begun to resort to doctrinal language that emphasizes expertise as clusters of
abstract knowledge within which there exist certain core competencies (Fields et
al., 2005). It has also begun focusing professional military education on problem-
solving skills, creativity and adaptability, where solutions to problems can take a
variety of forms (McCausland and Martin, 2001; Shelton, 2001). Moreover, because

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stability missions generally take place in areas already populated with a dense set of
organizational actors, the need to cultivate professional knowledge on the method
and terms of interchange with other actors has become a concern of increasing
importance. This has precipitated calls to emphasize joint service and interagency
and traditional intraservice career-path experience as equally important compo-
nents of military professional development (Thie et al., 2005).
In sum, as the merging of political, civil and military functions along with
the simultaneous trend toward the outsourcing and subcontracting of traditional
military tasks have confounded concepts of a civil–military dichotomy and juris-
dictional claim staking, the military has struggled to develop an accurate under-
standing of its professional responsibilities and the required scope of its professional
knowledge. In practice—if not in theory—the army in particular has moved farther
from the idea of professional boundary setting toward a more integrative concep-
tion of the management of violence spectrum. To borrow the professional analogy
forwarded by Dingwall and King (1995, 21), military professionals are becoming
less like border guards, concerned with “the rights of an occupation to a piece
of territory defined by division of labor,” and more like customs agents, focused
on “the terms that govern interchanges among occupational groups and between
them.” Though this analogy offers a more accurate reflection of the military’s
evolving role vis-à-vis the management of violence field, it falls short of providing
the clear delegation of responsibility required, if the professional model is to fulfill
the dual role as a theory of democratic civilian control of the military. It is increas-
ingly difficult to describe democratic legitimacy or civilian control of the military
as dependent on “a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities”
(Huntington, 1957, 163). It is a distinction that has always been under some mea-
sure of scrutiny (Feaver, 1995), but, in an era of task differentiation, porous jurisdic-
tions, and “operations across the spectrum of conflict” (Department of the Army
Headquarters, 2001), the hope that professional boundaries alone might define the
civil–military relationship appears particularly misplaced.

The Military as a Public Bureaucracy:

Rational Structures and Principle Agents
When asked to comment on the application of the competitive professional model
to the U.S. Army, Andrew Abbott responded with some degree of skepticism, argu-
ing that “thinking about [the army] chiefly as a profession involved in jurisdictional

 Robert Dingwall and Michael King challenge Andrew Abbott’s conception of professions as
vying for jurisdictional control based on the writing of the British sociologist Herbert Spen-
cer. According to Dingwall and King, Spencer’s theory of professional development is a more
accurate reflection of the task differentiation and specialization that characterize industrial
development (Dingwall and King, 1995).

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  17

adventures (over who controls traditional combat, unconventional war, and

MOOTW [Military Operations other Than War]) may really capture only a tiny
portion of the systems of environing relations that govern it” (Abbott, 2002, 534).
Abbott’s concern pushes us to see that the military, though displaying many of the
characteristics of a profession, is not wholly like the more archetypical professions
of law and medicine. To begin with, the military is embedded in the structure of
the democratic state, and taking stock of this structure provides a new lens through
which to understand the nature of military work and its relationship to important
questions of accountability and democratic legitimacy. Rather than simply a client
to whom professional services are rendered, this approach brings the state back into
the discussion in a much more comprehensive way. According to Robert Dingwall
and Michael King (1995, 21), this is a fundamental flaw in the competitive juris-
dictional model, a model that “appears uncertain as to where the state as an actor
stands in relation to the ‘system of professions’: is it in the system, intervening in the
interactions among professional groups, or is it part of the environment to which
the system accommodates itself?”
The military is unique among professions for its dual status as a large public
bureaucracy. As early twentieth century reforms embraced concepts of specializa-
tion and distinct expertise endemic to what one historian labeled the “culture of
professionalism” (Bledstein, 1976), a host of structural reforms would begin to
replace an army system of divided command and fragmented bureau responsibility
with more rational, hierarchical chains of accountability (Skowronek, 1982). For
instance, the 1903 consolidation of army senior command functions under the
General Staff mimicked commission-style centralization efforts that had become
popular in other aspects of government, including the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC), the Civil Service Commission, the Federal Trade Commission,
and the Bureau of Efficiency (Weigley, 1969; Rohr, 1986). The same reforms that
meritized military promotion and assignments in ways that made professionalism
possible also vested the new system in a bureaucratic organization with patterns of
accountability and responsibility inconsistent with typical professional renderings.
As Don Snider observed, “the continuous challenge for the strategic leaders of the
army profession, at least since the latter years of the nineteenth century when the
army professionalized, has been to keep these two internal natures in proper pro-
portion” (2005, 13).
The differences in the organizational patterns are significant. Thinking of the
military as a profession invites focusing on the military’s career-long training in a
body of abstract knowledge, internal ethical controls, service orientation and fidu-
ciary responsibility to the client. Control is largely internal, including the decisions
to compete for a particular span of functional jurisdiction. However, when one
considers the military bureaucracy in which the profession is embedded, control
becomes a function of hierarchical structure, with administrative and regulatory
uniformity institutionalized in routinized tasks, hierarchical regimentation and
rationalized processes.

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 18  n  Handbook of Military Administration

The tensions between these two divergent understandings are particularly

apparent in the military’s post-Cold War struggle to redefine its basic missions and
responsibility. Ironically, the Cold War mission certainty that clarified professional
jurisdiction also pulled the military closer to the bureaucratic pole. Mission cer-
tainty offered the ability to routinize professional knowledge and rationalize collec-
tive and individual task lists to ever finer degrees of specificity (Blackwell, 2001). The
fear was that as knowledge became less abstract it also became less adaptable. What
was termed the “McDonaldization” of the military function threatened to under-
mine the ability of the military to respond to the changing nature of post-Cold War
missions (Hajjar and Ender, 2005), prompting Snider and his colleagues to call for
a recommitment to professionalization over bureaucratization. The military was, in
another sense, caught in a jurisdictional dilemma: Specified jurisdictions promised
professional autonomy over expert knowledge, but these well-defined jurisdictions
also made possible a rationalization of function that threatened to replace that
very professional autonomy with an ever-thickening rule- and task-based doctrine.
Indeed, one of the lessons of military training transformation over the last decade
and a half seems to be that its professional character—far from being threatened by
jurisdictional uncertainty—requires at least some measure of it. The alternative is
a regimentation of work more reflective of bureaucratic than professional patterns
of administration.
The bureaucratic aspect of military organization also presents a different model
of democratic accountability and legitimacy. If in the professional model the mili-
tary is accountable for its fulfillment of broad civilian policy goals (operating within
broad professional boundaries), a bureaucratic model relies more on the transmis-
sion of authority, directives and, subsequently, legitimacy down the chain from the
National Command Authority to the individual soldier. In this vein, Peter Feaver
argues that a principle-agent typology of the military’s role vis-à-vis civilian leaders
provides more definite lines of authority, particularly in areas where jurisdictional
clarity is unachievable (Feaver, 1998, 2005). He avoids problematic reliance on an
autonomous professional domain by focusing “on the interaction of political actors
played out in the specific institutional setting of government” (2005, 10).
Though this gets around the difficulty of professional boundary setting, it
invites many of the typical public sector principle-agent concerns. For instance, as
mission ambiguity increases so does the potential for shirking on the part of the
military agents. Stability, post-conflict support, nation-building, and peacekeep-
ing operations may offer extreme examples of the kind of problems public sector
principles in general face in the principle-agent typology (Moe, 1984): How does
one monitor the performance of an agent when common market metrics like profit
are not present (Ingraham, 1995; Ingraham and Moynihan, 2000)? Because effec-
tiveness rather than efficiency is often the more pressing goal of military missions
(Snider and Watkins, 2000), how does one judge military effectiveness in opera-
tions with overlapping jurisdictions where multiple agents (and a number of third-
party organizations) share responsibilities toward common objectives? Moreover,

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  19

like the larger United States public service, the military is faced with competing
principles at the highest levels of government. When goals are not agreed upon by
executive and legislative principles or when they emerge as overly abstract, how
does one judge the performance of the military agent? In short, principle-agent
theory helps to clarify aspects of top-down accountability in the military as a public
bureaucratic institution without relying on the internal self-policing of the profes-
sional model. However, given the ambiguity surrounding the “military” domain,
the information asymmetry that often exists between military agents and civilian
principles, and the inability to clearly specify and then measure progress toward
agreed upon ends, the principle-agent theory alone falls short of a final, compre-
hensive accounting.
The inability of agency theory’s bureaucratic lens to offer this final account-
ing is similar to the reasons that the professional model at last proves incomplete:
It cannot fully address the enmeshment of the military in the American political
system, a system that variously calls on the military to be both an adaptable profes-
sion and a disciplined bureaucracy. The reasons one conception might emerge as
dominant in any particular episode of political contestation are many. For instance,
siding with the professional model may stem from the fact that information asym-
metry between civilian principles and military agents can be high, particularly in
more ambiguous stability and support operations. This can create high levels of
slack within the principle-agent chain, whereby civilian principles are hindered in
their ability to judge performance. The internal ethical controls of the professional
model can augment strict principle-agent accountability chains where effectiveness
is difficult to monitor. In a, perhaps, more troubling example, political contestation
might lead to the emphasis of autonomous professional renderings over strict prin-
ciple-agent chains when it serves politically expedient goals. Employing rhetoric
that consigns “military” operations to a separate, nonpolitical sphere of professional
jurisdiction can serve the political goal of insulating selected operations from the
full scope of political debate. Conversely, the record is replete with occasions where
political actors directed the smallest details of military operations when profes-
sional advice was either not trusted or determined insufficient to deal with the grav-
ity of the larger geo-strategic situation. The point in these last two instances is that
the basic decision as to which organizational model should be employed can itself
be fundamentally linked to basic incentives in the realm of political contestation,
highlighting the need for professional autonomy in one instance and bureaucratic
discipline in the next. This, of course, further confounds attempts to settle on any
one understanding of military organizations.

 Citing Lincoln’s overriding of General George McClellan’s strategic decisions, Franklin Roos-
evelt’s “meddling during World War II,” and John F. Kennedy’s establishment of a direct line
to the commander of the American convoy sent to Berlin upon completion of the Berlin Wall,
Peter Feaver argues that jurisdictional military sovereignty has routinely been ignored, even to
the lowest levels of tactical military operations (Feaver, 1995).

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 20  n  Handbook of Military Administration

What the professional model and the bureaucratic models each highlight, then,
are aspects of the military’s multifaceted nature. Barbara Romzek and Patricia Wal-
lace Ingraham describe this multicharacter enmeshment as “a complicated web of
overlapping accountability relationships that reflect both internal and external con-
trol strategies” (Romzek and Ingraham, 2000, 7). Attempts at more parsimonious
theories focus on one of these strategies to the detriment of the others. The fact that
military leaders manage “under conditions of multiple accountability systems …
[and] work for multiple masters” (Romzek and Ingraham, 2000, 7), however, means
that neither alone can fully describe the nature of military work or the full range of
accountability systems in which that work is practiced. The discussion to this point
has centered on the tension arising from the competing military administrative pat-
terns emerging from twentieth century trends toward an at once more professional
model of military service and a more linear military bureaucracy. There is, as yet,
an older and still persistent conception of the military as an interdependent public
institution that must be considered before concluding.

Article I.  The Military as a Public Institution:

The Long Shadow of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal
“Foundings,” according to John Rohr (1986), “are normative.” They create the pub-
lic life and lend it meaning; they provide the grammar and standards for legitimacy
in the subsequent life of the political community. The American military system
owes its founding to the citizen-soldier tradition, to the belief that broad social rep-
resentation is the cornerstone of military accountability and effective civil–military
relations. The authors of the Federalist Papers took great pains to link the more
centralized military system set out in the Constitution to the broader citizen-sol-
dier ideal, evidenced in Publius’s rhetorical “where in the name of common sense
are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our
fellow citizens?” (Madison, Hamilton and Jay, 1982, 154). As John Pocock (1975,
410–415) observed, the American republican tradition offered safeguards against
tyranny through “the property and independence of the people in arms,” and as
Stephen Skowronek added, the founders’ answer to the civil–military dilemma was
to create “a military force that could not act against liberty without destroying
itself” (1982, 86). Even as the pace of military professionalization quickened in
the early twentieth century, the conviction that the army should remain connected
across its breadth and depth to “the thoughts and feelings of the civil fireside from
which it had come” persisted (Baker, 1920, 8–9).
Today, we see the echoes of this concern in an eclectic array of approaches
that seek to understand the relationship between United States society and its
armed forces. For these approaches, the military is a broad public institution whose
health is dependent on its connections to its parent society. Likewise, the successes

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  21

and failures of societies can be measured in the face of its military. Indeed, much
of American military administrative history might be understood as a struggle
between these concepts of social-institutional interdependence and emergent efforts
towards a more distinct and separate military system. Though concepts like neu-
tral expertise, means-oriented autonomy and top-down hierarchical accountability
have at various points predominated, there has, nevertheless, remained a persistent
call for lateral military accountability through social representation and ideological
connectedness (Janowitz, 1971; Bachman, Blair, and Segal, 1977; Moskos, 2001).
In short, as a component of accountability, a source of democratic legitimacy, and
a means of fostering a shared national purpose, the citizen-soldier ideal has been a
resilient aspect of the American military system.
It is, perhaps, a gross understatement to say that the scope and scale of repre-
sentation has been a central topic of debate for democratic theory in the age of the
administrative state. The question has stemmed largely from the concept of division
of labor and to what degree (in an industrializing, specializing and professionaliz-
ing society) democratic control can, or ought to, be separated from policy means.
Many early proponents of a politics–administration dichotomy saw the burgeon-
ing confidence in scientific forms of knowledge as building a case for a separate
instrumental knowledge of government administration. In this way, separating the
inefficiencies of democracy from administration was both necessary and, because
of the objective rightness of scientific knowledge, democratically legitimate. The
advent of “military science,” according to James Burk, was part and parcel of this
attempt to locate some aspects of governance in other than politically derived
sources. Accordingly, Burk finds in subsequent attention to science’s “non-rational
social factors”—forwarded by those like Thomas Kuhn (1962)—the seeds of a mili-
tary legitimacy deficit (Burk, 2002a). If, as Robert Dahl (1989, 68) has argued,
the “difficult questions are not about ends [but] means” and the execution of such
means is influenced as much by normative commitments as objective neutrality,
the idea that foreign policy means can be assigned to an unrepresentative expert
military few is rendered troublesome for questions of democratic legitimacy. This
may be of particular concern in a foreign policy era that Stanley Hoffman (2003, 1)
argues gives “military might … pride of place among all the kinds of [state] power.”
Thus, the often-used “postmodern military” moniker reflects more than just a new
era of mission uncertainty and jurisdictional permeability; it implies a criticism of
the very foundation of claims for an objective, instrumental and means-focused
military knowledge (Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, 1999; Snider, 2000). Although all
professions have had to contend with these trends to various degrees, the public

 Here, Burk draws on Thomas Kuhn’s criticism of the linear objective model of scientific evo-
lution. As Kuhn’s argument for a more social view of science began to take hold, the idea
that “military science” could be socially or politically independent became more problematic
(Kuhn, 1962).

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 22  n  Handbook of Military Administration

nature of military service and the significant implications that accompany military
action have posed particularly pressing questions of legitimacy.
One recurring answer to these trends has been to match the functional merging
of the civilian and military responsibilities with a concomitant imperative of broad
social representation in the military services, to reinvest in a social rather than a
separate “objective” basis for military legitimacy (Moskos, 2001). Looking to the
broader public service, Samuel Krislof states the argument as such: “The public
sector has explicit need for extrinsic validation … no matter how brilliantly con-
ceived, no matter how artfully contrived, government action usually also requires
societal support. And one of the oldest methods of securing such support is to draw
a wide segment of society into the government” (2003, 23). Going further, Morris
Janowitz worries (contra-Huntington) that social isolation in the form of an “officer
and enlisted body markedly unrepresentative of civilian society” could produce an
“inbred force which would hold deep resentment toward the civilian society and
accordingly develop … ‘extremist’ political ideology” (Janowitz, 1971, liii). A recent
upsurge of literature is replete with these kinds of concerns, labeling the perceived
civil–military social and ideological separation as a “great divorce” (Hadley, 1986),
a “civil–military gap” (Feaver and Kohn, 2001), or military members themselves
as strangers “on American soil” (Ricks, 1996). Janowitz, for one, recommended
addressing this predicted separation through a variety of ameliorative measures,
including educating all military academy cadets for one year at a civilian university,
the development of shorter career options for military officers, lateral entry into
mid-level officer ranks, more emphasis on the officer candidate school commission-
ing source and, most importantly, the avoidance of military “intellectual isolation
from the main current of American university life” (Janowitz, 1971, liv). These
types of prescriptions are perhaps predictable. If legitimacy founded on expertise
in a separate field of instrumental knowledge is at least contestable, socially derived
legitimacy becomes more important. This was the basic solution of the citizen-sol-
dier tradition well before concepts of profession and instrumental knowledge in a
separate military sphere arose.
Of course, this approach, too, has not been without criticism, which has gener-
ally focused on the dual concerns of accountability and effectiveness. Samuel Hun-
tington argues that social representation, as a method for the “subjective control” of
the military, is not well defined (1957, 85). Clear accountability, it may be argued,
requires measures of functional responsiveness rather than simple reliance on socio-
logical diversity. Huntington understands the emergence of the military profession,
with its internal ethical controls and clear division of responsibility, as bringing

 Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn make similar recommendations in the conclusion to their
2001 survey of social, political and cultural attitudes of civilian elites and military officers,
ultimately determining that “the views of the military officers we surveyed are much more
conservative than those of the civilian elite, but not more so than the general public” (Feaver
and Kohn, 2001, 459).

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  23

this clarity. Peter Feaver (2005), ironically, indicts Huntington for many of the
same errors in clarity. Functional separation not being possible, Feaver prefers more
precise statements of institutional hierarchical control as the only means of discov-
ering exogenous criteria for accountability. The basic criticism, as the term “subjec-
tive civilian control” implies, is that social representation fails to define precisely
the accountability relationship between elected representatives and the appointed
leaders of the military. Both the professional and bureaucratic models purport to
address this deficiency.
A second primary criticism of social representation is that the requirement
undermines military effectiveness. Samuel Huntington saw it as destroying the
idea of professional autonomy so important for modern armies. Others have, more
pointedly, questioned the feasibility of broad representation in a smaller, more tech-
nologically reliant and skill-intensive armed forces (Cohen, 2001). To be sure, the
idea that the majority of a population can expect to see military service in a mass
citizen army appears impracticable in the technology-centric contemporary armed
forces.
Nevertheless, proponents of social representation focus on the value of diversity
in military formations where problem solving and the application of increasingly
abstract knowledge have replaced mission certainty, defined task lists, and clear
performance measures. As Mady Wechsler Segal and Chris Bong argue, “With
the increasing variety of missions and tasks within the army, the organization and
units within it are most effective when they are composed of people with different
strengths” (2005, 708). The convergence of civil–military tasks tends to question
rather than confirm the need for isolated military training and education. That is,
as the military’s jurisdiction is increasingly defined by functional permeability, it is
difficult to justify the need for a personnel management system that is not equally
permeable, particularly with respect to areas of shared expertise. Moreover, advo-
cates of maintaining a more representative and socially diverse military point to the
independent benefits of such a force. That is, to have an army that looks like the
general citizenry may hold some independent social and democratic worth separate
from its capacity to function as a stand-alone accountability system or increase
problem-solving effectiveness.
Though the public institutional rendering brings to the foreground different
answers to the persistent arguments over effectiveness, accountability and demo-
cratic legitimacy, its greatest divergence is best seen in its more robust understand-
ing of the role of the military in a democratic society. Understanding the military
as a national public institution requires careful attention to the myriad social rela-
tionships in which it is embedded. As such, military organizations and patterns
of civil–military relations are both a dependent and an independent variable for
societal change. For instance, early citizen-soldier arguments that linked military
service and citizen virtue saw the military as both dependent on and fostering that
virtue. Similarly, later-day proponents like Morris Janowitz argued that the mili-
tary be a component of a broader national service regime that would link individual

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 24  n  Handbook of Military Administration

citizens to national and, perhaps increasingly, transnational purposes. In James

Burk’s description of these arguments that “[military] service demonstrated and
enhanced one’s citizenship and fulfilling the obligation improved democratic life”
(Burk, 2002b).
Other observers have focused on the degree to which these obligations and
expectations have shaped the boundaries and conceptions of citizenship. Claire
Snyder (1999) describes citizenship in the civic-republican rendering as a perfor-
matively constructed status, linked irrevocably to military service. For both Snyder
and Linda Kerber (1998), the gender-dependent opportunity for military service
has had a negative effect on women’s citizenship rights. Ron Krebs suggests that
military policies—the result of political contestation—are important collective
symbols for what constitutes community inclusion, arguing further that “the field
of civil–military relations is far richer than the classic matter of who guards the
guardians, and it should properly be understood as encompassing a wider range
of questions about the relationship between the armed forces, the polity, and the
populace” (Krebs, 2004). Professional and bureaucratic models of the military, by
contrast, have often sought to separate and study singular aspects of its organi-
zational character, with little attention to its importance as a national institution
firmly embedded in debates over the nature of democracy and the boundaries of
political community.

Conclusion
Changing patterns of civil–military relations and military administrative forms have
yielded a United States military that is, as Andrew Abbott described, “enmeshed in
many different ‘ecologies’” (2002, 534). In themes, if not in grammar, this develop-
ment and enmeshment are not unlike those experienced by the broader public sec-
tor. Founding state-builders sought a sociological merging of the civil and military,
and early institutional military forms of divided army bureau control mirrored
larger power divisions and checks in the fragmented American government (Skow-
ronek, 1982). Early twentieth century reforms were bent on adjusting both of these
earlier patterns. Sociological merging could be replaced with neutral professionals
and fragmented bureau control with a greater measure of organizational centraliza-
tion. This developmental legacy continues to define conceptions of the military’s
role and identity. As a producing organization whose product is state protection,
the military is variously described and treated as both a profession and a bureau-
cracy. The military’s public institutional nature reveals a much more sociopoliti-
cally embedded organization, one that both reflects and influences the values of the
larger political community. Here the military’s role is not simply state protection,
but the sustainment of democratic values and practices.
Of course, each of these three conceptions describes various aspects of military
work and organization. The professional model has provided the military with a

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 Professionals, Bureaucrats and Citizen Soldiers  n  25

grammar for a system of ethical controls and service orientation. This decreases the
likelihood of shirking in the principle-agent paradigm and makes possible a system
of intrinsic status and service rewards for its members, improving the military’s
ability to recruit talented leadership. Additionally, the professional model has cre-
ated room for the internal development of professional knowledge and fostered
initiative and experimentation in areas where set procedures are confounded by
new and unique circumstances. Nevertheless, clear lines of authority, established
administrative procedures, definite paths for promotion, and uniform regulations
make the military organizationally possible. These ideal-typical bureaucratic pat-
terns lend unity of effort and synchronization capacity in ways that loose profes-
sional membership alone cannot. They also formalize the military’s mandate to
remain responsive to the national elected leadership. Finally, the citizen-soldier
emphasis on broad social representation continues to be forwarded as a critical
component of military legitimacy in a diverse democratic polity. As functional
demands on the military increasingly puncture Cold War jurisdictional bound-
aries and the distinction between the civil and the military grows more obscure,
legitimacy founded on neutral expertise in a defined area of responsibility appears
less compelling. Future military legitimacy, then, may again rely as much on who
the military is as what it does.
Deciphering post-Cold War changes in military administration, then, requires
a broader eye than those focused exclusively on the military’s internal efforts to
match organization and administration to new emerging technologies and threats.
How these changes are interpreted by the political system has important implica-
tions for whether the military might become more of a public profession, more of
a public bureaucracy, or debated more forthrightly as a socially embedded public
institution. The real concern, however, may not be that these sometimes conflicting
natures will continue to create tensions in the military organization. Perhaps, the real
concern for a democratic military is that the debates will settle on some means for
organizing military work that forecloses the public nature of the debate altogether.
The market as a means for organizing military work is an approach that has not
been discussed much to this point. However, the political advantages of outsourc-
ing military risks and distancing political decisions from the vagaries and potential
burdens of war are great. A privatized military force could well escape enmeshment
in the disparate systems of accountability and means of interpreting effectiveness
discussed to this point. However, as Deborah Avant (2005, 3) queries, “How does
the private security affect the ability to contain the use of force within the political
process and social norms?” And, in the vein of the present discussion, how should
we think about democratic legitimacy for such a force? In addition to reinvigorat-
ing old disputes, the unsettled nature of our current debates over the organization
of military work has opened new—potentially troubling—possibilities.
Finally, it is increasingly popular in critical reviews of this sort to call for a new
theory of civil–military relations (Burk, 2002b), one that could, for the present topic
of concern, reconcile the competing natures of military work and administration.

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 26  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Though I, too, would offer my hope that such a theory might yet synthesize these
often countervailing patterns into a conceptual whole, of greater interest is the way
in which the political system continues to embrace each of these patterns: empha-
sizing the professional responsibility of the military at some points, highlighting
the need for bureaucratic responsiveness at other points and stressing its public
institutional obligations at yet others. Americans seem, at once, to want their mili-
tary to be all of these things. Though these competing natures have and will con-
tinue to create tensions in military organizations, it is not clear that a democracy
should be altogether willing to give this up.

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 Chapter 3

Military Administration
1850–1900

Heidi Amelia-Anne Weber

As this phase of military history commenced (1850–1900), the army was preoc-
cupied with the safeguarding of the western acquisitions and the protection of the
settlers in these lands from native threats (Report of the Secretary of War, 1850). In
the wake of the defeat of our bordering neighbors in the Mexican–American War,
the administrative efforts of the military shifted focus. With the close of the cen-
tury, America had emerged as a world power with the effective defeat of the Spanish
on the field of battle (Annual Report of the War Department, 1900). Though the
United States remained engaged in the suppression of an insurrection in the Philip-
pines, this new found status would help to usher in yet another phase of adminis-
trative changes. Through the years 1850 to 1900, military administration met with
unique challenges. The United States engaged not only in her solitary experience
of a Civil War and the aftermath of reconstructing the nation into a whole once
again, as well as defeating foreign powers, but also brought to rest an issue that had
plagued White America from her origins—the systematic demise of the American
Indian. The great precedence established by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
(1817–1825) guided American military administration through the remainder of
the nineteenth century.
As the American military strategy evolved from peacekeeping tasks into deal-
ing with an internal war during the course of the 1850s and 1860s, administrative
policy had to be cultivated to fit the needs as well. Among the first policy issues to
be handled in the 1850s was defining the roles that the commander in chief and his

31

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 32  n  Handbook of Military Administration

leading men were to take. The newly titled general in chief filled the duties of the
former commanding general, minus the exercise of authority over both the outfit-
ting and equipping as well as administrative issues of the army. These tasks were
assigned to the secretary of war, who rapidly found himself dependent upon the
guidance offered by his departmental leaders (Shrader, 1993).
In the previous era, the U.S. Army had received great internal accolades during
the course of its contest with Mexico; Ulysses S. Grant proclaimed that General
Zachary Taylor maintained his force “… under the best of drill and discipline”
(Grant, 1952, 84). However, general lessons were not learned at the end of the
Mexican War, much like in previous eras. Military administration greatly reduced
the size of the army because the only deemed threat was the Indian problem. As
hostilities escalated in the west against the various Native American tribes, the
president evoked his authority to enlarge the overall size of the army to combat this
enemy (Upton, 1917). Most of the activities of the U.S. Army and its administra-
tion were confined to quelling the western Indians’ stance against the encroaching
White settlers in addition to the Utah War (1857–1858) until the advent of seces-
sion and rebellion (Upton, 1917).
The antebellum era had been rife with struggles that impacted the U.S. mili-
tary and its overall organization and administration. Though the United States
Military Academy at West Point itself was in excellent functional capacity, the feel-
ings among the students did not always coincide with the school’s effective output
(Report of the Secretary, 1850). Cadet emotions ran high along sectional tides,
fostering a hostile and challenging environment for learning. Southern students
clamored for support in their quest for separation, leaving large rifts among the
corps of cadets (Hammond, 1832).
Controversy with the general in chief and the president, as well as with the
secretary of war, was not an unfamiliar event, and would occasionally find a place
during the remaining fifty years of the nineteenth century. General in Chief of
the Army Winfield Scott, who fostered great animosity toward many presidents,
including his former fellow comrade in arms President Zachary Taylor, opted to
keep his office a fair distance from Washington, D.C. Remaining in New York
City until the commencement of the presidency of Millard Fillmore, at which time
the office of the general in chief returned to the nation’s capital, Scott operated
under his own jurisdiction, away from the president’s reach. However, the office
would seemingly yo-yo back and forth between the two cities, returning again to
New York with the next presidencies until the remaining months of his leadership,
where for the last time he returned to Washington, D.C. (Scott, 1864; Sherman,
1990). The precedent established by General Scott, in essence, granted the secretary
of war complete authority over the army. In the future, the issue of the general in
chief keeping office in the nation’s capital was addressed in the Acts and Resolutions,
39 Congress, 2 Session, the so-called Command of the Army Act (1867). Through
one aspect of this legislation, it was mandatory that the general not move his office
outside of Washington, D.C.

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With the advent of national crisis, with secession looming on the horizon, the
army was faced with new administrative challenges. Though General in Chief Win-
field Scott had the foresight of moving the military to strategic Southern forts, he
never received approval for such actions. Of the many great “what ifs” of history,
the outcome might have been different in 1860 if these locations had been properly
refortified (Scott, 1864, 615–616). An intricate set of issues arose with secession and
the formation of the Confederate States of America.
The complexities of the challenges that arose with secession manifested them-
selves in dramatic operational changes within the military system. Replacement of
officers who remained with their native states, as well as a substantial call to arms,
presented new challenges to the commander in chief, as well as the secretary of war
and the general in chief.
The newly formed Confederate States of America also needed to create its own
military administration, which was based greatly upon that of the United States.
Jefferson Davis had been selected as the one and only president of the Confed-
eracy, a position that he recognized the great complexities of and truly had not
desired (Davis, 1861, 1862). Davis’ heart was with the military, and he had sought
to command the troops (Glatthaar, 1994). He had a considerable background in
the military and in military administration. A graduate of the United States Mili-
tary Academy at West Point, he served as a young officer in the Black Hawk War,
the Mexican War and later was appointed secretary of war in the 1850s, a position
for which he received great accolades (Dupuy, Johnson, and Bongard, 1995; Jones,
2000). In the formation of the Confederate States of America, the states conferred
upon their president virtually complete control over all military administration
and conduct. Rapidly, the former United States Army officer, senator and secretary
of war pronounced the need for one hundred thousand to join the ranks of service
in defense of their new government (Upton, 1917). Jefferson Davis, however, took
his authority to an extreme, lending a deaf ear to any source of advisement on all
military matters. His desire to be an integral part of the war effort in the context
of battlefield orders frequently caused dissension in the ranks of officers and led to
some inferior acts of judgment. Confederate President Davis reserved most of the
war powers for himself, essentially denying his multiple secretaries of war any true
jurisdiction (Doughty and Gruber, 1996).
Military tradition had long been influential in the South. From the nation’s first
lieutenant-general and commander in chief George Washington, who was a mem-
ber of the Virginia planter class, through Secretary of War Joseph Holt, Southern-
ers long held the highest military posts as well as leadership roles in the American
military and its administration. Starting in 1849 until the early months of 1861,
Southerners exclusively filled the cabinet position of secretary of war, the ranks of
which included the Confederate President Jefferson Davis (Kreidberg and Henry,
1955; Weigley, 1967). In command of the American army was General in Chief
Winfield Scott, who too was a native of the South. His loyalties, however, remained
with his country, not his state (Matloff, 1989).

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The War of the Rebellion created a unique phase of military administration, for
new complex issues had arisen in many facets. The overall nature of the war itself
created opportunities for expansion of ideals and greater options then would have
previously been taken under consideration (Cooper, 1986). Of major concern for
administrators of the American military was to keep operations successful. Efforts
were made to keep forces acting in concert and to keep troop and supply move-
ments in a timely fashion, so as to affect a victorious outcome. As the North strug-
gled to find the right commander, President Abraham Lincoln, who recognized the
limitations of his military abilities, conferred great authority upon his secretary of
war, opting to mostly defer to his judgment (Doughty and Gruber, 1996). But as
the late Russell F. Weigley pointed out in his History of The United States Army, “the
institutions of the high command remained as unsatisfactory in the Civil War as
they had been before. President, Secretary of War, and commanding general con-
tinued to play badly defined and overlapping parts” (1967).
The Union army’s administration faced many challenges in their leadership
corps. Command of the Army of the Potomac and command of all Union armies
passed through various hands before President Abraham Lincoln found the type
of fighter he needed to drive the forces to victory. The Army of the Potomac was
led by the slow-acting George Brinton McClellan, who was later named as gen-
eral in chief of the Union armies by the action of General Order No. 94 (Webb,
2002). “Little Mac,” though greatly admired by his men, was not what the military
administrators of the war desired and he found himself temporarily relieved of
command. Although he was reappointed to the Army of the Potomac, the Lin-
coln administration found they could no longer tolerate his actions (Commanger,
2000). McClellan was replaced by Ambrose Burnside, who too soon found himself
at odds with the president, and even advocated to Lincoln that he remove both the
secretary of war and the commanding general to help bring effective and necessary
changes to the military and its overall administration (Burnside, 1863). President
Abraham Lincoln then proceeded to try his luck with a new commander, Joseph
Hooker (Lincoln, 1863; Guerney and Alden, 1866; Commanger, 2000). “Fighting
Joe” Hooker challenged Lincoln’s authority and tested him and the overall military
administration. His greatest contention came with General in Chief Henry Wager
Halleck, which in turn resulted in his dismissal following a direct challenge to
President Lincoln. It was then that the last commander of the Army of the Potomac
was selected. George G. Meade took command on the brink of the battle of Get-
tysburg and continued to hold this post through the remainder of the war (Cullen,
1975).
American military administration was also straddled with the problem of find-
ing the right overall commander of the Union armies so as to exact a complete
victory over the Confederate forces. With General in Chief Winfield Scott’s health
faltering, combined with his natural aging, a replacement was necessary. Scott
did, however, outline his “views” on handling the current situation in 1861, which
included “conquer the seceded States by invading armies” (Scott, 1864, 626–627).

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Winfield Scott did not conduct the operations throughout the entire War of the
Rebellion, retiring from service on 31 October 1861 (Scott, 1864, 628–629). Presi-
dent Lincoln sought a young, aggressive officer to take the place of aged Scott and,
with the outgoing general’s commendation, selected George Brinton McClellan
(Webb, 2002). However, the president frequently found himself at odds with his
new commanding general, and truly needed great cooperation and guidance in
order to run the war more smoothly. In July 1862, Lincoln sought a more aggres-
sive soldier, thus relieving McClellan of his duties. Henry Warner Halleck was
named as the new general in chief (Grant, 1952). Halleck sought to restructure the
various armies and placed Ulysses S. Grant second in command (Sherman, 1990,
270–271). Halleck made effective changes in the army while he held this post until
12 March 1864. Working with Grant, combined with the efforts made by Lincoln
and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Halleck executed plans for successfully
taking command of the Mississippi (Matloff, 1989). But still, Lincoln and his war
administration sought leaders who would take bold initiatives. It was from the
western command that these men were found.
Ulysses S. Grant (Hiram Ulysses Grant), although a graduate of the United
States Military Academy at West Point, could be classified as a reluctant soldier. At
times he was remiss about the army, from his longing for the closure of West Point
while he was a student, to his pursuit of a career in business, but he knew how to
fight. Having earned the reputation of “unconditional surrender” at Fort Donelson
in Tennessee, he had proven his abilities to bring an effective end to many battles
by taking great chances (Grant, 1862, 167). Grant, acting in concert with William
Tecumseh Sherman, showed Lincoln the type of fighting by which the war could
be won. With this, Lincoln revived the rank of lieutenant-general and named the
Commanding General of the Armies of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant (Grant,
1952). In Grant, he knew he had finally found the leader he had so long desired.
With Grant at the helm, coupled with Sherman’s actions in the West, their actions
generated the end of the war. All the concerns of military administration were
finally met in the final years of the war. Commander in Chief Lincoln effectively
relinquished some of his powers, though not officially, when he named Grant. As
he expressed in a letter of 30 April 1864 as Grant commenced his great campaign
to end the war, Lincoln stated that “… I wish not to obtrude any constraints or
restraints upon you” (Lincoln, 1864, 266).
Command of the conduct of the Confederate armies as well as the leadership
of the Army of Northern Virginia made three major transitions during the course
of the War of the Rebellion. Joseph Eggleston Johnston held the position first and
found himself constantly at odds with the Commander in Chief Jefferson Davis,
who had wished to command the armies himself. Wounded again at Seven Pines
in Virginia, Johnston was relieved and the somewhat obscure Gustavus Woodson
Smith was named to this position, for roughly twenty-four hours (Law, 2000). It
was then that Davis placed Robert Edward Lee in charge, “to conduct operations”
of the Confederate armies (Lee, 1862, 66). As the war started to draw to a close,

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Lee was commissioned as the “commander-in-chief of all the military forces of

the Confederate States” (Lee, 1862, 144). However, late changes in military direc-
tion and administration could not transform dwindling supplies and manpower,
coupled with minimal industrial capacities, into victory.
From the time of the Southern states’ secession, the Union army overall was
in dire need of alteration. The War Department was technically ill-prepared for a
grand confrontation, and the president needed to take quick action in developing
a fighting force. At the onset of 1861, the U.S. Army numbered only 16,367. How-
ever, by 1 May 1865, after the surrender of the two great Confederate armies, the
army tallied over one million (Phisterer, 2002). Abraham Lincoln, relatively new to
the office of the presidency in April 1861, recognized the deficiencies and assessed
that recruits were necessary to fill the great void of the U.S. Army. Through his
Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress, 15 April 1861, 75,000 militia
were called. Though 75,000 militia would not create an expansive army, it was a
starting step in rebuilding. These men had not been called to fight per se, but to
protect as well. Lincoln expressed in this proclamation the general belief held by
many that this was to be a brief contest by calling for forces to serve only a quarter
of a year (Lincoln, 1861). The short sightedness of both North and South’s limited
calls represented the lack of understanding of the scope of this war by military
administrators as well as their governments in general. On 3 May 1861, another call
was made by Lincoln for more volunteers, regulars and naval personnel, thus trying
to better prepare the United States for this impending crisis (Upton, 1917).
Military administration also had to keep these soldiers effectively armed. Though
the armories contained enough weapons for a force of about five hundred thousand,
it would mean severe shortages initially. State militias, however, faced countless
shortages (Shannon, 1928). Concerns for arms as well as supplies, uniforms and
provisions plagued military administrations on both sides during the course of this
war (Shannon, 1928). In the end, though, the Confederate government’s military
administration failed at the task of supplying and waging a successful war.
During the course of the War of the Rebellion, military administration also
dealt with the evolving naval engineering and strategy. Both the United States and
Confederate States secretaries of the navy faced the challenges of creating and out-
fitting an effective fleet with only limited resources. With the Union’s Anaconda
Plan advocating a blockade, a large number of ships had to be assembled in order to
undertake this action (Wait, 2000). The Confederacy itself had to completely create
a navy, under the auspices of a president who lacked naval vision or interest. Atten-
tions of both sides’ administrations turned to advancing naval technology and the
employment of ironclad ships (Howarth, 1991). At Hampton Roads, Virginia, the
ironclads, the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (the former USS Merrimack), met
and engaged in the initial contest of these types of craft (Green, 2000). This battle
changed the future of naval engineering and warfare, presenting new challenges
for military administration. The War of the Rebellion ushered in another distinct
phase of combat on the high seas with the introduction of submarine warfare, with

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the Confederate’s untried innovation of the H. L. Hunley. Though this was an

unsuccessful venture, it paved the way and opened the eyes of military administra-
tors to look to the future (Howarth, 1991).
Through 1865, the American army was departmentalized by geographic loca-
tions. Five principal armies made up the Union forces, inclusive of the Army of the
Potomac, the Army of Virginia, the Army of the Ohio, the Army of the Cumber-
land and the Army of the Tennessee (Phisterer, 2002). Departmental classifications
would change again following the end of the war. In the immediate aftermath of
the war, an alterative organization of commands and departments was established.
This effectively placed the western part of the country under two regional headings,
under the leadership of Sherman and Halleck (Utley, 1973). By 1900, there were
fifteen departments, in addition to the specified divisions and departments in Cuba
(Annual Report of the War Department, 1900).
The method, mode and style of warfare that was fought in the War of the Rebel-
lion marked the last of its kind. Though issues that were faced in this war would be
similar in the advent of the next century’s wars, it presented numerous problems in
the realm of military administration (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955).
There were many lasting legacies from the War of the Rebellion for the mili-
tary and its administrative efforts. Frank N. Schubert ascertains in the opening
of his Black Valor: Buffalo Soldiers and the Medal of Honor, 1870–1898, that “the
Civil War spawned two enduring military traditions, the Medal of Honor and
the continuous service of black Americans in the U.S. Army” (Schubert, 1997, 1).
During the course of the War of the Rebellion, the issue of African Americans in
service was contemplated by both sides. The Union army created Colored Regi-
ments in the wake of the Emancipation Proclamation. Though African Americans
had served in previous wars in the United States, this time Congress provided for
separate regiments, still under the command of white officers. The initial regiment
created was the 54th Massachusetts, which held the distinction of taking part in
the siege at Fort Wagner and the Battles of Honey Hill and Boykin’s Mill, as well
as reaping even greater vengeance on the people of South Carolina through Potter’s
Raid (Hudson, 2002; Stevens, 1999; Thigpen, 1999). The 54th Massachusetts also
was the unit in which the first African American, William H. Carney, received
the Medal of Honor, albeit many years after his heroic actions. The Confederacy
at times contemplated bringing African Americans into service, though President
Davis was adamantly against this idea. As the ominous situation for the Confed-
eracy turned more dire, the president relented and signed into law the “Negro Sol-
dier Law.” Though the potential of freedom was offered in exchange for service, by
the time the units were assembled, the War of the Rebellion had already been lost
(McPherson, 1982).
In the aftermath of the War of the Rebellion, once again military administra-
tion was faced with a new set of complex issues. Lieutenant-General Ulysses S.
Grant, in the course of correspondence with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton,
assessed the current situation and offered his recommendations that “the entire

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adjutant-general’s office should be under the entire control of the general-in-chief of

the army” and that “… orders should go … through the general-in-chief.” He went
on to proclaim that clearly “…the general-in-chief stands between the President
and the army in all official matters, and the Secretary of War is between the army
(through the general-in-chief) and the President” (Grant, 1866, 940).
Reconstruction brought another unique and distinct phase in American his-
tory, which held great consequences for the administration of the American mili-
tary. With the South broken into five military districts, each, under a commander
and his subordinate officers, faced a variety of challenges with the attempts to inte-
grate the newly freed African Americans into society as a whole (in addition to
protecting their new civil rights as citizens) as well as guide the former Confederate
states back into the Union. The men at the helm tended to share somewhat com-
parable backgrounds (Coffman, 1986). Much like the course of the War of the
Rebellion, officers who faced off against each other had, for the most part, been
educated together and served side by side during the course of the Mexican War
(Grant, 1952). During the course of Reconstruction, these officers frequently found
themselves struggling against the combative nature of the relationship between
Congress and the president. Military administration further added to the compli-
cations with changes in troop numbers and the lack of any real direction, while the
forces faced the perpetual political battleground for complete jurisdiction over their
authority (Cooper, 1986).
In a contest between Congress and President Andrew Johnson, the lines were
drawn as to the commander in chief’s exercise of authority over the Army and its
overall administration. The Acts and Resolution, 39 Congress, 2 Session, commonly
referred to as the Command of the Army Act (1867), not only required the general
of the Army to maintain his office in the capital, but also technically expanded his
overall authority. In a slight toward the president, the general in chief only could
present directives and orders to the army. Both the president and secretary of war
were ordered to send all directives via the general of the army only, effectively deny-
ing the men who held these two offices their powers. Even greater restrictions were
placed on the president regarding the military in another stipulation of this act.
The commander in chief could no longer remove the general of the army from his
post except with senatorial consent (Weber, 2006a). This Congressional act made
dramatic changes for overall army administration.
Debates raged over what was the necessary size of the post-war Army. Tempers
flared among the army administration and the powers in Washington. The eighty
thousand soldiers the commanding general sought were far from the number of
troops that were provided for. Although thirty-five thousand were allotted in 1865,
within five years, financial provisions were only sufficient to arm and outfit twenty-
eight thousand (Walter, 1993).
The officer corps was always under the greatest consideration by the military
administration. With the War Department at the helm, new criteria standards were
issued during the close of the nineteenth century regarding the potential for moving

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 Military Administration 1850–1900  n  39

up in rank. The adaptation of “a system of proficiency examinations” provided a

more organized, and technically fairer, system of promotion (Cosmas, 1994, 4).
Though certain officers like John A. Logan (who served in Congress representing
the state of Illinois) campaigned against the claimed favoritism that graduates of
the military academy received and advocated legislation that both diminished the
salary of the general in chief and decreased the total number of men employed in
the armed services, this system of promotion seemed to have instituted an ideal
system for the times.
Impetus was given to bring greater restructuring of the Army and to impose
reductions. Although efforts were undertaken by Senator Ambrose Burnside’s ini-
tiative in the 1870s to institute modifications, the legacy of the Union’s victory in
the previous war prevailed. Congress sought to keep a force available, though not at
the peak strength when the war concluded (Cooper, 1986).
Another major institution of military administration in the post-Civil War era
came regarding the status of African Americans in the military. Though not strang-
ers to service, because Negro Regiments had served in the War of the Rebellion, the
forces of African American soldiers would be stationed on the frontier and take part
in the western campaigns as well. The Congressional Act of 1866 allotted for two
separate African American cavalry regiments as well as six infantry. Buffalo Soldiers
from the Ninth and Tenth United States Cavalry along with the Twenty-Fourth
Infantry gained notoriety for their distinguished service on the frontier, as well as
for the eighteen troopers and soldiers who were awarded the Medal of Honor for
their distinguished actions in the Indian Wars. Five of these Buffalo Soldiers earned
Medals of Honor in the next phase of warfare as well, in the Spanish-American
War (Schubert, 1997). Though these forces would remain separated from the rest of
the army and they would be commanded by white officers, the men of these com-
mands gained the recognition of army administrators. Another change made in the
Reconstruction era regarding military administration and African Americans dealt
with the United States Military Academy. In 1877, the first African American was
graduated from West Point. The child of slaves, Henry Ossian Flipper defied all
odds and became the first African American to successfully complete his education
at the academy. He went on to serve as an officer in one of the segregated cavalry
units until his dismissal, when he, in all likelihood, fell victim to discrimination in
the military (Dupuy, Johnson, and Bongard, 1995).
Though combating American Indians was long entrenched in the history of
North America settlers, in the aftermath of the War of the Rebellion, army admin-
istration sought to bring this phase of administrative focus to a close. As the debate
continued to wage over the necessary size of the post-war army, troops were being
stationed out West. President Andrew Johnson enacted the “Congressional Act to
increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States” on 28 July
1866, which actually incorporated additional regiments of both cavalry and infan-
try, as well as set a fixed amount of time for enlistments (Utley, 1973, 11). This act
also provided for the general officer corps to include both a singular general and

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lieutenant-general, positions filled by Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman,

respectively (Weber, 2006b). As problems escalated with the alleged violation of
the Tenure of Office Act between Secretary Stanton and President Andrew Johnson,
Commanding General Grant found himself caught in the midst of the struggle.
He requested the president to “make some order that we of the army are not bound
to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War” (Grant, 1866, 913). Once
again, strife remained between the secretary of war and the commanding general as
the president left each with somewhat confusing powers and authorities. One other
major administrative change for the army that occurred during the course of the
post-Civil War era dealt with the position of commanding general. With the ascen-
dancy of Ulysses S. Grant to the White House, his comrade in arms and dear friend
William T. Sherman also was elevated in his realm of power. Sherman, once again,
took over Grant’s former position as general in chief of the army. With the taking of
office and Grant’s orders, which conferred vast powers on the commanding general,
Sherman felt confident that the problems of the previous eras had been resolved.
However, changes in who held the office of secretary of war quickly rescinded the
control that Sherman had been granted over the army and the War Department
(Athearn, 1956). In time, much like his earlier predecessor Winfield Scott, who had
moved his office to New York when faced with challenges from various presidents
as well as secretaries of war, Sherman found himself at odds with secretaries of war
John A. Rawlins and William W. Belknap, along with various politicians, and relo-
cated his office to St. Louis, out of the reach of Washington, D.C. (Sefton, 1967).
Though a majority of the troops in the post-Civil War era had been posted
in the West, the logistics of getting the forces to the field of battle to combat the
American Indian tribes were among the greatest of concerns. In addition to the
problems that had to be handled regarding troop movement, concerns had to be
addressed regarding the need for additional supplies for the forces as well as for
the cavalry horses. In order to keep that infantry moving at an efficient pace, their
individual packs were lightened, thus allowing the soldier to carry less with him on
his campaign (McDermott, 1998).
Soldiers fighting in the Indian Wars were faced with a distinctive style of fight-
ing different from what was found during the course of the War of the Rebel-
lion. Though administrators were slow to develop an alternative style of tactic in
combating, they acknowledged that their method of warfare did not always fit the
situation. However, the administrators contended that when the methodized style
of warfare that was advocated in the texts of the day was applied in the right cir-
cumstances, they were unbeatable (Simmons, 1992).
In the Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs of 1874, after outlining the
classification of the remaining Indian tribes in North America, the greatest con-
cern plaguing the U.S. government, citizens and military/military administration
regarding the native population was addressed. The tribes that were noted to be
in the first classification were deemed as the “Wildest tribes,” which included the
Sioux, most specifically. The “Sioux Problem” was of the greatest apparent concern,

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 Military Administration 1850–1900  n  41

especially due to the recent findings in the Black Hills (Smith to the Secretary of
the Interior, 1874). It was waging war against the Sioux that would capture Ameri-
can attention, particularly that of the military administration. Custer’s Last Stand
helped push military administration into waging a contest of extermination against
the American Indians. In addition to the war of attrition that was being waged,
schools were created for the American troops in the West and greater discipline
was enacted for the men (Utley, 1973). At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “A School
of Application for Infantry and Cavalry” was set up in order to provide “practical
instruction” (Kreidberg and Henry, 1955, 147).
General in Chief William Tecumseh Sherman assessed, during the course of
his survey of the lands surrounding the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1877, that “I
now regard the Sioux Indian problem, as a war question, as solved” (Sheridan and
Sherman, 1878). Until Wounded Knee on 29 December 1890, the Sioux remained
a challenge for the American military because it was here that the wars against
the Indians climaxed. The Battle of Wounded Knee (South Dakota) effectively
marked the end of struggles between the American army and the Native Americans
(Weeks, 2001).
The War Department remained plagued with critical issues that had permeated
its overall existence for over fifty years. With the unclear boundary lines on the
powers of the commanding general and the secretary of war, the men who held
these two positions frequently found themselves at odds. The Army Regulations of
1895 provided that the secretary of war handle all financial matters and that both
he and the president issue their commands via the general (Grant, 1866). In essence,
this challenged the Army Regulation of 1847, which placed the financial matters of
the military under the Department of the Treasury, which received orders from the
secretary of war (Grant,1866). This Regulation of 1895, however, really provided no
greater clarity for Congress and the secretary of war, who maintained their superior
stance over the commanding general, thus effectively diminishing his actual pow-
ers through their actions.
As the century drew to a close, the American military system had fallen to the
wayside. Once again, it would take the emergence of hostilities to give the much-
needed boost to the reorganization and restructuring that was needed (Abrhamson,
1981). As antagonisms grew in Cuba, America watched and waited as aggressions
slowly unfolded.
An attempt at revitalizing the somewhat diminished military on the brink of
the Spanish–American War was fostered through the so-called “Fifty Million Bill.”
In this act of legislation, President William McKinley authorized the use of excess
funding of the Treasury for expanding the military, under his auspices, in case the
tumultuous situation in Cuba escalated into war. This bill gave impetus to a legisla-
tive effort at military mobilization.
Military planners assessed the potential situation in Cuba and ascertained
that this was to be the navy’s war; the army would be more of a supplementary
force. Under the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his advocacy of building

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a superior navy, planners and administrators had started to undertake the task of
revamping the U.S. Navy (Challener, 1973). The Spanish–American War techni-
cally commenced with actions of the U.S. Navy—the explosion of the USS Maine
as well as Commodore George Dewey’s utterance of “you may fire when you are
ready, Gridley” aboard the USS Olympia to usher in the opening shots of the war (A
Brief History of the Pacific Fleet, n.d.). But the burden of this war would be shared
by both forces.
The specifications of fighting a war in a tropical climate created new chal-
lenges for military administration. Again, concerns were placed on transportation
of troops to Cuba and the Philippines, but supplies and uniforms presented the
greatest of obstacles. The struggles between the army and the War Department
remained, however, firmly in place, leading to many problems in logistics, ord-
nance and planning. Though the war was won, the deficiencies had been revealed
in this contest. In the aftermath of the war, the Dodge Commission revealed the
need for a more effective military administration. Secretary of War Root accepted
the challenge and began the new century ushering in the reforms that the military
administration had long been in need of (Matloff, 1989).
A new era of hope was ushered in for military administration with the appoint-
ment of Elihu Root as secretary of war in 1899. With the opportunity at the helm
to alter the powers and actions of the War Department and its secretary, Root
brought about changes to effect a more efficient system (Hewes, 1975). Using the
reports of the Dodge Commission, he assessed that the rivalry between the secre-
tary of war and the commanding general had fostered the problems faced by the
army. His recommendation was to eliminate the office of the Commanding Gen-
eral and replace it with a General Staff, which would be affected in the next century
(Matloff, 1989).

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Commanger, H.S. 2000. “Little Mac” is reappointed to command. In The Civil War
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 Chapter 4

Reshaping the
Defense Enterprise

Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006

Just as we must transform America’s military capability to meet chang-

ing threats, we must transform the way the Department works and
what it works on. We must build a Department where each of the dedi-
cated people here can apply their immense talents to defend America,
where they have the resources, information and freedom to perform
… It demands agility—more than today’s bureaucracy allows. And
that means we must recognize another transformation: the revolution
in management, technology and business practices. Successful modern
businesses are leaner and less hierarchical than ever before. They reward
innovation and they share information. They have to be nimble in the
face of rapid change or they die.
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, September 10, 2001

To win the long war, the Department of Defense (DoD) must reshape the defense
enterprise in ways that better support the war fighter and are appropriate for the
threat environment. Today, the armed forces are hampered by inefficient business

 This chapter was first published in the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review
Report 2006, pages 63–74.

47

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 48  n  Handbook of Military Administration

practices. The DoD’s current structure and processes are handicaps in the protracted
fight we now face against agile and networked foes. Over the last twenty years,
the DoD has increasingly integrated its war-fighting concepts, organization, train-
ing and operations to create the world’s most formidable joint force. Sustaining
continuous operational change and innovation are a hallmark of U.S. forces. The
DoD’s organizations, processes and enabling authorities urgently require a simi-
lar transformation. The DoD’s approach is to improve significantly organizational
effectiveness, and in so doing, reap the rewards of improved efficiencies.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlighted the loss of resources,
in terms of people and dollars, caused by inefficiencies in the DoD’s support func-
tions. The department responded with a comprehensive effort to streamline busi-
ness and decision-making processes, with the express goal of better supporting the
joint war fighter. Since 2001, the DoD has moved steadily toward a more integrated
and transparent senior decision-making culture and process for both operational
and investment matters. The DoD has made substantial strides in fostering joint
solutions, including the creation of new organizations and processes that cut across
traditional stovepipes. It has standardized business rules and data structures for
common use. Most importantly, the department has made notable progress toward
an outcome-oriented, capabilities-based planning approach that provides the joint
war fighter with the capabilities needed to address a wider range of asymmetric
challenges. Recent operational experiences have demonstrated the need to bring
further agility, flexibility and horizontal integration to the defense support infra-
structure. The DoD has responded to that need with several innovations in its orga-
nizations and support services. Three examples of such innovations are the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Task Force, the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell (JRAC) and improved supply-chain logistics.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the terrorist weapon of choice remains the impro-
vised explosive device, normally taking the form of roadside bombs, suicide car
bombs and a variety of remotely initiated devices. To counter the threat posed by
these weapons, the DoD created the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. The Task Force
unified all department efforts to defeat IEDs, combining the best technology solu-
tions with relevant intelligence and innovative operating methods. In fiscal year
2005, the DoD invested more than $1.3 billion in IED Defeat initiatives, includ-
ing counter–radio-controlled IED electronic warfare, IED surveillance, the Joint
IED Defeat Center of Excellence, counter-bomber programs and stand-off IED
detection and neutralization. The Task Force has also provided funds for training
to military units en route to operational theaters as well as expert field teams that
work directly with units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the Task Force’s inception,
the department has decreased the IED casualty rate by a factor of two.
The JRAC is another innovation that grew out of U.S. experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The DoD’s standard processes for providing materials and logistics
proved too slow and cumbersome to meet the immediate needs of forces in the field.
Recognizing this deficiency, the Secretary of Defense established a cell dedicated

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  49

to finding actionable solutions to urgent war-fighter needs. The JRAC has sup-
ported efforts that provided military personnel key force protection items, such
as the Advanced Combat Helmet, lightweight Global Positioning System receiv-
ers, improved ammunition packs and individual weapon optics. Working with the
military departments and combatant commands, this initiative has accelerated
development and delivery of more than a dozen critical programs, from intelligence
collection and dissemination to enhanced force protection.
Improved support to the war fighter has occurred in the logistics chain as well.
The DoD vested leadership of the complex distribution process in a single owner,
the U.S. Transportation Command (U.S. TRANSCOM). Exercising its new role,
U.S. TRANSCOM established a Deployed Distribution Operations Center in
Kuwait to speed the flow of materials into Iraq and Afghanistan in support of
coalition operations. The center quickly assembled a team of logistics experts and
gave them authority to direct air and seaport operations and cross-country moves
in the theater. Lead times for stocked items dropped by more than 45% since the
peaks recorded in 2003. Better synchronization of transportation assets allowed
the Army to cut costs by $268 million in fiscal year 2004. On-time delivery rates
are now at over 90%. The center’s process innovations improved mission perfor-
mance at less cost to the DoD and the U.S. taxpayer. Department reforms since
2001, including those innovations born of wartime necessity, represent the types of
changes the QDR has sought to accelerate.

Toward a New Defense Enterprise

The DoD’s enterprise reforms are guided by a three-part vision:

First, the department must be responsive to its stakeholders. Not only must the
department’s support functions enhance the U.S. military’s ability to serve
the president and provide a strong voice for the joint war fighter, it must also
provide the best possible value to the U.S. taxpayer. The DoD will work to
improve effectiveness dramatically across civilian and military functions as
the foundation for increased efficiency.
Second, the department must provide information and analysis necessary to
make timely and well-reasoned decisions. The department’s culture, authori-
ties and organizations must be aligned in a manner that facilitates, rather than
hinders, effective decision making and enables responsive mission execution
while maintaining accountability. Improved horizontal integration will be
critical to the department’s success.
Third, the department must undertake reforms to reduce redundancies and
ensure the efficient flow of business processes. As we capitalize on existing
transformational efforts across the enterprise, we will continually evaluate
support systems and processes to optimize their responsiveness.

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 50  n  Handbook of Military Administration

To achieve this vision and produce strategy-driven outcomes, the DoD’s roles
and responsibilities, and those of each of its component organizations, must be
clearly delineated. Roles and responsibilities within the DoD fall into roughly three
categories. At the senior-most levels, leaders are concerned with governance—set-
ting strategy, prioritizing enterprise efforts, assigning responsibilities and authori-
ties, allocating resources and communicating a shared vision. In order to meet the
strategic objectives set out by the department’s senior leadership, some components
act in a management role, focusing on organizing tasks, people, relationships and
technology. The vast majority of the department’s personnel then work to execute
the strategy and plans established at management level. In the 2006 QDR, the
department looked across these three levels of responsibility—governance, manage-
ment and work—to ensure that organizations, processes and authorities are well
aligned.

Governance Reforms
Senior Leadership Focus
A key measure of success is the extent to which the DoD’s senior leadership is able
to fulfill the following functions:
(i) Strategic direction—Identify the key outputs, not inputs, they expect from
the department’s components and determine the appropriate near-, mid- and
long-term strategies for achieving them. Such outputs will be focused on the
needs of the president as commander in chief and the joint war fighters.
(ii) Identity—Establish an organizational culture that fosters innovation and
excellence. Communicate the department’s strategy, policy and institutional
ethos to the internal workforce and to external audiences.
(iii) Capital acquisition and macro resource allocation—Shape the depart-
ment’s major investments in people, equipment, concepts and organizations
to support the nation’s objectives most effectively.
(iv) Corporate decision making—Implement agile and well-aligned gover-
nance, management and work processes. Ensure the department has the pro-
cesses, tools and transparent analyses to support decisions.
(v) Performance assessment—Monitor performance to ensure strategic align-
ment and make adjustments to strategic direction based on performance.
(vi) Force employment—Determine how U.S. forces are utilized and meet the
day-to-day oversight needs of the joint force. Operational matters are the
responsibility of the joint war fighters. The department’s senior civilian and
military leaders ensure that forces are employed in ways that meet the presi-
dent’s strategic objectives.
  The department will work to better align processes, structures and, as
necessary, authorities to improve its senior leaders’ ability to govern in these

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  51

core areas. Today, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff
perform many functions beyond those identified above, including program
management and execution. To ensure that senior leadership can maintain
focus on the key governance issues elaborated above, the Department will
identify management and execution activities currently being conducted at
the governance level and consider them for elimination or realignment.
(vii) Build Capability to Inform Strategic Choice
To better support the joint war fighter, the DoD is launching several initia-
tives to integrate the processes that define needed capabilities, identify solu-
tions and allocate resources to acquire them. The following four interrelated
reforms emphasize the need for improved information sharing and collabo-
ration. First, the department will implement a more transparent, open and
agile decision-making process. To do this, common authoritative informa-
tion sources will be identified, department-level financial databases will be
combined, and common analytic methods will be adopted. For example, the
DoD is testing a number of tools that could provide common capability views
using existing resource and programming databases. One such pilot project
is a transparent integrated air and missile defense database. Experimenting
through such pilots, the department will seek to identify and rapidly develop
preferred capability area solutions that will facilitate open and agile decision
making.
  Second, the department will reach investment decisions through collabora-
tion among the joint war fighter, acquisition and resource communities. Joint
war fighters will assess needs in terms of desired effects and the time frame in
which capabilities are required. Assessments of potential solutions should be
informed by the acquisition community’s judgment of technological feasibil-
ity and cost-per-increment of capability improvement, and by the resource
community’s assessment of affordability. These inputs will be provided early
in the decision-making process, before significant resources are committed.
Once an investment decision has been approved, changes will require col-
laboration among all three communities at the appropriate decision level to
ensure strategy-driven, affordable and achievable outcomes.
  A recent, much-needed restructuring of the troubled Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) program exemplifies this collaborative approach. Because the
radio system must be interoperable with other systems across the full spec-
trum of the joint force, decisions regarding the future of the JTRS program
had profound effects throughout the DoD. To ensure a solution that will
meet the joint war fighter’s needs and provide best value to the taxpayer, the
war-fighting and acquisition communities worked closely together to develop
the investment strategy and the military departments contributed needed
resources for the restructuring.
  Third, the DoD will begin to break out its budget according to joint
capability areas. Using such a joint capability view—in place of a military

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 52  n  Handbook of Military Administration

department or traditional budget category display—should improve the

DoD’s understanding of the balancing of strategic risks and required capa-
bility trade-offs associated with particular decisions. The DoD has already
developed and tested at U.S. Pacific Command an automated process that
maps resource needs to discrete operational plans and missions. For the first
time, a combatant commander is able to ascertain the resource requirements
associated with particular capabilities, such as striking fleeting targets. The
DoD is working to expand on this program to enable department-wide assess-
ment of capability areas and facilitate capability portfolio management and
will explore this approach with the Congress.
  Fourth, to manage the budget allocation process with accountability, an
acquisition reform study initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense rec-
ommended the department work with the Congress to establish “Capital
Accounts” for major acquisition programs. The purpose of capital budgeting
is to provide stability in the budgeting system and to establish accountability
for acquisition programs throughout the hierarchy of program responsibility
from the program manager, through the service acquisition executive, the
secretaries of the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
  Together, these improvements should enable senior leaders to implement a
risk-informed investment strategy reflecting joint war-fighting priorities.

Aligning Authority and Accountability

through Joint Capability Portfolios
Most of the DoD’s resources are provided through the military services. This
arrangement can lead both to gaps or redundancies within capability areas as each
service attempts to supply a complete war-fighting package rather than organize
to depend on capabilities provided by other military departments. To optimize
the provision of capabilities for the joint war fighter, the DoD will work to reori-
ent its processes around joint capability portfolios. In the acquisition realm, the
department has already instituted several joint capability reviews. These reviews
look across major force programs to assess needed investments in specific capability
portfolio areas, such as integrated air and missile defense, land attack weapons and
electronic warfare.
The QDR used such a portfolio approach to evaluate surveillance capabilities.
The DoD began by accounting for all of its current and planned surveillance capa-
bilities and programs. This included a transparent review of capabilities at all levels
of classification. Viewing capabilities across the entire portfolio of assets enabled
decision makers to make informed choices about how to reallocate resources among
previously stove-piped programs, to deliver needed capabilities to the joint force
more rapidly and efficiently.

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  53

The department will build on these initial efforts to integrate tasks, people,
relationships, technologies and associated resources more effectively across its many
activities. By shifting the focus from service-specific programs to joint capabilities,
the DoD should be better positioned to understand the implications of investment
and resource trade-offs among competing priorities. As a first step, the DoD will
manage three capability areas using a capability portfolio concept: Joint Command
and Control, Joint Net Centric Operations and Joint Space Operations. As we learn
from experience and gain confidence in this approach, we plan to expand it to other
capability areas.

Managing Joint Task Assignments

Effective governance is facilitated by the clear alignment of authority, responsibil-
ity and resources at the management level. Some of the most difficult challenges in
governance arise when joint management arrangements cut across the traditional
and often statutory authority structure of the military departments and defense
agencies. The establishment of the combatant commands created new sources of
demand for joint capabilities separate from the organizations with responsibility
to supply them.
For example, when a program or mission is identified as a priority area, the sec-
retary may choose to direct an organization to manage or resource the joint effort
for the DoD. In the past, this has been accomplished by designating a component
or activity as the “Executive Agent”—a term the meaning of which varies widely
from one arrangement to the next. When the responsibilities for joint management
activities are not clearly defined or strategically aligned, implementation is prob-
lematic and resources are used less efficiently.
This QDR underscores the need for a better way to organize and manage joint
activities to ensure that mission assignment is accompanied by the authorities,
resources and clear performance expectations necessary for mission success. Conse-
quently, the DoD is implementing a disciplined process for assigning joint missions
and tasks and evaluating their resource priority. The Joint Task Assignment Process
will centrally assign and oversee joint management arrangements to ensure joint
activities are aligned to the department’s strategic objectives; designated with the
proper authorities, responsibilities and resources; effectively structured to minimize
overlaps and gaps; established with clear lines of accountability; and continually
assessed for performance and need.

Driving Business Transformation

The Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) was established
to improve governance of the DoD’s business transformation effort. The DBSMC is
a top-level, single point-of-decision mechanism that brings together senior leaders

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 54  n  Handbook of Military Administration

from across the enterprise to drive business process change and improve support
to the joint war fighter. The department also developed an Enterprise Transition
Plan and associated Architecture to guide transformation of its business operations.
The DBSMC will govern execution of the Enterprise Transition Plan by ensuring
accountability and increasing senior leadership direction.
To ensure alignment with the business transformation strategy, the DoD has
created Investment Review Boards to evaluate programs of record against the
Enterprise Architecture. Funds cannot be obligated for any business system invest-
ment not certified by the appropriate official and approved by the DBSMC to be in
compliance with the Department’s architecture.
More recently, the Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) was created
to integrate and oversee corporate-level business systems and initiatives. The BTA
is the management link responsible for integrating work across the Department in
areas such as human resources, financial management, acquisition and logistics. It
is accountable to the DBSMC governing body for results.

Managing Risks and Measuring Performance

Across the Enterprise
In the 2001 QDR, the DoD introduced a risk management framework to enable
its senior leadership to better balance near-term demands against preparations for
the future. This balanced risk approach has been successfully implemented in a
number of organizations throughout the department to guide strategic planning
and day-to-day management. The department is now taking advantage of lessons
learned from this initial implementation phase to refine and develop a more robust
framework to enable decision making.
The DoD will reevaluate its enterprise-wide outcome goals to maintain strategic
alignment and ensure its objectives are clearly set forth. The DoD will also evalu-
ate and develop or refine the metrics to measure efforts to implement the strategy
to provide useful information to senior leadership. Improved metrics will allow
senior leaders at the governance level to manage by exception—monitoring the
overall health of the organization and focusing attention on areas needing top-
level direction and support. Each level of the enterprise is accountable for measur-
ing performance and delivering results that support the department-wide strategy.
Organizations must have the autonomy needed to perform within guidance, but
with adequate oversight to ensure strategic alignment.

Additional Governance Reforms

The DoD is considering additional initiatives aimed at improving governance in
each of the five corporate focus areas. These include the following:

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  55

Designating a single lead advocate for the future joint war fighter in order to
improve the department’s long-range, joint perspective on the requirements,
acquisition and resource allocation processes.
Creating new horizontal organizations to better integrate the department’s
activities in key areas, including strategic communication and human capital
strategy.
Migrating toward a shared services model for support functions, such as admin-
istration, management and computer support.

Although reforms cannot occur overnight, the course is clear. The complex
strategic environment demands that our structure and processes be streamlined
and integrated to better support the president and joint war fighter. The DoD is
committed to doing so.

Management and Work Reforms

Beyond governance, this QDR identified opportunities for continued transforma-
tion of acquisition and logistics processes.

Improving Defense Acquisition Performance

There is a growing and deep concern in the DoD’s senior leadership and in the
Congress about the acquisition processes. This lack of confidence results from
an inability to determine accurately the true state of major acquisition programs
when measured by cost, schedule and performance. The unpredictable nature of
defense programs can be traced to instabilities in the broader acquisition system.
Fundamentally reshaping that system should make the state of the DoD’s major
acquisition programs more predictable and result in better stewardship of the U.S.
tax dollar. There are several ongoing reviews of defense acquisition improvements
being conducted both within and outside the department in an effort to address
these issues. Their results will inform the department’s efforts to reshape defense
acquisition into a truly twenty-first century process that is responsive to the joint
war fighter.
The DoD is focusing on bringing the needed capabilities to the joint force more
rapidly, by fashioning a much more effective acquisition system and associated set
of processes. The department is considering adopting a risk-based source selec-
tion process in place of the current cost-based approach. Source selection decisions
would not use cost as the sole criteria but rather would be based on technical and
management risk. Effectively balancing cost, technical risk and management reali-
ties would require closer integration of the DoD’s joint capabilities identification,
resource allocation and acquisition processes, with clear responsibilities defined for
each.

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In an effort to ensure needed capabilities are fielded rapidly, acquisition devel-

opment and procurement programs will shift to a time-certain approach. Early
in program development, senior leaders will make the key trade-offs necessary to
balance performance, time and available resources. Upgrades and improvements
can be added in subsequent spirals based on the maturity of the technology. Com-
bining time-certain development and procurement of capability with a risk-based
approach to source selection should provide much greater stability in the acquisi-
tion system. Stability should allow for more predictable acquisition programs mea-
sured by cost, schedule and performance.

Managing Supply-Chain Logistics

In response to the 2001 QDR, the DoD undertook a number of initiatives to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency with which it moves and sustains mili-
tary forces. These initiatives included efforts to improve the deployment process
and reduce the logistics footprint and its associated costs. The DoD also worked
to provide standing joint force headquarters with an integrated logistics picture
and accelerated the creation and use of logistics decision-support tools. In the past
four years, the DoD has markedly increased the integration of field exercises and
experimentation with the processes for determining logistics systems, doctrine and
force structure requirements. In addition, as noted earlier, the DoD is changing its
logistics processes and procedures as dictated by the needs of current operations.
As a result of these initiatives, the department has made significant strides in
migrating to a capabilities-based logistics approach. In this QDR, the department
focused on improving visibility into supply-chain logistics costs and performance
and on building a foundation for continuous improvements in performance. The
strategy for achieving these objectives starts by linking resources to supply-chain
logistics activities in order to understand the costs they entail. The department
must also assess commercial supply-chain metrics as potential performance targets
to bring down the costs and to speed the delivery of needed items. Promising ongo-
ing initiatives, such as the single deployment process owner, must be continually
improved and accelerated. Lastly, there is a need to develop realistic and defendable
strategic performance targets for focused logistics capabilities to guide both capital
investment and process improvement.
The DoD is implementing a number of specific initiatives aimed at meeting
supply-chain objectives. For example, the use of active and passive radio frequency
Identification (RFID) technologies will play a key role in achieving the DoD’s
vision for implementing knowledge-enabled logistics support to the war fighter
through automated asset visibility and management. RFID is designed to enable
the sharing, integration and synchronizing of data from the strategic to the tactical
level, informing every node in the supply-chain network. This information should
provide greater insight into the cause-and-effect relationship between resources

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and readiness. Such fact-based insights, coupled with the implementation of con-
tinuous process improvement tools like Lean, Six Sigma and Performance Based
Logistics, will help optimize the productive output of the overall DoD supply
chain.

Transforming the Medical Health System (MHS)

New breakthroughs in science and health, and new innovations in prevention and
wellness, offer the opportunity to develop a twenty-first century Military Health
System (MHS) that will improve health and save both lives and money. This trans-
formation in health and health care parallels other transformations in the DoD. It
is the department’s goal to have a lifetime relationship with the entire DoD fam-
ily that maximizes prevention, wellness and personal choices and responsibility.
As with other areas related to the DoD enterprise, the QDR recommends align-
ing medical support with emerging joint force employment concepts. Building
on recent improvements in new purchased care contracts and the streamlining of
regional TRICARE management structures, the QDR recommends continuing
to shift toward a market-driven, performance-based investment program. It also
recommends improving planning processes and the transparency of information,
while leveraging the recent launch of the department’s electronic health record sys-
tem. This new system is needed to effectively manage MHS by adopting a more
flexible financing process. Above all, the department’s military and civilian senior
leaders endorse the need to modernize the TRICARE benefit structure for those
customers who are not on active duty. The intent is to promote longer and healthier
retirement lives by encouraging self-responsibility for their own and their family’s
health and the use of health resources to achieve the longest, healthiest lives at the
lowest cost. Doing so will require changes in legislation and rules to adjust TRI-
CARE cost-sharing features so that they restore the balance Congress created in
establishing the TRICARE program in the 1990s and also to seek authority for
health savings accounts.

Summary
Without a doubt, reshaping the defense enterprise is difficult. The structures and
processes developed over the past half-century were forged in the Cold War and
strengthened by success in it. However, the strategic landscape of the twenty-first
century demands excellence across a much broader set of national security chal-
lenges. With change comes turmoil, and achieving a desired vision requires deter-
mination and perseverance within the DoD and, importantly, cooperation with
the Congress. As we emphasize agility, flexibility, responsiveness and effectiveness
in the operational forces, so too must the department’s organizations, processes and

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practices embody these characteristics if they are to support the joint war fighter
and our commander in chief.

Developing a Twenty-First Century Total Force

The Department of Defense is the world’s largest employer, directly employing
more than three million people. The DoD’s Total Force—its active and reserve
military components, its civil servants and its contractors—constitutes its war-
fighting capability and capacity. Members of the Total Force serve in thousands of
locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical
missions.
No prudent military commander wants a fair fight, seeking instead to “over-
match” adversaries in cunning, capability and commitment. The selfless service and
heroism of the men and women of the well-trained all-volunteer Total Force has
been a primary source of U.S. strategic overmatch in confronting the wide range
of threats we face and a key to successful military operations over the past several
decades. The Total Force must continue to adapt to different operating environ-
ments, develop new skills and rebalance its capabilities and people if it is to remain
prepared for the new challenges of an uncertain future.
Recent operational experiences highlight capabilities and capacities that the
DoD must instill in the Total Force to prevail in a long, irregular war while deter-
ring a broad array of challenges. The future force must be more finely tailored,
more accessible to the joint commander and better configured to operate with other
agencies and international partners in complex operations. It must have far greater
endurance. It must be trained, ready to operate and able to make decisions in tra-
ditionally nonmilitary areas, such as disaster response and stabilization. Increasing
the adaptability of the Total Force while also reducing stress on military personnel
and their families is a top priority for the DoD. These imperatives require a new
strategy for shaping the department’s Total Force, one that will adjust policies and
authorities while introducing education and training initiatives to equip civilian
and military war fighters to overmatch any future opponent.
The DoD and military services must carefully distribute skills among the four
elements of the Total Force (active component, reserve component, civilians and
contractors) to optimize their contributions across the range of military operations,
from peace to war. In a reconfigured Total Force, a new balance of skills must be
coupled with greater accessibility to people so that the right forces are available at
the right time. Both uniformed and civilian personnel must be readily available to
joint commanders.
This operational Total Force must remain prepared for complex operations at
home or abroad, including working with other U.S. agencies, allies, partners and
non-governmental organizations. Routine integration with foreign and domestic
counterparts requires new forms of advanced joint training and education.

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Finally, the DoD must effectively compete with the civilian sector for high-qual-
ity personnel. The transformation of the Total Force will require updated, appropri-
ate authorities and tools from Congress to shape it and improve its sustainability.
Two key enablers of this transformation will be a new Human Capital Strategy for
the department, and the application of the new National Security Personnel System
to manage the department’s civilian personnel.

Reconfiguring the Total Force

Recent operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to
rebalance military skills between and within the active and reserve components.
Accordingly, over the past several years, the military departments are rebalancing—
shifting, transferring or eliminating—approximately 70,000 positions within or
between the active and reserve components. The DoD plans to rebalance an addi-
tional 55,000 military personnel by 2010. The military departments are applying
this same scrutiny across the Total Force to ensure that the right skills reside inside
each element. The military departments and combatant commanders will continu-
ally assess the force to ensure it remains responsive to meet future demands. U.S.
Joint Forces Command (U.S. JFCOM), as the joint force provider, is aiding the
effort by ensuring the appropriate global distribution of ready forces and competen-
cies. The department plans to introduce a new methodology and review process to
establish a baseline for personnel policy, including the development of joint metrics
and a common lexicon to link the defense strategy to service-level rebalancing deci-
sions. This process will help synchronize rebalancing efforts across the DoD.

A Continuum of Service
The traditional, visible distinction between war and peace is less clear at the start of
the twenty-first century. In a long war, the United States expects to face large and
small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. To fight the long war and conduct
other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more
immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the reserve component must
be operationalized, so that select reservists and units are more accessible and more
readily deployable than today. During the cold war, the reserve component was
used, appropriately, as a “strategic reserve,” to provide support to active component
forces during major combat operations. In today’s global context, this concept is
less relevant. As a result, the DoD will:

Pursue authorities for increased access to the reserve component—to increase the
period authorized for Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 to 365 days.
Better focus the use of the reserve components’ competencies for homeland
defense and civil support operations, and seek changes to authorities to

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improve access to Guard and reserve consequence management capabilities

and capacity in support of civil authorities.
Achieve revision of Presidential Reserve Call-Up authorities to allow activation
of military department reserve components for natural disasters in order
to smooth the process for meeting specific needs without relying solely on
volunteers.
Allow individuals who volunteer for activation on short notice to serve for long
periods on major headquarters staffs as individual augmentees.
Develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice
for deployment.

Additionally, the military departments will explore the creation of all-volunteer

reserve units with high-demand capabilities, and the military departments and com-
batant commanders will expand the concept of contracted volunteers.

Building the Right Skills

Maintaining the capabilities required to conduct effective multidimensional joint
operations is fundamental to the U.S. military’s ability to overmatch adversaries.
Both battlefield integration with interagency partners and combined operations—
the integration of the joint force and coalition forces—will be standard features in
future operations. The combination of joint, combined and interagency capabilities
in modern warfare represents the next step in the evolution of joint war fighting
and places new demands on the DoD’s training and education processes.

Joint Training
The QDR assessed and compared the joint training capabilities of each of the mili-
tary departments. Although they have established operationally proven processes
and standards, it is clear that further advances in joint training and education are
urgently needed to prepare for complex, multinational and interagency operations
in the future. Toward this end, the DoD will:

Develop a Joint Training Strategy to address new mission areas, gaps and con-
tinuous training transformation.
Revise its Training Transformation Plan to incorporate irregular warfare,
complex stabilization operations, combating weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and information operations.
Expand the Training Transformation Business Model to consolidate joint train-
ing, prioritize new and emerging missions and exploit virtual and construc-
tive technologies.

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Language and Cultural Skills

Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is also criti-
cal to prevail in the long war and to meet twenty-first century challenges. The
DoD must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key lan-
guages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese and make these languages available at
all levels of action and decision—from the strategic to the tactical. The DoD must
foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and
Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Current and emerging challenges highlight the increasing importance of foreign
area officers, who provide combatant commanders with political-military analy-
sis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness. The military departments will
increase the number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers seconded to
foreign military services, in part by expanding their foreign area officer programs.
This action will foster professional relationships with foreign militaries, develop in-
depth regional expertise, and increase unity of effort among the United States, its
allies and partners. Foreign area officers will also be aligned with lower echelons of
command to apply their knowledge at the tactical level.
To further these language and culture goals, the DoD will:

Increase funding for the Army’s pilot linguist program to recruit and train
native and heritage speakers to serve as translators in the active and reserve
components.
Require language training for Service Academy and Reserve Officer Train-
ing Corps scholarship students and expand immersion programs, semester
abroad study opportunities and interacademy foreign exchanges.
Increase military special pay for foreign language proficiency.
Increase National Security Education Program (NSEP) grants to U.S. elemen-
tary, secondary and post-secondary education programs to expand non-Euro-
pean language instruction.
Establish a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps, composed of approximately one
thousand people, as an on-call cadre of high-proficiency, civilian language
professionals to support the DoD’s evolving operational needs.
Modify tactical and operational plans to improve language and regional train-
ing prior to deployments and develop country and language familiarization
packages and operationally-focused language instruction modules for deploy-
ing forces.

Training and Educating Personnel to

Strengthen Interagency Operations
The ability to integrate the Total Force with personnel from other federal agencies
will be important to reach many U.S. objectives. Accordingly, the DoD supports

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the creation of a National Security Officer (NSO) corps—an interagency cadre of

senior military and civilian professionals able to effectively integrate and orchestrate
the contributions of individual government agencies on behalf of larger national
security interests.
Much as the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that senior officers complete a
joint duty assignment has contributed to integrating the different cultures of the
military departments into a more effective joint force, the QDR recommends cre-
ating incentives for senior department and non-department personnel to develop
skills suited to the integrated interagency environment.
The DoD will also transform the National Defense University, its premier edu-
cational institution, into a true National Security University. Acknowledging the
complexity of the twenty-first century security environment, this new institution
will be tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national secu-
rity profession. Participation from interagency partners will be increased and the
curriculum will be reshaped in ways that are consistent with a unified U.S. govern-
ment approach to national security missions, and greater interagency participation
will be encouraged.

Designing an Information Age Human Capital Strategy

To compete effectively with the civilian sector for highly qualified personnel to
build the Total Force, the DoD must have both a modern Human Capital Strategy
and the authorities required to recruit, shape and sustain the force it needs.
The new Human Capital Strategy focuses on developing the right mix of people
and skills across the Total Force. The DoD’s Human Capital Strategy may be con-
sidered “competency-focused” and “performance-based.” It is based on an in-depth
study of the competencies U.S. forces require and the performance standards to
which they must be developed. Each of the military departments will map the
array of competencies and performance criteria that constitute its forces and also
evaluate and improve personnel development processes to achieve those standards.
Advancements, awards and compensation may then be linked to an individual’s
performance rather than to longevity or time-in-grade. This will better align incen-
tives to outputs and reward excellence.
To execute the Human Capital Strategy, the DoD will establish a single Pro-
gram Executive Office responsible for the consolidated Personnel Reporting/Man-
agement System and management of the strategy as a major defense program. Once
implemented, the Human Capital Strategy will be integrated into a consolidated
personnel tracking and management system capable of linking all department
competencies to manpower, training and education.
The DoD also needs to ensure suitable promotion and development opportuni-
ties are available to attract and retain the best and brightest military and civilian per-
sonnel. The department’s career advancement philosophy should foster innovation

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by encouraging career patterns that develop the unique skills needed to meet new
missions such as irregular warfare. New career patterns might include seconding
young officers, noncommissioned officers and civil servants to work within allied
and partners’ militaries or ministries of defense or to serve on long-term assign-
ments in key strategic regions of the world rather than assuming the traditional
career path of multiple, short-term assignments. The DoD will provide further
incentives and improve advancement opportunities in key career fields, including
foreign area officers, trainers, advisors and linguists, as well as in other mission
areas that are taking on greater importance, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and
information and space operations. In addition to providing incentives for strong
performance and continued service, the Human Capital Strategy’s shaping tools
must also enable discrete, necessary force reductions as well as selective accessions
when a specific skill is called for and not available within the joint force.

National Security Personnel System

The DoD’s civilians are unique in the U.S. government because they are an inte-
gral part of a military organization. Consequently, like the military workforce, the
DoD’s civilians must adapt to changing mission needs. The new National Secu-
rity Personnel System (NSPS) is designed to facilitate the effective management
of the department’s 650,000 civilian personnel in the twenty-first century. The
NSPS addresses three major personnel issues the department faces: staffing the
enterprise to support twenty-first century missions; using compensation to com-
pete more effectively in the broader labor market; and providing civilian support
to contingency operations. The NSPS will incorporate a labor relations system that
recognizes the department’s national security mission and the need to act swiftly to
execute that mission while preserving the collective bargaining rights of employees.
The DoD will begin its transition to the new system by training personnel to imple-
ment the new procedures. The NSPS also recognizes the importance of defense
civilians and the support they provide for contingency operations. It enables civil-
ians to perform inherently governmental functions, freeing military personnel to
perform inherently military functions.
Similarly, implementing the new Department of Defense Instruction Contrac-
tor Personnel Authorized to Accompany U.S. Armed Forces is another step toward
integrating contractors into the Total Force. The department’s policy now directs
that performance of commercial activities by contractors, including contingency
contractors and any proposed contractor logistics support arrangements, shall be
included in operational plans and orders. By factoring contractors into their plan-
ning, combatant commanders can better determine their mission needs.
Taken together, measures to reconfigure the Total Force provide a continuum of
service, build the right skills and design an information age human capital strategy

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will yield a Total Force that is better able to meet the diverse challenges the United
States will face in coming years.

Achieving Unity of Effort

The Department of Defense cannot meet today’s complex challenges alone. Success
requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. government to bring to bear all
elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and
partners abroad. During the QDR, senior leaders considered the changes needed
to enable the DoD to contribute better to such unified efforts. Just as the Second
World War posed immense challenges that spurred joint and combined operations
within the military, today’s environment demands that all agencies of government
become adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy.
This requires much more than mere coordination: the DoD must work hand
in glove with other agencies to execute the National Security Strategy. Interagency
and international combined operations truly are the new joint operations. Support-
ing and enabling other agencies, working toward common objectives, and building
the capacity of partners are indispensable elements of the DoD’s new missions.

Why a New Approach Is Essential

The United States’ experience in the Cold War still profoundly influences the way
that the Department of Defense is organized and executes its mission. But the cold
war was a struggle between nation states, requiring state-based responses to most
political problems and kinetic responses to most military problems. The DoD was
optimized for conventional, large-scale war fighting against the regular, uniformed
armed forces of hostile states.
Today, warfare is increasingly characterized by intrastate violence rather than
conflict between states. Many of the United States’ principal adversaries are informal
networks of non-state actors that are less vulnerable to Cold War-style approaches.
At the same time, many partner nations face internal rather than external threats.
Defeating unconventional enemies requires unconventional approaches. The ability
to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for counterin-
surgency, stabilization and reconstruction, “military diplomacy” and complex inter-
agency coalition operations are essential—but in many cases require new and more
flexible authorities from the Congress.
Authorities developed before the age of the Internet and globalization have not
kept pace with transnational threats from geographically dispersed non-state ter-
rorist and criminal networks. Authorities designed during the Cold War unduly
limit the ability to assist police forces or interior ministries and are now less appli-
cable. Adversaries’ use of new technologies and methods has outstripped traditional

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concepts of national and international security. Traditional mechanisms for cre-

ating and sustaining international cooperation are not sufficiently agile to dis-
aggregate and defeat adversary networks at the global, regional and local levels
simultaneously.
Supporting the rule of law and building civil societies where they do not exist
today, or where they are in their infancy, is fundamental to winning the long war.
In this sense, today’s environment resembles a challenge that is different in kind,
but similar in scale, to the Cold War—a challenge so immense that it requires
major shifts in strategic concepts for national security and the role of military
power. Therefore, the United States needs to develop new concepts and methods
for interagency and international cooperation.

Strategic and Operational Frameworks

Unity of effort requires that strategies, plans and operations be closely coordinated
with partners. At the operational level, the United States must be able to prevent or
disrupt adversaries’ ability to plan and execute operations rather than being forced
to respond to attacks after they have occurred. Adversaries using asymmetric tac-
tics are global, adaptive and fleeting, thus analyses, decisions and actions to defeat
them must also be swift. But for swift action to be fashioned and effective, it must
occur within well-coordinated strategic and operational frameworks. Authorities,
procedures and practices must permit the seamless integration of federal, state and
local capabilities at home and among allies, partners and non-governmental orga-
nizations abroad.
Drawing on operational experience and lessons learned over the last four years,
the QDR examined changes within and beyond the DoD to strengthen unity of
effort. Improved interagency and international planning, preparation and execu-
tion will allow faster and more effective action in dealing with twenty-first century
challenges. New modes of cooperation can enhance agility and effectiveness with
traditional allies and engage new partners in a common cause. Initiating efforts to
better understand and engage those who support the murderous ideology of terror-
ists and the evolution of states at strategic crossroads will be critical.

Strengthening Interagency Operations

Increasing unity of effort to achieve the nation’s security policy priorities across
the agencies of the federal government is essential. Only with coherent, leveraged
U.S. government action can the nation achieve true unity of effort with interna-
tional partners. To address more effectively many security challenges, the DoD is
continuing to shift its emphasis from department-centric approaches toward inter-
agency solutions. Cooperation across the federal government begins in the field
with the development of shared perspectives and a better understanding of each

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agency’s role, missions and capabilities. This will complement better understanding
and closer cooperation in Washington, and will extend to execution of complex
operations. To that end, the DoD supports improvements to strategy development
and planning within the department and with its interagency partners. The QDR
recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the
development of both military and nonmilitary plans and institutional capabili-
ties. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles
and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would
help federal departments and agencies to better align their strategy, budget and
planning functions with national objectives. Stronger linkages among planners in
the military departments, the combatant commands and the Joint Staff , with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and with other departments should ensure that
operations better reflect the president’s National Security Strategy and country’s
policy goals.

Learning from the Field

Closer relationships between parent agencies in Washington and elsewhere support
increased collaboration in the field. Solutions developed in the field often have appli-
cability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience
shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with
common challenges in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and
seamlessly to achieve team objectives.
For the DoD, joint war fighters—the combatant commanders and leaders of
deployed joint task forces—are the primary level at which unity of effort develops.
For most other agencies, the U.S. chief of mission in a specific country, leading an
interagency country team, has an important field leadership role. Creating opportu-
nities to help enable combatant commanders (whose purview extends across many
countries) to work more collaboratively with chiefs of mission (who focus on only
one country) is one objective. Currently, personnel in the Department of State and
Department of Defense must expend considerable effort, on a case-by-case basis, to
act together in support of operations. The result is that commanders and chiefs of
mission lose agility in the face of an adaptive adversary, fleeting targets are missed,
and risks to U.S. interests and those of our partners increase.

Complex Interagency Operations Abroad

The president’s National Security Presidential Directive designating the Secre-
tary of State to improve overall U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction
efforts recognizes the challenges of achieving unity of effort for complex overseas
contingencies. Although many U.S. government organizations possess knowledge
and skills needed to perform tasks critical to complex operations, they are often

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not chartered or resourced to maintain deployable capabilities. Thus, the DoD has
tended to become the default responder during many contingencies. This is a short-
term necessity, but the Defense Department supports legislation to enable other
agencies to strengthen their capabilities so that balanced interagency operations
become more feasible—recognizing that other agencies’ capabilities and perfor-
mance often play a critical role in allowing the DoD to achieve its mission.
Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical
to the long war on terrorism, the DoD issued guidance in 2005 to place stability
operations on par with major combat operations within the department. The direc-
tive calls for improving the department’s ability to work with interagency partners,
international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to increase
capacities to participate in complex operations abroad. When implemented, the
DoD will be able to provide better support to civilian-led missions, or to lead stabi-
lization operations when appropriate.
The QDR supports efforts to expand the expeditionary capacity of agency
partners. In addition, increased coordination between geographic combatant com-
mands and interagency partners in the field will increase overall effectiveness. The
department proposes a number of policy and legislative initiatives to improve unity
of effort for complex interagency operations abroad, providing greater presidential
flexibility in responding to security challenges. The DoD will:

Support substantially increased resources for the Department of State’s Coor-

dinator for Reconstruction and Stability and State’s associated proposal
to establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response
Fund.
Support broader presidential authorities to redirect resources and task the best-
situated agencies to respond, recognizing that other government agencies may
be best suited to provide necessary support in overseas emergencies. This new
authority would enable the U.S. government to capitalize on inherent compe-
tencies of individual agencies to tailor a more effective immediate response.
Strengthen internal DoD mechanisms for interagency coordination.
Improve its ability to assess the relative benefits of security cooperation activities
to enable better resource allocation decisions.
Strengthen its regional centers to become U.S. government assets in support of
government outreach to regional opinion makers.

Complex Interagency Operations at Home

Unified interagency efforts are no less important at home. The DoD must work
as part of a unified interagency effort with the Department of Homeland Security
and other federal, state and local agencies to address threats to the U.S. homeland.
Moreover, the response to Hurricane Katrina vividly illustrated the need for the

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DoD to support other agencies in the context of complex interagency operations

at home.
The QDR recommends several actions to improve unity of effort with other
federal agencies, state and local governments to improve homeland defense and
homeland security. The DoD will:

In partnership with Department of Homeland Security, develop a National

Homeland Security Plan clarifying the optimum distribution of effort among
federal agencies for prevention, preparation and response.
Expand training programs to accommodate planners from other agencies and,
working with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency
partners, offer assistance to develop new courses on developing and imple-
menting strategic-level plans for disaster assistance, consequence manage-
ment and catastrophic events.
Partner with the Department of Homeland Security to design and facilitate full-
scope interagency homeland defense and civil support exercises, leveraging
the Defense Department’s experience in planning and training. The exer-
cises will be conducted in near-real-world conditions, with civilian and mili-
tary participation from national, state and local government agencies. These
exercises should help to yield common understandings of assigned roles and
responsibilities, and shared practice in complex planning and operations.
At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, organize and sponsor
homeland defense tabletop exercises, in which senior leaders from civilian
and military agencies practice responses to disaster scenarios.
Continue consultations with our neighbors to address security and defense issues
of common concern, while ensuring coordination with the Department of
Homeland Security.

Working with International Allies and Partners

Long-standing alliance relationships will continue to underpin unified efforts to
address twenty-first century security challenges. These established relationships
continue to evolve, ensuring their relevance even as new challenges emerge. The
ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global
environment is fundamental to defeating terrorist networks. Wherever possible,
the United States works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capa-
bilities, building their capacity and developing mechanisms to share the risks and
responsibilities of today’s complex challenges.
The nation’s alliances provide a foundation for working to address common
security challenges. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remains the
cornerstone of transatlantic security and makes manifest the strategic solidarity of
democratic states in Europe and North America. NATO is evolving through the

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  69

addition of seven new allies, the Partnership for Peace Program, the creation of the
NATO Response Force, the establishment of the new Allied Command Transfor-
mation, the Alliance’s leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. In many European allied
states, however, aging and shrinking populations are curbing defense spending on
capabilities they need for conducting operations effectively alongside U.S. forces. In
the Pacific, alliances with Japan, Australia, Korea and others promote bilateral and
multilateral engagement in the region and cooperative actions to address common
security threats. India is also merging as a great power and a key strategic partner.
Close cooperation with these partners in the long war on terrorism, as well as in
efforts to counter WMD proliferation and other nontraditional threats, ensures the
continuing need for these alliances and for improving their capabilities.
The DoD will continue to strengthen traditional allied operations, with
increased emphasis on collective capabilities to plan and conduct stabilization,
security, transition and reconstruction operations. In particular, the DoD supports
efforts to create a NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability and a Euro-
pean constabulary force. The United States will work to strengthen allied capabili-
ties for the long war and countering WMD. The United States, in concert with
allies, will promote the aim of tailoring national military contributions to best
employ the unique capabilities and characteristics of each ally, achieving a unified
effort greater than the sum of its parts.
Consistent with the president’s emphasis on the need to prevent, rather than be
forced to respond to, attacks, the DoD recommends that the United States con-
tinue to work with its allies to develop approaches, consistent with their domestic
laws and applicable international law, to disrupt and defeat transnational threats
before they mature. Concepts and constructs enabling unity of effort with more
than seventy supporting nations under the Proliferation Security Initiative should
be extended to domains other than WMD proliferation, including cyberspace, as
a priority.
To prevent terrorist attacks or disrupt their networks, to deny them sanctuary
anywhere in the world, to separate terrorists from host populations and ultimately
to defeat them, the United States must also work with new international partners in
less familiar areas of the world. This means the DoD must be prepared to develop a
new team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions
of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign lan-
guages and cultures and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner
interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence—rather
than through military force alone. To support this effort, new authorities are
needed. During the Cold War the legal authorities for military action, intelligence,
foreign military assistance and cooperation with foreign police and security services
were separately defined and segregated from each other. Today, there is a need for
U.S. forces to transition rapidly between these types of authorities in an agile and
flexible manner, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

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Based on operational experiences of the last four years, the QDR recommends
that Congress provide considerably greater flexibility in the U.S. government’s abil-
ity to partner directly with nations in fighting terrorists. For some nations, this
begins with training, equipping and advising their security forces to generate stabil-
ity and security within their own borders. For others, it may entail providing some
assistance with logistics support, equipment, training and transport to allow them
to participate as members of coalitions with the United States or its allies in stabil-
ity, security, transition and reconstruction operations around the globe.
Recent legislative changes remove some of the impediments to helping partners
engaged in their own defense, but greater flexibility is urgently needed. The DoD
will seek to:

Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund and, as appropriate,

stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night
vision devices for use by coalition partners.
Expand department authority to provide logistics support, supplies and services
to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement as necessary, to enable
coalition operations with U.S. forces.
Expand department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition
partners for use in military operations in which they are participating with
U.S. forces.
Expand the authorities of the Departments of State and Defense to train and
equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations. These may be nonmilitary law enforcement or
other security forces of the government in some nations.

The DoD will continue to support initiatives, such as the Global Peace Opera-
tions Initiative, to increase the capacity of international organizations so that they
can contribute more effectively to the improvement of governance and the expan-
sion of civil society in the world. In this regard, the DoD supports the African
Union’s development of a humanitarian crisis intervention capability, which is
a good example of an international organization stepping up to the challenge of
regional stabilization missions. The DoD stands ready to increase its assistance to
the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in areas of the depart-
ment’s expertise, such as doctrine, training, strategic planning and management.

Transforming Foreign Assistance

Foreign military assistance missions during the Cold War were largely designed to
shore up friendly regimes against external threats. Today, the aim is for partners to
govern and police themselves effectively. Assistance in today’s environment relies
on the ability to improve states’ governance, administration, internal security and

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  71

the rule of law in order to build partner governments’ legitimacy in the eyes of
their own people and thereby inoculate societies against terrorism, insurgency and
nonstate threats. In partnership with the State Department and others, the DoD
must become as adept at working with foreign constabularies as it is with externally
focused armed forces, and as adept at working with interior ministries as it is with
defense ministries—a substantial shift of emphasis that demands broader and more
flexible legal authorities and cooperative mechanisms.
Bringing all the elements of U.S. power to bear to win the long war requires
overhauling traditional foreign assistance and export control activities and laws.
These include foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction, foreign police training, international military education and train-
ing (IMET) and, where necessary, providing advanced military technologies to
foreign allies and partners. In particular, winning the long war requires strengthen-
ing the ability of the DoD to train and educate current and future foreign military
leaders at institutions in the United States. Doing so is critical to strengthening
partnerships and building personal relationships. In all cases, they are integral to
successful irregular warfare operations.
For example, quick action to relieve civilian suffering, train security forces to
maintain civil order and restore critical civilian infrastructure denies the enemy
opportunities to capitalize on the disorder immediately following military opera-
tions and sets more favorable conditions for longer-term stabilization, transition and
reconstruction. Full integration of allied and coalition capabilities ensures unity of
effort for rapidly evolving counterinsurgency operations. Similarly, foreign leaders
who receive U.S. education and training help their governments understand U.S.
values and interests, fostering willingness to unite in a common cause.
The QDR found that, with the exception of legislation applicable only to opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq, existing authorities governing planning, financing
and use of these instruments for shaping international partnerships do not accom-
modate the dynamic foreign policy demands of the twenty-first century. Based
on recent operational experience, the DoD seeks a continuum of authorities from
Congress balancing the need to act quickly in the war on terrorism with the need to
integrate military power to meet long-term, enduring foreign policy objectives.
The DoD recommends a number of important legislative changes in the near
term, while also working in close partnership with the Department of State and
the Congress to enable better alignment of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms
Export Control Act with today’s security challenges. In addition to expanding coali-
tion management authorities, the DoD seeks to:

Institutionalize OIF/OEF authorities to conduct humanitarian assistance and

stability operations.
Significantly improve and increase IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping
relationships and developing future foreign leaders.

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 72  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Consider whether the restrictions on the American Service Members Protection

Act (ASPA) on IMET and other foreign assistance programs pertaining
to security and the war on terror necessitate adjustment as we continue to
advance the aims of the ASPA.
Expand the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program beyond its current focus
on senior-level government officials and national strategic issues. Combatant
commanders and U.S. chiefs of mission, in consultation with regional part-
ners, will develop education programs to improve regional counterterrorism
campaigns and crisis response planning at the operational level.

Strategic Communication
Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the
United States and its international partners. Effective communication must build
and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis
on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds. Such cred-
ibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological support for
terrorism.
Responsibility for strategic communication must be government-wide and the
QDR supports efforts led by the Department of State to improve integration of
this vital element of national power into strategies across the federal government.
The DoD must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture,
developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support combatant
commanders that reflect the U.S. government’s overall strategic objectives. To this
end, the DoD will work to integrate communications efforts horizontally across
the enterprise to link information and communication issues with broader policies,
plans and actions.
The QDR identified capability gaps in each of the primary supporting capabili-
ties of Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, Military Diplomacy
and Information Operations, including Psychological Operations. To close those
gaps, the DoD will focus on properly organizing, training, equipping and resourc-
ing the key communication capabilities. This effort will include developing new
tools and processes for assessing, analyzing and delivering information to key audi-
ences as well as improving linguistic skills and cultural competence. These primary
supporting communication capabilities will be developed with the goal of achiev-
ing a seamless communication across the U.S. government.

Summary
The United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national
security objectives discussed in this chapter by military means alone. Instead, the

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 Reshaping the Defense Enterprise  n  73

application of unified statecraft, at the federal level and in concert with allies and
international partners, is critical. In addition to coalition- and partner-supported
combat and preventive operations, simultaneous effective interaction with civilian
populations will be essential to achieve success. Authorities that permit nimble
and adaptive policies, processes and institutions—domestic and international—are
essential adjuncts to the military capability needed to address the rapidly evolving
security challenges around the globe.

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DK3629.indb 74 11/7/07 8:32:56 AM
 Chapter 5

Strategic Planning by the

Chairmen, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1990 to 2005

Richard Meinhart

Introduction
Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to
position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation,
while simultaneously focusing on future challenges. This chapter examines how
four Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Colin L. Powell (1989–1993), John
M. Shalikashvili (1993–1997), Henry Hugh Shelton (1997–2001) and Richard B.
Myers (2001–2005)—used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their
statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 U.S. Code and respond to the strategic
environment. As the 1990s progressed, the first three chairmen were faced with
responding to a strategic environment that started with the Gulf War and was fol-
lowed by an increasing number of regional military operations across the spectrum
of conflict, while accommodating slowly declining financial resources and a one-
third decline in force structure. Since 2000, and particularly after September 11,
2001, the last two chairmen were faced with entirely different strategic challenges

 This chapter does not reflect the views of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense
or the United States Army War College.

75

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 76  n  Handbook of Military Administration

dominated by the focus on terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while
needing to transform by developing future capabilities to achieve full spectrum
dominance.
In focusing on how these four leaders used a strategic planning system, this
chapter briefly describes the chairman’s responsibilities, as well as the Joint Staff’s
key organizational characteristics. Both the leader’s focus and the organization’s
characteristics will influence how a strategic planning system is used. The author
then examines how the strategic planning system evolved to better meet each chair-
man’s needs. This planning system produced many products related to assessment,
vision, strategy, resources and plans. These products will be described for their
broad impact and influence. Because many of these products are classified, the
assessments will have to be brief. The author then summarizes the more significant
ways each chairman used this strategic planning system, which is part of his lead-
ership legacy. Although this comprehensive assessment of each chairman’s use of
strategic planning has historical relevance, its main value is that today’s leaders can
learn from these four leaders how they used systems and processes differently to
respond to their complex global environment and varied strategic challenges. Dur-
ing this assessment, specific leadership concepts are illustrated throughout, includ-
ing how leaders use vision, how leaders balance flexibility and structure in strategic
planning processes and products, how leaders use strategic planning to respond to
different types of global environment challenges, and how leaders use systems to
influence an organization’s climate and culture. Hence, this chapter concludes by
identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders can employ when using
strategic planning.

Chairman’s Responsibilities
Congress specified the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s formal leadership respon-
sibilities in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 153, under the following descriptive sub-
headings:1 (1) strategic direction; (2) strategic planning; (3) contingency planning
and preparedness; (4) advice on requirements, programs, and budget; (5) doctrine,
training, and education; and (6) Other matters. These increased responsibilities were
a result of the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(GNA), which is considered the most significant piece of defense legislation since
the National Security Defense Act of 1947 established the Defense Department.2 The
GNA was the result of almost four years of contentious dialogue and debate among
Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan
administration on how best to organize the Defense Department fundamentally
to strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, pro-
vide for more efficient use of resources, and better execute in the field to respond
to the nation’s security challenges.3 Since the U.S. Code was changed to incorpo-
rate the GNA’s provisions, the major functions and broad wording describing the

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  77

chairman’s key responsibilities fundamentally have remained the same, but there
have been a few additions. These additions are associated with reports required by
Congress, which were not envisioned in 1986, to assist members with their over-
sight and resource responsibilities. For example, the chairman must now produce
an annual report on combatant command requirements about the time when the
budget is submitted to Congress. Most significantly, the National Defense Authori-
zation Act of 2004 (NDAA) required that the chairman produce, by February 15 of
every even-numbered year, a detailed report that is a biennial review of the National
Military Strategy to include the strategic and military risks to execute that strategy.4
This 2004 Act cleared up ambiguity that existed as to whether the chairman actu-
ally needed to produce a National Military Strategy and what it should encompass.
This change to existing U.S. Code is an example where the chairman’s responsibili-
ties initially were broad and identified “what” he had to do versus “how” to do it.
But if Congress is not satisfied with execution or information, then the subsequent
Code becomes more specific.
To help with executing his responsibilities, the Joint Staff now directly supports
the chairman, an important distinction emphasized in the GNA. The Joint Staff
has a budget of under $700 million and consists of approximately 700 military
officers, 210 enlisted members and 195 civilians, which is about a 15 percent mili-
tary reduction from 2000.5 Further, there are others, such as those in the Defense
Intelligence Agency or contractors, who work alongside this staff to support their
focused work directly. The chairmen used a well-documented strategic planning
system, which formally changed four different times (1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999),
to help them execute the first four formal responsibilities identified earlier.6 The
importance of this planning system is reflected by the words “primary” and “for-
mal,” which appeared in the beginning of all Joint Staff guidance that described the
desired impact of its products and processes.
The chairman’s strategic planning system creates products to integrate defense
processes and influence others related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources and
plans.7 This planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people
and organizations above the chairman (president and secretary of defense) and the
people and organizations with whom he directly coordinates (services and com-
batant commanders). The chairman has no control over any significant defense
resources (secretary of defense and services control resources) or direct control of
operational military forces (combatant commanders control operational forces);
however, orders to those forces flow through him. The chairman formally influ-
ences his civilian leaders and those with whom he coordinates through this strategic
planning system. In addition to influencing leaders, this system provides specific
direction for many staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system
is a key function that integrates the nation’s military strategy, plans and resources
consisting of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total
defense outlays of $290 billion in 2000 that increased to $465 billion by 2005.8

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 78  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Strategic Challenges, Culture and Structure

Strategic challenges can affect both a leader’s and staff’s use of a strategic planning
system. The major challenges the chairmen faced in the 1990s were characterized
by the following: global competition and regional instability, increased military
operations across the spectrum of conflict, slowly declining financial and per-
sonnel resources, rising maintenance and infrastructure costs, Cold War-focused
equipment, and a need to infuse new technology. Since 2000, with the secretary
of defense’s initial focus on transformation, followed shortly by the global war on
terror and then the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, these challenges signifi-
cantly changed in scope and character. To meet these new challenges, there was an
increase of financial resources and better integrated technology, but there was no
military manpower growth.9
Each chairman generally used a consensus and collaborative leadership style
when dealing with civilian and military leaders, but there were differences in their
style and focus.10 This style and focus can have important influences on their orga-
nization’s climate and culture. What they pay attention to, what they say and what
organizational systems they use can embed and reinforce a certain culture within
their organization.11 The chairman establishes his unique “joint” climate that has
been shaped by years of service culture and experiences. The other joint chiefs,
who serve dually as their separate military service chiefs, may embrace that joint
climate. But they are also steeped in their service culture and have specific service
interests and Title 10 responsibilities they must articulate and sometimes defend.
For example, each service chief routinely identified unfunded needs to improve
effectiveness. The officers on the Joint Staff, who have specific joint responsibilities
among the eight staff directorates, only serve in this joint climate between two and
three years before most return to their respective services. Although developing a
joint culture was difficult, a strategic planning system can be an important rein-
forcing mechanism leaders can use to change existing culture.
In addition to these culture issues, there are multiple structural layers between
the highest and the lowest levels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A strategic planning
system must integrate the focused interests within these levels. For example, to
process a typical Joint Staff action, there are between four and six layers where
an issue will be scrutinized and revised to respond to these focused interests. This
occurs typically as the staff action flows from action officer to division chief to the
first general officer to Joint Staff director to director Joint Staff and, finally, to vice
chairman or chairman. Within these structural layers are the historic cultural influ-
ences officers bring with them when working on or with this staff for a short time.
Hence, a strategic planning system must be both inclusive and flexible enough to
accommodate these staff structural realities, while being responsive to the leader’s
needs. Table 5.1 summarizes these strategic planning challenges and decision-mak-
ing influences.

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  79

Table 5.1  Key Challenges and Decision-Making Influences

Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990-2005
1990s Challenges 2000s Challenges
A. Regional competition and threats A. Global War on Terror
B. Gulf War B. Iraq and Afghanistan
C. Greater number of military C. Continued global engagements
operations
D. Declining financial and personnel D. Increasing financial resources
resources
E. Need to integrate technology E. Need to transform capabilities
F. Well maintained Cold War F. Updated but worn equipment
equipment
Decision-Making Influences
A. Chairman uses consensus and collaborative leadership style with little
direct control
B. Joint climate versus service’s unique culture
C. Financial focus on effectiveness
D. Four to six structural layers to process actions

Strategic Planning System Changes

Having identified the leader’s challenge, culture and structure as they influence
strategic planning, this chapter now focuses on the changes to the planning system
itself to give one insight into its use. There were four formal changes to the strategic
planning system in 1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999. Although the 1999 version is the
current chairman’s operation instruction in 2005, it has not been completely fol-
lowed and is currently being revised. These formal changes, along with the current
system in use, will be examined.

1989 Status
Prior to 1990 there was a realization that the strategic planning system, as specified
in the January 24, 1989, Memorandum of Policy No. 84, was not accomplishing its
purpose to enable the chairman to execute fully his increased 1986 GNA respon-
sibilities. This memorandum, the seventeenth revision since 1952, was described
as “unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic, and produced no less than ten major
documents every two-year planning cycle.”12 Congress criticized the strategic plan-
ning process itself during hearings that led to passing the GNA. Hence, the Joint
Staff’s director of Strategy and Planning was tasked to “… undertake an end-to-end

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 80  n  Handbook of Military Administration

evaluation of the products which are created by the Joint Strategic Planning System
to seek further opportunities in the cogency and timeliness of the process and prod-
ucts.”13 Such a comprehensive evaluation was the exception and not the norm.

1990 Change
The outcome of this complete system overhaul culminated with Memorandum of
Policy No. 7, dated January 30, 1990.14 This change streamlined the system by
adding front-end leader’s guidance and eliminating or combining many other
documents into more concise products, as ten products were reduced to four. The
front-end guidance was provided through a formal joint strategy review for “…
gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy,
operational planning, and program assessments,”15 that culminated in publishing
its first product— Chairman’s Guidance. This concise document (six to ten pages)
was structured to provide the principal, initial guidance in support of develop-
ing the planning system’s next three documents: the National Military Strategy
Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Chairman’s Program Assessment.
This system, although streamlined, still required that a classified National Military
Strategy Document (NMSD) be produced under a rigid two-year cycle with several
parts, one of which was called National Military Strategy. In addition, there were
several separate functional annexes added to this document, such as intelligence
and research and development that totaled hundreds of pages. One annex alone
had eleven chapters, thirteen tables, and fifteen tabs. The part of the NMSD called
the National Military Strategy (also classified) was sent to the secretary of defense
for review, forwarded to the president for approval, and then returned to influ-
ence defense resource guidance. As will be later described, only the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan was produced as specified in the memorandum; the other three
documents were changed significantly during execution. These changes enabled the
chairman to respond more nimbly to the strategic environment, then dominated by
the Soviet Union’s demise and the Gulf War’s quick completion.

1993 Change
The next revision to the organization’s planning system culminated with publica-
tion of a change to Memorandum of Policy No. 7 in 1993.16 This change essentially
codified what had been executed in previous years rather than designing a new sys-
tem. Major revisions, which built on these practices, included placing more focus
on long-range planning overall by requiring formal environmental scanning, issu-
ing the National Military Strategy as an unclassified document designed to commu-
nicate with the American people rather than providing internal military direction,
and establishing a Joint Planning Document to sharpen the chairman’s advice to
the secretary of defense on budget issues. The process and product, called the Joint

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  81

Strategic Capabilities Plan, which provided guidance to combatant commanders to

develop plans to execute the strategy in the field, remained fairly constant.

1997 Change
The next major revision to the strategic planning system occurred in 1997 and again
reflected execution changes the chairman instituted in prior years.17 The chairman
needed to provide better resource advice and long-range direction to enable defense
leaders to make needed mission or weapon system trade-offs required by fiscally
constrained defense budgets. His planning system did not provide him this ability.
To correct this problem, in 1994 General Shalikashvili expanded the charter of the
existing Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).18 This council, chaired
by his vice chairman and including the services’ vice chairmen, was empowered to
assess specific war-fighting areas. This expanded charter created analytical rigor in
an inclusive review process to shape mission or weapon system decisions among the
services. It provided recommendations that later appeared in a new leader-focused
resource document called the Chairman’s Program Recommendation. The older
chairman’s assessment was retained. In 1996, General Shalikashvili published the
first chairman’s vision, Joint Vision 2010, a thirty-four-page document designed
to provide the conceptual template to channel the vitality of people and lever-
age technology to achieve more effective joint war fighting.19 These two new plan-
ning products were added formally to the planning system’s guidance published in
1997 as a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Memoranda of Policies were
phased out.

1999 Change
The last formal change to the strategic planning system in 1999 did not change any
major processes or products.20 Instead, it focused on Theater Engagement Plans to
integrate the strategy’s “shape” component and to implement the 1996 Joint Vision,
which was a priority General Shelton identified when he became chairman.21 This
decade’s evolution is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1.22 These changes incre-
mentally evolved the strategic planning system from a rigid, Cold War focus at the
start of the decade to a more flexible, vision-oriented and resource-focused system
at the decade’s end.

The 2005 System

Although there have been no official changes to the 1999 chairman’s operating
instruction that describes the strategic planning system as of November 2005, it
has not been completely followed during General Myers’ tenure. Three strategic

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 82  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Evolution of the JSPS

Pre-1989
Cold War 1990 – 1992 1993 1997 & 99

JIEP-SPD Long Range

Joint Vision
Vision Paper
JSPD-PG JSR When Needed
2010 & 20
JSR
JSPD-PF
CG JSR Report JSR Report
JSPD (2 Years) CG Annually Annually

CNASP NMSD
-NMS NMS When Needed
NMS As Needed
-Annexes
IPSP (2 Years)
JPD 2 Years JPD Annual
JSAM
JSCP
JSCP When Needed JSCP Bi-Annual
JSCP (2 Years)
CPA CPA 2 Years
JIEP-SCP CPR Annual
(2 Years)

JPAM CPA Annual

JSR = Joint Strategy Review JPD = Joint Planning Document

CG = Chairman’s Guidance JSCP = Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
CPA = Chairman’s Program Assessment
NMS = National Military Strategy
CPR = Chairman’s Program Recommendation

Figure 5.1  Evolution of strategic planning system.

planning documents have been added, two were deleted, and four retained. The
three new products added from the 1999 revision were: National Military Strategic
Plan for the War on Terrorism, Chairman’s Risk Assessment and the Joint Operations
Concepts (changed to Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in August 2005). The
two strategic planning products deleted were the joint vision (vision is now embed-
ded in the strategy) and the Joint Planning Document (staff resource advice). The
unclassified strategy, two leader-focused resource documents, and the war planning
guidance remained the same. As the 1999 operating instruction is currently under
revision, the next one will be influenced by these practical changes and a recent
study on strategic planning by the Institute for Defense Analysis. These strategic
planning system changes as of June 2005 and integrating relationships are depicted
in Figure 5.2.23

Strategic Planning Products

The chairman’s strategic planning process described above created many products
to provide formal direction to manage existing demands and respond to future
challenges during this sixteen-year period. As mentioned, there were products
related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources and plans; all subjects identified
in the academic literature as areas that a strategic planning system should address.
The key planning products in each of these major subjects are now discussed for
their broad direction.

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  83

Strategy: Foundation for All Major Processes

LEGEND Planning, Programming and Budgeting

POTUS/NSC Direct Enhanced Planning Process
SecDef/OSD Inform
CJCS/JS Strategic Joint Service
Services Planning Programming POMS
CoComs
Guidance Guidance
CPR CPA
Unified Strategy
Command IPLs
Plan Operational
Joint
Concepts Doctrine
National National National
Security Defense Military JOpsC
Service
Strategy Strategy Strategy Doctrine

Operations Planning
NMSP-WOT

Strategic Contingency CoCom

Assessment Planning JSCP
War
Guidance Plans
Joint Chairman’s
Strategy Risk Security Posture Security
Review Assessment Cooperation Cooperation
Global Force Management
Guidance Plans

Figure 5.2  Strategy: Foundation for all major processes.

Assessment
The chairmen’s assessment of the strategic environment, called the Joint Strategy
Review, became a constant strategic planning product beginning in 1993; however,
it was completed in different ways and with different focuses.24 A separate classi-
fied report was issued frequently, but at other times the intellectual output from
the review process was used to update this system’s strategy or vision documents or
prepare the Joint Staff to support the Quadrennial Defense Review. When a separate
report was produced, it often would identify issues that needed more intense study
or areas where existing strategic planning products needed updating. The chairman
directed what the strategy review would entail prior to its start, hence, this review
responded to strategic issues he needed examined. The strategy review process was
not conducted within the Joint Staff alone, but included representatives from the
services, combatant commands, and appropriate defense organizations.
The process was inclusive in design, allowing ideas to be initially introduced
from an organization’s lower levels, which helped ensure this strategy review had a
broad perspective that resonated with those the chairman influenced. Another type
of assessment, now called the Chairman’s Risk Assessment, has been part of the
strategic planning system since 2000. Earlier, the chairman assessed strategic issues
under the overarching construct of a net assessment, which was loosely defined in
his planning instructions and did not always result in a formal product. In addi-
tion, Congress required the chairman to write an assessment of the secretary of

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defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review, which appeared at this document’s end. The
Chairman’s Risk Assessment started as an annual assessment with the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2000 (NDAA)25 and was modified to require greater
specificity by the 2004 NDAA.26 The chairman is required to conduct a com-
prehensive examination of the strategic and military risk to execute the National
Military Strategy.27 There are defined areas this report must address, along with a
caveat that it must be routed through the secretary of defense if risk is determined
to be significant.

Vision
The strategic planning system’s first two vision documents, Joint Vision 2010 in
1996 and Joint Vision 2020 in 2000, each consisted of about thirty-five pages.28
They were used to identify joint war-fighting requirements ten to fifteen years out
and directly influence service programs to meet those requirements. In organi-
zational terms, this was a way the chairman was trying to embed a joint climate
within the services’ cultures through resource direction. The first vision was cen-
tered on four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement,
focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. It served to focus attention and
leverage technology to achieve better joint interoperability and war fighting. The
second vision directly built upon the first, as it kept the same four operational con-
cepts. But it placed more emphasis on innovation, information, and interagency
coordination to transform the force to be fully joint; now defined as “intellectually,
operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.”29 Both visions had
broad acceptance as service leaders spoke positively about each vision’s influence
in shaping their decisions or their service visions. These two visions were the most
mentioned strategic planning products in the chairman’s annual posture statements
to Congress during this time frame, which is an indicator of their importance.30
The current joint vision is now embedded in three pages of the 2004 National
Military Strategy. This vision built upon the previous joint vision, as it is focused
on the goal of full spectrum dominance, which is defined as “the ability to control
any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”31
Although the chairman’s vision is still specified, its purpose to influence service
resource decisions was replaced by the secretary of defense’s transformation guid-
ance documents in the 2000s, with the services developing transformation plans
to execute this guidance. However, the vision of full spectrum dominance is in
conceptual agreement with the more detailed transformation guidance.
Vision can be focused operationally in addition to being strategic. The chairman’s
Joint Operations Concepts in 2003 and now the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
in 2005 provided an operational war-fighting focus to develop a capabilities-based
joint force.32 This capabilities focus was described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review and later in other defense guidance. The focus of the twenty-eight-page

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  85

Joint Operations Concepts was to articulate the overarching concept for future joint
military operations. It broadly defined the construct for robust subordinate operat-
ing, functional, and enabling concepts to create joint capabilities. The 2005 Cap-
stone Concept for Joint Operations incorporated lessons learned from operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, while looking to the future to develop capabilities to fight
tomorrow’s wars. These operationally focused vision documents, and the substan-
tive complex processes and products developed to implement these concepts, are
encouraging military personnel to think and act jointly. The earlier joint visions,
along with these operationally focused concepts, will complete the joint journey
that began with service deconfliction in the early 1990s, to interoperability in the
mid-1990s, to now emerging interdependence. This is a journey to create a joint
military culture.

Strategy
The chairman’s unclassified National Military Strategy, the key strategic planning
system product, was produced in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2004.33 These four strate-
gies broadly outlined the military’s global challenges, identified the objectives to be
achieved, specified the foundations and principles of military power, and described
the force structure or capabilities to achieve those objectives. This was essentially an
ends, ways, and means paradigm to respond to the ever-changing strategic environ-
ment. In the first three strategies, the service’s force structure was defined broadly
(carrier battle groups, divisions and wings), but with greater specificity as the decade
continued. For example, the 1997 strategy identified the numbers of army regi-
ments and brigades, navy attack submarines, coast guard cutters, and special opera-
tions people. In the 2004 strategy, there was no reference to specific force structure.
Instead, joint force attributes and capabilities were broadly identified, along with a
need to size the force in a 1-4-2-1 construct to accomplish the following: defend the
homeland (1), deter forward in and from four geographic regions (4); conduct two
overlapping swiftly defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign (1).34
This latest approach was designed to provide flexibility for force structure changes
in concert with a capability-based versus a threat-based military focus.
When the 1990s began, the strategy was focused on global war, and the enemy
was the Soviet Union. The 1992 strategy changed the focus to the core mission
of fighting regional wars. The 1995 strategy more broadly encompassed global
engagement across the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping, to peacemaking,
to war. In 1997, the strategy provided a balance between shaping the environment,
responding to the multiple missions and preparing now for the uncertain future.
The words shape, respond and prepare and their concepts appeared in many other
strategic documents, such as the 1997 National Security Strategy and 1997 Qua-
drennial Defense Review. As these strategies changed in the 1990s, the force struc-
ture to accomplish these strategies was reduced by about one-third. In 2004, the

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strategy was simply articulated along three “p” words—“protect the United States
against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise attack, and
prevail against adversaries.”35 Its success rested on the three priorities of winning
the war on terror, enhancing the ability to fight jointly, and transforming the armed
forces through a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments.
In addition to the unclassified national military strategies, there were two clas-
sified strategies produced that were focused on the war on terrorism. In October
2002, Chairman Myers and the secretary of defense issued a National Military
Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism to provide guidance to the military ser-
vices and regional commanders to focus their efforts.36 Later, in March 2005, they
issued an update to that plan. This update, which went through many revisions,
was described in a news article as “… a multipronged strategy that targets eight
pressure points and outlines six methods for attacking terrorist networks.”37

Resources
The chairman’s three resource documents (Joint Planning Document, Chairman’s
Program Recommendation and Chairman’s Program Assessment) expanded in the
mid-1990s as strategic planning processes were developed to influence resource
decisions.38 These resource documents, along with the Defense documents they
were intended to influence, were classified. As the decade progressed, these docu-
ments were focused to enable the chairman to provide more resource influence
and specificity, a requirement emphasized by the GNA. The staff-focused resource
document, Joint Planning Document, was produced biennially starting in 1993. It
went from separate chapters developed by Joint Staff directorates or separate agen-
cies to a fully integrated resource document in 1997 that used the chairman’s vision
and war-fighting assessments to produce integrated resource advice. However, by
decade’s end, this document was no longer published, which perhaps was an indica-
tor of its declining influence.
The planning system’s two leader-focused annual resource documents, Chair-
man’s Program Recommendation and Chairman’s Program Assessment, increased in
influence and specificity starting in the middle 1990s. For example, the Chairman’s
Program Assessment went from a few pages in 1992 to an expanded assessment in
1995 that argued for shifting significant funds and pursuing different approaches
for recapitalization that would readjust up to 12 percent of the defense budget.39
These two leader-focused documents, which reflected the chairman’s style and pri-
orities, were considered personal correspondence between the chairman and the sec-
retary of defense. Hence, they had limited external review and were classified. The
program recommendation was designed to influence the secretary’s initial resource
guidance to the services. The program assessment was designed to enable the chair-
man to assess the services’ Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and influ-
ence budget deliberations that converted the services’ POMs to the defense budget

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  87

submitted to Congress. These two documents, which were shaped by the JROC’s
meetings, were vetted with the service chiefs and combatant commanders instead
of being merely coordinated. They were a formal way the chairman, in addition
to other resource advice, directly advocated the combatant commanders’ require-
ments within the defense processes.

Plans
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was the one constant among all the strategic
planning changes during this sixteen-year period. It continued to have the same
purpose, which was to provide strategic guidance to the combatant commanders
and service chiefs to develop executable plans based on resourced military capa-
bilities to execute the military strategy.40 More specifically, it identified the vari-
ous types of plans that combatant commanders must develop, as this document
integrated higher-level guidance from the president and secretary of defense into a
family of executable plans and apportioned forces based on completed budgets. It
identified the agreed assumptions upon which these plans were based and specified
the numerous functional annexes required by specific plans, such as intelligence,
logistics and mobility. The actual contents of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
were classified, but it evolved during this sixteen-year period as the types of plans
it tasked changed in response to the changing threats and the different military
strategies. For example, in 1990 it specified global (Cold War focused) and regional
plans. They were replaced in 1993 with operational plans (OPLANS), concept plans
(CONPLANs) and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. Later
there was guidance to develop theater engagement plans, which are now called
security cooperation plans. In the 1990s, these products continued to be reviewed
formally for currency within an overall two-year planning cycle, and they were
republished or amended during this cycle. In the 2000s, the intent was to shorten
this planning cycle to one year, and the process by which combatant commanders
develop plans also received additional secretary of defense involvement.

Chairman’s Legacy
General Colin L. Powell (1989–1993)
General Powell greatly simplified strategic planning by reducing the number of
formal planning products from ten to four and increasing the system’s flexibility to
respond to his direction by a concise leader-focused document called Chairman’s
Guidance. He short-circuited the system’s processes, as he did not wait for a com-
pleted environmental assessment specified by his planning system, but issued this
guidance based on a senior commander’s meeting.41 He did not wait for his planning

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system’s structured processes and coordination cycles to produce another classified,

voluminous military strategy document with hundreds of pages of annexes, but pub-
lished an unclassified twenty-seven-page National Military Strategy in 1992 under
his signature. Considered the most significant strategy change since the 1950s, this
strategy’s content, overall coordination and the force structure incorporated within
it were more a result of his interpersonal skills than of a formal strategic planning
process.42 This strategy’s focus on communicating with the American people and
Congress, versus the internal staff advice it provided before, was an important leg-
acy that remains today. In the resource area, whereas his planning system specified
a detailed assessment of service programs not to exceed one hundred seventy-five
pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum.43 Although General Powell
did not use many formal planning processes, he kept some structure. For example,
he used the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and structured processes to keep the
military in the field focused operationally.
Although his strategic planning products clearly addressed the military’s chal-
lenges as identified in the chairman’s annual Posture Statements to Congress, very
few strategic planning products or processes (average five) were mentioned in his
statements. In addition, the word “joint” also was not emphasized in his lexicon,
as this word barely appeared in these same statements.44 As the first chairman fully
under the GNA’s direction, a joint climate had not yet evolved. As he did not follow
his planning system in producing three of its four products, either the system was
not nimble enough to respond to fast-moving challenges, or he preferred a leadership
style in which personal relationships dominated when providing formal advice.

General John M. Shalikashvili (1993–1997)

General Shalikashvili used the strategic planning system markedly differently than
his predecessor. He kept the flexibility and simplicity his predecessor established by
limiting the strategy’s complexity, but he emphasized using the planning processes
to develop it. For example, his two national military strategies in 1995 and 1997
were coordinated fully within the planning system’s processes, and other strategic
planning products were used in their development. He kept the same structure in
war planning as his predecessor, but he expanded its focus by requiring new the-
ater engagement plans to more fully implement his 1997 strategy’s “shape” compo-
nent. General Shalikashvili went farther in providing long-term strategic direction,
when he published the chairman’s first vision in 1996, and later included it in the
planning system. He used considerable interpersonal skills, which included send-
ing personal notes to his colleagues and personally reviewing every recommended
change to develop this vision.45 He used this same strategic planning system to start
an implementing process for the vision. He also fostered a close relationship with
defense officials using the strategic planning system through his consensus and
process-focused decision style. For example, his vision gained wide acceptance with

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  89

civilian and military leaders, aspects of it appeared in Defense resource documents,

and his environment assessment helped focus the initial work of the Department of
Defense’s first Quadrennial Defense Review.46
General Shalikashvili expanded strategic planning in the resource areas, as he
added a short leader-focused document called the Chairman’s Program Recommen-
dation that continues today. He used his vice chairman to expand by roughly a
factor of ten the amount of time spent by the JROC to access programs analytically
and provide resource recommendations that appeared in his two leader-focused
resource documents.47 Using outputs from this council, his resource advice to the
secretary of defense grew in content and influence. He mentioned strategic plan-
ning products and processes in his annual Posture Statements to Congress an aver-
age of fifteen times versus his predecessor’s average of five. He also mentioned the
word joint or derivatives of that word about twenty-five times during these posture
statements, which is an indicator of his focus.48 Perhaps his most important legacy
was that his vision, process-focused strategic planning system and joint emphasis
embedded a joint climate within his staff and those he influenced. This established
the foundation for today’s joint thinking.

General Henry Hugh Shelton (1997–2001)

General Shelton used the strategic planning system in a very process-oriented
manner. No substantive changes were made to this system overall, but he focused
on using it to promote evolutionary changes to the military and provide difficult
resource recommendations. Similar to his predecessors, he kept the heavily struc-
tured war planning document and processes relatively untouched, but he more fully
integrated theater engagement plans within the planning processes. He defined a
process to implement his predecessor’s joint vision by identifying twenty-first cen-
tury challenges and the desired operating capabilities to meet them, while provid-
ing direction to conduct vision-related experiments.49 In 2000, during the later
part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning processes to update formally
the joint vision to better incorporate concepts associated with leveraging the infor-
mation component, encouraging more innovation, and using the interagency to
help resolve strategic issues.50 He also improved the process and timeliness of the
leader-focused strategic planning resource recommendations to defense leaders. He
elevated the work of the JROC and the associated processes to be more strategic
in nature.51 He used his resources and leadership influence to more directly sup-
port quality of life programs for military people and their families, the importance
of which was specifically covered in his Congressional Posture Statements.52 For
example, he mentioned strategic planning products and processes an average of
twenty-two times and the word “joint” forty-four times in these posture statements,
which were indicators of his process and joint leadership focus.53 Most importantly,
he clearly continued the joint focus. He built on General Shalikashvili’s work to

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embed that joint climate more strongly and perhaps establish the beginning of a
joint culture within his staff and the services.

General Richard B. Myers (2001–2005)

General Myers faced a more challenging strategic environment caused by the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attack. His environment was dominated by the operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the global war on terror that continues today.
If this was not enough, the need to transform in stride also occupied his and his
staff’s energy. These challenges caused him to modify significantly the strategic
planning system he inherited. He referenced strategic planning processes and prod-
ucts more than any other chairman, illustrating the importance he placed on this
system.54 These modifications, which involved three new strategy-related products,
have not yet been codified in a chairman’s strategic planning instruction. However,
instructions have been published that specify the processes used by the JROC and
establish new Functional Capability Boards that shape issues before the JROC. The
programs this council reviewed also greatly expanded, which provided greater joint
inclusiveness in his resource advice.55 To illustrate this greater inclusiveness, the
Functional Capability Boards review all programs with a joint impact, instead of
those with large dollar criteria only, and members of defense agencies or even other
government agencies, such as Homeland Security, can attend meetings associated
with these programs.
The strategy parts of his strategic planning system differed most from those
of his predecessors. He and the secretary of defense produced a separate classified
strategy focused on the war on terrorism in 2002 and updated it in 2005 to bet-
ter link the military element to the many other national strategies associated with
combating terrorism. The chairman’s 2004 National Military Strategy, redrafted
numerous times, was completed in May 2004 as the need for a chairman’s military
strategy, along with the need to assess the strategic and military risk to execute that
strategy, was clarified by Congress in the 2004 NDAA. He also succinctly identi-
fied the overall joint vision in this strategy. Chairman Myers identified the impor-
tance of a joint culture or being “born joint” in several of his Posture Statements.56
His focus on operationalizing a vision with the additional joint concepts and inclu-
sive processes resulting from the 2003 Joint Operations Concepts and 2005 Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations have the potential to create a remarkable legacy for
transforming to a true joint force. He instituted a greater top-down and combatant
commander input on jointness to develop capabilities to create a synergistic joint
end-state now called interdependency. It is too early to determine the result of
his efforts, as developing capabilities to achieve joint interdependency takes years;
however, he not only enhanced the joint climate, but perhaps established a culture
of real jointness among all the military services. Creating a culture is much more
difficult than creating a climate, but it is more powerful once established.

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  91

Conclusion
Today’s senior leaders can learn from examining how others used systems or pro-
cesses to better enable their organizations to respond to complex and ambiguous
strategic challenges. Examining how four chairmen of different leadership styles
used an evolving strategic planning system to respond to the complex and ever
changing strategic environment reveals five key leadership concepts today’s lead-
ers should employ. These leadership concepts are organized along the following
five areas: importance of a vision, key characteristics of an effective strategic plan-
ning process, the need to strike a balance between flexibility and structure within
the strategic planning system’s products, understanding the magnitude of change
needed and using systems and processes to create a culture.
The first leadership concept is that leaders need to clearly articulate a vision,
owned by the organization, as part of the strategic planning system to influence
long-term change effectively. Chairman Shalikashvili clearly identified a need for
a joint vision in 1996 and employed an inclusive leader-involved process to cre-
ate that vision, which had wide acceptance among those he coordinated with and
those above him. Chairman Shelton followed this and developed comprehensive
processes to implement that vision before he formally updated the joint vision in
2000 to place more emphasis on innovation, information and interagency. Chair-
man Myers continued with a vision focus through his two concept guidance docu-
ments to transform the military operationally to a higher level of jointness. Much
of the joint war-fighting progress to date can be traced back to the first two visions,
and the current vision to achieve full spectrum dominance is being directed by the
2005 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.
The second leadership concept is that leaders need to ensure their strategic plan-
ning processes are flexible, inclusive and integrated to improve effectiveness. The flex-
ible aspect rests with the fact that, in execution, each chairman modified to different
degrees the strategic planning system he inherited. This was caused by the leader’s
style and the strategic environment. For example, Chairman Powell’s modification
of the planning system from ten classified, voluminous products into four products
of greater clarity and simplicity that were developed more nimbly was influenced
by the Cold War’s unexpected demise and his personal leadership style. Chairman
Shalikashvili’s addition of leader-focused resource advice and joint vision was influ-
enced by the tight fiscal environment and his process-oriented style. The inclusive
aspect is supported by the diverse composition of the joint boards and councils that
developed strategic planning products, which allowed divergent views to be heard,
understood and incorporated. Interviews with strategic planners revealed that these
inclusive processes educated and created important relationships, and many planners
even considered planning processes more important than products.57 The integrated
nature aspect goes one step farther than inclusiveness in that this system’s planning
processes directly influenced other defense, service and combatant command leaders
and their processes to ensure the end result was integrated.

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The third leadership concept centers on the need for leaders to ensure their stra-
tegic planning products have the proper balance between flexibility and structure.
The chairman’s strategic planning products related to strategy and vision had great
flexibility in providing broad direction, which enabled staffs to use their intellec-
tual capacities to develop a wide range of successful responses to complex issues.
The chairman’s strategic planning products related to plans had a much greater
degree of structure to provide the needed disciplined direction to execute those
strategies. This disciplined direction in developing war plans is driven by the sys-
tems integration and overall synchronization that is associated with joint inter-
dependence needed by the supportive and supporting combatant commanders.
Disciplined direction in developing war plans, then, allows the creativity needed
in execution, as disciplined planning considers various options that are vetted prior
to execution.
The fourth leadership concept is that leaders need to understand the relation-
ship between the magnitude and speed of change needed and how a strategic plan-
ning system can be used to influence that change. If change is needed quickly and
is revolutionary in scope, then leaders should not use a strategic planning system
but work outside that formal system. For example, when Chairman Powell created
the 1992 National Military Strategy, a strategy revolutionary in substance when
compared to its predecessors, he did not follow the processes or product character-
istics described in his strategic planning system. Similarly, Chairman Shalikashvili
did not follow directions in his strategic planning system, but used extraordinary
personnel interaction when creating the chairman’s first joint vision, a direction
thought outside the chairman’s domain. However, in implementing both this strat-
egy and vision, which would take a decade or more, the strategic planning system
was used heavily. Hence, a strategic planning system is more valued to make the
needed evolutionary changes over time that can ultimately lead to revolutionary
results.
The last leadership concept is that leaders can use a strategic planning system
to help them create a climate and embed a culture within complex organizations.
Although there have been many other mechanisms that influenced a joint culture,
such as congressional-required joint promotion, assignment and educational crite-
ria, the strategic planning system reinforced these mechanisms. Whereas Chair-
man Powell was just starting to create a joint climate, Chairman Shalikashvili
greatly reinforced that climate with his strategic planning joint vision and inclusive
planning bodies that developed the system’s resource products. Chairman Shelton
reinforced that joint climate and started the beginning of a joint culture through
implementing the joint vision and more inclusive planning bodies. Chairman
Myers focused on embedding a joint culture through his expansive joint operating
concepts and more inclusive functional capabilities boards. It is this author’s belief,
based on working within and studying the effects of strategic planning during this
period, that a culture of jointness, envisioned in the heart and spirit of many of our
nation’s civilian and military leaders, has taken hold within the higher levels of the

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  93

Joint Staff and the services. The strategic planning system clearly assisted this joint
cultural evolution.
Leaders of complex organizations who embrace these five concepts just men-
tioned will be able to better use a strategic planning system to respond to their
strategic challenges and provide direction to their organizations to meet the current
demands while positioning for the future. An examination of history has shown
that each chairman’s ever-evolving strategic planning system comprised of inclusive
and flexible processes, along with the right combination of flexibility and struc-
ture in products, was important in enabling him to provide strategic advice and
direction to our nation’s civilian and military leaders during volatile and uncertain
times.

Notes
1. Robert H. Cole et al., The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.:
Joint History Office, 1995), 207–209.
2. Ibid., 30.
3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report, 99th Congress, 2nd session, September
12, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Section 3, 99–824);
Richard Meinhart, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Leadership Using the Joint Strategic
Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders (Carlisle Bar-
racks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 2–7.
4. House Report 108–354, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,”
Section 903; “Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff,” available from http://thomas.loc.gov/ (accessed November 11, 2005).
5. The Joint Staff, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,” Feb-
ruary 2003, available from http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/bud-
get_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/TJS_FY04-05_
PB.pdf (accessed November 30, 2005). Personnel reductions reflect 1999 defense
reform initiatives and 2002 Nation Defense Authorization Act guidance.
6. Detailed strategic planning guidance was reflected in Memorandum of Policy (MOP)
7, 1990; MOP 7, 1993; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01,
1997; and CJCSI 3100.01A, 1999.
7. Discussion that follows on relationships and integration of the leader with organiza-
tions above the chairman and those with whom he coordinates is covered in the 2000
edition of The Joint Staff Officers Guide and in the memorandum and instructions that
define the organization’s strategic planning system.
8. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, “National Defense Budget
Estimates for FY 2006,” April 2005; and “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY
2001,” March 2000, 4, 33, both sources.
9. This discussion of challenges is the author’s assessment from reading the four national
military strategies and attending service chiefs’ lectures while teaching at the Army
War College.

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10. Davis, 160; Meinhart, Chairman Joint Chiefs, 11–12. Some chairmen, such as Powell,
had a more developed personal relationship with many leaders in Washington, D.C.,
based on past experiences than General Shelton, who was relatively new to this stra-
tegic arena. In addition, each succeeding chairman used “joint” words with varying
frequency in his annual Congressional Posture statement.
11. Edgar H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey Bass,
1993), 231.
12. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, U.S. Department of Defense
Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, 2003) 10, 35–36.
13. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy (hereafter CJCS MOP)
No. 84 (CJCS MOP 84), Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1989), 3.
14. CJCS MOP 7, Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of
Staff, January 30, 1990). Discussion reflects materiel in this document.
15. Ibid., 20.
16. CJCS MOP 7, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993. Discussion reflects material in this
document.
17. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01 (hereafter CJCSI 3100.01), Joint
Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1,
1997). Note: Chairman’s instructions replaced memoranda of policies during this
period.
18. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JROC Planning in a Revolu-
tionary Era (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996), 4–5.
19. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1996), 1.
20. CJCSI 3100.01A (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1999). Dis-
cussion reflects material in this document.
21. The “shape” component was one of the three components of the 1997 National Mili-
tary Strategy. The other two components were titled “respond” and “prepare.” These
components are discussed later in the chapter, in the section on “Strategy.”
22. “Joint Strategic Planning System” briefing slides for Joint Processes and Landpower
Course 3, Lesson AY 05 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 28,
2004), slide 5.
23. “National Military Strategy Linkages and the Joint Strategic Planning System,” brief-
ing to Joint Faculty Education Conference (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, June 22, 2005), slide 12. In Figure 5.2, IPL stands for Combatant Com-
manders Integrated Priority List, which identifies what combatant commanders
desire that is not funded in service programs. POMs are Program Objective Memo-
randums, the programs the services desire to place in the upcoming budget submitted
to Congress. JOC stands for Joint Operating Concepts described later in the chapter, in
the discussion of vision. CPR is the Chairman’s Program Recommendation, and CPA is
the Chairman’s Program Assessment, explained later in the discussion of resources.
24. The author read many classified strategy reviews and correspondence documenting
the process and, in May 2002, interviewed military planners who worked on the
vision and military strategies during the 1990s.

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  95

25. House Report 106-162, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,”
Section 1034, available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html (accessed
December 4, 2005).
26. House Report 108-354, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,”
Section 903, “Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff,” available from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin (accessed November 11,
2005).
27. There is a congressional requirement under U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 153 (b) for
the chairman to assess the strategic and military risks associated with executing the
missions called for under the current National Military Strategy. This task is due
no later than January 1 of every odd-numbered year. There is also a congressional
requirement under Section 153 (d) to do a detailed biennial review of the National
Military Strategy, which includes as part of this review an assessment of the military
and strategic risks in executing the missions of the current strategy. This much more
detailed review is due no later than February 15th of every even-numbered year.
28. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010; Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000). Discussion reflects
material from these documents.
29. Shelton, Joint Vision, 2.
30. Richard M. Meinhart, Strategic Planning Through an Organizational Lens (ProQuest
UMI Dissertation Services, 2004), 104–107. An analysis was performed on key
words in the chairman’s annual Congressional Posture Statements to identify what
was emphasized.
31. Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2004), 20.
32. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Joint Operations Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs
of Staff, November 2003, available from www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_ approved_
jopsc.doc; accessed December 1, 2005); Richard B. Myers, Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff August 2005, available from
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf; accessed Decem-
ber 1, 2005).
33. Discussions that follow reflect material in the following strategies: Colin L. Powell,
National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992; John M. Shalikashvili,
National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995; John M. Shalikash-
vili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997; and Richard B.
Myers, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004 (all, Washing-
ton, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff).
34. The overlapping “swiftly defeat” campaigns were described as quickly denying an
adversary’s operational or strategic objective in both locations and rapidly reestab-
lishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. A “win
decisively” campaign is much broader in scope than a swiftly defeat campaign. It is
designed to bring about fundamentally favorable and enduring results that may entail
lengthy periods of combat and stability operations, along with significant investments
of the nation’s resources and time.
35. Myers, National Military Strategy, 8.

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 96  n  Handbook of Military Administration

36. U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National

Strategies Related to Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office,
March 3, 2003), 5.
37. Linda Robinson, “Plan of Attack,” USNews.com, August 1, 2005, http://www.usnews.
com/usnews/news/articles/050801/1terror.htm (accessed November 11, 2005).
38. Author’s assessment from listening to many lectures from speakers at the U.S. Army
War College from 1997 to 2005, who described these documents, and from reading
some of the 1990 documents.
39. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning, 23.
40. These words describing the JSCP’s purpose remained fundamentally the same from
the MOP 7 through CJCSI 3100.01A. The descriptions of the types of plans came
from the strategic planning instructions and discussions with individuals who worked
directly with the plans or taught this subject.
41. Douglas Lovelace and Thomas-Durnell Young, U.S. Department of Defense, 37–45.
42. Harry E. Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold War
World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, 1992), 16; Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 1989–1992 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1993), 48–50.
43. Meinhart, Strategic Planning, 132.
44. Ibid., 104.
45. Interview with Joint Staff planner on May 9, 2000; Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, JV 2010 Case Analysis (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2002),
6.
46. Joint Vision 2010 was referenced in Defense Planning Guidance and the Defense
Department’s logistics strategic plan. Many service leaders spoke positively on this
vision’s influence. For the QDR influence linkage, see John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis,
and Roger A. Brown, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 1999, 19.
47. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning, 10–12.
48. Meinhart, Strategic Planning, 104.
49. Processes described in CJCSI 3010.02, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 9, 1998); CJCSI 3010.02A, Joint Vision
Implementation Master Plan (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 29,
2000).
50. Interagency is a term used to identify when other government agencies under the
president collectively work together to respond to our nation’s challenges.
51. “Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,” April 4, 2000, http://armed-services.senate.gov/ hearings/2000/
e000404.htm (accessed November 20, 2005).
52. Meinhart, Chairman Joint Chiefs.
53. Meinhart, Strategic Planning, 104.
54. The author analyzed Chairman Myers’ posture statements in the same way as was
done for the other chairmen and he averaged the highest.

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 Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff  n  97

55. Author’s assessment from reading the many CJCSIs that covered the Joint Require-
ments Oversight, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, and Functional Capa-
bility Boards since the middle 1990s.
56. Chairman Myers referenced “born joint” in his 2004 and 2004 Posture Statements
to Congress. In addition, he talked about the importance of a cultural change in his
2002 and 2003 Posture Statements to change mindsets. He was the first chairman to
do so.
57. Meinhart, Strategic Planning, 187–188.

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DK3629.indb 98 10/9/07 1:41:38 PM
 Chapter 6

The Leviathan’s Bit: The

U.S. Defense Budget

Jeffrey A. Weber

The way the Department of Defense runs the budgeting system, the
planning system is broken. It is not serving the department or the coun-
try well. And yet it is inexorable. It just rolls along, like a freight train
coming from San Francisco with the wrong things for New York. There
are plenty of people who look at it and don’t know it’s wrong … and
people say, “Well, that’s the way we do it. This is how it works, and don’t
you understand that the only way to affect that (the freight train) is to
reach back 2½ years and load it properly.” Of course, my answer is,
“Don’t you understand, we don’t have 2½ years to wait to change.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in answer to a ques-

tion asked after a speech unveiling DoD transformation plans,
National War College, January 31, 2002.

Introduction
Budgeting is recognized as the primary administrative tool for controlling an orga-
nization. Financial resources are the life blood of any policy or program. In order

99

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 100  n  Handbook of Military Administration

for any program to begin or continue, it requires funding. The priorities of an

organization are found in what it chooses to fund and what it chooses not to fund.
Shift an organization’s funding from one program to a different program and you
change that organization’s direction.
Budgeting for defense is a complex, networked structured, multifaceted, time-
consuming process, fraught with uncertainty, especially for the long-term implica-
tions. The decision makers involved are not only considering the current operating
costs, but force structures, weapon systems, bases, training and maintenance require-
ments for defense needs ten to fifteen years from now.
Control and direction of the Department of Defense (DoD) is determined
through the budgetary process. With over $500 billion in expenditures and opera-
tions in every state and around the globe, there is no single point of control over
the DoD’s budget process. The vast and complex network that the DoD’s Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) encompasses makes sin-
gular control of the DoD an impossibility. The inherent complexity in PPBES, in
both its process and the number of stakeholders involved, has produced an asym-
metric results state, combined with a paradoxical state of organizational inertia.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the DoD’s budget
process and its interconnection with defense policy. This chapter begins with an
overview of the influence of the U.S. Constitution on defense budgeting. The first
section clarifies what is meant by the defense budget. Misunderstandings can occur
from failing to understand the scope of what the defense budget entails. The sec-
ond section focuses on explaining who the key decision makers are in terms of the
DoD, the president, and Congress. The focus of this section is to identify the key
agencies, committees and positions involved in the budgetary process. The defense
budgeting process occurs in a network structure with no central locus of power,
thereby requiring a collaborative process. The third section examines the specific
defense budgeting process as it occurs through the entire defense budget network.
Consequently, the DoD’s specific budget process, PPBES are explained, as well
as the process of the Office of Management and Budget and other offices of the
president, and the congressional appropriation process. The intent in the second
section is to show the interconnection of multiple processes and how each is used as
a way of controlling the direction of defense policy and the U.S. military. The final
section explains the trends in the actual defense budget numbers and the possible
long-term implications.

Overview of a Public Budget

A budget is a fiscal plan for a defined time period, which describes and explains fis-
cal resources available and their allocation for the accomplishment of policy objec-
tives compared over one or more past and future time periods. Basically, a budget
illustrates, across multiple time periods, past, present and future, the allocation of

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  101

anticipated financial resources to established or desired policy objectives and pro-

grams. One can conceive of a budget as the actual budget document, which shows
the revenues and expenditures in different categories over three or more time peri-
ods, or as a process for allocating fiscal resources for the purpose of accomplishing
policy objectives.
A budget document typically consists of an explanation of what the budget is
meant to achieve. This is followed by a presentation of expected revenues, which
are shown based on the sources for those revenues. Generally, revenues are depicted
either by their sources or by source and program area. Next, the expenditures are
shown for the past year, current year and for the next year.
Generically, a budgeting process consists of four phases: (1) planning and analy-
sis, (2) formulation and allocation, (3) execution and (4) audit and evaluation. The
planning and analysis phase involves determining the policy goals and objectives
to be achieved and their priority. Next, is an analysis of revenue sources and the
amounts of revenue that can be expected, matched to the estimated costs of the
approved policy goals and objectives. The second phase, formulation and alloca-
tion, concerns the drafting, presenting and approving of a budget. Once the budget
is approved, the funds are allocated to the policy goals and objectives as directed in
the approved budget. The third phase of the budget process, execution, is the actual
expenditure of the funds and the tracking of those expenditures and the determina-
tion of policy accomplishment. The fourth and final phase, evaluation and audit,
examines the revenue and expenditure data, in connection with the policy accom-
plishment data, to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the current budget
and provide direction for future budgets. Using information derived from the audit
and evaluation phase, the process begins again with the next budget.
The defense budgeting process occurs within the context of the federal gov-
ernment budgeting process, which also occurs within the Constitutional frame-
work. An understanding of the defense budget requires one to understand how the
Constitution frames the federal budgeting process and the overall federal budget
process. Once this context is established, it helps to make sense of the defense bud-
geting process.

The U.S. Constitution and the Defense Budget

Whoever controls funding, controls policy. Consequently, recognizing the power
that is inherent in the budget process, the United States’ founders ensured that the
use of money was divided between the Congress and the president. The Constitu-
tion does not explicitly address the formulation and approval of a budget. It does
vest the power of the chief executive with the president, thereby implying the power
of managing a budget. The Constitution also provides sole authority for the levying
of taxes (raising of revenue) and the appropriation of funds (spending of money) to
Congress.1

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 102  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Control over defense budgeting is further divided by the U.S. Constitution,

which explicitly divides control over the military between the president and Con-
gress. Whereas Article II, section 1 of the Constitution vests all executive power in
the president, and section 2, clause 1 makes the president the commander in chief
of the military, article I, section 8, clause 1 provides Congress with the authority
to “make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.”
Furthermore, as in all areas of the budget, as “chief executive,” the president com-
piles a budget and presents it to Congress, but only funds that have been authorized
and appropriated by Congress can actually be spent. The president is also bound to
spend the appropriated funds in the manner proscribed by Congress, thereby giv-
ing Congress additional authority in the administration of the military.
Additionally, the Constitution explicitly places defense funding in a unique
category, in that article 1, section 8, clause 12 forbids any appropriation for the
military to be for a two-year term. This provision makes defense funding separate
and distinct from all other appropriations because there are no long-term funding
obligations. However, defense funding does entail long-term funding for the devel-
opment and procurement of weapon systems and capital projects. Consequently,
there is an inherent conflict between the type of funding and budgeting that is
necessary for a portion of the defense budget, and the type of funding and budget-
ing that actually occurs.
The constitutionally proscribed friction has produced an historical, administra-
tive power struggle between the president, Congress and the military leadership
over control of the U.S. military organization and operations. The power struggle
has produced a budgetary process for defense that is distinctive from the rest of the
federal government’s budgetary process, but at the same time is fully a part of the
process.

The Federal Budget

From the founding of the United States (in 1789) to 1921, there was no explicitly
defined federal budget process. Generally, each executive branch department or
agency would go to Congress when it required funding and Congress would appro-
priate funds. Additionally, Congress would demand an accounting of expenditures
by the different departments and agencies. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
(P.L. 67-13;42 Stat. 20-27) as amended, changed all of that and established the
current federal budget process.

The Federal Government Budget Documents

There are multiple budget documents for the U.S. government. The first document
is the president’s multivolume annual budget request, which the president presents

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  103

to Congress by the first Monday in February.2 Basically, the budget contains the
overall budget message of the president, what he hopes to achieve in the coming
fiscal year and this is followed by a section for each of the fifteen executive branch
departments, the Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency, NASA,
the National Science Foundation, Small Business Administration, and the Social
Security Administration.
The second budget document is the congressional budget resolution, which
provides the revenue and expenditure limits by major areas. This document is not
law and, therefore, does not authorizes any expenditures of funds by the executive
branch. The budget resolution establishes the boundaries for the formulation of the
actual allocation of funds to specific programs within each of the areas.
The third budget document is the set of appropriation bills, which are the statu-
tory authority for executive branch agencies to spend. Each fiscal year, the number
of appropriation bills can vary. Generally, there are thirteen appropriation bills, one
for each major area of expenditures.
Each of the three budget documents occurs at a different point in the federal
budget process during the fiscal year. The president’s budget request is released
by the first Monday in February. The Congressional Resolution is required to be
passed by April 15. Finally, all thirteen appropriation bills are to be passed prior to
the end of the fiscal year, by September 30.

The Federal Government Budget Process

Overall, the federal budget process consists of: the president’s budget request, con-
gressional budget action, implementation of appropriations and a period audit and
review (Figure 6.1).
The entire federal government budget process for a single fiscal year budget
takes 2.5 years. Consequently, federal agencies will be working on three fiscal years,
each at different stages in the process, simultaneously in any given year. For exam-
ple, when department X is working on generating its budget request for the next
fiscal year 2009, it is executing fiscal year 2007 budget, and it is in the allocation
phase for fiscal year 2008 (Figure 6.2).
The federal budget process begins with the president establishing policy objec-
tives and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)3 drafting and issuing bud-
get guidance to the departments and agencies. The secretary of the department or
the director of the agency will add to the guidance. In addition to establishing pol-
icy objectives to be achieved, the guidance will also include planning assumptions,
which are critical to developing cost estimates. Examples of planning assumptions
would include anticipated salary increases or increases in the cost of benefits.
The middle and lower management in each department and agency goes
through a process of assessing the budgetary impact of changes in existing policy
objectives and the establishment of new ones. The specific process varies with each

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 104  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Analysis and President’s

Planning Budget

• Adoption of Budget
Formulation Congressional Resolution
Budget Action • Passage of Annual
Appropriations Bills

Execution and
Implementation
Reinterpretation

Audit and
Audit and Review
Evaluation

(Activities related to a single FY

stretch over a period of 2.5 calendar years)

Figure 6.1  Overview of the federal budget process.

Establish Operating Plans Operating Plans Implement Programs

OMB Review Prepare Budget Congressional Hearings/Budget Resolution/Bill

Long Range Planning Prepare OMB Request OMB

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct
‘06 ‘07 ‘07

Establish Operating Plans

Review Prepare Budget Congressional Hearings/Resolution/Bill OP Plan

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct
‘07 ‘08 ‘08
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

Figure 6.2  Timing of the federal budget process.

department and agency. Once estimated budget requirements are determined they
are passed in the proper format to the senior management of the department or
agency.
The senior management of the agency works with the OMB to draft the agen-
cy’s request. The request is submitted to the OMB’s examiners, who review it and
finalize the budget request. The department or agency is notified of the OMB’s
decision.

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  105

Next, the OMB assembles all the budget requests into one single document,
which will become the president’s budget request to Congress. The president’s bud-
get is only a request for spending levels in the form of budget authority (BA), which
is the legal authority provided by Congress for the departments and agencies to
obligate funds. The obligation of funds can be in the near to far term. Once funds
are obligated, the Treasury issues payment in the form of a check or electronic
transfer, which then becomes an outlay.
Once Congress receives the president’s budget request, it begins the process of
adopting a budget resolution.4 By February 15, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) provides the members of Congress with a report on the economic and
budgetary outlook. Simultaneously, budget hearings are held concerning different
parts of the proposed budget and the various committees submit their reports on
their views and estimates to respective budget committees not later than six weeks
after the president’s budget is presented. By April 1, the Senate Budget Commit-
tee reports a budget resolution, and by April 15 Congress completes action on the
budget resolution.
The budget resolution consists of the following: (1) total expected revenues and
the amount revenues will change due to expected legislative action, (2) total new
budget authority and outlays in each departmental and agency area (functional
category), (3) the expected deficit or surplus, and (4) the expected debt limit.5 The
budget resolution is not the legal authority to spend money; consequently, it is not
signed by the president, but is simply passed by both the House and the Senate. The
budget resolution provides the framework for the development of the appropria-
tion bills by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The revenue and
spending levels in the budget resolution may be adjusted during the appropriations
process for the following five reasons: emergency spending, continuing disability
reviews, providing for the International Monetary Fund, providing for Interna-
tional Peacekeepers or multilateral banks, and maintaining the Earned Income Tax
Credit program.6
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees each consist of several
subcommittees, which put together appropriation bills within their areas of juris-
diction. Altogether, there are, since 1997, thirteen appropriation bills. Typically,
appropriation bills originate in the House and then are considered by the Senate.
More recently, there have been several incidences where the rules of House and Sen-
ate have been modified so as to permit simultaneous consideration of appropriation
bills in the House and Senate.
The subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee consider the specific
legislative language for their respective appropriation bill. The chair of the sub-
committee proposes a bill and the members of the subcommittee discuss changes
(amendments) to the bill. This process is know as “marking up” the bill. The
marked-up bill is voted on and sent to the entire Appropriations Committee, which
considers each of the subcommittee’s marked-up bills separately.7 Once the entire
Appropriations Committee has approved the bill, it is sent to the floor.

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 106  n  Handbook of Military Administration

The House has special rules that govern the consideration of regular appropria-
tions bills, which typically provide for a Committee of the Whole, where all the
representatives are considered members. The bill is debated and amendments are
considered by predetermined rules guiding the length of debate and requirements
for amendments. Once the Committee of the Whole completes debate on the bill,
it reports the bill, with amendments, to the full House for a vote on passage. If the
bill passes the House, it is sent over to the Senate for consideration.
In the Senate, the bill is sent to the Appropriations Committee, which consid-
ers the bill, makes amendments and votes to move the bill out of committee. The
bill is reported out of committee for consideration by the full Senate. Similar to the
House, the Senate has predetermined rules governing the debate and amendment
of appropriation bills. Typically, after the opening statements on the bill, Senators
are allowed to discuss or debate any portion of the bill and offer amendments. Once
the debate is closed, the bill is brought for a vote, typically by unanimous consent,
but on occasion by a motion.
The differences between the House and Senate version of a bill are worked out in
a Conference Committee. The members of Conference Committees are appointed
by the leadership of majority and minority parties in the House and the Senate.
Generally, the members are from the Appropriations Committees, subcommittees
relevant to the bill being considered.8 The members of the Conference Commit-
tee focus on reaching an agreement between the two versions of the bill. Once the
Conference Committee reaches an agreement and passes a conference report, it is
considered by both the House and the Senate. When a Conference report goes to
the House and the Senate, it cannot be amended by either chamber.
All appropriation bills are suppose to be passed by September 30. When Con-
gress does not pass all appropriation bills by September 30 it passes a continu-
ing resolution to continue funding the areas without enacted appropriation bills,
funded at the current level. Once an appropriations bill is passed by Congress it is
sent to the president. The bill must be signed or vetoed in ten days; if no action is
taken, the bill automatically becomes law.

The Defense Budget

Any understanding of the defense budget and the process that produces it needs to
have an appreciation for the complexity of the deadline-driven process, combined
with the uncertainty of the impact of some of the decisions. The overall complex-
ity is generated by the number of individuals and organizations involved at vari-
ous stages in the planning, formulation, execution and evaluation of the budget.
The process is made even more complex by the enormous uncertainty involved in
developing a budget eighteen months from when it will actually be executed, and
the budget contains a fifteen year plan within a six year defense program, which

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  107

only funds personnel for three years, but with one year appropriations, which are
normally passed by Congress six months or more later.9
Consequently, there is no single individual who fully comprehends all the
complexities of the defense budget. Deceptively the process appears to be straight-
forward when laid out in diagrams and on paper. The process has varied from
administration to administration, as political and military leaders have attempted
to control DoD. Consequently, one can find differing explanations of the defense
budget process depending on the source. The frustrating thing is that all the sources
can be correct because each source has approached the process from a different per-
spective. The following is an attempt at capturing the current process from multiple
sources.

The Defense Budget Process

The defense budget process primarily consists of the DoD’s PPBES. Ninety-five
percent of the funds, which fall under the defense function in the budget, are
controlled by PPBES. The other five percent are controlled by the Departments of
Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, State, and NASA in areas
that are directly related to defense. For the purpose of this chapter, the focus is on
PPBES.

Historical Overview of PPBES

The Department of Defense was created in 1947 as a way of coordinating all aspects
of defense instead of each service operating independently. From the start, the bud-
get process was seen as one of the primary tools for helping to force the services
to operate in a joint manner.10 The Department of Defense began as the National
Military Establishment (NME). By the time the first secretary of defense, James
Forrestal, took office, President Truman, independent of the service chiefs and For-
restal, had submitted the NME budget for FY 1949.11 The initial appropriation,
$10 billion, was insufficient to meet expenditures the military was encountering in
operations in Germany, Greece, Turkey and Korea. The president wanted to limit
a supplemental appropriation to $3 billion, and the service chiefs were arguing for
$9 billion. Forrestal held a joint meeting of the service chiefs to work out an agree-
ment among the services for the supplemental budget request. The fledgling Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), with General Eisenhower acting as temporary chair, meet
with Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and they focused on developing the strategic
goals of the NME, which became three: protecting the United Kingdom, control-
ling the Western Mediterranean and retaining a position in the Middle East.12
This led the JCS to develop the composition of forces necessary to carry out the
strategy. Working independently, each service focused on its component and what

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 108  n  Handbook of Military Administration

it believed the other services required. Eisenhower took the lowest estimate offered
and was able to come within an additional $5 billion.13
Under Truman, the budget ceiling would steadily decrease even in the midst of
fighting the Korean War. Fiscal Year 1950 DoD budget request and appropriation
was $13.3 billion. After the war started, the FY 1951 budget request and appropria-
tion was $12.2 billion. In the midst of the Korean War, the focus of the Truman
administration was to fight while keeping the budget balanced.14 The remaining
years of the Truman administration focused on Frank Pace, the budget director for
the president, establishing a budget ceiling for defense, and the joint chiefs working
on having a force structure that fit the budget. Little to no consideration was given
to how the joint chiefs believed U.S. military capabilities matched U.S. diplomatic
goals.15
During the Eisenhower administration, budget ceilings were maintained, but
instead of an amount based on projected revenues, the ceilings were a percentage
of the gross national product (GNP). DoD’s budget ceiling was no more than ten
percent of the GNP.16 Similar to the percentage-driven ceiling on DoD as a whole,
the amount divided out to the services also fell into rigid percentages: Army, 24
percent; Navy (which included the Marines), 29 percent; and the Air Force, 47
percent.17 A budget request process was developed by the JCS, which consisted of
using the National Security Council’s Basic National Security Policy as guidance.
This document was translated into the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and costs
from each of the services were developed to meet those objectives. These requests
were fielded by the secretary of defense who would ensure the budget ceilings
were enforced and settle disputes among the services. Overall though, this process
occurred separate and distinct from the actual budget process, which was top-
driven from the president’s Bureau of the Budget office.18
General Maxwell Taylor would later remark about defense budgeting dur-
ing this time as being unrealistic and creating a mismatch between the emerging
threats in the world and the U.S. military capabilities.
The maintenance of the rigid percentage distribution by service of the budgets
since 1953 is clear proof of the absence of flexibility in our military preparations.
The frozen pattern could only be justified if the world had stood still since 1953 and
I doubt that anyone would say that it has.19
The disconnect between the ever-changing world situation and actual military
capabilities became evident to the new Kennedy administration. While the services
were planning to defend against an attack by the Warsaw Pact along the Rhine
River, the budgetary reality constraints “did not even allow them to maintain a line
of communication in the Mediterranean.”20 Even though President Eisenhower
moved the review of the defense budget from the Bureau of the Budget to the
National Security Council, there was no real integration of foreign policy, defense
strategy and the defense budget.21
After winning the presidency in 1960, president-elect John F. Kennedy sought
to appoint a fresh face to the DoD, specifically looking for a person who could

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  109

get the military establishment to function as a unified whole, instead of disparate

services.22 Kennedy appointed Robert S. McNamara, who was then serving as presi-
dent of Ford Motor Company. McNamara came into the position feeling himself
not qualified.23 He had made a study of the administration of large organizations as
an assistant professor of business administration. Additionally, a field of interest and
research for him was statistical analysis. These attributes, combined with his limited
military experience as an officer in the Pentagon during World War II, served as the
foundation he was to bring to the DoD.24
McNamara believed that business and government could be run in a similar
fashion. He quickly discovered that all defense strategy planning was constructed
on the assumption of total nuclear war and that the goal of the services were to
attempt to maintain a “viable society.”25 The focus had been so driven to stay within
the ceiling that most of the funding was devoted to maintaining a strategic air and
missile retaliation system. All other areas of the military had been lacking funding
for so long, they were barely functioning. Kennedy was surprised to find out that
when he alerted the 82nd Airborne Division during the Bay of Pigs, they had to
borrow men and equipment to bring themselves up to full complement.26 Most of
the equipment throughout all services dated from World War II. In short, McNa-
mara found that the United States did not possess a useable military. Additionally,
he found that there was no unifying procurement or accounting process.
In March 1961, Secretary McNamara disbursed among the services ninety-
six questions concerning the state of affairs and how planning and budgeting was
currently done. These questions served as a basis for a review of the DoD. This
review resulted in a change of strategy, which was the first time it came out the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Instead of focusing on maintaining a viable
society, McNamara made the strategic focus of all forces to be able to respond in a
non-nuclear fashion to any potential aggressor, worldwide, in a “suitable, selective,
swift, and effective, method.”27
The DoD had already turned into the largest and most expensive federal gov-
ernment department. A system of accounting needed to be introduced as well as
some method of controlling it. In 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara introduced
to the DoD a budgeting process known as the planning, programming and budget-
ing system (PPBS). PPBS was introduced as a means of maintaining control over
the military departments. President Kennedy, as a former senator on the Armed
Services Committee, was distrustful of how the military departments were doing
their own budgeting. Consequently, he directed Secretary McNamara to establish a
centralized budgeting system which would ensure civilian control over the process
(McCaffery and Jones, 2005).
The intent of PPBS was to integrate a coordinated, unified, long-range resource
planning and allocation into the budgeting process. The primary way that PPBS
accomplished this was by passing budgeting each fiscal year on the Planning Guid-
ance developed by the National Security Council, and the Defense Guidance devel-
oped by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which the JCS converted

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 110  n  Handbook of Military Administration

into the Joint Strategic Planning Document. This in turn was divide into ten inter-
related programs across the services and agencies. Weapons systems, force and cost
projections were compiled for each program into the Five Year Defense Program
(FYDP), which also contained an eight-year force structure projection compiled by
the JCS. The FYPD became the basis for the single defense budget request, which
was worked out between OSD and OMB. Previously, each of the services would
present a budget request to Congress; under PPBS it became a single budget request
presented by the secretary.28
To implement PPBS, McNamara appointed as comptroller of DoD one of the
originators of the process, Charles J. Hitch. In addition to Hitch, he also brought
in a large systems analysis staff, all young Ph.D. civilian analysts with no military
experience. This group, within the OSD, became the focal point for the new PPBS.
Weapons systems were chosen based on systems analysis being conducted from the
OSD, which became one of the more controversial elements of PPBS.
Despite the opposition of service chiefs and some members of Congress to
PPBS, the “McNamara revolution” is still the framework for defense budgeting.
After McNamara left the OSD, the process became increasingly decentralized. The
services adapted to the process and a corresponding increase in the staff of the
JCS occurred, thereby increasing their ability to counter arguments by the system
analysts in the OSD. Each of the combatant commanders’ input became more
formalized.
Consequently, depending on the secretary of defense, the locus of control of
the process would shift between the OSD and the JCS. The Nixon–Ford adminis-
tration saw a resurgence of the JCS as the primary controller of PPBS, while dur-
ing the Carter administration, Secretary Harold Brown exercised a larger degree
of control. There was a return of decentralization under Casper Weinberger, fol-
lowed by a tightening of control during Dick Cheney’s tenure as he sought to cut
defense spending. Les Aspin sought to increase centralization, while at the same
time arguing for more input below the combatant commander level, as the cuts in
defense spending were increased. This was followed by a more balanced approach
under William Perry. The Clinton administration ended with William Cohen, who
decentralized the process almost completely to the JCS and the combatant com-
manders. Overall, during the Clinton administration, due to the succession of three
secretaries of defense, and the increase in the number of operations, the JCS and the
combatant commanders tended to dominate the process.
Calls for reform of the PPBS began almost as soon as it was developed. Aaron
Wildavsky (political scientist/University of California-Berkeley) argued that PPBS
was a rational process overlaid on a political decision-making process. He con-
tended that the political costs were omitted and that it was not possible to quantify
all the political values (national and international) involved in defense. Addition-
ally, he saw the volume of detail as unmanageable; consequently, it was a system
that gave only the illusions of control because in actuality it typically fell into an
incremental adjustment.29 Later, Wildavsky would argue the system unrealistically

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  111

would lock the president into major weapons systems expenditures, which would
remain unchanged despite changes in the world situation.30
Similarly, Jacques Gansler (former Under Secretary of Defense—1997 to 2001)
would argue that despite allegations of cost overruns, PPBS did provide an effi-
cient way of purchasing weapons systems and that weapons systems cost overruns
were some of the smallest in federal government and in major corporations.31 The
difficulty was that the system was not responsive to the changing circumstances
of the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, DoD remained locked into
weapon systems developed for defeating a threat that no longer existed. The abil-
ity to cancel those weapons systems was limited due to the services vested interest
and the political maneuver by defense industries of spreading the development and
manufacturing of the weapons system over multiple congressional districts to help
ensure its political survival.
In 2000, the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) conducted a
study of PPBS to determine “what the process is intended to do, what it actually
does, and if it should be retained, modified, or replaced.”32 Overall, the BENS
study found that PPBS is more reflective of what had occurred than of what will
occur in the future. They called for turning PPBS into a two-year cycle, with a
consolidation of some of the steps in the process, thereby shortening the process, so
that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and JCS were not constantly involved
in drafting a budget. The process should focus more on objectives, by specifically
tying each of the programs to strategic objectives. Additionally, it called for increas-
ing the focus on objectives and performance of achieving those objective. Each
program should be linked to the accomplishment of an objective. The PPBS system
was more focused on the planning than on the execution; by looking more at the
performance it would bring about an emphasis on the execution. Finally, the report
called for the trimming of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and JCS staff,
arguing that PPBS had created a vast planning bureaucracy. Instead of producing a
useful document, the focus was in the process itself.
On September 23, 1999, then presidential candidate George W. Bush had
argued, in a speech at The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, that
the DoD, its organization and processes needed to be restructured to match the
new and emerging threats, and that this may require skipping a whole generation
of weapons systems.

Yet today our military is still organized more for Cold War threats
than for the challenges of a new century—for industrial age operations,
rather than for information age battles. There is almost no relation-
ship between our budget priorities and a strategic vision. The last seven
years have been wasted in inertia and idle talk. Now we must shape the
future with new concepts, new strategies, new resolve. … As president,
I will begin an immediate, comprehensive review of our military—

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the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its
procurement—conducted by a leadership team under the secretary of
defense. I will give the secretary a broad mandate—to challenge the
status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for
decades to come.33

Six days after Bush was sworn in as president, Donald Rumsfeld, for the second
time in his life, became the secretary of defense. From the start of his tenure, his
focus was going to be on defense transformation. On August 2, 2001, the change in
PPBS began when Secretary Rumsfeld announced a concurrent review process as a
way of simplifying the process. In essence, it started the move to a two-year budget
cycle. In April 2003, the changes were formalized with the passage of the Defense
Transformation Act for the 21st Century. This act authorized the secretary to estab-
lish more flexible rules for the management of funds, and gave the secretary the
authority to shift funds between programs and departments depending on changes
in the security situation. Additionally, it authorized the elimination of regulations
to make it easier to competitively outsource nonmilitary functions that were being
performed by the military. Secretary Rumsfeld was quick to task the Senior Execu-
tive Council in the Department of Defense with studying the decision-making
processes of DoD and recommend improvements. The Executive Council’s study
recommended the process, which was adopted without change, known as Plan-
ning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

The PPBES Process

PPBES is a strategic process designed to serve as a “bridge between military plan-
ning and budgeting.”34 Strategic defense plans are developed and current and future
needs are assessed, then fiscal resources are matched to accomplish these needs.
The overall goal of the process is to produce a budget that provides the financial
resources to accomplish established strategic objectives within the fiscal restraints
and political priorities.
One of the major changes to the PPBES was to turn it into a biennial process,
that varies odd- and even-numbered years. This change makes the PPBES coincide
with the four-year term of the president (Figure 6.3). A presidential term begins
on an odd-numbered year (off-budget), which is year one and three in the process,
whereas even-numbered (on-budget) are years two and four. During even-numbered
years, it is a full PPBES process, while during odd-numbered years the process is
shortened to an assessment on the progress made in achieving objectives laid out the
previous year, and to make any necessary adjustments.35
PPBES occurs in four sequential, but overlapping phases: planning, program-
ming, budgeting and execution.

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  113

Even-Numbered Year Odd-Numbered Year

Jan Sep Dec Mar May

National
Security
Council

NSS
NSS

SECDEF
SECDEF
CPR
CPR
NMS
OSD
JPG
JCS JPG
COCOMs Issues
Issues
SPG
SPG & Metrics
& Metrics
JPD

Joint Capabilities Development

Figure 6.3  PPBES: planning phase.

Planning
The planning phase on odd-numbered years begins with the Office of the Presi-
dent, sixteen months prior to the start of the fiscal year under consideration.36
The National Security Council is responsible for developing the National Security
Strategy (NSS), which outlines the strategic goals of the United States, the threats
to those goals and the overall defense strategy to counter those threats. Based on
the NSS, the JCS develops and prepares the National Military Strategy (NMS).
The NMS provides the primary military strategic objectives that correspond to the
NSS, and the force levels and options that are necessary based on fiscal and political
constraints. Based on the NMS, the JCS produces the Joint Planning Document
(JPD), which provides the JCS guidance on the implementation of the NMS.
Using the NMS and the JPD, the unified commanders conduct a review of
their areas to determine the major issues and problems associated with executing it.
The analysis is provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Next, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the JCS go through the Joint Capabilities Development process, which consists of
three parts: (1) the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), (2) the Major Issue Analy-
sis and (3) the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG).37 The SPG provides overall
policy and strategy guidance and direction for force and resource planning to the
unified commanders, and all the major program areas in DoD. The commanders
in each of these areas provide feedback to the JCS on the implications of the SPG.

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 114  n  Handbook of Military Administration

The second part, the Major Issue Analysis is a combined effort of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the JCS to develop measures for monitoring program suc-
cess. The final component, JPG is issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
on even-numbered years and represents the combined results of the SPG and the
Major Issue Analysis. Simultaneously, with the execution of the Joint Capabilities
Development process, the CJCS develops the Chairman’s Program Recommenda-
tion (CPR), which is the CJCS personal recommendation and advice given to the
secretary of defense. The CPR also contributes to the JPG. The JPG is the final
document of the planning phase.

Programming
The programming phase is focused on the components of the DoD using the JPG
to develop a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). The POM is a seven-year
plan that provides analysis of missions, objectives, alternative methods to accom-
plish objectives and the allocation of resources, and categorizes each of these by one
or more of the DoD programs.38 DoD has eleven programs:
1. Strategic Forces
2. General Purpose Forces
3. Intelligence and Communications
4. Airlift and Sealift
5. Guard and Reserve Forces
6. Research and Development
7. Central Supply and Maintenance
8. Training, Medical and General Personnel Activities
9. Administrative and Associated Activities
10. Support of Other Nations
11. Special Operations Forces
The development of the POM takes into consideration the combatant com-
mander’s Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), which is a fiscally unconstrained list of
the “highest priority requirements, prioritized across service and functional lines,
defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant com-
mander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander’s forces to
accomplish their assigned mission.”39
POMs are seven-year plans that include the previous fiscal year, the current fis-
cal year, the budget year and the next four fiscal years. Fiscal and human resources
and force structure are considered for the budget year plus the next four fiscal
years. Another part of the POM considers force structure for eleven fiscal years, the
previous fiscal year, the current fiscal year, the budget year and the next seven fis-
cal years. This portion of the POM is known as the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP).

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  115

The FYDP is actually a database that catalogs the anticipated force structure
seven years into the future. Also entered in the database are all the decisions made
during programming and budgeting phases.40 This data is essential for establish-
ing production of repair or replacement parts for equipment and facilities. It is
updated after every major process action during PPBES and the congressional bud-
get process.
POMs are developed during even-numbered years. During odd-numbered
years, they are reviewed by the combatant commanders and Program Change Pro-
posals are submitted. The review of POMs is based on the performance measures
or metrics developed during the even-numbered years as a way of measuring success
in accomplishing the program. The focus is on outputs, what is being accomplished
for the money and how cost effective is the program.
Because they are only reviewed during the odd-numbered years, an additional
change made by Secretary Rumsfeld in 2001 was to speed up the process by run-
ning the POM review at the same time as the budgeting phase. Consequently,
POMs have to be assessed in an on-going fashion, and change proposals drafted
beforehand and submitted immediately at the start of the phase if they are going to
impact the budgeting phase.
The combatant commanders submit the POMs or Program Change Proposals to
review teams comprised of personnel from other defense agencies, the JCS, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. The result of the review is provided to a Senior
Level Review Group (SLRG), who, based on the review, may propose changes to the
POM. The JCS conducts a concurrent check on all POMs, “focusing on the balance
and capabilities of the proposed force levels.”41
All of the reviews of the POMs are given to the secretary of defense who will use
this input to draft the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is a set
of directives from the secretary and the deputy secretary of defense, based on the
POM review, to each of the DoD components, the CJCS, the JCS, and the OMB.
The PDM provides the approval or adjusts each POM. Based on the approved/
adjusted POMs, each service is now prepared to submit its budget estimations.42

Budgeting
Prior to 2001, the budgeting phase was a separate and distinct phase. In August
2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld merged the programming and budgeting
phases so as to streamline the process and to bring about a better sense of coopera-
tion/collaboration among the programming and budgeting staff. The overlapping
of the POM and the budget estimate submissions process enables the budget staff
within the services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and OMB to further
adjust the POMs based on budgetary reality.43
Utilizing the approved and adjusted POMs, the services (army, air force, navy,
and marines) develop their budget estimate submissions. Prior to the changes in

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 116  n  Handbook of Military Administration

PPBES, the budget estimate submissions were frequently characterized as reflect-

ing previous estimation with upward adjustments and ensuring that everyone “got
their fair share.”44 The services’ budget staff use performance measures (metrics) to
assess the cost efficiency/effectiveness of programs, the idea being to help ensure the
proper allocation of resources. This has raised the level of scrutiny that the budget
estimate submissions go through and has resulted in an increase in realignment of
resources.
Each budget estimate submission includes the prior fiscal year, the current fis-
cal year, the budget year and the next fiscal year. During even-numbered years, a
detailed budget estimation process is conducted. Once the services have developed
the budget estimate submissions and adjustments are made to the POMs, they are
submitted to the under secretary for defense (comptroller) for review.
During odd-numbered years, the services prepare and submit Budget Change
Proposals (BCP). The FYDP serves as the budgetary baseline, and BCPs are submit-
ted only on changes from that baseline. Changes can result from: “costs increases,”
beyond what had been worked into the FYDP; “schedule delays, workload changes,
and changes resulting from congressional action.”45
During even-numbered years, the comptroller and staff from the OMB conduct
a detailed and exacting review and analysis of the budget estimate submissions.
According to the DoD’s comptroller, the review process focuses on answering the
following questions:46
1. Does the budget estimate reflect the priorities of the secretary of defense and
the president?
2. Does it support the administration’s policies and initiatives?
3. Does it appropriately reflect legislative direction that may have been included
in DoD and Military Construction Appropriation Acts, the Defense Authoriza-
tion Act and the Intelligence Authorization Act for the current fiscal year?
4. Does it reflect earlier guidance?
5. Are the programs funded in a manner that is consistent with the legal limita-
tions and financial policy guidance?
6. Are the programs appropriately priced, based on sound estimating and cost
principles, and executable as proposed?
7. Can the programs and the budget estimates be justified to the Congress?
During odd-numbered years, the focus of the comptroller and OMB joint
review is to assess the extent to which current programs are meeting their goals.
The performance measures (metrics) that were developed originally by the combat-
ant commanders and other DoD components are used as a basis for the assessment.
Based on the assessment, decisions will be made to stop a program and replace it
with an alternative, or reallocate resources to the program area.
A result of the review process (even- or odd-numbered years) is a set of issues con-
cerning adjustments or reallocation of resources. The process authorizes the deputy

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  117

secretary of defense to make realignment decisions on the issues regarding “mar-

ginal or overpriced programs to cover shortfalls in higher priority programs.”47
The services and other DoD components are given an opportunity to appeal
decisions that are made on issues identified in the review process. Solutions gener-
ally are worked out between the comptroller and the component, but the compo-
nents do have the option of appealing directly to the secretary of defense. These
appeals are typically handled in mid-December in Major Budget Issues (MBI)
sessions.
Once all the decisions have been finalized, the comptroller pulls all the budget
data together into the approved OMB format, and electronically transmits it to
the OMB in early January. Additionally, standing agreements with congressional
committees and statutes require the submission of supporting documentation. In
2003, this documentation amounted to 26,000 pages contained in 800 different
required reports.48 At this point, the DoD budget is integrated into the president’s
budget request.

Execution
The addition of and emphasis on the execution phase is a significant change intro-
duced by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. This phase begins after congressional
approval and the president signs the appropriation bill(s). One should note that
there is a gap in the process between the budget phase and the execution phase,
which covers the entire congressional appropriations process (see the section on
Federal Government Budget Process).
During the congressional appropriations process, hearings are held with officials
from DoD to discuss various aspects of the budget request. These hearings typically
require significant preparation time and, therefore, consume a large amount of time
of the leaders of the DoD components. Additionally, it should be noted that the
appropriation process is lengthy and that the defense appropriation bills are rarely
passed on time. Consequently, Congress often passes supplemental appropriations
or continuing resolutions.
Congressional appropriations are broken down by service across five
categories:
1. Military personnel—Provides for pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence and
official travel or permanent change of station, for one year.
2. Operation and maintenance—Provides operation and maintenance for instal-
lations and units, for equipment, facilities, supplies and civilian pay.
3. Procurement—Provides for the manufacture and reconfiguration of aircraft,
missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, ammunition and other items
to include spare and repair parts.

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 118  n  Handbook of Military Administration

RDT & E 2040

PROC 2031-5
Congress MCA 2050
MPA 2010 ion
r iat es
OMA 2020 op ri
pr go
I Strategic Forces Ap Cate
II General Purpose Forces
III Intelligence & Comm Army,
IV Airlift & Sealift Air Force,
V Guard & Reserve Forces Navy &
OSD Other
VI Research & Development DOD
VII Central Supply & Maint Agencies
VIII TNG, MED & GEN PERS ACT
IX Admin & Assoc Activities
X Support of Other Nations
XI Special Opns Forces

Figure 6.4  DoD programs versus appropriations. (Data from the Financial

Management Department, U.S. Army Finance School.)

4. Research and development, test and evaluation—Provides for the development,

engineering, design, purchase, fabrication or modification of end items,
weapons, equipment or materials.
5. Military construction—Provides for the acquisition of land and the con-
struction of buildings, roadways and facilities that have been authorized by
statute.
After an appropriation bill has been signed by the president, the Treasury
Department issues a Treasury Warrant, which permits the OMB to transfer the
appropriations to DoD. The funds are allocated to DoD’s components by the DoD
comptroller. Once DoD components receive the funds, they are provided budget
authority, which permits them to obligate the government to pay for goods and
services.49 It is important to note that congressional appropriations are made in
different categories than the DoD components use them. A comparison of the two
categories is provided in Figure 6.4.
The allocation of appropriated funds by the DoD comptroller to the DoD
components involves a period of rebudgeting because appropriated funds do not
always correspond to the budget request. During this period, an allotment review
is conducted to decide the division of actual appropriated funds and how the funds
will be spent, by month, quarter or fiscal year. The allotment review is approved
by OMB and Treasury when the actual distribution of funds to DoD components
occurs.

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  119

As the DoD components obligate funds, auditors and comptrollers at all levels
of the DoD monitor and control the expenditure to ensure it complies with statu-
tory and regulatory requirements. At the mid-point in the fiscal year, a review is
conducted of all performance measures and funds may be shifted due to changing
priorities. At the end of the fiscal year all obligations and spending are documented
and all accounts are reconciled. Internal and external, fiscal and performance audits
are conducted by the DoD components, DoD inspector general, the OMB, the
General Accounting Office, and independent outside auditors.

The Defense Budget Network

Although understanding the process is important, it is essential to realize that the
final result of the defense budgeting process is influenced by the interactions of all
the components of the network of individuals and organizations that are stakehold-
ers within the defense policy area. One can easily understand the key organizations
in the network: DoD components, the OMB, the leadership of the House and
Senate, and the House and Senate Budget and Appropriations subcommittees for
armed services, and some of the major industries concerned with the manufacture
of weapons systems.
Due to the proliferation of weapon systems development, and the increased
use of National Guard and Reserve forces, the number of congressional districts
impacted by Defense activities has greatly increased; consequently, the number of
congressional stakeholders involved in the process has increased. Simultaneously,
the growth of congressional staff has enabled an increasing number of members
of Congress to research and study and perform their own competing analyses of
expenditures. Adding to that was the market for private and nonprofit think tanks,
which saw a rich and diverse market for selling their ideas, often able to increase the
value of their product by having it produced by a former DoD official.
Stakeholders attempt to influence the organizational direction of the DoD
sometimes on a macro level and sometimes on a narrow micro level. This can result
in DoD being pushed and pulled in numerous directions simultaneously. Increases
in DoD’s budget do not necessarily translate into greater flexibility because of more
resources. The growth of congressional earmarks, a direct result of attempting to
satisfying an increasing number of stakeholders, has had the effect of preventing
DoD from spending its resources where they need to be spent. A recent supple-
mental defense appropriation bill started out as a request for $90 billion, but by
the time it had gotten through the House, it had grown to $124 billion, with
the addition of $34 billion of unrelated earmarks attached and of the $90 billion,
approximately $35 billion were earmarked for specific use. Additionally, the House
placed a timetable for Defense operations in Iraq, and restrictions on DoD’s ability
to deploy forces.50

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Additionally, the defense policy network is operating in an intense political

environment, which currently is resulting in a historic power struggle between the
presidency and Congress over the direction and use of the military. This has the
result of increasing congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. In the
FY 2005 defense appropriation bill there were 3,200 earmarks that directed the
expenditure of funds in a specific manner.51

Conclusion
The full result of the reforms instituted by Secretary Rumsfeld is unknown. The
early assessment varies depending on the source. Some see this as a major positive
reform that has led to “increased cooperation between programmers and budget-
ers” and “gives services longer to finish the POM while incorporating emergent
budget issues.”52 Others have assessed the change as producing “chaos” and leading
to a “ complete breakdown” of the budgeting system.53
Overall, the changes get the secretary of defense involved in the process earlier
than before. This has increased the power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to influence the DoD and effect change. Although this makes the military bureau-
cracy more responsive to civilian leadership, it also can increase the politicization of
the DoD process, by decreasing the authority of the military leadership.
The changes that have been made to the DoD budgeting process had been
argued for over ten years. The most significant change was the shifting from a the-
ater-based approach to a capabilities-based planning process. This helped to focus
the capabilities to counter current and emerging threats. The biannual budget pro-
cess enables DoD to spend more time on actual execution, instead of being locked
into a perpetual planning/analysis stage.
The focus on outcomes of the programs is an important change that helps to
ensure an evaluation of the program in light of changing world situations. This
should enable DoD to become more flexible in facing threats. Also, it enables the
services to alter or change programs faster.
The ability of the secretary to shift funds increases the flexibility of the DoD to
react to unexpected situations that may arise. This authority, though, is being used
for the frequent shifting of funds based on performance measures as indicators of
the success or failure of a program and its established priorities. This frequent use
of the shifting of funds combined with congressional earmarking has increased
the uncertainty of funding on different installations and in different programs.
Consequently, the military is experiencing military installations that are unable
to perform basic, routine maintenance because of a lack of funds. Also, units are
resorting to cannibalizing parts from one piece of equipment to get several other
pieces of equipment operational, due to a lack of funds to purchase repair parts.54

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 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  121

References
1. The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 7, Clause 1; Section 8, Clause
1; and Article II, Section 1, Clause 1; and, Section 2, Clause 1.
2. 31 U.S. Code, section 1105(a).
3. Office of Management and Budget.
4. The Congressional Budget Act. 1974. 2 U.S. Code 601–656 (Titles I–IX of Public
Law 93-344 (88 Stat. 297). The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended, out-
lines the process by which Congress considers the budget request of the president and
appropriates funds.
5. Robert Keith, A Brief Introduction to the Federal Budget Process (Washington, D.C.:
The Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1998), 8.
6. Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (Title X of Public Law 105-33).
7. Keith, A Brief Introduction, 7.
8. Ibid., 9.
9. Larry Stiller, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution System (Fort Jackson, SC:
U.S. Army Finance School. 2003).
10. Department of Defense, “Histories of the Secretaries of Defense: James V. Forrestal.”
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/(accessed March 15, 2007).
11. Ibid.
12. Melvin Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administra-
tion, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 273.
13. Ibid.
14. Lawrence Korb, “The Budget Process in the Department of Defense, 1947–77: The
Strengths and Weakness of Three Systems,” Public Administration Review, July/
August (1977): 335.
15. Leffler, Preponderance, 276.
16. Korb, “The Budget Process,” 335.
17. Ibid.
18. Amos Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Secu-
rity, Policy and Process, 4th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1993), 193; Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, Harper Row and
Brothers, 1959), 120–129.
19. Korb. “The Budget Process,” 129.
20. Jordan, Taylor and Korb, American National Security, 193.
21. Ibid., 194.
22. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Press, 1965), 131–133.
23. Ibid., 132.
24. Ibid., 314.
25. Ibid., 315.
26. Ibid., 316.
27. Ibid., 318.
28. Jordan, Taylor and Korb, American National Security, 196–203.
29. Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston, MA: Little
Brown, 1964), 147–167.

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 122  n  Handbook of Military Administration

30. Aaron Wildavsky, “The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Sys-
tems Analysis, and Program Budgeting,” in Public Budgeting and Finance, 4th edi-
tion, ed. Robert Golembiewski and Jack Rabin (New York, Marcel Dekker, 1989),
883.
31. Jacques Gansler, Affording Defense (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 4–5.
32. Business Executive for National Security, Report on the U.S. Department of Defense’s
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). 2 vols. Tail to Tooth Com-
mission, Smith Richardson Foundation, 2000.
33. George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences.” Speech delivered at The Citadel, Mili-
tary College of South Carolina, September 23, 1999.
34. Comptroller, Department of Defense, “PPBE: The Bridge between Military Plan-
ning and Budgeting.” http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/hist-
context.htm (accessed March 16, 2007).
35. Secretary of Defense, Management Initiative Decision 913, 2003.
36. Stephen Elias, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, (Fort Bel-
voir, VA: Defense Acquisition University, 2006).
37. Comptroller, Department of Defense, “PPBE — Planning.” http://www.defenselink.
mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/planningphase.htm (accessed March 16, 2007).
38. Comptroller, Department of Defense, “PPBE — Programming.” http://www.
defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/progphase.htm (accessed March 16,
2007).
39. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publica-
tion 1-02. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html (accessed March 16,
2007).
40. Stephen Elias, Planning.
41. Comptroller, “PPBE — Programming.”
42. Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones, “Reform of Program Budgeting in the Depart-
ment of Defense,” International Public Management Review 6, no. 2 (2005): 152.
43 Ibid., 161
44. Ibid.
45. Comptroller, Department of Defense, “PPBE — Budgeting.” http://www.defenselink.
mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/budgphase.htm (accessed March 16, 2007).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Taking Exception: Defense for the 21st Century,” The Wash-
ington Post, May 22, 2003, p. 35.
49. Comptroller, Department of Defense, “PPBE — Budget Execution.” http://www.
defenselink.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/budgexecution.htm (accessed March 16,
2007).
50. U.S. House. Emergency Wartime Supplemental, FY 2007, also known as the Sup-
porting Our Troops and Veterans Health Care Act of 2007. H.R. 1591. http://frwe-
bgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h1591eh.
txt.pdf
51. Pat Towell, “Analyzing Earmarks,” Defense News, April 23, 2006.
52. McCaffery and Jones, “Reform,” 161.

DK3629.indb 122 11/7/07 8:33:20 AM

 The Leviathan’s Bit  n  123

53. Gordon Adams, “Time to Rebuild What Rumsfeld Has Broken,” Defense News,
November 6, 2006.
54. These observations are the results of interviews at various military installations con-
ducted July 2006.

Further Readings
Smith, R.W. and T.D. Lynch. 2004. Public Budgeting in America, 5th ed. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Streeter, S. 2006. The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. CRS Report
97-684. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
Tyszkiewicz, M.T. and S. Daggett. 1998. Defense Budget Primer. Washington, DC: Con-
gressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
Wildavsky, A. and N. Caiden. 2004. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process, 5th ed. New
York: Pearson Education.

DK3629.indb 123 11/7/07 8:33:21 AM

DK3629.indb 124 11/7/07 8:33:21 AM
 Chapter 7

Human Capital: DoD’s

National Security
Personnel System
Faces Implementation
Challenges

Government Accountability Office

Background
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20041 provided the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) with authority to establish (1) a pay and performance man-
agement system, (2) an appeals process and (3) a labor relations system—which
together comprise the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). The legislation
permits significant flexibility for designing NSPS, allowing for a new framework of
rules, regulations and processes to govern how defense civilian employees are hired,
compensated, promoted and disciplined. The law granted DoD certain exemptions
from laws governing federal civilian personnel management found in Title 5 of the
U.S. Code.2 The Congress provided these flexibilities in response to DoD’s position

 Reprinted from Government Accountability Office Report, GAO-05-730, July 2005, pp.
9–32.

125

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 126  n  Handbook of Military Administration

that the inflexibility of federal personnel systems was one of the most important
constraints to the department’s ability to attract, retain, reward and develop a civil-
ian workforce to meet the national security mission of the twenty-first century.

The Initial NSPS Design Process

The initial proposals for NSPS were developed by DOD and were based on a 2002
compilation of best practices generated by demonstration projects that experi-
mented with different personnel management concepts. After these proposals were
sent to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for review, OPM iden-
tified a broad range of legal, policy and technical concerns, and also noted that
the labor–management relations proposal was developed without any prior OPM
involvement or union input. OPM also indicated that the initial proposals had
been crafted with only token employee involvement, and it noted a high level of
concern expressed by congressional oversight committees, stakeholders and con-
stituent groups. In addition to OPM, assistant secretaries for the military services’
manpower organizations also expressed concerns that NSPS as designed would not
work.
Subsequently, the secretary of defense established a three-week reassessment
of system requirements, process issues, personnel and communication strategies,
and program schedules and milestones. The Overarching Integrated Product Team
(OIPT), an advisory group co-chaired by the principal deputy under secretary of
defense for personnel and readiness and OPM, and including the military services’
assistant secretaries for manpower and reserve affairs, oversaw this reassessment.

Employees Covered by NSPS

NSPS labor relations provisions will be implemented across the entire department
once final NSPS regulations are issued and effective, and they will apply to all DoD
employees currently covered by the labor relations provisions of U.S. Code, Title 5,
Chapter 71. In contrast, NSPS regulations governing the new pay and performance
management system and appeals process will be phased in and will not apply to
some employees, as stipulated by law (e.g., intelligence personnel and employees in
DoD’s laboratory demonstration organizations). The authorizing legislation stipu-
lates that these latter regulations may not apply to organizations with more than
300,000 employees until the secretary of defense determines and certifies that the
department has a performance management system in place that meets the statu-
tory criteria established for NSPS.
The first phase of implementation—Spiral One—will provide the basis for this
certification prior to the deployment of Spiral Two. Spiral One includes approxi-
mately 300,000 general schedule defense civilian employees, who will be converted

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 Human Capital  n  127

to the new system over a period of eighteen months. DoD initiated Spiral One
in early fiscal year 2006. Spiral Two will include the remainder of DoD’s eligible
workforce, including wage-grade employees. Spiral Three will apply to demonstra-
tion laboratory employees no earlier than October 1, 2008, and then only to the
extent the secretary of defense determines that NSPS provides greater personnel
management flexibilities to the laboratories than those currently implemented.

DoD’s Employee Unions

According to DoD, almost two-thirds of its more than 700,000 civilian employ-
ees are represented by forty-three labor unions, including over 1,500 separate bar-
gaining units.3 According to a DoD official, since 2000, defense civilian employee
membership in DoD’s labor unions has remained about the same; however, the
number of unions has dropped from about sixty unions to the current forty-three
unions, primarily the result of mergers and consolidation among the unions.

Practices and Implementation Steps for

Mergers and Transformations
In our prior work, we identified key practices and lessons learned from major pub-
lic and private sector organizational mergers, acquisitions and transformations.4
This work was undertaken to help federal agencies implement successful cultural
transformations in response to governance challenges. Although no two mergers
or transformation efforts are exactly alike and the “best” approach depends on a
variety of factors specific to each context, there was general agreement on a number
of key practices, which are as follows:
1. Ensure top leadership drives the transformation. Leadership must set the direc-
tion, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale that brings
everyone together behind a single mission.
2. Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transforma-
tion. A clear set of principles and priorities serves as a framework to help the
organization create a new culture and drive employee behaviors.
3. Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show prog-
ress from day one. Goals and a timeline are essential because the transforma-
tion could take years to complete.
4. Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. A
strong and stable team is important to ensure that the transformation receives
the needed attention to be sustained and successful.

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 128  n  Handbook of Military Administration

5. Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report

related progress. The strategy must reach out to employees, customers and
stakeholders and engage them in a two-way exchange.
6. Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the
transformation. Employee involvement strengthens the process and allows
them to share their experiences and shape policies.

NSPS Design Process Evolved into a Phased Approach

DoD’s current process to design NSPS is divided into four stages: (1) development of
options for the personnel system, (2) assessment of the options and translation into
recommended proposals, (3) issuance of proposed regulations and (4) a statutory
public comment period, a meet and confer period with employee representatives
and a congressional notification period. As discussed earlier, DoD’s initial process
to design NSPS was unrealistic and inappropriate. However, after a three-week
reassessment, DoD adjusted its approach and attempted to create a more cautious
and deliberate process that would involve all of the key stakeholders, including
OPM. At this time, DoD adopted a management framework to guide the design
of NSPS based on DoD’s acquisition management model and adopted an ana-
lytical framework to identify system requirements as well as a phased approach to
implementing the new system, also based on the acquisition management model.5
Figure 7.1 presents the four stages in DoD’s current process in terms of the key
organizational elements, inputs and outputs.
In the first stage, the NSPS PEO6 convened six multidisciplinary design
teams—called working groups—that were functionally aligned to cover the fol-
lowing personnel program areas: (1) compensation (classification and pay banding);
(2) performance management; (3) hiring, assignment, pay setting and workforce
shaping; (4) employee engagement; (5) adverse action and appeals; and (6) labor
relations. The working groups were co-chaired by DoD and OPM, and they were
largely staffed from the defense components. The working groups reviewed and ana-
lyzed data from alternative federal personnel systems and laboratory and acquisi-
tion demonstration projects, research materials from the Department of Homeland
Security’s personnel system design process and private industry practices. Accord-
ing to DoD, the working groups also received input and participation from DoD
human resources practitioners, attorneys, financial management experts and equal
employment opportunity specialists. The working groups also reviewed input gath-
ered from DoD employee and employee representatives. The PEO was responsible
for conducting outreach to employees and employee representatives, in conjunction
with NSPS program managers in the DoD components;7 their efforts included
106 focus groups, more than 50 town hall meetings worldwide and 10 meetings
with DoD employee representatives. The working groups provided a broad range

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 Human Capital  n  129

Stage 1
Analysis of Other
System Outreach Human Capital
Requirements Results Approaches

NSPS Working Groups

• Compensation Architecture
• Performance Management
• Hiring, Assigning, and
Workforce Shaping
• Employee Engagement
Stage 2
• Adverse Actions and Appeals
• Labor Relations NSPS Program
Executive Office
Senior Advisory Group
Proposed Overarching Integrated
Design Options Product Team
Senior Executive
Stage 3
Secretary of
Recommended Defense
Design Options Director of
OPM Stage 4
• 30-day Public
Comment Period
Proposed • 30-day Minimum Meet
and Confer Period
Regulations • 30-day Congressional
Notification Period
Legend:
Input
Organizational Element Final Regulations
Output

Source: GAO Analysis Based on DOD Information.

Figure 7.1  Key elements of the NSPS design process.

of options for the OIPT in September and October 2004; they did not prioritize
the design options.
In the second stage of the design process, OIPT assessed the design options
and then submitted them to the NSPS senior executive in November 2004. The
senior executive—appointed by the secretary of defense to design and implement
NSPS on his behalf—reviewed and approved the design options and presented
them as proposed enabling regulations to submit to the secretary of defense and
the director of OPM for a decision. Throughout this period, the OIPT, PEO, and
working group members continued to participate, in both drafting and reviewing
the proposed regulations.
In the third stage, the secretary of defense and director of OPM reviewed the
proposals submitted by the NSPS senior executive. After finalizing the proposed
regulations, the secretary and director jointly released them for public comment in
the Federal Register on February 14, 2005.
In the fourth stage, the NSPS proposed regulations were subjected to a statu-
tory thirty-day public comment period, after which DoD held a thirty-day meet
and confer period (which began on April 18, 2005) with employee representatives

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 130  n  Handbook of Military Administration

to discuss their views; the meetings were facilitated by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. As allowed by statute, DoD extended the meet and confer
process. Lastly, DoD is to engage in a thirty-day congressional notification period.
As called for in the authorizing legislation, the proposed regulations are subject to
change based on consideration of formal comments received during the thirty-day
public comment period and the results of a thirty-day meet and confer process
with employee representatives. As provided for in the authorizing legislation, DoD
can immediately implement those parts of the regulations upon which they have
reached agreement with employee representatives. DoD can implement those parts
of the proposed regulations not agreed to only after another thirty calendar days
have elapsed after (1) notifying the Congress of the decision to proceed with imple-
mentation and (2) explaining why implementation is appropriate.
DoD’s NSPS design process generally reflects practices of successful trans-
formations, but some key practices are lacking. The design process reflects four
of six key practices we identified that have consistently been found at the center
of successful transformations. First, DoD and OPM have developed a process
to design the new personnel system that is supported by top leadership in both
organizations. Second, from the outset, a set of guiding principles has guided
the NSPS design process. Third, DoD has a dedicated team in place to design
and implement NSPS and manage the transformation process, to include pro-
gram managers from DoD components. Fourth, DoD has established a timeline,
albeit ambitious, and implementation goals for implementing its new personnel
system. The design process, however, does not fully reflect two other key prac-
tices. First, DoD developed and implemented a written communication strategy
document, but it is not comprehensive. Second, although the NSPS design has
involved employees through town hall meetings and other mechanisms, it has not
included employee representatives on the working groups that drafted the design
options for the new system.

Top DoD and OPM Leadership Drives

Human Capital Transformation
DoD and OPM have developed a process to design DoD’s new human capital
resources management system that is supported by top leadership in both organiza-
tions. As previously discussed, DoD’s initial process to design NSPS was unreal-
istic and inappropriate; however, after a strategic reassessment, DoD adjusted its
approach to reflect a more cautious, deliberative process that involved top DoD and
OPM leadership. In our report on key practices for successful transformations, we
noted that top leadership that is clearly and personally involved in transformations

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 Human Capital  n  131

provides stability and an identifiable source for employees to rally around during
tumultuous times.8 In addition, we noted that leadership should set the direction,
pace and tone for the transformation. In our prior reports and testimonies, we
observed that top leadership must play a critical role in creating and sustaining
high-performing organizations.9
Senior leaders from DoD and OPM are directly involved in the NSPS design
process. For example, the secretary of defense tasked the secretary of the Navy to
be the NSPS senior executive overseeing the implementation of NSPS. Also, the
under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness and the NSPS senior exec-
utive provided an open letter to all DoD civilian employees stating that DoD is
tasked to design a transformation system for the department’s civilian employees
that supports its national security mission while treating workers fairly and pro-
tecting their rights. In addition, the principal deputy under secretary of defense
for personnel and readiness, the assistant secretaries for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs from each military service and the OPM senior advisor to the director
for the Department of Defense are members of an integrated executive manage-
ment team—the OIPT—that, among other things, provides overall policy and
strategic advice on the implementation of NSPS. Similarly, senior-level executives
from DoD and OPM are members of a group, known as the Senior Advisory
Group, that provides advice on general NSPS conceptual, strategic and imple-
mentation issues. Finally, senior leaders from DoD and the military components
participated in town hall meetings at DoD installations worldwide to discuss the
concept and design elements of NSPS.
Experience shows that successful major change management initiatives in large
private and public sector organizations can often take at least five to seven years.
This length of time and the frequent turnover of political leadership in the federal
government have often made it difficult to obtain the sustained and inspired atten-
tion to make needed changes. The development of the position of deputy secretary
of defense for management, who would act as DoD’s chief management officer, is
essential to elevate, integrate and institutionalize responsibility for the success of
DoD’s overall business transformation efforts, including its new personnel manage-
ment system.
As DoD embarks on a large-scale change initiative, such as its new personnel
management system, ensuring sustained and committed leadership is crucial in
developing a vision, initiating organizational change, maintaining open commu-
nications and creating an environment that is receptive to innovation. Without
the clear and demonstrated commitment of agency top leadership, organizational
cultures will not be transformed and new visions and ways of doing business will
not take root.

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 132  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Guiding Principles and Key Performance

Parameters Steer the Design Process
During the strategic reassessment of the NSPS design process, DoD and OPM
senior leadership developed a set of guiding principles to direct efforts throughout
all phases of NSPS development. We have reported that in bringing together the
originating components, the new organization must have a clear set of principles
and priorities that serve as a framework to help the organization create a new culture
and drive employee behaviors.10 Principles are the core values of the new organiza-
tion and can serve as an anchor that remains valid and enduring while organiza-
tions, personnel, programs and processes may change. Focusing on these principles
and priorities helps the organization maintain its drive towards achieving the goals
of the new transformation.
According to DoD, its guiding principles translate and communicate the broad
requirements and priorities outlined in the legislation into concise, understand-
able requirements that underscore the department’s purpose and intent in creating
NSPS. The NSPS guiding principles are

n Put mission first—support national security goals and strategic objectives

n Respect the individual—protect rights guaranteed by law
n Value talent, performance, leadership and commitment to public service
n Be flexible, understandable, credible, responsive and executable
n Ensure accountability at all levels
n Balance personnel interoperability with unique mission requirements
n Be competitive and cost effective

Senior DoD and OPM leadership also approved a set of key performance
parameters, which define the minimum requirements or attributes of NSPS. The
key performance parameters are

n High-performing workforce and management: employees and supervisors

are compensated and retained based on performance and contribution to
mission
n Agile and responsive workforce management: workforce can be easily sized,
shaped and deployed to meet changing mission requirements
n Credible and trusted: system assures openness, clarity, accountability and
merit principles
n Fiscally sound: aggregate increases in civilian payroll, at the appropriations
level, will conform to Office of Management and Budget fiscal guidance, and
managers will have flexibility to manage budget
n Supporting infrastructure: information technology support and training and
change management plans are available and funded

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 Human Capital  n  133

n Schedule: NSPS will be operational and demonstrate success prior to Novem-

ber 2009

These principles and key performance parameters can serve as core values for
human capital management at DoD—values that define the attributes that are
intrinsically important to what the organization does and how it will do it. Further-
more, they represent the institutional beliefs and boundaries that are essential to
building a new culture for the organization. Finally, they appropriately identify the
need to support the mission and employees of the department, protect basic civil
service principles, and hold employees accountable for performance.

Team Established to Manage the NSPS

Design and Implementation Process
As previously discussed, DOD established a team to design and implement NSPS
and manage the transformation process. Dedicating a strong and stable design
and implementation team that will be responsible for the day-to-day management
of the transformation is important to ensuring that it receives the focused, full-
time attention needed to be sustained and successful. Specifically, the design and
implementation team is important to ensuring that various change initiatives are
sequenced and implemented in a coherent and integrated way. Because a transfor-
mation process is a massive undertaking, the implementation team must have a
“cadre of champions” to ensure that changes are thoroughly implemented and sus-
tained over time. Establishing networks can help the design and implementation
team conduct the day-to-day activities of the merger or transformation and help
ensure that efforts are coordinated and integrated. To be most effective, establish-
ing clearly defined roles and responsibilities within this network assigns account-
ability for parts of the implementation process, helps reach agreement on work
priorities, and builds a code of conduct that will help all teams to work effectively.
The secretary of defense appointed a NSPS senior executive to, among other
things, design, develop and establish NSPS. Under the senior executive’s authority,
the PEO was established as the central policy and program office to conduct the
design, planning and development, deployment, assessment and full implementa-
tion of NSPS. Specifically, its responsibilities include designing the labor relations,
appeals, and human resource/pay for performance systems; developing a communi-
cation strategy and training strategy; modifying personnel information technology;
and drafting joint enabling regulations and internal DoD implementing regula-
tions. As the central DoD-wide program office, the PEO provides direction and
oversight of the components’ NSPS program managers who wear dual hats under
their parent component and the NSPS PEO. These program managers also serve as
their components’ action officers and participate in the development of NSPS and

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 134  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Senior Executive

Overarching
Integrated
Product Team

Program Program Management

Congressional and Senior Advisory
Executive Officer Support
Public Affairs Group
Budget and Financial
Training Management
Deputy Program
Executive Officer Human Resource
Information Systems
Program Evaluation
Implementation and
Director,
Director, Human Deployment
Labor Relations,
Legal Resources
Adverse Actions,
Systems
Appeals

Components
Deputy Deputy
Army Program
Management Office

Air Force Program

Management Office

Department of the
Navy Program
Management Officea

Washington
Headquarters Service
Program Management
Officeb Direct Reporting Authority
Indirect Reporting Authority

a
Includes the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps.
b
Represents defense agencies, DOD field activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Inspector
General, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Services, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Figure 7.2  NSPS design and implementation team organization.

plan and implement the deployment of NSPS. Figure 7.2 shows the organization of
the NSPS design and implementation team.

Ambitious Timeline and Implementation

Goals Established
DoD established an ambitious eighteen-month timeline and implementation goals
for completing the design process and beginning the phased implementation of
NSPS. We have reported that successful practices of mergers and transformations
include the establishment of a timeline with specific milestones that allow stake-
holders to track the organization’s progress towards its goals.11 Figure 7.3 shows
the current timeline and implementation goals for designing and implementing
NSPS.
Although DoD established a clear timeline with specific implementation goals,
they have allotted about six months for completing the design process and beginning

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 Human Capital  n  135

2004
April DoD conducts a strategic reassessment and adjusts its
approach to system design.
April DoD appoints a NSPS Senior Executive and establishes
the NSPS Program Executive Office. NSPS Labor Relations
Working Group and Adverse Actions and Appeals Working
Group begin developing design options.
April NSPS Senior Executive briefs DoD labor unions on the NSPS
Design and Implementation Plan.
June-December DoD officials meet with employee representatives on NSPS
design and implementation.
July DoD officials start holding Town Hall meetings about NSPS.
July NSPS focus groups meet to provide input on elements of NSPS.
July-September All six NSPS working groups meet for an eight-week period to
develop NSPS design options.
September-October NSPS officials brief Overarching Integrate Product Team on
NSPS design options.
December DoD selects components and units for initial roll out of NSPS
performance management system (Spiral One).
2005
February 14 DoD and OPM issue proposed NSPS regulations in the Federal
Register.
February 14 30-day public comment period begins.
April 18 30-day meet and confer period begins between DoD, OPM, and
DoD employee representatives.
To be determined 30-day congressional notification period begins.
To be determined DoD and OPM develop and issue final NSPS regulations.
To be determined DoD develops and issues NSPS implementing regulations and
develops and conducts training for defense civilian employees,
military and civilian supervisors, and managers.
To be determined DoD modifies existing automated human resource information
systems, including personnel and payroll transaction process
systems department-wide.
Late fiscal year Roll out of NSPS labor relations system, including establishment
2005 of the National Security Labor Relations Board.
Early fiscal year Initial roll out of NSPS performance management system
2006 (Spiral One).

Figure 7.3  NSPS timeline and implementation goals.

implementation of NSPS (as shown in the shaded area of Figure 7.3). Specifically,

the authorizing legislation provides for a meet and confer process for not less than
thirty calendar days with the employee representatives in order to attempt to reach
agreement. However, as allowed by statute, DoD extended the thirty-day meet and

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 136  n  Handbook of Military Administration

confer period with employee representatives. After the meet and confer process is
concluded, the secretary of defense must notify the Congress of DoD’s intent to
implement any portions of the proposal where agreement has not been reached,
but only after thirty calendar days have elapsed after notifying the Congress of
the decision to implement those provisions. In addition, DoD and OPM must
jointly develop and issue the final NSPS regulations, which must go through an
interagency coordination process before they are published in the Federal Register.
Also, DoD must develop and conduct in-depth and varied training for its civilian
employees, military and civilian supervisors, and managers. Moreover, DoD must
modify its existing automated human resource information systems, including per-
sonnel and payroll transaction process systems department-wide, before NSPS can
become operational. Finally, DoD plans to roll out the NSPS labor relations system
and establish the National Security Labor Relations Board before the initial roll out
of the NSPS performance management system in early fiscal year 2006. The board
must be staffed with board members as well as about one hundred professional staff,
which will support the board.
A large-scale organizational change initiative, such as DoD’s new personnel
management system, is a substantial commitment that will take years before it is
completed, and therefore must be carefully and closely managed. As a result, it
is essential to establish and track implementation goals and establish a timeline
to pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections.
Although it is appropriate to develop and integrate personnel management systems
within the department in a quick and seamless manner, moving too quickly or
prematurely can significantly raise the risk of doing it wrong. Having an ambi-
tious timeline is reasonable only insofar as it does not impact the quality of the
human capital management system that is created. In recent hearings on the NSPS
proposed regulations, we testified that DoD’s new personnel management system
will have far-reaching implications for the management of the department and for
civil service reform across the federal government.12 We further testified that NSPS
could, if designed and implemented properly, serve as a model for government-wide
transformation. However, if not properly designed and implemented, NSPS could
impede progress toward a more performance- and results-based system for the fed-
eral government as a whole.

Communication Strategy Not Comprehensive

DoD developed and implemented a written communication strategy document that
provides a structured and planned approach to communicate timely and consistent
information about NSPS, but this strategy is not comprehensive. It does not contain
some elements that we have identified as important to successful communication dur-
ing transformations. As a result, the written communication strategy document may
not facilitate two-way communication between employees, employee representatives

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 Human Capital  n  137

and management, which is central to forming effective partnerships that are vital to
the success of any organization.
Specifically, the strategy does not identify all key internal stakeholders and their
concerns. For example, the strategy acknowledges that employee representatives
play an important role in the design and implementation of NSPS, but it does
not identify them as a key stakeholder. Instead, DoD’s written communication
strategy document characterizes union leadership as a “detractor,” in part due to
their criticism of NSPS. Consequently, DoD identified the following four objec-
tives as its most urgent communications priorities, which are to (1) demonstrate the
rationale for and the benefits of NSPS, (2) express DoD’s commitment to ensur-
ing that NSPS is applied fairly and equitably throughout the organization, (3)
demonstrate openness and transparency in the design and process of converting
to NSPS, and (4) mitigate and counter any potential criticism of NSPS from such
detractors as unions and their support groups. Experience shows that failure to
adequately consider a wide variety of people and cultural issues can lead to unsuc-
cessful transformations.
Furthermore, although the written communication strategy document identi-
fied key messages for those internal and external stakeholders that are identified, it
does not tailor these messages to specific stakeholder groups. For example, the strat-
egy does not tailor key messages to such groups of employees as human resource
personnel, DoD executives and flag officers, supervisors and managers, even though
these employees may have divergent interests and information needs. Tailoring
information helps employees to feel that their concerns are specifically addressed.
We have reported that organizations undergoing a transformation should develop
a comprehensive communications strategy that reaches out to employees, custom-
ers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage them in the transformation
process and facilitate a two-way, honest exchange with and allow for feedback from
employees, customers and stakeholders.13

NSPS Design Process Has Involved Employees

Although the design process has involved employees through many mechanisms,
including focus groups, town hall meetings, a NSPS Web site for employee com-
ments and meetings with employee representatives, it has not included employee
representatives on the working groups that drafted the design options.14 The com-
position of the team is important because it helps employees see that they are being
represented and that their views are being considered in the decision-making pro-
cess. A successful transformation must provide for meaningful involvement by
employees and their representatives to, among other things, gain their input into
and understanding of the changes that are occurring in the organization. Employee
involvement strengthens the transformation process by including frontline perspec-
tives and experiences. Further, employee involvement helps increase employee’s

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 138  n  Handbook of Military Administration

understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain

ownership for new policies and procedures. Involving employees in planning helps
to develop agency goals and objectives that incorporate insights about operations
from a frontline perspective. It can also serve to increase employees’ understanding
and acceptance of organizational goals and improve motivation and morale.
The PEO sponsored a number of focus group sessions and town hall meetings at
various sites across DoD and around the world to provide employees and managers
an opportunity to participate in the development of NSPS. During a three-week
period beginning in July 2004, over one hundred focus groups were held through-
out DoD, including at overseas locations. The purpose of the focus groups was to
elicit perceptions and concerns about current personnel policies and practices as
well as new ideas from the DoD workforce to inform the NSPS design process.
Separate focus groups were held for employees, civilian and military supervisors,
and managers and practitioners from the personnel, legal and equal employment
opportunity communities. According to DoD officials, bargaining unit employees
and employee representatives were invited to participate. DoD officials stated that
over 10,000 comments, ideas and suggestions were received during the focus group
sessions and were summarized and provided to NSPS working groups for use in
developing options for the labor relations, appeals, adverse actions and personnel
design elements of NSPS.
In addition, town hall meetings were held and, according to DoD, are still
being conducted at DoD facilities around the world. According to DoD officials,
these town hall meetings have provided an opportunity to communicate with the
workforce, provide the status of the design and development of NSPS, and solicit
thoughts and ideas. The format for town hall meetings included an introductory
presentation by a senior leader followed by a question and answer session where
any employee in the audience was free to ask a question or make a comment. To
facilitate the widest possible dissemination, some of the town hall meetings were
broadcast live, as well as videotaped and rebroadcast on military television channels
and Web sites.
DoD’s NSPS Web site was available for DoD employees and interested parties
to view and comment on the proposed regulations, as well as for the most recent
information and announcements regarding NSPS. After the proposed NSPS regu-
lations were published in the Federal Register, there was a thirty-day public com-
ment period, providing all interested parties the opportunity to submit comments
and recommendations on the content of the proposal. The proposed regulations
were published on February 14, 2005, and the thirty-day comment period ended
on March 16, 2005. During this time, according to DoD, it received more than
58,000 comments.
Prior to the publication of the proposed NSPS regulations, DoD and OPM con-
ducted ten joint meetings with officials of DoD’s forty-three labor unions to discuss
NSPS design elements. According to DoD officials, these meetings involved as many
as eighty union leaders at any one time, addressed a variety of topics, including (1) the

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 Human Capital  n  139

reasons change is needed and the department’s interests; (2) the results of depart-
ment-wide focus group sessions held with a broad cross-section of DoD employees;
(3) the proposed NSPS implementation schedule; (4) employee communications;
and (5) proposed design options in the areas of labor relations and collective bargain-
ing, adverse actions and appeals, and pay and performance management. According
to DoD officials, these meetings provided the opportunity to discuss the design ele-
ments and proposals under consideration for NSPS, and solicit employee representa-
tive feedback.
According to DoD, the focus group sessions and town hall meetings, as well as
the working groups and union meetings, assured that DoD employees, managers,
supervisors, employee representatives and other stakeholders were involved in and
given ample opportunity to provide input into the design and implementation of
NSPS.
Opportunities for employee involvement were limited between the conclusion
of the town hall meetings and focus groups in July 2004 and the publishing of the
proposed NSPS regulations in February 2005; the primary means for employees to
provide feedback during this time was through the NSPS Web site.

DoD Faces Multiple Challenges in Implementing NSPS

As DoD implements its new personnel management system, it will face multiple
implementation challenges in both the early and later stages of implementation.
At recent hearings on the proposed NSPS regulations, we highlighted multiple
challenges: (1) establishing an overall communications strategy, (2) providing
adequate resources for the new system, (3) involving employees and other stake-
holders in implementing the system, (4) ensuring sustained and committed leader-
ship, and (5) evaluating the new personnel management system after it has been
implemented.15

Early Implementation Challenges

n Establishing an overall communications strategy. A significant challenge for
DoD is to ensure an effective and ongoing two-way communications strat-
egy, given its size, geographically and culturally diverse audiences, and differ-
ent command structures across DoD organizations. We have reported that a
communications strategy that creates shared expectations about, and reports
related progress on, the implementation of the new system is a key prac-
tice of a change management initiative. The communications strategy must
include the active and visible involvement of a number of key players, includ-
ing the secretary of defense, and a variety of communication means and
mediums for successful implementation of the system. DoD acknowledges

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that a comprehensive outreach and communications strategy is essential for

designing and implementing its new personnel management system, but the
proposed regulations do not identify a process for continuing involvement of
employees in the planning, development and implementation of NSPS.
n Providing adequate resources for implementing the new system. Experience
has shown that additional resources are necessary to ensure sufficient planning,
implementation, training and evaluation for human capital reform. Accord-
ing to DoD, the implementation of NSPS will result in costs for, among other
things, developing and delivering training, modifying automated personnel
information systems, and starting up and sustaining the National Security
Labor Relations Board. Major cost drivers in implementing pay-for-perfor-
mance systems are the direct costs associated with salaries and training. DoD
estimates that the overall cost associated with implementing NSPS will be
approximately $158 million through fiscal year 2008. However, it has not
completed an implementation plan for NSPS, including an information tech-
nology plan and a training plan; thus, the full extent of the resources needed
to implement NSPS may not be well understood at this time.
n Involving employees and other stakeholders in implementing the system.
DoD faces a significant challenge in involving—and continuing to involve—
its employees, employee representatives and other stakeholders in implement-
ing NSPS. DoD’s proposed NSPS regulations, while providing for continuing
collaboration with employee representatives, do not identify a process for the
continuing involvement of employees and other stakeholders in the plan-
ning, development and implementation of NSPS. The active involvement of
all stakeholders will be critical to the success of NSPS. The involvement of
employees and their representatives both directly and indirectly is crucial to
the success of new initiatives, including implementing a pay-for-performance
system. High-performing organizations have found that actively involving
employees and stakeholders, such as unions or other employee associations,
when developing results-oriented performance management systems helps
improve employees’ confidence and belief in the fairness of the system and
increases their understanding and ownership of organizational goals and
objectives. This involvement must be early, active and continuing if employ-
ees are to gain a sense of understanding and ownership of the changes that
are being made.

Later Implementation Challenges

n Ensuring sustained and committed leadership. As DoD implements this
massive human capital reform, its challenge will be to elevate, integrate and
institutionalize leadership responsibility for NSPS to ensure its success. DoD
may face a future leadership challenge when the NSPS senior executive and

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 Human Capital  n  141

the PEO transition out of existence once NSPS is fully implemented. Accord-
ing to a PEO official, at that time, ongoing implementation responsibility for
NSPS would come under the Civilian Personnel Management Service, which
is part of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness. In recent testimony on the transformation of DoD business oper-
ations, we stated that as DoD embarks on large-scale business transformation
efforts, such as NSPS, the complexity and long-term nature of these efforts
requires the development of an executive position capable of providing strong
and sustained change management leadership across the department—and
over a number of years and various administrations.16 One way to ensure
such leadership would be to create by legislation a full-time executive-level II
position for a chief management official, who would serve as the deputy sec-
retary of Defense for Management. This position would elevate, integrate and
institutionalize the high-level attention essential for ensuring that a strategic
business transformation plan—as well as the business policies, procedures,
systems and processes that are necessary for successfully implementing and
sustaining overall business transformation efforts, like NSPS, within DoD—
are implemented and sustained. In previous testimony on DoD’s business
transformation efforts, we identified the lack of clear and sustained leadership
for overall business transformations as one of the underlying causes that has
impeded prior DoD reform efforts.17
n Evaluating the new personnel management system. Evaluating the impact
of NSPS will be an ongoing challenge for DoD. This is especially important
because NSPS would give managers more authority and responsibility for
managing the new personnel system. High-performing organizations con-
tinually review and revise their human capital management systems based
on data-driven lessons learned and changing needs in the work environment.
Collecting and analyzing data will be the fundamental building block for
measuring the effectiveness of these approaches in support of the mission and
goals of the department.

According to DoD, the department is planning to establish procedures to evalu-

ate the implementation of its new personnel management system. During testimony
on the proposed NSPS regulations, we stated that DoD should consider conduct-
ing evaluations that are broadly modeled on demonstration projects. Under the
demonstration project authority, agencies must evaluate and periodically report on
results, implementation of the demonstration project, costs and benefits, impacts
on veterans and other equal employment opportunity groups, adherence to merit
system principles, and the extent to which the lessons learned from the project can
be applied government-wide. We further testified that a set of balanced measures
addressing a range of results, and customer, employee, and external partner issues
may also prove beneficial. An evaluation such as this would facilitate congressional
oversight; allow for any midcourse corrections; assist DoD in benchmarking its

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 142  n  Handbook of Military Administration

progress with other efforts; and provide for documenting best practices and lessons
learned with employees, stakeholders, other federal agencies and the public.

Conclusions
DoD’s efforts to design and implement a new personnel management system repre-
sent a huge undertaking. However, if not properly designed and implemented, the
new system could severely impede DoD’s progress toward a more performance- and
results-based system that it is striving to achieve. Although DoD’s process to design
its new personnel management system represents a phased, deliberative process,
it does not fully reflect some key practices of successful transformations. Because
DoD has not fully addressed all of these practices, it does not have a comprehensive
written communication strategy document that effectively addresses employee con-
cerns and their information needs, and facilitates two-way communication between
employees, employee representatives and management. Without a comprehensive
written communication strategy document, DoD may be hampered in achiev-
ing employee buy-in, which could lead to an unsuccessful implementation of the
system.
In addition, evaluating the impact of NSPS will be an ongoing challenge for
DoD. Although DoD has plans to establish procedures to evaluate NSPS, it is
critical that these procedures be adequate to fully measure the effectiveness of the
program. Specifically, adequately designed evaluation procedures include results-
oriented performance measures and reporting requirements that facilitate DoD’s
ability to effectively evaluate and report on NSPS’s results. Without procedures that
include outcome measures and reporting requirements, DoD will lack the visibility
and oversight needed to benchmark progress, make system improvements and pro-
vide the Congress with the assessments needed to determine whether NSPS is truly
the model for government-wide transformation in human capital management.

Notes
1. Public Law No. 108-136, § 1101 (Nov. 24, 2003).
2. The Congress did not exempt DoD from provisions of Title 5, U.S. Code, pertaining
to veterans’ preference, merit systems principles, prohibited personnel practices and
equal employment opportunity.
3. The United Defense Workers Coalition currently represents thirty-six of the forty-
three DoD labor unions. The coalition was formed in February 2004 to more effec-
tively represent the interests of its members during NSPS design meetings with DoD
officials. The remaining unions, for various reasons, decided to remain independent
of the coalition.

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 Human Capital  n  143

4. U.S. GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation—Lessons Learned

for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies. GAO-03-293SP
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2002); and Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementa-
tion Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2003).
5. The acquisition management model is contained in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD
Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003).
6. The PEO is the policy and program management office responsible for conducting
the design, planning development, implementation and assessment of NSPS.
7. Component program managers wear dual hats under their parent components and
the NSPS PEO.
8. GAO-03-669.
9. See U.S. GAO. Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views Show Need for Ensuring
Top Leadership Skills. GAO-01-127 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2000); Management
Reform: Using the Results Act and Quality Management to Improve Federal Performance.
GAO/T-GGD-99-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1999); and Management Reform:
Elements of Successful Improvement Initiatives. GAO/T-GGD-00-26 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 15, 1999).
10. GAO-03-669.
11. Ibid.
12. U.S. GAO. Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Regulations for
DoD’s National Security Personnel System. GAO-05-559T (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
14, 2005); Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed Department of
Defense National Security Personnel System Regulations. GAO-05-517T (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 12, 2005); and Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed DoD
National Security Personnel System Regulations. GAO-05-432T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 15, 2005).
13. GAO-03-669.
14. It should be noted that ten federal labor unions have filed suit alleging that DoD
failed to abide by the statutory requirements to include employee representatives in
the development of DoD’s new labor relations system authorized as part of NSPS. See
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO et al. v. Rumsfeld et al., No.
1:05cv00367 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 23, 2005).
15. GAO-05-432T, GAO-05-517T and GAO-05-559T.
16. U.S. GAO. Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DoD
Business Operations, GAO-05-629T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).
17. U.S. GAO. Department of Defense: Further Actions Are Needed to Effectively Address
Business Management Problems and Overcome Key Business Transformation Challenges.
GAO-05-140T (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, 2004).

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DK3629.indb 144 10/9/07 1:43:01 PM
 Chapter 8

The History and Role

of TRADOC System
Manager (TSM) Abrams

John M. Shay, Seth T. Blakeman and Hank Hughes

Setting the Stage for TSM: Formation of

TRADOC and M1 Abrams Tank
In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army initiated the 1973 STEADFAST Reorganization
plan and began modernizing the force, focusing on readiness and overall combat
effectiveness. The Vietnam and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars illustrated the need for an
overhaul, forcing a reassessment on combat effectiveness against our heavier armed
and numerically superior Soviet counterparts. Although the Arab–Israeli conflict
proved a smaller force, applying sound doctrine could repel and destroy a larger,
Soviet-equipped army; the U.S. military community recognized the emergence of
a technological threshold and more importantly that we were not at the forefront
of this combat revolution. Due to the growing sophistication of Soviet weapons
and the increased lethality of modern combat, combat development rose as the
natural conduit for reorganization, mirroring the induction of other innovative
weapons systems like the armored horse, the longbow or artillery. The creation of
the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 proved one of the most

 This chapter does not reflect the views of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense
or the United States Army War College.

145

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 146  n  Handbook of Military Administration

important actions taken to ensure the continued ability of U.S. soldiers to secure
battlefield dominance (Swain, 1985, 69). Under the command of General William
E. DePuy, TRADOC assumed the training functions of the Continental Army
Command (CONARC) and merged them with the combat development mission
of the Combat Developments Command (CDC) (Cameron, 1999, 1).
The 1973 Arab–Israeli conflict emphasized the need for continuous evolution of
weapon systems and matériel to ensure superior combat effectiveness on an adapt-
ing battlefield. With a clear task and purpose, the military made determinations on
what systems to develop based on criteria to meet the Soviet threat. In contrast to
the cumbersome CONARC, TRADOC’s operative design of combining doctrine
and development streamlined the modernization process (Romjue et al., 1998, 42).
Now a key player in the requirements and characteristics determination of new
matériel, TRADOC relied upon input compiled by combat developers working
within their respective branches. Even after a system entered the acquisition process,
TRADOC continued to monitor its progress and provided a check on the actions
of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Through control of the operational test-
ing process, TRADOC measured the effectiveness of a given system against its
initial performance requirements. These tests and TRADOC’s evaluation directly
affected a system’s continued development. In determining the parameters for the
operational tests and in assessing a system’s performance, TRADOC relied upon
the views of the combat developer (Romjue et al., 1998, 42).
Spearheading the military’s transformation was the “big five” concept. To solve
the dilemma of how to fight a numerically superior enemy, the United States relied,
in part, on technologically superior hardware that could defeat an enemy at ratios
higher than one to three (Kelly, 1989, 81). To achieve that end, the army in the
early 1970s began work on the “big five” equipment systems: a new tank, a new
infantry combat vehicle, a new attack helicopter, a new transport helicopter and a
new antiaircraft missile (Swain, 1985, viii).
The Fulda Gap (situated between East and West Germany, near Frankfurt), the
most likely penetration point for Warsaw Pact countries to invade the NATO alli-
ance, determined the most critical improvement—a competitive Main Battle Tank
(MBT). The M1 Abrams tank, the first of the “big five” systems, rose from the fail-
ure of a preceding tank program and benefited from this trial. Prior to the Abrams,
the standard tanks in the army inventory had been various models of the M48 and
M60, both surpassed in some respects by new Soviet equipment. The M60 was
intended as an interim vehicle pending the development and fielding of the MBT
70 (joint U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany program). The Germans backed
out of the program due to immature technology and cost overruns. The XM803 was
the successor to the abortive joint American–German Main Battle Tank-70 project
carried on solely by the Americans, which Congress later cancelled due to cost. The
Army started work on a new MBT in 1973, fielding the first M1s in February 1980.
The M1 was the first U.S. tank since World War II that was qualitatively superior

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 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  147

to Soviet models (Kelly, 1989, 270). American success in Desert Storm (1991) pro-
vided conclusive evidence to justify armored dominance.

The System Needs a Parent: Formation of TSM

General Donn A. Starry assumed command of TRADOC from General DePuy
on July 1, 1977. Creator of the AirLand doctrine, Starry’s reform on internal affairs
proved to be a beneficial act of his tenure, leaving an imprint on the organiza-
tion of the modern army (Kelly, 1989, 135). Accordingly, he enacted a pronounced
decentralization of major projects to the integrating centers and schools. Decen-
tralization of power and proximity of partners, he hoped, would expedite results.
The concerns about the U.S. army’s readiness and ability to win on the battlefield
delineated the emphasis of planning combat development to current needs over
long-term needs. Learning their lesson from the failed MBT-70 and XM803, tank
designers shied away from unproven technologies and toward the innovative use
of proven components and technology (Romjue et al., 1998, 43). However, the
tank required proper oversight in order to make a successful transition into com-
bat units. Training, organizational, personnel and fielding issues had still to be
resolved. Therefore, in 1977 TRADOC introduced the system manager to perform
this role. This new position helped to ensure that preparations for a weapon’s com-
bat usage began before production and fielding. The TRADOC system manager
(TSM) represented a quality control measure whose roots stemmed from a series of
failed programs in the 1960s and 1970s. The TSM also assumed responsibility for
improving a system after fielding began (Romjue et al., 1998, 43).

Army Transformation: Evolution of TRADOC

and TSM CBRS and DOTLMS
Introduced in the 1980s, the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) emerged
as the answer to TRADOC’s determination to successfully manage combat devel-
opment and requirements determination. CBRS tied doctrine, organization, train-
ing, leadership, matériel and soldiers (DOTLMS) requirements to specific army
needs and provided a structured process to coordinate modernization efforts, using
Soviet military capability as the standard of comparison for all systems (Kornacki,
1993, 28) (Figure 8.1).
CBRS began with TRADOC’s evolving vision of the future battlefield. Opera-
tional concepts derived from this vision identified desired capabilities. The Mission
Area Assessment followed in which each branch compared its current capabilities
to those deemed necessary for the future battlefield. The Battlefield Development
Plan prioritized and integrated these assessments, suggesting actions to ensure

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 148  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Cold War Combat Development

Step 1:
Step 4:
Identify Problem
Development

Step 2: Step 5:
Develop Conceptual Detailed Acquisition
Solution

Characteristic
Step 3: • Linear
Generate Requirements
• Threat-based
Statement
• Lockstep Milestones
• 15 Years Concept to FUE

Figure 8.1  Concept Based Requirement System.

effective operation on the future battlefield. It directly fed budget and program
planning, and it guided AMC efforts to provide technical support. Mission Area
Development plans recommended a course of action to address each deficiency
identified. From these plans were derived the input for specific matériel require-
ments that would guide development and acquisition. Supporting studies reviewed
logistical, personnel and cost issues. Subject to TRADOC and Department of
Army approval, the outcome of these studies then fed the Life Cycle System Man-
agement model. Program initiation and related budgeting authority from the sec-
retary of defense followed. Once a new design entered the acquisition cycle, AMC
bore primary responsibility for research, matériel development, engineering tests
and product validation (TRADOC pamphlet 71-9, 1998).
Although success in the Gulf War illustrated the “big five’s” achievement, the
1990s saw a downturn in military spending. The 1991 Gulf War also highlighted the
innovative use of evolving information technology, triggering a revolution in military
affairs. Digitization, symbolized by the activities of the Experimental Force (EXFOR)
and the Force XXI process, began to transform the army as far out as 2010 to 2020.
The emphasis of combat development therefore shifted back to meeting future battle-
field needs because the modern military’s effectiveness hinged on meeting the next
threshold. A growing concern arose over the length of time to develop matériel from
concept to fielding. The 1980s witnessed major efforts to streamline the development
and acquisition process, but too often these highly visible and politically charged
efforts resulted in more steps to the process, thus lengthening it. Consequently, in the
1990s, several rapid acquisition initiatives were started to speed up delivery of new
matériel to the field. These efforts proved only partially successful and acquisition
reform remains a focus at the Pentagon today (Cameron, 1999).
Mirroring the digitization revolution, the CBRS adapted from a Soviet-based
threat requirements determination, refocusing for use against a multitude of

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 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  149

potential regional threats in an array of environments. The shift in the army’s stance
from forward deployment to power projection necessitated all planned combat
vehicles being easily transportable via air or sea transport. Moreover, army down-
sizing ensured that the number of such systems would be limited, increasing the
importance of effective doctrine and training (TRADOC pamphlet 71-9, 1998).
This CBRS process was a lock-step process well suited to matching or surpassing
the capabilities of a known threat. It did not work as well in a rapidly changing
environment marked by uncertainty as to threat, location of conflict and timing of
a national crisis (Cameron, 1999).

Battle Labs
In 1992, TRADOC created the Battle Lab Program to explore new concepts and
technology and determine their applicability across the doctrine, training, lead-
ership, organization, material, personnel, and force (DTLOMPF). Their princi-
pal analytical tools included modeling, simulation, field trials, and the horizontal
integration of technology. The strong science and technology orientation of the
Battle Labs made them a useful link between the research and development (R&D)
efforts of the military and private industry. TRADOC also relied upon the Battle
Labs to test new approaches to requirements determination, saving time and money
by utilizing technology and bypassing the more costly resources of previous experi-
mentation (Romjue et al.,1998, 48).
The principal role of the Battle Labs became one of testing and experimenta-
tion. Through these activities, the Battle Labs identified promising technology for
accelerated development and acquisition, worked with industry to evaluate ideas or
matériel for potential military applications, tested new concepts and helped define
the need for new systems and their characteristics. Their testing of concepts across
the DTLOMPF suited the holistic approach to requirements determination that
TRADOC sought. The combat developer and the appropriate Battle Lab deter-
mined possible solutions through experimentation. They also determined whether
these solutions should be pursued through DOTLMPF channels. As the most
expensive, time-consuming and complex, matériel solutions were considered the
last option (Cameron, 1996, 4).

New Requirements System

The 1996 TRADOC Black Book No. 3: Requirements Determination and 1998
TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, Force Development Requirements Determination formal-
ized a new requirements policy (Figure 8.2). TRADOC assumed control over all
war-fighting requirements. The TRADOC commander bore sole responsibility for
approving such requirements, eliminating the need to seek approval from multiple

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 150  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Process Overview

Army S &T Requirements

Leading to
I Solutions
Vision N D
S T
I L
G O
Experimentation
H S
T
Analysis M MNS
S
Overarching Operational, Functional, Future Operational ORD
Concept Branch Concepts Capabilities

• Holistic requirements based on desired • Warfighting experiments primary source

future capabilities—joint and army of insights used by army leaders to
• Single overarching warfighting concept analyze DTLOMS requirements
with more detailed, subordinate concepts • Cost considered during requirements
• Concepts influenced by and in turn determination as an independent variable
guide S &T research

Figure 8.2  Force Development Requirements.

commands within the Department of the Army (DA). This authority enabled
TRADOC to standardize the requirements process by providing a single system
applicable to all weapons, equipment, clothing and information technology (Cam-
eron, 1999, 4). TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66: Future Operational Capabilities fur-
ther refined these ideas into specific capabilities to guide research and development
efforts. This document indicated the desired end state of the army in twenty to thirty
years, serving as a focal point for the separate development paths of each branch. It
also helped to guide the independent R&D efforts of the national laboratories and
industry. Through experimentation and operational experience, a means of realiz-
ing each desired capability was sought. The combat developer and the appropriate
Battle Lab determined possible solutions through experimentation. They also deter-
mined whether these solutions should be pursued through DOTLMPF. As the most
expensive, time-consuming and complex, matériel solutions were considered the last
option (TRADOC pamphlet, 71-9, 1998).

Integrated Concept Teams

The Armor Center became one of the first branches to make wide use of integrated
concept teams (ICTs) in 1995. The army developed a new requirements determina-
tion process aimed at providing decision makers with better cost and technological

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 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  151

feasibility information with goals to cut the acquisition cycle time and costs. The
user, requirements and acquisition communities will have representatives on newly
created integrated concept teams. ICTs will guide the requirements development
process and complement the integrated product team (IPT) methodology already
used by material developers. Establishing ICTs early in concept development
enables the teams to transition to IPTs when a material requirement is approved at a
Milestone I decision. One of the key components of the ICT process is considering
cost as an independent variable (CAIV) to weight capabilities versus cost tradeoffs.
Under Major General Lon E. Maggart, the Armor Center played a central role in
developing the ICT notion. Once accepted and incorporated into the requirements
determination process, the Armor Center established separate ICTs to analyze key
armor issues: tank fleet modernization, ammunition and guns, development of a
replacement for the current tanks’ Future Combat System (FCS), and development
of a dedicated scout vehicle Future Scout Combat System (FSCS) (ACH, 1996,
112).
The integrated approach to requirements determination and combat develop-
ment suited the “system of systems” nature of major end items. Each comprised a
collection of subsystems that possessed their own development tracks and fielding
schedules (see Figure 8.3/M1A2SEP). In addition, some subsystems also required
doctrinal changes, training plans, and organizational modifications. All of these
separate schedules and actions had to be coordinated and balanced. Moreover, sub-
systems often were incorporated into several parent systems with different propo-
nents, whose development and fielding schedules also had to be considered. Such
an intricate web of linked activity, spanning branch and service lines, forced the
complete abandonment of the stovepipe development patterns of the Cold War and
the CBRS (ACH, 1996, 128).

Army Transformation Initiative

In mid-October 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki and Secretary
of the Army Louis Caldera outlined their initiative for the army of the future.
Including rapidly deployable forces and equipment capable of responding to the
full spectrum of operations, they termed this initiative “Transformation.” The ini-
tiative looked to the weapons, force structure, training and doctrine of the army
well into the twenty-first century. TRADOC was the forerunner of that effort.
The advances in technology indicated an evolution to a battlefield on which time,
distance, movement and firepower existed in new relationships emerging from the
evidence of the extended reach and pinpoint accuracy of weapons brought to effect
by deployability, responsiveness, near-real-time intelligence, target acquisition and
communications technology. This advent of a new strategic world and the emer-
gence of a new higher level of technological warfare took place in the context of a

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 152  n  Handbook of Military Administration

• Embedded Battle
Command • 2nd Generation Forward
Architecture Looking Infrared (FLIR)
( FBCB2) • Mass Memory Unit
W/Built-in Growth • Integrated Thermal
• Global
Positioning Management System
System
• Under Armor
• Enhanced Position Auxiliary Power
Location Unit
Reporting System
(EPLRS) • Eye Safe Laser
Range Finder
• Improved Display
• Expert System
Color
Diagnostics
Terrain Maps
Keyboard

Figure 8.3  M1A2 SEP.

U.S. military establishment sharply drawing down in the wake of the retrenchment
of Soviet power (Chapman, 1998, 25).
The Abrams Tank Modernization Strategy (ATMS) supported the Army’s
transformation vision. The 2000 Mechanized Force Modernization Plan critically
acclaimed the Abrams as a decisive factor in the U.S.’s war-fighting requirements.
The ATMS took a balanced approach that allowed the army to sustain combat
overmatch while improving reliability and reducing operations and support (O&S)
cost on an aging tank fleet. To operate effectively within a “system of systems” envi-
ronment and provide improved force effectiveness to the organization, action must
be taken to improve the Abrams platform (Chapman, 1998, 43).

The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System

In 2002, in order to augment future battlefield capability and combat development,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated the Joint Capabilities Integration
Development System (JCIDS) program, which defined acquisition requirements
and evaluation criteria for future defense programs. Created to fix the problems of
redundancies and unilateral development of the previous service-specific require-
ments generation system, JCIDS guided the development of requirements for future
acquisition systems to reflect the needs of all four services. JCIDS now focuses the
requirements generation process on needed capabilities as requested or defined by
one of the five U.S. combatant commanders. In the JCIDS process, regional and
functional combatant commanders give feedback early in the development process
to ensure that their requirements are met.

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 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  153

TSM Function and Method

Today, TSMs bear the responsibility to serve as the TRADOC user representa-
tive and single POC for systems assigned in accordance with the TSM charter
and provide intensive, centralized, total system management and integration of all
DTLOMPFS considerations. The TSM also monitors and synchronizes all aspects
of total system development, testing and evaluation, corrective actions, acquisi-
tion, matériel release, and fielding, to include direct interaction with the program/
project/product managers and matériel developers of the primary and ancillary
system(s), test community, and the fielding/gaining commands (Skaff, 2002, 1).
Using an ICT with empowered membership from schools and matériel developers,
coordinate the development and documentation of all related materials, as needed:

n Operational and Organizational Plan (O&O)

n Operational and System Architecture
n Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
n Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP)
n System Threat Assessment Report (STAR)
n Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT)
n Supportability Strategy
n System Training Plans (STRAP)
n Software Development Plans
n Doctrinal publications
n System Evaluation Plans (SEPs)
n Critical Operational Issues and Criteria (COIC)
n Simulation Support Plan (SSP)
n User input to Qualitative and Quantitative Personnel Requirements Infor-
mation (QQPRI) and Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) Feeder Data
n Integrated Logistics Support Plan
n Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)

In coordination with the proponent Directorate of Combat Developments

(DCD), the TSM proposes refinement of system requirements in the Operational
Requirements Document/Capabilities Development Document (ORD/CDD); jus-
tified or validated system requirements at all levels of the army, DoD, and Con-
gress, as directed. The TSM participates in system concept analyses by matériel
developers, as well as cost performance trade-off and cost as an independent vari-
able analyses by providing detailed war-fighting capability impact of specific sys-
tem characteristics. Additionally, the TSM provides TRADOC senior leadership
recommendation for all design reviews (Skaff, 2002, 2).
The TSM prepares the TRADOC position on, receives TRADOC leadership
approval for and participates in decision reviews (In Progress Review (IPR)/Army

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 154  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Systems Acquisition Review Council/Army Requirements Oversight Council

(AROC)/Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)/Defense Acquisition
Board) for assigned systems. He or she provides user input for documentation of
these reviews, such as Acquisition Program Baseline and acts as a user representa-
tive on any other acquisition review boards for assigned systems (Skaff, 2002, 2).
As part of unit set fielding, the TSM manages a coordinated schedule of work
for TRADOC schools and activities in support of system development and initial
fielding. The TSM identifies and prioritizes system hardware and software deficien-
cies to the matériel developers for corrective action. The TSM reviews and evaluates
proposed actions and engineering change proposals of the project or program man-
ager to ensure that user requirements are adequately addressed (Skaff, 2002, 2).
The TSM provides for system improvements (Preplanned Product Improve-
ments, System Enhancement Program, Service Life Extension Program, recapi-
talization efforts, etc.) in coordination with the proponent. This is accomplished
through the identification of Science and Technology, Science and Technology
Objectives, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, Advanced Concept Technol-
ogy Demonstrations, and Concept Experimentation Programs for systems assigned
to the TSM. The TSM ensures that test units are trained and prepared for testing;
coordinates all user involvement in system testing (for example, scenario develop-
ment, test support, unit training and user subject matter expertise); and monitors
technical and user test activities for assigned systems to keep TRADOC leadership
informed of system progress and to initiate corrective action for user unit or test
personnel activities as needed (Skaff, 2002, 2).
Lastly, the TSM cross-walks and reconciles O&O concept to ORD characteris-
tics to the request for proposal (RFP) matériel specifications, to ensure the acquisi-
tion strategy meets user needs; articulates system operational and organizational
concepts associated with the system as a member of combined arms system of sys-
tems and joint environments; provides user coordination to manpower estimates;
user representation in analysis of alternatives (AoAs), and other studies, evaluations
and efforts that support the development programs. The TSM provides TRADOC
representation to allied/prospective users of the assigned systems and develops and
implements office closure and responsibility transfer plan (Skaff, 2002, 3).

TSM Abrams Day-to-Day Activities

The mission statement of TSM Abrams is to conduct total capabilities management
for the Abrams tank program across DOTLMPF and ensure all current and future
user requirements are developed, fully integrated early and continuously through-
out the development, production and deployment of assigned systems.
From this mission statement, the TSM Abrams office performs many functions
on a daily basis. The TSM, a colonel, and his deputy, a GS-14, get guidance from
the TRADOC CG and Fort Knox CG (Chief of Armor). They coordinate with

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 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  155

many outside agencies, such as the Abrams project manager, division and brigade
commanders (user), other TSMs and disseminate their guidance to the other mem-
bers of the TSM Abrams office and manage their progress. The activities of the
twelve-member staff are many and include the following:

Project Management
− Provide oversight on Abrams training aids, devices, simulators, and simu-
lations (TADSS), ensuring they are up to date and reflect the current
capabilities of the systems in the field.
− Coordinate with Training and Doctrine and Combat Development (TDCD)
who write the doctrine and develop new systems for the armor community
and ensure new systems and technology are reflected in doctrine.
− Monitor new capabilities being developed for the Abrams tank and assist
with the integration of these new technologies/capabilities.
− Write documents in the form of requirements documents, information
papers, DA form 2028 change documents, and memoranda updating the
Abrams tank with current and future technology.
− Review other system’s requirements documents for commonality oppor-
tunities and ensure they are able to integrate and are in sync with the
Abrams tank.
− Interact with the user, ensuring his needs are met with DOTLMPF
analysis.
− Coordinate for soldier testing and evaluation on new systems and
equipment.
− Coordinate with program manager (PM) for new equipment plans, field-
ing, budget.
− Coordinate with National Guard Bureau for fielding, budget and
fleet issues.
− Track the number and type of tanks in the fleet and at each installation
to include Fort Knox.
− Track the modifications that are being applied to the Abrams fleet.
− IAW DA and PM offices address modernization needs in relation to
threat, budget projections and Army Campaign Plan.
Ammunition
− On-site monitoring and evaluation of currently fielded tank ammunition.
− Monitor, evaluate, coordinate and participate in testing of developmental
tank ammunition.
− Develop, coordinate and participate in capability requirements of
future ammunition.
− Provide ammunition information to soldiers and marines through on-site
briefings, written responses, as well as through technical, tactical and
professional publications.

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 156  n  Handbook of Military Administration

− Serve as a liaison for TCM/ammunition community with soldiers and

marines on all areas of tank ammunition to include lessons learned dur-
ing training and combat.
Safety
− Track and analyze the trends on the number and type of armor crewmen
deaths in Iraq.
− Analyze all Abrams tank fires and accidents for trends and possible
risk mitigation.
− Research and submit findings and recommendations to the Combat
Readiness Center concerning fatal accidents.
− Address Congressional Requests for Information (RFI) on various acci-
dents, incidents and occasional “good ideas.”

Termination of TSM Abrams and Formation of

TCM Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)
Many officials within the Army felt the Abrams could not fight and succeed in an
urban fight. They felt it could be replaced with emerging technology as it was obso-
lete, too heavy to deploy rapidly and too expensive to own and maintain. In May
2002, the deputy chief of staff of the army called for the termination of the TSM
Abrams office and the establishment of the TSM Future Combat System (FCS)
office (Jordan, 2002). TSM Abrams was able to prolong the termination for two
more years and eventually avoid it altogether, but lost its charter in August 2004
(Harris, 2004). The TSM Abrams office remained opened, but with minimal staff-
ing, no budget and without a charter (Harris, 2004).
It wasn’t until the Abrams and Bradley demonstrated overwhelming success
in spearheading the assault on Baghdad in March 2003 and again in counterin-
surgency operations shortly after the fall of Baghdad that the army realized they
needed heavy, mobile protected firepower to win its ground battles in all envi-
ronments, including urban. In 2005, TRADOC and the Futures Center (FC)
reemphasized their support for the Army strategy to improve and maintain the
Abrams and Bradley as key elements of the combat capability through the next two
decades and beyond. They also added, “Abrams and Bradley were needed in the
Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) to continue to provide the necessary com-
bat overmatch to modular forces for the foreseeable future … This will drive the
requirement for these systems to remain compatible with the future force network
as a viable combat element” (Curran, 2005). With this the TSM Abrams office had
their Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) reinstated and planned for the
reinstatement of their charter and Research, Development, Training, and Evalua-
tion (RDT&E) money.

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 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  157

By 2003 and 2004 the Army reorganized its combat formations into modular
HBCTs, combining two tank battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions
forming a HBCT. This was done in an effort to move away from a divisional struc-
ture into a more lethal, flexible brigade structure. The Product Manager Combat
Systems followed suit and adopted the name PM HBCT soon after. For consoli-
dation purposes and economy of effort, in 2006 the decision was made for TSM
Abrams to assume management of the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the M104
Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge and the M88 HERCULES recovery vehicle in
forming the TCM HBCT office. TCM HBCT officially became an organization
with an effective date of January 1, 2007. The former TSM Abrams office has grown
to the largest size and encompasses more heavy combat vehicles than ever before.
The TSM offices managed the systems, whereas the new TCM office now manages
the capability driven by the army requirements.

Summary
Since the 1970s there have been numerous attempts at acquisition reform, most
of which are still applicable today in one form or another. The acquisition process
was a fixed, regimented inflexible path that focused on threat requirements. The
new system today is better in that it represents a major change to how weapon and
support systems are started in the Defense Acquisition System and the detailed
processes and documents required in the different phases of acquisition. The sum-
mation of changes is as follows:

The 1970s were characterized by an effort to decentralize major projects and

assign them to newly formed TRADOC. To assist in managing those pro-
grams, the TSMs were created in 1977. Requirements are threat-based.
The 1980s brought the concept-based requirements system (CBRS) in an attempt
to successfully manage combat development and requirements determination.
CBRS tied doctrine, organization, training, leadership, matériel and soldiers
(DOTLMS) requirements to specific army needs and provided a structured
process to coordinate modernization efforts.
The 1990s saw the most acquisition reform in several initiatives starting with
the creation of Battle Labs in 1992. The battle labs explored new concepts
and technology and determined their applicability across the DOTLMPF.
In 1995 the Armor Center became one of the first branches to make wide
use of integrated concept teams (ICTs). One of the key components of the
ICT process is considering cost as an independent variable (CAIV) to weight
capabilities versus cost trade-offs. The 1996 TRADOC Black Book No. 3:
Requirements Determination and 1998 TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9: Force
Development Requirements Determination formalized a new requirements
policy by TRADOC assuming control over all war-fighting requirements.

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 158  n  Handbook of Military Administration

This authority enabled TRADOC to standardize the requirements process

by providing a single system applicable to all weapons, equipment, clothing
and information technology.
In 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki and Secretary of the
Army Louis Caldera outlined their initiative for the army of the future, call-
ing it “Transformation.” It included rapidly deployable forces and equip-
ment capable of responding to the full spectrum of operations. The initiative
looked to the weapons, force structure, training and doctrine of the army
well into the twenty-first century. The Abrams Tank Modernization Strat-
egy supported the army’s transformation vision. The 2000 Mechanized Force
Modernization Plan critically acclaimed the Abrams as a decisive factor in
the U.S.’s war-fighting requirements. The strategy took a balanced approach
that allowed the Abrams MBT to sustain combat overmatch while improving
reliability and reducing O&S cost on an aging tank fleet.
In 2002, in order to augment future battlefield capability and combat devel-
opment, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated the Joint Capa-
bilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) program with the intent
of fixing the problems of redundancies and unilateral development of the
previous service-specific requirements generation system. This new system
defined acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense
programs. JCIDS was created to guide the development of requirements for
future acquisition systems to reflect the needs of all four services. JCIDS now
focuses the requirements generation process on needed capabilities (versus
threat) as requested or defined by one of the five U.S. combatant command-
ers. In the JCIDS process, regional and functional combatant commanders
give feedback early in the development process to ensure that their require-
ments are met.

Over three decades of reform has made the acquisition process easier and more
user friendly; however, it still remains a complex and time-consuming venture.

References
Annual Command History (ACH), United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox,
1996.
Cameron, R.S. 1996. Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Lab, “Experimentation in the
Mounted Battlespace,” Overview briefing, August 23.
Cameron, R.S. 1998. United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 1996 An-
nual Command History (ACH). Fort Knox, KY, 122–123.
Cameron, R.S. 1999. The Nature of Armor Combat Development 1973–1999. III: Getting It
Right? Fort Knox, KY.

DK3629.indb 158 10/9/07 1:43:27 PM

 The History and Role of TRADOC System Manager Abrams  n  159

Chapman, A. 1998. Transforming the Army: TRADOC’s First Thirty Years,1973–2003. Fort
Monroe, VA: TRADOC Military History Office.
Curran, J.M. 2005. Memorandum to Terry L. Tucker and Walter Wojdakowski, regarding
Improvement to and Maintenance of the Abrams and Bradley Fleets, 30 September.
TSM Abrams Historical Files.
Harris, C. 2003. “Re: Mixon meeting—this was cancelled.” E-mail from Futures Center,
HQ TRADOC to TSM Abrams, 12 December.
Harris, C. 2004. “Re: Status of the Termination of TSM Abrams.” E-mail from Futures
Center, HQ TRADOC to Greg Skaff, 30 September.
“JCIDS.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 28 November 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/JCIDS (retrieved January 23, 2007).
Jordan, L.R. 2002. Memorandum to R. Steven Whitcomb, MG, regarding termination of
TSM Abrams, 10 May, TSM Abrams Historical Files.
Kelly, O. 1989. King of the Killing Zone: The Story of the M-1, America’s Super Tank. New
York: Berkley Books.
Kornacki, T.F. 1993. Defense Management Challenge, “Sending the Very Best: An Oral
History Interview with Major General Peter M. McVey.” Warren, MI: U.S. Army
Tank-Automotive Command Historical Office.
Romjue, J.L. et al. 1998. Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998. Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Military His-
tory Office.
Scales, R. 1999. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 1999–2000.
Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College.
Skaff, G.M. 2002. TSM Abrams, “Function of a TSM.” TSM Abrams Historical Files, April.
Swain, R.M. 1985. Selected Papers of General William E. DuPuy. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
TRADOC Battle Lab Integration Office, Technology and Concepts Directorate, “Force
XXI Process: Changing the Way We Change,” Overview briefing, October 20, 1998;
Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Lab, “Experimentation in the Mounted Battlespace,”
Overview briefing, August 23, 1996.
TRADOC Black Book No. 3, TRADOC PAM 71-XX: Requirements Determination
DRAG. February 25, 1997.
TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9: Force Development Requirements Determination, August 1,
1998, Chapter 1, Paragraph 1-4.

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DK3629.indb 160 10/9/07 1:43:28 PM
 Chapter 9

Private Military Companies

Matthew Armstrong

Introduction
All wars are fought for money.
— Socrates

Mercenaries solve the problem of limited political and economic resources to fight
wars. The recorded history of mercenaries begins with the first recorded battle
thousands of years ago. Today’s mercenaries, in the form of contractors work-
ing for private military companies, provide ostensibly the same benefits as they
did throughout history, but the rules of war have changed bringing into ques-
tion the real value of those benefits today. Whether on the land or the sea, they
are a source of temporary forces that providing new and additional capabilities,
while supposedly extending diplomatic cover and providing deniable accountabil-
ity at both home and abroad. The advantages and disadvantages were not foreign
to Thucydides, Machiavelli, or the Founding Fathers of the United States, but the
accountability, deniable or otherwise, is influenced and directed by news cycles that
prioritize perceptions over fact. Today, the role and the impact of private military
companies, specifically private security companies, have changed as the rules of war
have changed. Understanding how they impact strategic, operational, and tactical
operations is essential.
Military manpower has often been treated like a commodity, with provid-
ers bearing the cost of maintenance, technology adoption, and recruiting while
the hiring party pays cash, including perhaps a booty sharing agreement, while

161

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 162  n  Handbook of Military Administration

working within constraints imposed by domestic political and economic realities.

Private arrangements, whether with nearby princes or hired armies of other lands,
were often desired and even necessary because it limited the impact on sovereigns
economy and permitted greater leeway by not directly engaging the population, if
it did at all. Furthermore, most sovereigns could not afford to maintain a standing
army. Not to be forgotten is much of the ancient armies of the Chinese, Greeks,
Romans, and even half of William the Conqueror’s army were mercenary (Shearer,
1998). Then, just as they are now, for-hire military service providers were attrac-
tive for their relatively quick availability, often in the form of turn-key solutions,
absence of long-term costs, such as maintenance, training and research and devel-
opment, deniable accountability, and the ability to conduct diplomacy through
intermediaries.
From the first recorded use of mercenaries four thousand years ago, through the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and until the nineteenth century, mercenaries were
regular features of war. It was not Westphalia that disarmed mercenaries, but a
confluence of nationalism, technology, and increasing interstate trade that margin-
alized them. It would be another two hundred years after the birth of the modern
state before states would effectively hold each other accountable for the actions
of their citizens, started linking the projection of force to a specific geographic
territory, and consolidated the decision to personally volunteer and fight in wars
away from the people and into the hands of the governments of states that private
militaries were “de-legitimized, de-democratized, and territorialized” (Thomson,
1994, 4).
The purpose of war, and notably the manner in which a domestic audience is
enlisted to support it, shows the importance of political capital. Clausewitz (1976,
87) wrote that war “is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument”
and “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can
never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”
This chapter looks at the impact of private military companies (PMCs) within
the context of American military administration, with a primary focus on the pri-
vate security companies (PSCs) as they have a greater influence on the outcome
of conflicts. This chapter begins with a brief discussion on the taxonomy of the
private military industry overall and the establishment of terms used here, this
chapter begins with an historical foundation to contextualize the purpose and use
of mercenaries through the ages and to properly frame why they were marginalized.
Following this is a comparison of the past and the present, with a look at modern
arguments behind using nonstate actors in the conduct of U.S. foreign and security
policy. This chapter concludes with the important question of how private security
companies integrate with and contribute to U.S. military objectives.

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 Private Military Companies  n  163

Terms and Taxonomy

The difference between mercenary and contractor is more than semantics. The
United Nations and international law define “mercenary” with such precision that
the spokesman for a U.S. association of private military companies remarked that
anyone convicted of being a mercenary by the UN should not only be shot, buy
so should his lawyer (Bicanic, 2006). Today, the preferred term is contractor, with
“mercenary” largely transformed into a pejorative akin to Machiavelli’s condottieri,
which ironically is Old Italian for contractor.
Despite the legal specificity, this chapter generally uses the term “mercenary”
when referencing for-hire military forces on land and sea from the distant past up
through the end of the Cold War. While many take umbrage with my choice to
make as equals land and sea mercenaries, the fact is, privateers resembled mod-
ern corporate security firms with many of the privateers organized as shareholding
members, accountable to a contract that provided for a cut beginning with the ship
owner down through the captain to the lowest man on the vessel.
There are different ways categorize PMCs. One is to place the function and
purpose of a firm along a horizontal axis styled after an image of a spear. At the
tip are “military provider firms” with implementation and command capabilities.
PSCs fall into this category and are the primary focus of this chapter. In the middle
are “military consultant firms,” which provide advisory and training services, such
as training foreign militaries such as the Croatians and Nigerians. The third and
last category is “military support firms,” which provide nonlethal aid and assistance
like food services, transportation, and latrines (Singer, 2003, 93). Halliburton is
probably the most famous provider in this category.
Another view looks at the location of a firm’s headquarters to suggest the intent
and purpose of the firm. The judicial and administrative reach into the firm by
the state may hint at the intended accountability and transparency of the firm. By
locating the headquarters away from the reach of laws that might penetrate the veil
of corporate privacy, the firm may consider its action more independently, and less
in the context of its home, and more likely to provide services in the developing
world with minimal (if indirect) government participation. Firms based in advanced
legalist states like the United States and the United Kingdom would be expected to
act in greater accordance with, or at least fear of, the wishes of the states.
States with lesser legal systems or states with different and less distinct civil-mil-
itary relations, such as Belarus and Israel, are less likely to impose legal or bureau-
cratic restraints on private military firms. For example, the now-defunct Sandline
International was shielded from legal remedies by the government of the United
Kingdom. When the U.K. House of Commons investigated Sandline as a result
of its violation of international arms embargoes in the Sri Leone affair, it found
that even if it could pursue juridical action against Sandline, it would have limited
recourse because of it was headquartered in the Isle of Man, beyond the legal reach
of the United Kingdom (House of Commons, 2002).

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Lastly, we may see firms based in rogue or failed states in the future. These
should not be considered firms at all, but militia, insurgents, terrorists, pirates, or
simply unofficial extensions of the government, if one exists. Rent-a-terrorist Carlos
the Jackal may fit into this category.
This chapter will use “nonstate force” interchangeably with private forces. Simi-
larly, “public military force” is synonymous with the military force of a state, such
as the armed forces of the United States.

History
Machiavelli’s oft-cited warning against the condottieri in fourteenth-century Italy
stemmed from the failure to manage and oversee the condottieri. When both sides
of a conflict were condottieri, it was not unheard of for a meeting to take place to
extend the conflict at the expense of their clients but to the benefit of the merce-
nary. This collusion, however, was far from the norm. Then, as now, private military
companies delivered trained professionals as fighters, sometimes as self-contained,
without intrusive disruption of the economy or politics of the hiring party. By
reducing the political capital necessary by distancing the people from military ser-
vice, the ruler maintained autonomy in decision making (Zarate, 1998).
Before the rise of nationalism, foreign policy, state security, and even economic
expansion depended on the services of mercenaries on land and sea. The value of
the private firms to sovereigns and states was threefold: deniable accountability of
independent actors; acquisition of resources; and refusing resources to the enemy
of the moment. While similar, the course toward marginalization of sea and land
mercenaries took different paths.
On the sea, legitimated privateering expanded as states authorized private men-
of-war financed by growing private capital to operate on behalf of the state to attack
enemy shipping and were motivated by the profit from the sale or ransom of the
captured vessel and cargo under agreed upon terms with the authorizing govern-
ment. In one example, King Louis XIV even encouraged the use of French warships
by private investors for privateering to bolster the treasury (Little, 2005, 16).
Sea rovers, as Benerson Little describes them, were instrumental in both the
acquisition and protection of resources and wealth of empires. A notable example
of how inconsequential the Treaty of Westphalia was on mercenaries, English-hired
boucaniers flushed out Spanish guerrillas on Jamaica and defended a Royal Navy
base were the English launched attacks against the Spanish. The boucaniers, along
with French-hired filibustiers, “were often very much a part of major government
and business interests” in their use against the Spanish until rising legitimate trade,
and the fall of Spain, made these raiders too troublesome and interfering (Little,
2005, 12–14). The development of “legitimate” trade and the fall of a central power
would later conspire against sea rovers and landed mercenaries later.

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Private mercantile companies, the first PMCs, were granted sovereign pow-
ers that in effect created mini-states. Granted the authority to raise troops, print
money, and sign treaties on behalf of the state, companies functioned with license
from a state and used violence to benefit the state while shielding the state from
the dirty nature of empire building, resource extraction and the responsibility of
diplomacy away.
Rising international trade also increased the cost of uncertainty. Merchants,
back an increasingly wealthy that exerted greater influence on their governments,
conspired to reduce the autonomy of states. A dichotomy began to develop with
the increase in domestic pressure on foreign and commercial policy. On the one
hand private military solutions became more appealing as a means to reduce the
impact on and involvement of the domestic constituency, but growing international
trade increased potential penalties as interconnectedness deepened it became “dif-
ficult to determine which acts of nonstate violence were state sanctioned and which
were private, independent, or free-lance” (Thomson, 1994, 19). This was especially
troublesome as private entrepreneurs turned against their masters or colluded with
specific individuals while being paid from the state’s coffers, as Machiavelli had
warned earlier. The benefit of this loose principal–agent relationship was not lost
on the actors of the time. Simply put, plausible deniability was “not a trivial feature
of global politics … between 1600 and 1800” (Thomson, 1994, 21).
As the concept of neutrality took hold and laws of war were developed, proxy
attacks on seaborne trade lost their distance. This and other factors led to the Dec-
laration of Paris, signed in 1856, which made illegal any acts on the high seas
against commercial trade not involved in a war and not accountable to a state
(Stark, 1897, 153; Thomson, 1994, 144).
In time, the first PMCs were competing with the states that licensed them,
becoming interfering and antagonistic. The United East India Company was
authorized “to make war, conclude treaties, acquire territories and build fortresses”
(Thomson, 1994, 11) and aggressively pursued its goal to satisfy shareholders
regardless of the political costs to the home country, including seeking to sell ter-
ritory to the enemies of the United Provinces. A governor general of the Company
noted that “Trade must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour
of your own weapon … Trade can not be maintained without war, nor war without
trade” (Singer, 2003, 19). In the case of the English, their British East India Com-
pany, while controlling military resources of the Crown, demanded land from the
Royal Navy for its own use (Thomson, 1994, 67). With parallels to the eventual
outlawing of privateers in 1856, states dismantled their private mercantile compa-
nies as they interfered more in the foreign policy of their home states.
In Canada and the East Indies, Britain closed down the Hudson’s Bay Com-
pany and the East India Company to assert its sovereignty in European and North
American politics, respectively. The corsairs of North Africa were shut down
through the establishment of French sovereignty, with the pirates of Tripoli and

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Tunis deauthorizing nonstate operations from their ports as well (Thomson, 1994,
144).
As frustration with private forces increased and deniable accountability
decreased, practical alternatives started to emerge. The United Provinces used their
wealth from international trade to establish and train a standing professional army
and eliminate their reliance on mercenaries drawn from the outside long before
Napoleon was born (Howard, 2001, 37). Changes in military administration
included conscription, an improved officer corps, and improved technology and
logistics were impacted by societal and political pressures and demands. Global-
ization led to increasing wealth and interstate trade as successful states deepened
their economic capacity through taxation and infrastructure development (Bob-
bitt, 2002, 152–157; Paret, Craig, and Gilbert, 1986, 124–129).
Prior to Napoleon, the French marshaled the resources of the state to support
and fight the war. States, in response, saw their borders ossify as they became more
capable and desirous of extracting domestic resources, through such means as tax-
ation. This increased capacity of the state, along with intensifying international
trade and an increasing reliance on merchants who generated income for the state,
ironically meant rulers were less autonomous internationally. According to Max
Weber (1957), the authority of the state was coterminous with its territorial bound-
aries. As such, “states were held accountable for the trans-border coercive activities
of individuals residing within their borders” (Thomson, 1994, 19). As power was
consolidated inside borders and domestic resources were extracted with increasing
efficiency, states sought to limit diplomatic liability and economic uncertainty as
trade and conflicts over resources increased in a shrinking world.
Building on political and social changes wrought by the new Republic, and
six years before Napoleon took control, France implemented universal conscrip-
tion. This revolutionary source of manpower to fight wars relied on mobilizing the
people through nationalism and patriotism on a massive scale.
It was not just the sheer size of national armies that shoved mercenaries to the
margins, but also the amount of state control over these forces, which in turn was
supported by professionalism of the officer corps, better fighting technology, as well
as time for drill. Nationalism, new weapons technology, tactics, and strengthened
command and control meant the common soldier could now be the citizen-sol-
dier with little military experience. Universal conscription meant the bulk of the
army was deprofessionalized in relation to the military cadres and mercenary bands
that came before. Professionalization of the officer corps had other benefits besides
increasing command and control of the military; it also promulgated the hierarchy
of state authority over the military. Developing professionalism of the officer corps
as servants of the state, with constant employment, also furthered the development
of a distinct culture separating civilian from military (Howard, 2001, 54).
Technological advances, including more mobile and accurate artillery, acceler-
ated changes on the battlefield. The advances of Gustavus Adolphus were improved
upon by the Frenchman Jen-Baptiste de Gribeauval to create highly effective fire

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near and in support of friendly troops whose ranks swelled under levée en masse
(Howard, 2001, 61–63; Huntington, 1957, 32). Strategic and tactical changes by
Napoleon are often noted as well. Napoleon disparaged fighting in “little packets”,
or small unit warfare, which is generally all that mercenaries could do (Paret et al.,
1986, footnote #127). Larger units of emotionally motivated soldiers were all ral-
lied by nationalism (as was the supporting public back home), supported by mobile
and powerful artillery, permitted and even required fighting in columns, or l’ordre
profund instead of the traditional lines, or l’ordre mince (Bobbitt, 2002, 152; How-
ard, 2001, 79).
Through the nineteenth century, the international trend brought on by increas-
ing interconnectedness held states accountable for the actions of their citizens. The
growing international structure made it difficult for states to claim their citizens
were independently accountable. States began enacting laws to prevent their citi-
zens from entering conflicts against allies of the state, such as the British Foreign
Enlistment Act of 1819, revised in 1870 when many of its citizens went to war on the
side of the Prussians against the British ally, France.
Further, the maturation interstate politics and increasing state autonomy placed
raison d’ état over other considerations. Personal, or individual, enmity was replaced
by the interests of the state and the state became a tool of the nation. Princes no
longer went to war for sport at relatively low political and financial costs. Out of
necessity in the changing nature of conflict, now the resources of the entire state
were brought to bear, requiring greater mobilization. This change was reflected in
international negotiations on trade that were increasingly codified. This created an
ideal type of a soldier that laid down his arms being nearly equal to a person who
never took up arms: both should be spared since neither was a combatant (Stark,
1897, 13–19). Accordingly, war was no longer “a ritual or instrument to redress
petty grievances, but rather an activity to serve the interests of the state” (Handel,
2001, 66). Politics and trade between and within states increased the accountability
of regimes to one another.
Different than earlier efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on mercenaries,
now there was a viable alternative that, in Europe for example, was required to
match the threat of Napoleon. The result was the beginning of the end for merce-
nary armies as they were replaced with larger, cheaper, and better controlled armies
of the state (Howard, 1976, 54; Huntington, 1957, 32–33).
By the time of the time of the Franco–Prussian War of 1870, it was a given that
for a state to enter a large conflict, its people must be mobilized and armies of its
own people put into action. Debating the use of mercenaries to fight for England
in the Crimea in 1856, members of Parliament argued that if England could not
mobilize its own people to fight, then it was should not consider itself a Great
Power. By the end of the nineteenth century, no longer did “small armies of profes-
sional soldiers [go] to war to conquer a city … Wars of the present day call whole
nations to arms … entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to the
purpose” (Moltke, 1892, 1).

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With regard to another oft-quoted and yet infrequently understood statement,

Max Weber’s declaration that a state must have a “monopoly” of force does not
apply to expeditionary forces. Weber’s “monopoly” described the internal capacity
of a state and its ability to control its own territory. The nature or legitimacy of Max
Weber’s “administrative unit,” or state, does not prohibit the use of, or suffer from
the employment of, mercenaries. As Max Weber described it, a state was not a state
without successfully upholding the “claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force” in its territory for the “enforcement of its order … by the application
and threat of physical force on the part of the administrative staff” of the politi-
cal leadership (Weber, 1957, 154). The license of force, internally and externally, is
permitted through implicit licensing.

The U.S. Experience

The United States, like most states of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, embraced private forces to satisfy national security requirements. Beginning
with the Revolution, the U.S. used private military forces to augment or fulfill
the requirements of war and national security. Used by the American insurgency
against the British as well against foreign pirates twenty-five years later, the Found-
ing Fathers never felt mercenaries, or their sea-borne counterparts, privateers, to be
inherently undemocratic. While concerns over maintaining a standing army were
deep, Samuel Adams’ warned that while an army was both necessary and danger-
ous to “Liberties of the People,” he cautioned the military “should be watched with
a jealous Eye” (Stevenson, 2006, 1).
Intimately aware of the potential that an army could be used to suppress its own
citizenry, the Framers of the Constitution and found it prudent to firmly subjugate
the military under civilian authority. As codified in the Constitution, the armed
forces were given two masters: Congress and the President. Congress was empow-
ered to “raise and support” the army as well as the power “To declare War” while
the President was given the power to conduct the war (Stevenson, 2006).
Neither hiring nor hiring out as mercenaries was inimical to the Founding
Fathers or to nascent American nationalism. As a contractor himself, America’s
own naval war hero, John Paul Jones, rented out his services after the Revolution to
Catherine the Great of Russia.
Of course, the dollar cost of a standing military was expensive for the young
U.S. More telling was that to defend the new nation’s commerce, James Madison,
before he was president, suggested hiring the Portuguese Navy to deal with the Bar-
bary Pirates while campaigning against taxes for the national defense (Chernow,
2004, 460).
The truth be told, privateering was more a boon than a bane to the early United
States. It was the backbone of some New England economies, even as it was a threat
to international goodwill. Towns like Salem and Portsmouth relied on the income

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generated from raiding English and other European commercial vessels during and
after the American Revolution. The impact on English commerce was not only the
quantity of lost goods, but shipping insurance rose significantly, and thus so did
the cost of doing business, for English shipping going in and out of English ports
(Stark, 1897, 123).
Despite their nominal independence, privateers still represented their principal,
or the one who hired them. Then, as is the case now, a wrong move by a contractor
could have severe repercussions and the veil of deniable accountability thinned or
disappeared with increased trade and communications. A single American priva-
teer, for example, created in Spain “considerable anti-American feeling” because of
an expensive capture on the seas. Fortunately, American public and private diplo-
macy was such that this and similar incidents were not associated with the U.S.
government and its policy goals (Stark, 1897, 125).
As in the millennia before, insufficient political and economic capital to main-
tain a military to satisfy the foreign policy and national security aspirations contin-
ued to make mercenaries attractive. This was certainly the case in 1812 when the
United States and Britain went to war. With a navy outnumbered by almost ten to
one, Congress gave the President the authority to “issue to private armed vessels of
the United States commissions or letters of marquee and general reprisal, in such
form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States” (Stark, 1897,
127). Congress, in granting the president this authority, gave specific instructions
on compensation and, more importantly, instructions on monitoring the privateers,
as Congress was keenly aware of their impact on public diplomacy and foreign
policy.
The rules of war and politics changed and leaders needed to mobilize the citi-
zenry to go to war. Once the domestic campaign is in motion, however, democracies
can be hard to stop. Using private forces means the level of domestic mobilization
can be substantially lower. The people do not need to participate either directly or
even viscerally in the conduct of war.
American wars through the end of World War II included various private and
pseudo-public ventures. From Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders that was in some
respects a privately organized combat team to the mercenarial Flying Tigers, pri-
vate military forces never completely left the American way of war.
From an economic capability to make war, liberal economic considerations
pushed for greater integration with the private sector. One notable private–public
partnership can be traced to the end of World War I when the government accepted
that it did not and could not sufficient ability to manufacture all of the ammuni-
tion and other provisions required to fight future wars based on the troubles of
World War I. This partnership expanded and deepened over the decades, rising to
a level that was both helpful and troublesome, as President Eisenhower famously
remarked in his farewell address to the nation.
Even as he warned of the military-industrial-Congressional complex, Eisen-
hower’s commitment to have the U.S. government increasingly “rely on commercial

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sources” started the outsourcing ball rolling, possibly faster than he intended. It
took a few years, but in 1966, with Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-76, the ball President Eisenhower started rolling really took off and the private
sector was preferred over the public sector if it could provide the service or product
more economically (Congressional Research Service, 2005).
In the decades since A-76, outsourcing by the U.S. government increased. In
the post-Cold War era, the pace quickened without a comparable growth in moni-
toring and oversight. In the 1980s, overpriced hammers and toilet seats created a
public and Congressional furor. Just twenty years later, with more outsourcing and
higher prices, barely an eyebrow was in Congress as questionable services and prices
were bought with taxpayer money.
By the time of the Iraq War in 2003, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) was issuing frequent warnings on the failure to provide adequate oversight
over contractor expenses and actions (Government Accountability Office, 2006).
This lack of oversight in the unpredictable environment of a war zone has resulted
in several high-profile problems in Iraq, ranging from use of force and rules of
engagement to equipment and transport availability. From the private sector per-
spective, the uncertainty of war demands a cost-plus contract to cover unknown
expenses. A cost-plus contract is when a vendor is able to bill the cost of a truck, for
example, and mark it up with a previously agreed on percentage, for payment.
However, when contracting officers are unavailable, as is the case in Iraq, com-
munication failures may occur and oversight disappears. There is little incentive for
the contractor to pressure its supplier for better prices, but on the contracting state,
it is useful because the contractor is not burdened with carrying and writing off
inventory (Government Accountability Office, 2004).
An additional cost is lack of accountability through the military command
structure, military legal system, or in-country legal system of the private military
force. Hidden costs associated with the lack of accountability include the impact on
morale of public troops, potential lack of steadfastness in time of need, and perhaps
more importantly in the modern media environment and nonstate warfare, public
diplomacy and image problems resulting from conduct (Kohn, 2002; Michaels,
2004).

Reasons for Use

On the subject of private military companies, the most important but more infre-
quently asked question is “why” and “for what purpose.” Modern responses are
similar to the historical reasons behind their use: surge capacity or availability,
short-term cost, deniable accountability, and diplomacy by proxy. However, the
rules of war have changed. Today, perceptions carry more weight than in the past
and sometimes have a greater and longer lasting impact than bullets, and yet pri-
vate forces are deployed with often little guidance and connection back to the core

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mission resulting in a situation similar to the environment that marginalized them

one hundred and fifty years ago.
Using slick marketing words and reacting to social constraints of military
spending, mission selection, and accountability, PMCs promote themselves as
a “low-risk, low-cost, low-visibility way to exert military influence in a time of
diminished budgets and shrinking armed forces” (Adams, 1999) while providing
flexible and professional solutions to clients with marketing language similar to
information technology companies providing outsourcing.
The availability of additional guns that private security companies provide, or
“surge” capacity, is one argument for going to the private sector. Based on the idea
that it is politically or economically unfeasible to pay for increasing the size of the
armed forces, its underlying assumption is the conflict will be short in duration.
Some have argued the only way to upsize the military is through reinstituting the
draft and thus private security companies avoid conscription from returning to the
U.S.
This argument has proven to be empty with the passage of time. After five years
of the “Long War,” the White House finally changed its position on upsizing the
military. Meanwhile, the Army and Marine Corps remain indirectly augmented
(more on this below) in Iraq and Afghanistan by tens of thousands of security con-
tractors. In response to attractive pay of the private sector in 2003-2005, the U.S.
military, especially the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) vastly increased
retention bonuses to prevent soldiers from leaving the service for the private sector.
However, the services continue to supply the private sector with qualified person-
nel through inappropriate “Up or Out” personnel policies (Congressional Budget
Office, 2006). Many recruiting cycles have passed since the war began and it is
hard to argue that the ad hoc surge capability continues to provide a benefit to the
strategic interests of the United States.
The downsizing of the post-Cold War period put a focus on “core competen-
cies” and more “tooth” less “tail” in a variation of the Abrams Doctrine, except
without the public support element. General Creighton Abrams sought to create
a link between deploying the Army and public support for military operations.
In practice, it was Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird who initiated Total Force to
provide sufficient troops without the costly burden of maintaining a large stand-
ing army. Over time, instead of using Reserve and National Guard components to
round out the force, the military was made more “lean” and the private sector was
looked at to be the fat when necessary.
As this practice took hold, the government was slow to realize what the private
sector had experienced in the 1990’s: overzealous outsourcing can result in a loss of
control over critical functions and less favorable contract terms and higher per unit
costs when factoring in all of the hidden costs. The government, not heeding the
lessons of the private sector saw advantages in short-term access of expensive skill
sets and a perceived lower unit cost.

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These “private sector efficiencies” have actually increased costs in terms of hard
dollars, institutional knowledge, and military-to-military connections and a failure
to integrate private resources into missions increasingly focused on the struggle for
minds and wills. The focus on the short-term ignores the real costs and real benefits
associated with the outsourced services and skills.
Dollar-for-dollar comparisons, while frequently used, are misleading. At the
macro level, there is the impact on the economy, including reduced investment in
pensions and healthcare. At a lower level, These dollar-for-dollar comparisons over-
simplify long-term costs of private markets that fail to be truly competitive while
hiding substantial transaction costs that include higher finance costs of the private
sector compared to the government’s ability to borrow money at lower rates, vendor
incentives to skimp on quality or adhere to the letter of the contract not the spirit,
future public costs to return outsourced skills in-house, and transactional costs of
writing, enforcing, and monitoring contracts. In the aftermath of the expensive
toilet seats and hammers in the Reagan Administration, the Federal Acquisitions
Regulations (FAR) were strengthened in an effort to make sure the government
received a fair product at a fair price. However, in the fast-paced post-9/11 environ-
ment FAR was frequently bypassed. The end result is questionable cost effectiveness
of the practice of outsourcing security services (Fredland, 2004; Hartley, 2004).
Another feature of privatization found in historical use and assumed today is
deniable accountability. Privatization allows for an upsizing of the force, or at least
the project of the force if not well integrated into at the operational or strategic
levels, without engaging popular support. Private military companies allow the
government to ignore the Abrams Doctrine that led to the current force struc-
ture. As Thomas Friedman wrote, “You all just go about your business of being
Americans, pursuing happiness, spending your tax cuts, enjoying the Super Bowl
halftime show, buying a new Hummer, and leave this war to our volunteer Army”
(Friedman, 2004).
This brings up the interesting evolution in the U.S. where the citizen-soldier
is increasingly a myth as soldiers, and their families, turn inward and focus on
their own support networks. Fewer Americans know somebody who is presently
serving or even directly impacted by the post-9/11 wars. The modern all volunteer
force (AVF) is far removed from the modern political and social spheres of power
in the United States, leading to suggestions that nonveteran civilians may be more
“interventionist” and simultaneously placing more constraints on the use of mili-
tary force (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Stevenson, 2006). The result is the redevelop-
ment of a professional warrior class in the United States proficient in the conduct of
war, with a continuous and deep involvement in military affairs that harkens back
to professional mercenary soldiers. In fact, because private military contractors are
drawn from all walks of life, it might be that more Americans know a contractor
than know a serviceman or servicewoman.
This disconnect as well as the marginal view of private military companies means
outsourcing shortens the decision-making horizon into immediate “commercial

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concerns and lobbying rather than real gains to the nation and citizens” that
encourage the use of companies that “lack verification and mandatory evaluation
safeguards to deliver promised results” (Markusen, 2003). But the potential prob-
lems of the decision of a private military force to withdraw from a combat zone
because of rising interest rates, leverage for contract negotiations, including replace-
ment time and costs, may seriously damage and reduce military capacity without
much recourse. This is both a boon and a bane of the industry. Without effective
oversight, problems will arise, yet this is part of their allure and a value to their
clients.
As diplomatic proxies, private forces provide a questionable return on invest-
ment. In hindsight, net gains from their use may be less than if military exchanges
were used instead of contracting for private services, such as in the Balkans in the
1990s and in Nigeria in 2006. The potential for differences between enterprises
driven by professionalism and those by the market may limit the depth of insti-
tutional relations, cultural understanding, and even future intelligence operations.
The Balkans in the mid-1990s is one example of bypassing proven Interna-
tional Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in favor of private mili-
tary training that, while expanding foreign policy options of the United States,
prevented institutional connections that have proven invaluable in the past. This
foreign policy by proxy in Croatia allowed intervention when political sensitivities
prevented overt participation. Three factors contributed to the Clinton Adminis-
tration intentionally avoiding congressional, and democratic, oversight and inter-
national law. First was the UN embargo in the region that prevented direct U.S.
government assistance. Second and third was the need to respond to Russian assis-
tance to the Serbs against the Croatians and necessary support of Croatia as a
moderating force. The United States also wanted Croatia in NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PfP) program as a counterbalance to Russian-supported Serbia. U.S.-
based military services firm MPRI, Inc., a firm that once bragged of having more
generals per square meter in their office than could be found in the Pentagon,
was positioned to help Croatia improve in required operational areas. After a few
months of training from MPRI, the Croats were able to execute two sophisticated
and successful military operations that brought the Serbs to the negotiating table.
It is likely the engagement of MPRI, in addition to the training provided, was a
clear signal to the Croats of American backing of the Croat government (Avant,
2005, 101–109; Singer, 2003, 124–127).
The choice between private forces, an international coalition, or American
troops comes down to political capital and the ability or desire to use it. Private
military forces afford a path of least, or less, resistance through bypassing Congress
and the media.
Oversight and monitoring of contracting is negligible compared to deployed
public military forces, and the deaths and injuries of contractors are not included
in news tallies and are usually reported as lesser deaths than uniformed personnel.
Using contractors decreases “casualty sensitivity” in the media, public debate, and

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at senior levels in government. The “Dover Test,” the public response to Americans
returning in flag-draped coffins (Lacquement, 2004), is arguably less relevant with
today’s senior decision makers because of their lack of attachment (versus detach-
ment) to the realities and consequences of military action (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004,
13).
Democratic control over the military in the U.S. is based on oversight by Con-
gress as well as control by the President. The military knowingly operates within this
political system and, at times, plays one master against the other. It may even inter-
ject a kind of “veto” into discussions on the use of military force in the interest of
both itself and its oath to uphold the Constitution (Stevenson, 2006, 196–204).
How do these private forces fall under the combatant or noncombatant classifi-
cation scheme of modern warfare, for which rules were drawn up as nonstate forces
were delegitimized? This is more than an exercise in theory; these are questions that
go to perception and control of America’s military.
The present arrangement ignores the balance of power in the U.S. system and
assumes a system of hand-offs instead of the system of checks and balances the
Founders created. First, the Senate gets to “advise and consent” to nominations
of military (as well as civilian) officers of the government. Second, the House was
given the power of the purse. Although the House has only once cut off funding, it
has, to its right, managed to make changes over the years (Stevenson, 2006, 5–6).
The Founding Fathers, after fighting an irregular war against colonial masters
and aware of history, were concerned about a military whose power was superior
to the civilian authority. Military service and war was something most of the del-
egates to the Constitutional Convention knew well. Threats to the early United
States were such that of congressional powers the U.S. Constitution enumerates,
eleven of the eighteen pertain to security. Over half served in uniform during the
Revolutionary War and at least half of those saw serious action. Concern was deep
that an unchecked military would become an agent of one of the separate branches
of government. The Congress, therefore, was empowered to “raise and support
Armies,” to “provide and maintain a Navy,” and given the power “To declare War.”
The executive branch was given the power to conduct the war (Stevenson, 2006).
The potential for an unchecked military becoming an agent of one of the separate
branches of government led to this deliberate separation of powers and the need for
accountability and oversight.
PMCs allow control over armed force to be outside congressional oversight and
in a way that “may increase functional control [of military force]” while changing
“political control in ways that some view as distasteful” (Avant, 2005, 44). Exam-
ples include congressional authority to select and approve public military officers, a
feature absent in the use of private military companies. As of this writing, Congress
has yet to exercise its ability to hold hearings into the use and appropriations of
financial resources to pay for private security companies and to look into the con-
duct of individuals employed by private military companies through its oversight
committees. Congressional power over the military is more than holding the purse

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 Private Military Companies  n  175

strings, and with private military companies, their power is at best closing the purse
strings but even paying for hired guns by the United States may be hidden, com-
plex, or even disallowed by contracts, but without apparent recourse. This last point
emphasizes the likelihood of a political aversion to do anything when considering
the years of GAO warnings, media coverage, and even congressional testimony.
A major deviation of the normally discrete operation of contractors – at least
from the perspective of the American public – was the famous slaughter of four
security contractors in Fallujah in 2004. These contractors were employed by a
large U.S. private security firm which was in turn contracted by a Kuwaiti-based
company, which was subcontracted by a German food service company, which
was subcontracted by a U.S. company that was providing logistical services under
LOGCAP and paid by the U.S. army (Pelton, 2006, 119–120). However, an under-
secretary of the army testified to Congress that the army never authorized “Hal-
liburton or its subcontractors to carry weapons or guard convoys” (Neff and Price,
2006).
Missions performed in the name of the state may not be short-staffed because
of field limitations, but because of contractual limits and profit motives. The four
contractors, employed by Blackwater, killed in Fallujah in March 2004 allegedly
died in part because their employer did not provide the armored vehicles and failed
to properly fill the team with rear gunners (Bicanic, 2006; Pelton, 2006). Further,
as a result of the contractors acting outside of military command authority, they
were unaware of changing conditions in the city (Ricks, 2006, 331).
Private military companies redemocratize war. Soldiers and nonsoldiers now
have the ability to participate in a conflict they otherwise could not, an opportunity
made illegal in the nineteenth century. The British Foreign Enlistment Act, was
just one of many laws enacted to limit state liability from the actions of its citizens
(Thomson, 1994, 79–84). The capabilities of the Western contractors, typically
older and more experienced to provide a better looking portfolio for the client, is
conforming more to the citizen-soldier of nationalist armies than the AVF regu-
lar army. However, this is not the only profile of the contractor. Increasingly, as
demand outstrips supply, third-country nationals are used.
The recruiting pool that is the U.S. armed forces can only feed the private
industry for so long, which is one reason why private security companies are actively
recruiting and acquiring facilities outside of the U.S. These facilities, along with
their faculty, are increasingly providing training not only to the company’s own
personnel, but to security personnel of other private companies, to government
soldiers, and paramilitaries.
As the private security field expands and acquires new capabilities, including
air power components, heavy equipment, and more, what will be the pressure to
use these assets? Military equipment and training has little value and limited mar-
ketability outside conflict or recovery operations. Companies must seek revenue
streams to make a profit. Ultimately the diplomatic costs of this new private abil-
ity could be unexpectedly high in the long run, especially if American military

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firms begin providing assistance to unsavory foreign clients as Israeli PMCs do with
Colombian and Mexican drug cartels.
To whom do the private companies grant their loyalty and how do they use that
power is a question that can be answered indirectly through the guiding hand of
clear monitoring and oversight.
It is noteworthy that some of the pressures that led to marginalizing mercenar-
ies in the nineteenth century are eroding today. For example, the rise and increased
manipulation of nationalism led to accountability crises, whereas twenty-first cen-
tury “imagined communities” based on geography, heritage, ethnicity, religion,
and even sport affinities creates new bonds and permits groups to draw on global
audiences for financial, social, and physical support. This has altered the stigma
and the ability to hold states accountable for the activities of its citizens. Globaliza-
tion has largely, but not completely, especially in the case of South Africa discussed
below, nullified laws banning citizens from participating in foreign conflicts, nota-
bly those against allies, such as the first British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 men-
tioned earlier.
Increasingly heterogeneous, states must satisfy an increasingly diverse constitu-
ency while managing international media and markets. Citizens can now get infor-
mation the state would prefer was unavailable. The state can do its best to co-opt the
media and encourage certain views to percolate through the press to write its own
version of history, but the rise of the blogosphere, camera phones, commercial pres-
sures on the media, and a global news cycle complicates the efficacy of communica-
tion strategies. The need to effectively manage international communications and
image is seen in the rising power of nonstate actors, from Hezbollah to the United
Nations to the World Trade Organization at the expense of state autonomy.
Through public law and investigative powers, Congress could restrict the use
of PMCs. This was done before in the interest of the neutrality of state and to
protect the national execution of U.S. foreign policy. As war is a continuation of
politics and military force is central to this, it is understandable that PMCs are an
increasingly important solution tool in the toolbox of U.S. foreign policy in an era
of accountability. However, unlike the past, oversight is absent and the agent may
represent the principal in distasteful ways without repercussion.

Legal Frameworks
The U.S. legal mechanisms to regulate trade in military skills and weapons are eas-
ily skirted by both contracting and contracted parties, if permitted as they often
are. In 2002, the House of Commons’ Green Paper found the United States had the
most substantial legal solutions for monitoring and regulating military industries
(House of Commons, 2002). However, the two primary regulatory tools overseeing
the export of security from the U.S., the International Traffic in Arms Regulations

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 Private Military Companies  n  177

(ITAR) of 1986 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) are both managed by the
State Department and but lack any means to review contractual revisions.
In the case of ITAR, congressional review is not required unless the contract
exceeds $50 million and AECA may be avoided entirely if the contracting party is
either the U.S. government or a contractor working directly for the United States.
The threshold of additional scrutiny under ITAR is easily avoided by breaking
up the contract into smaller segments, a frequently employed tactic. There are no
review mechanisms once a contract is approved.
Bilateral agreements like Status of Forces agreements (SOFA) are, virtually by
definition in the context of this discussion, meaningless since deployment is in
failed states where the government has largely disappeared. In the case of Iraq with
its nominal state governance, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Memorandum 17
granted immunity from local regulation and prosecution to foreign military con-
tractors operating in Iraq. The only law providing any real monitoring is the Defense
Base Act of 1941 that requires private U.S. insurance coverage for workers in combat
zones hired under U.S. contracts.
Contractors in modern conflict raise questions about their identity and legal
authority. Is the contractor a combatant or not? Frequently the discussion over
their legal status holds them as noncombatants—but the inherent nature of the
security contractor is at odds with this determination. The Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) provides a comprehensive scheme of “procedural rules and
proscriptive laws to cover transgressions by members of the military,” but it does
not cover the private military forces working for the government in the same the-
ater of operations.
In early 2007, a subtle change was made to the section of the UCMJ defining
personnel covered. The change, replaced “war” with “war or contingency opera-
tion,” and arguably means civilian contractors are now subject to UCMJ. Even
if the UCMJ were to be found applicable to the civilian contractors, it is unclear
how UCMJ proceedings and even punishments could be adapted to nonmilitary
personnel.
The U.S. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 extends the
UCMJ to cover civilians employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside
the United States or who are members of the armed forces. MEJA jurisdictional
coverage is limited to civilian support personnel “hired to provide services that will
free a ‘trigger-puller’ to fight, or … provide technical expertise to the force, thereby
assisting the force in waging war or enforcing peace” (Perlak, 2001).
The applicability of MEJA is questionable, when the U.S. armed forces do not
directly hire the private security forces and they do not work alongside one another.
Contractors not covered by MEJA include those under contract with the CIA,
USAID, former CPA, for the Iraqi government, or being paid with “Iraqi funds”
(Elsea and Serafino, 2004).
More important than the questionable applicability of MEJA to individu-
als outside of the service, and thus insensitive to reductions in rank or letters of

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reprimand, is adherence to the mission. The noble but meaningless modification to

the UCMJ was a step in the right direction but companies must be held account-
able to the overall mission and not to their profit margin or beholden exclusively
to their principal. By definition, PSCs are hired for two reasons: military or other
security forces are unavailable or existing resources are not appropriate for the mis-
sion. Using the military for diplomatic protective services has proven unworkable
for these reasons. One example was the use of Navy SEALS to provide personal
security for a major principal in Afghanistan. Not trained in providing security for
high-value targets in crowded civilian environments, their indiscriminate and yet
perfectly reasonable response to an attack was inappropriate. They were replaced
by a private security detail comprised of contractors knowledgeable with working
and mingling in busy civilian environments. In another example, a major principal
was protected by a military team but when they exited a building outside the Green
Zone long ago, the detail was nowhere to be seen. The reason? The detail felt there
was no risk at the moment and went to lunch.
The relationship between the state and nonstate force has more similarities
than dissimilarities with the state and international peacekeeping operations. The
accountability issue focuses on the relationship between the U.S. military unit and
the private force, specifically in their role as proxies of the U.S. military, govern-
ment, and public. The American perception of hiring somebody else to do the
“dirty” work, or work that is too “expensive” for public soldiers brings with it an
implied distance. This is a moral and legalistic distance that disconnects the United
States from fallout of a contractor’s action. Similar distance is found between force
and politics. Members of PKF who commit crimes generally tarnish the Blue Hel-
met and not their country of origin except to those paying close attention.
In today’s media environment, America’s response to the treatment of a con-
tractor as a noncombatant by some current or future enemy is likely to create a
delicate political situation. Examples of how the United States distances itself from
associations with contractors include the contractors taken “hostage” in Colombia
in 2004, the Aegis “Trophy Video,” and the Fallujah incident mentioned earlier, in
which four contractors were killed. In Colombia, the United States has specifically
declined to participate in calls to release three Americans who were working under
contract for a U.S. private military company as part of “foreign policy by proxy.”
The United States has stated these three individuals, held hostage for over a year as
of this writing, are private citizens operating on their own. This language is similar
to the distance the U.S. put between itself and Chennault’s Flying Tigers in 1940.
Outsourcing provides distance and deniable accountability. When a video sur-
faced of private security contractors firing indiscriminately at Iraqis while listening
to Elvis, the subsequent investigation was kept secret. Aegis Defense Services Ltd.
(Aegis), the security firm involved, compiled a two-hundred page investigation. The
Defense Department reviewed the case and decided there was nothing improper.
But independent review of the document, as would be possible by Congress or
private citizens had it been a military unit, through simple request, subpoena or

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Freedom of Information Act requests were denied because the Pentagon maintained
the investigation was the property of Aegis, which in turn claimed the document
to be proprietary corporate information and, thus, not to be made available to the
public.

International Accountability
At the core of the debate on how contractors conform to LOAC is whether they are
considered a combatant or not. To say the contractor is a combatant under interna-
tional law is, in part, to admit he is an agent of the state and that he operates in con-
junction with the armed forces of a signer of the Geneva Conventions. Barred from
wearing the uniform of the U.S. military, private security contractors in Iraq, for
example, generally operate outside of the structure of the U.S. military and under
informal and ad hoc relationships with military units and commanders. The doc-
trine, where it exists, assumes private military resources as working alongside public
military units and quite often this is not the case. Recognizing the role of contrac-
tors in shaping public opinion and thus participating in the public diplomacy of
the U.S. is essential to manage for successful and long-lasting counterinsurgency,
and yet this awareness has been absent until the September 16, 2007, incident with
Blackwater mentioned above. Instead, contractors are considered by U.S. politi-
cal and military practice as independent agents with little reflection of the United
States and are kept distanced from tactical, operational, and strategic planning.
In writing the Counterinsurgency Manual, FM 3-24, the manual’s authors felt the
issue of contractors in the battlespace for the minds and will was a “too hard” of a
problem to deal with (Nagl, 2006).
The implications for contractors of existing international legal precedence, such
as the Geneva Conventions dealing with prisoners of war and civilians on the battle-
field, are questionable. The Geneva Conventions are structured and designed to deal
primarily with conflicts between states, a feature not lost on nonstate actors, as men-
tioned above in the case of the United Nations. But in the case of contractors who are
employed by a state but intentionally kept at arms length through a lack of integration
with command and control and by not wearing distinguishing insignia indicating
membership in the armed forces, questions abound on where they fit in.
Noncombatants are protected under Common Article 3 of the Conventions. Per-
sons protected by Article 3 are entitled, at a minimum, to humane treatment if they
fall into enemy hands. However, noncombatants lose their status if they “take up
arms” and must be properly identified. Contractors do carry an identity card in a
format established by the convention that identifies them as a civilian authorized to
accompany the force and confirms their noncombatant status. U.S. policy regard-
ing these identity cards is found in Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1,
“Issuance of Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions.” If captured, an
authorized civilian accompanying an armed force is entitled to prisoner-of-war status.

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But remember, this status applies only to contractors “accompanying the force.” The
majority of deployed security contractors do not, as was the case in the three examples
of Colombia, Aegis, and Blackwater cited above.
The reality is that under LOAC, the activities of private security contractors make
them illegal combatants and, thus, subject to criminal prosecution. Taken to the
extreme, the statement by the undersecretary of the army discussed above made the
contractors in Iraq not working directly with the U.S. government illegal combat-
ants. If captured, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, an arguably moot
point considering the enemy presently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Failure to enforce appropriate conduct through existing available means is a fail-
ure of the client and not necessarily the company in a world of political account-
ability, strict licensing and purchasing business driven regulations, and the need to
satisfy the client. The dilemma of accountability is not unique to government use of
private military companies; it is also an issue for intergovernmental forces, such as
those wearing the Blue Helmet for United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
By comparison, the independent nature of the contracting state, with liability and
punishment resting solely within the state, is similar to the operation of a private mili-
tary company in the employ of a state. Particularly in the United States, enough legal
mechanisms exist for both, and simultaneous carrots and sticks to compel appropri-
ate behavior. Looking at the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations, an area U.S.
private military companies are eager to expand into, shows how accountability rests
with the state and its delegated authority and not the agent.
Beyond legislative and legal arrangements, private security companies can be kept
in line with two tools absent from the international peacekeeper toolbox. Private
companies rely on governmental contracts and authorization and tend to shy away
from negative publicity if incentivized properly. These levers are absent in the interna-
tional peacekeeping arena with its dearth of contributing states.
The Security Council (SC) engages states to provide peacekeeping forces (PKF) in
the stead of the SC members who collectively contribute less than 5 percent of forces
themselves. The failure to create a permanent UN military force called for in Article
43 of the UN Charter results in ad hoc combinations of military and police resources
almost exclusively drawn from outside of the permanent members of the UN Secu-
rity Council. The SC makes a decision, often without direct input from the Gen-
eral Assembly, and then hires military manpower at a substantial mark-up over cost.
There is a usual top five that contribute nearly fifty percent of all peacekeeping forces.
The Security Council relies on these “subcontractor” states — Bangladesh, Pakistan,
India, Jordan, and Nepal — because of political constraints on the SC members that
prohibit committing troops to regions when domestic interest is weak. In the post-
Cold War environment, this pressure increased as Western military downsizing fur-
ther eroded their ability to participate in peacemaking or peacekeeping operations,
resulting in an increased reliance on forces for hire.
While PMCs are potentially held accountability by contract wording and options
against the hiring principal, like the U.S. government, for its part, the UN does not

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see itself as a member of the regimes of international humanitarian law (IHL) and
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), but does attempt to apply the “principles and spirit”
of the law, primarily so the other actors it faces will operate at least at the same level
(Bialke, 2001). In terms of legal liability, the actions of Blue Helmets are not the
actions of a state, but of a collection of states, which removes them from constraints
of signed international treaties. The international community in general, or the Secu-
rity Council specifically, may be clear in the desire to intervene, granting authority
from international law and collective will, but mission specifics are often murky and
unclear and subject to further politicking and lobbying. This is compounded by inde-
terminate accountability of the PKF under international humanitarian law (Wills,
2004). The United Nations’ declared commitment to IHL and LOAC comes with
the understanding that because a UN PKO is operating on behalf of the international
community, they “cannot be considered a ‘party’ to the conflict, nor a ‘Power’ within
the meaning of the Geneva Conventions” (Murphy, 2003). To accept this respon-
sibility would imply they were no longer impartial (Murphy, 2003). To this, the
U.N. secretary-general reaffirmed in 1999 that in cases “of violations of international
humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are
subject to prosecution in their national courts” (United Nations, 1999). The UN
reminded the world it is not a signatory to nor bound by the Geneva Conventions
or the Additional Protocols, specifically stating the standards set forth in IHL are
“observed at the national level,” obliging states and not nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) to guarantee the principles and spirit of the laws of war while explicitly
and implicitly excluding peacekeepers as not combatants. A subsequent bulletin by
the UN in 1999 attempted to address this, but major gaps remain (Wills, 2004). As
recently as early 2007, the UN is still attempting, without success, to grapple with
peacekeepers that violate international laws.

Administration
In 2002, the dean of the Army War College said, “the U.S. cannot go to war
without contractors” (Avant, 2005, 115). In Iraq, at the time of maximum contri-
bution of forces by the “Coalition of the Willing,” the force contribution by the
United Kingdom was less than half the number of private security contractors,
the armed subset of private military companies, in Iraq. This led some to suggest a
more appropriate label: the “Coalition of the Billing.”
Although this book is on military administration, it is admittedly odd that this
chapter is anemic on the topic. The fact is, there is little evidence of integrated oper-
ations between the private and public sectors and the history of hired force indicates
this is intentional. Reconstruction efforts, largely reliant on private enterprise, are
critical to defeating insurgencies, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The role of the
military is limited by its political masters through both action and inaction. In the
laissez faire environment of privatization and outsourcing, it is considered to be the

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responsibility of the individual contractors. The four reasons given through history
that support the use of private contractors contribute to keeping the contractors
beyond the reach of military administration.
One paper looking at PMCs and the U.S. military noted similarities in Iraq
and Afghanistan with the 1990 motion picture Dances with Wolves. Lt. John Dun-
bar (Kevin Costner) was accompanied to his post on the mid-nineteenth century
American frontier by a civilian wagon driver. The wagon contained the weapons,
ammunition, subsistence, and other supplies necessary to maintain a deployed
military force. On the return trip the civilian driver was killed by Indians, the
wagon abandoned, and the horses confiscated. This example raises important ques-
tions that are equally appropriate today as then. Were troops available to escort the
wagon? Was the civilian driver considered from the outset a disposable resource, as
was possibly Lt. Dunbar himself, that did not require an armed escort of military or
private personnel? Did the driver receive premium pay or some special compensa-
tion for undertaking hazardous duty? Who paid for the lost wagon and horses? Did
the Indians target the driver because of his association with the military or was his
mere presence on their land sufficient cause to attack him? Did it make good sense
to use a civilian driver under the circumstances? (National Defense University,
2006)
Two major milestones in using contractors occurred after President Bush’s
famous “mission accomplished” speech. Soon after his speech, the number of pri-
vate security contractors in Iraq was close to twenty thousand (Singer, 2003). Soon
after that, media coverage of contractors in Iraq usually began with a reference
to the four contractors ambushed in Fallujah in 2004 and strung up on a bridge
over the Euphrates River. Now numbering thirty to fifty thousand, the number of
Westerners in this force actually dropped as contractors are drawn from cheaper
countries like Iraq (known as host country nationals, or HCN) and South America
(known as third country nationals, or TCN). While ostensibly the second largest
“contributor” in Iraq at either twenty thousand in 2003 or fifty thousand in 2007,
they are not unified or a coherent military unit while still derisively referred to as
the Coalition of the Billing. For business reasons, including reducing per unit costs
as well as multicultural sensitivity but not awareness, the real number of U.S. and
U.K. contractors decreased as cheaper labor from other countries, including HCNs
and TCNs, are increasingly hired to lessen expenses but also provide culturally
sensitive staffing. Certain companies have admitted to avoiding hiring American
security personnel in favor of Latin American because of skin color but also to avoid
the “ugly American.”
A real and potential problem of PMCs is the lack of training and indoctri-
nation. U.S. military personnel swear an oath to uphold the Constitution of the
United States. Private military contractors are under no such obligation, even the
company.
An increasing problem is deconfliction between contractors and troops when
neither side has an effective identification system and sometimes incomplete

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intelligence. For example, in Iraq, regional operations centers (ROCs) provide a

clearinghouse for private military company operations with visibility to both the
private and public (Coalition military) sectors. However, except through informal
and ad hoc relationships, the private sector has virtually no insight into Coalition
military operations and military intelligence.
Tactically, U.S. military support of private forces is usually in the form of the
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and relies on informal lines of communication and
availability of resources at the moment of request by Coalition members, which
includes private military companies. U.S. military support of private military com-
pany operations is, from the point of view of the contractor, luck of the draw and
not guaranteed.
While UCMJ and MEJA, at best, only cover contractors working under DoD
contracts and alongside U.S. armed forces, formal disciplinary control by com-
manders in the field is minimal or nonexistent, from major crimes down to minor
crimes. The existence or absence of contractual terms governing PMC employees
assume a minimum level of contractual insight and authority, which is absent in
the field for a variety of reasons.
Field commanders essentially rely on a network of informal communications
and gestures to influence the actions of contractors. At best, a commander can
declare individual employees persona non grata for cause and have them removed
from the theater or the commander can create an uncomfortable environment for
the company, jeopardizing its ability to perform for its client, which is often not the
U.S. government directly. The gestures include preventing access to bases, limiting
support, and possibly harassment and detention. At worse, it means completely
independent operations by the private firm in the conflict.
Press reports indicate serious confusion in authority between PMCs and the
military. For example, in an incident in May 2005, nineteen security contractors
working for Zapata Engineering were detained for allegedly shooting recklessly in
the streets of Fallujah and nearly hitting U.S. forces. The whole incident may have
been a misunderstanding as another PSC may have been the target of the marines’
wrath (Armstrong, 2006).
The nonexistent authority of a military commander over contractor employees
goes beyond formal and enforceable coercive regimes, or rewarding for that matter,
of the contractor and hints at the lack of integration and accountability to the mis-
sion of the public military versus the private military. There is no unity in the chain
of command and at best informal connections for information, tactical awareness,
and support. This is confirmed in reports from the Government Accountability
Office (GAO).
In December 2006, the GAO issued a report that further emphasized a lack
of integration between contractors and the military at all levels (Government
Accountability Office, 2006). This particular report is one of a few from the GAO
condemning continued failed oversight of contractors providing “supplies and ser-
vices,” including security and intelligence, in the field and domestically.

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More telling is the absence of the sizable contractor force in virtually all of the
discussions and plans from the White House, Pentagon, or even Congress. Also
in December 2006, Central Command (CENTCOM) issued a preliminary find-
ing on the number of private security contractors currently operating in Iraq and
put the number at the seemingly too round of a figure of one hundred thousand.
One month later, General David Petraeus in his Senate Armed Services Committee
confirmation hearing made the first official acknowledgement that private security
companies and U.S. military forces would be working together on the then forth-
coming “surge” in Iraq.
Without regulation or oversight, and regulation itself is an empty can in the
absence of monitoring, there is no guarantee that such firms will act in the United
States’ national interest. Regulatory regimes already exist to monitor the expert of
arms and services, what is necessary are the understanding that each private entity
is an agent of the United States’ mission in current and future wars.
Problems can usually be traced back to inadequate oversight rather than to
any intrinsic problem with contract support. Relying on the private sector requires
good commercial acumen, supported by quality legal advice, when writing, sign-
ing, and, most importantly, monitoring contracts. It is this last detail that is the
most problematic.
How contractors fit into military administration is further complicated by fail-
ures to enforce requirements to process through the CONUS Replacement Center
(CRC). Limited to contractors working directly for the U.S. government, this is
an opportunity for active military, who must also process through CRC, to meet
contractors. However, besides excluding the majority of contractors working in
Iraq and Afghanistan by definition, requirements to go through have become more
lax.
Although private security companies are generally responsible for training their
own employees, one of the benefits of outsourcing, the government has certain
responsibilities for training contractor employees. Resistance to CRC processing by
PSCs has included complaints that requirement to process through the CRC did
not always fit with deployment schedules required by contracts due to the time-
line imposed or the inadequacy of the CRC to meet the throughput requirement,
and training did not always stay current with the evolving threat environment or
theater commander directives (National Defense University, 2006; personal cor-
respondence with security contractors, 2007).

Conclusion
Availability, deployment, and co-location of public military forces with private
military contractors impacts U.S. foreign policy and U.S. national security. It is
essential that the soldier, as a member of the public military ultimately hiring or
otherwise allowing the PMC to operate, be aware of this as the United States owns

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 Private Military Companies  n  185

the battlefield and not the PMC. The goal of this chapter is to create a frame of ref-
erence for the U.S. military officer to consider the PMC, should it be located in his
or her area of operation, as the resource that it can be. That said, the PMC may not
always operate in a symbiotic manner, as the second scenario, a real-life example
from Iraq, demonstrates.
Ultimately, perceived deniable accountability and the perception of reality
often vary considerably. Failure to understand this, to see how the populations
you are trying to win over or at least prevent from helping the enemy, is all too
frequent. By contracting these forces, the state licenses these firms to operate on the
behalf of the state. In Iraq, for example, the population views these firms as having
direct authority from the United States, the arms-length deniability theorized or
fantasized by U.S. policy makers simply does not exist except in the U.S. media
and political environment. In the big scheme of things, domestic politics does not
make the country safer.
The twentieth century brought increasing institutionalization as a response to
increasing growth in cross-border commerce and new technology. The rise of trans-
national corporations and increasing power of nongovernmental organizations cre-
ated networks of interconnection at the cost of state agency. Voluntary or not,
states were surrendering sovereign authority to suprastate organizations in areas
of social, political, military, and economic policy areas. While borders drawn on
maps ossified, functional boundaries between states became more permeable or
disappeared altogether. The history of mercenaries, especially their disarming two
hundred years ago and their resurgence today, seems to have an inverse relationship
to nationalism and state autonomy.
Globalization places create new options while removing or discounting other
options available to states. Global trade, instant news, and communication force
states to reconstruct and reframe their goals to address a broader audience. While
Pre- and post-Westphalian leaders relied on private, non-state armed forces for want
of capital to maintain their own armies, modern leaders find themselves with simi-
lar capital shortfalls, mostly in the area of political capital that extends beyond their
border, a similar problem of spending capital, but new is the power of international
opinion that holds states accountable to people and not other states. Debates sur-
rounding the bombing of the Marines’ barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and in the
aftermath of the “Blackhawk Down” incident in Somalia ten years later represent
societal and political restrictions felt in all military missions, humanitarian or oth-
erwise. State agency in economics and foreign policy, the first to fall to globaliza-
tion, are now followed by a lessened inviolability of domestic issues as concepts of
preemption, prevention, dissuasion, and projection become part of state security
policies.
Machiavelli’s oft-quoted description of mercenaries as “useless and dangerous …
and without discipline” is misleading (Machiavelli, 1950, 45). As is frequently the
case, the context of his quote is ignored, but not necessarily obsolete. Machiavelli’s
condottieri have a lot in common with modern private military companies today

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in that they existed and operated with explicit, or sometimes implicit, permission
of the “administrative unit” hiring them, at least at the outset. When waging war,
the condottieri concentrated on taking prisoners, as their preoccupation was with
raising ransom money. Generally, because they were ideologically and politically
detached from their battles, the hired soldiers were not interested in killing per se;
instead, they conducted themselves within the accepted professional strictures of
warfare (Zarate, 1998).
Private military forces complicate traditional norms of military command and
control, challenging the basic norms of accountability designed to govern the use of
violence. With greater distance between decision and policy maker comes increased
deniability in the eyes of the policy maker. Publics, especially foreign publics, do
not see nor appreciate this insularity and detachment. Public diplomacy is victim-
ized when the forces under indirect control are perceived as extensions or members
of the U.S. armed forces.
There are two levels of accountability: domestic and foreign. The first is account-
ability of policy making to the domestic audience, including Congress. Private
military force is managed directly by the Department of State or the civilian lead-
ership of the Department of Defense. Demands on accountability in international
politics are as old as nationalized militaries. This is an important point because the
purpose of holding armies and navies accountable was their impact on relations
between states, not on relations between persons. State borders are more permeable
as states lose autonomy, but ultimately they still exist and the international system
and international publics see and hear the results of foreign policy decisions and
public diplomacy programs. Dodging criminal prosecution is not restricted to cor-
porate warriors but indirect and unintended extensions of state policies and images
of the state and its people must be first on the list when discussing private military
force. It is not a stretch to say that peacekeeping forces composed of contractor
states is “foreign policy by proxy,” performing tasks the “government [or collective
governments], for … political sensitivities, cannot [or will not] carry out” (Silver-
stein, 2000, 145). Applying this argument to the private security industry today is
where the discussion of their applicability must begin.
The net effect is deeper reliance on the state to enforce legal restraints than
may be widely realized. Private security companies have more pressure points
than state militaries. When analyzing the pros and cons of private military force,
it is important to understand the whole argument. The ability to control private
security companies is greater than a multinational force with its varying rules of
engagement negotiated by each contributor nation, various weapons and ammuni-
tion requirements, and personnel selection policies. The PSC, on the other hand,
seeks to satisfy the requirements or spirit of the contract. Preventing, catching, and
punishing PSC abuses or contract failures are the responsibility of the state through
proper selection, vetting; inability to control the PSC is the failure of the state, not
the failure of the system. PSC motivation aligns closely with satisfying the implicit

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 Private Military Companies  n  187

and explicit requirements of the client. This is a far different motivation than that
of contractor state soldiers.
Contemporary warfare has changed the structure and role of the military.
Returning to requiring a high degree of specialization and volunteerism it is much
more like the preconscription armies. The deepening divide between military and
nonmilitary culture has led to a continuing disengagement between the two. Mobi-
lization of military force does not require mobilization of the masses. Looking at
the United States, as it is the leader in private security utilization, we see the politi-
cal elites disengaged from the military process: few have family in the armed forces
and none serve in battle. They send the military overseas to conduct the war and
control it remotely, as if they were there due to technology.
From Iraq to Afghanistan, and even into Pakistan and elsewhere in Asia, Africa
and South America, the United States increasingly uses and relies on private mili-
tary force for a variety of reasons. Although their value as deniable, expendable, and
available resources—especially in discussions of “surge” capacity—continues to be
reinforced as contractor missions and even deaths garner little attention from the
media, their fit into the structured civil–military relationship central to American
democracy and fundamental in the decision to use force is questionable.
In the aftermath of the vicious attacks of September 11, 2001, the national
trajectory of outsourcing military capabilities was broadened and accelerated. The
trend toward outsourcing combat soldiers was in place before 9/11 and the seed was
already germinating before planes hit the Towers and the Pentagon.
It is too early to tell if private military companies are a temporary aberration or
the signal of a long-term reversion to the ways of earlier times. Complicating our
understanding is the conduct of the administration of President George W. Bush
on the world stage. Far from an actual coalition builder, national security strategies
and speeches over the years of his tenure have reinforced a unilateralism on the
international stage and in domestic politics and a clear disregard for international
norms that combined to eliminate pressures to keep a lid on nonstate forces.
Private military companies can be effective tools of foreign policy, if they are
intelligently and thoughtfully used. It is still too soon to tell if for the last century
and a half the by and large absence of nonstate military forces hired by states and
sovereigns is an anomaly, a fashionable trend, or something else. Their use in the
foreign policy of the United States today is more indicative of the short-sighted
foreign policy and endemic failure of the U.S. leadership to appreciate the value of
foreign perceptions, notably the civilians with whom our soldiers and private secu-
rity forces are interacting, in the fight against terror. The U.S. legal environment
provides adequate tools to control and manage PMC actions as agents of the United
States; however, the use of these mechanisms is intentionally not exercised, to the
detriment of all concerned.
Both the conduct and rules of war has changed and the range of services that
private military companies provide and what the US requires of them is significant.
Unlike technology stewardship issues that prevent aircraft carriers from putting

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to sea without civilians (for the last four decades), security contractors are on the
front lines, directly and independently engaging foreign publics. These “guns with
legs” are point persons in American foreign policy and public diplomacy and are
perceived as representatives of the United States. Their role isn’t a given nor is it
required, but we seem to have accepted it. We cannot afford to make these assump-
tions today or in the future.

References
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Howard, M.E. 1976. War in European history. London: Oxford University Press.
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Hopkins University Press.
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2006%20PMOIS.doc.
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the nuclear age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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Weber, M. 1957. The theory of social and economic organization. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
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tional Law 34(1): 75–162.

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 Chapter 10

Defense Policy and

Doctrinal Insulation

Charles R. Miller

Introduction
Constitutionally the U.S. Army’s purpose derives from the simple phrase in the
preamble to ‘‘provide for the common defense.’’ Yet the U.S. Army, twelve years older
than the Constitution itself, has lived through many iterations of guidance as to
what providing for the common defense actually entails. Just as the rest of the fed-
eral government has burgeoned over time in response to external and internal needs
not covered by that rather sparse document, so has the organization charged with
maintaining the nation’s land forces.
Even though the ashes of Marxism-Leninism have cooled considerably, the
Army still holds fast to its comfortable Cold War purpose and its ensuing doctrine.
It was during that time, rather anomalous considered against the entire history of
the United States, that decision makers found it easiest to develop a grand strategy
and its subsequent defense policy and supporting doctrine. Is it only in the post-
Cold War world, however, that the Army has done the less than battle-focused
tasks such as peacekeeping? A longer study of the Army’s history outside the Cold
War would suggest that the Army’s primary purpose during the entire nineteenth

 Reprinted from Public Administration and Management 10, no. 2 (2005). With permission
from the publisher. This chapter does not reflect the views of the Department of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the United States Southern Command.

191

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century, regardless of self-concept and other than the very infrequent episodes of
actual battle, was exactly the now familiar role of constable and peacekeeper, a
force somewhat removed from the pressures of international relations and sizably
tiny. The twentieth century marked not only the modernization of war and the
U.S. Army, but also the first time in its history when the international environment
drove its existence, transformation and employment. Just as the external threat was
not a driving factor during the nineteenth century, and the Army had real missions
to accomplish, though with greatly scaled back forces on the frontier, the initial
half of the twenty-first century portends a similar lack of external drivers, with the
globe substituting nicely for the American West (Jervis, 1999). There are still rov-
ing bands of terrorists and suspect regimes to fight, but since the diminution of the
Soviets, the Army has struggled to reconcile its concept of purpose with systemic
dictates, partially by transforming itself to a lighter, more versatile force. A lighter,
more lethal force of itself is good for the common defense; using that force because
it will be even easier to deploy to places even further removed from any tangible
national interest is not.

Basic Argument
This chapter examines the twentieth century U.S. Army by exploring its responses
to external and internal pressures through the vehicle of doctrinal change and its
integration with strategy. A balance of power approach provides one useful tool
for understanding doctrinal change given that the United States was a great power
throughout the period studied and therefore increases in the offensive capabili-
ties of putative adversaries should have triggered conceptual leaps in doctrine that
would also be well integrated with the state’s grand strategy and defense policy.
Two other approaches that look inside the organization provide alternatives to this
balance of power baseline. An organization theory approach suggests that the orga-
nization’s need to reduce uncertainty primarily by maximizing autonomy, but also
prestige and budget, acts as the primary driver of organizational behavior regardless
of integration with strategy. Alternatively, an organizational culture approach sug-
gests that the social and institutional self-concept of the organization derived from
historical preferences and successes will affect the doctrine that its leaders design in
response to civilian guidance so that it also might not mesh perfectly with strategy,
though peculiarities of the U.S. Army dampen some of the more virulent tenden-
cies of both organizational approaches. The general finding from the case studies
is that exogenous, material pressures found under the balance of power approach
explain a great deal of doctrinal change and integration, particularly through the
first half of the Cold War, but that these pressures alone were not enough to prevent
typical organizational autonomy characteristics from surfacing towards the end
of the Cold War due to an inability of the organization to respond to an enlarge-
ment in its scope of responsibilities. Thus, although Army decision makers were

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cognizant of systemic cues when they modified their doctrine, eventually they used
doctrinal change as a means of insulating the Army from the uncertainties found
in fluctuating defense policies.

Realist and Liberal Foundations of the U.S. Army

A realist approach suggests that all states will have armies with certain capabilities
and that over time they will learn and emulate other successful armies (Waltz,
1979, 127–128; Goldman and Andres, 1999, 83). Certainly this is the case with the
U.S. Army, which, over its history, copied many procedures and tactics from the
French, British, Germans and Russians in succession. More than any other entity
within the state, the Army mirrors what a theoretically realist state would assume.
Part of the dilemma in this project, however, is in reconciling the foundations of a
realist analysis that focuses on the sameness of states with the notion of American
exceptionalism. The belief of there being a unique American concept and character
must be examined as well (Morgenthau, 1993, 143–149; Waltz, 1979, 97). Samuel
Huntington intimated that, ‘‘a gap has always existed between the ideals in which
Americans believed and the institutions that embodied their practice’’ (Hunting-
ton, 1996, 1). A military force, as Huntington observes elsewhere, has ‘‘functional
imperatives that conflict most sharply and dramatically with the liberal democratic
values of the American Creed’’ (Huntington, 1957, 15–16). Is it problematic, then,
that the U.S. Army is situated in a Lockean liberal republic, obedient to the wishes
of its masters and subject to the passing whims and fancies of the public and its
elected leaders? Many liberal thinkers have considered the army as an oppressive
tool of the executive. John Locke’s conception of the theoretical state of nature was
many times more generous than Hobbes’ dark vision (Hobbes, 1997), as Locke
placed his faith in the legislative body rather than a single sovereign, and more
importantly, made a provision for the people to depose said government if it failed
to uphold its role as a trustee of life, liberty and property (Locke, 1952, 4–11). Of
course Locke’s vision most animated the American Founders, who took the ideas of
life, liberty and property and encoded them in the Constitution.
The U.S. Army received a firm liberal imprint from the debates over the Consti-
tution. Due mostly to territorial fortune, this imprint lay undisturbed until nearly
halfway into the twentieth century. With its constitutional constraints and peaceful
neighbors, the U.S. Army was different from the ground forces of other nations for
most of its history. The encroaching world of the twentieth century would severely
test its liberal character (Edwards and Walker, 1988). The bias against a large stand-
ing army and its pernicious effect on liberty was so strong that it was more than 150
years under that Constitution before there stood one on U.S. (and European and
Asian, and now, Middle Eastern) soil.
The modern U.S. Army differs in at least three important ways from the heav-
ily studied European armies of the early twentieth century. First, the U.S. Army

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has no feudal heritage and no significant history of meddling in domestic politics

compared to those in Europe (Hartz, 1955). These traits were solidified constitu-
tionally and, in conjunction with its geography, material abundance and relative
isolation until the twentieth century, enabled the U.S. Army to develop somewhat
differently than the armies of Europe. Second, the U.S. Army existed in a bipolar
world during much of the period of this study. Because of this, the U.S. Army
had a single, identifiable enemy that served to focus doctrine. This trait is unique
when compared to the European experience, given the shifting alliances that the
continent continuously underwent. Third, the U.S. Army during much of this time
coexisted with nuclear weapons, which were welcomed at first but later rejected.
The technological challenge that nuclear weapons posed to the writing of doctrine
and the future of ground combat were an order of magnitude greater than those
with which any other army had to deal. These three differences allow at least a
partial reconciliation of realist logic and American exceptionalism. Another way
to reconcile systemic dictates and the U.S. Army is to consider how it operates in
a liberal democracy that, due to its pluralistic nature, might at times have trouble
developing a coherent grand strategy.

Grand Strategy and Defense Policy

Clearly defining strategy and applying it consistently to foreign policy is a prob-
lematic endeavor for all states, but particularly for liberal democracies subject to
routine elections. Strategy covers a range of options. The highest level, grand strat-
egy, seeks to synthesize the diplomatic, economic, cultural and military practices
of a state towards a common goal of satisfying core interests and objectives. Below
grand strategy are the policies that flow from each of the elements of grand strat-
egy. With a single identified enemy, those policies generally work toward the same
goals; in the absence of that enemy, they may, in fact, work at cross-purposes to
one another. Although the thrust of this project is not on strategy itself, but rather
a bottom-up study of doctrinal integration with strategy, a working, broad defini-
tion of what strategy means in the U.S. context must be provided in order to assess
doctrinal integration therewith.
Most surveys of strategy in the West begin, and sometimes end, with Carl Von
Clausewitz and his formulations of war as more of an art than an exact science.
Von Clausewitz began by distinguishing strategy and tactics. Strategy was ‘‘the use
of engagements for the object of the war,’’ whereas tactics were at a lower level and
concerned ‘‘the use of armed forces in the engagement’’ (Von Clausewitz, 1976,
128; Sun Tzu, 1994; Handel, 2001; Paret, 1986). More recent academic studies of
strategy highlight the difficulty of developing any coherent strategy or of doing so
inside of liberal democracies (Betts, 2000). Others lay out possible grand strategies
for the United States, though without a Soviet Union, the likelihood of maintaining

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  195

one, even with a substantial threat of international terrorism, still does not look
likely, absent another great power (Jervis, 1998; Posen and Ross, 1997).
The grand strategy across the cases, deliberately not developed to a greater extent,
can be covered by essentially three categories. First, in the absence of enemies, the
grand strategy is typically most sensitive to classic economic considerations found
under U.S. liberalism, so that this is characterized as economically driven, a situation
found generally in the post-war periods in the study. The Second World War stands
alone with an obvious grand strategy of defeating the original Axis powers. The Cold
War, once it was firmly established under NSC-68, can be fairly characterized as
having a grand strategy of containment that drove the varying defense policies.
Although there are notable limitations to developing a coherent grand strategy,
or even a defense policy, as part of the democratic system of the United States, the
U.S. Army is constitutionally bound to follow the guidance that comes from its
duly elected civilian leaders, even if it causes the organization considerable pain.
Thus, although receiving conflicting and oft-changing guidance is problematic, the
Army normatively should attempt to make its war-fighting doctrine support the
immediate defense policy and therefore the grand strategy. The cases under consid-
eration will give us several examples across varying periods of threat to the United
States, either with minimal threat as in the interwar and post-Cold War period,
or with considerable threat throughout the Second World War and the Cold War.
Thus, as U.S. grand strategy and its derivative defense policy changed, so should
Army doctrine. The integration of the Army’s doctrine with those higher levels of
guidance is the question to be studied, by using a survey of the Army’s conception
of doctrine and testing it with three approaches.

What Is Doctrine?
Doctrine is the conceptual framework that ties together theoretically and practi-
cally what the Army teaches, how it trains its forces and how it fights in battle.
These areas all work together synergistically, generate feedback and eventually
modify doctrine, though it is most sensitive to the capabilities of the forces in other
states. Therefore, to assess change in doctrine I will look at three areas:
1. Purpose—All armies obviously want to win, but they have different concep-
tions of how to do so. How well is its doctrine integrated with the national
strategy? In the absence of national strategy, what does doctrine provide? Does
it react to enemy capabilities or does it serve the interest of the organization?
2. Concept—How does the Army’s leadership think about applying force? Is the
doctrine oriented offensively or defensively? How does it envision winning on
the battlefield, by destroying the enemy’s forces or its ability to fight, by deter-
ring, by meeting every threat on every range of the spectrum? Does it favor
maneuver or firepower? How does it view the role of the arms, branches and

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services? Does technology play a role? What scale of operations and spectrum
of conflict do leaders envision?
3. Structure—How are forces organized to support the first two factors? What
is procured to support those? What is taught in the schools and how are they
organized? What structures or command relationships exist to link training,
operations, and doctrine?
This approach to doctrine differs somewhat but not drastically from the concep-
tualizations of other authors. Mostly, this method of studying the Army’s doctrine
is one level below that of the state that other scholars consider. This approach gets
more to the organization’s self-concept by looking from the bottom up to its link-
age to political guidance given in the way of defense policy. Changes in the U.S.
Army’s doctrine are most obvious in a single measure, the capstone written state-
ment found in the Field Manual 100-5 series. This manual is the blueprint for Army
doctrine and provides the broad overall guidance required for commanders at all
levels (Farrell, 1996). Because of its distribution and the time needed to implement
its guidance, it is not changed on a whim, but only when there is significant pres-
sure dictating the change, generally seen as well in the overarching defense policy.1

Why Does Doctrine Change?

A key question arises as to why would there not be a status quo bias regarding doc-
trinal change and integration in the U.S. Army. After all, the Army is a governmen-
tal organization, a bureaucracy in most regards, and bureaucracies are designed for
continuity, not change. They are begun to establish rules and procedures with which
they will perform repetitive, routine, orderly tasks (Rosen, 1991, 2). Still, the quick
survey of Army doctrine over the past century does show that its doctrine changed
at least a dozen times, many of those changes innovative and not just incremental,
bureaucratic additions. Although there are many elements of continuity through
the doctrinal changes under consideration, and a fair amount of status quo, it is
not as strong a bias as might be expected. The biggest reason doctrine changed in
the twentieth century seems to come from the growth of U.S. Army roles and mis-
sions. The scope of possibilities that doctrine had to cover grew across the century
as the United States took more of a role in world affairs. The Figure 10.1 shows the
expansion of this scope.

Necessary Distinctions
While noting these distinctions from the formulations of other authors the residual
approach here is still characterized as testing a balance of power explanation against
one in which an organization seeks self-generated ends to explain doctrinal change

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  197

Atomic
efield
ear Battl
Nucl

Combined Arms
Intensity of Conflict

High Conventional Warfare

Conventional

Medium Co
un
ter
- ins
Low- ur Low Intensity
ge
Intensity nc Conflict
y
Pea
cek
e ep
ing
OOTW*
23 39 41 44 49 54 62 68 76 82 86 93
Year
*OOTW = Operations Other than War

Figure 10.1  Scope of FM 100-5 doctrinal responsibility.

and integration with higher political and strategic goals. The most noted example
for studying military doctrine remains Barry Posen’s work. His balance of power
and organization theory approaches explain doctrine in terms of three causal forces:
purpose, people and environment. Posen focuses mostly on how the organization
attempts to reduce uncertainty, to the extent that it prefers an elaborate offensive
doctrine and will only innovate with civilian intervention (Posen, 1984, 41–59;
Zisk, 1993).
Another school of thought typified by Jack Snyder is that militaries want to
reduce uncertainty and will therefore seek elaborate offensive doctrines that civil-
ians cannot understand, the implication being if they do not understand it then they
will not meddle (Snyder, 1984, 24–25). Scott Sagan suggests that militaries prefer
offensive doctrines because it allows them to deny the enemy its preferred offensive
doctrine and place the battle at a time and place of their choosing. Sagan also argues
that army officers will be perennial pessimists, who, while seeking to maximize
the advantage their organization may have at any given point in time, may overly
prescribe preemptive strikes and thus lead to more frequent wars (Sagan and Waltz,
1995, 55–57). All of these scholars demonstrate a military bias for the offensive that
also seems to coincide with some less flattering aspects of organizational behavior.
Both Posen and Snyder share a realist outlook and some common underpinnings:
1. Civilian intervention is a good thing because it shapes the military towards
the objective strategic interest of the state.
2. Military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines and can pursue
their own parochial interests rather than the national good if unchecked.
3. That systemic conditions shape doctrine.

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 198  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Their arguments imply that a military that seeks its own interest serves its state
badly because it will break the link with grand strategy. Of course this begs the
question noted earlier as to whether or not the state can actually develop a coherent
grand strategy. Neither do these authors account for an endogenous, cultural argu-
ment that the defense is simply not the way a warrior class does business. The U.S.
Army poses a different question, because, as previously noted, homeland defense
has been nowhere on its task list until very recently. Finally, my argument assumes
a gentler view of the aspects of military professionals, largely due to American char-
acteristics as typified by Carl Builder (Builder, 1989; Betts, 1991).
As Elizabeth Kier develops her argument, military culture becomes an inter-
vening variable between civilian decision makers and doctrine (Kier, 1997; Porch,
2000). Unlike Posen and Snyder, she suggests:
1. Systemic conditions do not directly shape doctrine.
2. Domestic implications of military policy often shape civilian decisions.
3. Military organizational culture intervenes between civilian leaders’ interpre-
tation of systemic conditions and the output of doctrine.
Kier examines the same period in the British and French armies. She contends
that functional logic does not hold, as both offensive and defensive doctrines can
serve to increase a military’s autonomy, budget and prestige. Interests do not come
directly from either the functional needs of the organization or the systemic envi-
ronment; instead, Kier claims that military power is about the allocation of power
within society as much as it is about state survival. She rightly posits that military
culture intervenes between civilian decision makers and doctrine; her argument
further suggests that the military culture responds to the external environment of
the organization, which can be primarily the domestic political environment. It
revolves around the question ‘‘who within the state has the support and control of
the armed services?’’ (Kier, 1997, 20). Although this argument is persuasive in the
case of the interwar French, where the Right wanted a professional army to guard
against the Left, and the Left a conscript army to guard against the Right, it fails
to apply to the United States. This might be due to Hartz’s liberal tradition with no
feudal past in America, a factor that imputes a solid liberal core with only minor
deviations to each side of the political spectrum.
It could also be that the United States has no contiguous enemies. Before the
Cold War, the Army was reduced after every conflagration to skeletal levels and
played a minimal role in domestic politics. The United States, until the Cold War,
possessed neither internal nor external enemies nor a large standing army. By the
time the Cold War arrived, the strict civilian control of the military had become
inculcated, only to be reinforced by bipartisan Soviet fear. Both Democrats and
Republicans shared not surprisingly similar views and beliefs as to the military’s
role. Like the realist versions, Kier’s construct fails to speak directly to American
exceptionalism. Although her view of culture as an intervening variable is one that
I share, I share it more in a realist sense. The Army has a culture that reinforces

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  199

both functional and material needs. It seeks autonomy but has strong normative
constraints and takes its role in providing the public good of defense seriously, even
if to the detriment of integrating professional doctrine with political supervision.
For an overview of the implications of these three approaches, some broad fac-
tors can be compared. Consider Table 10.1.

Hypotheses
Balance of power can best be characterized as the approach in which ‘‘states respond
to potentially dangerous increases in power of their putative adversaries’’ (Posen,
1984, 21). The change in the offensive military capabilities of another state will be
tested with three measures: new offensive doctrine, technological innovation or an
increase in cumulative resources (Van Evera, 1999, 7–11). This approach generates
two major hypotheses. First, if another state increases its offensive capabilities, then
defense policy and doctrine will be integrated in response. This hypothesis would
also suggest that both defense policy makers and the U.S. Army respond well to
changing capabilities that threaten U.S. interests, and also that minimal civilian
intervention is required for doctrinal change. Conversely, when the offensive capa-
bilities of a potential enemy decrease, defense policy and doctrine may drift apart
in the absence of a unifying threat. Due to this trend, the Army is not particularly
innovative without systemic pressure. When the system is indeterminate, internal
features can surface.
The organizational approaches suggest that doctrinal change serves the organi-
zation regardless of threat situation by reducing uncertainty through autonomy or
by serving the social and institutional self-concept derived from historical prefer-
ences and successes. Both of these carry negative consequences for doctrinal inte-
gration with strategy. The approaches will be tested using two major hypotheses,
one from organization theory and one from organizational culture. First, under
organization theory, the Army will pick a doctrine regardless of threat situation,
normally offensive, with which to maximize autonomy and insulation rather than
integration with defense policy. It will use ambiguous and traumatic events to pur-
sue a self-defined agenda. It will also likely fail to change doctrine except when
prodded by civilians (Posen, 1984, 47–49). Second, under the cultural view, if ‘‘the
set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape
collective understandings’’ does not resonate with systemic cues, doctrinal change
will not be integrated with defense policy (Kier, 1997, 28). In the U.S. case, how-
ever, those cultural effects are tempered by an Army self-concept of skill, military
art, fire superiority and people rather than machines, systems and platforms, with a
nearly sentimental focus on the people element (Builder, 1989, 33–34).
Given Builder’s observations, it is possible that the nastier version of organiza-
tion theory found in the third hypothesis does not apply as well to the U.S. Army
as to European armies or to the Air Force and Navy. There are certainly many

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 200  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 10.1  Theoretical Overview

Balance of  Organization Organizational
Power Theory Culture
Values sought Security Organizational Social and
autonomy institutional
self-concept
Groups Civilian leaders Military leaders Military leaders
controlling
Civil–military Normal: Problematic: Not problematic:
relations subservient aggressive military obedient
military handymen
Interest fostered State Organization Organizational
norms
Modes of Somewhat Selfishly rational Tradition bound
behavior rational
Source of External and Internal and Internal and
behavior material material ideational
Key drivers of 1. Nature and 1. Seeking of 1. Basic values,
doctrinal level of threat autonomy through norms, beliefs
change specialization, and formal
2. Intelligence on
prestige or budget knowledge of
capabilities of
the organization
putative 2. Technological
adversaries advances 2. Historical
defined as new preferences and
3. Use of traumatic
offensive successes
and ambiguous
doctrine,
events to gain 3. Learning from
technological
autonomy wartime
innovation and
experience
cumulative
resources
Integration of Doctrine should Doctrine may be Doctrine will
doctrine with be integrated separate from serve the
strategy deferential to the strategy as an organization’s
state’s defense insulation self-concept
policy and mechanism more than the
strategy state’s policy and
strategy

episodes that reflect a healthy dose of self-interest, however, and part of the task is
to illuminate those tendencies that organization theory suggests should be present,
particularly across the period studied given that as a great power the U.S. Army’s
doctrine should be sensitive mostly to systemic cues. Another point of interest is

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  201

the offensive bias in U.S. doctrine, which seems to predate reasonable organization
theory explanations and is a constant, even in Active Defense, ever since 1892’s
pre-doctrine and 1905’s manual, existing at a time when the Army’s role was not
primarily that of war fighter. This would indicate that bias is a cultural one, though
it differs from Kier’s conception, since U.S. offensive doctrine was designed to be
used with citizen-soldiers long before the large standing army came about, and not
as a tool for the military to pick domestic political sides.
Because the United States was a great power throughout the time frame stud-
ied, this baseline will provide an adequate testing of those hypotheses. It is to be
expected in cases lacking significant external pressure that organizational explana-
tions might offer more causal value. The survey of each doctrinal iteration will test
these baseline predictions and determine the usefulness of the balance of power and
organizational approaches across a varied period of eighty years. A great power’s
doctrine should be integrated with its defense policy and subsequent military strat-
egy, in times of threat certainly, but also in times of relative peace, even despite the
already mentioned problems with developing grand strategy during peacetime. If
doctrine and strategy are not integrated, then organizational tendencies have taken
hold that could endanger the well being of the state.

Findings
This study looked at the decision making of senior Army officials over the course
of eighty years as they changed the Army’s capstone doctrine. Doctrine was not
fixed or immutable, but instead a living conceptual document that reflected the
principal essence of the organization. The Army was not as stagnant as might be
thought, and looking at these twelve iterations over a considerable swath of time
shows the organization changing under a variety of pressures. Consequently, the
Field Manual 100-5 series is a valuable tool for studying pressures on the Army as
an organization, both external and internal, international and domestic. The basic
concept in doctrine that this study sought to capture, however, was its theory of
warfare, that is, how the Army’s leaders thought the Army should be employed on
the battlefield and whether or not that concept was integrated with or divorced
from defense policy.
In this regard, the Army’s core doctrine was fairly well attuned to systemic con-
ditions based on the Army leadership’s projections as to the level and nature of threat
and the offensive capabilities of putative adversaries. When other armies that threat-
ened U.S. interests were innovating and developing new doctrine, weapons and
cumulative resources, Army leaders responded generally with alacrity. Yet despite
this sensitivity to systemic factors, some of the features of organization theory and
cultural approaches played a significant causal role in hampering doctrinal integra-
tion with civilian guidance. These organizational approaches generally surface most

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 202  n  Handbook of Military Administration

readily in the absence of systemic drivers, though surprisingly, also during the last
few iterations of doctrine in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union.
During that critical period beginning after Vietnam, the Army, unable to cope
with fluctuating defense guidance, specifically developed a doctrine that insulated
it from defense policy and focused its efforts nearly squarely on operational excel-
lence on a conventional battlefield. The Army’s theory of fighting wars became its
self-concept to the exclusion of what it saw as excessively variable strategic guidance.
This runs counter to what a baseline balance of power analysis would suggest, given
the Army’s success on various battlefields that should indicate a close integration
with defense policy and the grand strategy of a great power. The Army was sensi-
tive to balance of power considerations, and those drove its increase in war-fighting
proficiency. But it was only through insulating itself that the Army could in the lat-
ter period of the study increase its war-fighting proficiency by shielding itself from
unpredictable domestic guidance. Consequently, a danger to the state, though not
excessive, may exist when its primary armed force has divorced its concept of war
fighting from the state’s strategic concerns.
To survey the relevance of this chapter, first I will provide an overview of the
tested cases by comparing actual and predicted outcomes of integrating doctrine
with defense policy under a balance of power baseline. In analyzing those cases,
I will consolidate evidence from the case studies to demonstrate how the exter-
nal growing pressures on the organization to widen its scope and simultaneously
respond to uneven guidance eventually forced it to seek relative independence,
though still sensitive to threats from other states. Next, I will assess those themes in
light of the September 11 attacks on the United States and suggest likely implica-
tions. Finally, I will address several relevant policy issues based on the causal and
historical trends found in this study and draw a general conclusion as to the danger
of divorcing doctrine from strategy.

Review of Outcomes from BOP Baseline Predictions

Table 10.2 provides a synthesis of the empirical findings.
The first four cases all fit squarely with the baseline predictions from the bal-
ance of power approach. After the First World War, the United States returned
very nearly to only self-regard and thus did not need a grand strategy other than
pursuing economic growth. The United States did stay involved on the world stage
economically throughout the 1920s, but defense policy fell by the wayside with
muted debate over universal military training and rapid post-war demobilization.
Despite dire predictions of combat on the North American continent, the lack of
plausible enemies led to organizational concerns mostly shaping the 1923 version
of doctrine. This case belies the cultural explanation most, given the relative lack
of change from its previous version and the minor amount of learning that was
taken from the Great War, such that the organization was able to retain a notion

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  203

Table 10.2  Case Chart

Policy/Grand  Predicted Actual
Cases Strategy Defense Policy/Strategy Doctrine Outcome
A. 1923 Economically driven Retrenchment Divorced Divorced
B. 1939 Economically driven Isolationist Divorced Divorced
C. 1941 Preparation for war Buildup Integrated Integrated
D. 1944 Defeat Axis Total war Integrated Integrated

E. 1949 Economically driven Atomic deterrence Divorced Divorced

F. 1954 Containment Massive retaliation Integrated Integrated
G. 1962 Containment Flexible response Integrated Integrated
H. 1968 Containment Flexible response and Integrated Integrated
counterinsurgency

I. 1976 Containment Realistic deterrence Integrated (Divorced)

J. 1982 Containment Conventional retaliation Integrated (Divorced)
K. 1986 Containment Conventional retaliation Integrated (Divorced)
L. 1993 Economically driven Projection force Divorced Divorced

of relying on the man with the rifle, and even the horse cavalry, to the exclusion
of most other factors. This internal cultural reliance would not likely have been
integrated with defense policy, had there been one, and rather had to rely still on
mass mobilization in time of need, though the military’s call to train many men
in the United States to stand more ready than they would be under then-current
mobilization plans went largely unheeded.
The doctrine published in 1939 likewise falls prey to a similar lack of both
grand strategy and defense policy. The Army had barely survived the Great Depres-
sion, partially by hiring out its officers to the Civilian Conservation Corps, and as
such, no outside powers pressed for significant U.S. development in doctrine. Army
leaders were aware, however, of the capabilities of other states, as seen particularly
in the planning against the British and Japanese in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Still, with a defense policy that can only be characterized as isolationist, the Army’s
lack of doctrinal developments and eventual minor effort in 1939 still indicate
cultural effects at work as the major explanation, particularly those proclivities that
retained a romantic notion of horse cavalry and individual soldiers fighting bravely
on against equally stoic foes.
The versions of 1941 and 1944 are easy cases for a balance of power approach
and show strikingly how well doctrine responded to changes in adversaries’ capabil-
ities, even well short of war. Whereas 1939’s doctrine only hinted at mechanization
and combined arms warfare, 1941’s doctrine made an enormous conceptual leap

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 204  n  Handbook of Military Administration

in war-fighting capability with a rapidly assembled document developed mostly

from the innovations in doctrine and technology demonstrated by the Germans
against a series of hapless European foes. The Army then took these concepts and
tested them in maneuvers across the southeastern United States before producing
the document that would be used to train millions of mobilized soldiers. Grand
strategy was becoming clearer at the time, as President Roosevelt made it rather
transparent throughout those two interim years that the United States would sup-
port the Allied cause. That the Germans had made no aggressive overtures toward
the security of the United States provides even more causal weight to a balance of
power explanation, given that this conceptual leap in doctrine was made without
that direct threat and based almost solely on the capabilities and not the intent of
the most advanced state at the time. 1944’s case is an even easier explanation for
doctrinal integration with defense policy and grand strategy, given that the United
States was actually at war with the Axis powers with a stated goal of total victory,
in Europe first, followed by Asia.
The next four cases cover the first half of the Cold War and show the United
States in a novel position with only one peer competitor. The first case, however,
was one in which U.S. grand strategy was not particularly focused on military
policy given the prevalence of the United States as the sole atomic and dominant
economic power, thus relying mostly on sheer deterrence and benevolent intentions.
The Army, without a single focused enemy, despite some of its projections as to the
likely capabilities of the Soviets, largely kept its successful 1944 wartime doctrine in
place, word for word, in the 1949 edition, minus the Air Corps and with some minor
role for atomic weapons. This supports another nonintegration with strategic con-
cerns example, as the cultural explanation explains most of this reticence to develop
given the previous war that offered mainly success stories in terms of organizational
learning as to the value of raw attrition. Additionally, the nascent Department of
Defense system at this time was rethinking how to formulate defense policy, with
the Army being the out party compared to the other services, at least initially, even
as it tried to implement, again, universal military service.
In the 1954 case, the Cold War was engaged at full throttle, given the Korean
conflict and the subsequent NSC-68 that had quadrupled the defense budget. The
United States now had a grand strategy that would take it through the end of the
Cold War. Under containment, all of the varying policies were designed to contain
the Soviet Union across the military, economic, diplomatic and cultural spheres.
Defense policy under the Eisenhower administration, however, was problematic for
the Army, given the administration’s reliance on massive retaliation as the defense
policy. The Army had very little flexibility under this system, though the now
nuclear capable and conventionally massive Soviets did spawn a healthy concern
for nuclear battlefield capabilities in the 1954 edition of doctrine, as well as in the
subsequent Pentomic divisions. Some facets of organization theory began to surface
during this period as the Army found itself trailing the Air Force and the Navy in
prestige, budget and influence. Still, 1954’s doctrine can be fairly characterized as

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  205

integrated with defense policy given its movement towards the European nuclear
battlefield, even if many Army leaders saw from the beginning that this strategy
lacked flexibility.
The doctrine of 1962 marks a sharp departure in defense policy from the Eisen-
hower administration’s guidance. Under President Kennedy’s Flexible Response,
military policy was to counter Soviet influence across the spectrum and not just
on European soil. This expansion of scope, to include focus on the lower end of
the spectrum, was a welcome addition to the Army’s repertoire in many regards,
given that it gave the Army a tangible and achievable mission on conventional and
low intensity, unconventional battlefields. The 1962 edition of doctrine welcomed
the expansion in scope and incorporated detailed chapters in counterinsurgency in
addition to the high-intensity and atomic battlefields. As such, it was well integrated
with defense policy at the time. Still, there is also a healthy amount of organiza-
tion theory in Flexible Response as well. The Army was beginning to understand
better the inter-service competition inherent in the new Department of Defense
system and also welcomed increased roles and missions that expanding the scope of
responsibility would give the organization in terms of specialization.
The doctrine of 1968 does not add significantly to scope of doctrinal responsi-
bility. The grand strategy remained the same, with a Soviet-centric focus, though
the war in Vietnam took up a sizeable share of defense policy as well, such that a
focus on destroying the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong on the ground in South
Vietnam was the driving strategic goal. The Army was largely successful in accom-
plishing this mission, partially at the counterinsurgency level, but mostly at the
conventional tactical level, by maximizing attrition of enemy forces but failing to
break their admirable will. The war indicates a sizeable amount of organizational
influence, both from the cultural view, that valued learning from the wartime expe-
rience and direct ground combat, and from an organization autonomy view that
suggested the Amy could continue to gain prestige and influence by executing the
assigned strategy, if only with greater numbers of troops. Yet, this case also reflects a
fair amount of integration with defense policy, perhaps to the Army’s detriment, as
the goal in Vietnam was never realized despite reliance on sheer attrition. As such,
it also reflects a concern with balance of power factors, given the offensive doctrine
found in Vietnam.
In all, 1968’s version of doctrine reflects almost in equal parts the influences
of each approach, though all of these did in fact push toward integration with
defense policy instead of pulling in the expected opposite directions. In summary,
the middle four cases studied show one case of nonintegration with strategy in the
immediate aftermath of World War II given the lack of relative drivers at that time.
The other three cases show a relative integration with defense policy and strategy,
though in the last two iterations not solely for balance of power reasons. A creep-
ing concern with maximizing the autonomy of the organization was growing and
would continue throughout the next period.

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 206  n  Handbook of Military Administration

1976’s version of doctrine still fell under the grand strategy of containment
but saw the post-Nixon administration refocused on realistic deterrence in Europe
and elsewhere, with much less of a concern for lesser conflicts. 1976’s doctrine was
also, more than any other iteration studied, the work of one man, General William
DePuy. While partially insulated from defense policy through the creation of the
new Training and Doctrine Command, DePuy was nonetheless very attuned to
the capabilities of other states in the system, and he learned greatly from the Arab-
Israeli War of 1973. From this benchmark, DePuy pushed his doctrine known as
Active Defense toward first battle dominance through firepower. The belief under-
lying first battle dominance was that if the first battle could be won decisively, then
the conditions for either later victories or negotiation could be set. Active Defense
also had a nearly European focus to the exclusion of other theaters, something of a
cultural after-effect of Vietnam. DePuy’s doctrine reserved a large role for nuclear
weapons, though it also laid the groundwork for conventional dominance that was
to follow. As such, DePuy’s doctrine is fairly well integrated with defense policy at
the time, though as much by accident as by intentional flow from a grand strategy
through defense policy to doctrine. This version marks the first true break from
what balance of power would predict, as the Army’s doctrinal efforts at the time
came largely from a specialization function found under organization theory and a
learning approach designed to preclude another Vietnam by maximizing the scale
of the first victory in the next war such that it would not be a protracted affair.
1982’s edition of doctrine marks the last conceptual leap in this study and would
only be improved on in a minor fashion by its two successors. Moving beyond the
first battle firepower focus of Active Defense, 1982’s Airland Battle shifted the
focus to maneuver and to the operational depth of the battlefield. It was designed to
defeat not only the first echelon of Soviet forces but also their second, and possibly
third echelons, and thereby disrupt their war-fighting ability without necessarily
attritioning every troop. As such, Airland Battle changed doctrine in three major
ways: by shifting from firepower to maneuver, from the first echelon to the second
and beyond, and from attrition to maneuver. The shifts in emphasis were designed
specifically based on the capabilities of the Soviets, indicating a keen sensitivity to
the capabilities of aggressor states. Yet the doctrine was developed largely free of
interference from defense policy.
Similar to General DePuy’s Active Defense, Airland Battle was the product of
relatively few minds working fairly autonomously. As such, Airland Battle cannot
fairly be characterized as being integrated truly with the defense policy of conven-
tional retaliation, and in fact, the development of the capabilities found in Airland
Battle shaped defense policy to a much larger extent than the converse, such that
doctrine began to reverse the posited chain of influence. This indicated a fair dose
of autonomy through specialization, as well as cultural preferences for conventional
combat and leadership of men, even if the doctrinal writers were well attuned to
systemic conditions. Likewise, 1986’s Airland Battle continued this trend, with
another expansion in the scope of responsibility to respond to the lower level

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  207

contingencies again, the lingering visions of Vietnam having receded somewhat

from memory. Developed in much the same manner, Airland Battle 1986 also
shows the organizational tendencies emerging as the training and education bases
began to implement the 1982 concepts on a large scale.
The doctrine of 1993 was the next extension of Airland Battle, and reflected
culturally the success of the previous edition of doctrine as seen in Panama and
the Persian Gulf War. These validations of the concept of operational shock found
in Airland Battle and its training and education systems were seen as all that was
necessary to carry the Army forward onto the battlefields of two near-simultane-
ous, major regional conflicts. Faced with force cuts and no driving enemy, 1993’s
edition was the first in decades without a unifying grand strategy, and with a mini-
mal defense policy, described first as the projection force, but later as engagement
and enlargement. An organization facing ambiguous international conditions will
likely pursue the successful rules it had in place. As such, 1993’s doctrine remained
focused on the higher end of conventional conflict, again developed with little or
no guidance from the administration, given the change in administrations dur-
ing its development, such that its war-fighting ethos, encoded after so many Cold
War iterations, was not easily adapted to operations other than war occurring
much lower on the scale of contingencies. Again, this iteration of doctrine rein-
forced organizational tendencies although in the light of a new administration and
changed systemic conditions did not influence the development of defense policy
as much as did its two predecessors.

Too Many Fluctuations

The major finding of this project comes from the linkage and lack of linkage
between defense policy and Army doctrine. The scope of doctrinal responsibil-
ity depicted in Figure 10.2 came from both the external environment and from
the defense policy that demanded capabilities across the larger spectrum. Yet that
defense policy was not a constant throughout, and at times varied widely, even from
one year to another, particularly during changes in administrations. Essentially,
the fluctuation and range that could plausibly be expected in a defense policy was
too much for Army decision makers to handle. Given that the Army had nearly
complete ownership of doctrine, much more so than personnel strength, budget,
technology or weapons systems, it used doctrine as a tool to gain certainty in the
face of possible radical changes in civilian guidance. Consider Figure 10.2, which
overlays the central thrust of defense policy and doctrine separately on the previ-
ously developed doctrinal scope of responsibility.
Granted, the placements of the central thrust of both measures on this chart is
somewhat subjective, yet their placement resonates generally with the findings of
this study and the visual depiction helps illuminate the key proposition. As detailed
in the summary above, defense policy changed throughout the period of study

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 208  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Atomic

field
attle
ear B
Nucl

High
Combined Arms
Conventional Conventional Warfare

Co
Medium un
ter
-in
Low- sur
ge
Intensity nc Low Intensity
y Conflict

Pea
cek
eep
ing
OOTW

23 39 41 44 49 54 62 68 76 82 86 93

- Central Thrust of Defense Policy - Central Thrust of 100-5

Figure 10.2  Defense policy and doctrine.

somewhat dramatically at key junctures, particularly during the Cold War. Ini-
tially, lacking interest in foreign affairs, defense policy was concerned mostly with
protecting regional corporate interests or coastal defenses, while the Army main-
tained something of a war-fighting focus. The Second World War saw a necessary
fusion of all levels of war in the face of a determined and capable set of enemies. The
post-war saw an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons that the Army tried to fol-
low but could not fully, also partially inducing some instances of organization the-
ory expectations, particularly under the Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy
administration brought a radical change to defense policy with Flexible Response
and moved away from massive retaliation, followed by later focus on Vietnam that
was nearly equal to the focus on the Soviets. Defense policy returned to the Soviets
exclusively after Vietnam, but by then, the organization, which had attempted to
adjust to two previous extensive changes, had sought insulation through doctrine
in order to reduce uncertainty. Although the 1976, 1982 and 1986 versions seem
to match neatly with defense policy, they were developed largely absent of civilian
guidance and in the 1980s cases actually provide some amount of reverse causation.
Likewise, the final doctrine continues the insulation path, despite a radical change
in defense policy.
This chart helps highlight the initial sensitivity to balance of power concerns
as perceived by the Army through its civilian-generated defense policy. Eventually,
though, the organization followed what organization theory would predict and
sought autonomy. This relative even keel in doctrine as depicted can also indicate

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  209

some of the cultural ethos of the organization, as its always felt most comfortable
fighting the mid- to high-intensity battle against conventional foes.

American Exceptionalism?
In this study, doctrine was found to have developed eventually with minor regard for
defense policy although grand strategy served as a cognitive device through which
Army leaders still focused on putative enemies if not their own civilian bosses.
Douglas Porch’s incisive critique of Elizabeth Kier’s work noted that Kier conflated
doctrine with strategy, or grand strategy. More so than in the French case, U.S.
Army doctrine is definitely not strategy. Doctrine as the U.S. Army defines it and as
outlined in the course of the study, essentially stops at the operational level of war,
with a minor nod to strategy in the varying prefaces. For the U.S. Army, doctrine
is largely a playbook for how to think, train and fight battles and campaigns; con-
sequently, the Army is largely agnostic on strategy. Regardless of the strategic guid-
ance for either defensive or offensive operations, the Army will generally find an
operationally offensive way to accomplish the mission. The Army seems to remain
satisfied with operational excellence and eager to leave the discontinuities found in
not fully integrating all of the elements of national power to someone else.
Part of this inability to fuse the Army’s doctrine with more strategic linkage
comes directly from the U.S. system of government. The Army is a loyal organiza-
tion that follows its orders, yet it can receive a variety of conflicting guidance from
the various components of government. Executive guidance may conflict with leg-
islative budget priorities. Bases might be closed, and broad strategic guidance could
conceivably change radically every four years. Partially to insulate itself from these
potentially wavering strategic priorities, the Army essentially develops its own view
of what the threat is, what the threat will be, and what it needs to do to meet it.
Because the U.S. system is wonderfully transparent, civilian decision makers are
mostly kept informed of the Army’s priorities and views of how to fight a war and
provide tacit or explicit approval beforehand. In any case, as demonstrated, the
Army rarely makes drastic, radical changes, and in the United States, there are
several systems of oversight involved at least in terms of all of the material support
systems of the Army, if not its doctrine.

Operationalization of Strategy
In many ways, the separation of the Army’s doctrine from strategic concerns can
be characterized as the operationalization of strategy.2 This is acutely problematic
because when ‘‘strategy is not consciously formulated, it emerges by default. Instead
of being the driving force in war, strategy becomes a mere by-product or after-
thought. In prolonged wars, this is a recipe for disaster, since even extraordinary

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tactical and operational successes may not add up to a winning strategy’’ (Handel,
2001, 354). In the U.S. case, Vietnam fits this description closely. The outcome of
that conflict was one of the factors that inadvertently reinforced more separation of
operational doctrine and strategy given that strategy had failed miserably. Similar
examples are the Germans in both the First and Second World Wars. Always the
superior force man for man, even the stunning victories found under blitzkrieg
could not sustain a strategy that essentially challenged the entire world, despite
considerable success in conquering virtually all of mainland Europe.
The greatest danger in divorcing doctrine from strategy is not surprisingly
found in Von Clausewitz as he argues that ‘‘No one starts a war—or rather, no one
in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends
to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it’’ (Von Clausewitz, 1976,
579). This statement summarizes the primacy of politics over the lower functions
of war. War without political aim and will is simply random killing that can only
be classified as immoral. Derivatively, doctrine developed in the absence of politi-
cal aims, no matter how efficient and artful on the battlefield, also lacks the same
moral considerations, regardless if applied under either a realist or liberal schema.
As noted in this study, the Army remains largely agnostic on strategy and pre-
fers to insulate itself with an operational focus, particularly in the absence of clear
or wavering strategic guidance. Although it is still highly debatable whether or not
strategy can even be accurately described let alone formulated, the gap between
doctrine and defense policy was not so troubling during the development of the
seminal doctrines of 1976, 1982 and 1986. This was due mostly to the nature of
bipolarity and the very obvious nature of who exactly constituted the enemy against
which to plan. This trick of fate allowed the danger of divorcing doctrine and strat-
egy to pass relatively mildly for that time period, yet the full implications of the
danger became readily visible in the absence of the predictable, comfortable Soviet
presence. As indicated before, doctrine continued at a steady state of maintaining
operational conventional war-fighting excellence while the external international
system dictated otherwise. Although the danger of political aims of a state not driv-
ing the concerns of its warriors is the primary danger from divorcing doctrine and
strategy, there are at least four other major negative implications.

Threatening Signals
First, an army not attached firmly to the political goals of its state is likely to develop
an aggressive, offensive doctrine. In the U.S. case, this was a cultural relic at least
from the nineteenth century and not directly a factor of an organizational quest
for autonomy.3 Yet this very type of doctrine can send rather clear and dangerous
signals internationally that a state does not want to send. This case was typified in
Airland Battle, viewed by the Europeans as overly aggressive and likely to provoke
the Soviets. As seen particularly in the case of 1939’s and 1941’s doctrine, a state

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  211

does not even have to be under direct threat to see clearly what the offensive doc-
trines of other states can do, and thus provoke responses (Miller and Lynn-Jones,
1989; Mearsheimer, 1983). Although conventional deterrence did seem to work, it
was not until after a shaky initial period and could have gone horribly wrong. This
anomalous Cold War example was one in which the Army’s leaders understood the
grand strategy intent of containment, yet through their own means moved aggres-
sively past that with the operational shock of Airland Battle. These signals cannot
but help other states to focus on their own shortcomings and consequently seek
remedies more readily than they otherwise would.
Additionally, a strikingly offensive doctrine, if nearly the sole focus of an Army,
can exacerbate a security dilemma. If an Army builds its entire essence around an
offensive mode of war fighting, and then demonstrates those capabilities across
a variety of scenarios, it cannot fail to be noticed by other states. Consequently,
although Airland Battle and its derivatives led the Army to apparently easy victories
in Panama and both Persian Gulf Wars, this demonstration seemed to indicate,
that at least for the United States, the offense was easier than it had been before,
even in places where the United States had to deploy troops over great distances
(Jervis, 1978). Although one should not read an invasion by 20,000 troops of a
Caribbean country near the United States or the weakness of Saddam Hussein’s
military as validation that the offense is easy, those situational factors only partially
mitigate the fundamental concern. Conveniently, at the time, there was no state
actor left with which to engage in a serious security dilemma, though those actions
would have exacerbated underlying tensions had such been the case. As such, the
Army provided its portion of the possibly destabilizing policy with its distinguish-
able offensive doctrine that it developed internally. Civilian leaders then had the
opportunity to advertise the Army’s capabilities widely on the world stage. Without
the precursor of offensive doctrine, civilian leaders could not have done the same.

Foot Dragging
The second danger of divorcing doctrine and strategy comes from foot dragging,
or the resistance that can be found when the military is given missions that do not
fit its self-identity. On a larger scale, the positive aspects of the U.S. Army’s culture,
namely the norms and institutions of the political systems and the Army’s own
culture and heritage of continuous, unchallenged, constitutional civilian control,
make its threat to democracy a rather moot question. The U.S. Army also lacks
Kier’s concern with the domestic arrangements of which party is in power and the
subsequent relationship with the people. Although there are some fears of growing
Republicanization of the officer corps and of recently retired generals speaking on
behalf of presidential candidates, the Army generally considers itself a profession
and more reflects the humble servant notion found in Builder (Snider and Watkins,
2002). Yet, there are still areas of concern under civil–military relations. As was seen

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in the cases, civilian intervention was not necessary to provoke doctrinal change.
Indeed, there was only scant evidence that any civilian leaders paid any attention
to how the Army designed doctrine. In the U.S. system it appears that civilian
leadership will engage with the military and each other in contentious debates as to
base closures, force end strength, the number of divisions, weapon systems, social
policies and military pay, among others, but rarely does it ever seek to tell the Army
‘‘how to fight.’’ Perhaps this is a true sign of Army professionalism or officials’ trust
in it, given that its core competency is left to its own design, something analogous
to not telling a medical doctor how to perform an operation. This trait, however,
also reinforces the divide between the Army’s operational excellence and overall
lack of strategic integration.
On the grander scale then, foot dragging is not a sign of an imminent coup. On
a smaller scale, however, it can hamper an administration’s short-term policy. The
drawback found in foot dragging was perhaps most perceptible in the short war
over the Balkan province of Kosovo inside of sovereign Serbia. As was indicated, an
Army with a war-fighting culture had not adapted well to a strategy of engagement
and enlargement under the Clinton administration. Advice from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff ruled out ground troops for the ‘‘war’’ before taking action, thus reducing stra-
tegic options. Once troops were actually needed to move to Kosovo, most notably
in Task Force Hawk, the Apache helicopter detachment, there also appeared to be a
considerable amount of foot dragging (Halberstam, 2001, 463–467). Additionally,
the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was not allowed to talk to the president
directly, was ordered to not discuss ground options on television, and found himself
very much at odds with the Army and the Army Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as he attempted to reconcile conflicting guidance from a variety of sources
(Clark, 2001, 273–283). Leading into the Balkan crises, a variety of Army lead-
ers released reports as to the combat readiness of their units, with the implication
being that the peacekeeping task had degraded the wartime mission readiness of
their units such that a lengthy retraining period would be needed once the unit
returned from the seemingly unending occupation of southern Europe. Although
the wisdom of the United States being involved at all in a place that Chancellor Bis-
marck found worthless is certainly questionable, this resistance to strategic options
and mission orders runs counter to the U.S. constitutional arrangement and liberal
imprint of the Army and could portend a future similar set of problems, even under
Republican budgetary munificence.

The Downside of Culture

A third drawback follows from foot dragging and takes a broader look at the effects
of a war-fighting culture, in particular the lack of flexibility that this feature builds
into the organization. The current military structure, though reduced in size but
increased in scope, is left over from the Cold War; likewise, the culture built into

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  213

the organization by the Cold War remains and results in dissonance with the new
roles and missions. Following Builder’s argument, the Army wants to see itself in
the last year of World War II, or defending the Fulda gap, or invading Panama, or
winning either Gulf War with dramatic armored advances and helicopter assaults
across the desert. It does not want to see itself propping up an illegitimate democ-
racy in Haiti, dividing a variety of belligerent ethnicities in the ruins of the Otto-
man Empire, or handing out meals in any country on the African continent. This
war-fighting focus is necessary and maximizes operational effectiveness regardless
of strategic consequences, yet again, might not support the broader strategic goals
of an administration. The Army and most of its Special Operations Forces have
performed exactly those envisioned missions by conducting combat operations in
the Middle East and Afghanistan. The resonance with cultural values is certainly
partially to credit for the amount of success thus seen.
In many ways, this Cold War culture, derivative of so many years of a con-
stant threat, has cut into the ‘‘obedient handymen’’ concept and built in a cultural
resistance to lesser missions. The danger here lies in over-socialization of the officer
corps to threats. Most evidence does not suggest a war-mongering class of officers,
however, but instead points to a general reticence to war combined with a desire
to fight well if needed. This set of war-fighting skills, however, perhaps does not
cover all of the skills needed to support national policy and therefore causes the
organization to lack flexibility. Particularly in the latter cases from Active Defense
on, Army doctrine shaped young officers through their schooling and training, and
as they advanced in rank found it hard to think outside of the Airland Battle frame-
work. This apparent self-limitation of the Army’s repertoire is partly a function of
our U.S. system of vacillating defense guidance that led to the Army’s operational
focus. Generations of officers have grown up thinking operationally, and perhaps
find it hard to make the switch to advising on strategy and grand strategy once they
reach the higher levels of service, relying still on a notion of how to fight a brigade
or a division or a corps across the depth of the battlefield in a certain scenario but
with a less certain vision as to how to reach the desired overall outcome of the use
of force.

Losing Touch with the People

The final drawback to the operationalization of doctrine and the ensuing institu-
tional isolation puts a personal face on the problem. Von Clausewitz outlined the
trinity of the government, the military and the people working together to enact
policy. While the breaking of the link between the government and the military
has been discussed, the current state of Army doctrine also threatens to break the
link with the people as well. Despite American tradition and a long history of the
expansible Army, the citizen-soldier is as dead as the Massachusetts Minuteman.4
Granted, the Army Reserve and National Guard have performed yeoman’s work

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throughout history, yet they do not generate the self-concept of the active force.
This development reinforces distance between a professional Army and its guarded
citizenry. The actual strengths of the Army, adjusted as a percentage of the U.S.
population, are closer today to the strength levels of 1938 than any other year in
the past century. A basic grasp of history obviously suggests that this percentage is
rather low, and it is highly likely that of 286 million Americans, most of them will
not know one of 480,000 soldiers. Forced to abandon the expansible Army in the
aftermath of Vietnam and under Cold War pressures, the Army also lost touch with
the U.S. people since the introduction of the all volunteer force, which not coinci-
dentally mirrors the era of operationalization of strategy. This evolution begins to
cast some amount of doubt on Builder’s earlier observation as to the Army’s own
history of being closest to the people, expanding and contracting with the threat.5
It may have taken the all volunteer force instead of conscripts to make the com-
plexities of Airland Battle work; this example, however is one in which the Army
took its raw materials and incorporated them into doctrine, not one in which the
Army fought for a certain doctrine and then sought to shape conscription policy,
essentially the opposite of Kier’s French case.

Positive Connotations
While the negative implications of divorcing doctrine and strategy are serious, there
are at least three positive implications. The first stems from the two doctrinal leaps
in war-fighting effectiveness seen across this entire study. The first leap, the transi-
tion from the arms to combined arms, was driven almost purely by the Germans
and the reaction that their blitzkrieg provoked. This conceptual leap is most readily
explained under a balance of power approach, given that the Germans represented
the most capable state in the system at the time. The second conceptual leap took
place largely without civilian guidance through the intellectual renaissance sparked
by Active Defense and realized in Airland Battle. This instance was an equivalent
jump in war-fighting effectiveness as it transitioned from raw attrition to a more
artful maneuver-based disruption of enemy systems through operational shock.
This leap, however, was internal to the Army, and although spurred by concern with
the Soviets, was also based partially on factors inside the organization as indicated
previously. Perhaps this second increase in war-fighting ability shortened the suffer-
ing of victors and losers alike, though it has also caused considerable consternation
for Allies unable to keep up and enemies who must resort to asymmetric means.
Nevertheless, this doctrinal good, the increase in the core competency, came out
of the Cold War and out of insulation, particularly the method of thinking about
how to design doctrine and then how to fuse it with military education, training
and feedback.
The second positive implication that comes from the operationalization of
strategy lies in the nature of decision making in a liberal democracy. As part of

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  215

a pluralistic system, the Army’s resistance to other than war-fighting missions

becomes part of the consideration when debating use of force for other than secu-
rity-related missions. Although the Army normatively should try to accomplish all
missions that its civilian leadership directs, the fact that it is a slow, conservative
organization can induce some amount of constraint into an administration’s deci-
sion making. It is plausible, from a balance of power perspective, that imperial
policing is most likely to rouse future challengers and also probably not a mission
that the U.S. people would support if they were aware of it. It is also somewhat
evident that while military forces can deploy to various locales to provide immedi-
ate assistance, they are not likely to solve the problems stemming from underly-
ing social, political and economic conditions within borders (Mandelbaum, 1996,
16–32). As such, if the Army’s cultural resistance to expanding the empire at least
causes some consideration during executive decision making, then it is much closer
to serving its historic charter of providing for the common defense of the American
people, as opposed to provoking balancing due to the international signals sent by
military overactivity.
A third positive implication is that under this insulation strategy the Army
retains a very high level of proficiency in its core war-fighting skills. Across the
period studied, had the Army’s doctrine moved perfectly in synch with defense pol-
icy as designed by civilian leaders, then the Army of the 1930s would have given up
the art completely, the Army of the 1950s would have been solely nuclear, and the
Army of the 1990s emasculated as imperial constables. In each case the Army and
its war-fighting skills were needed in the ensuing decade. A complete tailoring to
the dictated defense policy at any one point in time can unforeseeably and severely
limit the options years down the line, another indication of why formulating an
integrated grand strategy, defense policy and doctrine is a particularly difficult task.
Having a quality force with a smaller basic set of fairly fungible war-fighting skills
serves as a stability mechanism to a much greater extent than having a force with
a wide range of responsibilities but no deep expertise. This option is also superior
to one in which a force is tailored to one specific scenario and thus develops a less
fungible set of abilities. In many ways this resembles a strategy of maintaining the
core function, similar to picking an index fund designed to track rather beat the
market. This stability in itself offers some amount of flexibility to decision makers
domestically, as the quality of the fighting forces will be known and relatively con-
stant, not subject to some set of experiments. At the same time, this predictability
sends clearer signals in the international arena such that other states might perceive
less danger than they would from forces that radically change every few years.

Conclusion
Regardless of selected policies, and despite its external and internal struggles, the
Army will continue to serve the American people in its constitutional role. The

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 216  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Army has performed exceptionally well on the battlefield at the operational level;
whether or not a coherent, overarching strategy emerges remains to be seen. Over
time the Army has been required to serve and reconcile multiple sets of two mas-
ters. It had to serve pressures from the international system and from the domestic
politics realm, a face-off between Hobbes and Locke. It had to serve defense policy
and its own quest for excellence through doctrine. Within the organization, it had
to reconcile tendencies towards organizational autonomy with its own culture of
being obedient handymen. Finally, it had to reconcile American tradition that held
the expansible, citizen-soldier Army as the model with the modern need for a ready,
professional standing force. Christ’s parable suggested that no man could serve two
masters without neglecting one for the other. Indeed, the Army was not able to
serve all of these masters equally well, and chose doctrinal insulation as the favored
one. Given the available options, this was perhaps the best choice.

Notes
1. Farrell suggests that published doctrine is not a good measure of what the organiza-
tion is actually doing on the ground. This is a valid point that I will address in the
chapter, but still I would suggest that written doctrine flows from what a signifi-
cant number of units experiment with before doctrine is published. Of course, once
published, doctrine arguably should then be disseminated and followed Army-wide.
Across the cases I study, published doctrine takes on the role of generator of what
units are doing in the ground primarily from the 1976 edition forward, though the
prior editions do capture the ground truth ex post facto.
2. Handel called this phenomenon ‘‘tacticization of strategy’’ from which I developed
‘‘operationalization’’ to describe the U.S. Army’s view of it more accurately.
3. The doctrinal affinity for the offensive in the U.S. Army seems to predate any valid
application of autonomy seeking expected under organization theory. It was pres-
ent when the Army was tiny with no budget and no enemy before World War I.
It was also present during the interwar, the Second World War, the cold war, and
remains today. Aspects of organization theory come and go in the U.S. Army, but the
offensive bias remains. Along cultural lines as well, the bias for the offensive is pres-
ent with or without citizen armies; it was thought that American men possessed the
requisite qualities to attack whether they were draftees or regulars. If anything, the
constant predisposition with the offensive probably indicates a cultural explanation
tied around the construction of military identity, a topic beyond the scope of this
project.
4. The National Guard and the Reserves certainly count as citizen soldiers and perform
many vital support functions in case of call up to active service. This was partly as a
function of the post-Vietnam reforms such that important go-to-war functions were
placed in the reserves, forcing public attention to the war effort immediately. The
notion of entire maneuver divisions of National Guard going into combat after a short
train-up has been largely abandoned though. Still, the Army has managed to incor-
porate the National Guard into some of its less desired missions such as peacekeeping

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 Defense Policy and Doctrinal Insulation  n  217

in the Balkans and on the Sinai peninsula. From all accounts, the National Guard
performed those missions with aplomb.
5. One of the more disturbing features of being separated from the people is found in
the nature of volunteers. Potential volunteers who have a plethora of options in life
are not likely to join a branch of military service, particularly given the generational
impact of the all volunteer force coupled with fewer veterans from the larger wars in
history. In particular this trend leads to a near complete absence of society’s elites in
the Army and other services, given that they can completely opt out of the system,
especially since most of the elite universities in the United States have banned ROTC
from their campuses. The Army, as a service, loses potentially bright candidates and
simple recognition in the elite sector, perhaps leading to further civil–military gaps in
the future as elites rise to positions of prominence. The Army’s war-fighting excellence
is not hampered by the absence of elites, but its long-term health may be.

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United States War Department. 1923. Field Service Regulations. Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office.
United States War Department. 1939. FM 100-5 Tentative Field Service Regulations: Opera-
tions. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
United States War Department. 1941. Field Service Regulations: Operations, FM 100-5.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
United States War Department. 1944. Field Service Regulations: Operations, FM 100-5.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Van Evera, S. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Von Clausewitz, C. 1976. On War, edited by M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Zisk, K.M. 1993. Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation,
1955–1991. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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 Chapter 11

Military and
Homeland Security

Risa A. Brooks

Introduction
Since September 11, 2001 the United States has undertaken a variety of military
actions, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the stated goal of anticipating and
preventing future terrorist threats against Americans. Although the rationale
offered for these military actions is largely new, in other respects, these wars and
interventions represent familiar territory for Americans. The tradition of using the
military abroad to protect U.S. security is, after all, what the armed forces have
been trained and equipped for. Historically, the military has been a tool to protect
Americans from threats emanating from outside their borders.
In the post-September 11 era, however, U.S. politicians are increasingly employ-
ing and contemplating a new role for the military: as a participant in safeguard-
ing U.S. domestic security—a force that not only secures Americans from threats
originating from abroad, but protects us from each other and would-be terrorists
here at home. For many, the imperatives of homeland security make expanding the
military’s role in countering terrorism an appealing option. Yet Americans should
carefully consider the implications before supporting such initiatives. Expanding
the U.S. military’s role in homeland security could, over time, alter the purpose
and culture of the military establishment and its relationship to American society

 Reprinted from Public Administration and Management 10, no. 2 (2005). With permission.

221

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in ways that undermine the legal and social fabric of civil–military relations in this
country.
Although little noticed by the public at large, some important changes have,
in fact, already occurred in the military’s roles in homeland security. Members of
the Air National Guard have flown over 42,000 air patrol missions over U.S. cities
since September 11. Army National Guard Units have been guarding major infra-
structure sites, including dams, bridges and power plants. Since 9-11 the Guard has
also provided 1,100 troops to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service at
the country’s borders. In fact, as of July 2003, over 28,000 active duty, Reserve and
Guard troops were involved in homeland security.1 These activities have led to talk
of relocating the National Guard in the Department of Homeland Security, with
some prominent politicians and think tanks, conservative and liberal, advocating
assigning homeland security to the National Guard as a primary mission.2
In addition to the Guard’s activities, the Department of Defense (DoD) has
undertaken a major reorganization, creating a new unified combatant command,
Northern Command (NORCOM), which is charged with protecting the security
of the territorial United States (an innovation DoD managed to avoid through-
out the Cold War). Justice and Defense Department lawyers have been review-
ing legislation that limits the military’s role in domestic law enforcement-related
activities, while the Department of Homeland Security is reviewing how best to
employ for the military in supporting its domestic security mandate. Although
prior initiatives, such as ‘‘Total Information Awareness,’’ which would have allowed
the Pentagon to monitor financial and other data on civilians, have been defeated,
new efforts to enhance those prerogatives are under consideration. Recently, for
example, Congress has proposed granting the Pentagon the prerogative to demand
direct access to individuals’ personal and financial records in order to monitor the
activities of civilians residing in the United States.3 In sum, in a variety of ways the
United States has begun slowly to enhance the domestic security roles of the U.S.
military.
As striking as these changes have been, they represent the proverbial tip of the
iceberg in terms of altering the military’s role in homeland security. Public officials
continue to warn that the United States remains at risk of serious terrorist attacks
on its own soil. These risks may in fact grow as the U.S. military expands its train-
ing activities and other operations overseas, maintains a presence in Iraq in com-
ing years, and as al-Qaeda continues to regroup, expands its mobilization activity
and replaces leaders that the U.S. apprehends.4 Skeptics continue to voice concerns
about whether civilian agencies can handle the nature of the threats facing Ameri-
can citizens in an era of growing terrorist activity.5 And if civilian agencies do prove
incapable, political leaders and analysts may be inclined increasingly to call on the
United States’ most well-trained, professional organization to assist in rooting out
these threats: the military establishment.
Alarmingly, these potential and manifest changes in the military’s role in
antiterror activities are occurring in a relative vacuum of public debate about the

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 Military and Homeland Security  n  223

appropriate role of the armed forces in homeland security. These issues are too
important to leave to lawyers, or even to the president and Congress to decide.
Americans must decide for themselves what, if any, role the country’s armed forces
should play in protecting their cities and neighborhoods from terrorist threats.
There are some good reasons to consider creating a substantial role for the armed
forces in homeland security. Without question, our powerful military is a major
resource that could be marshaled in support of the war on terror here in the United
States. But the arguments against allowing it such a role are stronger. Although the
National Guard has helped ensure stability during episodic crises in this country’s
history, granting the military a major, on-going domestic role in ensuring internal
security is not part of American civil–military tradition. It also conflicts with the
fundamental philosophical traditions upon which our society rests, which privilege
a free and open society reflexively opposed to militarist values. More concretely,
policing citizens and fighting wars are largely incompatible tasks. They require dif-
ferent mindsets, training and involve a different sensibility toward the use of force.
For these and other reasons Americans should resist the impulse to institutionalize
a major military role in homeland security.

The Scenario
Assume, for a moment, that officials obtain reliable intelligence that the coun-
try could face a September 11-scale attack within the next year. A mobile, highly
compartmentalized and skilled terrorist cell is suspected of planning operations in
several major metropolitan areas. To confront the threat, public officials develop
a plan to expand security and intelligence operations within the country’s major
cities. They seek to establish a surveillance regime, employing sophisticated and
expensive equipment, to monitor civilian groups who live within select urban areas
and are suspected of having ties to the network. Offices within each city will over-
see the search, apprehension and interrogation of suspects. These activities are to be
coordinated by integrated command and control centers.
The considerable demands of implementing the plan overwhelm state and fed-
eral civilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They lack essential resources,
infrastructure and experience. Under the strain, they look to Washington to supply
military resources to staff, equip and coordinate the operation. Washington would
likely be tempted to commit them. Protecting the lives of U.S. citizens would weigh
heavily on the president and his advisors. Given the stakes involved, they could call
on the Pentagon to act—perhaps at first to run the command centers, and later
to actually participate in the monitoring and apprehension of suspected civilian
suspects.
Of all the changes wrought by September 11, using the military in this way
would represent the largest and most significant departure from our political and
legal traditions. Historically the U.S. military has not played a central role in

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domestic security. Rather, the military and civilian establishments have tradition-
ally conformed to a division of labor in protecting the country from domestic and
international threats. The military protects the country’s borders and sovereignty
from external challengers. Civilian entities, such as the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, other federal agencies, and state and local officials enforce our laws and
protect us at home.
Beyond this practical division of labor, our current laws prevent the military
from playing an active role in law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of
1878 prohibits such a role. The PCA was passed during the Reconstruction-era
South when the military was being used to enforce federal law. Disturbed by the
politicization of the military, Congress prohibited the use of the army and navy (it
applies to the marines and air force by DoD regulation) as a posse comitatus, which
literally means ‘‘force of the county,’’ in order to enforce laws. As it now stands,
with the exception of the National Guard when under state control, military per-
sonnel cannot participate in activities associated with searching citizens, seizing
their property for evidence or arresting them. In practical terms, this means that
the military cannot now legally participate in criminal-style investigations of civil-
ians residing in the United States in order to enforce federal laws.
Expanding the military’s place in homeland security to more actively moni-
tor, investigate and pursue suspected terrorists would require relaxing these limits
on the military’s law enforcement-related activities, and altering the longstanding
division of labor between the military and civilian establishments. In short, under-
taking these activities would represent an unprecedented change in the role of the
military in the United States.

Reasons for Change

There are some good reasons to consider making such changes. First, and perhaps
most importantly, the U.S. military is an extremely effective organization. It is the
largest and best-funded public institution in the United States. It is composed of
highly competent officers and enlisted personnel—an untapped pool of resources
available for protecting U.S. citizens against terrorism. The Department of Defense
also already has sophisticated satellite and other reconnaissance capabilities, as well
as specialized surveillance equipment, not broadly available to civilian agencies.
The military is used to contingency planning and the speedy deployment of forces.
It is expert at establishing control of an area quickly and monitoring movements of
people and equipment.
In addition, some may argue that there is already a precedent for expanding
the military’s role in law enforcement activities. As noted above, the military, and
the National Guard in particular, has long played an important role in quelling
civil disturbances and suppressing domestic insurrections during episodic crises.
Recently, for example, Federalized Guard troops and U.S. marine units helped

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 Military and Homeland Security  n  225

restore order in Los Angeles in the aftermath of the 1992 Rodney King verdict.
Since the early 1980s the military has also played a role in counter-drug opera-
tions. Military personnel assigned these responsibilities are tasked with patrolling
borders, and providing intelligence and other support to civilian law enforcement
officials. Moreover, the U.S. military plays a role in humanitarian operations,
especially in the aftermath of national disasters. In the 1990s Congress assigned
the U.S. military a role in training and coordinating a response to a chemical,
biological or nuclear attack within the United States. Today the National Guard
maintains twenty-seven civil support teams whose main responsibilities involve
supporting civilian emergency operations and clean-up in the event of a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) attack.
Finally, although the PCA prohibits the active duty military and reserves from
participating in civilian law enforcement, it does not apply to the National Guard
when under state control, or to the Coast Guard. Hence these services now could
be assigned substantial roles in intelligence, gathering evidence and even in the
interrogation and detainment of civilians without legal restrictions. In addition, the
courts and Congress already allow all the armed forces to provide passive support
to civilian authorities. Only active participation is illegal (e.g., search, seizure and
arrest).6 The military can share equipment and facilities, train civilian personnel in
the use of the equipment, and provide technical assistance and operate surveillance
and communications equipment on their behalf.
In short, since part of the military is already exempt from the PCA, and support
activities are permissible for all the armed forces, amending the law to allow the
regular, active duty forces, the Reserves or the Federalized National Guard to par-
ticipate in law enforcement-related activities may seem a logical next step. In short,
advocates of change may argue that there already is a legal and practical basis for a
military role in law enforcement to combat terrorism on U.S. soil. Much is already
allowed and acceptable.

Turning Soldiers into Policemen

Institutionalizing a major role for the military in domestic counterterrorism activi-
ties may seem a short departure from the status quo. In reality it is a major, and
potentially risky, step. There are three main reasons to be wary of taking it.
First, it would be bad for our military. The U.S. military has already assumed
new responsibilities in the post-September 11 era. To start, Special Forces continue
to patrol Afghanistan, in search of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The military has
also accepted a series of new training missions for foreign militaries to bolster their
capacity to fight terrorism. On top of this, tens of thousands of military personnel
are now deployed in Iraq and will stay for an unknown duration. Iraq aside, the
U.S. military must remain prepared for a potential conflict in Asia. A range of

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incendiary situations—from North Korea to Taiwan—make that a top priority for

the foreseeable future.
Expanding the military’s role in homeland security may harm readiness to per-
form these external missions. It would absorb critical personnel and equipment.
The U.S. military already experienced shortages in equipment, such as unmanned
surveillance aircraft in Afghanistan. Strains on personnel are also serious consid-
erations. As noted above, the National Guard, since September 11, has played a
significant role in providing security to civilian infrastructure and major sites in the
United States. Yet, it is critical to remember that the Guard also maintains a criti-
cal external role. The Guard provides 98 percent of the staff for civil affairs units
involved in stability operations overseas. The personnel requirements of maintain-
ing stability in post-war Iraq alone will demand considerable Guard resources for
years to come. The active duty force is similarly constrained. From January to the
end of July 2003, of the Army’s thirty-three active duty brigades, twenty-four were
deployed overseas, or approximately 73 percent. While deployments may decline
moderately in the future as some forces are withdrawn from Iraq, in July 2003 48
percent of the active duty military was deployed overseas (with 167,000 in Iraq
alone) as was 30 percent of the Army Reserve force and 21 percent of the Guard.7 In
addition to current deployments, the reserves and active duty force—the country’s
mainline combat forces—may be assigned other combat-related tasks in coming
years, and must remain prepared if politicians require them to act. For these rea-
sons, requiring the Guard, Reserves or active duty forces to commit their personnel
and equipment permanently to homeland security could overstress our resources
in these areas.
Beyond straining resources, expanding the military’s active participation in
domestic counterterrorism would distract the Department of Defense from its
other external responsibilities. The Pentagon has already developed new layers
of bureaucracy to liaison with various civilian agencies and the Department of
Homeland Security. An even greater role in law enforcement-style activities would
demand even more investment in bureaucratic structures to interface with poten-
tially dozens of federal bureaucracies and local and state entities. Everything from
chains of command, doctrine and training, to rules of engagement and conduct for
military personnel would have to be designed, established and monitored. Civilian
entities already have the basic infrastructure and know-how for enforcing laws. The
military would have to develop these structures and skills.
The problem will run even deeper than modifying bureaucracies. Military and
police work require fundamentally different mindsets. These skills are not easily
interchangeable. Police are trained to deescalate situations. They draw their weap-
ons as last resort. They administer Miranda rights and operate under a strict man-
date to safeguard citizen rights and liberties. Military personnel are trained to be
decisive and liberal with the use of force. They are trained to act reflexively in a
combat situation. They have specialized doctrine and language which helps them

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 Military and Homeland Security  n  227

communicate to their units, and not necessarily with outsiders. They are not trained
in basic citizen protections.8
The culture clash is illustrated by a potentially devastating incident during the
1992 Los Angeles riots when federal troops were brought in to help restore order in
the aftermath of the Rodney King verdict. One night during the riots, officers from
the Los Angeles Police Department, accompanied by U.S. Marines, were asked to
respond to a domestic dispute. When they arrived at the doorstep of the house,
shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the police officers.
One reportedly yelled “cover me” to the Marines. With that command, the police
officer was directing the Marines to point their weapons and be prepared to shoot
if necessary. The Marines, however, responded as they had been trained to react to
that phrase: over two hundred bullets were fired into the house. No one was hurt in
the incident, but the couple’s children were in the house at the time.9
The current occupation of Iraq also highlights some of these dilemmas. The
particular mix of an unstable security environment and need for political and eco-
nomic reconstruction has required soldiers deployed in Iraq to reconcile the train-
ing, tactics and mindset essential to countering guerilla-style operations with the
skills necessary for dealing effectively with civilian populations, at times with con-
siderable difficulty. Although arguably less acute than would be the dilemma of the
U.S. military policing civilians within the country’s borders, the problems in Iraq
highlight the conflict between police work and combat operations. For example,
reports of soldiers searching homes and treating Iraqi civilians disrespectfully in an
effort to apprehend criminals and opposition forces speak directly to the differences
in the mindsets involved in combat operations and stability operations.10
Some might argue that these problems are less acute for the National Guard,
and therefore while keeping the active duty force out of internal security is impor-
tant, the obstacles are less for the Guard. As citizen soldiers, many members of the
Guard work in civilian jobs and serve in locally based units that have strong roots
in their communities; as a result, organizationally and culturally the Guard is prob-
ably best prepared to interface with civilians and their institutions in the United
States and therefore to play a role in internal security. Yet, the Guard too must
maintain readiness to operate in a conventional military environment to fulfill its
present mandate—its members may be best prepared to bridge the gap between
the skills essential to stability operations and combat operations, but that does not
mean it is easy to do so. To train and equip the National Guard to participate more
actively in antiterrorism activities here in the United States—especially in those
activities that could potentially fuse with criminal-style investigations involving
the monitoring and apprehension of civilians—would require an important shift in
doctrine, training and military education in order to establish civil protections and
restraint in the use of force. Such efforts to prepare the Guard as an institution and
its members to play an enhanced role in internal security would potentially entail
changes in the current mandate of the Guard and a shift away from its combat
roles. However, politicians do not seem inclined to take on such ambitious and

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politically sensitive initiatives. Rather, in the current climate momentum is push-

ing in the opposite direction; rather than making the Guard a less combat-oriented
force, the Department of Defense is advocating a rebalancing of responsibilities
between the Guard, reserves and active duty force, which would result in a greater
emphasis on combat operations within the Guard and reserves.11
In summary, there are important differences between the resources, skills and
instincts required for war fighting and policing. Assigning military personnel roles
related to law enforcement would require major changes in culture and training,
as well as strain resources. And such changes would certainly compromise the mil-
itary’s capacity to perform its primary responsibility: protecting the United States
from external threats and challengers. In sum, turning soldiers into policemen is a
bad idea.

Politicizing the Military

Involving the military more extensively in homeland security would also be bad
for civil–military relations. The U.S. system is premised on having a military that
keeps its distance from politics and focuses on its professional responsibilities.
Although, as Eliot Cohen reminds us, military activity is inevitably political, for
the most part U.S. military personnel are socialized to keep their noses out of active
political debate (Cohen, 2002). Rather, politics is a civilian endeavor. The Consti-
tution helps perpetuate this convention. Civilian control of the military is assured
through the designation of the president as commander in chief. The Constitution
also vests Congress with the right to manage the military (including deciding its
organization and approving its budget). All of this is reinforced by the conven-
tions of civilian supremacy central to U.S. military culture. Civilians are ultimately
accountable and responsible for military and security policy.
Involving the military in homeland security could erode the practical base—if
not the formal legal pillars—of this architecture of civilian control. Samuel Hun-
tington himself, the United States’ most prominent theorist of civil–military rela-
tions, warned of the dangers of involving militaries in internal security. He worried
that it would enmesh these organizations in domestic politics, invite their politici-
zation and harm their effectiveness in war (Huntington, 1957).
In fact, scholars working on the politics of lesser developed countries have long
documented the dangers of actively engaging the military in states’ internal secu-
rity.12 Important lessons can be learned from these scholars’ observations—lessons
that are relevant not only for the present and transforming autocracies that are com-
monly studied, but for consolidated democracies as well. Among them is the risk
that involving the military in internal security could undermine civilian compe-
tence in such activities, by slowing the development of civilian agencies whose train-
ing, mission and function is better tailored to the delicate nature of investigating
citizens and protecting their institutions and environments. Louis Goodman, for

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example, warns against engaging military authorities in activities that ‘‘shut out’’
civilian actors and prevent them from ‘‘developing the critical skills and expanding
their activities’’ (Goodman, 1996, 39; also see Desch, 1996, 14).
Equally important are the effects on the politicization of the officer corps and
military service organizations of growing involvement in domestic security. Once
again, Goodman suggests decision makers think carefully about expanding activi-
ties of this nature. He warns that they could result in the ‘‘armed forces gain[ing]
added privilege and becom[ing] a special-interest group promoting their own
institutional interests at the expense of private and public entities’’ (Goodman,
1996, 39). Specifically, the risk is that in the process of institutionalizing a role in
domestic security, military leaders and their organizations become vested in inter-
nal debates about the allocation of resources and methods in countering terrorist
activity in the United States—they develop their own institutional interests in how
domestic security is managed and funded. This would also likely enhance pres-
sures to become participants in partisan debates about these issues, as politicians
court military support in trying to sell alternative conceptions of how homeland
security resources are structured and allocated (a phenomenon, for example, that
is increasingly observed in the area of foreign and external security, as politicians
have sought and received endorsements about their credentials and platforms from
retired military personnel in recent elections) (for details see Brooks, 2002).
One of the underlying normative principles upon which U.S. civil–military
relations rests is that officers are professionalized—a term that is, in part, conven-
tionally understood to mean that officers withhold public participation in politics
and do not align with particular parties or interest groups; explicit partisanship and
politicking stop at the barracks doors. This value has already been tested in service
branches’ organizational battles over the defense budget and procurement (Scroggs,
2000), and even in foreign policy,13 but for the most part military leaders and their
organizations in the contemporary United States do not participate in debates and
lobbying on domestic policy. This could be tested, however, if the military services
or their subcomponents become organizationally committed to a mission of inter-
nal security. In sum, one of the consequences of expanding the military’s organiza-
tional roles in internal security is that it subverts this normative ethos and alters the
existing basis of professional conduct for U.S. military personnel.
Of course, to some, this may seem far-fetched for the U.S. military. But the
reality of U.S. civil–military relations in the twenty-first century suggests it is pos-
sible. There are indications that the U.S. military is already increasingly politi-
cized.14 Its officers are more partisan than they were thirty years ago. Most now
profess allegiance to a political party (primarily the Republican Party) while in the
early 1970s a majority preferred to be identified as independents. Today officers are
better educated than civilians with similar levels of professional achievement. Their
services run elaborate and sophisticated lobbying campaigns on Capitol Hill. At
the same time, nearly two-thirds of the country’s military officers surveyed in the
1990s said they believed politicians were either somewhat ignorant or very ignorant

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about military activity. Large numbers of those officers replied that they should
insist (not just advise or advocate) when it comes to civilian policy decisions related
to the conditions under which force is used. This may embolden them to speak
out on domestic security issues, especially if their organizations and personnel are
directly involved. And U.S. citizens may be prone to listen. The military enjoys
more esteem than any other public or private institution in the country, including
religious institutions.15
To be clear, the danger of politicization is not that its leaders will engage in
an overt intervention in politics (such as through a coup d’ etat). The risk is more
subtle, if equally worrisome. Military leaders may be drawn into domestic political
debate, and be forced or compelled to adopt positions on sensitive issues essential to
domestic security. The commander of NORCOM alone, for example, could become
a prominent voice on domestic security. Concerned that an administration is mis-
managing domestic security, and in his capacity as chief of the unified combatant
command for the continental United States, it would not be difficult to imagine
that he could give statements that question or challenge an administration’s policy.
A president with strong credentials might be able to counter effectively these state-
ments. But not all presidents will have that luck. It is one thing for the military to
advise civilians behind closed doors. Much more worrisome is a military leadership
that publicly advances its own agenda on domestic security. Such actions threaten
to undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of civilian supremacy.
Moreover, even if military leaders do not deliberately seek out opportunities to
speak out, they could easily get drawn into debate inadvertently. Had the marines
shot someone during the Los Angeles riots or were they to in some future antiter-
rorist operation they would inevitably become embroiled in social controversy. His-
tory shows that institutions’ reputations emerge bruised and bloodied from such
episodes. This would be bad for the U.S. military, and for the society that it pro-
tects. Moreover, in such an event, the military brass may find it has no choice but
to speak out in defense of its own, inviting its politicization. For all these reasons,
extreme caution is in order before we enhance the military’s domestic roles.

Compromising Values
Last, involving the military in homeland security would be bad for society. This
country was born with a basic apprehension about a domestically powerful mili-
tary. The founders were convinced a powerful military establishment ran counter
to the principles of democracy and liberty enshrined in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. In fact, it was not until the Constitution was written that the exigencies of
protecting the young republic prevailed over the reflexive fear of a standing army,
and a federal force was established. Involving the military in homeland security
would run counter to our tradition of maintaining a military carefully divorced
from civilian society.

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 Military and Homeland Security  n  231

Of course, tradition may be a luxury we can no longer afford. The reality is that
the country is facing a threat to the well-being of its citizens of a kind unforeseen
in the past two hundred years. The nature of the adversary—a nonstate actor that
operates within the boundaries of the country’s borders and targets its citizens inter-
nationally—differs from the traditional, state-based adversaries the United States
has faced throughout much of its history. Although some dimension of confronting
terrorist activity arguably involves conventional military operations and other com-
bat-related activity, the nature of terrorist movements also entails the redirection of
existing resources and capabilities—both civilian and military resources. In short,
from this perspective, confronting global, ideological terrorism may demand new
ways of thinking about the uses and functions of the U.S. military (as well as the
country’s other public institutions and ways of life). It may require a revisitation of
the country’s historical, philosophical and legal traditions: maintaining tradition
may be an indulgence U.S. citizens can no longer afford.
The problem with this argument is that the traditions at stake are not mere
luxuries. Thinking critically about both the benefits and costs of reorienting secu-
rity structures and redefining the activities of public institutions is essential. Yet
transforming the role of the U.S. military in internal security represents more than
a natural evolution of values and practices to suit the contemporary era. Rather,
doing so would challenge some premises of core societal and cultural values. Ameri-
cans live in a society based on the philosophy of Liberalism (that is Liberalism
in the philosophical sense, not in the sense of contemporary politics). They value
individual rights, and set up institutions to facilitate commerce. They retain a basic
mistrust of an imposing state that might hinder individual rights. They are funda-
mentally antimilitarist.
A large domestic security role for the military goes against this cultural grain.
Cultural change happens slowly and usually with little notice. We have already
begun to alter some of our traditions by relaxing protections on rights of privacy
and other civil liberties with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, related legisla-
tion and regulation that grants civilian entities greater prerogatives to monitor the
activities of the U.S. population.16 Although these actions are controversial, they
are mild compared with the cultural implications of allowing the military a vis-
ible, institutionalized role in monitoring and policing our schools, work places,
churches and communities. Such activities smack of the role of militaries in auto-
cratic regimes and in pseudo democracies—regimes and societies the United States
has traditionally reviled for failing to divorce their militaries from civilian society.
In short, by acquiescing in an expansion of the military’s role in domestic society,
we may inadvertently promote distortions in the basic principles of civil liberty,
individual rights and freedom upon which our society rests.

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What Is To Be Done?
Certainly there is room for a sensible compromise. Some role for the military in
homeland security is arguably appropriate and desirable. But a number of actions
must be taken in order to define that role.
First, we need clarification of Posse Comitatus based on a comprehensive assess-
ment of the principles of civil–military relations in United States. Traditionally,
Congress has offered ad hoc amendments to the PCA. They did so in the early
1980s to facilitate the military’s expanded role in drug interdiction, and more
recently with a series of legislative initiatives in the 1990s (Taylor, 1998). But ad
hoc amendments are no substitute for a coherent concept of how to use the military
domestically. We need a clear, principled view on which to base law and regula-
tion. Specifically, we should clearly delineate what activities are permissible and
appropriate in supporting homeland security. Any new legislation should provide
comprehensive guidelines for how and when the military should and can partici-
pate in protecting the U.S. population against terrorist activity. This would create a
legislative fire wall against the slow erosion of limits on the military’s role in home-
land security. Note, moreover, that such a clarification would be helpful not only
to civilian authorities, but to military officials who must now try and interpret the
act’s and related legislation’s relevance on a case-by-case basis. Military authorities,
as well as their civilian counterparts, would have a clearer understanding of what
was and was not allowable.
Second, these newly clarified principles should be based on the premise that the
active duty military and reserves are, in all cases, tools of last resort. We should not
institutionalize any regular roles for these forces in homeland security, which are the
country’s mainline combat forces. Instead, we should plan to use them primarily
when no one else can do the job, as an emergency force, not a daily protector—in,
for example, the event of a catastrophic WMD attack (a role Congress has already
provided for in legislation in the 1990s). Regardless of the circumstance, when
these forces’ personnel are called upon to act, it must be done with clear plans for
integrating their units and entities into a civilian-led command structure. Research
is essential on doctrine for how best military agencies can assist and support civilian
law enforcement agencies in emergencies, and on the dangers and pitfalls of such
activities. Clear lines of authority and spheres of responsibility must be delineated
and maintained. Otherwise, during crises military authority and activity will tend
to fuse or coexist awkwardly with civilian law enforcement functions.
Third, although some roles for the National Guard in homeland security may
be appropriate, these should be sharply limited. It may be appropriate, for example,
to maintain Guard participation in civilian infrastructure protection and in air
patrols over urban areas, as long as these activities remain distinct from any law
enforcement-related roles. Of the country’s armed forces, the Guard is arguably
best equipped for tasks that require interface with civilian populations and com-
munities. It is under the peacetime command and answers to state officials (state

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 Military and Homeland Security  n  233

governors). Members of the Guard often have ties to local communities and may
even work for civilian law enforcement and emergency services. Hence, using the
Guard as a supplemental protection force at dams, nuclear facilities and the like
may make sense. However, prohibitions against directly involving it in surveillance
or law enforcement-related activities should be maintained. The Guard is still the
military, and its members are not trained in civilian protections and civil liberties.
And, as noted above, National Guard units play a central, external role in stabil-
ity operations abroad. In particular, they will likely play a pivotal role in Iraq for
the foreseeable future. In short, the Guard, like the active duty force and reserves,
should never act as a supplementary law enforcement entity, in charge of monitor-
ing or investigating civilians.
Fourth, we must invest in civilian law enforcement itself. It is meaningless to
intend to use the military as a tool of last resort, if we have not actually prepared
civilian entities to handle all but the worst jobs. This means anticipating the types
of terrorism crises the United States may face, and providing the necessary resources
and infrastructure far ahead of time. Specifically, we should continue to explore
reform of our processes and structures for immigration and border control; this
includes examining the Coast Guard’s functions in these areas and clarifying its
appropriate roles in safeguarding our territorial waters and ports (important work
that has begun, but must continue). We also need to better fund and administer
not just the FBI, but organizations such as the Department of the Interior’s police
forces.17 Public pressure on civilian intelligence agencies must be maintained, so
they operate by the highest standards. High-technology equipment useful for sur-
veillance and other activities, now only in the hands of military services, should be
supplied to civilian agencies with clear prescriptions about how and when it can be
used. Innovative training programs for this equipment also must be institutional-
ized, so that civilian officials will not always have to call upon the military to fly
airplanes and operate computers.
Last, and most importantly, we should establish a better dialogue about civil–
military relations in the United States. The military is more important to U.S. citi-
zens than ever before. The military, politicians and the society that the former serves
need to be in constant conversation about how and when to use the military in the
war on terrorism. Civilians have a duty to educate themselves about the issues. And
our politicians and military professionals have a responsibility to consider carefully
the short- and long-term ramifications before altering our traditions.

Notes
1. Eric Rosenberg, ‘‘Global Crises Push Army to the Limit,’’ The State, July 27, 2003.

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2. See Bill Miller, ‘‘National Guard Awaits Niche in Homeland Security Plan: White
House’s Caution Chafes against those Urging Action,’’ The Washington Post, August
11, 2002. Also, the Hart–Rudman report (authored before September 11), ‘‘Road
Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,’’ U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century, January 31, 2001, 10. Joseph Lieberman, a potential presiden-
tial candidate, has, for example, on multiple occasions advocated creating a host of
new National Guard units trained and assigned exclusively domestic roles (Sydney
Freedberg, Jr. ‘‘Changing of the Guard,’’ The National Journal, August 20, 2002).
3. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, ‘‘Broad Domestic Role Asked for CIA and the Pen-
tagon,’’ The New York Times, May 2, 2003.
4. For example, the Iraq war has apparently fueled the mobilization effort (Don Van
Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler, ‘‘Anger on Iraq Seen as New Qaeda Recruiting Tool,’’
The New York Times, March 16, 2003).
5. See, for example, the report by the Council on Foreign Relations independent task
force, chaired by Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, America—Still Unprepared,
Still in Danger (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).
6. As long as the military refrains from active support (search and seizure), courts have
declared it in compliance with the PCA. Legislation passed in the 1980s and 1990s
codifies the military’s passive support rules. For a review of these changes, see Steven
L. Miller, The Military, Domestic Law Enforcement, and Posse Comitatus: A Time for
Change (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, Air Univer-
sity, , April 2000), 5–9.
7. Eric Rosenberg, ‘‘Global Crises Push Army to the Limit,’’ The State, July 27, 2003. In
November 2003, twenty brigades from the active duty component were deployed. See
www.Globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments. tm (accessed November 1,
2003).
8. For discussion of this point, and other concerns about military readiness see Mathew
Hammond, ‘‘The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,’’ Washington
University Law Quarterly 75, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 953–984.
9. James D. Delk, Fires and Furies: the LA Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications,
1995), 221–222. Cited in Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ‘‘Lessons in Command and
Control from the Los Angeles Riots,’’ Parameters (summer 1997), 88–109.
10. On some of these challenges, see Sarah Kershaw, “The Struggle for Iraq,’’ The New
York Times, September 15, 2003.
11. In an effort to lessen the need for lengthy and frequent mobilization of reserves for
duty in Iraq, the Pentagon is seeking to move more conventional combat-oriented
tasks into the Guard and shift some responsibilities largely located in the Guard
(e.g., civil affairs) to the active duty force. See Thom Shanker, ‘‘Pentagon Grapples
with Troop Shortage,’’ The International Herald Tribune, July 21, 2003; Bryan Mitch-
ell, ‘‘Weekend Warriors in No One’s Shadow,’’ Knoxville News Sentinel, October 12,
2003.

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 Military and Homeland Security  n  235

12. There is enormous literature on militaries’ roles in internal politics in these coun-
tries and their implications for democratization, society and the organizations them-
selves. For a sample, see Alfred Stepan, Re-Thinking Military Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1988); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain
Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
13. See for example, debates about Colin Powell’s influence over decisions to intervene
in Bosnia in the early 1990s. See the overview in Don Snider and Miranda Carlton-
Carew, eds., U.S. Civil–military Relations: in Crisis or Transition (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995).
14. For the figures cited below, and further evidence of these trends, see the compre-
hensive and detailed studies by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS)
compiled in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–
military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
15. Gallup surveys show that Americans consistently rate the military on surveys, which
measure confidence in public and private institutions; see http://www.gallup.com/
poll/specialReports/pollSummaries/aoa_index.asp. Also see figures cited in Paul
Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, ‘‘Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes
about Civil Military Relations,’’ in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Soldiers
and Civilians: The Civil–military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2001), 134.
16. Among them, the USA PATRIOT Act relaxes restrictions on CIA capacity to engage
in domestic surveillance and grants police agencies greater prerogatives in telephone
and Internet surveillance. The Justice Department has also enhanced the powers of
the FBI to track individuals suspected of potential terrorist activities without prior
evidence of affiliation with terrorist groups. For more discussion of the civilian angle
of homeland security and the debate about ‘‘security versus liberty,’’ see Thomas F.
Powers, ‘‘Can We Be Secure and Free?’’ The Public Interest (Spring 2003, 3–25).
17. For a discussion of the Interior Department’s problems, in particular, see Joel Brin-
kley, ‘‘Interior Department Struggles to Upgrade its Police Forces,’’ The New York
Times, November 3, 2002.

References
Brooks, R.A. 2002. Political strategies of the military in democracies. Paper presented at
the annual meetings of International Studies Association. New Orleans, LA, March
23–27.
Cohen, E. 2002. Supreme Command. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Desch, M. 1996. Threat environments and military missions. In Civil–military Relations
and Democracy, ed. L. Diamond and M. Plattner. Baltimore:, MD Johns Hopkins
University Press, 12–29.

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 236  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Goodman, L.W. 1996. Military roles past and present. In Civil–military Relations and
Democracy, ed. L. Diamond and M. Plattner. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 30–46.
Huntington, S. 1957. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scroggs, S. 2000. Army Relations with Congress. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Taylor, S. 1998. Analysis of the Military Role in America’s Domestic Counterdrug Effort. Car-
lisle Barracks, PA: Army War College.

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 Chapter 12

Civil–Military Relations
Theory and Military
Effectiveness

Suzanne C. Nielsen

Introduction
The state of civil–military relations in the United States resurfaced as a notable focus
of concern in the 1990s. In the early years of the decade, many saw a potential crisis
brewing in civilian control (see Kohn, 1994; Weigley, 1993; and Bacevich, 1998).
Some observers attributed this to the fact that President Bill Clinton’s administra-
tion, which suffered from a lack of credibility in military affairs, came into office
at the same time that the Joint Chiefs had a popular and activist chairman in the
person of General Colin Powell (Cohen, 1995). Another factor that some saw at
work was the new authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Luttwak, 1994). However, consensus about the
scale of the problem was never reached, with some arguing that claims of a crisis
were exaggerated (see Kohn, 1994, 29; Avant, 1998; and Burk, 1998). Even during
the Clinton administration, at least one observer saw the balance being restored
during the tenures of successive chairmen of the Joint Staff (see Goldstein, 2000).
Alongside the popular debate described above, there have been new and more
explicitly theoretical attempts to examine post-Cold War civil–military relations in

 Reprinted from Public Administration and Management 10, no. 2 (2005). With permission.

237

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the United States. In fact, Peter Feaver characterizes the renewed attention to this
problem in the 1990s as an ‘‘American Renaissance’’ (Feaver, 1999, 230–233). At
least three approaches, those by Michael Desch, Deborah Avant, and Peter Feaver,
are particularly valuable in that their theoretical perspectives are (or could be)
applied to civil–military relationships in comparative perspective as well as to the
American case. In Civilian Control of the Military (1999), Desch formulates a struc-
tural theory of civil–military relations that makes predictions about the strength
of civilian control based on the degree of internal and external threat faced by a
given society (Desch, 1999). Taking a different approach, Deborah Avant and Peter
Feaver have applied adaptations of the principal-agent framework to explain the
state of civilian control and military responsiveness in the United States (see Avant,
1996/1997; and Feaver, 2003). Although these analyses differ in their focus and in
their findings, they have in common an emphasis on civilian control as the central
concern.
This focus on civilian control has two noteworthy aspects. First, it is a bit sur-
prising given that those writing about civil–military relations in the United States
generally are not concerned about overt disobedience of orders—let alone a mili-
tary coup. For example, in the book cited above, Desch points out that even in
what he sees as the post-Cold War environment of lessening civilian control, ‘‘there
is little danger that the U.S. military will launch a coup d’état and seize power.
Nor is it likely to become openly insubordinate and disobey direct orders’’ (1999,
30). The same basic presumptions underlie the work of Avant and Feaver. In fact,
Feaver’s use of the principal-agent framework implicitly assumes ‘‘that the military
conceives of itself as a servant of the government.’’ He goes on to point out that,
‘‘The model works best in democracies which, by definition, identify the govern-
ment as the rightful principal with the authority to delegate (and not to delegate)
responsibility’’ (1998, 421). This presumption of lack of direct military insubordi-
nation does not make the question of quality of civilian control in the United States
unimportant or uninteresting. However, because extreme problems of loss of con-
trol are ruled out it does leave room for analyzing other aspects of the civil–military
relationship. This leads to the second noteworthy aspect of the focus on civilian
control, which is that this concern has tended to overshadow the exploration of
other important outcomes.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues associated with examin-
ing one of the other potentially significant ramifications of civil–military relation-
ships, their impact on military effectiveness. My underlying premise is that military
effectiveness rivals civilian control as a legitimate central concern in the study of
civil–military relations. Though I will not provide evidence for this claim here, I
will attempt to put it into perspective and raise some of the issues associated with
doing research along these lines. The discussion below is therefore organized into
three sections. In the first, I will review existing civil–military relations literature as
it relates to the problem of military effectiveness.

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  239

In the second, I will mention some of the concerns that scholars working in this
area will have to address. Finally, in the third section I will provide some conclud-
ing thoughts.

Civil–Military Relations and Military Effectiveness

I argued above that existing works, especially studies of the civil–military relation-
ship in the United States, focus most heavily on the question of civilian control.
In this section, I will briefly review some of the founding works in this area, and
then discuss more recent contributions. Though military effectiveness has been
addressed by a number of authors in a variety of ways, it remains a profitable area
for further research.

The Classics
It is important to start by acknowledging that the two classic works of American
civil–military relations, Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) and
Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier (1960), address both military effectiveness
and civilian control. Huntington discusses civil–military relations as an explanatory
variable, and argues that their nature has an important impact on military effec-
tiveness. However, the manner in which he formulates this relationship is problem-
atic. Janowitz also discusses military effectiveness but it is not clear in his discussion
that civil–military relations serves as an explanatory variable for his assessment of
what would constitute an effective military. Instead, he bases his argument for a
constabulary force on his assessment of the military needs of the United States in
the Cold War, and then argues that acceptance of such a role by the military would
also have a beneficial impact on the character of civil–military relations and civilian
control. I will address each of these works in turn.
In The Soldier and the State, one of Huntington’s basic methodological assump-
tions is that it is possible to define an equilibrium called ‘‘objective civilian control’’
that ensures civilian control and maximizes security at the same time (Huntington,
1957, viii) He argues that, ‘‘In practice, officership is strongest and most effec-
tive when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most
defective when it falls short of that ideal’’ (11). An officer corps is professional to
the extent it exhibits the qualities of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.
In addition to enhancing effectiveness, these traits also enhance civilian control
because a professional military seeks to distance itself from politics (84).1 In the
U.S. context, however, military professionalism is difficult to maintain because
liberalism is inherently hostile to the military function and military institutions.
The classic liberal approaches to military affairs are extirpation (reduce the military
to the lowest possible level) or transmutation (to civilianize it) (Huntington, 1957,

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155). Huntington later lists a third option: ‘‘The prevailing societal values can shift
away from traditional liberalism in the direction of conservatism, society thereby
adopting a policy of toleration with respect to the military’’ (1977, 7). This seems to
be the option Huntington advocates in The Soldier and the State.
If obtaining a shift in the values of an entire society is not possible, the only way
to maintain military professionalism in a liberal context is to ensure that the mili-
tary has minimal political power. Therefore, Huntington argues that the achieve-
ment of objective civilian control in the United States requires allowing military
professionals autonomy within their own realm, while ‘‘rendering them politically
sterile and neutral’’ (1957, 84). Firm civilian control and military security are com-
plementary and mutually supporting goals.
As mentioned above, though civilian control is a central concern, Huntington
also sought a pattern of civil–military relations that would promote military pro-
fessionalism and hence military effectiveness. As he later acknowledged, he was
concerned at the time of the book’s writing that the United States, given its lib-
eral ideology, would be disadvantaged in a prolonged competition with the Soviet
Union in the Cold War (Powell et. al., 1994, 29). However, ‘‘professionalism’’ as
Huntington defines it is problematic as an adequate indicator of effectiveness. This
comes through clearly in Huntington’s interpretation of military theorist Carl
von Clausewitz. Huntington argues that, ‘‘The fact that war has its own grammar
requires that the military professionals be permitted to develop their expertise at
this grammar without extraneous influence … The inherent quality of a military
body can only be evaluated in terms of independent military standards’’ (Hunting-
ton, 1957, 57). This extension of von Clausewitz’s thought is problematic because
it implies that there exists a set of ‘‘independent military standards’’ that is valid
across time and place. This is unlikely, because the characteristics of effective armed
forces will vary with factors such as the resources they have, the missions they
must accomplish, and other aspects of their environments. In addition, reliance on
‘‘independent military standards’’ is also problematic given that the effectiveness
of military means can only be evaluated in relation to the political ends that these
means are to serve.
To say this is not to deny one of the major contributions that Huntington
makes in The Soldier and the State when he argues that military organizations are
shaped by both functional and societal imperatives. Functional imperatives are spe-
cial characteristics of military organizations driven by their need to be capable of
defending the state against external threats, and societal imperatives arise from
‘‘the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society’’ (1957, 2).
When attempting to understand the characteristics of a given country’s military
institutions, thinking about how they may be affected by these two imperatives is
helpful. To the extent that a country’s military does not share the attributes of the
society as a whole, a useful starting proposition is that these differences are due
to what the military believes to be required for success in war.2 However, it is not
true that there is a set of universally valid functional imperatives and that societal

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  241

imperatives merely weaken military organizations (or have a neutral impact). This is
clearly what Huntington is implying when he argues that, ‘‘The peculiar skill of the
military officer is universal in the sense that its essence is not affected by changes in
time or location’’ (1957, 13).
In making this claim Huntington runs counter to von Clausewitz, a thinker
with whom he claims to be in agreement. These authors’ differing assessments of
reserve forces provides a useful example of this divergence. Huntington has a nega-
tive view of reservists because they are not fully professional, whereas von Clause-
witz has positive words to say about people’s war (war by nonprofessional forces)
and reserve forces under certain circumstances (Huntington, 1957, 13; von Clause-
witz, 1976, 187–189 and 479–483). What is required for military forces to be effec-
tive is context dependent.
This context dependence is relevant not just to thinking about valuable char-
acteristics of individual soldiers and officers, but also to thinking about organiza-
tional structures, equipment, technology, training techniques, and a whole host of
other factors. There is nothing to guarantee that evaluation by ‘‘independent mili-
tary standards’’ will alone ensure integration of all these in a way that maximizes
the effectiveness of the military organization in a dynamic societal and interna-
tional context. In fact, Barry Posen argues that military organizations will stag-
nate without civilian involvement and will be ill-suited to meet the requirements
of their political leaders’ grand strategy (Posen, 1984, 80). Without accepting the
power of this prediction from organization theory that organizations never adapt
on their own—indeed it has been convincingly argued against—Posen is correct in
emphasizing the point that military organizations may need to change over time to
remain relevant and effective (see Rosen, 1991, 1–8; Posen, 1984, 24–29).
In sum, although Huntington does discuss military effectiveness as a product
of civil–military relations, the manner in which he does so is problematic. His basic
formulation seems to be that the pattern of civil–military relations that produces
the most effective militaries is that which impinges least on their ability to operate
according to a constant and universal functional imperative. The difficulty is that
the superiority of this ‘‘professional military’’ ideal type regardless of context is
doubtful. There is not one type of military organization that is most effective across
time and space, regardless of adversary or strategic context. A second point arising
from the above discussion is that the maintenance of military effectiveness may
require change over time—a point that Huntington does not address.
The focus of Janowitz’s Professional Soldier overlaps significantly with the con-
cerns of Soldier and the State. Janowitz is similarly concerned with both civilian
control and the military’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities in meeting the secu-
rity needs of the state (Janowitz, 1964, lviii). However, in contrast to Hunting-
ton, Janowitz argues that relying on the creation of an apolitical military in order
to ensure civilian control is an unrealistic approach. ‘‘In the United States, where
political leadership is diffuse, civilian politicians have come to assume that the
military will be an active ingredient in decision-making about national security’’

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(Janowitz, 1964, 342). Janowitz argues that it is inevitable that the military will
come to resemble a political pressure group, and this is not necessarily a problem
as long as its activities remain ‘‘responsible, circumscribed, and responsive to civil-
ian authority’’ (343). One strong guarantee of the maintenance of civilian control
is the military’s ‘‘meaningful integration with civilian values’’ (420). Janowitz also
advocates other measures for enhancing civilian control, such as increasing legisla-
tive oversight, extending civilian control into lower levels of military organizations,
and increasing civilian involvement in officer professional education (439). Yet, as
Feaver points out, in the end Janowitz is similar to Huntington in relying on the
professional military ethic as the fundamental means for ensuring control (Feaver,
1996b, 166).
On the question of effectiveness, however, Janowitz and Huntington differ.
Janowitz argues for the constabulary concept:

The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is con-

tinuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and
seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has
incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is
grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine. (Janowitz, 1964, 418)

Janowitz does not entirely separate professionalism and effectiveness, and so

his disagreement with Huntington is not complete on this point. Janowitz writes,
‘‘The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he is
a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth’’ (1964, 440). However,
Janowitz does part ways with Huntington in his assertion that effectiveness is very
context dependent. In Janowitz’s view, the ‘‘‘no-war–no-peace’ period” of the Cold
War demands a military that is aware of the international political consequences of
military action (1964, 342). A constabulary force would have this awareness, and
it would understand the primacy of political objectives and the occasional need
for limited applications of force (Janowitz, 1964, 257–279). Janowitz sees these
as essential attributes of an effective U.S. military during the Cold War. In sum,
though Janowitz’s work is similar to Huntington’s in that he discusses both profes-
sionalism and civilian control, Janowitz argues that evaluating effectiveness may
rely on an appreciation of the military’s changing environment.
A point that must be highlighted, however, is that when Janowitz discusses
military effectiveness he seems to base his prescriptions on his assessment of the
international environment. He does not set up a causal argument that a certain pat-
tern or type of civil–military relations will produce a military with a given amount
of effectiveness. To point this out is not to criticize Janowitz’s work; it is merely to
recognize that such an argument is beyond the scope of The Professional Soldier.
Janowitz’s primary aim in that book was to describe the current state of the military
profession (vii). The five hypotheses that Janowitz set forth focused on how broader

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  243

societal trends would manifest themselves in the military, and how the military
would respond (7–16). Some of these trends had implications for military effective-
ness, but these implications were not the central focus of Janowitz’s analysis.

Dependent Variables of the Civil–Military Relations Literature

Although both effectiveness and control are addressed in the classics of U.S. civil–
military relations, only Huntington’s work attempts to use civil–military relations
as an explanatory variable to explain military effectiveness and his approach is prob-
lematic. What work has been done in this area since The Soldier and the State and
The Professional Soldier? Without claiming to mention all relevant literature, this
section will review the focus of other authors working in the field of civil–military
relations and highlight significant representative works.3 In addition to not being
comprehensive, the review below is limited in another sense. Janowitz is commonly
identified as the founder of military sociology in the United States, and his The
Professional Soldier has inspired a large body of sociological research into military
organizations in modern democratic societies (Burk, 1993). This review does not
adequately capture the contributions of this literature, but instead focuses on works
in the political science portion of an inherently multidisciplinary field. This scope
is sufficient to suggest that it would be valuable for political scientists to more fully
explore the impact of civil–military relations on military effectiveness.
Although I argued above that the issue of civilian control has tended to domi-
nate the literature, its predominance is not absolute and even scholars who examine
it may look at slightly different dimensions of the problem. Because of this, a useful
way to sort the work in this field is according to the authors’ differing dependent
variables. This is the approach I will adopt here, adapting and borrowing heavily
from similar surveys provided by Desch and Feaver (Desch, 1999, 3–4; Feaver,
1999, 217–222). Possible dependent variables include the following: coups, military
influence, civil–military friction, military compliance, and effectiveness.4 The first
four of these, as will be discussed further below, are closely related to the issue of
civilian control. I will briefly discuss each of these dependent variables before turn-
ing to the issue of effectiveness in the next section.
The first dependent variable, coups, may be a significant concern in a compara-
tive context, but it does not capture the important aspects of the U.S. case.5 Despite
the provocative and much-cited piece written by a U.S. Air Force officer in 1992
about a coup in the United States in the year 2012, most analysts would argue that
there is no serious possibility of a military takeover in the United States (Dunlap,
1992–1993). However, as Feaver points out, even in a comparative context the dan-
ger of focusing on coups is that it may cause analysts to miss other important ways
in which a military exercises influence over political leaders (Feaver, 1999, 218). In
other words, such a focus may cause analysts to understate problems with civilian
control. Though a coup constitutes perhaps the strongest dysfunction possible, its

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likelihood is not the only significant issue—or even a significant issue—in some
civil–military relationships.
A second possible dependent variable is military influence. The foremost work
in the American context on this subject is Richard Betts’ Soldiers, Statesmen, and
Cold War Crises (1991). This book is an examination of the record of civil–military
interactions in the context of use-of-force decision making during the early phase of
the Cold War. In a summary of his findings, Betts concludes, ‘‘The diversity of mil-
itary recommendations and the extent of consonance with civilian opinion indicate
that military professionals rarely have dominated decisions on the use of force,’’
though influence was greatest when military leaders argued against its use (Betts,
1991, 5). Betts updates these findings in the preface to a 1991 edition, though his
core conclusions remain remarkably consistent with his earlier work. Overall, he
paints a mixed picture of military influence. Military leaders did not control use-of-
force decision making, but their input had especially significant weight when they
opposed the use of force (Betts, 1991, x; see also Petraeus, 1989).
The dependent variable of military influence has its own difficulties. As Betts
points out, judging whether military influence on decision making has been “good”
or “bad” is problematic, and even one’s views on its appropriate level are likely to
vary with political identifications (Betts, 1991, xv). Nevertheless, it should be pos-
sible to trace change over time. In addition, though measurement may be more
difficult than in the case of military coups, this variable captures dynamics more
relevant to the U.S. case.
A third possible dependent variable is civil–military friction. This dependent
variable has the advantage of being easily observable and measurable if defined
as ‘‘the degree to which the military is willing to display public opposition to
announced civilian policy’’ (Feaver, 1999, 220). One analysis that focuses here is
Peter Feaver’s article, ‘‘Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the
Souring of American Civil–military Relations” (1998).6 He argues that friction is
predictable based on the relationship between the incentives that the civilian has to
intrusively monitor military work, and the incentives that the military has to avoid
perfect compliance (‘‘shirk’’). For Feaver, shirking occurs when the military either
fails to diligently and skillfully do what the civilian asks, or does what the civilian
asks in a manner that undercuts the civilian’s position of greater authority. In other
words, shirking occurs when military leaders fail to respect either the functional or
the relational goals of their civilian leaders (Feaver, 1998, 409).
As Deborah Avant points out, one difficulty with this approach is that a focus
on friction can obscure the matter of civilian control. There may be a lack of fric-
tion because civilian leaders are securely in charge, or because they are following
the military’s lead (Avant, 1998, 382–383). It is also not clear that all civil–military
friction is bad, either in a normative or in a policy sense.
A fourth dependent variable is military compliance. An advantage of the term
‘‘military compliance’’ is that it makes clear that even in a context in which coups
are unlikely (i.e., total civilian loss of control is unlikely), subtler issues of control

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  245

may still be an issue. Recent work has continued to highlight military compli-
ance as a key concern in the U.S. civil–military relationship (Kohn, 2002). Some
of this may have been motivated by the debate—discussed in the introduction to
this article—over the existence of a “crisis” in civilian control in the early 1990s.
One example of a scholar who has contributed in this area is Christopher Gibson.
Gibson argues that the key to ensuring continued civilian supremacy in the U.S.
civil–military relationship is the enhancement of the national security education
and credentials of senior civilian officials (Gibson, 1998).
As mentioned in the introduction, two authors who have recently applied the
principal-agent framework to this concern are Deborah Avant and Peter Feaver.
Avant uses the principal-agent framework to gain insight into military reluctance to
get involved in small-scale contingency operations. Her post-Cold War cases bear
out the prediction that, in the face of a divided principal that disagrees over goals
and strategy (in this case the president and Congress), the agent is likely to pursue
cautious policies (Avant, 1996/1997). Her answer as to whether the ‘‘reluctant war-
riors’’ are out of control is ‘‘not quite.’’ She argues that their behavior is an expected
outcome due to prior lack of agreement among civilians across divided institutions
(Avant, 1996/1997, 52).
Although Feaver also uses the principal-agent framework, he focuses on the
forms of delegation and monitoring civilian leaders are likely to embrace rather
than on the issue of a divided principal. Above it was mentioned that Feaver devel-
oped a game theoretic model and used it to explain the 1990s ‘‘crisis’’ through its
predictions about friction. That same model also makes predictions about military
compliance, which is in fact the focus Feaver himself ascribes to the article (Feaver,
1999, 221). He further develops, in later work, his argument about the importance
of delegation and monitoring mechanisms, and the understanding they provide
about the state of U.S. civil–military relations and civilian control (Feaver, 2003).
As the title makes clear, the issue of military compliance is also central to
Michael Desch’s Civilian Control of the Military (1999). He argues that, ‘‘The best
indicator of the state of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military
preferences diverge. If the military does, there is a problem; if the civilians do, there
is not’’ (1999, 4–5). The central argument of his structural theory of civil–military
relations is that the particular combination of internal and external threats faced by
a state (independent variables) determines the quality of civilian control (the depen-
dent variable). Civilian control should be best in times of high external threat and
low internal threat, worst in times of low external threat and high internal threat,
and indeterminate in the other two cases. Finding support for his hypothesis when
applying it to the United States, Desch finds relatively firm civilian control dur-
ing the Cold War (high external and low internal threat), and mixed in the post-
Cold War period (low external and low internal threats). His conclusion about
the United States in this period is that, ‘‘Clearly, the less challenging international
threat environment of the post-Cold War period has weakened civilian control of
the U.S. military’’ (1999, 36).

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 246  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Though Desch’s argument may be useful in comparative perspective, its utility

in the case of the United States is rather limited. Even after suggesting that civilian
control in the United States has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, he does
not argue that the military will disobey direct orders or engage in a military coup
(Desch, 1999, 30). Given that civilian control is not fundamentally at risk, it seems
valuable to examine other possible aspects of the civil–military relationship. Paul
Bracken’s comments are salient on this point:

The central role that civilian control has played in [U.S.] civil–military
relations is understandable. But in its raw form it is a trivial problem
because under nearly any conceivable set of arrangements civilian con-
trol is assured. To overconcentrate on it when it is inappropriate to do
so will only elevate a host of ordinary misunderstandings and differ-
ences into a high political arena where they do not belong. Moreover, it
will distract attention from other important dimensions that character-
ize the relationship of the military to the state. (Bracken, 1995, 163)

One way of interpreting Bracken’s comments would be to argue that ‘‘civilian con-
trol’’ is still an important concern, but needs to be reconceptualized to have greater
significance in the U.S. case. For example, can U.S. political leaders responsible for
national security policy control the military in the sense of shaping it to meet the
country’s security needs? A second interesting question is whether this can be done at
a reasonable cost in terms of other values being pursued.7
Before moving on to discuss the dependent variable of effectiveness, an addi-
tional literature that should be mentioned is the extensive amount of work done
in the last decade on the existence of a ‘‘gap’’ between civilians and members of
the military in the United States. Although there is a wide variance within the
literature on a gap, it is mentioned in this section on military compliance because
a common strong concern seems to be the implications of a gap for civilian control
(Feaver and Kohn, 2000, 36; Cohen, 2000, 46). Some authors focus on a growing
cultural divide, and others find a growing divide in ideological identifications and
policy preferences (Ricks, 1996; Holsti, 1998–1999). A multiyear project by the
Triangle Institute of Security Studies, involving approximately two dozen scholars,
was recently devoted to determining the sources of the civil–military gap, more
specifically defining its nature, and determining its possible implications (Feaver
and Kohn, 2000, 1).
Many of the project’s findings have been published in Soldiers and Civilians:
The Civil–military Gap and American National Security (Feaver and Kohn, 2001).
This book is a rich contribution to the civil–military relations literature, and
constructively enters a long-standing debate. At the heart of the debate, as key par-
ticipants in the study have acknowledged, are differing assessments as to whether
a civil–military gap is even problematic. Differences of opinion on this have their

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  247

roots in the founding works of Huntington and Janowitz (Feaver and Kohn, 2000,
30–31). These disagreements apply to the ramifications of a gap for civilian control,
as well as its ramifications for military effectiveness. As discussed above, Hunting-
ton saw a degree of separateness as enhancing both civilian control and effective-
ness. Some authors writing more recently have implicitly agreed by pointing out
the differences between some core U.S. values, such as the priority placed on indi-
vidualism, and the functional needs of the military (Snider, 1999, 14–19). On the
other hand, Janowitz argued for greater military integration with civilian values
and believed that this would not necessarily harm military effectiveness. Soldiers
and Civilians is a contribution to the debate that argues that the gap matters, and
explores its implications for both military compliance and military effectiveness.

Military Effectiveness
This discussion leads to the final dependent variable mentioned above, effective-
ness. Some authors working in civil–military relations avoid highlighting this
issue. Desch, for example, dismisses this focus mainly by labeling it inadequate
(Desch, 1999, 4). However, although effectiveness does not tell us everything we
want to know about a civil–military relationship, neither does degree of civilian
control—especially in the U.S. context. Feaver takes a slightly different approach,
arguing that this outcome is deserving of further research (Feaver, 1999, 234). In
his discussion he focuses primarily on use-of-force issues and recommends testing
propositions such as whether civilian involvement at the operational and tactical
levels does or does not lead to better outcomes.8
In any event, the literature that uses civil–military relations as an explana-
tory variable for military effectiveness is sparse. One important exception is Ste-
phen Biddle and Robert Zirkle’s work on civil–military relations and technology
assimilation in Iraq and Vietnam (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996). Using the degree to
which civil–military relations are marked by conflict as the explanatory variable,
they explain the two states’ differing abilities to take advantage of the complex
air defense technology they possessed. Biddle and Zirkle argue that Iraq’s radi-
cally conflictual civil–military relations help to explain its inability to exploit its
advanced air defense technology in the Persian Gulf War. They compare this with
the Vietnam War, and argue that North Vietnam’s harmonious civil–military rela-
tions help to explain its significant success in using its technology to good effect
against the United States in that conflict.
Other authors who examine the nexus between civil–military relations and
military effectiveness turn their attention to characteristics of the societies from
which armed forces stem or the nature of their governments. One example is
Stephen Rosen’s work on societal structures. Rosen’s independent variables are the
dominant social structures of a country and the degree to which military organiza-
tions divorce themselves from society, and he argues that these affect the national

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 248  n  Handbook of Military Administration

military strength a country can obtain from a given amount of material resources
(Rosen, 1995, 1996). Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, with a slightly different focus,
seek to establish a relationship between regime type and battlefield effectiveness. In
their statistical work, they find support for the idea that ‘‘soldiers emerging from
democratic societies enjoy better leadership and fight with more initiative’’ (Reiter
and Stam, 1998, 260). A third example of work along these lines is Risa Brooks’
look at the negative impact that the political control mechanisms chosen by Arab
regimes have on their armies’ military effectiveness (Brooks, 1998, 45–53). She
finds that highly centralized and rigid command structures, the squelching of ini-
tiative at lower levels, and tinkering with chains of command for political reasons
significantly inhibit the effectiveness of Arab armies (46).
In addition, some of the work on military doctrine speaks to the relationship
between civil–military relations and military effectiveness, if only indirectly.9 For
example, Jack Snyder argues that in the period before 1914, ‘‘military doctrine
and war planning were left almost entirely in the hands of military professionals,
who usually incline toward the offensive but rarely have so free a rein to indulge
their inclination’’ (Snyder, 1984, 199). A clear implication of this analysis is that a
civil–military relationship characterized by greater involvement of rational civilians
(not captured by military organizational bias favoring the offense) could have led to
an avoidance of some of the disasters of 1914. Deborah Avant makes a similar argu-
ment that the involvement of civilians is important to the military’s adoption of an
effective doctrine, but relies on the characteristics of domestic institutions and their
historical development to explain both the relative necessity of this involvement
and its likely success (Avant, 1994). Posen’s argument that military organizations,
left to their own devices, will tend to stagnate and become disintegrated with a
country’s grand strategy has similar implications (Posen, 1984, 80).
A fourth example is Elizabeth Kier’s work on the role of culture in shaping mili-
tary doctrine. In what could be characterized as different civil–military dynam-
ics, Kier argues that the extent to which civilian policy makers agree about the
domestic role of the military will shape whether or not international considerations
will drive their military policy (Kier, 1997, 27). She also argues that ‘‘the greater
the hostility in the organization’s external environment, the greater the potential
for organizational dogmatism’’ (32). This is clearly another proposition about the
impact of civil–military relations that has ramifications for military effectiveness.
Although Kier argues that the formulation of military doctrine is primarily the
purview of military leaders, civilian leaders create constraints that shape the choices
that these military leaders make (Kier, 1997, 12–14).
It is interesting that despite the different approaches of the authors above, these
works have several points of agreement. First, the authors seem to generally agree
that conflict-laden relations between political and military leaders will harm a
country’s national security. These authors find that relatively cooperative relation-
ships between senior military and political leaders, on the other hand, facilitate a
number of desirable developments: the integration of advanced technologies into

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  249

military capabilities (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996); the capable employment of force
(Brooks, 1998); the development of a military doctrine that is supportive of politi-
cal ends (Avant, 1994; Snyder, 1984; Posen, 1984); and the retention of flexibility
in military organizations (Kier, 1997). A second point of agreement is that soci-
etal characteristics may be reflected in the ability of a country to create military
power (Rosen, 1995, 1996), or in battlefield effectiveness (Reiter and Stam, 1998).
A challenge on this latter point is that military organizations often have very strong
socialization processes, and therefore may not entirely reflect the societies from
which they stem. At a minimum, this socialization is a consideration that must be
taken into account.10
The authors listed above have begun to shape a research agenda for those inter-
ested in attempting to evaluate the impact of civil–military relations on military
effectiveness. However, there are characteristics of the problem that make it a tough
one to tackle. The next section discusses some of the reasons why this is the case.

Challenges
Scholars who seek to evaluate the impact of civil–military relations on military
effectiveness face several major challenges. Here I will address three of these: defin-
ing effectiveness; defining civil–military relations; and attempting to characterize
the independent impact of civil–military relations as compared to other factors that
may shape military effectiveness. I will briefly discuss each of these below.
Addressing the first challenge—defining and operationalizing military effec-
tiveness—would seem at first to be a simple matter. Effective militaries are those
that achieve the objectives assigned to them or are victorious in war (Korb, 1984,
42). However, as Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman point
out, ‘‘Victory is not a characteristic of an organization but rather a result of organi-
zational activity. Judgments of effectiveness should thus retain some sense of pro-
portional cost and organizational process’’ (Millett, Murray, and Watman, 1987,
3). One example that they give is that although Soviet forces defeated the Finns
during the ‘‘Winter War’’ of 1939–1940, a detailed look at the manner in which
the conflict was fought makes it implausible to argue that the Soviets had the more
‘‘effective’’ military.
In addressing this challenge, it may be useful to keep in mind Millett, Murray,
and Watman’s argument that a comprehensive framework for measuring military
effectiveness is required. Military activity occurs at multiple levels: political, stra-
tegic, operational, and tactical (Millett, Murray, and Watman, 1987, 3). Because
effectiveness implies different characteristics at each of these levels, multiple mea-
sures of effectiveness are needed. Some projects may benefit by narrowing their
claims in such a way that they are addressing effectiveness at only one or two of
these levels. In any event, it is important to acknowledge different aspects of mili-
tary effectiveness and be clear about the claims being made.

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 250  n  Handbook of Military Administration

The second challenge mentioned above is that of carefully defining the term
‘‘civil–military relations.” As Paul Bracken has suggested, in order to assess the full
impact of civil–military relations it might be helpful to move down a level of analy-
sis and disaggregate civil–military relations into its various dimensions (Bracken,
1995). Although most work in U.S. civil–military relations focuses on the interac-
tions between senior members of the executive branch and military leaders, the
military also interacts with Congress, the industrial base, and society (see Bracken,
1995, 155–162). Each of these relationships, as well as their combined effects, can
impact on military effectiveness. Looking at the problem in this way may be espe-
cially helpful to investigations that examine institutional questions concerning the
development and shaping of military capabilities, but could also be helpful when
the concern is the use of force.
A third major challenge is that the effectiveness of a military organization, at
whatever level being discussed, is likely to stem from a number of factors. How
much do civil–military relationships matter? In many cases, there will be internal
organizational factors that impact on effectiveness as well as changes in the secu-
rity challenges a particular country faces (see Goldman, 1997, 43). As the relative
importance of internal organizational developments and civil–military dynamics
will vary depending on the particular research problem being investigated, this will
remain an issue for empirical research in each case.

Conclusion
As developed by Peter Feaver, the civil–military “problematique’’ is the challenge of
reconciling ‘‘a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do
with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do’’
(Feaver, 1996b, 149). It is worthwhile to note that this formulation seems to imply
a tension between the two concerns—control and effectiveness—that at least theo-
retically does not have to exist. A nation’s armed forces could become more effective
without any loss of civilian control. In fact, when thinking about trying to develop
a coherent relationship between military means and political ends, civilian control
becomes essential to military effectiveness.
However, like the founding works of Huntington and Janowitz, Feaver’s formu-
lation helpfully puts both effectiveness and control at the center of the civil–mili-
tary relations research agenda. To this point, the problem of civilian control has
drawn more attention. The impact of civil–military relations on military effective-
ness deserves a closer look.

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 Civil–Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness  n  251

Notes
1. Not all analysts have agreed with Huntington that professional militaries are by their
very nature apolitical (see Finer, 1962).
2. The functional imperatives associated with accomplishment of military missions may
often require these institutions to have characteristics that distinguish them from the
society from which they stem (see Boëne, 1990).
3. In a 1999 review, Peter Feaver focuses on the political science works in the literature
on civil–military relations, but the sociological dimension of the field is also briefly
discussed (see Feaver, 1999).
4. This list adopts Feaver’s labels for these dependent variables (Feaver, 1999).
5. Feaver argues that ‘‘modern American civil–military relations are about the conflict
that remains after the basic principle of civilian control is accepted’’ (Feaver, 1996a,
159).
6. Rebecca L. Schiff, in a different article, also focuses on level of consensus (lack of fric-
tion) between the military, political elites and citizenry on key issues as a significant
concern. However, the presence or absence of friction serves more as an explanatory
variable than as a dependent variable in her work. Her dependent variable is military
intervention into politics (Schiff, 1995).
7. As Amy Zegart argues in Flawed By Design (1999), factors impinging on the effective-
ness of national security institutions can be based in the nature of political institu-
tions as well as in the relationships between the leaders of these institutions and the
federal bureaucracy. She makes this argument in her explanation of why the develop-
ment and functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
National Security Council have been suboptimal from a national perspective (Zegart,
1999).
8. Eliot Cohen has recently written a book that addresses this concern (see Cohen, 2002).
9. I wish to thank Dr. Stephen Biddle for pointing out to me this implication of the
military doctrine literature.
10. In his analysis, Rosen takes this into account by analyzing the degree to which a
military has divorced itself from society.

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 Chapter 13

Application of the
Military for Countering
Nonstate Terrorist and
Guerilla Networks

Matthew R. McNabb

Much debate persists as to what kinds of activity constitute terrorism, existing along
a sliding scale of varying instruments for low-intensity conflict. As a result, any
effort to define with precision the nature of those operations aimed at countering
such techniques are thus equally confused. But, if experience teaches one anything,
it is that defeating terrorists requires a nation to do far more than merely “send
either cops or soldiers to capture the evildoers” (Bohn, 2004, xiv). Within the con-
text of military applications, traditional models of identify, target, and kill lack the
requisite sophistication alone necessary to route out the disease with its symptoms.
As such, the military’s responsibilities in counterterrorism involve a wide spectrum
of both kinetic and nonkinetic activity.
Terrorism, whatever the precise characteristics of its definition, is ultimately a
tactic, not descriptive of organizational dynamics, an ideology, or modus vivendi.
Indeed, terrorism at its core, whether directed against pedestrian or official tar-
gets, implicates the use or threatened use of violence in an effort to incite fear
for political ends. Nonstate international terrorists, whether backed by recognized
governments or operating independently, are comprised of any number of varying

255

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 256  n  Handbook of Military Administration

formations. In some cases, the threat posed may involve isolated cells of friends and
family inspired to act by the pull of their revolutionist ideology or of ecumenical
rite. This may be called the self-starter model. Other times the threat posed may
be slightly more conventional in nature, through the use of state-sponsored gue-
rilla formations. Under this revolutionary war model, an organized and disciplined
leadership comprises the effectual “general staff of the revolution” replete with its
own tailored “popular ideology that is used to explain the past, present, and future”
(Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, 1999, 240). The nature of military involvement vis-à-
vis counterterrorism is largely dependent upon which variation of these models is
adopted by the adversary, though military involvement is rarely static, fluctuating
from waves of widespread counterinsurgency approaches to targeted strikes, a fact
echoed in the genealogy of U.S. military counterterrorism. But directing military
assets through kinetic, forceful options, without due appreciation for the narrow
circumstances surrounding their respective support networks, can be dangerous.
In conventional military engagement, the principal focus is given to bat-
tlespace—the geo-political boundaries within which conflict is concentrated. Ter-
rorism, in its nonstate form, however, is often far more complicated, eschewing
the binds of geography, or even of traditional studies in political relations, in favor
of highly asymmetric, often ideological, bands of dissident political actors. These
bands in turn depend upon extensive networks for support, both material and ideo-
logical, well beyond the scope of the traditional battlespace. As one author notes,

The problem, of course, is that dominating the battlespace only gets

the U.S. military through the war, or what the Powell Doctrine pre-
fers to call “mission accomplished” (bad guys out of power, captured,
or killed), and if that’s all you need to light up the victory cigars and
strike up the band, then your duty is done. But if you’re waging a global
war on terrorism, then all you’ve done by conquering that battlespace
is kill a bunch of bad guys and nothing else. You’ve stormed into the
inner-city ghetto, shot the place up, maybe snatched the most wanted
criminals if you’re lucky, and left the situation more beat-up then you
found it. To the innocent locals, you can’t help but come off like a
man-made disaster in the end, despite your good intentions, because
what you leave behind is no more likely to produce good guys than
before—in fact, it’s more likely than ever to produce even worse guys.
(Barnett, 2005, 24–25)

As a result of this divergence from traditional military management, a pre-

mium is placed on the value of reliable and timely intelligence, flexibility through a
range of varying options, and a worthy investment into nonkinetic efforts to isolate,
divide, and disrupt the continuity of terrorist activities.

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  257

Nonstate international terrorism, whether in self-starter or revolutionary form,

seeks to use the asymmetry in the adversarial relationship to its advantage. Muja-
hideen fighters in the late 1980s, for instance, were able to utilize comparatively
simplistic technologies, like surface-to-air RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) that
targeted helicopters, to force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as Somali war-
lords set rubber tires ablaze in the streets of Mogadishu to render U.S. night-vision
superiority obsolete. Even in Iraq today, primitive pressure-detonated, improvised
explosives hidden in potholes and Coke cans have inflicted such injury to allied
forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, that the Pentagon was compelled to estab-
lish a $3 billion per year Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) headed by a four-star general and former commander of U.S. Army
Europe, to address the threat. Asymmetries in the terrorism–counterterrorism rela-
tionship can be staggering.
What makes terrorism all the more frightening and difficult for traditional forces
to address is not merely its asymmetry. Terrorism, by definition, relies not merely
on force, but also upon fear. Idiosyncrasies in its targeting, flexibility in its opera-
tional management, and an underpinning of ardent supporters, conjures a milieu
of chaos and omnipresent threats—anyone could be its next victim. This milieu of
fear is often the most difficult element in countering a terrorist threat, requiring the
military to tailor its kinetic options in line with its nonkinetic approaches; thus, no
singular strategy is sufficient in countering all terrorist adversaries.

Genealogy of U.S. Military Counterterrorism

Applications of the military as an instrument in countering terrorism are not new.
Indeed, similar activities might be said to date back as early as to mid-seventeenth
century colonial efforts to defend against and neutralize threats posed by raiding
Native American tribes. In 1756, skilled woodsman Major Robert Rogers drew
command of four motley companies of rugged Northeastern outdoorsmen, skilled
in rapid, offensive actions against hostile tribesmen. Known for their unreliability
and distinctly mercurial attitudes, the Rogers irregulars comprised the nation’s very
first special operations forces, and proved a pivotal response to the asymmetry pre-
sented by Native tribes throughout the French and Indian War.
Specialized guerilla units were again seen in the American war for independence.
British ranger forces found their way deep into rebel territory by way of Canada,
teaming up with their Indian allies to sabotage and terrorize colonial settlements
throughout the countryside of Pennsylvania and New York. Similar British–Indian
irregular units were formed in the South. But in the face of these asymmetries, spe-
cialized American units were tasked to respond. Major General Nathanial Greene,
for instance, employed a blend of both regular and irregular forces utilizing small,
elite, guerilla fighters known for approaching their enemies quietly before igniting
lightening-fast frontal assaults coordinated with especially violent flanking maneu-

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vers. As one author has said of Greene’s most famous guerilla commander Col.
Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion, “He seemed ubiquitous, lurking everywhere: hid-
ing in an unknown rendezvous, creeping stealthily along on a raid, or leading a
midnight attack” (Taillon, 2001, 60). Even in the times of formalized etiquette for
the gentlemanly conduct of conventional war, U.S. strategists employed creative
low-intensity solutions to the asymmetries presented by unconventional guerilla
and terrorist activities.
A few years later, the low-intensity instrument of counterterrorism was trans-
posed in favor of conventional application of force. The violent nuisance of Barbary
pirates faced in the early days of the American Republic haunted the successive
administrations of Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson alike. In October
of 1784, an adept Moroccan corsair interdicted an American merchant ship, the
Betsey, as it sailed off the coast of Cadiz, Spain. Nine months later, Algerian corsairs
seized two additional American merchant ships, the Dauphin and the Maria, along
with their twenty-one crew members and passengers, seeking to incite sufficient
fear in the hearts of merchantmen that the young Republic would be compelled
to comply with the Barbary racket’s demand for financial tribute in return for safe
passage across the high seas. For the pirates acting on behalf of their nominal states,
terrorism was both a matter of nationalistic policy and a jihadist agenda operating
under the banner of an oft abused Islamic Surah: “When the hallowed months have
slipped away, then slay the idolaters wherever you may find them, and take them
captive, and besiege them, and waylay them at every outpost. But if they repent
and establish worship and pay their fair due, then leave them free” (Holy Qu’aran,
Surah 9:5). It was, in truth, the first American encounter with jihadi terrorism and
the response was robust (Wheelan, 2003). As the seizures increased, particularly
following an 1801 formal declaration of war by the Barbary states’ apparent leader-
ship in Tripoli, American policy makers became progressively more displeased with
the ongoing maritime racket. By the time President Jefferson was in office, however,
the administration was preparing for war. With the development of a small fleet of
battle-bound frigates, the military was able to team with its transatlantic European
neighbors to defeat the Barbary racket. Conventional forces were employed success-
fully in a full-scale operation to face a weak, idiosyncratic adversary.
Applications of conventional force are not always so successful, as the mili-
tary quickly learned years later in facing successive insurgencies throughout the
so-called Banana Wars of the Philippines, Central America, and the Caribbean.
In Nicaragua, the lesson was especially harsh. Fighting the rebel forces of Augusto
Sandino, U.S. Marines were compelled to dig in and fight a protracted war to
destabilize the early Sandinista movement and return control to the democratically
elected pro-American government. Though prepared for difficult and extensive
combat, the marines quickly learned that their failure to attain a sufficient cultural
sensitivity left them unable to undercut the movement’s popular support. As one
scholar has noted,

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  259

They failed not as conquerors … but as rulers of conquered places.

Striving to teach by example, they found it necessary to denigrate the
cultural values of those whom they had come to save … [T]hey mistak-
enly assumed that community values could be inculcated with sanitary
measures or vocational education or a reformed military where soldiers
from humble social origins learned to identify with “nation” instead of
prominent politicians or families. Their presence … stripped Carib-
bean peoples of their dignity and constituted an unspoken American
judgment of Caribbean inferiority. (Langley, 1985, 71)

The lesson was clear: Military involvement in counterterrorism and counterinsur-

gency is not dependent upon the application of force alone.
Years later, the very first counterterrorist war in the wake of the two world wars
took place against a Greek communist movement, the People’s Liberation Army
(ELAS). Shortly following the German withdrawal of its forces in the country in
1945, ELAS made a sharp grab for power. Unfortunately though, the British gov-
ernment, formerly an ardent supporter of the prodemocratic Royalist government in
Athens, was financially ruined and militarily overdrawn from the war. Amidst the
civil war between the Greek government and the ELAS which ensued, in February
of 1947, the British government deemed it necessary to withdraw its own support
for Royalist forces. Thankfully, the U.S. government had long since anticipated the
withdrawal. For the United States, support for the Greek military was crucial to
maintain the delicate post-WWII bipolar balance with the Soviet Union, as Soviet
elements appeared to be offering direct assistance to the ELAS. As then Secretary
of State General George Marshall would say of the British withdrawal, their act
“was tantamount to British abdication from the Middle East with obvious implica-
tions as to their successor” (Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997, 79). Undersecretary of
State Dean Acheson, in a presentation to President Harry S. Truman, concurred,
emphasizing the fear that “if Greece were lost, Turkey would be untenable. Russia
would move in and take control of the Dardanelles, with the ‘clearest implications’
for the Middle East. Morale would sink in Italy, Germany, and France” (Ambrose
and Brinkley, 1997, 79). It was, as political scientists would later dub the fear, that
of domino theory: Soviet success in one state may spill over into its neighboring
states, and advent the rapid horizontal proliferation of Communist power world-
wide. But for the immediate time, the threat was guerilla operations and terrorism,
and the U.S. response was robust.
The first stages of U.S. counterterrorism in Greece came by way of a signifi-
cant foreign aid program. To facilitate the aid program, a Joint U.S. Military and
Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was formed as a joint forum for assisting the Greek
operations, training, and logistics. As was feared, “the conduct of Greek military
operations became the responsibility of JUSMAPG,” and the U.S. general became
the de facto commander of the Greek National Army (GNA) (Taillon, 2001, 67).

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 260  n  Handbook of Military Administration

This process underlined a sense of urgency otherwise unknown to the Greek mili-
tary, but recognizing the problem they faced, the GNA acceded. What was once
a counterterrorist and anticommunist strategy hinging on traditional foreign aid
quickly transformed to indirect military and nation-building assistance, which in
turn ripened to direct military involvement.
JUSMAPG employed a two-edged approach in facing the ELAS threat. The
principal tactic employed was the use of heavy, overwhelming force, summoning
the strength of significant tactical air support, artillery, and U.S.-supplied auto-
matic weapons. By 1948, although the utilization of heavy airpower and artillery
proved reasonably successful in disrupting the larger elements of ELAS, it quickly
became clear that large-scale conventional operations were insufficient in tackling
the lighter, guerilla aspects of ELAS operations. As a result, JUSMAPG expanded
and extensively utilized elite, light, rapid-reaction Greek commandos (LOK) to
infiltrate the organization’s urban strongholds. The move to special forces was
highly successful, so much so that regional commanders, seeing success rates by
LOK commandos, moved to replicate those achievements, to the severe detriment
of the special forces. In an effort to belay very high casualty rates endured by the
abuse of the special forces, the U.S.-dominated JUSMAPG took control, reinstitut-
ing its conventional approach, an approach that at the time, in spite of tremendous
LOK successes, was credited with the ultimate success of the Greek military over
the ELAS threat.
Meanwhile guerilla tactics and terrorist acts were also occupying the U.S. mili-
tary within the Korean peninsula. Although, of course, most of the Korean conflict
was predominated by conventional warfare, unconventional guerilla and terrorist
formations emerging as early as 1948 deep within Republic of Korea (ROK) ter-
ritory became an important concern both for ROK military defenses and later for
U.S. forces on the ground. Even before the initiation of conventional hostilities,
the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) initiated sporadic, idiosyncratic attacks
against civilians and military personnel alike, forcing ROK forces to deploy three
entire divisions from what would soon become the front lines of the Korean War.
As NKPA and ROK forces engaged, the NKPA’s guerilla forces were well situated
for harassing civilian populations, interdicting military supply lines, and collecting
valuable intelligence for North Korea commanders. But, more importantly, NKPA
guerillas were not alone in their efforts. Headed by the young South Korea Labour
Party Leader Kim Il Sung, communist dissidents, inspired by the NKPA guerillas
and the introduction of Chinese forces into hostilities, coagulated into a Partisan
Guidance Bureau, serving as a native guerilla and terrorist force aimed at assisting
North Korean and Chinese interests. Kim Il Sung’s bureau became known for
its impressive sabotage techniques and extensive use of violence to incite fear in
noncompliant locals, military and civilian alike. The threat was very real. While
the United Nations command located in the South was forced to dedicate much-
needed resources to countering the guerilla and terrorist threat, U.S. and ROK
troops conducted ad hoc operations with conventional patrols. But conventional

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  261

forces lacked the requisite mobility, flexibility, and interoperability to be effective.

By 1951, the marines took over. And although marine replacements made impor-
tant efforts in their counterinsurgency operations, by the end of the conflict, how-
ever, the trend was set in favor of overwhelming conventional force. In the words of
one scholar, “The Army had become accustomed to massive amounts of firepower
which came at the expense of mobility,” and in essence had “substituted firepower
for strategy” (Id., 71).
For much of the period following U.S. involvement in Korea, the nature of the
threat posed by terrorist networks shifted largely from that of guerilla actions to
limited activities of semiautonomous terrorist networks; from communist insur-
gencies to Cuban or Palestinian airplane hijackers. With this shift in threat, the
concept of applying military force to address terrorism fell largely into disfavor,
turning instead to federal law enforcement and state-centric diplomacy. Terrorism
was viewed simply as a second-class threat. In the words of one observer, “Neither
the Kennedy nor the Johnson administration had chosen to expend any political
capital on the problem” (Naftali, 2005, 21).
September 1970 pivoted this reticence to utilize the military, when a team of ter-
rorists operating on behalf of the so-called Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) hijacked three airliners flying from Europe to New York (TWA Flight 741,
Pan Am Flight 93, Swissair Flight 100) and carried out a failed attempt on a fourth
from Tel Aviv (El Al Flight 219). The hijackings ignited an immediate international
incident, persuading President Richard Nixon to place federal marshals onboard inter-
national flights originating in U.S. airports. Unable to hire all of the requisite 5,750
law enforcement officials, Nixon turned to the military. It was a controversial first step
in applying military force for a traditionally civilian-centric homeland defense appara-
tus. Military intervention in the subsequent hostage crises that followed was rendered
unnecessary when negotiations with the PFLP effectuated the release of the hostages
in exchange for a pan-European and Israeli prisoner exchange.
In the early post-Korean War world, general military doctrine had shifted in
favor of “flexible response,” giving the military the “ability to respond to aggression
at the appropriate level through the possession of a wide spectrum of conventional
and nuclear forces” (Taillon, 2001, 72). But as President John F. Kennedy took
office, fears of Soviet-sponsored proxy wars galvanized the Pentagon into the inten-
sive study of guerilla warfare. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism became the
fad of military doctrine, a fad that, surprisingly, was lost on the Vietnam War plan-
ners who sought to reapply the gradual approach of flexible response.
The period between the middle of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a remark-
able escalation in anti-U.S. terrorist activity. According to a report by the Vice

 Fears of terrorism also surrounded Soviet domestic sabotage or the small-scale use of chemical
weapons against targeted persons or locations, but these concerns were considered second-
ary threats and received little or no attention as an issue beyond planning stages for military
application.

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President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, between the years 1976 and 1986
international terrorists “attacked U.S. officials or installations abroad approximately
once every seventeen days” (Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on
Combating Terrorism, 1997, 1). It was within the midst of this uptick in terrorist
activity that there was a radical shift in acceptability of the use of extreme measures
to neutralize the threat. With terrorism beginning to come on the radar of national
security specialists and out of the exclusive hands of criminologists, the paradigm
for countering it began to shift.
On May 12, 1975, only two weeks after the United States’ protracted involve-
ment in Southeast Asia had been ended by its final evacuations from Cambodia
and Vietnam, a deliberate act of sea piracy by Cambodian rebels reactivated mili-
tary attention to the region. A U.S.-flagged merchant ship, the S.S. Mayaguez, en
route to Sattahip, Thailand from Hong Kong was traveling some fifty miles off the
coastal shores of Cambodia in the Gulf of Siam, when a U.S.-made gunboat flying
a deep red flag intercepted the ship. Cambodian Khmer Rouge operatives, wear-
ing their customary black ninja pajamas and carrying Chinese made AK-47s and
rocket launchers, fired a rapid burst of .50 caliber machinegun fire and a couple of
small rockets across the ship’s bow, before boarding and taking the Americans hos-
tage. In response, President Gerald Ford declared the interception an overt act of
piracy, holding the Cambodian government fully responsible for the act, just before
initiating air strikes against it and introducing an elite contingent of marine ground
forces directed to rescue the seamen. But the operation quickly shifted from defen-
sive to retaliatory. Even after the crewmen were eventually retrieved, a 150,000-
pound conventional explosive—the largest nonnuclear weapon in America’s arsenal
at the time—was detonated on a small Cambodian island measuring only a few
square miles (Fisher, 2004). In the post-Vietnam world, President Ford wanted to
make clear that the United States would not hesitate to respond with overwhelming
force against any act of aggression, by any state or any group. The military would be
a key instrument to neutralize any such threat.
Unfortunately though, the operation itself was rife with errors. Successive intel-
ligence failures plagued both defensive and offensive actions, to a degree that for-
mer crewmen rescued by the military sued the government for its gross negligence
(Rappenecker v. United States, 1980). Forty-one soldiers lost their lives in an effort to
save thirty-nine crew members, and of the forty-one who died, an estimated eigh-
teen were killed—as a result of poor intelligence acquisition—raiding the wrong
locations (Bennett, 1976, 15-16). The botched operation proved the importance
of timely and accurate intelligence acquisition as a constituent to successful low-
intensity conflict.
By the late 1970s, international terrorism had reached new heights. On Sunday,
November 4, 1979, a motley cadre of militant Iranian students overran the U.S.
Embassy in Teheran, holding hostage some fifty-two civilian and military inhabit-
ants. The move was openly supported by the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, among
other Iranian clerics, as officially condoned conduct. Under the command of the

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  263

entrepreneurial Colonel Charles Beckwith, the newly established Delta Force was
tasked to rescue the hostages. Operation Eagle Claw, as it was known, exemplified
a second embarrassing failure in military counterterrorism. Due to unfavorable
weather conditions and a mechanical failure, leading to the crashing of one helicop-
ter before the operation had even commenced, Eagle Claw was scrapped entirely,
underscoring the importance of a more professional, well-equipped special forces
division, a call the military would heed as it found itself engaged in over a dozen
hotspots around the world in the following decade.
Where an increase in international terrorist incidents between the 1970s and
1980s introduced the military into the counterterrorism equation, a marked escala-
tion in their boldness has reintroduced deficiencies in the prosecutorial approach.
In 1983, the military again faced the specter of international terrorism, this time in
the Middle East. U.S. forces stationed in Lebanon at the time were not directed for
a counterterrorist mission. Theirs was a peacemaking operation, aimed at regaining
stability in the midst of Israeli, Syrian, and conflict throughout the Lebanese terri-
tory. But, for many Muslim communities across the country, the U.S. presence was
viewed as a proxy for Israeli aggression. In their eyes, the United States had taken
sides with their Jewish adversary, uninterested in playing the role of neutral arbiter.
This perception fueled the fire of radical Islamist discontent, only serving to inten-
sify the conflict. On October 23, the powder keg of that discontent exploded. As
over three hundred marine and navy officers slept in their secured Beirut barracks,
a yellow five-ton Mercedes truck entered the parking lot south of the building,
quickly accelerating and barraging through a barbed wire and concrete barricade
before detonating over twelve thousand pounds of TNT. The Hizbullah-sponsored
martyrdom operation, the first of its kind, instantly became a legend and a point for
replication among violent jihadists worldwide. Two hundred and forty-one Ameri-
cans were killed, the largest number of marines killed in a single day since Iwo Jima
(Huchthausen, 2003).
In the wake of the bombing, serious consideration was given to conducting
extensive strikes against Hizbullah training facilities in the Baalbek region of the
Bekaa Valley, perhaps even reaching into Syrian territory, but nothing was done.
Meanwhile, French and Israeli forces continued their offensive counterterrorism
operations throughout Lebanon. On March 31, 1984, shortly following evacua-
tions by Italian and French forces, the Americans assessed their losses, some 266
soldiers killed and 151 injured in just over 530 days, and decided to retreat. Those
Americans who remained, some eighty soldiers tasked to guard the Embassy, were
again hit the following September when an annex to the Embassy was hit by yet
another suicide truck, killing twenty-three people and wounding eight marines. A
rebel cadre of Islamist militants and a handful of shaheeds had forced the U.S. mil-
itary out of Lebanon, and the counterterrorism response was scarcely detectable.
In the wake of the withdrawal from Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan approved
NSDD 138, a comprehensive strategy to “shift policy focus from passive to active
defense measures,” tasking the Department of Defense (DoD) to “maintain and

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 264  n  Handbook of Military Administration

further develop capabilities to deal with the spectrum of threat options.” The policy
served as a subtle indication to the military that it was to serve an important role
in the future of counterterrorism. Upset with Libyan-sponsored terrorism, par-
ticularly one foiled plot involving the use of a suicide bomber to attack the U.S.
Embassy in Cairo, the National Security Council (NSC) developed two plans of
response: Operation Tulip, an effort to provide training and support to Algerian
and Egyptian paramilitary actions deep inside Libya, and Operation Rose, a plan
for a joint U.S.-Egyptian war against Libya (Naftali, 2005). In a move chalked
as the first official attempt to seek regime change for a state sponsor of terrorism,
President Reagan signed a Presidential Finding initiating Operation Tulip. In the
words of one NSC staffer pushing for radical preemption, the United States sought
to “get the sponsors of terrorism before the terrorists get you” (Naftali, 2005, 169).
And although the Tulip operation was scrapped after a key NSC leak to The Wash-
ington Post investigative journalist Bob Woodward, it was the beginning of U.S.
involvement in Libya, followed by retaliatory airstrikes a year later in response to a
Libyan-sponsored bombing of a nightclub in Germany (Naftali, 2005). U.S. mili-
tary assets, vis-à-vis counterterrorism policy with Libya, were viewed as both pre-
emptive and reactive instruments.
October 7, 1985 marked an important period in the history of U.S. counterter-
rorism. On that day, just months after Lebanese gunmen hijacked a TWA flight
in transit from Athens to Rome, four discontented Palestinian terrorists hijacked a
631-foot long Italian cruise ship as it traversed the high sees. The Achille Lauro, as
the ship was named, quickly became an international incident, after they killed and
threw overboard a disabled American as he lay helplessly in his wheelchair. Denied
entry by the governments of Cyprus, Lebanon, and Syria, the hijackers were com-
pelled to return to Port Said, Egypt. After several days of intensive negotiations,
the hijackers gave in, and U.S. Navy SEAL teams prepared to board the ship in a
rescue effort. In exchange for leaving the ship and its 750 passengers, the hijackers
were given safe passage by the Egyptian government onboard an Egyptian airliner
to Tunisia, along with their PLO negotiator, Abu Abbas—who it was later learned
had been involved in planning the operation from the start. Unable to electronically
pinpoint the precise location of EgyptAir flight 2843, Air Force Tomcats were dis-
patched to fly their 63,000-pound fighters close enough to civilian airlines to see the
tail number with a flashlight (Bohn, 2004). Eventually, the flight was successfully
forced to land at the nearby Italian Naval Air Station and NATO airbase at Sigo-
nella, Italy. Once grounded, U.S. forces surrounded the plane, ending the standoff
through negotiations with Italian forces. The incident proved an important water-
mark in the use of the military for the purposes of counterterrorist interdiction.
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton would go on to use military
force to supplement foreign law enforcement activities through counternarcotics
enhancements in Colombia against Pablo Escobar and his infamous Cali cartel,
and against Panamanian President Manuel Noriega, support irregular renditions
of terrorists like Fawaz Yunis and Ramzi Yousef, and exact retaliatory strikes

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  265

against al-Qa’eda operatives in Sudan and Afghanistan. Throughout the 1990s,

these activities and others underscored the validity of military action as an instru-
ment of counterterrorism, particularly in regards to low-intensity operations. At
the time, the military’s role was to assist and respond, not to neutralize. September
11, 2001 spurred a momentous pivot back in favor of threat neutralization, as the
nation prepared to embark on its newly declared global war on terrorism (GWOT),
under the banner of which force was deemed appropriate against any individual,
state, or organization associated with the al-Qa’eda network. Shortly thereafter
the nation found itself engaged in the very first truly special operations war in its
history, Operation Enduring Freedom. Working in isolated spots throughout the
Afghan countryside, special forces formed strategic alliances with native warlords
and conducted a series of air and ground raids on specific high-value targets, in an
effort to disrupt al-Qa’eda and Taliban operations. Drawing from the lessons of
the nation’s late nineteenth century defeats in Nicaragua, commanders were keen
to adapt, establish parochial networks of support, and take every action necessary
to garner approval by the local populations. Successes enjoyed by the military’s
light-footed, mobile special operations forces were not “just impressive, in the his-
tory of modern warfare [they were] virtually unprecedented” (Barnett, 2005, 14).
Through a blending of special operations and regular forces, Operation Enduring
Freedom has thus far remained the model for large-scale unconventional military
counterterrorism. Nonetheless, as the significance of illicit nonstate actors on the
transnational plane are increasingly implicated in the broader networks maintained
by terrorist organizations is realized, and the tolerability for using force to neutral-
ize them enhanced, the broad spectra of instruments in varying intensities remains
at the military’s disposal.

“General Warfare” as an Instrument

of Military Counterterrorism
The traditional U.S. model used in legal arenas for distinguishing the nature of
conflicts is born principally in a bifurcation made between so-called “general war”
and that of “limited war” (Bas v. Tingy, 1800, 37). General war is that form of

 On September 18, seven days following the 9/11 attacks, Congress promptly passed an Autho-
rization to Use Military Force (AUMF) granting the president authority to “use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or person, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organization, or persons.” Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), 107th Congress, Public Law 107-40 [S. J. RES. 23],
September 18, 2001. This AUMF has been construed to define by congressional assent the
scope of the GWOT as applying solely to those associated with the al-Qa’eda network, at least
in so far as military applications of force may be concerned.

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conflict, typically recognized by formal declaration, involving widespread and

broadly aimed armed conflict. Limited war, on the other hand, is by definition
limited in space, in participants, and in time. Military antiterrorism measures span
the spectrum of both forms.
General warfare is a highly atypical application of force within most counter-
terrorism contexts. This reality is tied largely to the nature of the threat posed by
an adversary. Indeed, it seems unreasonable to use aircraft and tanks to neutralize
three men in a Karachi apartment mixing chemicals for their next attack. Most
encounters with terrorist cells are therefore irregular, or imperfect, in nature. But,
from time to time, full-scale war has been deemed appropriate. In the first instance,
President Jefferson’s military actions against the Barbary pirates and their respec-
tive state sponsors, was a massive exercise of force aimed at ending the piratical
racket. Force, in this case, was most appropriately conventional as the degree of
threat presented by the Barbary states was considerable. In essence, what began as
directed action against nonstate actors upon the high seas, quickly evolved into a
state-to-state conflict. Importantly, President Jefferson chose to apply conventional
force in both stages, knowing that the power posed by even pirates when supported
by a state was great enough to be addressed only by conventional arms. At times,
even nonstate actors can harness such militaristic capability that only the applica-
tion of conventional forces will suffice toward their eventual neutralization.
As with the secondary stages of Jefferson’s war against the jihadist pirates, Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom illustrated the occasional necessity to engage in direct
state-to-state conflict as an instrument of counterterrorist policy. By stemming the
flow of covert (or at times even overt) assistance by a state to a nonstate terrorist
network, it becomes possible to divide the tree from its roots. Without continuous
state sponsorship, many terrorist networks—albeit not all, as in the case of al-
Qa’eda—cannot survive. Thus, disuniting the state from its violent proxy through
general warfare, in some instances, may castrate the threat.
Not all acts of war are intended as offensive operations, however. Defensive
measures, like protecting life or property, at times may call for extensive military
engagement. Although defensive measures of this sort rarely necessitate full-scale
warfare, there have been exceptions. In October of 1983, for instance, President
Reagan launched Operation Urgent Fury, a robust military occupation of the small
Caribbean nation of Grenada, under the auspices of providing protection for U.S.
medical students in the region. Six years later, President Bush went on to storm
Panama, in large part out of genuine concern for the security of some thirty-four
thousand U.S. citizens who resided there. Although neither operation was specifi-
cally tailored for counterterrorism per se, the same protective principle could apply
in those instances where a state shed its sovereign protection by sponsoring, or
otherwise deliberately failing to counteract, terrorist or guerilla activities aimed at
Americans living abroad.
Ultimately, however, general warfare is rarely an appropriate counterterrorism
measure. Deliberate disproportionality of such a response, in many instances, may

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  267

galvanize greater public support for the terrorist or guerilla movement and, where
such operatives hide among civilian populations, may cause such unnecessary dis-
ruption to civil infrastructure, or the displacement of populations thereof, as to
violate the customs of international humanitarian law. The level of response is best
when tailored narrowly to the level of threat.

Imperfect Warfare and Military Operations

Other Than War (MOOTW)
The key challenge posed by imperfect warfare, in counterterrorism and elsewhere,
is that of “institutionalizing the irregular” (Bell, 1984, 24; Jordan, Taylor, and
Mazarr, 1999, 253). Irregular operations of this class often comprise the “bread and
butter” of military counterterrorism, ranging from offensive special operations to
interdictions and humanitarian and law enforcement support. By addressing the
threat on this plane, a narrowly tailored response may be constructed to respond to
the specifics of a given threat.

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC)

In the most general of terms, low intensity conflict (LIC) refers to the selective
application of force used with restraint to achieve narrow and specific military
objectives. Traditionally, LIC is applied through the use of special operations forces
in either an offensive or defensive arrangement. Within the context of counterter-
rorism, LIC may include operations such as the dispatching of Delta Force or SEAL
teams to capture or neutralize independent cells, seize volatile armaments, or even
to rescue hostages. In many instances, the application of LIC is the first line of
military counterterrorism.

Targeted Strikes
When commando teams of special operators conducting LIC may prove either too
cumbersome and slow, or too small and inefficient, targeted strikes remain a pos-
sibility. Given the asymmetric nature of terrorism, in many instances force may be
applied by way of a technique known as targeted killing, the narrowly tailored use
of force against particular individuals, typically leadership personnel of a terrorist
or guerilla organization. As a matter of theory, by decapitating the principals, a ter-
rorist or guerilla group may be sufficiently disrupted so as to cause it to collapse—
or at minimum weaken its core. Of course, in other instances, a targeted strike
directed against leadership may blowback—causing popular support in the wake of
the leader’s death to swell well beyond a manageable point. Targeted killings, once

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applied, rely upon the state’s authority to act preemptively to disengage a serious
threat to national security, although its application is both politically volatile, and
where such an operation is conducted outside the geographic theater of a general
war, raises serious legal questions of legitimacy.
Where targeted killings provide a scalpel approach to threat neutralization,
selective retaliatory strikes provide the war fighter a slightly broader instrument. By
firing, for instance, cruise missiles or air-launched rockets at facilities used by a ter-
rorist organization, it may be possible both to temporarily disrupt a terrorist organi-
zation’s physical capabilities (weapons armaments, training camps, etc.) and deter
them from future actions. In some instances, though typically when sponsored by
rational states, terrorist organizations can be deterred, although misapplication of
the deterrence principle can leave forces appearing impotent and willy-nilly, swat-
ting flies in the face of an ever real threat (Trager and Zagorcheva, 2005/2006).
In March of 1986, National Security Agency (NSA) operators intercepted an
important message. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi, once described by Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan as the “mad clown of the Middle East,” had ordered twelve
sabotage teams throughout Western Europe and Turkey to execute attacks against
U.S. interests and facilities (Naftali, 2005, 185). Acting on this intelligence, shared
by Washington, French and Turkish authorities were able to subvert plots in their
respective countries (Naftali, 2005). On April 5, a Libyan team detonated a bomb
in the popular La Belle discothèque in West Berlin, trendy among locally stationed
U.S. troops. One hundred people were injured, one U.S. soldier killed. At mid-
night, Tripoli time, nine days later, a team of F-111 bombers, Navy EA-6B elec-
tronic jammers, EA-3 intelligence aircraft, EA-2C radar-control aircraft, A-7 and
F-18 antiradar missile attack vehicles, and Navy F-14s were sent screaming across
the Libyan sky, striking deep in the heart of Tripoli, including Qaddafi’s compound
(Huchthausen, 2003). It was the first military overt retaliatory strike in response
to terrorist activity, but scarcely the last. Military retaliation has long since been
viewed as a legitimate instrument of military antiterrorism. President Bill Clin-
ton would go on to send cruise missiles into the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence
following the acquisition of information on President Saddam Hussein’s apparent
involvement in a 1993 assassination attempt against former President George H. W.
Bush. Retaliation was part of the counterterrorism instrument.
Ultimately though, retaliation alone is rarely sufficient to neutralize the threat
posed by international terrorism. Retaliation, largely utilized as a cathartic means to
condemn acts of aggression, an effort to neutralize or disrupt the threat posed by a
particular adversary, or an after-the-fact measure to reassert or reaffirm deterrence,
is an instrument traditionally reserved for state-to-state conflict. It is, after all, some-
thing less than complete threat neutralization. When addressing nonstate actors,
like international terrorists, simple retaliation may serve only to further inflame
their base of support while failing to render ineffective their capacity to attack.

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Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Not every conflict with terrorism or guerilla factions with which a nation is involved
is its alone. Indeed, international terrorism, by its very nature, transcends borders,
and in so doing often involves operations conducted in friendly territories not con-
trolled by the United States. When a friendly state is at war with these terrorists,
foreign internal defense (FID) assistance, providing military assets or intelligence
in support of foreign operation, may go far in allowing allies to neutralize a threat
by proxy, or give the nation the opportunity as an uninterested party to provide
counterterrorism aid as a measure of goodwill. Such was the case of JUSMAPG in
the Greek war against communist ELAS guerillas. But not all forms of FID are so
direct in their counterterrorist intent or in the scope of U.S. involvement. Fearful of
a spread of Libyan ideology and terrorism, for instance, the United States provided
substantial military assistance to Chadian forces throughout the late 1980s, “help-
ing them to deal Qadafi’s Libyan forces a humiliating military defeat in 1987” (Jor-
dan, Taylor, and Mazarr, 1999). The assistance was an effort to aid another party
for its own military ends, as such ends coincided with U.S. counterterrorist inter-
ests in retaliation for their sponsorship of anti-U.S. terrorism. Ultimately, whether
direct or indirect, FID gives the nation an opportunity to disrupt or neutralize a
terrorist threat through other means.

Law Enforcement Support

When terrorism is contemplated through the rubric of criminal activity, rather than
as an act of war, the response quite naturally entails activities of the law enforcement
community. In many instances, the military may provide substantial assistance to
law enforcement, in an effort to harness the discipline or resources to bolster the law
enforcement mandate. From a defensive standpoint, military assets have regularly
been used to assist law enforcement officials for highly visible public events, such
as the Olympics or World Cup, or domestically through North American Com-
mand (NORTHCOM) assistance to the Department of Homeland Security, FBI,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. Such was the case when President Nixon
placed military personnel onboard international flights as air marshals in Septem-
ber of 1970, lacking the federal law enforcement personnel to do the job. When the
potential terrorist target is so considerable, law enforcement requires the greatest
resources at its disposal to secure the area, resources often only possessed by the
armed forces. In the event of a high-consequence attack, incident management is
likely to be bolstered by military support or command.
Military assets are also the principal national instrument to conduct interdic-
tions by sea or air. Whether aimed at defeating Somali or Malaysia sea pirates, as an
instrument in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to minimize the black
market circulation of radioactive and dual-use materials used for the production of

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nuclear weapons, or in response to a hijacked airplane, interdictions, if rare, can be

an important counterterrorism measure.
Another particularly important application of the military in support of law
enforcement operations is by way of irregular rendition. Rendition, in its simplest
of terms, is that process by which the body of an individual is taken from one state
to another. This process may occur in either a “regular” or an “irregular” form.
Regular rendition occurs when the individual is moved pursuant to the express
terms and procedures of a given extradition treaty. Irregular rendition, on the other
hand, is principally comprised of the rare instances in which an individual is moved
in lieu of, outside of, or in spite of an extradition treaty. These irregular forms of
rendition can generally be classified into four categories: (1) luring/trickery, (2)
deportation as de facto extradition, (3) forcible abductions for prosecution, and (4)
third-party interrogative renditions. The military has proven an important asset
for law enforcement cooperation in three of these four forms of rendition. Lur-
ing/trickery involves drawing an alleged criminal into a jurisdiction of control, or
into international waters, for an extraterritorial arrest. In such an instance, military
assets may be used as a platform and to transport the federal law enforcement
agents and alleged criminal from the point of arrest to a federal detention facil-
ity (Jenkins, 1990). It has also long remained the practice of the United States to
forcibly abduct alleged criminals for criminal prosecution, and more recently since
the mid-1990s the practice to abduct for the purposes of interrogation by another
country. Military personnel and assets can be crucial in forcible abductions, both
through the use of military airfields by FBI or CIA officials and, on less frequent
occasions, by direct involvement in the kidnapping itself, as was the case of one
well-known al-Qa’eda operative Ramzi Yousef (Reeve, 1999). In whatever capac-
ity, military activity rarely remains the sole mechanism for implementing a broad
counterterrorism strategy.

Nonkinetic Considerations
Though military administration is traditionally viewed through the scope of the
“management of violence,” its function is rarely limited to the exacting of harm
through an array of carefully crafted kinetic options (Huntington, 1957, 11). Non-
kinetic elements of the military are also present, and are of particular importance
in the field of antiterrorism.

Detention and Adjudication

Within the war context, detention and interrogation, for instance, are routine though
fundamental nonkinetic military functions. The military’s right to detain combat-
ants has always been viewed as legitimate and, as the Supreme Court has found, “is

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  271

a fundamental incident of waging war” (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004). Where, as the

post-9/11 milieu has provided, a terrorist is viewed not merely as a criminal rendered
to face trial, but as a combatant in the midst of an ongoing war against the United
States, it is the responsibility of the military to provide for his detention.
Once a combatant is surrendered and detained, he may be viewed as an impor-
tant source of operationally significant intelligence information. As a result, it rests
within the province of military authority to interview and, where necessary, inter-
rogate him. These interrogations are bound not only by traditional DoD and sec-
retary of defense regulations, but also by other international and domestic legal
considerations, such as the Geneva Conventions, Convention Against Torture, and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The application of and degree to
which such laws apply remain a matter of active and considerable debate.
Though the intent behind combatant detention is geared to prevent the return
of combatants to the battlefield and, therefore, must end upon the cessation of hos-
tilities, individuals detained by the military for their involvement in international
terrorist activity may also be in violation of the Laws of War, in modern times most
particularly those offences listed as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. In
such instances, the military has traditionally convened special military commissions
to try the combatants for their unlawful conduct. For nearly a thousand years, mili-
taries have maintained distinct classes of laws to maintain the order and discipline
requisite for effective military conduct (Fisher, 1). With time, British provisions of
this sort matured into formal regulations, which, when modified by the Continental
Congress in June of 1775, were codified into a series of sixty-nine articles, providing
for distinct prohibitions on military conduct and instituting an independent sys-
tem of adjudication for their violation, military courts-martial (Fisher). But, in the
American tradition, these courts were not reserved to U.S. soldiers alone. Amidst
the War of Independence in 1780, apprehended British spy Major John André was
ordered by General George Washington to be tried, and subsequently executed, for
the crime of espionage (Fisher). Similar tribunals have been used throughout U.S.
history against combatants for their irregular and unlawful activity. On November
13, 2001, in a presidential order closely tracking the language of a 1942 military
order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to institute a military commission to
try Nazi saboteurs, President George W. Bush became the first president to con-
template the application of such tribunals to suspected terrorists, and in so doing
made adjudication yet another nonkinetic instrument of military antiterrorism. On
November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order relative to the Deten-
tion, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in the War Against Terrorism,
followed by a series of six Military Commission Orders and nine Military Commis-
sion Instructions defining the scope of adjudicatory authority, and solidifying the
organizational and procedural aspects of a trial. On June 29, 2006, the Supreme
Court of the United States found that the formulation proposed by the president
for the construction of the military commissions was in violation of the laws of war,

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although they may return upon the construction of appropriate legislative assent
(Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006).

Intelligence
As the predominant player within the intelligence community, the DoD is in part
also responsible for collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. Signals
intelligence (SIGINT), that form of intelligence that is derived through the inter-
ception of electronic or electromagnetic signals, and measurement and signaling
intelligence (MASINT) are controlled principally by the NSA, an arm of DoD-
based intelligence. Though not precisely “military” in nature as such, NSA SIGINT
operations play an instrumental role in eavesdropping on the telecommunications
of foreign terrorist operatives.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), functioning in its current form since
July of 1961, is responsible for the organizational and management aspects of all
DoD intelligence assets (Richelson, 1999). As a result, DIA acquires from its con-
stituents detailed, all-source, raw, defense-related information for the production
of intelligence, in turn disseminated among policy makers, operators, and liaisons
throughout the government. Since 1992, information acquired by DIA arrives in
not only SIGINT and MASINT, but human intelligence (HUMINT) as well
(Centralized Management of DoD Human Intelligence Operations, 1992). While
NSA and DIA operations, in conjunction with other quasi-military and civilian
intelligence entities (e.g., CIA, National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA], Bureau of Intelligence and Research
[INR], etc.), remain the mainstay of strategic intelligence within the intelligence
community, day-to-day operations within the military context are principally
driven through the use of tactical, or operational, intelligence. For U.S. military
personnel, with respect to the application of the military for antiterrorist activities,
this frontline for operational intelligence collection remains in the hands of service
branches and unified combatant commands.
Army intelligence, the principal responsibility of the deputy chief of the Army
for Intelligence (DCSI), is centralized within the service’s Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM). Although varying assistant chiefs of staff (ACSs) focus on
veritable concentrations ranging from logistics to force modernization, it is under
the guise of the ACS for Operations and INSCOM’s Support Battalion where
actionable, day-to-day intelligence information is acquired and processed for the
war fighter, often run through the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)
based in Charlottesville, Virginia, which provides a holistic picture for ground

 It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom and Canada both replaced military intel-
ligence in favor of unified entities for defense information, and that Australia and France
restrict their military service intelligence operations to tactical information alone. For more
see Richelson (1999, 74).

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forces. Given the idiosyncratic nature of the enemy, INSCOM and NGIC opera-
tions are pivotal in the success of army counterterrorism activities.
Naval intelligence is divided into two components, the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence (ONI) and the Naval Security Group Command (NS). GCONI, the more
central of the two offices, is tasked to provide overall collections, coordination,
and dissemination of that information acquired by or relevant to naval operations,
in close coordination with combatant commands. NSGC, on the other hand, is
geared directly at SIGINT, MASINT, and providing security for naval communi-
cations systems. Naval intelligence of this sort is a crucial asset to detecting terrorist
activities in coastal states, particularly in Southeast Asia, and in detecting piratical
activities on the high seas.
Though vested within the Naval Department, the Marine Corps also maintains
an independent Intelligence Division under the ACS for Command, Control, Com-
munications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). C4I coordinates overall marine
intelligence by way of four specialized compartments, though analysis is provided
to the war fighter principally by way of the Support Division located within the
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).
Finally, working under the air force’s deputy chief of staff for Air and Space
Operations, the Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(DISR) is tasked, in addition to operational responsibilities, with collecting and
analyzing air and space intelligence provided by the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA)
and the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). The air force is the
sole service where intelligence and operations are found in the same directorate
(Richelson, 1999).
But intelligence on operational grounds is even more the product of combatant
command activity than specific service branches. Each combatant command main-
tains its own capabilities. The war fighter, whether operating within the context of
the GWOT, or within any other counterterrorism context, is served tremendously
through the timely acquisition and application of relevant intelligence.

“Hearts and Minds”

Whereas the collection of intelligence implicates the reception of an adversary’s
thoughts and feelings, other operations may be used to influence them. There is a
story about a U.S. colonel who, on meeting with his North Vietnamese counterpart
after the cessation of hostilities said to him, “You know you never defeated us on
the battlefield.” The Communist soldier considered and replied, “That may be so,
but it is also irrelevant” (Summers, 1984; Taillon, 2001, 79). Military operations,
of whatever scale, do not exist solely within the province of kinetic force. Opinions
often matter, and matter a great deal. When placed into the context of antiterror-
ism efforts, operations must take into account the impact any given action may
have on the impressions of those in a position to assist the enemy—the so‑called

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“fence sitters”—the impressions of the U.S. public, and to the broader court of
world opinion. Though the impressions made upon a determined and zealous
enemy rarely matter, as is typically the case with hardened international terror-
ists, others who may be willing to assist those terrorists by providing logistical or
material support, or safe haven, are often open to persuasion. Paradoxically, as the
North Vietnamese soldier’s remarks suggest, operational success does not always
translate to an improvement in the opinions of others. This divide is a crucial wedge
in counterterrorism.
American public opinion also matters. In keeping with its tradition of demo-
cratic liberalism, the United States is both a nation of laws as well as general moral-
ity. Though a given operation may prove efficient to neutralize a threat, if the means
employed subvert legal principle, or are otherwise ethically suspect, public support
for those efforts quickly corrodes. Indiscriminate bombing, particularly cruel or
unusual interrogation techniques, or threats to kill, torture, or detain innocent
family members as a means to deterrence would not only fuel the fire of the terrorist
movement, but would severely undermine necessary public support.
World opinion also matters. No doubt, U.S. security must not be subject to the
whims or will of other states, but the scope of permissible conduct in the view of
others plays an important role in the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. Antiterrorism
measures deemed illegitimate or unlawful provide a basis for further complaint to
those states with which the United States does not have particularly good relations
and, more importantly, may wear away the bonds of support provided by allies.
Military administrators and policy makers alike face common problems in
attempting to gauge something as ethereal as opinion. Metrics often vary, between
the use of international legal obligations like the Geneva Conventions and Conven-
tion Against Torture, domestic legal considerations ranging from Constitutional
war power discussions to appropriations, and, in limited instances, the cautious use
of reliable polling data. In this sense, particularly in an age of the twenty-four-hour
news cycle, military operations are themselves also political actions of sorts, and
therefore demand some measure of attention to the impressions given to others,
whatever the operational intent. But the military’s relationship with public opinion
is not always so passive.
As a class, terrorism relies heavily upon the general support of a key popula-
tion. Identifying that population and successfully employing measures to win its
support can be effective in undermining a terrorist or guerilla web. Humanitarian
assistance programs in Pakistan in the wake of a catastrophic 2005 earthquake
killing upwards of an estimated seventy-three thousand people, was instrumental
in softening the pull of anti-U.S. sentiment in the affected areas. Assistance a year
before in southeast Asia, in response to a devastating tsunami, achieved much the
same end. Although such assistance was principally humanitarian in nature, rather
than for counterterrorism purposes, U.S. goodwill in the face of tragedy proved an
important testing ground for the theory that assistance matters.

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Information Operations (IO)

Since the installation of poet Archibald MacLeish as the director of the Office of
Facts and Figures, a pre-World War II construction aimed at counteracting the
effects of Nazi propaganda efforts, the outward use of information has remained
a paramount instrument in the U.S. defense posture. Information is itself a tool
(Sorensen, 1968). Information operations (IOs), though traditionally nonkinetic,
may be both offensive and defensive in nature. Where offensive measures seek to
influence the opinions of others—or destroy their capacity to effectively communi-
cate between themselves or others—defensive measures seek to provide security for
the free flow of information within the nation.
Offensive IO is principally centered around two classes: psychological opera-
tions (PSYOPS) and electronic warfare (EW). PSYOPS refer to the direction of
information in such a manner as to influence the opinions of either an adversary or
his supporters. By disseminating information, whether through the press or other
means, it becomes possible to provide the tools to the target audience so as to influ-
ence their objective interpretations of particular events or subjective opinions of the
same, in a manner favorable to the overall strategy employed. Use of information in
this manner may be “white” or “black”—that is to say, it may be truthful (white) or
not (black), though the use of black propaganda has long been repudiated by most
commanders as both immoral and susceptible to blowback.
Defensive IO refers to those efforts in which critical information is secured
from outside interference. U.S. institutions, government, corporate, and public
alike, presume a high level of free-flowing information. It is often the responsibility
of the DoD, through physical measures or NSA-spearheaded cybertechniques, to
protect it.
As terrorism relies upon the fear its perpetrators incite, acquisition, dissemina-
tion, and interpretation of information is key and, therefore, is incident to the the-
ater of adversarial conflict. The military is not without its instruments to influence
the medium.

How Things Changed after 9/11

Few aspects of counterterrorism are true today that were not equally true on Sep-
tember 10, 2001. The “planes operation” did not, in and of itself, wholly revolu-
tionize the strategic playing field for the United States, or elsewhere. Instead, what
marks post-9/11 counterterrorism as significant is the almost universal acceptance
of previously contentious perspectives, igniting advanced discussions in the field
of unconventional warfare. The push toward a complete military transformation
from traditional to untraditional, LIC forces, has been long in coming, but 9/11
gave it wings. Recognizing the importance of full-spectrum dominance, through

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the application of highly mobile, networked forces, the Pentagon has slowly moved
through the process of transformation toward a new revolution in the structure of
the military, in time replacing traditional hierarchical models and platforms with
lean, agile, and interoperable forces. Under the banner of light-footed, rapid-reac-
tion special operations forces, the military has since been applied in Operation
Enduring Freedom’s anti-Taliban and al-Qa’eda operations in Afghanistan, Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom’s activities directed against insurgents and foreign fighters,
and through varying assistance programs in the Philippines and Africa (Feickert,
2005).
In congruence with the National Security Strategy, toward comprehend-
ing threats in different ways, in February of 2006, the DoD issued a first-ever
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, outlining the mis-
sion objectives in the GWOT and the ways in which the military contributes
toward the achievement of those objectives. According to the plan, objectives in
the GWOT include:

n Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive

n Enable partner nations to counter terrorism
n Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials,
and increase capacity for consequence management
n Defeat terrorists and their organizations
n Counter state and nonstate support for terrorism in coordination with other
U.S. government agencies and partner nations
n Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological sup-
port for terrorism

To achieve these objectives, the Special Operations Command is designated the

principal “synchronizer,” targeting the eight chief vulnerabilities for terrorist net-
works: ideological support, weapons acquisition, financing, territorial safe havens,
personnel, leadership, communications, and easy access to targets. Addressing these
vulnerabilities requires not only hardening targets and conducting offensive opera-
tions, but also includes the other instruments of kinetic and nonkinetic counterter-
rorism, like humanitarian assistance and IO. The approach has become holistic,
and increasingly so.

Other Countries’ Experiences

Within the international arena, many states address the threat of terrorism very
differently, handling the application of military force in varying ways. Consider,
for example, the cases of Colombia and Israel.

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  277

Colombia
The nature of counterterrorism in Colombia is uniquely framed within the context
of its long history in dealing with Marxist rebels and complex narcoterrorist regimes.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army
(ELN), and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), have long since
threatened the lives of any person, civilian or otherwise, who dared interfere with
their narcotics trade and respective political agendas. Employing the use of light
explosives, assassination, and kidnappings, among other measures, Colombian gue-
rilla forces are among the most lethal terrorist organizations in the world. But in
light of their considerable political and economic force, the Colombian government
has long been compelled in part to deal with these groups on the plane of recognized
political interaction, dispensing with most tradition distinctly counterterrorism leg-
islation. Instead, the government relies principally upon their ill-defined Constitu-
tional powers and executive order, or apply broad-based criminal legislation, like
article 187 of its penal code criminalizing actions against public order. Under the
purview of its broad authority, the military has, on occasion, applied force against
rebel factions, but in so doing has largely treated them as internal rebels rather than
as terrorists. In this fashion, the application of force has often centered around
conventional military operations. Although the Colombian approach has largely
envisioned the conventional use of force, it appears to be moving more in the direc-
tion of law enforcement and LIC through the use of special operations.
In the past few years, however, the Colombian military has bolstered its efforts
through the creation of several bodies specifically aimed at countering the terror-
ist threat. One army battalion, for instance, is designed to bolster national police
efforts in countering narcoterrorism. A joint intelligence center has also been estab-
lished to provide coherent collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant intelli-
gence. The army has formed a rapid deployment force based north of Bogotá in the
state of Cundinamarca, though many fear it will be suited more for counternarcotic
operations than for the narrow task of countering terrorism. For Colombians, a tra-
dition of conventional applications of force through the back-and-forth assessment
of terrorist groups as recognized political actors and rebel forces has left a difficult
legacy that has long served as an impediment toward the surgical operations of
threat neutralization, a trend that with time has slowly corroded.

Israel
Like Colombia, Israel too has a long and somewhat checkered history of mili-
tary counterterrorism. Employing every level of violence—both conventional and
irregular—the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have applied force not only defensively,
but also on a rather frequent occasion preventively and offensively. Ultimately, the
lawfulness and effectiveness of some Israeli offensive activities remain in dispute.

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Many international organizations, including the United Nations, have routinely

condemned Israeli military incursion into Gaza and the West Bank for their pro-
found impact on the humanitarian situation within the Palestinian Territories. In
the summer of 2006, for instance, in response to the HAMAS-sponsored kidnap-
ping of a nineteen-year-old IDF corporal Gilad Shalit patrolling the security fence
separating Israel proper from the Gaza Strip, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered
the initiation of a substantial and continuing military campaign against a very
wide range of targets throughout Gaza, declaring, “I want no one to sleep at night
in Gaza” (Israeli Warplanes Continue Airstrikes on Palestinian Buildings, 2006).
These actions, like the many before it, have drawn extensive international criticism,
though the Israeli government reiterates its claim that such actions are necessary to
disrupt the continuity of terrorist operations within the Territories. Many have also
questioned the effectiveness of these tactics. Although there remains little doubt
that the application of both conventional and irregular force to the Palestinian
terrorist organizations has proven effective in limiting their short-term capabil-
ity, many counter, however, that the profound “boomerang effect” kinetic force
typically has on the general Palestinian population has gone far in improving their
regenerative capability through otherwise unwilling fighters, abettors, and finan-
ciers (Ganor, 2005, 129). In any case, facing the perpetual threat of Islamic terror-
ism on its geographical doorstep, Israel has been more inclined than most modern
states to employ conventional techniques to an unconventional threat.

The Future of Military Counterterrorism

As the worldwide campaign against al-Qa’eda-affiliated terrorists ensues and glo-
balization increasingly escalates the potency of criminal enterprise with nonstate
violence on the transnational plane, careful consideration must be given to how
these emerging asymmetries should be incorporated into grand military strategy
and its reflection in force structure. Presently, a great divergence between two gen-
eral schools of thought has emerged. One philosophical camp subscribes to a theory
of historical dialectic, neatly defining warfare into generations. Taking from the
late 1980s work of military thinker William Lind, these strategists comprehend
the history of modern warfare in four temporally bound trends. The first genera-
tion, according to Lind, extended from the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 up to the
American Civil War, marked by the strict maintenance of orderly formations firing
smoothbore muskets and cannons. It was the French, in Lind’s interpretation, who
replaced this with a second generation, shortly preceding World War I. Under the
second generation model, artillery rounds were used to subdue a defined geography,
and foot-soldiers followed to occupy. A third generation followed, when Nazi strat-
egists employed “blitzkrieg” tactics, replacing firepower with speed. The aim of the
third generation was to weaken the adversary through lightning attacks on critical
supply lines, repositories, and leadership depots, rather than by attrition. According

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 Countering Nonstate Terrorist and Guerilla Networks  n  279

to the Lind camp, a fourth generation of warfare has now emerged, where gue-
rilla tactics seek to defeat an adversary politically, rather than merely by way of
traditional force, through years of low-intensity operations. In essence, a dialectic
shift in strategic warfare has moved from the utilization of massive manpower,
to impressive firepower, to crafty maneuver, and now into politico-military cam-
paigns. For the fourth generation warfare (4GW) strategist, insurgency-styled ter-
rorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with broader al-Qa’eda-sponsored agendas
in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Central Asia, Somalia, and elsewhere, serve
to underscore this thesis.
Under the 4GW doctrine, irregularities of counterterrorism will themselves
become the norm, requiring the military to prepare for drawn-out conflict and
engage in considerable efforts to provide much-needed assistance for the sustain-
ability of critical infrastructure and the rule of law. In this vision, terrorism and
guerilla fighting is the future of warfare, not its archaic past.
A second school of thought is born from the fascinating developments
bequeathed by the technological and globalizing age. For these theorists, com-
bat is centered principally around the platforms, or principal machines, of war,
be they tanks, ships, aircraft, or the like. Through an enhanced mechanization of
the war-fighting process, these platforms over time have transformed into nodes
within the context of a broad network. Each node in the network, the techno-
logical progeny of war’s machines in days past, maintains the capacity to enter the
adversary’s decision loop with profound speed and accuracy. That is to say, the war
fighter can “make two or more decisions for every one [his] opponent can man-
age—our silicon-based computers trumping their carbon-based brain every time”
(Barnett, 2005, 12). In essence, by harnessing the benefits of just-in-time logis-
tic support and the high technology of modern transportation and sensors, these
network-centric warfare (NCW) strategists subscribe to the belief that the key to
simultaneous operations across a wide swath of geographic dimensions is found
through the networked approach. Counterterrorism then, will be tackled through
the acquisition and heavy employment of technologies, such as sensors, unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and GPS to achieve full-spectrum dominance with pinpoint
precision. Where 4GW theorists would envision extensive, “boots on the ground”
counterinsurgencies, NCW strategists comprehend warfare through the specter of
high technology bolstering light, rapid-reaction forces intended for lightning-fast
actions against particularized targets.
Between the 4GW and NCW approaches to warfare, something of an amal-
gam of these theories has emerged in recent years. In a book entitled Blueprint for
Action: A Future Worth Creating, military strategist Thomas P. M. Barnett (2005)
has proposed a third way. Military forces in modern times, Barnett contends, may
be divided between what he calls leviathan forces—large, conventional military
capabilities—and system administrators (SysAdmin). “While the core security
and logistical capabilities are derived from uniformed military components, the
SysAdmin force is fundamentally envisioned as standing capacity for interagency

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(i.e., among various U.S. federal agencies) and international collaboration in nation
building” (xix). Ultimately, “the better the leviathan, the bigger the SysAdmin must
be” (35). To effectuate this model, Barnett recommends enhanced international
cooperation, wherein the United States would be the hub and its allies the spokes
(36). With its application to counterterrorism, the United States would maintain
the capacity to wage leviathan-centric warfare, in addition to LIC capabilities, but
would share its responsibilities for extensive counterinsurgency and stabilization
capabilities with allied forces. Where 4GW strategists call for large forces prepared
for protracted engagement and NCW theorists insist upon the careful application
of rapid-technology-based light forces, Barnett envisions a future for them both,
divided between partners under a presumable banner of mutual interest in counter-
ing international terrorism.
In December of 2006, the army and marine corps each released its official Field
Manual for Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24; MCWP 3-33.5) integrating many of the
predicates once reserved by 4GW strategists, emphasizing the importance of flex-
ibility, rapid institutional learning, grass-roots intelligence, and unity of command.
But, even with these changes, the future of military applications to counterterror-
ism remains uncertain; almost certain to ride the waves between conventional and
unconventional manifestations witnessed in its past. Though such a future form
remains unclear, as transnational criminal enterprise continues to destabilize law-
less corners of the world, conveniently marrying their interests with the violence of
terrorist and guerilla activities, the military can be expected to take on an increas-
ingly pivotal role in countering nonstate terrorist and guerilla networks.

References
Ambrose, S.E. and D.G. Brinkley. 1997. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since
1938. 8th ed. New York: Penguin Books.
Barnett, T.P.M. 2005. Blueprint For Action: A Future Worth Creating. New York: Penguin
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Bell, J.B. 1984. Unconventional war: The army in the year 2000. In Strategic Requirements
for the Army to the Year 2000, eds R.H. Kupperman and W.J. Taylor, Sr., chap. 24.
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bennett, C.F. 1976. The Mayaguez re-examined: Misperception in an information short-
age. Fletcher Forum.
Bohn, M.K. 2004. The Achille Lauro Hijacking: Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of Ter-
rorism. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
Centralized Management of DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations. 1992,
December. DoD Directive 5200.37. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.
Feickert, A. 2005, August 26. U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service.

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Fisher, L. 2005. Military Tribunals and Presidential Power: American Revolution to the War on
Terrorism.
Fisher, L. 2004. Presidential War Power. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Ganor, B. 2005. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. Herzliya,
Israel: The Interdisciplinary Center for Herzliya Projects.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2006.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2004.
Holy Qu’aran, Surah 9:5
Huchthausen, P. 2003. America’s Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military
Engagements 1975–2000. Mount Pleasant, SC: Nautical and Aviation Publishing
Company of America.
Huntington, S.P. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military
Relations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Israeli Warplanes Continue Airstrikes on Palestinian Buildings. 2006, July 2. Retrieved
from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,201819,00.html.
Jenkins, V. 1990. Bringing Terror to Justice: The Extra-Territorial Arrest of Fawaz Yunis.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government Case
Program, C16-90-960.0.
Jordan, A.A., W.J. Taylor, Jr., and M.J. Mazarr. 1999. American National Security. 5th ed.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Langley, L.D. 1985. The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean 1898–
1934. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
Naftali, T. 2005. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. New York:
Basic Books.
Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. 1997. Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F.Supp. 1024, 1029, 1030 (N.D. Cal.), 1980.
Reeve, S. 1999. The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terror-
ism. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
Richelson, J.T. 1999. U.S. Intelligence Community. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sorensen, T.C. 1968. The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda. New York: Harper
& Row.
Summers, H.G. 1984. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. New York: Dell
Publishing.
Taillon, J.P. de B. 2001. The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and
American Experiences. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Trager, R. and D.P. Zagorcheva. 2005/2006. Deterring terrorism: It can be done. Interna-
tional Security 30 (3).
Wheelan, J. 2003. Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror 18011805. New York: Carol
& Graf Publishers.

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DK3629.indb 282 11/7/07 8:34:06 AM
 Chapter 14

Military Leadership
and Culture

Randall Miller and Saundra J. Reinke

While leading his platoon north on Highway 1 toward Ad Diwaniyah,

Iraq, Marine Capt. Brian Chontosh’s platoon was ambushed. With
mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and automatic weapons fire com-
ing in, and coalition tanks blocking the road in front of him, Chontosh
realized his platoon was caught in a kill zone. He had to do something,
and he had to do it fast. Chontosh ordered his driver to move their
vehicle through a breach along his flank, then through machine gun
fire, directly at the enemy position. After silencing the enemy machine
guns, Chontosh ordered his driver to drive right into the enemy trench.
Exiting the vehicle, Chontosh led his troops in an attack on enemy
forces in the trench. When his own rifle and pistol ammunition ran
out, he “borrowed” discarded enemy weapons to continue the attack.
When it was over, Chontosh had cleared 200 meters of the enemy
trench, killed more than 20 enemy soldiers, eliminated the threat to
his platoon—and earned the navy’s second highest award for heroism,
the Navy Cross.

U.S. Marines (2006)

283

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In the fear and chaos that characterize combat, what keeps soldiers fighting? Why
would Chontosh’s platoon obey an order to charge directly into machine gun fire?
Viewed from the comfort of home, such obedience comes across as insane. Yet, it
is essential if the military is to fulfill its function—the controlled application of
violence to achieve some political objectives.
Keegan (1976) maintains that soldiers fight for survival, but do so believing that
their individual survival depends on the unit. The link between the individual and
the unit then is at the heart of military effectiveness. This link, referred to as cohe-
sion, is forged through shared experiences and is crucial to combat effectiveness
(Shils and Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 1970; Department of the Navy, 2002; Depart-
ment of the Army, 1999).
Cohesion depends on two critical components: military leadership and culture.
Leadership fosters the environment of trust that is the essential precondition for
cohesion. But leadership does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it exists within the
context of an organizational culture (Fairholm, 1994; Masi, 2000). Leadership and
culture therefore are inextricably intertwined.
The first section of this chapter (entitled Leadership) opens with a discussion
of how leadership may be defined. Afterwards, a brief recapitulation of the major
leadership models and theories is provided before the crucial question of whether
individuals can be taught to lead is addressed. Because each of the military services
has a slightly different leadership model it holds up as ideal, all four models are
described, compared and contrasted. The section ends with a discussion of the con-
nections between leadership, power and ethics.
The second section addresses the question of culture. After broadly defining what the
term “military culture” means, differences between the cultures of the separate military
services are explored. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the challenges to mili-
tary culture in today’s society and the use of the military as a “social lab.”

Leadership
What Is Leadership?
Defining leadership has always been a challenge, for it does not lend itself to mea-
surement. Nor is it easy to articulate just what we mean when we use the term.
Primarily, this is because leadership is not a property of a person. Rather, leader-
ship is a relationship between the characteristics of the leader, the attitudes and
needs of the followers, the organization and its characteristics, and the environment
(McGregor, 1960).
Leadership “refers to interpersonal processes in social groups, through which
some individuals assist or direct the group toward the completion of group goals”
(Segal, 1981, 45). Thus, it has two major features: (1) leadership is interpersonal,
and (2) its major purpose is to integrate individual needs and organizational goals

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 Military Leadership and Culture  n  285

(Broedling, 1981). In other words, leadership is fundamentally about relationships—

between the leader, his or her followers, and the organization. Additionally, leaders
need a purpose or cause to inspire and give direction to followers.
Each of the military services recognizes this reality. The official air force defi-
nition for leadership is “the art and science of influencing and directing people to
accomplish the assigned mission” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, 1). The
army’s definition is similar; leadership is “influencing people by providing purpose,
direction and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission” (Depart-
ment of the Army, 1999, 1–4). In Leading Marines, the marine corps repeatedly
stresses the importance of the relationship between the leader and the follower
asserting that “there is less of a line between the leader and the led than a bond”
(Department of the Navy, 2002, 2).
Leadership is not the same thing as management. One possible definition for
management might be “allocating resources toward the fulfillment of organiza-
tional goals” (Segal, 1981, 45). Effective leaders must (to some extent) engage in
management as they attempt to ensure followers have the material resources neces-
sary to achieve the group goal. Indeed, military leaders who do not provide for the
material needs of their subordinates violate the trust and confidence those subordi-
nates place in them (Shay, 2002). Ultimately, leadership is all about relationships,
and management is about material things.

A Short Tour of Leadership Theories

The earliest thinkers on leadership focused their attention on studying famous lead-
ers to discover what they had in common. Generally known as “trait theory,” these
studies identified traits that all leaders seemed to possess. Although trait theory is
generally discredited today, there is some recent research that is leading us back to
traits. Bartone and Snook (2002) found that intelligence, social judgment, logical
reasoning, agreeableness and conscientiousness predicted cadet leadership perfor-
mance three to four years later. Levels of trust between leaders and followers are
heavily dependent on follower perceptions of leader traits—these behavioral traits
include trustworthiness (Reinke and Baldwin, 2001).
Beginning in the 1950s, researchers turned their attention to using social science
research tools to investigate the nature of leaders and, in particular, what factors pre-
dicted a leader’s success. Stogdill and Coons (1957) were the first well-known schol-
ars to explore leadership. Their work, popularly known as the “Ohio State Studies,”
sorted leaders’ behavior into two types: consideration and initiating structure.
“Consideration” behaviors were those that were focused on building and main-
taining positive interpersonal relationships between the leader and his or her fol-
lowers. “Initiating structure” behaviors were those that were focused on mission
accomplishment. Stogdill and Coons advocated maximizing both consideration
and initiating structure behaviors.

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A more sophisticated version of their work appeared in Hersey and Blanchard’s

(1969) well-known situational leadership model. This model suggests that lead-
ers should adopt a style appropriate to the situation. In particular, Hersey and
Blanchard focus attention on the job knowledge and self-motivation of followers as
being critical elements in selecting an appropriate leadership style. In other words,
there are times when the leader needs to be an authoritarian. There are also times
when adopting the authoritarian approach will be disastrous. Both the air force
and the army provide instruction in the situational leadership model in leadership
training coursework.
Hersey and Blanchard, and many other researchers, propose that leadership is
essentially a transaction between the leader and the follower. Basically, the leader
promises to either reward the followers for good behavior or punish the followers
for bad behavior. Such transactional models of leadership suffer from several dif-
ficulties. The most significant of these is that individual followers differ widely in
their perception of reward and punishment (Vroom, 1964). The leader is challenged
to find out “what makes followers tick,” a task that may prove extremely difficult.
Moreover, in bureaucratic organizations, such as the military, where rewards and
punishments are expected to be standardized, it can be difficult to tailor rewards
and/or punishments to meet the needs of individual followers.
But leadership is more than just a series of transactions between a leader and
followers. Leaders play a pivotal role in the creation and maintenance of an orga-
nization’s culture, its accepted ways of doing things. In other words, leaders are
involved in the creation of a community within an organization (Fairholm, 1994).
In this process, leaders can produce cultural change or reinforce existing norms
(Masi, 2000).
With these issues in mind, scholars began to move beyond transactional or eco-
nomic models of leadership into transformational leadership. Bass (1996) suggests
that transformational leaders are charged to build organizational vision, mobilize
the organization to achieve that vision, and institutionalize whatever changes are
needed to turn the dream into reality. The leader’s vision inspires performance. In
other words, transformational leadership is about restoring broken organizations by
reshaping them through a shared vision into new ways of being and doing.

Can Leadership Be Taught?

Much officer and noncommissioned officer training and education rests on the
assumption that leadership can be taught. All the services officially state that
although some aspects of leadership may be innate, leadership skills can be

 “Transactional” models are also often referred to as “economic” or “exchange” models of lead-
ership. The term “transactional” is used here because it is the term used in the army’s leader-
ship manual (FM 22-100) and in Bass’ research on transformational leadership (1996).

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 Military Leadership and Culture  n  287

Table 14.1  Contact Hours Devoted to Leadership Air Force Professional

Military Education Courses
Contact
Course Audience Hours
Airman leadership School first-term enlisted personnel 103
NCO Academy Noncommissioned officers (NCOs); 115
paygrades E-5 and E-6
Senior NCO Academy NCOs in paygrades E-7 and E-8 121
ROTC Officer candidates 346.5
Squadron Officer School First lieutenant/captain 61.75
Air command and staff Major 95.75
College Air War College Lieutenant colonel/colonel 80.5

Source: T. Renckly, personal communication, January 10, 2004.

improved (Department of the Air Force, 2004; Department of the Army, 1999;
Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004). The air force’s doctrinal statement is typi-
cal: “The abilities of a leader, which are derived from innate capabilities and built
from experience, education, and training, can be improved upon through deliber-
ate development” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, 2).
As a result, all the services devote considerable resources to leadership train-
ing, at all levels. An example of this high degree of effort is provided in Table 14.1,
which shows a breakdown of contact hours devoted to leadership in various air
force professional military education courses.
The content of leadership training differs by service and by rank. For lower-rank-
ing personnel, the services place more emphasis on tactical skills and interpersonal
relationships. For higher-ranking personnel, the emphasis shifts towards planning,
influencing and creating organizational culture and climate, and strategic thinking
(Department of the Air Force, 2004; Department of the Army, 1999).
Despite this level of effort, the services have not succeeded in creating a sys-
tem that consistently identifies, promotes and develops their best leaders (Ulmer,
Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Although many leadership “traits” are behaviors that
people can and do learn, these traits are largely behaviors that we learn as children
(social judgment, conscientiousness, and the ethical behavior that leads to trust-
worthiness). It is in our families where we learn to be honest, trustworthy, hard
working and responsible. Is it possible to teach these behaviors to adults?
In short, can adults be taught to lead? Unfortunately, research has not provided
a generally accepted answer to this question. Robert and Janet Denhardt (2006)
suggest that although many people do seem to be born with leadership skills, these
skills can be practiced and learned by anyone. Hedlund and his associates (2003)

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 288  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 14.2  Comparison of Leadership Models by Military Service

Army Navy Marines Air Force
Be (refers to the Five core Leadership Leadership
character of the competencies: qualities: components:
leader) Accomplishing Inspiration Core values
Know (the list of the mission Technical Leadership
interpersonal, Leading people proficiency competencies
conceptual, Leading change Moral Leadership
technical and Working with responsibility actions
tactical skills people
leaders must Resource
acquire) stewardship
Do (leadership
requires action)
(Department of the (Department of (Department of (Department of
Army, FM 22-100, the Navy, the Navy, MCWP the Air Force,
1999) NLCM, 2004) 6-11, 2002) AFDD 1-1,
2004)

have demonstrated a connection between “tacit knowledge,” that is, knowledge

drawn from everyday experience, and subsequent ratings of leader effectiveness.
This suggests that mentoring and experience do help individuals learn how to be
more effective leaders, reinforcing the military’s traditional emphasis on mentoring
and providing leadership opportunities early in one’s career.

Military Leadership Models

Each of the military services has a different model that it puts forward as its leader-
ship ideal. Table 14.2 provides a comparative look at these models.
The army provides by far the most direction and detail on leadership of all the
services. FM 22-100, Army Leadership, provides precise information on what the
army expects its leaders to “be, know, and do.” According to the army, leadership
“begins with what the leader must BE, the values and attributes that shape a leader’s
character” (Department of the Army, 1999, 1–3). The army expects its leaders to
live out the service’s core values. Leaders also have things they must “know”; they
must also master a set of skills. These skills are divided into four domains—inter-
personal, conceptual, technical and tactical. The specific skills leaders must know
vary depending on the organizational level of the individual leader. Finally, leaders
must act (Do) in order to make the mission happen.
Unlike the other services, the army devotes space in its leadership manual to
discussing directing, delegating and participating leadership styles, along with situ-
ational, transactional and transformational leadership models. The manual stresses

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 Military Leadership and Culture  n  289

that all these approaches are valuable tools. Specifically, leaders are encouraged to
“be themselves,” but be flexible and adapt to subordinate needs. Transformational
leadership is specifically recommended for units requiring change or facing a crisis.
Transactional leadership is cited as being effective under more normal conditions
(Department of the Army, 1999).
The navy’s leadership competency model provides guidance for what is expected
of navy leaders. The navy defines a competency as a “behavior or set of behaviors
that describes excellent performance in a particular work context” (Department of
the navy, 2004, 1). Three of the five competencies (leading people, working with
people and accomplishing the mission) are consistent with guidance provided by
the other services. By including “resource stewardship” as a required competency,
the Navy is implicitly acknowledging that management skills are essential for suc-
cessful leadership. A special feature of the navy’s model is the inclusion of “leading
change” as a necessary competency. Subcompetencies listed in this area include
creativity and innovation, vision, strategic thinking, external awareness, flexibility
and service motivation. The navy is the only service to accord change, and the
necessity of leading people through change, such a prominent place (Department
of the Navy, 2004).
The marine corps’ major leadership document, Leading Marines, is unique in
that it is the only leadership manual that is not prescriptive in nature. The marines
subscribe to the idea that leadership is an art. Hence, “there is no formula for lead-
ership. It is not all-inclusive because to capture all that it is to be a marine or to
lead marines defies pen and paper” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 1). Instead,
the marine corps prefers to stress adaptability and innovation while encouraging
leaders to come to terms with their personal leadership style (Department of the
Navy, 2002).
The recently released AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, is the air
force’s first attempt to officially define leadership, link it to the service’s core values
and create a comprehensive framework for teaching leadership at all levels (C.
Nath, personal communication, March 11, 2004). AFDD 1-1 is quite similar to
the army’s FM 22-100; although, it is more concise. The leadership components of
core values, leadership competencies and leadership actions are strikingly similar to
the army’s “Be, Know, Do” model, with core values equating to the “Be,” leadership
competencies being the “Know,” and leadership actions, the “Do.” Additionally,
the air force teaches the situational leadership model in AFDD 1-1 and in its profes-
sional military education programs.

 Information concerning the content of air force leadership instruction was provided in a series
of personal interviews with officials of Squadron Officer School, the Air and Space Basic
Course, ROTC, Officer Training School and the Air War College, conducted at Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama, March 25–26, 2004.

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Leadership and Power

Power and leadership go hand in hand. Power may be defined as “the ability to
get things done the way one wants them to be done” (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).
Where does power come from and how is it connected to leadership?
French and Raven (1959) propose five sources of social power. These sources
include reward, coercion, legitimacy, referent and expertise. According to them,
the power a leader has is a function of how many of these five sources of power a
leader commands.
As its name implies, reward power is based on a leader’s ability to reward follow-
ers for good behavior. The opposite of reward is coercion, or the ability to punish
followers for bad behavior. Coercion is the most effective means of shaping behav-
ior immediately, especially in a crisis or emergency situation. However, coercion is
the least effective source of power over time because people eventually become sati-
ated with punishment and lose their fear or go passive (French and Raven,1959).
Legitimate power stems from occupying a position in the organization that
its members expect and accept will have power (French and Raven, 1959). In the
military, possession of a higher rank is a source of legitimate power. Referent power,
on the other hand, is based on the identification of the follower with the leader; in
other words, the follower wants to follow or emulate the leader (French and Raven,
1959). In the long run, referent power is the most effective source of social power,
and is the recommended approach in two of four military publications on leader-
ship, FM 22-100 (Department of the Army, 1999) and MCWP 6-11 (Department
of the Navy, 2002).
The final source of power is expertise—the possession of specialized knowl-
edge that other unit members accept and respect (French and Raven, 1959). All
of the official leadership models or manuals published by the military stress the
importance of tactical competence: FM 22-100 (Department of the Army, 1999),
MCWP 6-11 (Department of the Navy, 2002), NCLM (Department of the Navy,
2004) and AFDD 1-1 (Department of the Air Force, 2004). In fact, Toner (2000)
claims that expertise is so essential to unit survival in combat that it rises to the
level of an ethical responsibility.
Another widely recognized source of power comes from the control of resources
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Resources can include an organization’s budget,
equipment and information. Although it is not explicitly recognized as a source of
power, military leadership manuals do acknowledge the importance of providing
troops with the resources needed to perform the mission (Department of the Army,
1999; Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004; Department of the Air Force, 2004).
Only the navy explicitly includes a reference to managing resources in its list of
leadership competencies.
Another important resource can be access to senior leaders. Access often trans-
lates into the ability to get information to the senior leader, or (in some cases) to
screen undesirable information and keep it away from a senior leader. Smart leaders

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 Military Leadership and Culture  n  291

know what power they have, what power they do not have and who else may have
the power needed to help the unit accomplish its goals.

Leadership and Ethics

Cohesion and unit effectiveness cannot exist without trust. Trust is essential to all
relationships and for effective combat performance (Fairholm, 1994; Shay, 2002).
Moreover, trust has been linked to individual and organizational performance
in a wide range of civilian industry studies. At the individual level of analysis,
trust has been linked to more accurate problem identification, successful prob-
lem solving (Zand, 1972) and increased success in negotiations (Butler, 1990). At
the organizational level, trust has been linked to job satisfaction (Daley and Vasu,
1998), enhanced transaction efficiency, reduced monitoring costs, more initiative
and flexibility in negotiations (Sako, 1992) and organizational learning (Dodgson,
1993). Trust has been demonstrated in both experimental and real-world settings
to be a powerful factor in determining job satisfaction and fostering individual
productivity.
In combat, there is no substitute for trust. Leaders must behave in ways that
promote trust because trust lies at the heart of creating unit cohesion and combat
effectiveness (Shay, 2002). Trust is the necessary prerequisite for the creation of
cohesion, a critical component of unit effectiveness. Hence, all the military services
place heavy emphasis on ethical conduct, on and off duty.
Trust is particularly critical in hierarchal organizations such as the military.
This is because persons in low status or power positions are heavily dependent on
their leaders. They depend on their leaders for access to desirable resources, such as
promotions, pay increases, space, training, adequate equipment and other things
critical to completing assigned tasks (Kramer, 1999; Paparone, 2002). In the mili-
tary, this dependence is so complete that leaders can be said to have an ethical
obligation to “take care of their troops” (Shay, 2002).
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) suggest there are two types of trust—deterrence
and identification-based trust. Deterrence (sometimes called calculus-based trust)
rests on consistency of behavior; that is, a person’s actions are consistent with what
they say they are going to do. Identification-based trust, on the other hand, is based
on empathy and occurs when people understand, agree and take on the other’s
values. Relationships begin with deterrence-based trust. Over time, as communica-
tion develops and the parties get to know one another; relationships may progress to
identification-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Thus, perceptions of others’
trustworthiness are largely history dependent (Kramer, 1999; Paparone, 2002).
In other words, followers decide whether or not to trust their leader based on
what they see and experience of their leader. Thus, “leadership is not a value-free
enterprise” (Wakin, 1981, 102). The core value for creating trust (and thereby
enhancing unit performance), and developing loyalty and obedience in followers

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is integrity (Shay, 2002; Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy,
2002; Department of the Air Force, 2004). Leaders who exhibit high levels of
integrity stand a much better chance of success than those who do not.
All four of the military leadership models emphasize trust and integrity. In his
foreword to AFDD 1-1, General Jumper of the U.S. Air Force states, “Integrity is the
basis of trust, and trust is the unbreakable bond that unifies leadership with their fol-
lowers and commanders with their units. Trust makes leaders effective, and integrity
underpins trust” (Department of the Air Force, 2004, iii).

Conclusion
Cohesion is crucial to combat effectiveness. But cohesion is a product of trust between
unit members and their leader. Hence, leadership plays a pivotal role. Although each
of the services has a slightly different ideal leadership model, the models have a great
deal in common. Each of the models stresses the centrality of a set of values—placing
the group’s needs before individual needs, personal integrity, courage and commit-
ment to mission accomplishment. The values are the product of military culture and
provide the necessary structure that underpins combat effectiveness.

Military Culture
Military culture is the bedrock of military effectiveness. Culture can be broadly
defined simply as how things are done in an organization (Ulmer et al., 2000).
This includes values, customs, traditions and the reasoning behind them. There are
four widely accepted essential elements of military culture: discipline, professional
ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps (Snider, 1999;
Huntington, 1957).
Discipline may be defined as a “consistently rationalized, methodically trained,
and exact replication of the received order” (Weber, 1958, 253). Discipline enhances
predictability in war, reducing what von Clausewitz (1989) called “fog and friction.”
Consequently, it is seen as critical to victory (Weber, 1958). Military writers, from
Sun Tzu, twenty-five thousand years ago, to today’s leadership manuals, concur that
discipline is central to what it means to be a part of a military force. Consequently,
discipline is the first value taught to all new recruits entering military service.
Because the central, preeminent purpose of the military is combat, its profes-
sional ethos centers on combat (Snider, 1999). This ethos includes the acquisition of
expertise, a strong sense of responsibility towards the organization and the task at
hand, and a powerful sense of corporateness, or cohesion (Huntington, 1957). The
acquisition of expertise (tactical competence) is critical because it is quite literally
a matter of life and death under combat conditions (Department of the Army,
1999; Toner, 2002). Team and unit identity come out of mutual respect, trust

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and discipline (Department of the Army, 2000). The subordination of the indi-
vidual self for the benefit of the group is prized as an essential virtue in all the
military services’ list of core values. Whether it is expressed as “selfless service”
(army), “commitment” (navy and marine corps) or “service before self” (air force),
all four services subscribe to the idea that military action is not possible without
teamwork. Teamwork requires individuals to give up self-interest for the good of
the unit (Department of the Army, 1999). The professional ethos of the military is
discussed in more detail in chapter 15.
Ceremony and etiquette are the outward manifestations of cohesion, discipline
and history. As such, they reinforce the core element of discipline and make visible
the unique nature of military culture. Ceremony and etiquette play an important
role in establishing the distinctiveness of military service, socializing military mem-
bers into the service, and reinforcing military values (Snider, 1999). In addition,
ceremony and etiquette visibly link today’s military member with the vast history
and tradition of his or her military service. This link with tradition is viewed as an
important part of the member’s sense of identity and membership in a special call-
ing (Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002).
Cohesion and esprit de corps are also crucial to the ultimate goal of a military
organization, victory. Scholars have identified two types of cohesion, “social cohe-
sion,” or emotional bonds, and “task cohesion,” or shared commitment to common
goals. The latter is what is related to group outcome and effectiveness (Harrell and
Miller, 1997). Simply put, you do not have to like people to work with them to get
the job done. Taken together, these two are the measures of a unit’s willingness to
perform a mission and to fight. Thus, cohesion is a critical element that culture
contributes to military effectiveness (Snider, 1999; Department of the Army, 1999;
Shay, 2002; Department of the Navy, 2002).

Is There One “Military Culture?”

Although all the services share the central elements, each of the services displays
a unique cultural “accent” (Murray, 1999). The mission of each service affects its
culture. Moreover, subcultures exist within each service. In the navy, there is a “sur-
face” subculture, a “submarine” subculture, and an “aviation” subculture. In the air
force, subcultures are based on weapons platforms. In the army, there is a distinctive
“infantry” subculture, along with one for armor, artillery, etc. These subcultures play
a role in distinguishing and supporting the unique roles different elements play in
combat (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000).
“Service before self,” the West Point motto, summarizes army culture. Viewed
as the most resistant to change of all the services, the army stresses tradition and
history in its leadership manual, FM 22-100. The army claims that its culture is
“deeply rooted in long-held beliefs, customs and practices” (Department of the
Army, 1999, 3–14). Further, in the army’s view, soldiers are strengthened by

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knowing they are part of a tradition. This resistance to change and traditionalism
may be one reason the army has not had a good relationship with Congress nor has
it always excelled in public relations (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Nonethe-
less, the army receives high marks in human relations, especially when it comes to
minority inclusion (Moskos, 1993; Ulmer, Collins and Jacobs, 2000).
The navy’s culture is viewed as the most traditional of all the services. Being
fiercely independent is a product of its nature. A service that spends long periods
of time at sea, away from direct supervision of officials on shore, is bound to build a
culture of independence. The navy deliberately instills this in its officer corps. This
sense of independence underpins some unique features in the navy leadership com-
petency model (Department of the Navy, 2004). Leaders who are expected to be
independent need complementary competencies—creativity, vision, decisiveness,
an ability to link the situation with national and naval objectives. All of these fea-
tures appear in the navy leadership competency model (2004). Although indepen-
dence is a combat strength, it may have insulated the navy somewhat from social
trends. This sense of independence may have contributed to the perception that the
navy was less than forthright in its response to recent scandals, such as Tailhook
(Ulmer, Collins and Jacobs, 2000).
The marine corps, rightly, sees itself as unique. Proclaiming that “being a marine
is a state of mind” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 7), the leadership manual, Lead-
ing Marines, repeatedly stresses the unique nature of the Corps. “Marines believe that
to be a marine is special” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 23). So special, in fact, that
being a marine is seen as a lifetime status. The marines stress a sense of “family”—
once a marine, always a marine (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). This is reflected
in the Corps’ Web site, which now features a section entitled “Marine for Life,” which
provides information for transitioning marines on employment, education, benefits
and Corps-friendly organizations in their area (www.M41.usmc.mil/portal/server.pt).
The marine corps is the most “macho” of the services. This may be because most jobs
that attract female recruits are support jobs that are found in functions provided to
the marines by the navy (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000).
Given that it was a product of technology, it is not too surprising that the air
force is the most technologically oriented of all the services. One of the air force’s
three core values is “excellence in all we do.” In describing what this means, the air
force lays considerable emphasis on continuously looking for ways to improve unit
efficiency and effectiveness. The examples provided stress technical solutions to prob-
lems, enhancing the impression that this service sees technology as holding the key to
its future (Department of the Air Force, 2004). Due to the large combat support and
service support structures, the air force has been the most successful of all the services
at integrating women into its ranks (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000).

 An old navy joke runs like this: There are three ways of doing things: the right way, the wrong
way, and the navy way.

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Pressures on Military Culture

Technology has had a significant impact on military culture. This impact is most
evident in the air force, and least extreme in the army and marine corps. Technol-
ogy encourages organizations to adopt more “managerial” approaches as opposed
to leadership approaches (Murray, 1999; Collins, 1998), which in turn contrib-
utes to the tendency to move toward an occupational versus a professional model
(Moskos, 1977). The danger is that in moving toward “managerial” or “business”
approaches, the military will lose sight of the traditional values needed to ensure
combat effectiveness.
Each of the services faces technological challenges, which in turn creates special
challenges to organizational culture. For example, the advent of unmanned aerial
vehicles and military operations in space and cyberspace has already led to the air
force changing its definition of who is considered to be a “warfighter” (Mahn-
ken, 2000). The current emphasis on light, mobile forces threatens a central notion
in the army’s identity since World War II—its emphasis upon armor (Mahnken,
2000). In both these cases, technology is challenging deeply held beliefs about the
identity of the service and, in this sense, they challenge organizational culture.
As technology has become increasingly complex, and as the services down-
sized in the post-Cold War period, the military services began civilianizing or out-
sourcing combat support work (Mahnken, 2000). This has led to a blurring of the
boundary between “warfighters” and “nonwarfighters.” The results of this trend can
be seen in the present situation in Iraq where contractors provide security services
to the military in a manner that is reminiscent of mercenaries in the seventeenth or
eighteenth centuries. In fact, Operation Iraqi Freedom bears some resemblance to
eighteenth century warfare with its small professional force and a large contingent
of “camp followers,” in this case, contractors, providing essential support services.
In today’s rush to civilianize and contract out, military culture may be gradually
eroded, with adverse consequences for combat effectiveness.
Recruit quality is also a challenge. Many new recruits lack the value sets needed
to succeed in the military. As traditional value sets are displaced, and social dys-
function increases, the services increasingly find themselves with recruits who
pose greater challenges to their training functions (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs,
2000). Thus, recruits require more training to reshape their value sets to fit military
culture.
Morgan (2003) claims that this is a direct consequence of society’s adoption of
postmodernist viewpoints. Although it defies precise definition, postmodernism
has three features relevant to military culture: a rejection of absolutes, a rejection of
power and authority, and a celebration of difference. All three of these qualities run
counter to the concept of service, the marginalization of the sense of community
and an abandonment of authority. Given the emphasis military culture places on
discipline, self-sacrifice and service, it seems clear that recruit quality will continue
to be a major challenge for all the services.

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Although marriage does tend to increase the propensity to stay in the service,
demonstrate greater maturity and reduce problems with indigenous populations
overseas, a “married force” places additional strain on military culture (Snider,
1999). At the beginning of 2004, approximately one half of the active-duty enlisted
force, and 68 percent of the officer corps, were married (Department of Defense
[DoD], 2006). This puts pressure on the services to address quality-of-life issues.
Because most military spouses also work, the pressure is even more intense. Issues
that commanders might never have thought of thirty years ago, such as day care,
now loom large on many commanders’ agendas (Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs,
2000). Snider (1999) claims the advent of the married force is the biggest sociologi-
cal change in the military as an institution since the creation of the all volunteer
force in the 1970s.
“Ops tempo,” the increased number and length of deployments, and the unprec-
edented pressure placed on the military to participate in “operations other than
war” have placed additional strain on a married force. This has led to increased con-
cerns in all the services about the effects of such stress on individual performance,
divorce, domestic violence, suicide rates and morale problems. Military person-
nel feel that their military commitments conflict with their commitment to their
families. This leads to perceptions that the military is not taking care of its people,
which in turn erodes morale and reduces reenlistment rates (Steele and Walters,
2001). The initial spark that led ultimately to prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib appears
to have been the cancellation of the brigade’s return to the United States, fuel-
ling perceptions that army leadership was unconcerned about the soldiers’ welfare
(Taguba, 2004).
Moreover, the pressure to do “operations other than war” has led to confusion
over the military’s purpose. Such confusion has implications for practical matters.
Training soldiers for combat is simply not the same as training for peacekeeping
duties (Collins, 1998) or patrolling the border with Mexico. Beyond these practical
issues, conducting operations other than war threatens the military’s conception
of itself. Victory lies at the heart of the military’s self-concept, but victory may not
be the goal in operations other than war. Consequently, military personnel may
feel alienated or “lost” from both their leadership and the civilian population they
serve.
Although women have proven themselves effective, gender integration remains
a significant challenge to traditional military culture. Women were originally
recruited in large numbers to fill out the ranks with the onset of the all volunteer
force (Moskos, 1993; Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). Although women are still
excluded from direct ground combat units, submarines, certain navy ships, and
Special Forces, virtually all other occupational specialties are now open to women
(Ulmer, Collins, and Jacobs, 2000). In 2004, women accounted for 17 percent of
nonprior service active duty accessions and 22 percent of nonprior service acces-
sions to the reserves (DoD, 2006).

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 Military Leadership and Culture  n  297

This transformation has not come without problems. Reported sexual harass-
ment rates have dropped significantly from 46 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2002
(Lipari and Lancaster, 2002). However, questions about the effects of gender inte-
gration on readiness and cohesion, particularly in the army, navy and marine corps
remain. Harrell and Miller (1997) concluded that gender issues did not significantly
affect readiness and cohesion in units with good leadership. But units suffering from
poor leadership experienced a wide array of problems, including gender issues.
Gender problems may be more apt to surface during the stressful periods lead-
ing up to and including combat operations. During such periods, military person-
nel experience high levels of stress, which can lead to misconduct. Such misconduct
is more likely to occur when alcohol is available (Department of the Army, 1994).
Shay (2002) found that troops suffering from combat stress and trauma are more
likely to self-medicate with alcohol and sex. The recent investigation into the highly
publicized sexual assault cases in the Iraqi area of operations concluded that alco-
hol was available, and probably did play a role in the assaults that occurred in the
theater (DoD, 2004).

The Military as “Social Lab”

The military is seen as a large and potent laboratory for social experimentation
(Moskos, 1993). Such views rest on the successful integration of African Americans
into the military, but fail to consider that integration of African Americans suc-
ceeded because it was based on the realization that military effectiveness would be
improved by integration (Moskos, 1993). In other words, combat effectiveness was
the driving consideration, not equal opportunity.
The view of the military as a “social lab” has led to pressure from feminist
groups to end combat exclusion rules and from gay rights groups to allow openly
gay persons to serve in the military. Both views are based on the concept that
individual rights take precedence over group needs or goals, a philosophy that fits
with popular U.S. culture, but is antithetical to military culture, with its emphasis
on placing the needs of the group before the needs of the individual. Miller (1995)
found that most female soldiers disagree with such feminist agendas and philoso-
phies precisely because feminists insist that there are no appreciable differences
between men and women, and they emphasize individual rights, as opposed to
group goals and needs. Military women, like military men, share the core value of
placing group needs above individual needs.

Conclusion
Combat, with its chaos and violence, is at the heart of what separates the military
profession from all other professions. To survive and thrive in combat requires the

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development of a culture with a set of clearly defined values. Thus, military cul-
ture and its distinctive features are a response to the challenges and exigencies of
combat. At the same time, technology, changes within the military and within the
broader civilian society, threaten to undermine military culture.
Such challenges can only be met and overcome with leadership. Leadership has
always been recognized as a key to combat effectiveness. Leaders form the indispens-
able link between unit members and the organization and create the atmosphere
of trust essential to the development of unit cohesion. Although tactical skill and
managerial competence are important components of leadership, the interpersonal
nature of leadership demands more. Ultimately, leaders must behave with integrity,
and live out the values at the heart of military culture—duty, honor, country.

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U.S. Marine Corps. (2006). “Pace Honors Servicemembers for Heroism (Release number
0922-06-0728).” http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/ac95bc775efc34c
685256ab50049d458/a4b2ca07OpenDocument. Accessed 8/28/2007.
Von Clausewitz, C. 1989. On War. Trans. M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press.
Vroom, V.H. 1964. Work and Motivation. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Wakin, M.M. 1981. Ethics of leadership. In Military Leadership, ed. J.H. Buck and L.J.
Korb, 95–111. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Weber, M. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C.W.
Mills. Galaxy, NY: Sage Publications.
Zand, D.E. 1972. Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science Quarterly
17: 229–239.

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 Chapter 15

The Profession of Arms

and the Management
of Violence

Saundra J. Reinke and Randall Miller

Specialist Joseph M. Darby did not like what he was seeing. Sickened
by the photographs a buddy showed him of naked, abused Iraqi pris-
oners, Specialist Darby wrote a letter detailing the abuse, backed it up
with photographic evidence, and slipped the information to a noncom-
missioned officer. His courageous act started the investigation into pris-
oner abuse at Abu Ghraib.

Green (2004)

When we are faced with evil, what do we do? As individuals we may fall back on our
religious or moral upbringing, hoping it will tell us what to do. Professionals, how-
ever, also have a set of values that lie at the heart of what it means to follow and belong
to a particular profession. The military is no exception. In fact, the military may have
the best articulated, most consistent set of professional values in today’s world.
Nonetheless, the military also faces unique challenges. Specifically, the violence
of combat places extreme pressures on individuals to depart from the accepted
value set of the military professional. How does a profession that centers on combat
keep that violence within socially acceptable boundaries?

301

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The first section of this chapter is a discussion of the nature of a profession.

After examining in more detail what makes the military profession distinctive from
all others, the specific value set that lies at the heart of military professionalism will
be explored. The section ends with a discussion of the “civil–military gap,” and its
implications for our society.
The second section of the chapter explores some of the ways the military seeks to
manage the violent nature of combat. After laying out the broad outlines of the law
of armed conflict, this section explores the related topics of fratricide and combat
stress. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the long-term impacts of combat
violence on veterans and what can be done to prevent or lessen these impacts.

The Profession of Arms

What Is a Profession?
A profession is more than an occupation; a profession implies a life-long commit-
ment to a specific way of life. Huntington (1957) describes a profession as a type
of vocation. A vocation, or “calling,” is a way of life grounded in a set of values
(Palmer, 2000). This is similar to Moskos’ (1970) distinction between an institu-
tion and an occupation. An institution is centered on a purpose that transcends
individual self-interest for a higher good. Members of an institution are following a
calling, and they see themselves as being different from the mainstream of society.
Military service has traditionally been seen as just such an institution (Moskos,
1977).
Professions share three special characteristics: expertise, responsibility and cor-
porateness (Huntington, 1957). He argues that officers are professionals. In today’s
U.S. (all volunteer) military, with its increased need for a highly educated force, it
makes more sense to argue that all military personnel are professionals.
The special, central expertise of the military professional is in combat—the con-
trolled application of violence to achieve political goals (Huntington, 1957). “The
end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object
of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at
the right place and the right time” (von Clausewitz, 1989, 95). The violence of
combat must be controlled and used in a way that is in keeping with the overall
political objective. This is an expertise that is shared almost universally, through all
ranks. Those who do not share in the direct application of violence, have all their
efforts directed toward supporting those who do (Huntington, 1957, as amended
to include all ranks). Leaders of all services, regardless of their specialty or rank, are
explicitly directed to aim their efforts toward the accomplishment of the mission
(Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004a; Depart-
ment of the Air Force, 2004).

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The unique expertise of the military places a special social responsibility on

it—the obligation to apply violence only for socially approved purposes in a socially
approved manner (Huntington, 1957, emphasis added). Toner (2000) argues that the
essence of military professionalism is in making responsible choices that are appro-
priate to the situation. Hence, all the military services stress the critical importance
of discipline as well as adherence to an established code of behavior. This emphasis is
particularly pronounced in the leadership manuals and documents published by the
services (Department of the Army, 1999; Department of the Navy, 2002; Depart-
ment of the Air Force, 2004).
Military personnel are motivated largely by a strong sense of social obligation,
along with a genuine love for what they do (Huntington, 1957). Survey research
comparing military personnel with the civilian population has found that indi-
viduals attracted to military service are significantly more patriotic, nationalistic,
conservative and traditional. Moreover, it seems clear that the military training
process is merely accentuating differences that were already in existence. In other
words, the military is not “brainwashing” recruits into adopting a different value
set. Recruits come to the military because they share the military’s existing value set.
This value set is then further refined and clarified in the training process (Bachman
et al., 2000).
Corporateness, or the sense of unity (within the service) and separation from oth-
ers (the civilian world) is the third characteristic of the military professional (Hun-
tington, 1957). Unity, or cohesion, is highly prized because it is directly related to
combat effectiveness (Shils and Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 1970; Department of the
Navy, 2002; Department of the Army, 1999). More than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu
(1983, 30) wrote “without harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed.”
Shils and Janowitz’ (1975) classic study of the Wehrmacht’s performance in World
War II conclusively demonstrated that corporateness, the sense of belonging to a
cohesive social unit, was the primary factor that kept soldiers fighting even under
the most unfavorable conditions, when it was clear that defeat was inevitable. Sol-
diers fight for their survival, but they understand that their individual survival is
inseparable from the survival of their unit (Keegan, 1976). Moreover, the social
cohesion that comes from training and traveling together is what keeps people sane
and alive under the stress and fear of combat (Shay, 2002).
The sense of being apart or separate from society at large flows from the military
members’ belief that they are following a calling (von Clausewitz, 1989; Weber,
1958; Moskos, 1977). This belief is reflected in research on the attitudes of military
elites and in official military documents. Holsti’s (2000) survey found military
elites do believe they are following a calling. Official publications, such as Leading
Marines (Department of the Navy, 2002), stress that those who serve in the mili-
tary are following a distinctive and special calling.
The perceived differences between military personnel and their culture and the
wider civilian culture foster a sense of separation from the civilian world (Holsti,
2000). As Holsti states, “many in the military feel a sense of disappointment, if not

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alienation, about aspects of American society” (74). These perceived differences are
not simply a matter of pursuing a calling; many civilian professions (such as the
clergy) also feel “called” to serve. Rather, the differences are related to the set of
values that the military espouses. These values distinguish military personnel from
a society that is increasingly dominated by postmodern values.
Morgan (2003) proposes that three postmodern values in particular—the rejec-
tion of absolutes, power and authority—are responsible for much of what Holsti
(2000) refers to as a “sense of alienation” that military members feel from civilian
society. This sense of being separate from society at large can lead to tension and
misunderstanding between the military and society. Commonly referred to as the
“civil–military gap,” this issue has become the topic of much current research and
will be covered in a separate section later in this chapter.

The Professional Military Ethic

Huntington (1957) argues that military personnel share a particular weltaunschau-
ung, or professional military ethic. This “ethic” consists of the values, attitudes and
perspectives military members share. These values, attitudes and perspectives flow
logically from the unique role of the military in society, and are viewed by many
as essential to combat effectiveness, as is good training or weaponry (Huntington,
1957; Hillen, 1999; Toner, 2000). This is not to imply that every military member
shares all the components of the “professional military ethic.” Huntington (1957)
suggests this is an ideal type that is true for all militaries throughout history to the
extent that they may be regarded as “professional” as opposed to militias or other
nonprofessional military forms of organization.
The first component of the “professional military ethic” is a particular worldview
that can be characterized as Hobbesian (Huntington, 1957). In this worldview,
humanity is essentially evil and conflict is the natural state of existence. Human
reason is limited, and humanity’s inherent weakness makes discipline, organiza-
tion and leadership essential (Huntington, 1957; von Clausewitz, 1989). Shils and
Janowitz (1975) document the lack of trust military members typically have for
those outside their unit. This is echoed in recent survey research (Holsti, 2000)
where military members viewed civilian culture as “materialistic, self-indulgent,
undisciplined, and dishonest, on balance ungenerous, and disloyal” (57). In short,
military members do not trust those “outside” their institution.
A second component of the professional military ethic is a shared set of values.
Huntington (1957) identifies discipline, tradition, unity and cohesion as the core
values; Miller (1995) adds putting the group before individual needs. Discipline
has always been understood to be at the heart of combat effectiveness. Some 2,500
years ago, Sun Tzu (1983) pointed out that “method and discipline” were one of
the five key factors that predicted success in military operations. He claimed that
“soldiers must be treated with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron

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 The Profession of Arms and the Management of Violence  n  305

Table 15.1 
Army Navy/Marine Corps Air Force
Loyalty Honor Integrity
Duty Courage Service before self
Respect Commitment Excellence in all we do
Selfless service
Honor
Integrity
Personal courage

discipline” (49). The Roman military writer, Vegetius (1985, 75) said “victory in war
does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline
will insure it.” In the nineteenth century, von Clausewitz (1989) put discipline first
in his description of the military virtues.
This same set of values is repeated in modern military writing. All of the services
stress the importance of discipline, tradition, unity, cohesion and selfless service in
their leadership manuals (Department of the Navy, 2002, 2004b; Department of
the Army, 1999; Department of the Air Force, 2004). Moreover, there are shared
components in the values each of the services identifies as “core” (Table 15.1).
Throughout the lists shown in Table 15.1, and their accompanying explanations,
lie common expectations. These include placing group needs before individual needs,
personal integrity, courage and commitment to mission accomplishment.
These values are important because they build trust, and trust is at the heart of
creating unit cohesion. “Trust in the Marine Corps and in unit leaders who con-
sistently set the example expected of military professionals is vital to establishing
unit cohesion” (Department of the Navy, 2002, 59). According to the U.S. Army,
team identity comes out of mutual respect and trust (Department of the Army,
1999). “Integrity is the basis of trust, and trust is the unbreakable bond that unifies
leaders with their followers and commanders with their units” (Department of the
Air Force, 2004, iii). Shay (2002) proposes that trust is the key that links cohesion,
leadership and training and significantly improves combat performance.
Huntington (1957) identifies the third component of the professional military
ethic as a set of shared attitudes towards military policy. These attitudes are grounded
in the assumption that the nation-state is the basic unit of political organization,
with an accompanying skepticism towards supranational structures, such as the
United Nations. Moreover, military personnel tend to believe that conflict and war
are inevitable, and complete security is impossible. “The art of war is of vital impor-
tance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin”
(Sun Tzu, 1983, 9). Skepticism of the benefits of treaties, alliances and international
law is prevalent, along with a preference for U.S. military supremacy (Bachman et
al., 2000). Because the stakes involved in conflict are potentially catastrophic (total
annihilation), military personnel tend to overestimate security threats and solicit

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forces that can deal with “everything” (von Clausewitz, 1989; Drew and Snow,
1988). Finally, military personnel tend to prefer a foreign policy that avoids treaty
alliances (Huntington, 1957).

The Civil–Military Gap

The “gap” between military and civilian attitudes and values has drawn increasing
scrutiny from scholars. There are several approaches to examining this issue. The
first involves determining whether the gap actually exists, and, if it exists, how large
it is. Other researchers and authors focus on exploring the meaning of any gap that
may exist; its implications for the future and what (if anything) should be done
about it.
Broadly speaking, scholars agree that such a gap does exist (Holsti, 2000; Cronke
and Feaver, 2000; Bachman et al., 2000). Military personnel are more politically
conservative than their civilian counterparts. Moreover, they hold negative views
of contemporary culture (Holsti, 2000). Morgan (2003) argues that society’s adop-
tion of postmodern attitudes towards authority and traditional values are largely
to blame for the increasing gap between military and civilian cultures. In particu-
lar, Morgan proposes that three postmodern values in particular—the rejection of
absolutes, power and authority—are intrinsically incompatible with military values,
which stress placing the group before individual needs, discipline and adherence to
a recognizably traditional value set.
Opinion is divided, however, on the extent of the gap and its significance. Davis
(2000) argues that the gap is not large, and joins other scholars, such as Hillen
(1999) and Toner (2000), in arguing that the differences that do exist are essential
to the survival and success of the military in combat. These scholars claim that
efforts to “reform” military culture, to force it to become like civilian culture, are
not only in error, but are potentially disastrous.
Cronke and Feaver (2000) argue that although the differences are not signifi-
cant at the present time, they have the potential to become significant over time.
The adoption of an all volunteer force, coupled with continued downsizing of the
military, has reduced the number of individuals in the general population with mil-
itary experience. This same trend is reflected in civilian political elites, as fewer and
fewer of them have any military experience. As a consequence, Cronke and Feaver
believe that the civil–military gap will become increasingly large, with potentially
significant, negative, long-term consequences for the combat effectiveness of the
military itself. A civilian populace that no longer has the ability to understand why
military culture and values are different is not likely to support their retention. To
the extent that such values are essential to combat effectiveness, the military could,
over time, lose its ability to perform its central function—combat.

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 The Profession of Arms and the Management of Violence  n  307

Nevertheless, this has not stopped critics of military culture from applying
pressure on the military to “reform” its culture. While a fuller treatment of this
topic is included in the previous chapter, it suffices to say that those who advocate
for allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military, or for allowing women
in combat, believe that the military should reflect contemporary social values. In
other words, the civil–military gap is not acceptable; the military should conform
itself to civilian culture and values.

Conclusion
The military is a profession that is centered on a unique expertise—the application
of violence to secure political objectives. As a profession, the military possesses
a unique set of values, a “professional ethos” that sets it apart from the civilian
society it serves. These values include honor, loyalty, selfless service, integrity
and commitment. In today’s postmodern society, these values are not univer-
sally shared by civilian society, leading to the long-term possibility of estrange-
ment and misunderstanding between the military and the civilian community it
serves.

The Management of Violence

Violence is (of course) the defining feature of combat. But violence has a way of
feeding on itself and escalating out of control. Therefore, it must be contained if
unnecessary destruction is to be avoided and the political objectives of the war
achieved (von Clausewitz, 1989). Since the end objective of any war is to restore
peace, violence must be employed in a socially acceptable manner, otherwise the
enemy will refuse to make peace and keep fighting (Department of the Army,
1999). In a democracy such as the United States, controlling the level of violence is
also essential to maintaining public support for the conflict. Beyond this practical
rationale are humanitarian concerns to protect noncombatants, prisoners, cultural
and religious sites, and the environment.
The key to keeping violence under control is discipline and training. Discipline
can be defined as “consistently rationalized, methodically trained, and exact rep-
lication of the received order” (Weber, 1958, 253). Thus, violence is “managed”
primarily through discipline, and the enforcement of training and ethical stan-
dards. Professional military leaders understand that it is their responsibility to focus
combat violence to defeat the enemy, while keeping it within socially acceptable
boundaries.

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Laws of Armed Conflict

Justified Killing? Or War Crime?
In the middle stage of the Third Battle of Ypres in WWI, a group of
Australian soldiers surrounded a two-story pillbox. The Germans on
the first floor of the pillbox came out and surrendered. The Australians,
thinking the fight was over, relaxed. However, the Germans on the
second floor of the pillbox did not realize their comrades on the first
floor had surrendered. One of them fired from the second floor, kill-
ing an Australian. The Australians, incensed at what they took to be a
betrayal, promptly bayoneted the German prisoners (Keegan, 1976).

What constitutes “socially acceptable” violence in war? In the broadest sense,

violence in war is regulated through the accepted laws of armed conflict. Since
earliest times, it has been recognized that some restraints should be observed dur-
ing armed conflict. The ideas that civilians should be protected, poison should not
be used and captives treated humanely were widely accepted in the ancient world
(Green, 2000, 20-23). For example, in the Christian Bible (I Kings 6:22-23), the
prophet Elisha tells the king he should provide his captives with bread and water
before sending them to their home. In the Middle Ages, the Code of Chivalry,
along with injunctions of the church, led to the first recorded trials for war crimes
(Green, 2000).
The first modern code of law governing war was developed by Francis Lieber
(jurist and political philosopher) of the United States and made law by President
Lincoln in 1863. This code was based on commonly accepted practices of the time.
As a consequence, it spread rapidly through Europe and became the basis for many
national codes (Green, 2000).
The Hague Conventions of 1899 represent the first international codification of
the laws of armed conflict. Subsequent Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conven-
tions and refinements in humanitarian law have produced a set of principles that
are widely accepted, even if not always followed. Their purpose is to “minimize the
horrors of the conflict to the extent consistent with the economic and efficient use
of armed force” (Green, 2000, 348). The law of armed conflict applies to both par-
ties in any conflict, regardless of the justness of the conflict.
The central principle of the laws of armed conflict is a balance between military
necessity against other principles discussed below. It is not the intention of the
Hague or Geneva Laws to prohibit war. Rather, these laws recognize the reality of
armed conflict, and the right of a nation-state to pursue victory. They simply require
that military activity and the pursuit of victory be balanced against humanitarian
concerns (Green, 2000). Put another way, it is compliance with the principles of
the laws of armed conflict that keeps the military from becoming “armed thugs,
mercenaries without morals” (Toner, 2000, 161).

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The first principle of the law of armed conflict is humanitarianism. This prin-
ciple requires that “persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict shall
be treated humanely in all circumstances” (Green, 2000, 349). Moreover, this
principle requires that each party respect the “honour, conviction, and religious
practices” (349) of all such persons.
The second principle provides for restrictions on the means and methods of con-
ducting war. This principle restricts the means and methods of combat to those
necessary to achieve victory and prohibits the use of weapons or methods that cause
undue suffering. Included in this restriction is the elimination of strictly civilian
targets. However, it is not a breach of the laws of armed conflict if civilians are
injured incidental to attacks on lawful military targets (Green, 2000).
The principle of proportionality seeks to establish a reasonable connection
between the objective being pursued compared to the consequences of the action.
This involves a subjective weighing of the importance of the objective against the
possible harmful effects on civilians or civilian objects. This includes an accompany-
ing injunction on warring states to separate as much as possible civilians and civilian
objects from legitimate military targets and identifying facilities that are considered
protected, such as hospitals (Green, 2000).
The treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) is also governed under the laws of
armed conflict. POWs are not required to give any information to their captors
other than their identity. Moreover, they must be treated humanely; they may
not be tortured mentally or physically. They must be offered medical treatment if
needed and given shelter in keeping with the local climate. POWs may be required
to work. However, the work cannot be considered dangerous to them or supportive
of the war effort (Green, 2000).

The Case of Abu Ghraib

After defeating the Iraqi military in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Abu
Ghraib, formally a notorious prison for Saddam Hussein, became a
prison used by coalition forces for prisoners of war, security detainees
and common criminals. Allegations that U.S. Military Police (MPs)
abused Iraqi prisoners led to an investigation, and ultimately, to major
embarrassment for the U.S. government.
  In his investigation into the allegations of abuse at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq, Major General Taguba (2004) concluded that Iraqi
detainees were intentionally abused, physically and mentally, by U.S.
military police as part of an effort to “soften them up” prior to question-
ing by military intelligence. General Taguba’s report found that there
were a number of factors contributing to this failure to keep violence
within acceptable boundaries. The first, and most important factor, was
the lack of leadership from both officers and noncommissioned officers.

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Although other factors were present that led to the abuse, strong leader-
ship could have ameliorated them. These other factors included a lack
of training in detainee operations, understaffing and a lack of basic
soldier support services. Understaffing, coupled with the absence of
expected support services, could have led soldiers to believe the com-
mander did not care for them (Reinke, 2006). Shay (2002) found that
soldier confidence in the commander is critical to protecting troops
from stress. This confidence is grounded in the solders’ belief that the
commander is professionally competent, and credibly and genuinely
cares for their welfare.

Other forbidden activities include acts intended to terrorize the civilian popula-
tion, the use of civilians or civilian objects as screens to protect a legitimate mili-
tary objective from attack, attacks with no military purpose and attacks on dams,
dikes or nuclear power facilities. In addition, “scorched earth” tactics, the deliberate
destruction of everything in a given area, may also be prohibited (Green, 2000).

“Friendly Fire”
On March 23, 2003, an Air Force A-10 fired on a company of U.S.
Marines in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. Eighteen marines were killed and
seventeen wounded. The investigation concluded that several factors
contributed to this tragic event. These factors included problems with
communication links and a rapidly changing battle plan. But the prin-
cipal fault lay with a marine corps forward air controller who called
in the air strike believing there were no friendly forces in front of his
unit; even though he could not see the target area. Tragically, he was
mistaken (Herbert, 2004).

The prevention of fratricide, or “friendly fire,” is another key concern in the

management of combat violence. Fratricide is “the employment of friendly weap-
ons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or
facilities, which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly
personnel” (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 1992, 1). During 1991’s
Operation Desert Storm, 17 percent of American casualties were the result of
friendly fire (Garamone, 1999). During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, only 11
of 115 U.S. battle deaths (9.5 percent) were attributed to fratricide. Although the
downward trend is positive, as Lt. Gen. Leaf expressed, “in terms of fratricide, zero
is the only good score” (Cahlink, 2004, 69).
Regan (2002) argues that fear is an essential feature of combat. When “men are
afraid they will always shoot first rather than identify a target, or drop bombs too
early rather than risk the flak” (267). Historically, fratricide has most often occurred

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during the early stages of combat, in periods of reduced visibility, or where units
are operating in close proximity to each other (CALL, 1992; Regan, 2002). The
prevention of friendly fire requires good communication between combat units,
situational awareness on the part of commanders in the field, and fire discipline on
the part of combatants.
The two most common causes of fratricide are a lack of situational awareness
on the part of combatants and a failure to positively identify targets. Specifically,
two contributing factors stand out in the vast majority of fratricide incidents: (1) a
soldier did not know where he was on the ground, and/or (2) a soldier or airman
engaged without positively identifying his target (CALL, 1992). The case of the
previously mentioned A-10 incident illustrates both reasons. The marine air con-
troller did not have accurate information on the location of his fellow marines. As
often happens in combat, the attack plan changed in reaction to enemy activity,
and the unit that was the victim had moved beyond where the original plan placed
it. Furthermore, the air controller did not positively identify the target as enemy
and called in the air strike. As a result, U.S. Marines died (Herbert, 2004).
These primary factors can be complicated by poor communication between
friendly units. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the services experimented
with at least nine different tracking systems for friendly units, many of which could
not share information with one another (Cahlink, 2004). In his testimony to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, General Tommy Franks listed the lack of
standardized combat identification systems and procedures as one of the “lessons
learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom (Rumsfeld, 2003). After evaluating sev-
eral different technological solutions, the air force adopted a combat identification
system known as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and
installed it on E-8C Joint Stars aircraft. This is the same system the army adopted
for tracking blue forces several years earlier (Fox, 2006).

Combat Stress
A contributing factor to both fratricide and violations of the laws of armed conflict
is combat stress. Stress levels among military personnel, either in combat, support-
ing combat or awaiting combat, are high and a frequent source of problems. The
2002 Survey of Health-Related Behaviors among Military Personnel found that 40
percent of men and about half of the 12,500 military members surveyed used food
as a way to cope with stress. More than 25 percent used alcohol or cigarettes to deal
with stress. Heavy drinking was more prevalent among younger service members;
27 percent of those aged 18 to 25 acknowledged heavy alcohol use, double the rate
among civilians in the same age group (Miles, 2004).
Given the youthfulness of the military force, this use of alcohol is particularly
disturbing. Shay (2002) reports that combat trauma sufferers do use sex and alcohol
as a form of “self-medication.” The availability of alcohol, along with the stressful

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environment, may have played a role in the heavily publicized sexual assault cases
reported in the Iraqi area of operations (Department of Defense, 2004).
Combatants are subjected to significant physical and psychological stress both
during combat and in the period leading up to combat. These stressors include
exposure to weather, sleep deprivation, extreme fatigue, fear, time pressure versus
what may seem to be endless waiting, grief, guilt, frustration and injury, to name
only a few. These work in combination and can produce both positive and negative
responses in individuals (Department of the Army, 1994). Positive responses help
individuals adjust to the combat environment. Negative or dysfunctional responses
include battle fatigue and misconduct.
Battle fatigue is found in all types of combatants, including heroes. Minor
symptoms, such as hyper alertness or fear, can accompany excellent combat per-
formance (Department of the Army, 1994). However, if battle fatigue progresses
without treatment or rest, the combatant’s performance deteriorates, and can do so
to the point where he or she can no longer perform his or her duties (Department
of the Army, 1994). The inattention and carelessness that sometimes accompanies
battle fatigue can be a contributing factor in fratricide cases (CALL, 1992).
The other type of dysfunctional combat stress response is misconduct. Miscon-
duct stress behaviors can range from minor violations of orders up to violations of
the laws of armed conflict. Such misconduct can include killing or torturing pris-
oners, mutilating enemy dead, rape, looting, “fragging” (killing one’s own leader),
and desertion. These behaviors are more common in poorly trained, undisciplined
units. In addition to poor training and a lack of discipline, other factors that may
increase misconduct stress behavior include the availability of alcohol or drugs,
boredom or monotonous duties, commission of atrocities by the enemy, perceptions
that the civilian populace is hostile or untrustworthy, lack of expected support lead-
ing to a feeling of abandonment by senior leaders, lack of unit cohesion and loss of
confidence in leadership (Department of the Army, 1994).
All of these factors seem to have been at work in the prisoner abuse cases at
Abu Ghraib. The mistreatment, abuse and deliberate humiliation of these prisoners
constitute clear violations of the humanitarian principles underpinning the Geneva
and Hague conventions. Major General Taguba’s (2004) official investigation into
this abuse does not specifically single out stress as a causal factor. But, he does
conclude that the unit was not trained in detention or internee operations or in the
applicable rules of the Geneva Convention. In addition, the unit was undermanned
for its task and the soldiers’ quality of life was extremely poor. This could have led
the soldiers to believe they were not supported by their leaders. Finally, the soldiers
were working in a hostile environment, where relations with the local populace
were rapidly deteriorating.
Although the brigade commander, Brigadier General Karpinski, was well aware
of these deficiencies, she did little or nothing to correct them. Evidence in the report
indicated that discipline in the unit was lax, and Karpinski had little or no contact
with her soldiers (Taguba, 2004). An untrained, undisciplined unit, working in a

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 The Profession of Arms and the Management of Violence  n  313

hostile environment with a poor quality of life, and a largely absent leader creates a
situation ripe for misconduct stress behaviors, tragic violations of the law of armed
conflict, and national disgrace (Reinke, 2006).

Residual Impact of Violence

War itself creates situations that can wreck the mind. (Shay, 2002, 31)

The violence of combat has other effects as well, some of them lasting a lifetime. The
most well-known of these is posttraumatic stress disorder, or PTSD. Combat veterans
are not the only ones to suffer from PTSD. Nonmilitary trauma is actually the most
common source of PTSD (Stein, 2002). Nonetheless, PTSD, with its accompanying
tendencies towards depression and substance abuse, is a major problem (Department
of the Army, 1994). Shay (2002, 36) reports that 73.8 percent of active PTSD suf-
ferers are either alcohol dependent or abusers compared with a 26 percent lifetime
incidence of alcohol dependence or abuse among male civilian nonveterans.
PTSD is characterized by three clusters of symptoms—intrusive reexperiencing
of the event, numbness or disassociation, and hyper vigilance (Williams, 2003).
Many of the symptoms of PTSD were positive responses to combat stress that the
victim cannot “turn off” after combat is over. For example, hyper vigilance, or
constantly being on the alert for danger, is beneficial when one is in combat. In
civilian life, however, it is both unnecessary and counterproductive to be constantly
expecting attack (Shay, 2002). Combatants who suffered from emotional problems
or abuse prior to combat are more likely to experience PTSD afterwards (Gimbel
and Booth, 1994; Shay, 2002).
Although it is treated through the use of therapy and medication, PTSD is gen-
erally regarded as incurable (Stein, 2002). The goal of therapy is to help sufferers
improve to the point where symptoms do not interfere with normal functioning (Wil-
liams, 2003). Nonetheless, it can be helpful for individuals who have gone through a
particularly traumatic experience to have the opportunity to discuss what happened
in a safe, supportive environment. This may promote healing and prevent the devel-
opment of full-blown PTSD. The army encourages combat units to schedule time
for unit members to discuss their experiences, conduct memorial services or work
through unresolved issues before returning home (Department of the Army, 1994).
The recent cases of domestic violence after soldiers returned from combat in
Afghanistan highlight the importance of managing the transition of combat veter-
ans out of the war zone. The military has traditionally had a period of “decompres-
sion time” for returning POWs to help them adjust to freedom (Sample, 2003).
However, such a time period has not always been available to returning combat
veterans. This can lead to significant stress in marital relationships, resulting in
higher divorce and separation rates for combat veterans (Gimbel and Booth, 1994).
Coming home from combat with one’s unit and taking time to talk through what

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occurred can play a significant role in preventing both PTSD and other adjustment
problems that veterans experience when coming home (Shay, 2002).

Prevention
What can be done to prevent PTSD and other undesirable consequences of serving
in combat? Interestingly, the exact same factors that promote military effectiveness
lie at the heart of prevention. Shay (2002) proposes that although combat stress
cannot be prevented, it can be eased and the negative consequences reduced, if
units train together, go to combat together and return home together. It takes time
to create unit cohesion, and cohesion is at the heart of both combat effectiveness
and prevention. Cohesion reduces fear and anxiety and, thus, protects against the
psychological damage combat can do to military personnel.
Beyond cohesion, tough, realistic training and good leadership play crucial roles
in prevention. Training helps military personnel adjust to the stress of combat and
respond appropriately to the challenges combat presents (Shay, 2002; Department
of the Army, 1994). Leadership that is ethical, competent and courageous promotes
combat effectiveness and reduces stress. In particular, leaders must behave in ways
that promote trust because trust lies at the heart of creating unit cohesion and com-
bat effectiveness (Shay, 2002).

Conclusion
Combat is at the heart of what separates the military profession from all other pro-
fessions. The need to manage violence, to keep it focused on victory while, at the
same time, keeping it within socially acceptable bounds has generated a unique set
of values that separates military professionals from the civilians they serve. At the
same time, the stress and chaos of combat place extreme pressure on individuals to
violate that set of values. In an atmosphere of hostility and fear, as happened at Abu
Ghraib prison, it can be easy for violence to get out of control.
Leadership has always been recognized by military professionals as the key to
keeping the violence of combat within bounds. Such leadership must be founded
on more than just tactical competence or managerial skill. It must be founded
on the value set that has traditionally been at the heart of military service—duty,
honor, country.

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Green, Andrew A. (2004). “Maryland Reservist Alerted Officers to Alleged Abuses by His
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ruary 16, 2004.

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 Chapter 16

Regional Defense Policy:

The European Security
and Defense Policy

Johan Eliasson

The European Union (EU), with twenty-seven member states, over 450 million cit-
izens, a total gross domestic product (GDP) greater than that of the United States,
and the world’s largest trading block, is an influential international economic force,
with both positive (development aid, loans, free-trade agreements, potential mem-
bership) and negative (embargo, tariffs, withdrawal of aid) means of economic
influence. Such means are frequently effective in promoting political goals such as
regional stability, democracy and human rights (Zielonka, 1998a; Solana, 2005).
However, these capabilities have not always proven sufficient. In fact, the inability
of the EU to address the wider and more diverse set of security threats that have
come to dominate the international system—humanitarian crises, migration, eth-
nic conflicts, civil war, and various types of terrorist activities—has given rise to
criticisms of the paradoxical nature of the union: striving for a strategic impact
on Europe and elsewhere without any specific strategy; aspiring to be a powerful
international actor while rejecting ideas of a European supra-state; favoring strong
Atlantic ties coupled with strong autonomous institutions; and, critically, aspiring
to prevent and manage crises without the political determination to acquire the
means necessary to do so (Zielonka,1998a, 11; 1998b, Introduction; Sandström,
1998; Ojanen, 2000).

317

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However, things changed in 1999. The wars in the Balkans in the 1990s and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s emphatic insistence that EU states urgently
needed better military capabilities meant capability building was prioritized. EU
members, led by Britain and France, decided the union “must have the capac-
ity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to
decide to use them and the willingness to do so” (European Council, 1999). Before
year’s end, this new-found political will resulted in decisions on permanent security
and defense institutions, signaling to the United States and other non-EU NATO
members that the EU was serious, while simultaneously coveting non-EU states’
support in the development of European defense (Schake et al., 1999, 22–24).
Thus, unlike most EU policy areas involving new institutions and capabilities, the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) began as a practical, capability-
building enterprise, followed by a purpose-defining, policy-oriented period. The
reversal of the normal, logical order (of purpose preceding institutions) has proven
useful, and is one reason for ESDP’s speedy development. British Defense Minister
Hoon explained, “[ESDP] is all about enhancing military capability. It is not about
political niceties … If hanging a ‘European’ tag on it is what it takes to make it hap-
pen, then so be it.” (Howorth, 2000, n69). Although many might consider defense
integration a natural progression within a political and economic union—and the
September 11, 2001, Madrid 2004, and London 2005 attacks furthered political
will and boosted public support for stronger EU security capabilities—the rapidity
of developments, replacing rhetoric with improved capabilities and common EU
institutions in a policy area historically deemed the sacred domain of states, has
nonetheless surprised most analysts (Howorth, 2001; Gnesotto et al., 2004; Smith,
2004; Forsberg and Herd, 2006).
Following a brief overview and outline of recent developments, this chapter
will expand on how the ESDP works, its structures, organization, and operations.
Included is an explanation of EU policy aspirations, the agreed European Security
Strategy, and the formal administration of the ESDP. Military capabilities, includ-
ing force structures, equipment, the armaments industry and the EU Defense
Agency (EDA), are addressed before evaluating the integral ties to the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO). The emerging EU military culture that, much
like EU citizenship in the civilian realm, is forging an EU perspective and loyalty
among military personnel, precedes a section on EU operations. We conclude with
an evaluation of current and future developments in this rapidly developing area of
EU responsibility.

Introduction to the ESDP

As shown below, the ESDP is aptly defined as a process of enactment, the admin-
istration, of EU military and civilian crisis management operations. This requires a

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  319

strategy doctrine, military structures, improved and available capabilities, backed

by an EU defense industrial base.
The ESDP is incrementally complementing, supplementing, and harmonizing
member states’ national defense policies. In certain areas, EU level decisions and
projects have either replaced national counterparts (e.g., in armaments production)
or enabled a reorganization away from a total national defense along with special-
ization in certain areas (e.g., the Czech Republic’s focus on dealing with chemi-
cal and biological weapons), discussed below. Skyrocketing defense-related costs,
budget deficits, and competition from the United States have made “defense econo-
mies of scale” necessary. Acquiring the entire range of capabilities necessary for a
holistic defense is unrealistic for all but a few EU members (the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and Italy). Most complex weapon systems have a per-unit cost
too high for a single European nation; therefore, to cope with new and rising needs,
states have little choice but to pursue multinational projects. All states’ defense
reforms now also follow a similar pattern of revolution in military affairs (RMA),
initiated in the United States, focusing on rapid deployment and technological
innovation, which, along with member solidarity (further underscored by NATO
membership), and the need for military efficiency and international legitimacy, also
means EU states are less worried today about task sharing (de facto specialization).
Large and small states alike (NATO members or neutrals) know that pooled EU
capabilities, as well as large-country national resources, will be used to defend indi-
vidual EU members or EU regions should this become necessary (personal com-
munications, Brussels, 2002). There is now an EU security strategy, defense agency,
civil–military planning cell, and transnational battle groups, and the union has
carried out autonomous military operations. The EU also runs a strategic research
institute and a European Defense College. The ESDP’s legal basis lies primarily in
the Treaty on the European Union, articles 17–26, and various European Union
Council decisions (so-called “Joint Actions”). Many of the committees and agencies
involved have also been given international legal personality; that is, they can sign
agreements on behalf of members.
To achieve improved capabilities, a “Headline Goal” was adopted in 1999
(European Council, 1999c). This includes a rapid-reaction force of up to sixty thou-
sand troops (with twice that number for support and rotation), available with two
months notice and capable of being deployed for a year, Brussels-based military
structures, working proposals for stronger civilian conflict capabilities, and insti-
tutionalized EU–NATO cooperation. While not—at least in the short term—cre-
ating one unified European military to replace all national defenses, the strategic
goals and policy objectives of the EU discussed below, and the economy of scale
that dominates the armaments industry, have led some defense analysts to foresee a
future integrated EU force, backed by air and sea support, and capable of success-
ful engagement in regional warfare aimed at defending the “fundamental interests
and independence of the EU” (see Title V, article 11 of Treaty on the European
Union) within a decade (Gnesotto et al., 2004, 84). Such developments are also

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made more plausible by the fact that, amid wavering support for EU integration in
certain policy areas, public support across Europe for a common EU security and
defense remains consistently higher than for any other policy area (Eurobarometer,
2001, 2003, 2005). Thus, with demand for EU-wide responses growing, and with
the EU adopting common positions on all but one major post-Cold War conflict
(including the Gulf War, the bombing of Kosovo, the invasion of Afghanistan, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, and the crises in the Congo, the Middle East, and North Korea),
the 2003 invasion of Iraq (where half of EU states participated but the EU did not
adopt a common position) may have been the last divided endeavor (especially
given the post-invasion difficulties).

Strategy and Command Structure

European Security Strategy
Though any EU military action is, naturally, meant to support the EU’s Common
Foreign Policy (CFSP), having to react to, and engage in, different crises has also
strengthened the need for consensus on a wider security and defense strategy. The
increasing focus on EU-wide concerns underlies the 2003 European Security Strat-
egy (ESS), which serves as the key reference document for understanding collective
European ambitions, and how they might move forward. The ESS identifies five
major threats to regional and global security, which all require European involve-
ment: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, regional conflicts, and
organized crime. None of these new threats are purely military, nor can they be
tackled solely through military means as they require preventive and conflict-reso-
lution operations, yet any holistic approach to security and defense requires the use
of military means and thus military operations. The most common—but far from
only—situations in which European forces are employed are those typically labeled
humanitarian crises, stability (political) breakdowns, terrorist attacks, or limited
wars, thus requiring rescue, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement operations.
The ESS advocates a strategy of preventive engagement and effective multilat-
eralism, with police operations (training local officers, overseeing implementation)
and civilian operations (rule-of-law, election monitoring, and judicial operations)
in addition to, and in support of, military action. The latter is the focus of this
chapter, but for more on civilian aspects, see, for example, the EU’s Civilian Head-
line Goals (2008) or Gourlay (2005). Soft power, economic and political, is proving
effective in many instances where military posturing or threats yield little prog-
ress (e.g., northern Africa and eastern Europe). Economic and political assistance
to promote democracy in the near-abroad are part of preventive actions aimed at
avoiding having to address failed states and civil war down the road (ESS, 2003,
7–8, 11). Yet prevention may fail, requiring the use of military power to enforce
or oversee an agreement. Given the extensive and diverse experiences of EU mem-
ber states (ranging from contemporary British and French military operations

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  321

and active engagements in warfare to Nordic expertise in peacekeeping, Dutch

peace-enforcement activities, and numerous European diplomatic endeavors and
monitoring missions) the EU is better suited than any other state or international
organization to combine military and civilian instruments in such endeavors. In
many instances peacekeeping, maintaining peace based on a principle of impartial-
ity between the conflicting but separated parties, has moved into enforcing a peace
requiring the use of military means. The recognition that almost all operations will
require a combination of military, police, and civilian capabilities has been born
out in EU, NATO, and ad hoc coalition operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
and Iraq. European troops, particularly western European, have generally proven
apt at working with the police and local authorities, and engaging with civilian
populations in challenging peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. How-
ever, in each instance “winning the peace” after an intervention has proven diffi-
cult. Add to this the changing nature of war, where the military at times becomes
a means of law enforcement, especially in the war on terrorism (see below), and
challenges abound.
The EU’s increased willingness to decide autonomously when and how to assert
international influence is reflected in the ESS, which situates the EU’s likely use
of force “somewhere between a strict adherence to the UN Charter and a looser,
‘progressive’ interpretation of customary international law” (Quille et al., 2005, 7),
thus recognizing that justice sometimes requires action without waiting for a UN
resolution (see below). At the same time former deputy supreme commander Allied
Forces Europe explained, “… if we [Europeans] are to operate amongst the people
in the name of the law, we must do so within the law. To do otherwise is to attack
the essence of our own strategic objective, which is to establish and uphold the law”
(Smith, 2004, 121). This desire to adhere to international law in all operations is a
unifying feature in the EU and the ESDP.

Terrorism
The ESS is clearly aimed at this new type of military conflict. The capability-driven
development of the ESDP, along with contemporary crises calling for assistance
and intervention, and the reemergence of terrorism as a real threat to Europe, all
shaped the strategic objectives in the ESS. The EU has made fighting terrorism a
key priority, which must be part of “all aspects of the Union’s external relations
policy … [and] requires a global approach to strengthen the international coalition
and to prevent and contain regional conflicts” (EU 2002 Seville Council Declara-
tion). The ESS makes clear that Europe is both a target of and base for terrorism,
requiring a holistic approach to the problem, including intelligence cooperation,
police, judicial and military power (ESS, 2003, 3, 7). The March 2004 Madrid
bombings and the July 2005 attacks on London violently reinforced the notion that
EU states are intrinsically interdependent, facing common threats. This has also

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reinforced practical developments, easing agreements on many policy issues. One

example is the EU-wide cooperation that facilitated the swift arrest of numerous
bombing suspects.
In outlining EU strategy on terrorism, the ESS draws on members’ experiences
with insurgence and terrorism, domestically and in former colonies (Great Britain
and the Irish Republican Army; Spain and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, known as ETA;
as well as French, Italian, and Portuguese experiences); classical studies of gue-
rilla, or revolutionary, warfare; existing national security and counterinsurgency
strategies; and the recognition that new means and technologies necessitate new
means to prevent and fight terrorists. In so doing the EU pledges to uphold inter-
national humanitarian and human rights laws, which means killing is a last resort
and enemies, including terrorists, should be brought to justice (ESS 2003, 9–10).
Preventative measures, including expanded intelligence cooperation, integrated
police registers, common border regulations, and an EU arrest warrant, are strate-
gic developments complementing military developments.
With events in recent years, it is no surprise that the EU Constitution contains
a mutual assistance clause, where states commit to “use all available means to aid
and mutually assist in common efforts to respond to manmade nonstate terror-
ist attacks and similar crises” (EU Draft Constitution, article 42). The clause for-
malizes the mutual responsibilities espoused in treaty clauses and declarations of
protecting EU values and interests, while recognizing the implicit understanding
among member states that an EU state under attack will be provided all available
assistance (Interview Military Personnel, Brussels, 2003). The security and soli-
darity clause is already de facto working among members and will, according to
most policy makers and analysts, be formalized separately, along with several other
security and defense-related clauses, should the constitution fail to be adopted in its
entirety (to be decided in 2008 or 2009).
The European Council, consisting of heads of government (HoG), is the EU’s
highest authority, and ultimately decides on all matters of foreign, defense, and
security policy under the rule of unanimity, making it the supranational equivalent
of a national government administration. However, in 2001 the EU Council gave
formal legal standing to the Political Security Committee (PSC), the EU Mili-
tary Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and in 2004, the
European Defense Agency (EDA), which means there is now a formal structure of
institutionalized defense planning and execution (Table 16.1).
HoGs meet only four times a year, so most decisions are taken by the Council of
the EU—the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)—consist-
ing of members’ foreign ministers. They meet several times a month, and are sup-
ported by permanent representatives (CoRePer) who, like civil servants in national
governments, prepare and decide on most issues, which are then adopted by minis-
ters. Within the GAERC there are numerous directorates, headed by a directorate
general, supervising different areas of the ESDP, including external political and
military relations, defense, armaments, and civilian crisis management. There is no

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  323

Table 16.1  The Formal Structures and Chain of Command

European Council

Makes Defines the General Guidelines for the

Recommendations CFSP, Incl. for Matters with Defense
Implications
Assists the Council
Council of the EU
of the EU
(General Affairs and
External Relations Council) Secretary-General and
High Representative
Proposes for the CFSP
Political Objectives,
Recommends Supervises
Set of Options Privileged Link

Dialog EU Candidate
Political and Security States
Committee (PSC)
Dialog
Sends Non-EU
Guidelines Provides Military NATO Members
Advice and
Recommendations Dialog NATO
on Military Matters

Milit. Direction
EUMC EUMS
Early Warning, Situation
Assessment, Military Aspects
of Strategic Planning

Source: ISN Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich, Switzerland.

defense ministers’ council, but in addition to having “regularized informal” meet-

ings two to four times annually, they also participate biannually in the GAERC,
thus staying abreast of developments across the union while enabling defense
ministers to discuss common problems and proposals within the ESDP. Their
involvement is further strengthened through the daily work at the EU Military
Headquarters in Brussels where PSC ambassadors and EUMC representatives stay
in constant contact with national defense ministries. Thus, national foreign and
defense ministries remain involved with all aspects of ESDP.
The EU’s High Representative (HR), the EU’s foreign policy spokesperson,
serves as the secretary general of the Council of the EU, sits in on the GAERC, heads
the EU Diplomatic Service, and chairs the Political Security Committee (PSC), the
EU’s highest permanent ESDP committee. He or she is supported by a secretariat
staff consisting of several defense experts from member states, the EU Commission
(the EU’s executive branch), and several personally selected members. The staff
works closely with the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which
monitors the development of potential and existing crisis situations. The Situation

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Center, located in the GAERC secretariat and led by the HR, includes the EUMS
and the HR’s staff. The HR’s workload, and the increasing importance attributed to
the secretariat, is evident in the total increase in staff, from fifteen to forty in 2001,
to eighty by 2004. This multihatted structure is intended to both ensure seamless
policy coordination among EU institutions, and consistency in external relations.
Part of the constitutional reforms to be decided by 2009 include transforming the
HR into a formal EU foreign minister who, in addition to the aforementioned
responsibilities would serve as vice president of the EU Commission and also head
the EDA.
There are different decision-making options within the GAERC: consensus,
majority, or consensus with “constructive abstention” (a state abstains without pre-
venting others from acting on behalf of the EU). An adopted Common Strategy
specifies the goals to be implemented by joint actions. The latter may be decided
over the objection of a member state, increasing flexibility in a Council of twenty-
seven, as a “coalition of the willing” can no longer be prevented from acting (Peter-
son and Blomberg, 1999, 230).

Other Committees
The PSC is the central committee in the ESDP. Formally composed of members’
national political directors, ambassadorial-rank representatives from each state are
designated to carry out daily business; and in operational preparations or crises the
PSC is headed by the HR. More specifically the PSC has three explicit functions:
(1) to offer policy advice to the Council for EU military deployment and crisis
management operations; (2) to organize, plan, and evaluate, in liaison with the
PPEWU, all EU operations; and (3) to serve as the political control center for the
day-to-day direction of military operations in order to ensure overall consistency in
the EU’s military response to a crisis, as designated by the GAERC. “To that end,
on the basis of the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee, it
evaluates in particular the essential elements (strategic military options including
the chain of command, operation concept, operation plan) to be submitted to the
Council” (Council of European Union, 2001).
There is a Strategic Planning Branch, consisting of at least eight military and
seven civilian planners, and an EU Operations Center Permanent Staff. The former
undertakes strategic contingency planning for possible operations at the request of
the HR, taking account of the EU’s strategic objectives. This is then presented to
the GAERC for operational approval. The operations center staff is responsible for
generating and maintaining the inherent capacity to plan and run an autonomous
EU operation. It ensures that the Ops Center is operating within five days, and
fully operational in all areas within twenty days, of a GAERC decision, thus form-
ing the key nucleus of the EU Ops Center during an operation.

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  325

The EUMC is chaired by a four-star flag officer from an EU member state,

elected by the twenty-seven chiefs of defense (CHODs) and appointed by the
Council for three years. The EUMC is formally composed of the Chiefs of Staff
from members defense (equivalent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), who meet
at least biannually. Like the PSC, permanent military representatives work on a
daily basis in the EUMC in Brussels, providing advice and recommendations on
all military matters to PSC, including the elaboration, assessment, and review of
capability goals. In crisis management situations, following a Council decision, the
EUMC draws on the EUMS to develop and present strategic military options, and
authorizes the operation commander to engage in initial operational planning. The
EUMC then monitors the proper execution of military operations.
The EUMS is composed of military and civilian experts appointed by member
states. With its assembled military expertise the EUMS’ main purpose is to provide
military advice on the planning and execution of EU-led operations and, under the
direction of the PSC, to serve as the center of military planning during an EU-led
operation as directed by the EUMC. EUMS procedures are expected to be based
on, and fully compatible with, those of NATO (Howorth, 2000, 33–34). EUMS
staff work daily alongside each other, in working groups, projects, and frequently
with its NATO equivalent (discussed below), all to ensure the cross-national conti-
nuity and interoperability so necessary for EU operations.
Similar to any major national defense organization there are many different—
and rapidly growing—programs and working groups, framework agreements, dec-
larations, or special initiatives in place within the Council and the various ESDP
committees, all of which contribute to forging closer EU defense integration; some
are noted in the discussion below (for further elaboration, see, for example, Gne-
sotto et al., 2004; Rutten, 2006). Here briefly note two major civilian and military
committees and three agencies supporting the ESDP structure.
The Civilian Crisis Management Committee is responsible for nonmilitary
components of EU operations and reports to the PSC. The Civ-Mil Cell, headed by
a brigadier general seconded by a civilian deputy, brings together twenty-five mili-
tary and civilian experts to develop strategic options and contingency plans for EU
operations requiring joint civil and military means. It will also set up operations
centers for autonomous EU operations whenever a national operational headquar-
ters is lacking, or support the latter when one is used.
The European Institute for Strategic Studies provides security-related research,
background papers, proposals for EU White Papers, and should over time “contrib-
ute to a European security culture” (Eufocus, 2006, 7).
The Politico–Military Group undertakes overall assessments and evaluations of
EU procedures and operations, while the European Defense Agency coordinates
armaments research and procurement (discussed further below).
The European Satellite Center, located in Spain, provides Earth observation
space imagery for use in ESDP decision making, individual training in digital

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geographic information systems and imagery analysis, and it conducts research

projects assigned by the PSC.

Capabilities
The combined EU troop size exceeds that of the United States; the EU accounts
for 25 percent of the world’s military expenditures (the United States, 45 percent),
and 21 percent of the world’s arms exports (the United States, 49 percent) (Brit-
ish American Security Information Council, 2003). At the same time, expendi-
tures on material and acquisition equal only 40 percent of the U.S. equivalent,
with the same ratio for operation and management, and even less (33 percent) on
Research and Technology (R&T). Thus, even if, as some argue, defense expendi-
tures amounting to 50 percent of that of the United States should “be more than
enough to deal with contingencies inside and along the periphery of Europe. After
all, that figure represents one fifth of the world’s military expenditure!” (Heisbourg,
2000, 9), improved efficiency, “more-bang-for-your-bucks,” becomes crucial; pooled
resources are even more important when considering that most EU states—with
exceptions like Finland, Britain, and France—are not increasing defense spending
(as a percentage of GDP).
Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, while “EU” spending
refers to cumulative EU spending, most governments—ever more explicitly—fac-
tor in the larger European context when setting defense budgets. This includes
the projects, policies, and capabilities needed for the ESDP; strong public sup-
port for ESDP adds to this focus. Second, defense spending is not the most accu-
rate of figures as different member states exclude certain spending. For example,
France excludes from the defense budget spending on military infrastructure and
transportation, Finland includes certain dual-use products, while Sweden does not.
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned figures on material and development highlight
a challenging reality for all EU members in improving capabilities.

Headline Goals
The “Headline Goal” (noted above) has been the focus of developments and the
core from which other aspects of the ESDP have flowed. In 2000 member states
engaged in an initial pledging of national assets that would be available for EU
operations, resulting in a European Force Catalog. The 2001 follow-up conference
resulted in the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), erecting working com-
mittees tasked with proposing specific ways to improve and coordinate collective
capability goals in areas such as command, control, intelligence, and transport.
Each of the nineteen working groups was headed by EUMS staff specialists and
their work was coordinated by the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF). Their 2003

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  327

assessment pointed to shortfalls in assets members already possessed, but failed to

commit to EU operations and, more seriously, continued capability deficiencies in
air and sea lift, unmanned aerial vehicles, air-to-air refueling capabilities, or bal-
listic missile defense (Council of European Union, 2003).
The updated Headline Goal 2010 (adopted in 2004) envisions all members’
force contributions as being compatible, completely interoperable and self-sustain-
able in theater within a decade (i.e., 2012–2014); most states are now reforming
their defense structures in similar fashion, moving to mobile, rapid, and profes-
sional military (Salmon and Shepard, 2003; Duke, 2000, 20–22; Flournoy and
Smith, 2005). To ensure continued progress in addressing deficiencies, the Capabil-
ity Development Mechanism (CDM) replaced the working groups as a permanent
feature of ESDP. The focus is assisting and pushing stats on qualitative and quan-
titative improvements in capabilities through (primarily) a bottom-up approach;
the initiation and leadership of specific panels and projects in areas identified as
deficient are states’ responsibilities, but EU committees help coordinate work across
nations. Part of the CDM entails having the HTF publish an annual capabili-
ties improvement chart displaying progress in addressing recognized shortfalls and
deficits in EU, mainly, but not exclusively, those pledged to the HG force catalog.
Though lacking legal authority to enforce improvements, annual reviews of progress
on capabilities create “peer pressure” to reform domestic defense structures to meet
the quantitative pledges made and, importantly, the qualitative standards neces-
sary for operational interoperability. Furthermore, there are now also common EU
exercises conducted according to newly established EU training guidelines, based
on NATO standards. The Exercise Program is designed to allow proper testing
and validation of structures, procedures, and arrangements “through a sequence
of increasingly challenging exercises in order to ensure appropriate readiness and
efficient functioning in a crisis” (Von Sydow, 2001).
By late 2006, some deficiencies had been overcome (e.g., operational headquar-
ters, strategic transport, nuclear, biological and chemical protection, and medi-
cal supplies), some were soon to materialize (airlift, support helicopters), others
remained lacking (space assets, in-air refueling, see the section on armaments
integration).

Headline Goals Updated

Part of the second phase of the Headline Goal development to improve rapid
deployment capabilities in a sudden crisis include the formation of smaller, mobile
EU Battle Groups (BG). Operational tasks currently envisioned for BGs include all
those in the “Petersberg Tasks” (Article 17.2 of the EU Treaty), including conflict
prevention, peace enforcement, regional stabilization, reconstruction and military
advice, evacuations, or assistance to ongoing humanitarian operations; however,
this does not rule out offensive operations when so necessitated.

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A Battle Group

is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coher-

ent force package capable of either stand-alone operations, or the initial
phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-
sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service
support elements. Depending on the mission, the BG could have a
strength of about 1500 personnel. (Hamelink, 2005, 2)

The Headline Goal planning horizon for BGs is five years, with EU member
states offering their BG packages at the biannual, EUMS-chaired, BG coordina-
tion conference. There are thirteen national and multinational BGs, each of which
has a battalion-sized force, support elements (including preidentified logistics). This
arrangement enables BGs to be deployed separately, or jointly, as part of a larger
operation. Most BGs have specialty areas such as mine-sweeping, chemical and
biological weapons (CBWs), or special operations forces. All BGs must be deploy-
able within five days of an EU Council decision to initiate an operation—which
is preceded by EUMS identification of a task for the EU and operational recom-
mendations by the EUMC—and be sustainable for at least thirty days, extendable
to one hundred twenty. Since January 2007 the EU has been able to undertake two
concurrent single BG-sized rapid-response operations, with full support structures
for both (Table 16.2).
The contributing states guarantee that each BG is deployable and capable of
meeting the set minimum standards for EU deployment, but the certification is
also monitored by the EUMC and the EUMS, thus ensuring consistency and over-
all cohesion of the capabilities available to the EU. BG training remains primar-
ily the responsibility of the contributing states, although larger biannual EU and
EU–NATO training exercises provide valuable operational training. The Headline
Goal agreement, the BGs, and the growing number of EU operations (discussed
below), have led to enhanced cross-national military cooperation and coordina-
tion between affected ministries, as well as institutionalized coordination with EU
authorities. This improves the knowledge of each other’s military capabilities, facili-
tating rapid decision making when an EU operation is launched.
An intra-EU division of labor, or role specialization, is increasingly visible, yet
without a fully integrated defense command and force structure EU capabilities
will be hampered, even as capabilities and interoperability improve. Though some
brigades are under multinational command (e.g., there are cases with a German
commander of a Dutch brigade; a Swede in charge of a joint Swedish–Finnish
brigade), these, like equipment and force structuring under RMA, need to become
“second nature.” As many requirements necessitate increased commitments from
larger states (e.g., transport, headquarters), smaller states with specific strengths,
and eager to be perceived as equal contributors alongside military powers, such as

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Table 16.2  Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures

Qualitative/ Projects
Capabilities Shortfalls and Progress Readiness and
Catalog Deficits 2002–2006 Impact Shortfalls Initiatives
Land
Attack helicopter battalions ≈ S Yes
Composite army aviation ≈ R Yes
battalions
Medium/heavy helicopter ≈ Yes
transport battalions
Reconnaissance and liaison ≈ Yes
helicopter battalions
Nuclear, biological and Solved
chemical (NBC) battalions
NBC Coy (balanced) ≈ R
Logistic battalion ≈ R
Surveillance and target ≈ S Yes
acquisition (STA)/Unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) battalions
STA units ≈ S
Medical collective protection ≈ Yes
unit role 3
Deployable laboratories S Q Yes
Maritime
Carrier-based air power ≈ Yes
Helicopter Carrier ≈
Primary casualty receiving ship ≈
(PCRS)
Port and shipping advisory team ≈
Seaport of disembarkation
(SPOD) unit
Amphibious brigade HQ ≈ R
(including signal company)
Air
Combined air operations center Solved R
(CAOC)
Suppression of enemy air ≈ S Yes
defense (SEAD)
Air-to-air refueling (AAR) ≈ S Yes

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 330  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 16.2  Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures

(Continued)
Qualitative/ Projects
Capabilities Shortfalls and Progress Readiness and
Catalog Deficits 2002–2006 Impact Shortfalls Initiatives
Combat search and rescue ≈ S Yes
(CSAR)
Tactical air transport (TCC-M) ≈ Yes
Cruise missiles and precision ≈ S Yes
guided munitions (PGM)
equipped A/C
Tactical air support for Solved R
maritime operations (TASMO)
aircrafts (A/C)
Dispersed operating base ≈
(DOB) air traffic control (ATC)
and fire and crash support
element
DOB fuel distribution support ≈
element
DOB personnel support ≈
element
C3I
Operation headquarters S Q Yes
(OHQs)
Force headquarters ≈ S Q Yes
Land component commander ≈ S Q Yes
(LCC) headquarters
Maritime component ≈ S Q Yes
commander (MCC)
headquarters
Air component commander ≈ S Q
(ACC) headquarters
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
Imagery intelligence collection ≈ S Yes
Signal intelligence collection ≈ S Yes
Early warning and distant ≈ S Yes
detection strategic level
Theatre surveillance and ≈ S Yes
reconnaissance air picture

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  331

Table 16.2  Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures

(Continued)
Qualitative/ Projects
Capabilities Shortfalls and Progress Readiness and
Catalog Deficits 2002–2006 Impact Shortfalls Initiatives
Theater surveillance and ≈ S Yes
reconnaissance ground picture
Strategic Mobility
Strategic airlift S R: in Yes
relation to
passenger
aircraft
Strategic sealift (including ≈ S Yes
strategic medical evacuation)
Other Capability
Tactical ballistic missile defence ≈ S Q Yes
Catalog Deficits
Force headquarters (FHQ) ≈ Yes
carrying ship
Repair support ship ≈
Amphibious ship ≈ R Yes
Patrol vessel/Corvette (PV/FS) Solved
Harbor and shallow water mine ≈
counter measures (MCM) unit
Aircraft carrier (CV)-based recce ≈ R
pods
Division HQ ≈ R
Light infantry brigade HQ ≈ Yes
Light/medium armored ≈ Yes
squadrons
Mechanized infantry battalion R Yes
Light infantry battalions ≈ Yes
Amphibious infantry battalion ≈ R
Field artillery battalion ≈ R
(amphibious)
Short range air defense R Yes
(SHORAD) battalion

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 332  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 16.2  Capabilities Employed: Operational Structures

(Continued)
Qualitative/ Projects
Capabilities Shortfalls and Progress Readiness and
Catalog Deficits 2002–2006 Impact Shortfalls Initiatives
Ground-based air defense ≈ R Yes
(GBAD) medium level battalion
Ground-based air defense Solved R
(GBAD) battery
GBAD battery (amphibious) ≈ R
Combat engineer battalion ≈ R
(amphibious)
General support engineer ≈
battalions
General maintenance engineer ≈ S
battalions
Reconnaissance squadrons ≈ R
(amphibious)
Medical treatment facilities role Solved R
3 (including in-theater ashore
and afloat medical treatment
facilities)
Multinational support unit ≈ R
(MSU) battalion
Forward tactical aeromedical Solved R
evacuation helos
Note: S = Satisfactory.
      R = Situation has improved.
      ≈ = Situation remains approximately the same.
      Q = Significant in the assessment of capabilities.
      J = One column identifies qualitive (Q)/Readiness (R) shortfalls.
The Projects and Initiatives Column do not reflect definitive commitments
Source: Council of the European Union Press Office, Brussels, 2006.

France or Britain, pledge contributions in their respective specialty (mine-sweeping,

peacekeeping, WMDs etc.), thereby committing themselves to maintaining these
niche areas at the expense of a total defense system. The lack of comprehensive
national defenses, combined with common external borders, make states increas-
ingly dependent on other members even for territorial defense assistance, should
such be necessary (as recognized through the “solidarity clause” noted above).

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  333

Excluded from the EU’s arsenal are nuclear weapons; weapons all west Euro-
pean states have the capability to produce, yet which all but two have chosen not to
pursue. Britain and France have long been members of the nuclear weapons club,
with former French President Chirac declaring that his country’s nuclear missiles
would be used in response to a large-scale attack in Europe by an external power or
entity (terrorists), even if the attack occurred outside French territory.
One major problem area for the EU is logistics, another command and control.
Most EU forces are still largely static, a conspicuous problem when considering that
with the necessary troop rotations inherent in any operation, as well as the need for
at least a few reserve brigades, only fifteen to seventeen brigades, or fifty thousand
European troops—15 percent of all uniformed soldiers—can currently (2006) be
deployed simultaneously. Currently Britain and France have the most, albeit, lim-
ited capabilities for air and sealift, mostly C141s (fifty-four) and A200s (twenty-
eight), respectively, with Germany and Italy also possessing a dozen each. The UK
also has sixty intra-theater C130 airlift planes (compared to the United States’ over
four hundred), and some EU states have leased similar planes from Ukraine. While
this and other deficiencies are being addressed, with vast improvements in airlift,
command and communication, technological advances and interoperability phased
in from 2008 to 2012 (including, e.g., A-400M transport planes, a new command
headquarters, a European Strike Fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Euro-
missile), interim strategic airlift capabilities (SALIM) have been secured. Several
states (including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) have guaranteed short-notice
airlift capabilities (Antonov AN-124-100, C-141 and A200 model aircrafts) for all
EU operations. The Global Approach on Deployability (GAD), part of Headline
Goal 2010 and run out of the EUMS is critical here. Emphasizing that the EU, no
later than 2010, must have the necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift
in support of anticipated operations, the GAD works to coordinate all European
strategic air, land and sea-lift assets through the Strategic Airlift Coordination Cell
located within the European Airlift Center at Air Base Eindhoven (the Nether-
lands), which also hosts the Sealift Coordination Center. The cell is supported by
the Greek Sealift Center in Athens, which is helpful in case of Mediterranean and
North African operations. Both cells are also available to NATO.

The Armaments Industry as It Relates to Capabilities

A competitive European defense industrial sector is key to achieving improved
capabilities, while diminishing operational reliance on the United States. Not-
withstanding universal agreement that the best way to improve EU capabilities
is through commonality in force structures and equipment (Whitney, 2005),
political objections in a sector steeped in nationalistic pride, protectionism, subsi-
dies, and legislative barriers to transnational ownership have long prevented such

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developments (Guay, 2005), and was also why formal EU-wide convergence criteria
were rejected when establishing the Headline Goal.
The European Defense Agency (EDA), established in 2004, is under the
authority of the EU Council and headed by the HR. It has a staff of eighty and
a steering board, composed of one delegate from each participating state, usually
double-hatted with the EUMC, and one nonvoting representative from the EU
Commission, which serves as the EDA decision-making body. The EDA scrutinizes
members’ defense capabilities and their pledges to the EU, while also presenting
armaments policy recommendations to the GAERC. Following the determination
by the EUMC of the EU’s military requirements and shortfalls, and the political
priorities set by the PSC, EDA experts work to redress these needs by seeking to
coordinate, promote, and help facilitate armaments R&D and procurement among
member states (including legal contracts), and promote wherever possible the pool-
ing of states’ resources (Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, articles 13.2, 17, 20,
21). ECAP project groups were merged with EDA Capability Technology groups
(staffed with member states’ experts and networked to all members) in 2006, and
will, under the control of the EDA, focus on R&T, complementing the capability-
driven priorities. This “bottom-up” approach, starting with EU members prioritiz-
ing and specifying defense needs, and project groups identifying shortfalls via the
capabilities catalog, and areas suitable for EU-wide integration, is indicative of the
ESDP. This approach keeps national agencies involved in EU projects, providing
valuable input and feedback to EU agencies and committees. Progress reports on
ECAP is submitted by the EDA and the EUMC to the GAERC annually.
The agency’s administrative costs are financed through member contributions,
with projects financed by participating member states. The EDA has legal person-
ality, meaning it can enter binding agreements on behalf of members with third
parties. Its budget was €25 million in 2005, and €40 million in 2006, with addi-
tional research funding pending negotiations among states (as of November 2006).
Although the budget requires unanimity, Council members agreed that as many
decisions as possible will be taken by majority voting (Dempsey, 2004).
The EDA has four directorates (capabilities, R&T, armaments, and defense
industry/market), and the agency’s potential benefits for the development of Euro-
pean capabilities are considerable. In 2006, EU member states spent €2.3 billion
on defense R&T, equal to 1.25 percent of total defense spending, and 11 percent
of R&T (€280 million) spending was multinational. To this effect, the EDA
Armaments Directorate surveys member states’ intended upgrades of major equip-
ments, with the aim of facilitating collaborative development or procurement of
new technologies, subsystems, or components. It also reviews existing multina-
tional collaboration projects with the goal of finding other members that might
be encouraged to participate in replenishment or follow-up purchases. A major
problem in arms consolidation and expanding collaborative projects is Article 296
of the Treaty on the European Union. This allows states to exempt from intra-EU
competition—the internal market governing goods and service—all products with

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defense implications. The 2006 voluntary Code of Conduct of Defense Procure-

ment (premised on the Framework agreement), aims to establish a true European
defense equipment market (excluding nuclear weapons and cryptographic equip-
ment) to further integrate the rapidly consolidating European armaments market.
Members commit to maximize fair and equal opportunities for all suppliers in all
states by publicizing procurement opportunities through a new electronic bulletin
board operated by the EDA, and data for contracts awarded will be made avail-
able (Spongenberg, 2006). This all ensures transparent and objective criteria for
selecting bidders and awarding contracts. The EDA thus establishes a link between
military planning, defense research, and armaments R&T and procurement, thus
helping to foster standardization of equipment, translating common capability
needs into common procurement projects, and assisting in the rationalization of
Europe’s patchwork of armaments arrangements and institutions (Schmitt, 2005).
Defense industrial mergers and acquisitions, along with multinational frame-
work agreements—and pushed by the EDA—are rationalizing the EU defense
market, reducing overlap and redundancy, while improving collective capabilities.
Armaments procurement falls outside the regulatory framework of the EU free
trade area (see Article 296 of the EU Treaty), yet a diminished international arms
market, increasingly sophisticated and costly weapons and weapon systems, and
shorter production lines, are pushing leading industry representatives and policy
makers to realize the necessity of reducing inefficiency, all while improving indus-
try competitiveness (e.g., Schmitt, 2005; Guay and Callum, 2002). Between 1998
and 2005 Europe witnessed a massive merger and acquisition phase, leaving the EU
with two armaments champions in the European Aerospace and Defense Company
(EADS) and British Aerospace Industry (BAE), with roughly five other interna-
tionally competitive yet more specialized companies (including Finmeccanica, the
Italian helicopter specialist, Thales and Rolls-Royce plc). BAE now also owns parts
of Northrop-Grumman through a subsidiary, thereby making substantial inroads
in North America, to the benefit of European competitiveness.
The Organization for Joint Cooperation in Armaments (OCCAR), a five-state
organization (Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy) was formed to
coordinate and administer armaments procurements and collaborative defense
equipment programs. It administers the Tiger attack helicopter, the Future Sur-
face-to-Air Euromissile family, and the A400M transport aircraft. The “Framework
Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation
of the European Defense Industry” (FA), a treaty agreement among the OCCAR
states plus Sweden, established a standard and rules setting organization to iden-
tify and support common R&D, facilitate and promote harmonization and stan-
dardization of technical specifications and military equipment, ensure security
of supply, harmonize export procedures, and standards for security and classified
information. FA members account for 80 percent of all EU arms production, 90
percent of defense industry jobs, 96 percent of exports, and 97 percent of all R&D

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(Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), 2004; British

American Security Information Council, 2003; Flournoy and Smith, 2005, 72).
The FA, intended to facilitate the operation of an EU defense industrial mar-
ket, set the stage for vast defense industrial mergers and acquisitions, which by
2010 should resemble the U.S. market (which in the 1990s went from ten large
manufacturers to four). “The LoI [FA] was definitely the event destined to have the
greatest potential impact on the European defense market.” (Noen, in Guay and
Callum, 2002, 12). FA treaty signatories envision EU defense industrial consolida-
tions leading to transnational EU defense companies replacing national champi-
ons, as well as mutual defense material interdependence (FA Treaty articles 4, 7,
42, 45-49). FA signatories also supported the EDA as it enables an EU forum for
expanded defense- and armaments-related discussions and projects while seeking to
harmonize standards (Interview with Diplomatic Personnel, Brussels, 2000).
In fact, EDA structures and EU policies have been premised on the FA, includ-
ing two EU “Codes of Conduct:” one addressing arms exports is nearly identical
to that used by FA signatories, thus virtually ensuring EU-wide adherence to the
code (which, name notwithstanding, is far more stringent than the previous arms
embargo). The other “code” adopted enables European companies to compete for
all defense procurement contracts worth over €1 million, thus applying internal
free-market rules to defense, and making Europe more like the U.S. market. How-
ever, nuclear and chemical weapons are excluded, and EU members are still allowed
to exempt “highly sensitive” contracts, even if such cases need to be “well-justified”
to the GAERC.
A true EU armaments market makes for harmonized weaponry, easing interop-
erability while improving efficiency and enhancing capabilities in EU defense oper-
ations, and will likely materialize within a decade.

Links to NATO Assets to Improve Capabilities

NATO was the only preexisting organization with military standards, training
facilities and headquarters, operational experience, and assets. Given that the ESDP
is explicitly meant to complement and supplement the alliance’s work, much work
in the ESDP is tied to NATO.
The EU–NATO relationship has several components. NATO and EU (PSC)
ambassadors have met regularly since 2000, and there are formal and informal mili-
tary staff meetings between the two organizations. Committee meetings and officer
interaction and exchange are important steps in establishing a working relationship
between the EU and NATO, allowing the EU to learn from NATO’s experience
while ensuring that the alliance remains informed of all developments. There is
an EU–NATO Capability Group coordinating cooperation between the ECAP
and NATO’s project groups and overseeing reforms and improvements in the two
organizations to ensure compatibility in all areas between participating states. Part

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  337

of close weekly cooperation among EU and NATO military staff include regular
EU–NATO working groups, emanating from the respective organization’s military
committees and addressing operational procedures, training, and equipment. Most
EU–NATO members double-hat their representatives when possible (meaning the
same person sits on the EU and NATO committee). This is done to ensure continu-
ity, but also to minimize potential personnel conflicts and reduce the number of
people accessing sensitive information.
Even with the political and military institutions in place, many ESDP operations
require access to certain NATO assets, placing pressure on complete interoperabil-
ity between all EU and NATO states’ forces and equipment. An agreement formal-
ized in 2003 (“Berlin plus”) gives EU access to NATO assets such as AWAC planes,
communication systems, satellite pictures, and, if needed, use of its headquarters
in Mons, Belgium, during operations. There is also an agreement on NATO–EU
exchange of security information (Council of European Union, 2003a). Following
the security agreement national NATO specialists with significant experience of
operational planning now work side by side with EU military personnel on propos-
als, strategies, and other aspects of military planning in the EUMC and EUMS.
The EU also has a planning cell at NATO headquarters for Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE), to coordinate missions where NATO assets are used.
The year 2003 saw the first joint EU–NATO training exercise focused on the
interaction between EU and NATO at the strategic politico–military level, and has
been followed by annual exercises at various levels of scope and command (includ-
ing joint troop exercises).

The Military Culture

When the ESDP was conceived it was deemed essential that EU security and defense
institutions be erected as quickly as possible in order to ensure autonomy and to
promote an “EU security culture” (Howorth, 2001, 769). Many argue that to be
effective the EU must establish a “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and …
robust intervention” and “transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces
and enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defense and more
active use of resources … systemic use of pooled and shared assets” (ESS, 2003, 11,
12). To this effect it is essential that the military “understands the political objec-
tives they are working to achieve so that they can design their strategy to ensure
that the effects of actions by soldiers on the ground are consistent with political
goals” (Kaldor and Salmon, 2006, 28). Years later it is evident that member states
policy makers and military personnel increasingly place national security needs in
a broader European context, including new technologies, industries, and policies
(Whitney, 2005). One contributing factor is the more practical nature of defense
vis-à-vis foreign policy; the latter is laden with historical, ethnic, cultural, and other
sentiment-laden, value-based characteristics. Aiding the practical (implementation)

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 338  n  Handbook of Military Administration

side is that military personnel, including defense ministers, frequently speak a more
“similar language” (Whitney, 2005) because of their similar military training; they
frequently find common grounds on practical problems facing the states and the
region (Howorth, 2001, 767–782; personal communication, Brussels, 2003; Whit-
ney, 2005).

Brusselization
An institutionalization, or “Brusselization effect”—with EU perspectives and val-
ues—has pushed harmonization of views and practices and contributed to altered
national security and defense policies, while speeding up domestic security and
defense reforms in member countries. The permanence of military institutions,
along with the informal defense ministers’ Council, quickly began to promote a
greater harmonization of views as military personnel (Howorth, 2001, 767; Elias-
son, 2004a); and the EU foreign and security policy dimension has consciously
and unconsciously become part of policy makers’ basis for setting national policy
(Manners and Whitman, 2000, 243). The ease of interaction available to military
representatives at different levels in the ESDP, and with NATO representatives,
frequently resulting in common cross-national military positions on issues under
discussion, has begun to generate a harmonization through norms and accepted
behavior essential to a functioning military organization. Military and civilian per-
sonnel from across Europe are socialized in the EU environment (Eliasson, 2004;
Missiroli, in Gnesotto et al., 2004, 56), what analysts call “going native” (Checkel,
2003). Eliasson (2004), through analysis of official documents and statements, and
numerous personal interviews with policy makers, diplomats, and military per-
sonnel over a three-year period, provides evidence of how EU membership and
developments in ESDP has contributed extensively to harmonizing participating
individuals’ perspectives. This is particularly true for smaller, and/or neutral, states,
whose foreign policy apparatuses do not equal those of, for example, France or
Britain, which need to make use greater of the resources in EU institutions to
further ideas and proposals in all areas, including now defense. Several officers and
diplomats interviewed in 2001 and again in 2003 had changed their perspectives,
referring in much more positive terms to the EU’s new defense dimension.

We see a remarkable difference after they have been here for a while,
at first they stick with the official line … then they begin to see the
benefit of ESDP and convey their experience to government officials with
whom they interact and whom are increasingly receptive … while officials
cannot, for domestic political reasons, be as clear publicly, they have
recognized the significance of what is happening and the need to adjust
policies and practices accordingly. (Eliasson, 2004a, 183)

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  339

Institutionalized committee work, joint planning, exercises and operations, along

with armaments agreements and defense industrial integration, show how the ESDP
has adopted its own culture with compromise and adaptation, leaving less room for
separate economic or political maneuverability (Howorth, 2001, 776). National pat-
terns are increasingly harmonized among member states as daily interactions between
member’s officers and staff at EU military headquarters reinforce common perspec-
tives and goals in ways similar to those found in the U.S military establishment.
Increased responsibilities and a functional growth in staff (which increases fur-
ther as more operations are undertaken), contributes to member state operational
specialization as well as cross-national specialist interactions. It is also the case
that working side by side with U.S. and EU members’ NATO officials promotes
a NATO-based structural cultural, even as a distinctly European perspective on
operations and means-ends looms conspicuously among military personnel. Views
on when and how military vis-à-vis civilian power should be used are converging in
EU capitals, and the ESDP is now viewed as a natural complement to, and increas-
ingly a component of, national security policies, thus mutually promoting and
reinforcing an EU defense culture among military personnel stationed in the EU
military headquarters in Brussels. Although the aforementioned developments have
also in some cases fueled a tug-of-war between home-based officials and Brussels-
based representatives, both on policy issues and the larger question of how much
responsibility to be transferred to Brussels, in what areas, and to what institution
(Egeberg, 2002, 6–8; Attina, 2001, 146; Interviews with Diplomatic Personnel,
2004), the effects of socialization also indicate that states, although formally pos-
sessing a veto, are likely to agree with one another when in a setting where existing
institutions and repeated interactions provide both opportunities and constraints
beyond simple interstate bargaining.

Operations to Date Using Parts or All of the Command

The first military operation (Table 16.3) undertaken by the EU, from March to
mid-December 2003, was Operation Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (FYROM). Launched after a request from the FYROM authorities,
there was no UN Security Council resolution formally authorizing the operation,
although UN SC Resolution 1371 supports the “security presence” in FYROM.
The EU mission was composed of some three hundred fifty personnel from twenty-
seven countries, of which thirteen were EU member states, with France acting as
the “framework nation,” providing headquarters for the operation. NATO assets,
including AWACs were used.
Artemis was conducted in accordance with the UN SC Resolution 1484 (30 May
2003) and the Council’s Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. It involved eigh-
teen hundred personnel, and was aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the

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 340  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 16.3  Other Operations

ESDP Civilian, Police and Military Operations Since 2003

EU Operations and Staff Numbers as of End of May 2006

EUPM EUPOL PROXIMA EUPAT CONCORDIA
(Bosnia and Herzegovina) (former Yugoslav (fYROM) (fYROM)
198 international Republic of Macedonia) 29 international 400 personnel
208 national 2004–2005 (completed) 20 National March-December 2003 (completed)
(completed)
EUFOR ALTHEA
(Bosnia and Herzegoyina) EUPT Kosovo (new)
7000 personnel (24 international)

AMIS II Assistance
(Sudan/Darfur) EUJUST THEMIS
60 international (Georgia)
2004–2005 (completed)

EUSEC DR Congo
9 international AMM Monitoring Mission
+ EUSEC-FIN (Aceh/Indonesia)
28 personnel 90 international
84 national
EUPOL Kinshasa
(DR Congo) EUJUST-LEX
27 international/8 national (Iraq/Brussels)
+ temporary reinforcement 38 staff 20 international

ARTEMIS EUFOR Congo EUPOL COPPS EUBAM Rafah

(DR Congo) (DR Congo) (Palestinian (Palestinian Territories)
1800 personnel To be launched in June Territories) 60 international
June-September 2003 2006 14 international 5 national
(completed) Up to 2000 personnel 3 national
+ EUSR border team Moldova/Ukraine and EUSR border team Georgia

Source: Council of the European Union.

security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia.

France was again the framework nation.
Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina includes 4,500 troops and support personnel (as of
August 2007). It is based on a UN Chapter VII mandate, UNSCR 1575 (2004) and
UNSCR 1639 (2005). The force includes troops from twenty-two EU member states,
and ten supporting states, and there was also a five hundred-strong integrated police
unit (IPU) based in Sarajevo, training and assessing Bosnian police officers.
On April 25, 2006, UNSC 1671 authorized the temporary deployment of a EU
force to support the ongoing UN operation during the period encompassing the
elections in the DR Congo. Fifteen hundred troops are stationed in the capital and
around the country, with twelve states participating (Table 16.3). The planning and
coordinating of the whole operation takes place in Europe. The operation head-
quarters (at the strategic level) was in Potsdam (Germany), and was subordinated
to the PSC.

Problems
Another problem is intelligence. There is no EU intelligence agency equivalent to
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and to properly advise the PSC, the HR

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  341

needs intelligence. Currently, without independent power to require national ser-

vice to provide intelligence, the intelligence shared with the HR is at the discre-
tion of national governments, often channeled through representatives in Brussels.
Some members, notably Britain, have separate and globally extending intelligence
sources, such as the UKUSA agreement on signal intelligence.1 The United States
and western Europe use systems, in the interest of justice and security, that gather
information on their own citizens, foreign nationals, and anyone surfing the World
Wide Web. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), through the UKUSA intel-
ligence sharing alliance, has used the ECHELON intelligence gathering service,
in conjunction with a comprehensive databasing system on a private Intranet
(Intelink), to provide a searchable catalog of wide-ranging intelligence between five
countries (the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zeeland, and
Canada), but again, PSC and European Council access to any information gath-
ered is subject to the discretion of a UKUSA treaty member. There is still a certain
hesitancy to share intelligence across government agencies, notwithstanding inter-
dependence and mutual vulnerability.
Within the common domestic borders of Europe, the EU has established its
Schengen Information System (SIS), to share intelligence and investigatory infor-
mation on people within the common borders of all the member states. While not
directly tied to the military structure, its use in assessing threats in and around the
European region—threats that could require military intervention if left unad-
dressed—is evident. Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, with satellite units in
each of the member states, the SIS is a computerized network that allows the easy
transfer of basic information on suspects, fugitives, stolen vehicles, and other such
information, between national law enforcement agencies. The updated SIS II will
extend to national secret surveillance agencies, linking intelligence agencies and
law enforcement across the EU, thus also providing intelligence useful in mili-
tary operations, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. Additionally, the
database will include visa information and digital photographic surveillance data,
and perhaps biometrics. The HR (and the PSC) has access to commercial images
bought and analyzed by the EU Satellite Center, mostly from the French Spot I and
II satellites and Helios (Spain, Italy, France). Beginning in 2008 the new European
satellite system, Galileo, is also intended to provide quality images for use in civil-
ian and military operations.

Conclusion and Future Developments

The ESDP constitutes a major development in the integration process of the EU,
and a significant development in European military involvement internationally.
The ESDP is evolving and expanding, and the rapidity with which a formal admin-
istration, legal framework, and strategic goals have been established is impres-
sive. The continuing evolution of responsibilities demonstrate an unprecedented

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 342  n  Handbook of Military Administration

and conspicuous European resolve to improving capabilities and contributing to

regional and international security. Less than five years after a formal organiza-
tional structure emerged several military operations have been completed, some
are ongoing, and new operational challenges await as the EU is assuming respon-
sibilities as a global political force expanding on its significant economic clout. As
an international power with multiple engagements and growing responsibilities
to ensure regional and global security the Union’s willingness to act in multiple
environments in different types of operations is shaping the international security
environment.
Transnational, as well as interinstitutional, specialists’ interactions have further
promoted harmonization among member states’ policies, easing the construction
and expansion of the ESDP. Increased responsibilities and a functional growth in
staff, concomitant with new operations, has also contributed to skill specializa-
tion in member states’ armed forces. A strong ESDP and close ties with NATO is
increasingly accepted as improving the security of the EU and its member states
in ways that previously were the responsibility of each country. From non-NATO
states to long-time Atlantic alliance members, European integration has expanded
and deepened solidarity beyond economic interdependence, to include military
cooperation and the security and defense of European citizens and interests against
an all-encompassing array of threats. Members’ commitments allow smaller states
in particular to specialize in certain areas and on certain skills, thereby improving
their own, and by extension EU, resource utilization and contributing valuable
skills to the ESDP.
Nonetheless, while, as discussed above, a European defense culture is emerg-
ing through harmonized perspectives and policies, nationalistic thinking has not
completely dissipated. Klaus Naumann, former chairman of the NATO Military
Committee and chief of Defense in Germany, complained when commenting on
European defense: “Multilateralism is the only [viable] approach but Europe is
haunted by nationalism” (2005). Thus, national traditions and consensus-based
decision making, exacerbated by the 2004 ten-country expansion, remain obstacles
to the optimization of European resources, capabilities, and, ultimately, interna-
tional influence.
Much remains to be done to smoothly employ what the EU boasts as its
strength: Being the only security actor who can deploy the entire range of civilian
and military instruments to address a crisis. It is presumed that by 2012 the EU
will be able to deploy one or two BGs, or a battalion for peace enforcement, within
twenty-four hours; a brigade-size force within a week, and the full EU multina-
tional corps (sixty thousand) within six weeks of a decision to engage. An inte-
grated European defense, with common strategy, command, arms procurement,
exercises, and operations, is not only the goal of many Europeanists, but is also
supported by many U.S. strategic thinkers as an indispensable tool for improving
transatlantic defense cohesion, including the strengthening of NATO as a result of
improved European capabilities.

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 Regional Defense Policy  n  343

Note
1. With an operational nerve center at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade and listening
posts located all over the world, the two most notable in Menwith Hill of Yorkshire
and in Sugar Grove, West Virginia, some three billion communications are inter-
cepted per day. Those intercepts are sieved through by each member state’s “diction-
ary,” a compendium of terms, names, numbers, IP addresses, and any other key bits
of information submitted by member states respectively, keeping only those intercepts
that match one of the Dictionary terms submitted by one of the member states, and
is then forwarded on to those member states for which there is a match. (Bamford,
2001, 404.)

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Schmitt, B. 2005. Armaments Cooperation in Europe. Chaillot Paper no. 82. Brussels: Euro-
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Solana, J. 2005. Speech at the 40th Commanders Conference of the German.
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Zielonka, J., ed. 1998b. Paradoxes of European Foreign Policies. Kluver Law International.

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 Chapter 17

Transformation at Last?
Achieving Radical
Military Reform in
the Czech Republic
and Slovakia

Mary Beth Peterson Ulrich

Introduction
Central and Eastern European (CEE) militaries have undergone dramatic changes
in the postcommunist era. All have conducted significant downsizing, reoriented
their national security strategies and military doctrines to adapt to the post-Cold
War strategic environment, and achieved the essential elements of subordination to
democratic political control. Three CEE states, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Poland, were granted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership in
the first stage of NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement in 1997. Seven more received
invitations at the Prague Summit in November 2002: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

 Reprinted from Public Administration and Management 10, no. 2 (2005). With permission.
This chapter does not reflect the views of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense,
or the United States Army War College.

347

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Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, all cases are still victims of
their Warsaw Pact legacies which have had a long-term impact on their societies,
politics, and national security cultures. The greatest challenges exist in states that
are adapting national security apparatuses inherited from the communist era. The
Baltic states, Slovenia, and to some degree Slovakia, had the benefit of creating their
national security systems from scratch.
This chapter focuses on the current efforts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
to finally undertake radical systemic military reform. Although each state has made
significant contributions to NATO missions as either an ally or partner, each has
done so without the benefit of rational defense planning systems that can set priori-
ties and match resources to defense needs. Communist-era bureaucratic manage-
ment practices have persisted as key national security institutions’ efforts remain
uncoordinated. Personnel systems remain unreformed as the “inverted pyramid”
structure on hand in 1989 still lingers. Capabilities are low due to outdated equip-
ment, shortfalls in human resources, and systemic limitations.
In 2001 both the Czech Republic and Slovakia began an attempt to break the
cycle of inefficiency and lack of capability and institute radical military reform. As
a long-time observer of each case I was fascinated by the scope and ambition of each
effort. Factors that had limited such efforts in the past had obviously changed and I
wanted to understand the conditions that were finally coming together to effect real
change. In each case a reform plan has been put in place and implementation is in
the early stages. This comparative study analyzes the strategic context within which
the reforms are being carried out and what has transpired to date in each effort.1

Backdrop for Reform: NATO Enlargement

and the New Security Realities
In order to understand the direction that the Central and Eastern European secu-
rity structures have taken in the post-Cold War era, it is essential to consider the
parallel adaptations that have occurred within NATO. Since 1989, NATO has
been engaged in the primary task of adapting its political and military infrastruc-
ture to the new threats and opportunities of the European, and now increasingly
global, security landscape. Chief among the new opportunities was the possibility
of reaching out to the former adversaries to the East to integrate the newly democ-
ratizing states into the West’s premier security organization.
Meanwhile, as CEE states surveyed the options available to meet the security
needs of their states, the cooperative security approach embodied in NATO suited
both their severe resource constraints and their goal of integration into Western
institutions. NATO launched its Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in 1994 lay-
ing out in vague terms the criteria and timelines for accession. Participation in
non-Article 5 alliance activities, the conduct of a minimum level of military reform

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 Transformation at Last?  n  349

in order to develop compatible military forces, and evidence that democratic forces
had a firm hold on the domestic politics of the transitioning states were all impor-
tant factors for accession.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were swept into the Alliance in
1997 amid a sort of political euphoria that these former “captive nations” had made
the dramatic political and economic transformations, along with some progress
toward reforming their national security structures, that merited admission to a key
Western club. This first stage of post-Cold War enlargement had fundamentally
a moral and political character. There was not a great expectation that substan-
tive military capabilities be contributed immediately. The common view was that
defense reforms initiated in the candidacy and accession periods would proceed
with the result of the interoperability and capability gaps gradually closing within
a decade or so.
All three “first-wavers” fell far short of NATO military standards at the point
of accession. Poland was largely regarded as having the most professional armed
forces, with the Czech Republic and Hungary holding down distant second and
third places. The Czech Republic and Hungary have been continually berated as
“new allies” for not living up to the commitments established in the accession pro-
cess to improve their military capabilities. The Czechs have responded with the
reform plan detailed in this chapter, while Hungary seems to have accepted the
moniker of “most disappointing new member of NATO” (Wallander, 2002).

The Impact of 9-11 on the Continued

Importance of CEE Defense Transformation
In the period between accession of the “first-wavers” on March 12, 1999 and Sep-
tember 11, 2001 it was widely assumed that at the Prague Summit distinctions
would be made among the NATO aspirants based on their varied rates of progress
toward achieving the criteria laid out in the individual Membership Action Plans
(MAP) that each member was following as its path to NATO membership. Pundits
predicted that Slovakia and Slovenia would be welcomed because of the commit-
ment to reform that the Slovaks had demonstrated in the two years leading up to
the summit. The Slovenes, though still in need of reforming their defense struc-
tures, would be invited because of their political progress and the ease of absorbing
such a small armed force into the NATO system. The Baltic states’ admission would
depend on the U.S.’s enthusiasm for antagonizing Russia, which had consistently
opposed the admission of its former republics. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania’s
domestic political situations seemed too tenuous to be resolved with sufficient cer-
tainty of the continued dominance of democratic forces by 2002.
However, the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001
completely changed the calculus of enlargement. Testifying before Congress in

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June 2002, Robert Bradtke, deputy assistant secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs, laid out the Bush administration’s new view, “We want as many
allies as possible in the struggle against those who would destroy our way of life
and who would threaten us with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction” (Bradtke, 2002). He went on to credit all nine candidates (to include
Albania and Macedonia who did not receive invitations at Prague) for taking the
MAP process seriously and for making “real progress.”
This focus on the primacy of providing capabilities and assets, no matter how
small, to contribute to the war on terrorism, coupled with the Bush administra-
tion’s preference to increasingly regard NATO as a “tool box” from which forces
and niche capabilities can be drawn upon to contribute to U.S.-led coalitions, has
resulted in the downplaying of overall military capabilities at the point of accession.
Assessments evaluating the progress in the MAP process concluded that none of
the nine aspirants had fully met the formal criteria for membership and that the
military capabilities of all are substantially weaker than those of the “first-wavers”
at the time they were invited to join in 1997 (Moroney, 2002).
Observers predicted that NATO would signal its future direction—toward a
more politically oriented Euro-Atlantic talking society or toward a reinvigorated
defense organization committed to retool further to maintain its relevance vis-à-vis
global threats—with the scope of the enlargement at Prague. A smaller enlarge-
ment taking in only the most capable candidates would send a message that acces-
sion standards are necessarily high because the Alliance must be careful to absorb
only those armed forces that will not dilute the Alliance’s capacity to deploy inte-
grated forces through NATO integrated structures to take on NATO-led missions.
A larger enlargement, such as the “big bang” approach undertaken at Prague, was
thought to be a signal that NATO was defunct as a military organization. Groucho
Marx once quipped, “I’d never join any club that would have me as a member.”
Extending invitations to states with armed forces substantially below NATO stan-
dards and to some states with uncertain democratic futures, given the negative
experience of trying to keep the first-wave allies on track, would seem to indicate
that delivering military capabilities was no longer NATO’s raison d’etre. Allowing
such a development would signal further the Bush administration’s intention to
continue to bypass NATO as a key instrument of its foreign and security policy.
What actually happened at Prague, however, was more of a mixed and complex
message. NATO favored the “big bang” enlargement, yet at the same time insisted
that the Alliance was entering a new era of relevance and would be a prime player
in the war on terrorism, as well as be a force to put down other global threats.
Summit leaders approved the formation of a joint 21,000 Response Force to have
initial operational capability no later than October 2004, streamlined the com-
mand structure, and adopted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) that
will newly focus the allies, new and old alike, on making major gains to improve
military capabilities in key areas.

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 Transformation at Last?  n  351

What do these developments portend for the prospects of sustaining military

reform in CEE within both the new and newly invited allies? There is universal
agreement that leverage over new members diminishes drastically once the “golden
ring of NATO membership” is achieved. Indeed, some have proposed organizational
mechanisms through which underperforming members can be sanctioned and, if
nonperformance persists, dismissed from the Alliance (Wallander, 2002, 6–7). The
adoption of such a mechanism would be a positive lever for ensuring continued
progress on improving the defense capacities of the CEE states. The return of a
NATO capable of leading coalitions would also be an impetus for continued reform.
An Alliance concerned with the ability of its members to perform military missions
in an integrated fashion would be more likely to keep the pressure on members
straying from the interoperability standards required to be successful in such opera-
tions. The alternative is the scenario that has already played out in U.S.-led wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In these cases the essential capability is the ability to make
specific niche contributions to enhance and support the U.S. military machine. To
be a player in a security environment where the United States does all the heavy
military lifting, while ancillary players contribute according to their means, CEE
allies will have to develop individual niche abilities in order to participate.
A final motivation to follow through with the military reforms that will yield
increased capabilities may be found in states that value the perception that they
are “security contributors” to the multinational challenge of meeting transnational
threats—regardless of whether or not they are members of NATO. Ratislav Kacer,
state secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Defense, articulated this view for Slovakia:

The reform of the armed forces is mainly connected with the new reality
and new security challenges in the world. We must abandon the Cold
War model and adopt the armed forces of a modern European democ-
racy, which has nothing to do with NATO membership, although the
success of transformation increases our qualification for NATO. But
Slovakia would have to undergo such a development even without the
membership. (Czech News Agency [CTK], 2002)

Kacer added that Slovakia was interested in expressing “the ability of playing
an active role in world politics, contributing to the solution of emergency situa-
tions, and showing a certain international maturity. I would not like to link this
with NATO membership” (CTK, 2002). Although the direction and relevance
of NATO may still lack certainty in the wake of the Prague Summit, the current
international security environment calls for increased capabilities on the part of
all states whose interests are threatened by the transnational threats of terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction, as well as the challenges of dealing with failed
states, resolving postconflict societies, and nation building. These tasks will require
a spectrum of capabilities sustained over an indefinite timeline. The United States

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does not have the resources to take on these challenges alone. It is within this con-
text that the success of military reform in CEE states, and within other states with
shared interests, is important. This is the spirit within which the Slovak and Czech
cases will be explored. The hope is that by studying these cases and following them
through the implementation phase, lessons for other CEE states that have experi-
enced intractable problems in carrying out comprehensive military reform, yet seek
to contribute some capabilities toward countering regional and global threats, will
be learned.

Slovakia: Slovak Republic Force 2010

Background Leading to Reform
The Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) has only existed since 1993 when Slovakia
became an independent state, but its historical legacy follows a line of succession
back to the Czechoslovak Army (1989–1993 and 1918–1938), the Czechoslovak
People’s Army (1948–1989), and in the partisan resistance to the Slovak German
puppet state in World War II. Problems of organization and reorganization have
plagued the ASR from its inception as it was forced to deal with the challenge of
building a national security structure out of the assets inherited from the division
of Czechoslovakia in 1993. The Slovaks shouldered the greater burden of reorga-
nization of the two new states because they received only one third of the joint
assets and had to create not only their national security institutions but their entire
governmental structure from scratch. This posed such practical challenges as find-
ing the requisite office space to staffing the myriad positions throughout govern-
ment and the security community (Ulrich, 2002). The overwhelming challenge
proved to be adapting the former Warsaw Pact legacy organizations, doctrine, and
management systems to the needs of the new sovereign state (Armed Forces of the
Slovak Republic, 2002, 3).
Although the Slovak government was on record for supporting accession to
both the European Union (EU) and NATO since 1993, little was done to advance
these objectives until the Meciar government was voted out of power in 1998.
Bold reform plans can be found dating to the first few years of the Meciar regime;
however, no evidence of substantive implementation throughout those years exists
(Samson, 2002, 146–147). From the start, Slovakia was a member of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a body created to facilitate consultation
and cooperation with the former Eastern bloc on political and security issues. Slo-
vakia signed its Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document in early 1994
and participated in three rounds of accession discussions in 1996.
Slovak politics under Meciar was incoherent in that public pronouncements
supported the rational and practical view that Slovakia must maximize its oppor-
tunity to be integrated into European institutions, but in practice the government

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 Transformation at Last?  n  353

was disinterested in facilitating the conditions that would facilitate such gains.
Emblematic of the lip service paid to European integration aspirations was the
turning over of the reins of the Ministry of Defense to the extreme nationalist
Slovak National Party (SNS) even though the party openly opposed the goal of
NATO membership (Szayna, 2000, 74). Meanwhile the development of a domes-
tic political environment conducive to reaching consensus on issues of national
security, or any issue for that matter, was thwarted by Meciar’s refusal to let oppo-
sition politicians fully participate in the political process (Szayna, 2000, 74). The
international community’s repeated citings of the Meciar government for violating
democratic norms led to its pointed exclusion from the first post-Cold War wave of
new allies whose selections were announced at the 1997 Madrid Summit.
The Meciar period seriously affected the evolution of all Slovak institutions in
general, and of the national security infrastructure in particular (Ulrich, 2000).
By 1998, opposition forces tired of bankrupt economic policies, eager to restore
the rule of law, and determined to integrate Slovakia into the EU and NATO,
coalesced into a united front and defeated Meciar in the 1998 parliamentary elec-
tions. The new Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda had led the opposition coalition
and pledged to make admission to NATO and the EU the centerpieces of Slovak
foreign policy, root out corruption, restore democratic principles, and rebuild the
economy (Ulrich, 2002b).
Political will to undertake reform and to commit scarce economic resources to
it is a key factor for substantive reform. This did not exist in Slovakia prior to 1998.
The conditions for substantive reform of Slovak national security structures finally
began to take shape in the Dzurinda government. Slovakia had lost five critical
years and squandered a golden opportunity to become a NATO member. Within
a year of taking power, though, the Dzurinda government approved in June 1999
a program for preparing the country for NATO membership called PRENAME
(Program for Preparing Slovaks for NATO Membership) (Bilchik et al., 2001, 251).
This program was a marked departure from past declarations of interest in NATO
membership in that it required all government ministries to coordinate their activi-
ties undertaken to support the state’s candidacy for NATO membership.
Several Western defense assessments were completed which agreed that numer-
ous serious deficiencies plagued the defense establishment. On the heels of the Brit-
ish and American assessments came a negative NATO Planning and Review Process
(PARP) Assessment in February 2001. The Dzurinda government concluded that
“an extraordinary effort had to be initiated if there was to be any hope of cre-
ating the conditions for successful reform and the changes in strategy, doctrine,
organizational designs, and operational concepts that would be required” (Armed
Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 3). In March 2001, Prime Minister Dzurinda
directed that such an effort be undertaken.

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Scope of Current Reform Effort

The Minister of Defense published Ministerial Order Number 9 in March 2001
outlining the objectives, priorities, and organizational structure that should char-
acterize long term reform. The order stated that the goal was to transform the ASR
into a small but capable force interoperable with NATO and appropriately struc-
tured, trained, and equipped to meet the national security needs of the state. A
Senior Level Steering Committee was established along with subordinate working
groups to develop a Long Term Plan for the total reform of the ASR. The Minister
of Defense State Secretary was appointed committee chairman and the Chief of
the General Staff was named deputy chairman. The Deputy Chief of the General
Staff supervised the work of five working groups charged with proposing reforms
to the force structure, personnel system, logistics system, and process of integrating
the Ministry of Defense and General Staff organizational structures. (Svec, 2002:
pp. 8-9)

The Role of National Security Documents

Slovakia had been slow to put in place a comprehensive set of quality national secu-
rity documents to guide the transformation of national security institutions. This
was a key factor limiting the success of previous reform efforts. The Slovak Ministry
of Defense published The Defence Doctrine (1994) followed by the National Defence
Strategy of the Slovak Republic (1996), and the Concept of Reform to 2003. However
each of these policy and doctrinal statements was developed in the absence of an
overarching national security strategy. They therefore lacked both a logical hierar-
chy and the consensus found in mature national security systems. U.S. Department
of Defense external evaluators criticized these efforts as not adequately addressing
the defense requirements and concepts of their era. The 1999 Defense Assessment
of the Slovak Republic said that key elements essential to provide the conceptual
foundation for future military reform, such as a broad national security strategy,
and a subsequent national military strategy, were missing (Defense Assessment of
the Slovak Republic, 2000, viii).
Consequently the specific mission given to the five working groups driving
the reform process begun in 2001 was to develop a comprehensive set of national
security documents as a key step to comprehensive reform. The documents to be
developed included:

n The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic

n The Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic

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 Transformation at Last?  n  355

n The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: Model 2010 Concept Document
n The Long-Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of
the Slovak Republic.

Key to the overall enterprise was the drafting and approval of the Military Strat-
egy because this document would serve as the basis of the detailed planning process
getting underway. As the reform team was being organized the National Council
of the Slovak Republic approved Slovakia’s first Security Strategy in March 2001.
This document was unique in that it engaged key national security stakeholders
in its drafting and for the first time articulated long-term Slovak interests (Ulrich,
2002a). The Defense Strategy was subsequently approved in May 2001. This docu-
ment elaborated on the defense policy component of the Security Strategy and pro-
vided the conceptual framework for the development of the Military Strategy.
The Military Strategy surveys a variety of threats and developed different scenar-
ios, each of which would require different force structures and capabilities depend-
ing on the nature of the threat. The Military Strategy concludes that the probability
of a major armed conflict requiring a unilateral Slovak capacity for national defense
is low, while there is a moderate probability that a regional armed conflict requir-
ing a unilateral capacity could occur. Acknowledging and accepting the risk of not
allocating the vast majority of resources toward low-probability threats made pos-
sible the decision to put forth a strategy that recommends downsizing the inherited
force structure to gain savings that could be applied to such near-term priorities
as enhancing NATO compatibility and interoperability, reforming the person-
nel system to emphasize the roles of junior officers and noncommissioned officers,
introducing training management systems to improve unit training, and funding
quality-of-life issues to help recruit and retain the force (Military Strategy of the
Slovak Republic, 2001, 14–15).
The Military Strategy recognizes that the most likely threats will call for forces
prepared to participate in “cooperative security” responses rather than territorial
defense, and assumes that Slovakia would not face an aggressor alone (interview
with Western Advisor to the Slovak General Staff, 2001). Despite reservations of
some members of parliament that the Military Strategy was too vague, the National
Council unanimously approved it on October 25, 2001. From March 2001 to
the Military Strategy’s approval seven months later the assumptions of its working
drafts outlined above served as the conceptual guidance to the working groups as
they fleshed out their specific proposals and completed the complementary docu-
ments, Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic,
the Program Force Model 2010 document, and The Long Term Plan of Structure
and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. Ultimately all of these
inputs served as the basis and rationale for the overall plan to reform the ASR – Slo-
vak Republic (SR) Force 2010.

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Drafting the Plan: The Importance of

Leadership, Process, and Players
Observers agree that prior to March 2001 and the launch of Slovak Republic: Force
2010, reform efforts did not benefit from collaborative participation across relevant
ministries or between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore,
the half dozen earlier attempts at reforms depended on the efforts of Moscow-edu-
cated military leaders, who were neither committed to implementing real change
nor had the relevant skills to conduct such a review (interview with J. Pivaric,
2001) SR Force 2010, however, would be approached quite differently. In the few
years leading up to SR Force 2010 General Milan Cerovsky, chief of the General
Staff, methodically assigned Western-educated officers to key positions in the Slo-
vak Army and Ministry of Defense. These officers were then hand-picked to lead
the various working groups that shaped the various dimensions of SR Force 2010.
“Old-school” officers opposed to sweeping reform still serve, but their influence
in the drafting of the plan was marginalized in several ways. First, such officers
were not given positions of responsibility on the reform teams and, second, both
the military and civilian leadership sent clear signals that dissenters were “not on
board” and active steps to thwart the process would not have a positive impact on
such an officer’s career. Such an approach was effective in an environment where it
was well understood that a likely result of the reform effort would be the downsiz-
ing of the swollen top ranks of the officer corps. However, given the tenuous politi-
cal situation in Slovakia many of the reform-minded officers expressed concern that
a shifting political wind could move them out of their positions of influence and
facilitate a climate where the conservatives could become ascendant again.
Another key feature of the SR Force 2010 planning process was the presence of
an outside team of U.S. consultants that the Slovak government hired to assist the
Slovak defense community in the drafting of the comprehensive reform plan. Cubic
Applications, Inc. received a multiyear contract to help structure and implement
plans for total military reform. It completed a comprehensive report in December
2000 based on four months of studying the Slovak defense system up close, which
then became the basis for designing both the methodology and substance of the
planning process begun in March 2001 (interview with U.S. Army Major General
Bob Howard, 2001). The top civilian leadership in the Ministry of Defense eagerly
acknowledged the crucial role that the U.S. consultants played. State Secretary
Josef Pivaric noted that it has been easier to reach consensus on particular propos-
als in play in the reform process when U.S. experts stand behind them. He added,
these are “fantastic experts and experienced” of such high quality (interview with
Pivaric, 2001).
Clearly, the presence of the U.S. team was a critical ingredient to the whole
process. Expertise was inherent in the group of outside consultants that was simply
not present among the “native” members of the Slovak defense community. The
U.S. consultants were careful, too, to forge good working relationships with other

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 Transformation at Last?  n  357

influential outside advisors to the Slovak defense community. The key individuals
in the Slovak case were the British brigadier, French lieutenant colonel, and German
colonel assigned to advise the Chief of the General Staff, Land Forces Commander,
and Defense Planning Groups, respectively. When it came to key decisions in the
reform process related to the professionalization of the ASR these players usually
had coordinated positions and advice, which made it easier to reach consensus on
the range of issues being considered in the comprehensive reform planning process
(interview with U.S. Army Major General Bob Howard, 2001).
Observers of the reform effort uniformly note that it benefits from a favorable
leadership environment, from the top echelons of the national government through
the military and the Ministry of Defense. There is a broad consensus across politi-
cal parties on the priority of integrating Slovakia into European security and eco-
nomic institutions. The concept of SR Force 2010 was successfully pitched as a
way to achieve these objectives by overhauling defense structures and concepts in
order to create a more NATO-compatible force. Dzurinda infused the Ministry of
Defense with experienced international bureaucrats by assigning seasoned Ministry
of Foreign Affairs hands to Ministry of Defense leadership positions. The Minister
of Defense, Josef Stank, as well as Ministry of Defense State Secretary, Ratislav
Kacer, had served in key Ministry of Foreign Affairs roles. Stank was previously
the Slovak ambassador to Prague, where he observed the Czechs become selected
for and accede to NATO. Kacer had worked on international security issues at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accepted a transfer to the Ministry of Defense with
the understanding that his role was to lead a resistant bureaucracy through major
reform. These civilian leaders, along with General Cerovsky, whose key role has
already been noted, remained engaged in the planning process and truly led the
effort at every stage.
The particular methodology of the planning process is another feature worthy
of greater in-depth study. The Steering Committee met monthly to assess the prog-
ress of the individual working groups and the development of the overall plan. Gen-
eral Milan Cerovsky, chief of the General Staff, as well as the state secretaries for
Defense, members of Parliament, and NATO ambassadors were active participants
in the steering committee. Those involved with the process noted that often these
high-level participants would become personally engaged in the various debates
that ensued about the way ahead across the gamut of issues considered.
Slovak officers, senior Slovak defense officials, members of the American
CUBIC team, and other Western advisers agree that the process of conducting the
comprehensive strategic review has in and of itself resulted in significant changes
that are already having an impact on how the Slovak defense community conducts
its business. A key problem prior to the launch of the SR Force 2010 strategic review
was the integration of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. The General
Staff and Ministry of Defense had only recently been co-located in Bratislava and
were attempting to overcome years of uncoordinated efforts. Parallel directorates
existed in each entity that rarely worked together to achieve results in common

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areas of responsibility. The strategic review, however, was set up in such a way that
representatives from the Ministry of Defense and General Staff were forced to serve
on the various working groups together. In many cases individuals with common
responsibilities had never even met. The common enterprise of serving on the work-
ing groups has helped to promote cross-institutional communication and has had
some positive effect on integrating the Ministry of Defense and General Staff.

An Overview of SR Force 2010

To establish, by 2010, a professional, effective, but affordable, armed
force organized, equipped and trained to comply with the military
strategy of the Slovak republic, modernized to be interoperable with
NATO military organizations.
Objective—Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic—Force 2010, p. 15

SR Force 2010 is a departure from all previous Slovak attempts at reform because
of its scope: The effort is total, affecting all aspects of the ASR and its oversight;
its political support from above (the Slovak government has given its full support
to the effort); its political support from within (key Western-educated officers are
staking their careers on its success); and, finally, its acceptance of realistic assump-
tions in terms of its matching of reform objectives with economic resources.
Another key concept to understand about SR Force 2010 is that it embodied
Slovakia’s hopes for NATO membership. The timeline governing the working
groups’ activities appears to have been developed to be synchronous with key mile-
stones in the months leading up to the issuance of the second wave of NATO
invitations in Prague in November 2002. Indeed, one could make the case that
the Slovak strategy for “earning” its way to a NATO invitation was to invest its
resources in the detailed articulation of a credible defense reform plan, leaving the
challenges of actual implementation to the months and years subsequent to receipt
of an invitation.

Key Elements of SR Force 2010

Economic Assumptions
Previous reform efforts were severely underfunded and conducted without the
benefit of a strategic planning process that effectively and realistically matched
objectives with economic resources to carry them out. This led to inappropriate,
incomplete, or stalled implementation. SR Force 2010 was developed with a reason-
able annual funding level in mind. The defense planners received assurances from
the government that 1.89 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) was a defense

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 Transformation at Last?  n  359

spending level that they could expect the government to maintain through 2005.
From 2006 onward the expectation was that defense spending would increase to a
minimum of 2 percent of GDP (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 19).

Force Structure and Modernization

The threat analysis conducted in the military strategy called for the development
of a force structure that would transform the ASR into a smaller, but high quality
force with the capability of contributing to a range of collective security operations
across the entire spectrum of war. A major goal of SR Force 2010 is to reduce the
overall manpower levels from the current level of 40,000 (includes civilian employ-
ees) to approximately 24,000 personnel, with the possibility of further reductions as
the final force structure evolves (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002, 48).
Accomplishing the Force 2010 force structure goals will require integrating
and streamlining the current Ministry of Defense and GS structures to eliminate
redundancy. Much of this reorganization was implemented beginning in October
2001. Departments and positions have been redesigned, eliminated, or created.
However, creating a culture where the GS and Ministry of Defense effectively carry
out their shared tasks in an integrated fashion requires a transformation of attitudes
and ethos.
The plan also calls for centralizing training under the Training and Support
Command and adopting a new military structure formed around a light infantry
brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment, an engineer battal-
ion, a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an NBC battalion, an electronic
warfare battalion, and a command support battalion (Armed Forces of the Slovak
Republic, 2002, 22). Air Force operations will be streamlined to consolidate tacti-
cal fighter and transport operations at a single base and helicopter operations at
another base. Other air force operations will be streamlined and consolidated at
single locations. Base closures will result from the force structure reorganization of
both the land and air forces. Equipment modernization emphasizing a greater mix
of lighter, wheeled vehicles and multi-role, more modern aircraft will also gradually
be undertaken, with more resources flowing to this objective after 2006.

Supporting Programs: Personnel Reform

Fundamental transformation of personnel systems has eluded most postcommu-
nist militaries and been a major cause of these armies’ lack of capabilities. Top-
heavy rank structures consume defense budgets and prohibit the development
of more rational structures that match needed skill sets and experience levels to
the appropriate positions across the force. Colonels still outnumber captains in
the ASR by a hefty margin. Force 2010 calls for radical change that will reduce
the number of senior grade officers and increase the number of junior officers and

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noncommissioned officers. Yearly targets have been set in order to reach the desired
force structure by 2010. The 2002 goal was to reduce the officer corps by 1000 by
the end of the year. Observers report that although carrying out such reductions
is inherently difficult, the Slovaks are on track. Careful management of this par-
ticular element is key to the success of the overall plan. The method of reducing
the force must be perceived as fair and transparent. Slovak defense leaders must be
careful to balance their multiple goals of reducing, recruiting, and retaining (inter-
view with Brigadier Stephen Gledhill, 2002).
The ASR has also simultaneously taken on the additional challenge of eliminat-
ing conscription and moving to an all-professional force by 2006. This requires a
reconceptualization of officer and noncommissioned officer roles as currently prac-
ticed in the ASR, along with conversion of present grade structures to accommo-
date junior, mid-level, and senior noncommissioned officer positions.
The ASR has set for itself the ambitious objective of radical force restructur-
ing while simultaneously trying to systematize a merit-based promotion system,
establish a program for separating career personnel, rationalize its compensation
system, and institute a recruiting system. Inevitably, serious challenges lie ahead as
the attempt to implement these reforms simultaneously gets underway.

Supporting Programs: Leader Development

and Military Education
SR Force 2010 institutes systemic leader development into the ASR. This consti-
tutes radical change. Under the current system, military education is technically
oriented and focused on the development of military specialists. The reform plan
will introduce leader education at all levels of the professional military education
system. The plan also calls for consolidating the various military academies into a
single National Defense Academy beginning in 2003 (Armed Forces of the Slovak
Republic, 2002, 50).

Supporting Programs: Sustaining and Stationing

The top logistical priority is to transform ASR logistics structures to ensure compat-
ibility with NATO systems. The present twenty-six logistics bases will be reduced
and consolidated into five bases by 2010. A logistics command will be created as a
material management center and various services will be studied to see which can
gradually shift to the civilian sector.
The requirements analysis conducted in the course of the Force 2010 planning
process concluded that of the eighty-nine separate military installations in Slova-
kia, only forty should be retained. According to the Force 2010 defense planners
this number is sufficient to meet the ASR’s essential needs for housing, training,
and support of SR Force 2010.

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The Czech Republic: The Concept of Reform

of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic
Background Leading to Reform
Like its Slovak cousin to the east the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) can trace
its roots to predecessor forces, the Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSPA) and the
Czechoslovak Army (CSA). While the fledgling ACR’s personnel and equipment
were drawn from these previous entities, the whole strategic context of employ-
ing defense resources had dramatically changed in the postcommunist era. The
new democratic political leadership directed that a purge of the officer corps be
conducted to eliminate communist sympathizers. The controversial “lustration”
process that ensued removed political officers and many officers of the military
defense intelligence service. However, some contend that many good officers were
swept away in the purge. Additionally, 150 of the 156 general officers serving at the
time of the “Velvet Revolution” were dismissed (Ulrich, 2000, 28).
Early reform initiatives resulted in substantive downsizing, reorganization, and
redeployment of the ACR in light of the changed strategic environment. When the
communist regime fell in 1989, the CSPA was in the midst of drawing the force
down from 200,000 to 93,000 to meet the limits imposed in the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (The Army of the Czech Republic, 1994, 1). The split
of the country in 1993, therefore, complicated a reorganization process already
underway. In January 1993 at the birth of the independent Czech state, the ACR
numbered 106,447. Later that year the government approved a plan to draw the
force down to 65,000 troops. This number was achieved in 1997. In recent years
the force structure has fallen to its current level of 57,000.
In the first years of its postcommunist transition the Czech Republic was con-
sidered a model of reform, with steady growth, low unemployment, and a stable cen-
ter-right government (Rhodes, 2000). The Czech Republic’s overall relative success
compared to the other former Warsaw Pact states vying for NATO membership,
along with its active participation in the Partnership for Peace program, earned
the Czechs a NATO invitation at the 1997 Madrid Summit. By 1997 incomplete
and mismanaged structural reforms led to an economic downturn, from which the
Czech economy is only recently emerging (Interfax News Agency, 2002). Like its
democratizing neighbors economic prosperity is uneven and democratic political
institutions are still developing. Political interests, corruption, incompetence, and
public apathy are all features of the Czech political landscape (Ulrich, 2002c, 57).
Whereas the Slovak SR Force 2010 was largely driven by its goal to earn a NATO
invitation, the Czech reform plan is largely rooted in the realization that as a new
ally it enjoys all the rights of a NATO member nation without the requisite capabil-
ities to meet its obligations to the alliance (Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic, 2001, 10). In 2000 and early 2001 the Czech Republic received negative
assessments both from NATO and separate evaluators from the U.S. Office of the

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Secretary of Defense. NATO specifically took the Czechs to task for not fulfilling
alliance commitments. In the NATO assessment, National Chapters 2000, evalu-
ators noted:

Although the Czech Republic is allocating substantial sums of money

to upgrading of its armed forces, the planned resources will not suffice
to meet all requirements laid down in the Force Goals. Many major
upgrading and modernization programs will be implemented only dur-
ing subsequent defense planning cycles. If the Czech Republic wishes
to be able to meet its alliance obligations and commitments in a bet-
ter way, it will have to reprioritize its plans and reallocate available
resources in order to ensure a more balanced and timely implementa-
tion of its modernization programs. (Reform of the Armed Forces of the
Czech Republic, 2001)

Czech political leaders, who historically have paid minimal attention to mili-
tary affairs and who have long neglected the transformation needs of the ACR, were
embarrassed by the public disclosure of the assessments and moved to correct the
situation. As a result of Governmental Decision 489 taken on May 14, 2001, Prime
Minister Milos Zeman appointed Major General Jaroslav Skopek to head a special
commission charged with developing a plan to create small, modern, sustainable,
and deployable armed forces that balanced national interests with NATO obliga-
tions and resource allocation with likely threat scenarios (Skopek, 2001). Early on
reformers realized that fulfilling such a task would require comprehensive defense
reorganization. In May 2001, Major General Skopek and his team established the
Center for the Preparation of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Repub-
lic, which became the hub of reform activities.

Scope of the Current Reform Effort

The Center’s task was to complete a comprehensive defense review aimed at com-
pletely reforming the defense planning system, professionalizing the ACR and
improving the prestige of the ACR in Czech society (Reform of the Armed Forces of
the Czech Republic—Objectives and Principles, 2002) The governmental commission
was assigned four fundamental missions as departure points. The reformed armed
forces must (1) be capable of securing the vital and strategic interests of the state
as set forth in the Security Strategy; (2) fulfill the commitments and obligations of
the North Atlantic Alliance; (3) operate within the context of limited funds; and
(4) operate within the context of limited manpower (Reform of the Armed Forces
of the Czech Republic—Interdepartmental Comments Proceedings, 2002). The main
proposed changes include overhauling force structure, instituting an effective per-
sonnel management system, implementing a rational defense planning process,

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 Transformation at Last?  n  363

rethinking the current basing situation, and modernizing equipment and support
to service personnel and units (Skopek, 2001).

The Role of National Security Documents

It is important to note that the various reform and reorganization attempts between
1989 and 1999 occurred without the benefit of either a national security strategy or
a national military strategy to guide these processes. The government approved the
Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic
in February and March 1999, respectively, on the eve of the Czechs’ accession to
NATO. Prior to the issuance of these documents, a series of defense concepts and
national military strategies was produced; however, none was approved by Parlia-
ment until 1997. Furthermore, each document was developed in the absence of
an overall national security strategy, reflecting the political guidance of the state’s
political leadership. In the months preceding the Reform Center’s establishment,
the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was being worked on in the Ministry of Defense
as an internal initiative. At the same time General Jiri Sedivy was conducting a
parallel but uncoordinated study in the General Staff—Vision 2010 (interview with
senior western defense attaché). When the political leadership launched the more
comprehensive effort both studies were put on hold. One seasoned Czech defense
observer quipped, “In a paper war the Czech Republic would do great. We have
lots of documents. But one doesn’t know what the other is doing. Skopek’s job is to
come up with an overall concept” (interview with Otto Pick, 2001).
Those who have observed the Czech Republic’s fits and starts in the reform
echo the same bottom line—none of the restructuring processes has resulted in a
qualitative change in the capabilities of the ACR. “Due to scattered resources and
low efficiency of spending, their operational capabilities do not fully match the
requirements and nature of operations which the Czech army can be expected to
participate in” (Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic: Analysis of Required
Capabilities …, 2001). Total systemic overhaul of the Czech national security sys-
tem was needed.

Drafting the Plan

As in the Slovak case, Czech defense planning efforts to date had not been char-
acterized by collaboration across the relevant ministries and between the General
Staff and Ministry of Defense. The most fundamental flaw of all previous efforts
was the inability to marry objectives with the resources to achieve them. Indeed, the
national security system was unable to facilitate the degree of cooperation needed to
even come up with an institutional consensus on what the ACR’s priorities should
be. The stovepipe system of managing national security, a holdover from the com-
munist system of management, severely restricted processes aimed at organizational

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change. Piecemeal reform was attempted at various points in the system on an ad

hoc basis. For instance a Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) company was identi-
fied as a particular need and funded, but this unit was a stand alone entity outside
the general force structure of the ACR (interview with senior Czech officer, July
2001). The Center’s mandate was to overcome the systemic inertia and prioritize
objectives against which resources could be applied to effect qualitative change in
ACR capabilities. This mandate led to the identification of the defense planning
structure, itself, as a key priority in the reform effort.
Unlike previous efforts, the current reform effort has the support of the key
players in the Czech political scene. Major General Skopek was granted unprec-
edented government powers and access to carry out his task. He reported directly
to the prime minister and enjoyed the personal support of President Vaclav Havel,
who used his influence to bring the leaders of the various political parties on board.
(interview with senior Czech officer, July 2001). Furthermore, Major General Sko-
pek was allowed to assemble a team of the “best and brightest,” including many
Western-educated officers, to put together the plan.
Successful implementation also depends on the placement of key leaders
throughout the Czech defense bureaucracy. Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, who is not
connected with any particular political party, was brought in to be an agent of
change. The 32-year-old former ACR lieutenant colonel replaced Defense Minister
Vladimir Vetchy, who had been embroiled in various acquisition scandals (inter-
view with senior western defense attaché, July 2001). His military expertise cer-
tainly surpassed that of the eight mediocre ministers who preceded him, but some
worried that his recent service at the relatively junior rank of lieutenant colonel
may make him too beholden to the generals who may be the main obstacles to
reform (interview with Otto Pick, 2001). Stefan Fule, who held the top deputy
position to Defense Minister Tvrdik, was brought in from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs where he had responsibility for security issues and had served previously as
ambassador to Lithuania. He brought his “outsider” perspective to the ministry and
took aim at eliminating the duplicitous organizational structures in the Ministry of
Defense and GS. He was confident that he could navigate the turf battles to convert
the defense ministry into a machine “that if you put a coin at the top, would get a
product out.” He argued that this does not always happen—or at least quality out-
puts are not the norm (interview with Stefan Fule, 2001). Finally, some observers
questioned whether General Jiri Sedivy, chief of the General Staff, could really be a
change agent. He had overseen multiple failed defense planning processes and his
Vision 2010 effort did not adequately match resources with requirements. He had
argued against big change in the past, saying that such change cannot occur with-
out proper guidance from the government (interview with senior western defense
attaché, 2001).
U.S. consultants working for Cubic Applications, Inc. also supported the Czech
reform effort. The team is smaller than the one in Slovakia, but was more embedded
in the reform process. When the comprehensive reform plan was launched in May

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 Transformation at Last?  n  365

2001 one Cubic consultant was already on the scene supporting a contract to help
with the development of the Strategic Defense Review. When the Center began its
work, the Cubic consultant moved to the Ministry of Defense to assist the reform
team (interview with Cubic team member, 2001). Observers note that the Czech
approach to outside consultants has been to limit their involvement to ensure that
Czech expertise is built up in the process. The Czechs were also concerned that the
planning products were “home-grown.”
Stefan Fule remarked in a July 2001 interview that attempts at military reform
in the Czech Republic had failed in the past due to the lack of political support,
the lack of personal courage to make hard decisions (such as implementing painful
personnel reforms), the favoring of political over professional leaders in the min-
istry, and the lack of an overall vision to drive the change (interview with Stefan
Fule, 2001). The reform effort begun under Defense Minister Tvrdik represented
a rare window of opportunity when many of the factors that had previously been
absent came together. It turns out, though, that the opening was narrow and may
have closed markedly with the government’s decision in May 2003 to drastically
reduce the Army’s budget as part of an overall austerity package. This action led
Tvrdik to resign in protest, citing an inability to successfully carry out reform with
the reduced resources.

An Overview of the Concept of Reform of the

Armed Forces of the Czech Republic
The objective of the reform is to make the Czech armed forces a com-
pact, intrinsically balanced and efficient part of the Alliance’s forces,
capable of fulfilling tasks across a broad range of operations and all over
the area of interest of NATO.
Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—
Objectives and Principles (2001)

The key themes that echo through AFCR are rational defense planning, the improve-
ment of the operational capabilities of the ACR, professionalization, improving the
acquisition system, and streamlining the organizational structures and command
and control system. Overlaid on the entire effort is the realization that a trans-
formation in thinking must occur in every aspect of the Czech national security
system. Indeed, the AFCR planners have included as part of their plan programs
that educate defense personnel and the civilian public on the necessity of reform
in general, and, more specifically, on the need for the plan to be implemented in
its entirety.

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Key Elements of the Concept of Reform of the

Armed Forces of the Czech Republic
Economic Assumptions
It is impossible to conduct long-term defense planning without a predictable flow of
economic resources. One critical contextual feature of AFCR had been the decision
of the Czech government to commit to a defense spending level of 2.2 percent of
GDP through 2004. However, with the government’s decision to cut all ministries’
budgets, Czech planners had to adapt the reform plans to the new projected level
of 1.9 percent of GDP.

Force Structure and Modernization

AFCR documents emphasize that the Czech’s accession to NATO necessitated a
revamping of the ACR’s force structure in order to fulfill alliance obligations. It is
interesting to note that strategic documents approved on the eve of NATO acces-
sion and more than two years into the preparation for membership phase did not
consider such responsibilities. In this respect, the Czech defense planners have been
well behind the Slovaks. The retooled NATO-compatible force requires sufficient
downsizing and reorganization so that the forces that remain are well-led, suffi-
ciently funded, and have the benefit of quality training. A particular problem has
been the creation of ad hoc units to serve in NATO peacekeeping missions that do
not fit into an overall concept for the development of the ACR (Reform of the Armed
Forces of the Czech Republic—Analysis of Required Capabilities …, 2001, 5). The Tvr-
dik reform plan set the objective of drawing the ACR down from 57,000 to a force
structure of 34,000 to 36,000 troops, with a civilian work force of 10,000 (Schro-
eder, 2002, 3–4). Early indications are that Defense Minister Miroslav Kostelka’s
revised plan will make up the shortfall in funding with deeper cuts to reach a new
end strength of 23,000 professional soldiers and 7,000 civilian employees.
As in the Slovak case, the reform plan calls for the creation of a Training and
Doctrine command that would centralize and ensure the consistency of training
and doctrine across the ACR and allow for the reduction of headquarters staffs.
The ACR will be separated into deployable forces and in-place or territorial forces
composed of units with different levels of readiness. The reformed ACR will consist
of a mechanized and combined air division with subordinate brigades. The long-
term plan is for the Air Force to acquire supersonic aircraft; however, financial con-
straints will defer the achievement of that goal for at least six to eight years.
A major reorganization calls for the Ministry of Defense and General Staff to
ferret out distinct responsibilities. The Ministry of Defense will be structured as a
political-military body focused on strategic management tasks and the formulation
of national defense policy. The General Staff will be a subordinate body responsible
for the professional management of the ACR.

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 Transformation at Last?  n  367

Supporting Programs: Personnel Reform

As in the Slovak case, radical personnel reform was never accomplished in the
ACR. AFCR puts a “principal emphasis on personnel, whose quality will determine
whether the armed forces will acquire the required capabilities or not” (Reform of
the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles, 2001, 13). The
intractable “inverted pyramid” that had senior officers out-numbering junior offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers will be righted. The Tvrdik plan reserved 20
percent of the slots for officers, 25 percent for warrant officers, and 55 percent for
noncommissioned officers. The target for noncommissioned officers represents the
proportion of conscripts currently comprising the ACR. The number of officers
was to fall by 4,800 to reach a total of 7,000. The number of civilian employees
will be slashed by more than 50 percent (Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech
Republic—Objective and Principles, 2001, 12). The Kostelka plan is likely to keep
the same ratios in place, with deeper reductions across the board. A significant
challenge will be recruiting the approximately 5,500 soldiers annually to fill in the
lower and mid-levels of the personnel pyramid while eliminating many positions
at the top.
The plan calls for the creation of a human resources management system that will
lay out a clear career path for ACR professionals that details expected compensation
and quality-of-life benefits, sets out criteria for promotion, links pay to increasing
levels of responsibility, describes education and training opportunities, and prin-
ciples for assigning personnel. Long-festering housing issues will be addressed with
the institution of a housing allowance for defense personnel. Programs supporting
the quality of life of military, civilian, retired personnel and their families will also
have a high priority (Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective
and Principles, 2001; Schroeder, 2002, 5–6).

Supporting Programs: Leader Development

and Military Education
AFCR does not seem to place the same priority on instituting leader development
into the Czech military education system that SR Force 2010 does. The military
education system comes into the reformers’ sights, but the emphasis at this point
seems to be on reducing faculty positions and consolidating the various university-
level military institutions into a single Defense University. There will also be a
greater opportunity for civilian-educated university graduates to earn an officer’s
commission (Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Prin-
ciples, 2001, 12). Reforming the Czech military education system has proven to be
extremely difficult. Little progress has been made to date and AFCR may take only
a few initial steps toward correcting this critical component of the Czech national
security system.

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Supporting Programs: Sustaining and Stationing

Logistical reform is focused mainly on streamlining the logistics support system
and ensuring that stocks of supplies and materials are optimized to the needs of the
reformed ACR. The Czechs are looking at balancing in-sourcing and out-sourcing
logistics services to optimize efficiency and cost. The basing plan will undergo a
comprehensive review, with substantial reductions projected while other facilities
are upgraded or created from scratch to serve the needs of a modern, professional
force. The plan calls for deferring the first set of modernization priorities until 2005
(Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objective and Principles, 2001).

The Way Ahead: Implementation

and Preliminary Conclusions
Though SR Force 2010 and AFCR are only in the early stages of implementation,
there is a widespread belief that the reform efforts now underway will yield results.
After a decade of stasis, Slovakia and the Czech Republic may finally get national
security outputs based on rational defense planning systems that set priorities con-
gruent with the political guidance inherent in key strategic documents, and which
subsequently shape and transform defense structures in a realistic way that balances
each state’s limited resources with its defense aspirations.
However, successful implementation faces many obstacles. Indeed, the Czech
Republic is squarely facing the challenge of continuing with implementation of its
reform plan, while simultaneously scaling it back due to the cutback in resources.
Systemic bureaucratic change depends on reformers throughout the defense system
to ensure that implementation is carried out throughout every relevant branch,
directorate, and unit in the field. The comprehensive reforms call for building up
such capacities, but the fact that such experts will not yet be in place at the onset of
the reform’s implementation is a significant risk.
Observers point to several key areas that may prove to be the most problematic.
Modernizing and rationalizing the management of defense in Slovakia by forcing
the Ministry of Defense and GS to work together is difficult. “Talking the talk” of
integration is much more difficult than “walking the walk.” The introduction of a
mature Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that facilitates the
process of long-term defense planning is another significant challenge. Slovakia is
only now working through this system for the first time.
Some within the small community of civilian Czech national security experts
contend that the Army is incapable of reforming itself. Those of this view believe
that a NATO invitation in hand only led to complacence—that once the ACR
was in NATO, as an institution it was less willing to work for reform (interview
with Ivan Gabal, 2001). This view suggests that only sustained external pressure
from both NATO and Czech political leaders will sustain the reform efforts. The

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 Transformation at Last?  n  369

proposed reform represents a major change in Czech society and culture that must
involve the total participation of the Czech people and their political system. In
the Czech case more so than in the Slovak case the reform aims to improve the
standing of the Czech military in Czech society. The ACR seeks increased prestige
and the creation of the perception among Czechs that its military is a relevant
institution engaged in significant missions worthy of the state’s limited resources.
The myriad of personnel issues in play in both cases is foreboding. Accomplishing
force-level reductions while recruiting to the lower ranks and trying to retain at
the middle ranks is a monumental task. Furthermore, this must be achieved while
reconceptualizing the roles and functions of each member of the rank structure and
establishing career paths and conditions of service.
Finally the importance of personal leadership at every level of the effort—from
the highest echelons of the government to the lieutenant colonels and colonels
charged with reorganizing directorates, to the junior officers and noncommissioned
officers assuming positions of leadership—cannot be underestimated. Wholesale
reform will require wholesale implementation. Piecemeal implementation of a
large, complex, interdependent plan dependent on simultaneous implementation
of its various components will doom the efforts. The presence of committed leaders
supported with the human and material resources to carry out their mission is a
critical element of success. The absorption of the defense cuts and the departure of
Defense Minister Tvrdik dealt a severe blow to the Czech reform efforts. He took
several key reform leaders with him and those who remain face the task of imple-
menting reform with significantly less resources. It remains to be seen if this loss
combined with the scaling back of the government’s commitment will deal a fatal
blow to the effort.

Conclusion
Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia has yet achieved their shared goal of insti-
tuting radical military reform. Success will depend on maintaining the domestic
political consensus within the government and the armed forces that is currently
still at high levels compared to earlier points in the postcommunist era. Continued
external pressure is also vital. NATO can exert leverage due to its interest in polic-
ing interoperability standards so that the Alliance can improve its capabilities. The
EU, which has its own ambitions to be a relevant actor on the international security
stage, can send the signal that abandonment of national security responsibilities in
order to single-mindedly pursue economic goals is not desirable. Finally, the United
States can persist in its external assessments in order to enable its CEE allies to
make meaningful contributions to the war on terrorism.
Slovakia must avert the tendency to become complacent in the wake of Prague,
while the Czech Republic must convince its allies that its post-accession compla-
cency has been reversed. Obstacles will certainly challenge each. Czech planners

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are struggling to overcome the one–two punch of the economic toll of the Summer
2002 floods and the Summer 2003 defense cuts. Slovakia’s fragile governing coali-
tion must sustain its support for military reform and its commitment to spend 2.0
percent of GDP on defense.
The prospect for CEE states making significant contributions toward abating
regional and global transnational threats and securing their fledgling democracies
is great if they can stay the course on military reform. The newly named allies
should be particularly interested in studying the pitfalls and progress made by the
Czechs and Slovaks outlined in this survey. There is no common path that can be
universally prescribed to each state in search of the gains resultant from compre-
hensively reforming its national security structures, but the study of these two cases
suggests that there are common ingredients whose presence and integration across
the state’s political, military, and societal spheres are more likely to lead to success.

Note
1. For an extended discussion of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution focusing on its out-
reach to the East, see Marybeth P. Ulrich, “The New NATO and Central and East-
ern Europe: Managing European Security in the 21st Century.” In Almost NATO:
Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security (Boston: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2002).

References
Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. 2002. Force 2010 (SR Force 2010). Bratislava: Minis-
try of Defense of the Slovak Republic.
The Army of the Czech Republic. 1994. Prague: General Staff of the Czech Republic.
Bilcik, V., M. Bruncko, A. Duleba, P. Lukac, and I. Samson. 2001. Foreign and defense
policy of the Slovak Republic. In Slovakia: A Global Report on the State of Society.
Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs.
Bradtke, R.A. 2002. Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 19
June. Accessed November 21, 2002 on Lexis-Nexus.
Czech News Agency (CTK). 2002. Slovakia NATO Costs. July 28.
Defense Assessment of the Slovak Republic. 2000. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.
(This report is also referred to as the Garrett Study.)
Interfax News Agency. 2002. EC Announces Generally Positive Two-Year Outlook for
Czech Republic. Czech Republic and Slovakia Business Report, April 27.
Interview with Brigadier Janis Kazocins, British Military Advisor to the Slovak General
Staff, July 2001, Bratislava.
Interview (telephone) with Brigadier Stephen Gledhill, U.K. Advisor to General Cerovsky,
Chief of the Slovak General Staff, June 2002.
Interview with Ivan Gabal, National Security Analyst, 2001.

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 Transformation at Last?  n  371

Interview with Josef Pivaric, State Secretary, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic,
July 2002, Bratislava.
Interview with Otto Pick, Director of Studies, Brno Military Academy, July 2001, Prague.
Interview with senior Western Advisor to the Slovak General Staff. July 2001, Bratislava.
Interview with senior western defense attaché, July 2001.
Interview with Stefan Fule, First Secretary, Ministry of Defense. July 2001, Prague.
Interview with U.S. Army Major General Bob Howard, ret., July 2001, Bratislava.
Moroney, J.D.P. 2002. Enlarging NATO’s MAP. Current Defense Analyses, no. 5 (August
2002) (Washington, D.C.: DFI Government Services), 2.
Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic. 2001. Bratislava: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak
Republic.
Prague Report, January 3, 1993.
Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 2001. Prague: Ministry of Defense of the
Czech Republic.Retrieved from http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/analyza.htm
Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Analysis of Required Capabilities, Target
Structure and Composition of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 2001. Prague:
Center for the Preparation of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.
Retrieved from www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/reforma.htm
Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Interdepartmental Comments Proceedings.
Retrieved June 19, 2002 from www.army.cz/reforma/english/news/a010806.htm
Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic—Objectives and Principles. 2001. Prague:
Center for the Preparation of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.
Retrieved from www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/reforma.htm
Samson, I. 2002. Slovakia: Toward NATO indecisively. In Brassey’s Central and East Euro-
pean Security Handbook, 146–147. Washington, D.C.: Brassey.
Schroeder, D. 2002. Assessment of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.
Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic. Retrieved from www.army.cz/
zpravy/cesky/2002/cerven/schroeder/doc_eng.htm
Simon, J. 1997. Slovakia and NATO: The Madrid Summit and after. NDU Strategic Forum,
no. 111, April.
Skopek, J. 2001. Briefing entitled Reform of the Czech Armed Forces. Prague, Czech
Republic, June.
Svec, P. 2002. Slovakia’s RMA: SR Force 2010. Slovak Army Review, Winter, 8–9.
Szayna, T.S. 2002. Slovakia: Trying to catch up with Visegrad. In Brassey’s Eurasian and
East European Security Yearbook, 74. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s.
Ulrich, M. 2000. Czech Republic: Integrated, yet still in transition.” In Brassey’s Eurasian
and East European Security Yearbook, 28. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s
Ulrich, M. 2002a. Professionalisation of the Armed Forces in Slovakia. In Professionalisa-
tion of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Palgrave Press.
Ulrich, M. 2002b. Developing mature national security systems in postcommunist states:
The Czech Republic and Slovakia. Armed Forces and Society 28: 3.
Ulrich, M. 2002c. The Czech Republic: Negotiating obstacles on the way to integration.
In Brassey’s Central and East European Security Yearbook, 57. Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s.
Wallander, C. 2002. NATO’s price. Foreign Affairs 81(6).

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DK3629.indb 372 11/7/07 8:35:03 AM
 Chapter 18

Overview of Latin
America’s Military
Administrations

Bartosz Hieronim Stanisławski

Introduction
An attempt to describe military administrations within the Latin American region
is a considerable challenge considering the space limitations for one book chapter.
After all, Latin America is a region encompassing thirty-five states (members of the
Organization of American States, with Cuba’s membership suspended since 1962)
with very diverse territorial and population sizes, economic potentials, and industrial
bases (see Table 18.1.). For instance, El Salvador’s territory is similar to that of Mas-
sachusetts, while Brazil’s is comparable to that of the entire United States. Similarly,
whereas El Salvador is populated by about 7 million people, Brazil’s population is
close to 190 million. Their ethnic composition, historical conditions and legacy, cul-
ture and national traditions, and internal and international political dynamics also
differ. That is not to say that Latin American states have nothing in common with
each other; the point is merely to avoid the misperception that all Latin American
states are identical, which is not true and may lead to false simplifications.
All of these factors to a larger or smaller degree had and still have an impact on
the process of formation, reform, and existence of national armed forces and their
character in a specific state of the region. In that sense, clearly, the situation is not

373

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 374  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 18.1  A Look at Diversity among Some Latin American States

Population  Defense Budget
Country Comparative Size (Millions) ‘06 ($ Billion)
Argentina Almost 1/3 the size of the U.S. Almost 40 1.86
Brazil Slightly smaller than the U.S. 190 16.0
Chile Twice the size of Montana   15 1.93
Colombia Twice the size of Texas   44 4.01
Mexico Three times the size of Texas 108 3.35
Peru Slightly smaller than Alaska   23 1.1
Venezuela Twice the size of California   26 2.08

different from that of other states of the world, be it Bulgaria, Fiji, Uganda, or the
United States. Latin America, thus, includes a number of states possessing con-
siderable armed forces that are being modernized and reformed on a fairly regular
basis, but there is also a rather long list of states of the region possessing indeed very
small, or no, military potential. The reasons depend, of course, on a number of fac-
tors, including specific states’ internal and foreign policies, international standing,
territorial size, and economic basis for the national armed forces.
Military administrations in Latin America, with few exceptions, tend to share a
number of basic features, some of them found also in many countries outside of the
Latin American region. First of all, a great majority of Latin American armed forces
presently find themselves under the control of democratically elected national gov-
ernments. An exception that clearly stands out from this pattern is Cuba, which
since 1959 has been governed by a communist government. Second, most Latin
American armed forces are supervised and commanded by a defense ministry (or
its functional equivalent), which, in many cases, is headed by a civilian minister
responsible to the president. Third, most armed forces of Latin American states
maintain structural and functional service distinction between land, naval, and
air forces. In many cases, additional service branches are constituted by national
guard or national police formations (for instance, Chile’s Carabineros). The fourth
frequent characteristic is that the armed forces in Latin American states, in addi-
tion to fulfilling their constitutional duties of standing by to defend their nations
against external threats, have also increasingly been orienting toward peacekeeping
missions, civilian disaster relief activities, and assistance in law enforcement opera-
tions. The last, fifth, feature of most military establishments of Latin America is
that although they have clearly moved toward the modus operandi of armed forces
of democratic states, in most cases they still remain skeptical about the general
public having considerable insight into what goes on within the military estab-
lishments. Thus, transparency is on the rise, but it is often still fairly shallow. It is
important to keep in mind that civilian control of the armed forces is not a rule
throughout the region; in some cases (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, Chile), it is a civilian

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  375

who holds the position of a defense minister (or its equivalent), while in others those
positions are held by military officers (e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba).
This chapter focuses on the military administrations of four Latin American
states: Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. The reason behind this selection
is threefold. First of all, these states are of high significance to the U.S. foreign
policy in this part of the world. Second, they maintain considerable armed forces or
possess relatively significant military potential. The third reason is that it is impos-
sible to look in reasonable depth at all Latin America’s military administrations in
one chapter without making it into a book itself. Thus, following a more detailed
discussion of the aforementioned four national military administrations, a number
of other Latin American states are overviewed together.

Context
When analyzing the history of armed forces of Latin American states, it is impor-
tant to emphasize one characteristic that is known to most students of that part of
the world as the so-called “special role” of the armed forces. It refers to the historical
conditions present in many states of the region, conditions that resulted in armed
forces being seen as, if not de facto being, the most stable and effective state insti-
tution. A combination of centuries of colonial reality filled with complex racial,
economic, and social relations characterizing the past of most Latin American
countries laid foundations for coups, frequent changes in political leadership, and
long periods of internal and international instability. Initially, those socio-political
turbulences were related to the period in which most Latin American states gained
independence, a process that started in most cases in the early 1800s. The forma-
tion of national governance and state structures was accompanied by frequent and
fierce internal struggles in which emerging military structures played significant
roles and were a critical ally to have.
The second important factor in the history of armed forces of the region was
constituted by periods of dictatorial rule, which, although at different times in
different countries’ histories, influenced most Latin American states. Obviously,
maintaining control over armed forces was a sine qua non condition for any dictator
to retain power and it was frequently done at the price of increased role or status (or
both) of the military in public life.
After the end of World War II, most armed forces of Latin American states saw
their role as that of defenders against communism. Along these lines, two treaties
were signed: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (known also as
the Rio Treaty) was signed in 1947, and the Mutual Security Act, signed in 1951,
creating the basis of U.S. cooperation with and support for Latin America’s armed
forces. As a result of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War competition (1945–1991), armed
forces in Latin America, mostly supported by the United States, often fought left-
ist guerrilla formations (under different names) that were mostly supported by the

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 376  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Soviet Union. Thus, the Cold War reality only served to strengthen the rhetoric of
the “special role” of the armed forces because they saw and portrayed themselves
as defenders of external sovereignty and, through the fight against leftist rebels,
guardians of internal order and integrity. The Cold War period left significant
wounds on the social fabric of many Latin American states because many govern-
ments were in the hands of military dictatorships that not infrequently contributed
to human rights violations while targeting political opposition. Those people were
often victims of arrests, tortures, and physical elimination, while the official pre-
text for those actions was the defense of democracy and national integrity against
communism. Unfortunately, in this way what the communists did in other parts of
the world, right-wing dictatorial governments did in Latin America. As a result of
such actions, it is estimated that nine thousand people disappeared in Argentina,
several more thousand in Chile, while countries like Peru or Guatemala suffered
even greater casualties.1
Not surprisingly, in the atmosphere of various sorts of instability and socio-
political storms that Latin American nations experienced, armed forces saw them-
selves, and often were perceived, as the guarantors and defenders of the state’s
institutional continuation. Moreover, in most Latin American states, armed forces
were a part of the so-called power triumvirate, together with the politico–financial
elites (mostly of White, Iberian origin) and the Catholic Church. Presently, in most
of the region’s states, both the position of the Catholic Church as well as the role
of the armed forces have seen a decline, with simultaneous increase of the role of
democratic institutions and procedures, which have slowly, but effectively, been
replacing the archaic and undemocratic systems and mores of governance.
Presently, as was mentioned earlier, the armed forces of many Latin American
states, albeit not very enthusiastically, take part in or aid law enforcement opera-
tions and are used against drug crime organizations (e.g., in Colombia). On the one
hand, such tasks are not typical for armed forces, but on the other hand they practi-
cally prepare the respective national militaries for the challenges of the twenty-first
century in which mobile, hit-and-run, and unconventional warfare seems to be on
the rise, contrary to the large front, thousands of tanks, and millions of soldiers
scheme more typical for the first half of the twentieth century.
As a curiosity, it is worth mentioning that the armed forces of a number of
Latin American states are financed not only through national budgets and defense
appropriations, but also by income generated by private companies owned by the
very armed forces. In some cases, for instance in Chile, such solutions provide for
the resources needed to purchase new weapons and weapons systems (in the case of
Chile, such funding basically doubles the amount appropriated from the national
budget to the Ministry of Defense). The downside of such solutions is that the
amount is not guaranteed because it depends on the market fluctuations and result-
ing profits for the companies owned by the military. For that reason, full data on
the financial operations of the specific armed forces is not always available, since the
“outside-of-the-budget” part is not entirely known or predictable.

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  377

As a result of democratic elections, in recent years a number of governments in

Latin America have become dominated by left-leaning political parties. Although it
has not become a cause of a radically changed security landscape in this part of the
world, it is true that under the leadership of president Hugo Chavez, Venezuela’s
relations with the United States have become unusually bad and tense. As a result
of that situation, Venezuela’s arms acquisitions as well as its armed reserves have
been expanding. At the same time, claims that the general level of security in Latin
America has decreased as a result of the wave of political victories of left-leaning
parties in a number of states should be treated with a grain of salt. Such general-
izing claims themselves may become a source of a self-fulfilling prophecy and as
such they do not serve international security well. Moreover, they do not necessarily
reflect the facts from the ground, but rather certain political preferences or outdated
Cold War thinking and mentality. For instance, the situation is different in the case
of Venezuela’s populist President, Hugo Chavez, who is known to use anti-Ameri-
can rhetoric and it is different in the case of the Brazilian President, Luis Inacio da
Silva, whose activities are closer to that of a Western-style social democrat.

Mexico
Being the United States’ large and direct southern neighbor, it is natural to start the
comparative look at military administrations of selected Latin American countries
with Mexico. Mexican armed forces total close to 193,000, including 144,000 in
the army, 37,000 in the navy, and close to 12,000 in the air force. Mexico also pos-
sesses paramilitary troops numbering 11,000, while the reserve core of the armed
forces is estimated at 300,000.

Chain of Command
Chain of command in this country probably stands out the most in comparison
with other Latin American states. Similarly to many other countries, the president
of Mexico is the commander in chief of the armed forces. In contrast to many other
countries in terms of the administrative structure is the fact that the president does
not command the armed forces via one defense-related ministry or department,
but through two institutions known as Secretariats (Figure 18.1). The Secretariat of
National Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional–Sedena) supervises the Mexi-
can Army (Ejército) and the Mexican Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Mexicana, or FAM),
while the Secretariat of the Navy (Secretaría de Marina Armada de Mexico–Semar) is
responsible for the supervision of the navy, naval air, and marines.2 Thus, Mexico’s
governmental structure does not include a defense minister per se and, therefore,
only Mexico’s president has full command over the country’s entire armed forces.

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 378  n  Handbook of Military Administration

President of Mexico

Secretariat Secretariat
of National Defense of the Navy

Supreme Command Navy Command

High Command

Military Regions A.F. Command

Military Zones Military Units

Figure 18.1  Chain of command of the Mexican military.

The Secretariat of National Defense is headed by a four-star army general, while

the Secretariat of the Navy is headed by an admiral. They are both selected by
the president and they both perform two duties simultaneously: as cabinet minis-
ters responsible to the president and as operational commanders of their respective
forces. Because structurally the commander of the air force and his staff are located
within the army headquarters, and because the army general has always been in
command of the Secretariat of National Defense, it was he who was referred to as
the Minister of Defense.
Due to the actual embeddedness of the air force within the army, air force offi-
cers were de facto excluded from assuming the commander’s position in the Secre-
tariat of National Defense. That situation, for obvious reasons, made the air force
less than happy and this somewhat unbalanced, as some say, state of affairs between
the services continues until the present day. Mexican military authorities formally
stress, however, that the functions of the Mexican armed forces are fulfilled well
with the present military organization. They rightly point out that the Mexican
military needs to address the needs of the Mexican state and people and, there-
fore, there is no reason to structure its military differently just because military
administrations in other countries tend to have a defense ministry or its equivalent
overlooking all armed services. Hence, at present no changes to or reforms of the
military structure appear on the legislative horizon of Mexico.
Traditionally, the commanders of the secret0ariats of National Defense and the
navy were selected based on their seniority within their respective services. During
the administrations of Presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) and Vicente Fox

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  379

Supreme Command

Supreme Military
Tribunal High Command

Nat’l Defense General Staff

Military General
Prosecutor’s Office

Legal Counsel Operational Logistics Planning and

Office Subdirectorate Subdirectorate Military Doctrine
Subdirectorate

Intelligence Human Res.

Strategic
(Section 2) (Section 1) Planning
Operations Logistics (Section 5)
(Section 3) (Section 4) Education and
Mil. Doctrine
Antidrug Ops Secretariat (Section 6)
(Section 7) Section
Juridical
Assessors
Office

Military Air Force First Army Military Special Paratroop Presidential Rural
Regions Command Corps Police Forces Corps Guards Defense

Military Zones
-Mil. Air Regions Independent
-Mil. Air Bases Infantry
Military Units Brigades
-Combat Wing
-Reckon. Wing
-Air Squadrons

Figure 18.2  Mexico’s Secretariat of National Defense.

(2000–2006), officers from lower ranks were chosen to head the services, which
was perceived as a move towards letting more progressive and younger commanders
take charge. However, the traditional isolation of the internal affairs of the military
from the outside, public world did not change as a result of those personnel moves
and the military remains rather cold about public relations.

Structure and Organization of the Mexican Armed Forces

The Mexican Army and Air Force
Structurally, the Mexican Army (Figure 18.2) is organized into three army corps,
each with its own headquarters. Territorially, it is organized into twelve military
regions, which in turn are divided into a total of forty-four military zones. As
mentioned earlier, Mexico’s air force is commanded by a commander embedded
within the army headquarters. It is structurally divided into four aerial regions
(Northeast; Northwest; Central; and Southeast).3 Out of 144,000 men and women
in Mexico’s Army, 60,000 are conscripts and the army is organized around three
Army corps, each of them composed of three infantry brigades.4 Altogether, the
Mexican army includes one mechanized infantry battalion, ten motorized cavalry
regiments, forty-four air-mobile special forces units, and eighty infantry battalions.

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 380  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Secretary

General Inspection Naval General

and Control Staff Command

Strategic
Admirals Board
Planning Unit

Naval Board Juridical Unit

Subsecretariat Navy General

Office

Naval Investigations Human Directorate

Directorate
Construction and Dev’t Resources General of
General
Directorate Directorate General Administration
of Services
General General Directorate and Finances

Naval Forces,
Regions, Zones
and Sectors

Figure 18.3  Structure of Mexico’s Secretariat of the Navy.

The Mexican Army is armed with 264 reconnaissance vehicles, over 860 armored
personnel carriers, 1,174 artillery pieces, and 80 air defense guns. The army’s stra-
tegic reserve is composed of four armored brigades, one airborne brigade, one engi-
neering brigade, and one military police brigade.5
Although formally the Mexican Air Force possesses 107 combat-capable aircraft,
the main weight of potential fighting responsibility rests on ten F-5 and seventeen AT
33 Shooting Stars. Additionally, there are seventy-three transport aircraft, including
three B-727, one B-757, six Beech 90s, one C-118, seven C-130s, four C-26 Metros,
twenty Rockwell Commander 500s, and six Rockwell Turbo Commander 680s.6

The Mexican Navy

The Mexican Navy (Figure 18.3), commanded by the secretary of the navy, is orga-
nized into six zone commands in the Mexican Gulf region and eleven zone commands
on the Pacific coast. Navy headquarters are located in Acapulco and Vera Cruz.
The Mexican Navy is equipped with one destroyer, seven frigates, one hundred
eighty-four patrol and coastal combatants, three amphibious craft, and nineteen

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  381

logistics and support vessels. Naval Aviation comprises eleven hundred person-
nel with eight combat-capable aircraft. Mexican Marines number eighty-seven
hundred.7

Related Facts and Developments

In 2006, Mexico lost $3.6 billion worth of U.S. military assistance because its
government ratified Mexico’s participation in the International Criminal Court.
The United States, based on its American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, does not
provide military assistance to countries that do not offer special protection for the
U.S. troops stationed on their territory.8 Nevertheless, Mexico ordered two Spanish
AS-565 Panther helicopters that were to be delivered in 2005, and another eight
may be ordered.9
The Mexican military has been increasing its role in the Mexico–U.S. border
control efforts, as the huge number of illegal migrants entering the United States
annually (estimated at 850,000) is accompanied by a rising flow of illicit drugs.10

Colombia
The Colombian armed forces total 207,000 active duty personnel and are divided
into three branches. They include army (Ejército Nacional), navy (Armada Nacio-
nal, including naval aviation, marines, and coast guard), and air force (Fuerza
Aerea Colombiana). The paramilitary force, mainly national police units, number
129,000,11 and all military branches are under the control of Colombia’s Ministry
of Defense.

Chain of Command
The president of Colombia is the supreme commander of the Colombian armed
forces (Figure 18.4). Directly responsible to him is the Minister of Defense, who
oversees the General Command of the Armed Forces (Comando General de Fuerzas
Militares). Subordinated to it are the respective commands of the army, navy, air
force, and national police.

Structure and Organization of the Colombian Armed Forces

The Colombian Army
The Army’s structure (Figure 18.5) is closely linked with territorial responsibility.
It is organized into seven divisions (divisiones), each of them responsible for one
territorial region of the country. Each division is divided into brigades, which are

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 382  n  Handbook of Military Administration

President of Colombia

Min. of Defense

General Command
of the Armed Forces

Navy Command Army Command A.F. Command

Figure 18.4  Chain of command of the Colombian armed forces.

Personal Adjutant
External Assessors
Office
Army Commander General Inspectorate
Juridical Office
General Adjutancy

Personal Adjutant

Second Commander
General Staff Planning Directorate
and Chief of Staff

Informatics Directorate

Operations Command Logistics Command Human Dev’t Command Education and

Doctrine Command
Recruitment Directorate Instruction/Training
Intendance Directorate
Operations Directorate Directorate
Personnel Directorate
Communications Directorate Cadets Military School
Integral Action Directorate Welfare Directorate
Engineers Directorate Subofficers Military
Social Loans Directorate School

Intelligence Directorate Financial Directorate Military Education Center

Sanitation Directorate

Logistical Support Directorate Army Lyceums National Training Center

Figure 18.5  The structure of the Colombian Army.

further divided into battalions. The commander of the army supervises the second
commander and the chief of the Army General Staff. They, in turn, supervise seven
division commands, responsible for their respective territorial areas.

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  383

The Colombian Army numbers 178,000, with almost one third (64,000) being
conscripts, while the army’s reserves are estimated at almost 55,000.12 It is orga-
nized into seven division headquarters,13 with the bulk of the force constituted by
nine Mobile Counter Guerrilla Force brigades, six mechanized brigades, two air
mobile brigades, nine infantry brigades, one special forces brigade, four mountain
infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, one antiterrorism unit, and one coun-
ternarcotics brigade.14 The army has 12 light tanks, 135 reconnaissance vehicles
(mainly EE-9 Cascavel), over 190 armored personnel carriers, 639 artillery pieces,
and 30 air defense guns.

The Colombian Navy

The Naval Command supervises three naval forces and four commands (Fig-
ure 18.6). The naval forces (Fuerzas Navales) are responsible for their respective
areas of operations: Caribbean, Pacific, and South. Three of the four commands are
function-specific and responsible for marine infantry, coast guard, and naval avia-
tion. The fourth is responsible for the protection of the San Andres and Providencia
archipelago in the Caribbean. The Colombian Navy numbers 22,000, including
7,000 conscripts, with reserves of 4,800. It has one headquarters, which is located
at Puerto Carreño. The Colombian Navy is equipped with four tactical subma-
rines, four corvettes, and 179 patrol and coastal combatant vessels. Additionally, it

Naval Operations
Command

Western Naval Coast Marine

Fleet
Naval Aviation Guard Infantry
Command
Zone Command Command Division

Operational
River Eastern Coordination
Command Naval Zone and Control
Directorate

Hydrography Armaments
Telematics and and
Directorate Navigation Electronics
Directorate Directorate

Figure 18.6  Structure of the Colombian Navy.

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 384  n  Handbook of Military Administration

- Personal Adjutancy
- General Adjutancy
- Information and Press Office AF General
AF Commander
- Prof. Reserve Officers Command Inspectorate
- Juridical Department
- Military Ceremonial Protocol Dept.
- Adjutancy
- Classification Council
Second Commander and - Integral Action Dept.
Chief of General Staff
- Strategic Planning Dept.
- Contract Department
- Financial Department

Air Base Logistical Human

Air Ops Intelligence AF Logistic AF Education Sanitation
Security and Support Development
Command Command Ops Com. Command Directorate
Defense Com. Command Command

- 6 Air Combat Commands

- Military Air Transport Command
- Air Maintenance Command
- Military Aviation School
- Sub-Officers School
- Military Aeronautical Institute

Figure 18.7  Structure of the Colombian Air Force.

possesses eight amphibious units and seven logistics and support craft. Colombian
Marines number fourteen hundred.

The Colombian Air Force

The commander of the air force (Figure 18.7) oversees the Second Command and
the Air Force General Staff, which in turn commands six Air Combat Commands,
Air Transport Command, Air Maintenance Command, Caribbean and Eastern
Air Groups, and air force schools.
The Colombian Air Force totals 7,000, with an additional 1,200 in reserves.
It is structurally divided into four commands: air combat command (twenty-two
combat-capable aircraft), tactical air support command (thirty combat capable
aircraft), military air transport command (twenty-four aircraft), and air training
command forty-one aircraft). Primary fighting aircraft include A-37B Dragonfly,
IA-58A Pucara, OV-10A Bronco, and AC-47.15

Related Facts and Developments

Colombia’s turbulent history of civil war, virtually unending since the late 1940s,
has had its impact on the culture of the Colombian military. Perpetual, albeit vary-
ing in intensity, fighting against leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) and National Liberation Army
(Ejército para Liberación Nacional, or ELN) guerrilla forces made military personnel

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  385

skeptical of periodically aired ideas about conflict resolution, which would include
partial integration of former guerrillas into the military. Mutual animosity, not
infrequently on a personal level, does not bode well for potential cooptation of the
former leftist guerrillas into the formal military structures, although such a pos-
sibility remains an option. The fact is that under the leadership of Colombia’s cur-
rent president, Alvaro Uribe, Colombian armed forces contributed considerably to
the increase of governmental control over Colombia’s territory and its fight against
leftist guerrillas and drug organizations. To some extent, the success of the armed
forces and Uribe’s application of the concept of “democratic security” is measured
by the re-election of Alvaro Uribe to his second term in May 2006.
In the course of the fight against leftist guerrillas, a serious problem has been
reoccurring in recent years. While pursuing FARC forces near border areas,
Colombian troops crossed international borders and entered into Ecuadorian ter-
ritory, while on another occasion, they reportedly entered Venezuela, and yet on
another occasion Brazil.16 Colombian military claimed to be pursuing guerrillas,
who set up safe havens in bordering countries. Although those claims are almost
certainly true, military incursions into foreign territories lead to dangerous interna-
tional incidents. It is, therefore, clear that in order for the Colombian military to be
fully successful in cornering and eliminating the FARC or other illegal organiza-
tions, political international agreements must be reached, which will result in close
military cooperation of bordering states and, potentially, in joint military opera-
tions against guerrillas. Otherwise, the refugee crisis in Colombia’s border areas
is likely to continue, with the present number of refugees outside of Colombia’s
frontiers estimated at three hundred thousand, while internally displaced persons
now number between 3 and 3.5 million people.17
The fact remains, however, that the Colombian armed forces are engaged in
combat against a mobile, well-trained, and well-equipped enemy operating in dif-
ficult mountainous and jungle terrain. The Colombian military has suffered sig-
nificantly due to insufficient mobility, which is critical in combat against such an
enemy. Thus, the United States has been helping to fix that deficiency by providing
helicopters. Through an interagency assistance plan, as part of the “Plan Colom-
bia,” the U.S. government provided funds needed to procure fourteen UH-60 Black
Hawks and thirty UH-1H Huey II helicopters, in addition to supporting the pro-
curement of fifteen UH-1N helicopters.18 Moreover, Colombia ordered two UH-60
A/L Black Hawk helicopters from the United States and the first four of twenty-five
Brazilian EMB-314 Super Tucano planes were to be delivered in 2006.19

Venezuela
Venezuela’s National Armed Force (Fuerza Armada Nacional, or FAN) totals over
82,000, with 8,000 in Army reserves. They include ground forces or army (Fuerzas
Terrestres or Ejército), naval forces (Fuerzas Navales or Armada [including Marines

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 386  n  Handbook of Military Administration

President
of Venezuela

Min. of Defense

Navy Command Army Command A.F. Command

Figure 18.8  High-echelon chain of command of the Venezuelan military.

and Coast Guard]), Air Force (Fuerzas Aereas or Aviación), and Armed Forces
of Cooperation or National Guard (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación or Guardia
Nacional). They are under the control of the Ministry of National Defense (Minis-
terio de Defensa Nacional), which reports to the president of the republic.

Chain of Command
The President of the Republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces of
Venezuela. Through the Defense Minister, he commands the Army, Navy, and Air
Force (Figure 18.8).

Structure and Organization of the Venezuelan Armed Forces

The Venezuelan Army
The army (Figure 18.9) is organized into five divisions, responsible for five territo-
rial areas of Venezuela. Their divisional commands respond directly to the com-
mander general of the army. The army numbers 34,000, with 27,000 serving as
conscripts. Its core comprises: one mobile brigade specializing in counter-guerrilla
operations, two armored brigades (one of them light), one cavalry brigade, seven
infantry brigades (including one mechanized infantry battalion, eighteen infan-
try battalions, and four artillery battalions), two Ranger brigades, one airborne
brigade, two engineer regiments, one aviation regiment, and one military police
brigade.20 The Venezuelan Army is equipped with 197 tanks (81 AMX-30s, 36
AMX-13s, 80 Scorpion 90s), 30 reconnaissance vehicles, 290 armored personnel
carriers, 347 artillery pieces, 7 transport, and 2 utility aircraft.21

The Venezuelan Navy

The Venezuelan Navy (Figure 18.10) is organized into seven functional naval com-
mands, with Navy General Command having oversight of the Navy General Staff.

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  387

Army General Commander Information

Department

General Adjutancy Secretariat

Acquisitions
Department Juridical
Second Department
General Financial Division
Inspectorate Directorate
General Staff
Third
Aviation Division
Inspection
Directorate Commander Personnel Intelligence
Fourth Directorate Directorate
Security and Logistics Division
Investigations Command Planning Operations
Directorate Directorate Directorate
Fifth
Command Division
Evaluation and
of School Informatics Situation
Control
Sixth Directorate Room
Department
First Engineering
Division Corps

Ninth
Division

Figure 18.9  Structure of the Venezuelan Army.

Navy General
Command

Navy General Staff

Navy General
Inspectorate

Navy Naval Navy Navy

Personnel Operations Logistics Education
Command Command Command Command

Figure 18.10  Chain of command and structure of the Venezuelan Navy.

Responsible to the Navy General Staff is the navy’s Inspectorate General and four
function-specific commands:

n Operations Command
n Logistics Command

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 388  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Naval Operations
Command

Naval Coast Naval

Naval Fleet
Aviation Guard Infantry
Zone West Command
Command Command Division

Naval Coordination and

River
Zone Operational Control
Command
East Directorate

Hydrography Armament and

Telematics
and Navigation Electronics
Directorate
Directorate Directorate

Figure 18.11  Structure of the Venezuelan Navy’s Operations Command.

n Personnel Command
n Education Command

The Navy General Staff controls the Directorate of Organizational Develop-

ment and Human Resources, the Naval Intelligence Directorate, the Operations
Directorate, and the Logistics Directorate.
Naval Operations Command (Figure 18.11) oversees two territorially based
naval zones (West and East) and River Command, forces-specific administrative
units (Naval Aviation Command, Naval Infantry Division, Coast Guard Com-
mand), and functional departments (Fleet Command, Coordination and Opera-
tional Control Directorate, Telematics Directorate, Hydrography and Navigation
Directorate, and Armament and Electronics Directorate).
The Venezuelan Navy numbers over 18,000, including 4,000 conscripts.22
The Venezuelan Navy is equipped with two tactical submarines, six frigates,
and six patrol and coastal combatants. It also possesses four amphibious ves-
sels and six logistics and support craft. Naval Aviation numbers 500 person-
nel and has three combat-capable aircraft. Venezuelan Marines total 7,800 with
one amphibious vehicle battalion, two river battalions, six infantry battalions,
one artillery battalion, one river marine brigade, and two landing marine bri-
gades. Venezuela’s Coast Guard possesses two corvettes and forty-three patrol
and coastal combatants.23

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  389

AF General Command

General Staff and

AF Second Commander

AF General
Inspectorate

Personnel Air Logistical Air Defense

Operations Operations Operations Operations
Command Command Command Command

Figure 18.12  Chain of command and structure of the Venezuelan Air Force.

The Venezuelan Air Force

The air force (Figure 18.12) is commanded by the Aviation’s General Command.
Subordinated to it is the Aviation’s General Staff and the Second Commander of
Aviation, who supervise four functional air force commands, including Personnel
Command, Air Operations Command, Logistical Operations Command, and Air
Defense Operations Command.
The Venezuelan Air Force totals seven thousand personnel with some con-
scripts. It is divided into three fighting groups, the air force training group, two
special operations groups, and three transport groups.24 It is armed with 125 com-
bat-capable aircraft, including 38 fighters (16 CF-5 and 22 F-16) and 16 fighter/
ground attack aircraft (Mirage 50DV). It also has 31 support and 49 utility heli-
copters. Moreover, Venezuela’s Air Force operates ten surface-to-air systems and
over 230 air defense guns.25

The Venezuelan National Guard

Venezuela possesses, in the Latin American context, a considerabley sized National
Guard, which numbers 23,000 personnel. It is organized in eight regional commands
and armed with 44 armored personnel carriers, 150 artillery pieces (mainly mortars), 52
various combat boats, 12 transport and 11 utility aircraft, and 26 utility helicopters.26

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 390  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Related Facts and Developments

As a result of the political impasse with the United States, in late 2005 Venezuela
began extensive recruitment to boost its military reserves. In early 2006, it moved
to train its new recruits to increase its reserves and create a Territorial Guard, a large
army of armed reservists. Plans called for an increase of reserves from 500,000 to
2 million, a state of affairs that would, according to Venezuelan military authori-
ties, deter any potential invaders. Those moves indicate that Venezuela is to possess
six military services, including army, navy, air force, National Guard, National
Reserve, and Territorial Guard. The former four are to be directed by the Strategic
Operational Command (Comando Estratégico Operacional), while the latter two are
to be subordinated to the National Reserve and Mobilization Command (Comando
General de la Reserva Nacional y Movilizacion Nacional).
Venezuelan armed forces’ procurement plans have also been expanding, since
Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chavez, is officially concerned about potential U.S.
intervention in his country. Thus, Venezuela ordered from Spain ten CASA-295M
transport planes and two CASA-235 maritime patrol aircraft.27 By the end of 2006,
the Russian Federation was to deliver six Mi-17V-5s, three Mi-35Ms, one Mi-26T,
and five Mi-17V helicopters.28 The Venezuelan government also ordered three JYL-
1 air defense radars from China.29 Moreover, the Venezuelan Navy ordered from
the Spanish Navantia company four corvettes and four patrol vessels.30 The U.S.
government tried to stop some of the acquisitions from materializing, claiming that
U.S.-made technologies were used in them and that Hugo Chavez is threatening the
region’s stability. Due to the U.S. refusal to provide repair parts for Venezuela’s F-16
fleet, Chavez started negotiations with Russia about possible acquisition of Mig-29s.
Moreover, Russia will provide the Venezuelan armed forces with one hundred thou-
sand machine guns,31 which are badly needed to arm the huge reserve force.

Brazil
Before the Brazilian Ministry of Defense was created, its three branches of armed
forces were directed by three ministry-level departments dealing exclusively with
the specific military branch. In 1999, the three departments were transformed into
three military commands responsible to the Ministry of Defense (Ministério da
Defesa), which was created on June 10, 1999. The Ministry of Defense oversees
and coordinates the activities of the three branches of the Brazilian armed forces:
the Army (Exército), Navy (Marinha do Brasil), including Naval Air and Marine
Corps (Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais), and Air Force (Força Aérea Brasileira). Total-
ing 287,159 personnel, the Brazilian armed forces are the most numerous in all
of Latin America. In addition, Brazil possesses significant reserves, estimated at
over 1.3 million. Military police and state militia forces, or public security forces,

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  391

constitute a paramilitary wing of the defense system of Brazil and are estimated at
385,600.32

Chain of Command
The chain of command within Brazilian military administration begins at the top
level with the president of the Republic, who, according to article 84 of the Federal
Constitution, is the executive commander of the armed forces and appoints com-
manders of the army, navy, and air force. Directly responsible to him is the Minister
of Defense, who, via Defense Ministry and Defense General Staff (Estado Mayor da
Defesa), oversees the army, navy, and air force commands (Figure 18.13). Ministry
of Defense and Defense General Staff are responsible for strategic operations and
their coordination. The three respective commands of the military services (army,
navy, air force) are responsible for the component-specific, operational administra-
tion of the forces under their command through subcommands.

Structure and Organization of the Brazilian Armed Forces

The Brazilian Army
The army command (Comando do Exercito) oversees and administers operations
of the army through seven regional military commands (Figure 18.14), which, in

President of Brazil

Min. of Defense

Navy Command Army Command A.F. Command

Naval Ops Com A.F. Ops Com

1RMC
2NDC 1NDC 1RAFC
2RMC 1AF
3NDC 2RAFC
4NDC 3RMC 2AF
3RAFC
6NDC 5NDC 4RMC
4RAFC 3AF
8NDC 7NDC 5RMC
5RAFC
6RMC 5AF
9NDC
6RAFC
7RMC
7RAFC

Figure 18.13  The Brazilian armed forces: chain of command and organization.

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 392  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Army Commander

Superior Econ-
Army High Com
Financial Council

Commander’s Army Intelligence Army’s Social Army Command Army General

Cabinet Center Communic. Center Justice Council Secretariat

- General Department of Personnel

- Engineering and Construction Dept.
Army General Staff - Instruction and Research Dept.
- Land Ops. Command
- Science and Technology Dept.
- Economics and Finances Secretariat
- Logistics Dept.

Mil. Command Mil. Command Mil. Command Mil. Command Mil. Command Mil. Command Mil. Command
Southeast South East Northeast of the Amazon of Planalto West

2nd Mil. Reg. 3rd Mil. Reg. 1st Mil. Reg. 6th Mil. Reg. 12th Mil. Reg. 11th Mil. Reg. 9th Mil. Reg.

5th Mil. Reg. 4th Mil. Reg. 7th Mil. Reg. 8th Mil. Reg.

10th Mil. Reg.

Figure 18.14  Structure of the Brazilian Army.

turn, oversee twelve military regions. Regional military commands, responsible for
tactical-level operations, include:

n Amazon Military Command (8th and 12th regions)

n Military Command West (9th region)
n Planalto Military Command (11th region)
n Military Command Northeast (6th, 7th, and 10th regions)
n Military Command East (1st and 4th regions)
n Military Command Southeast (2nd region)
n Military Command South (3rd and 5th regions)

The Brazilian Army numbers 189,000 personnel and is presently organized into
eight Army divisions.33 Approximately 40,000 of the Brazilian army are conscripts
with the mandatory service lasting nine to twelve months.34 However, an increas-
ing number of conscripts remain in the army serving contractually extended terms
of service in narrowly specialized niches. The bulk of the Army includes:

n one frontier brigade

n three jungle brigades
n three armored infantry brigades
n one armored cavalry brigade
n four mechanized cavalry brigades
n one special forces brigade

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  393

n ten motorized infantry brigades

n one air defense artillery brigade35

The army’s main equipment comprises 464 tanks, 409 reconnaissance vehicles,
803 armored personnel carriers, over 1,550 artillery pieces, 79 helicopters, 54 sur-
face-to-air systems, and 134 air defense guns.36

The Brazilian Navy

The Navy Command (Comando da Marinha) oversees and administers operations
of the navy through the Naval Operations Command responsible for nine Naval
District Commands (Figure 18.15). District Commands have the role of tactical-
level operational command centers and they include:

n 1st Naval District Command (Rio de Janeiro)

n 2nd Naval District Command (Salvador)
n 3rd Naval District Command (Natal)
n 4th Naval District Command (Belem)
n 5th Naval District Command (Rio Grande)
n 6th Naval District Command (Ladario)
n 7th Naval District Command (Brasilia)
n 8th Naval District Command (Sao Paulo)
n 9th Naval District Command (Manaus)

Navy Commander

Navy General
Staff
Interministerial
Commander’s Intelligence Commission for Sea
Cabinet Center Resources Secretariat
Naval Systems
Navy School
Analysis Center

Naval Ops Navy General Navy Materiel Navy Personnel Navigation Gen. Command
Command Secretariat Gen. Directorate Gen. Directorate Gen. Directorate of the Marine Corps

Directorates of: Directorates of: Directorates of: Personnel

- Squadron Chief - Hydrography
- Finances - Engineering - Military Command
Command and Navigation
- Hist. and Culture - Naval Aeronautics Personnel Directorate
- 9 Naval District - Health Materiel
- Administration - Weapons Systems
Commands - Sea Studies Command
- Accounting - Telecommunications - Civil Personnel
Institute
- Squadron Infantry - Supply - Rio de Janeiro Naval - Social Aid
Command - Inventory Control - Naval - Ports and Coasts
Arsenal
Center Instruction Directorate
- Naval Research
Institute - Sports - Instructional
- Civil Works Commission Center
- Sao Paolo Naval
Technology Center

Figure 18.15  Structure of the Brazilian Navy.

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 394  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Similarly to the army, Naval District Commands have territorial responsibilities for
their respective theaters of operations.
The navy has nearly 33,000 personnel under its command and is almost entirely
professional, with only 3,200 conscripts. The bulk of the Navy consists of five tacti-
cal submarines, an aircraft carrier (Clemenceau-class), nine frigates, four corvettes,
six mine warfare vessels, three amphibious ships, and over fifty logistics and sup-
port vessels, including three hospital ships.37 Moreover, the Brazilian Navy includes
Naval Aviation, with personnel of approximately 1,200, with principal attack power
of one fighter squadron of twenty-three Skyhawks in four different versions. The
marines, organizationally part of the navy, number 14,600, with one amphibious
division, a special forces battalion, an engineering battalion, and eight regional
Marine groups.38

The Brazilian Air Force

The Brazilian Air Force has over 65,000 men and women serving and is predominantly
professionalized, with only 2,500 conscripts. The Air Force Command (Comando da
Aeronautica) oversees four function-specific commands (Figure 18.16), including:

n Air Operations Command

n Support Command
n Personnel Command
n Air Space Technology Command

The Air Operations Command oversees seven Regional Air Commands respon-
sible for tactical-level operations. The Brazilian Air Force is functionally organized
into four air forces (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th; the 4th is deactivated), as they are called,
each of them equipped with aircraft reflecting a given group’s specialization:

n First Air Force: training and support aircraft

n Second Air Force: antisubmarine warfare, marine patrol, and search and res-
cue aircraft
n Third Air Force: air defense, fighter/ground attack, reconnaissance aircraft
n Fifth Air Force: transport and communications aircraft

Related Facts and Developments

The Brazilian military is continuing with modernization, including foreign pur-
chases. In 2005, it ordered twelve M-2000C Mirage fighters from France, twelve
CASA C-295 transport planes and eight P-3A Orion planes from Spain, and nine
F-5 Tiger E/F from Saudi Arabia. With the exception of the P-3A order, which is to
be fulfilled in 2007, other deliveries are in progress.39

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  395

A.F. Commander Cabinet Air Force Commander Parliamentary Advisors of the A.F. Commander
Social Communic. Center A.F. Hist.-Cult. Institute
A.F. Intelligence Center Commission on Int’l Aerial Navigation Studies
A.F. Officers Promotion Commission

Air Force High Com. A.F. General Staff A.F. Econ-Fin. High Commission

Air Ops. Support Personnel Air Space Airspace Tech. Civil A.F.
A.F. Econ-Fin.
General General General Control General Aviation Instruction
Secretariat
Com. Com. Com. Dept. Com. Dept. Dept.

7 Regional Logistics Health Airspace Research A.F.

Air Center Directorate Control Centers University
Commands System
Logistics Psychology Implement. A.F.
Institute Institute Commission Academy
4 Air Force
Types
Engineering Personnel Amazon Cadets
Directorate Admin. Dir.Vigilance Preparatory School
System
Project
Material Quartermast. Coord. A.F.
Directorate Directorate Commission Specialists School

Historical A.F.
Document. Instruction and
Center Adaptation Center

Logistics Center

Figure 18.16  Structure of the Brazilian Air Force.

With the processes of democratization ending the Brazilian military’s orienta-

tion towards internal politics and “return to the barracks,” armed forces needed
to reorient themselves towards new missions. And since Brazil does not face any
tangible threats from its neighbors, law enforcement assistance and peacekeeping
have become new challenges for the Brazilian military. Because of Brazil’s territo-
rial size and significant criminal routes crossing its territory, the Brazilian armed
forces often appear to be best equipped, if not best suited, for crime-fighting duties,
although the Brazilian military is skeptical about getting too involved in law enforce-
ment-like activities. This may be difficult, as the Amazon jungle has for a long
time presented a great refuge and a transshipment point for drug traffickers from
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Brazilian armed forces, therefore, are maintaining,
if not expanding, their presence in the Amazon, thus helping civilian authorities
and law enforcement institutions in controlling and supervising this huge and geo-
graphically challenging area. Of high significance in this endeavor is the Brazilian
Air Force’s Amazon Vigilance System Project Coordinating Commission, which is
operating under the Air Space Control Department. The Brazilian military actively
participates in United Nations assistance and peacekeeping operations. Presently it
has contingents in six countries (Haiti, Ivory Coast, Guinea‑Bissau, Liberia, Sudan,

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 396  n  Handbook of Military Administration

and Cyprus), the largest one being deployed to Haiti and numbering approximately
twelve hundred troops.
Brazil had the region’s most developed nuclear research program and it possesses
sufficient resources to construct nuclear weapons if it so desired, mostly due to sig-
nificant uranium deposits. While civilian authorities conducted a nuclear research
program in the 1970s and 1980s, the military secretly led parallel research with
the aim of uranium enrichment. Yet the military program ended with the return
of democracy in the mid-1980s and the decisive rejection of any nuclear weapons
ambitions, signified through the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, establish-
ing Latin America as a nuclear weapons free zone, the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and membership in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Over the past two decades, military culture in Brazil has seen a considerable
shift. The armed forces have been increasingly directing their attention away from
individual political objectives inside the country and towards apolitical professional-
ism. That does not mean that certain legacies of political involvement from the past
have been entirely eliminated, but the armed forces today serve their society, rather
than primarily helping to control it, as was the case only two decades ago.

Other Selected Latin American States

South America
Peru
The Peruvian armed forces are organizationally divided into army (Ejército Peruano),
navy (Marina de Guerra del Perú, which includes naval air, naval infantry, and coast
guard), and air force (Fuerza Aérea del Perú or FAP). The military’s branches are
under the command of Peru’s Ministry of Defense (Ministerio de Defensa).40
The Peruvian armed forces total 80,000. The Peruvian Army has 40,000 per-
sonnel and is divided into four military regions.41 It comprises five infantry bri-
gades, two motorized infantry brigades, two armored brigades, two mechanized
cavalry army brigades, two mountain infantry brigades, a special forces brigade,
an armored training brigade, an aviation brigade, an army regiment, a mecha-
nized cavalry army regiment, a motorized infantry battalion, an infantry battalion,
three engineer battalions, an engineer group, and three field artillery groups. The
Peruvian Army is equipped with 386 tanks (90 T-54/T-55 and 110 AMX-13), 105
reconnaissance vehicles, over 276 armored personnel carriers, over 1,000 artillery
pieces, 12 transport and 10 utility aircraft, 47 support and 4 utility helicopters, and
262 air defense guns. Peru’s army also has 188,000 men and women in reserves.42
The Peruvian Navy has 25,000 personnel, including 1,000 in the coast guard.
It is organized into three commands, responsible for the Pacific coast, the Lake

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  397

Titicaca, and the Amazon River area. Peru’s navy is armed with six tactical subma-
rines, a cruiser, six frigates, thirteen patrol and coastal combatants, four amphibious
vessels, and nine logistics and support craft. Naval aviation numbers over 800 per-
sonnel and has one combat capable aircraft. Peruvian Marines number 4,000 and
include one marine brigade, a jungle infantry battalion, two independent infantry
battalions, one infantry group, and a commando group.43
The Peruvian Air Force totals 15,000 personnel and is organizationally divided
into five regions: North, Lima, South, Central, and Amazon. The Peruvian Air Force
has eighty-nine combat-capable aircraft, including eighteen MIG-29s, five MK 58
Canberras, twelve A-37s, twelve M-2000s, ten SU-25s, and over thirty SU-17s in
different versions. Moreover, it has three reconnaissance MIG-25 aircraft and eighty-
nine transport planes. The helicopter fleet includes sixteen attack choppers (Mi-24),
twenty-three support (8 Mi-17 and 15 Mi-8), fifty-two utility, and eighteen train-
ing helicopters.44 Peruvian paramilitary forces are comprised mainly of the national
police, which numbers 77,000 personnel.45 A key modernization event for Peru’s
armed forces in recent time was its 2005 order of two Italian Lupo-class frigates.

Chile
The Chilean armed forces are composed of army (Ejército), navy (Armada, including
naval air, Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine Directorate, and marine corps),
air force (Fuerza Aérea), and Carabineros (uniformed, militarized police). Interest-
ingly, the so-called investigations police (Policía de Investigaciones, a nouniformed
police force) is also responsible to the Ministry of Defense. All branches are com-
manded by the president via a civilian defense minister.
The Chilean armed forces total nearly 117,000 active duty personnel with the
army comprising 47,700, the navy nearly 19,500, the air force 10,300, and Cara-
bineros 38,000. Army reserves are estimated at 50,000. Nearly half (21,000) of the
Chilean Army are conscripts serving one-year terms, although as of 2005, Chil-
ean armed forces are heading towards a fully voluntary service. Chile’s army is
organized into six military regions in three theaters of operations (North, Center,
South). It has six army divisions, comprising fifteen reinforced regiments (i.e., with
diverse subunits, capable of undertaking diverse missions, a result of the reform
and modernization process of the Chilean Army), three armored cavalry regiments,
eight mechanized, motorized, and mountain regiments, one engineer regiment,
two artillery regiments, and two telecommunications regiments.46 They are armed
with 260 tanks, 157 reconnaissance vehicles, nearly 1,100 armored personnel car-
riers, over 600 artillery pieces, 30 transport, logistics, and training aircraft, 40
helicopters, 67 surface-to-air systems, and 60 air defense guns.47
The Chilean Navy is divided into four naval zones, with headquarters located
in Valparaiso, Talcahuano, Punta Arenas, and Iquique. The Chilean Navy is armed
with four tactical submarines, two destroyers, six frigates, twenty-five patrol and

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 398  n  Handbook of Military Administration

coastal vessels, five amphibious vessels, and twelve logistics and support craft. Naval
aviation counts six hundred personnel, six combat capable aircraft, and seventeen
helicopters. Marines count thirty-five hundred.48
The Chilean Air Force is organized into five air brigades, comprising twenty-
one groups (eleven aviation groups, four antiair defense groups, five telecommuni-
cations and aerial detection groups, and an Antarctic exploration group).49 The air
force possesses eighty-seven combat-capable aircraft, including, among others: eigh-
teen F-5s, eighteen A-37s, six F-16Cs, four F-16Ds, thirteen Mirage 50s, and sixteen
Mirage 5s. It also has eighty-four training aircraft and fourteen helicopters.50
Carabineros are organized into 13 zones, 39 districts, and 174 commissariats.
Carabineros possess about twenty armored personnel carriers, an estimated fifteen
helicopters, and a small quantity of transport aircraft.51
The Chilean military is without question among the most professional and
best-trained armed forces in Latin America. It is highly regarded by other coun-
tries’ military administrations and has proven itself historically. The Chilean armed
forces are also among the best-equipped in the region, making sure to constantly
modernize their weapons. To that end, the Chilean Navy in 1998 ordered two
Scorpene-class submarines from France, one of which has already been delivered
while the second was due in late 2006 or early 2007. Two Karel Doorman-class
frigates were ordered in 2004 from Holland and their delivery is expected to be
completed by 2007, while two Dutch Van Heemskerck-class frigates were expected
by mid-2006. Three British frigates are expected to be delivered by 2008. More-
over, in 2002 the Chilean Air Force ordered ten F-16C/Ds from the United States
and all of them were to be delivered by the end of 2006. Additional eighteen F-
16A/B Block 15 aircraft were ordered in 2006 in Holland with the delivery date
set for 2007. The Chilean Army in 2006 ordered a hundred German Leopard 2A3
main battle tanks.52 Moreover, six to eight Bell 412 helicopters are to be delivered
in the near future.
The Chilean military remains active in international peace and aid operations,
with present deployments to five locations, with the largest contingent (close to
five hundred fifty) presently on a United Nations mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH).
With the continued levels of professionalism, training, and modernization, Chile’s
armed forces are certain to retain the prestige they enjoy of being among the top
military forces in the region and even globally.

Argentina
The Argentine armed forces are composed of army (Ejército), navy (Armada,
including Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry), and air force (Fuerza Aérea) They
are responsible to the Ministry of Defense (Ministerio de Defensa), while the civilian
defense minister is responsible to the president of the republic.

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  399

The Argentine armed forces total over 71,400 active duty personnel. The para-
military forces include gendarmerie (18,000) and coast guard (13,240).53 The
Argentine Army includes 41,400 personnel. It has twelve functional commands
(communications, health, planning, education and doctrine, arsenals, engineering,
etc.).54 It is organized into three corps, each with its own headquarters. The army’s
core is composed of two armored brigades, four mechanized infantry brigades,
three mountain infantry brigades, and an airborne brigade.55 Main army equip-
ment includes 350 tanks, 74 reconnaissance vehicles, over 500 armored person-
nel carriers, 1,700 artillery pieces, 48 surface-to-air systems, 226 air defense guns,
nearly 100 helicopters, and approximately 45 transport, training, and logistics
aircraft.56
Argentina’s navy totals 17,500 personnel. It is centered around three head-
quarters, including Atlantic (Mar del Plata), Center (Puerto Belgrano), and South
(Ushuaio). The Argentine Navy is equipped with three tactical submarines, five
destroyers, nine frigates, sixteen patrol vessels, two mine warfare ships, twenty
amphibious craft, and fourteen logistics and support vessels. Naval aviation has
personnel of two thousand, with eleven combat-capable aircraft. The Argentinean
marine force counts two thousand people, with the principal combat force of four
marine infantry battalions.57
The Argentinean Air Force numbers 12,500 personnel and is organized into
four functional commands (air operations, personnel, air regions, and logistics),
which supervise and coordinate the activities of eight air force brigades. The air
force has about one hundred eight combat-capable aircraft in the Air Operations
Command (including thirteen Mirage EA/DAs, thirty-four A-4s, nineteen Nesh-
ers, seven Mirage 5s, thirty-five IA-58 Pucaras), and eighty-three training aircraft
in the Personnel Command.58
The Argentine military was at the rudder of state politics for considerable periods
of time in the country’s history. Military rule ended in 1982 with the failed attempt
to militarily seize the Falkland Islands from Britain, which was the nail to the mili-
tary rule’s coffin. Since then, the Argentinean armed forces have undergone a major
mentality transformation and, similar to most other military establishments of the
Southern Cone, became a force serving civilian authorities in a democratic state.
Recently, judicial moves have been made to reopen Argentina’s dictatorial past and
possibly try some of those military officers responsible for human rights violations.59
Argentina was the only Latin American state to participate in the Gulf War of
1991. In January 1998, the U.S. government recognized close ties with Argentina,
designating it as a major non-NATO ally. The Argentinean military was supportive
of governmental efforts at nonproliferation and regional stability in the Southern
Cone, which helped smooth and considerably improve relations with Brazil and
Chile, relations historically filled with suspicion and lack of trust.
Overall, the Argentine military is increasingly well-organized and undergoing
transformation into a light, but rapidly responding force, which is a part of the so-
called “Plan 2000.” In 2005, Argentina ordered an Ouragan-class French landing

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 400  n  Handbook of Military Administration

platform, which is to be delivered in 2007. The first such platform was delivered
in 2005.60 Argentina deployed military units internationally to European Union,
United Nations, and NATO operations, with the largest contingents presently in
Haiti, Cyprus, and former Yugoslav republics.

Central America
Central America, understood here as comprising the states between Mexico’s
southern frontier and Colombia’s northern border, includes seven countries: Belize,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. Their
combined population is just over 40 million people, with combined territory slightly
less than twice the size of Colorado. All of their military forces combined number
close to 72,000.61 Out of the seven countries, two, Costa Rica and Panama, do not
maintain formal military armed forces, but paramilitary organizations. In the case
of Costa Rica, there are 8,400 men and women serving in the Civil Guard (4,400),
Border Security Police (2,000), and Rural Guard (2,000).62 Panama’s paramilitary
force is constituted by the National Police Force, numbering 11,800.63 Thus, Cen-
tral America’s national armed forces taken together with the paramilitary forces
of Costa Rica and Panama number about 92,000.64 As with the diversity in other
realms in Latin America, the differences between national troop levels among Cen-
tral American countries are considerable, with the most numerous force of over
29,000 in Guatemala, the smallest one of over 1,000 in Belize, and with no formal
military in previously mentioned Costa Rica and Panama.
It is important to emphasize, however, that there is no de facto functioning
organization or institution of common defense of Central American states, so the
combined figures here serve only as a demonstration of relatively low levels of mili-
tary strength of the individual member states, rather than as an indication of a
combined strength of the region. However, there are ideas of creating what might
become the basis of a more common regional defense structures. One of them was
the meeting of all seven countries’ defense ministers in Miami in October 2005 to
discuss the possibility of creating one regional military headquarters and starting a
joint counternarcotics battalion in addition to holding joint exercises, more coordi-
nated multinational operations, and peace missions.65
As always, troop levels and armaments in the region are a function of the present
geopolitical situation, internal and foreign policies of national governments, and,
often most importantly, budgetary capabilities. Overall, presently Central America
is fairly free of international tensions and internal conflicts. Civil wars that used to
devastate the region during the Cold War, with the exception of Costa Rica, are
now a part of history. New security problems are primarily focused around drug
trafficking and organized crime activities, which are more pronounced in some
countries than in others. The fact is that Central America is a logical path from
South America’s coca fields to the primary drug market in the United States.

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  401

Standing out on the map of nonstate security threats in the region is the increased
activity of a predominantly Salvadoran mob, known as Mara Salvatrucha or Mara
13 (also called “MS” or “MS-13”). The organization was started in the 1980s as a
gang in Los Angeles, California, but has spread to the majority of U.S. states, El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and possibly other Central American nations. It
is involved in illegal migrants trafficking, drug running, and weapons smuggling.
So far, however, there are no indications of military involvement in combating that
threat. It is a possibility, though, if national police forces themselves become unable
to root out this rising threat to the economic and political stability of the region.

The Caribbean Basin

Island nations of the Caribbean basin are predominantly states with relatively tiny
populations, economies, and security forces. It is sufficient to mention that the
Caribbean states’ security personnel is mostly counted not in tens of thousands,
but in thousands and, frequently, hundreds. For instance, Jamaica maintains 2,830
in its Defense Forces (its 2005 defense budget was $57.5 million), Trinidad and
Tobago has 2,700 personnel in its army and navy (its 2005 defense budget was
$32 million), the Bahamas maintains 860 troops in the Royal Bahamian Defense
Force (with a 2005 defense budget at $32 million), Barbados has 610 army and navy
members (with a 2005 defense budget at $14 million), and Antigua and Barbuda
maintain 170 members in their army and navy (with a 2005 defense budget at $4.8
million).66 Clearly, these are miniscule numbers when compared with some other
Latin American nations, not to mention certain European or U.S. armed forces,
and for that reason they should be treated more as forces responsible for the main-
tenance of internal security and order, since their potential to engage in aggressive
international combat operations is very low. However, on the Caribbean landscape
of armed forces, two island states stand out: Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
Cuba maintains armed forces totaling 49,000, divided into army, navy, and
air force. Cuba’s paramilitary forces number 26,500 (they include 20,000 state
security and 6,500 border guards), while the relatively considerable reserve force is
estimated at 120,000.67 Moreover, the so-called Territorial Militia is estimated at
1 million reservists.68
The Cuban Army is composed of combat and support units (organized into bri-
gades, regiments, and battalions), which are under direct command of the central
General Staff. Other units respond to the respective Regional Military Commands.
Cuba’s territory is slightly smaller than that of Pennsylvania, with a population
of over 11 million people. It is, in the overall Latin American context, a relatively
small country territorially, but maintaining a relatively sizable armed force, which
is dictated by Cuba’s political situation and lack of formal diplomatic relations with
the United States. Since the fall of the Fulgencio Batista regime and communist
takeover in 1959, Cuba has remained under the communist regime, led by Fidel

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 402  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Castro, and presently is among the world’s few remaining bastions of communism.
During the Cold War, Cuba became the epicenter of international events in 1962
as a result of the so-called “Cuban Missile Crisis.” In 2005, Cuba’s defense expen-
ditures were estimated to reach $1.4 billion.69
The Cuban Army consists of one frontier brigade, up to five armored brigades,
nine mechanized infantry brigades, one airborne brigade, one air defense artillery
regiment, and one surface-to-air missile regiment. It is armed with mostly old,
Soviet-made equipment, which includes 900 tanks (T-34s, T-54s, T-55s, T-62s, and
some PT-76s), 700 armored personnel carriers (all of them BTR in various versions),
over 1,715 artillery pieces, 300 surface-to-air missile systems, and 400 air-defense
guns. The Cuban Navy numbers 3,000 personnel and is structurally divided into
Western and Eastern Commands. It is armed with five patrol and coastal combat
vessels, five mine warfare craft, and a logistics and support vessel. The Cuban Navy
also includes the so-called Naval Infantry, composed of two amphibious assault bat-
talions. Cuba’s air force numbers 8,000 personnel and is armed with 127 combat-
capable aircraft, but only 25 of them are believed to be operational. The key fighting
aircraft include three MIG-29s, ten MIG-23s, and eight MIG-21s. Additionally,
there are sixty-three transport aircraft, all of them old, Soviet-made (e.g., AN-2,
AN-26, IL-62, TU-154). The Cuban Air Force also possesses close to forty attack
choppers (Mi-24) and eighty-five support helicopters (Mi-8).70
Overall, Cuban military equipment is old and outdated and seriously suffering
from the lack of repair parts. The Soviet Union, Cuba’s primary weapons provider
during the Cold War, basically cut off all military support at the time of its collapse
in 1991. Since that time, the Cuban military has seen continuous degradation of its
equipment and, by default, of its fighting capabilities. Thus, although the Cuban
armed forces are comparatively numerous and with significant reserves, their com-
bat capability on the modern battlefield is very low.
The Dominican Republic maintains 24,500 troops, divided into army, navy, and
air force. National Police of 15,000 constitutes its paramilitary force. The country’s
territory is slightly more than twice the size of New Hampshire and its population a
little over 9 million people. Its 2005 gross domestic product (GDP) was $18.15 bil-
lion (in official exchange rate), while its 2005 defense expenditures reached slightly
over $190 million.71
The Dominican Army numbers 15,000 personnel organized into three Defense
Zones and including:

n an armored battalion
n six infantry brigades
n one special forces battalion
n one mountain infantry battalion
n one artillery battalion
n one engineering battalion
n one Presidential Guard battalion

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 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  403

The Dominican Republic’s army is equipped with twelve M-41 light tanks,
twenty-eight armored personnel carriers, and fifty-six artillery pieces. Interestingly,
there is a separate Airborne Cavalry Squadron equipped with forty-four helicop-
ters. The Dominican Navy totals four thousand personnel and includes a marine
unit and a SEAL unit. Its primary equipment includes seventeen patrol and coastal
combatants, and four logistics and support vessels. An estimated fifty-five hundred
men and women serve in the Dominican Air Force, which is tasked mainly with
search-and-rescue (SAR), medical evacuation (Medevac), and transport missions.
To that end, it is equipped with four transport aircraft (including 3 CASA 212-
400s), seven training planes (T-35 Pillans), and fourteen utility helicopters.72

Conclusion
This overview of the military organizations of Latin America serves as an indica-
tion of a significant variety of military potentials and tasks assigned to the region’s
national armed forces. Clearly, modernization levels and armaments strengths are
mostly a function of a given country’s economic performance, its political relations
with other countries of the region, and the developments planned for the near
future.
The most important lesson from present-day Latin America is that its armed
forces have, by and large, been coming closer toward becoming a tool of democratic
governments and are often used to maintain peace in the region and in faraway
parts of the world. This orientation provides the armed forces of many Latin Ameri-
can states with noble goals and a new sense of mission, which helps them move
away from the infamous interest in domestic politics. Peacekeeping operations have
also helped in moving some of the former adversaries (e.g., Chile and Argentina) all
the way from the position of a dangerous arms race towards joint operations. Such a
course of events is a great way of enhancing regional peace and stability, in addition
to increasing international trust and levels of transparency in military affairs.
Related to these changes have been administrative reforms within the mili-
tary establishments of Latin American states. Most of them, although not all, have
established civilian command and control as a permanent feature of their political
systems and as an expression of democratic governance. The effectiveness of such
control still is questioned in a number of cases, but gradual changes in mentality
have been taking place. Transparency levels have been increasing and public insight
into the operations of national armed forces in some countries is considerable, while
in others it is slowly rising.
Nevertheless, critics rightfully emphasize that some military officers still man-
age significant economic resources in a number of countries, while former coup
plotters operate on political scenes feeding on populist rhetoric. It is true that many
military establishments in Latin America see themselves not merely as parts of the
overall state administrations of ruling governments, but almost as their partners.

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 404  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Some observers point out that even in the most democratic of Latin American
states, certain unwritten agreements are still in place between civil and military
authorities, agreements based on the principle of not intervening into the other’s
sphere of competences. It is often the result of the lack of formal settlements of
civil–military relations, which, in turn, is a legacy of negotiated and difficult tran-
sitions to democracy. After all, changing the mentality and the structure from
guarding the governments against their nations to actually serving their nations
is a complex and time-consuming process. It must be understood that procedural
reforms may not be able to revolutionarily change existing reality from one day to
another and that homegrown models of democracy evolve over a period of time.
In most cases, generational changes are necessary to mark an end of a particular
era. Mentality-wise, such changes may be compared to the security analysts who
spent most of their lives analyzing Cold War threats and now are simply unable
to comprehend the new complexity of the post-Cold War environment. Similarly,
those who spent most of their lives serving in militaries that were seen as the pillar
of governmental security may not be able to understand the logic of democracy. But
these issues, although highly important, are topics for a different work.

References
1. See Latin America’s military soul searching. BBC, March 8, 2001. Retrieved
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1208958.stm
2. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, http://www.sedena.gob.mx; Secretaría de Marina
– Armada de Mexico, http://www.semar.gob.mx
3. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, http://www.sedena.gob.mx
4. See C. Langton, ed., “Caribbean and Latin America.” In Military Balance 2006
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006), chap. 7, 332–334.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. DeShazo, P., The Impact on Latin America of the American Servicemembers’ Protec-
tion Act. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee On Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, March 8, 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.senate.gov/ ~foreign/testimony/2006 /DeShazoTestimony060308.pdf
9. Ibid.
10. “The Mexican Border.” Economist, April 7, 2005; The US-Mexico Border. Migra-
tion Policy Institute. Retrieved June 1, 2006 from http://www.migrationinforma-
tion.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=407
11. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America.”
12. Ibid.
13. Ejercito Nacional de Colombia, http://www.ejercito.mil.co/
14. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America.”
15. Ibid.

DK3629.indb 404 11/2/07 3:15:44 PM

 Overview of Latin America’s Military Administrations  n  405

16. “Colombia and its Neighbours: The Tentacles of Instability.” Latin America, No. 3
(April 8), International Crisis Group, Bogota/Brussels, April 8, 2003. Retrieved
from http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/b04d4a28fce25d0685256d02006f55ec?
OpenDocument
17. CIA World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006).
18. U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet of the Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs.
March 14, 2001. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042.htm
19. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America.”
20. Ejercito Venezolano, http://www.ejercito.mil.ve
21. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America.”
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Aviacion Militar Venezolana–Grupos Aereos, http://www.aviacion.mil.ve/modules/
content/index.php?id=88
25. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America.”
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. See “Navantia Begins Work on 8 Venezuelan Patrol Boats.” Defense Industry Daily,
June 1, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/06/navan-
tia-begins-work-on-8-venezuelan-patrol-boats/index.php; “Venezuela Signs $2B
Arms Contract With Spanish Firms.” Defense Industry Daily, December 1, 2005.
Retrieved from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/12/venezuela-signs-2b-
arms-contract-with-spanish-firms-updated/index.php
31. See “Venezuela to Get Russian Aircraft.” BBC News, June 15, 2006. Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5082006.stm
32. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 314–317.
33. Organizações Militares por Estados do Brasil, http://www.exercito.gov.br/06OMs/
letraA.htm
34. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 314–317.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Marinha do Brasil–Nossros Navios, https://www.mar.mil.br/menu_h/navios/menu_
navios.htm
38. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 314–317.
39. Ibid.
40. Ejercito Peruano, http://www.ejercito.mil.pe; Marina de Guerra del Peru, http://
www.marina.mil.pe; Fuerza Aerea del Peru, http://www.fap.mil.pe/default1.asp;
Ministerio de Defensa del Peru, http://www.mindef.gob.pe/index.htm
41. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America” 337–339.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ejercito de Chile, http://www.ejercito.cl/

DK3629.indb 405 11/2/07 3:15:44 PM

 406  n  Handbook of Military Administration

47. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 317–320.

48. Ibid.
49. Fuerza Aerea de Chile–brigadas, http://www.fach.cl/quienes/quienes.htm
50. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 317–320.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ejercito Argentino, http://www.ejercito.mil.ar
55. Ibid.
56. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 309–312.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. See “Justice or Politics?” Economist, June 23, 2005.
60. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” 309–312.
61. Ibid., chap. 7.
62. Ibid., 322.
63. Ibid., 335.
64. Ibid., chap. 7.
65. “Rumsfeld, Central American Ministers Discuss Regional Ops.” American Forces
Information Service. October 13, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Oct2005/20051013_3036.html
66. Langton, “Caribbean and Latin America,” chap. 7.
67. Ibid., 322–324
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 324.
72. Ibid.

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co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1208958.stm
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Marinha do Brasil–Nossros Navios. Retrieved from https://www.mar.mil.br/menu_h/
navios/menu_navios.htm
Marinha Naval. Retrieved from https://www.mar.mil.br/

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 408  n  Handbook of Military Administration

The Mexican border. 2005. Economist, April 7. Retrieved from http://www.economist.

com
Ministerio da Defesa. Retrieved from at: https://www.defesa.gov.br/
Ministerio de Defensa de la Republica Argentina. Retrieved from http://www.mindef.gov.
ar/portada.htm
Ministerio de Defensa del Peru. Retrieved from http://www.mindef.gob.pe/index.htm
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile. Retrieved from http://www.defensa.cl/
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Retrieved from http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/
Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional de Venezuela. Retrieved from http://www.mindefensa.
gov.ve/
Navantia begins work on 8 Venezuelan patrol boats. 2006. Defense Industry Daily, June
1. Retrieved from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/06/navantia-begins-
work-on-8-venezuelan-patrol-boats/index.php
Organizações Militares por Estados do Brasil. Retrieved from http://www.exercito.gov.
br/06OMs/letraA.htm
Policia de Investigaciones de Chile. Retrieved from http://www.investigaciones.cl/
Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional–Division Aerea. Retrieved from http://www.sedena.
gob.mx/index4.html
Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional–Regiones Militares. Retrieved from http://www.sedena.
gob.mx/index4.html
Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional. Retrieved from http://www.sedena.gob.mx/index4.html
Secretaría de Marina–Armada de Mexico. Retrieved from http://www.semar.gob.mx/ppal.htm
Secretaria de Marina. Retrieved from http://www.semar.gob.mx/
A spectre stalks the Americas. 2005. Economist, February 24. Retrieved from http://www.
economist.com
United Nations. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/facts.
html
U.S. Department of State. 2001. Fact Sheet of the Bureau of Western Hemispheric Affairs.
Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042.htm
The US-Mexico Border. 2006. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved
from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=407
Venezuela to get Russian aircraft. 2006. BBC News, June 15. Retrieved from http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5082006.stm
Venezuela signs $2B arms contract with Spanish firms. 2005. Defense Industry Daily, Decem-
ber 1. Retrieved from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/12/venezuela- signs-
2b-arms-contract-with-spanish-firms-updated/index.php

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 Chapter 19

National Defense:
People’s Republic
of China

Hans Stockton

Introduction
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
on the cusp of revolutionary changes in its global and regional strategic goals and
capabilities. Although strategic modernization is several decades away from near-
parity with powers such as the United States, China’s party and military leaders
have already begun the process of developing new defense and foreign policy para-
digms. China’s goal is to become the premier regional military power by 2015 and
to be a global military power by 2050. In order for these goals to reach fruition, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has aggressively pursued a program of far-reach-
ing reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since the 1990s.
The foreword of China’s 2004 defense white paper states early on that (1) Chi-
na’s continued national prosperity requires a peaceful international environment,
and (2) the country is committed to a foreign policy of peace and a defensive mili-
tary policy. In order to accomplish this, the foundation of the CCP exercise of state
power is “to secure a coordinated development of national defense and the economy,
and to build modernized, regularized and revolutionary armed forces to keep the
country safe” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of

409

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 410  n  Handbook of Military Administration

China, 2004; hereafter IOSC). The modernization of the PLA long took a backseat
to China’s economic modernization, but the last decade has witnessed a marked
readjustment in doctrine and expenditures in order to rapidly move the PLA into
the era of high-technology warfare. As stated in the 2004 defense white paper, “The
role played by military power in safeguarding national security is assuming greater
prominence” (IOSC, 2004, 2).
Modernization of the PLA is viewed as a comprehensive program of reform
within the group. While the next defense paradigm is debated at the highest ech-
elons of the CCP and PLA, the PLA aggressively seeks to purchase military tech-
nologies abroad, reform China’s own domestic defense industry, and increase the
education levels of officers and troops. Key knowledge gaps exist and were recog-
nized in the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2002 Annual Report on the Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China. Three primary gaps identified were (1) the
exact quantity and capabilities of PRC military power juxtaposed to Taiwan; (2)
“intangible PRC capabilities,” such as training, command and control, doctrine,
and special operations; and (3) the ability to quantitatively assess how moderniza-
tion of the PLA will affect “overall military competition” (U.S. Department of
State, 2002 Annual Report, 2; hereafter DOS, 2002). The period of reform has
been brief and complete information is often difficult to obtain, yet analysts fre-
quently note that China’s military ascendance is gaining ground.
This chapter will address several key issues that will continue to influence the
PRC’s rise to regional and, perhaps, global military power. After an initial overview,
this chapter will address China’s military doctrine, introduce the PLA’s force struc-
ture and recent changes, military spending, command structure, and civil–military
relations in the PRC.

Overview
The PRC pursues a national development strategy based upon finding a balance
between “comprehensive national power” (CNP) and a “strategic configuration of
power” (SCP). Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the SCP, related to foreign
and security policy, was guided by Deng’s “24 Character Strategy.” This strategy
called for China to “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly;
hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and
never claim leadership” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005,11). The “24 Character
Strategy” was later amended with the phrase, “make some contributions” (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2005, 11). Clearly, overarching strategy calls for China to
build up its military capabilities quietly, avoid being drawn into conflicts or lead-
ership positions too early, and wait for a time when the PRC is more on par with
major military powers prior to becoming more active and outward oriented.
National military strategy since the 1970s has been further guided by the doc-
trine of “active defense,” but there is some confusion as to the meaning of the term.

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 National Defense: China  n  411

In its annual report to the U.S. Congress, the Office of the Secretary of State cites
a PLA text, “The Study of Campaigns” published in 2000. “While strategically
the guideline is active defense … the emphasis is placed on taking the initiative in
active offense. Only in this way, the strategic objective of active defense can be real-
ized” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, 15). In 1998, Vice Chair of China’s Cen-
tral Military Commission (CMC) and Minister of National Defense, Chi Haotien,
remarked that active defense was principled upon “gaining mastery by striking
only after the enemy has struck … rather than a passive defense of suffering beat-
ings” (Liu and Jingshi, 1998). Under the new “Revolution in Military Affairs with
Chinese Characteristics,” information warfare calls for a “positive offense” in which
conventional forces must rely on more aggressive information warfare prior to the
initiation of armed hostilities.
Since the illustration of the might of high-tech weaponry and airpower in the
Persian Gulf War and the Balkans Conflict, the PRC has devoted increasing atten-
tion to speeding up its own adjustment to the revolution in military affairs (RMA).
In its 2004 defense white paper, the PRC acknowledges that the “forms of war are
undergoing changes from mechanization to informationalization” and that “infor-
mationalization has become the key factor in enhancing the war fighting capability
of the armed forces” (IOSC, 2004). As is typical, however, the Chinese have local-
ized the broader meaning of RMA to that of “RMA with Chinese characteristics”
to account for China’s inability to immediately capture the financial, logistical, and
technological requirements of fully accommodating RMA.
Guided by the doctrines of “active defense” and “Revolution in Military Affairs
with Chinese Characteristics,” the expressed goals of China’s national defense in
2004 are
1. To stop separation and promote reunification, guard against and resist
aggression, and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mari-
time rights and interests.
2. To safeguard the interests of national development, promote economic and
social development in an all-round, coordinated and sustainable way, and
steadily increase the overall national strength.
3. To modernize China’s national defense in line with both the national conditions of
China and the trend of military development in the world by adhering to the pol-
icy of coordinating military and economic development and improving the oper-
ational capabilities of self-defense under the conditions of informationalization.
4. To safeguard the political, economic, and cultural rights and interests of the
Chinese people, crack down on criminal activities of all sorts, and maintain
public order and social stability.
5. To pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and adhere to the new
security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coor-
dination with a view to securing a long-term and favorable international and
surrounding environment. (IOSC, 2004)

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Clearly, the most immediate concern for the CCP and PLA is the preven-
tion of Taiwan’s permanent political separation from the mainland. China’s mili-
tary modernization and military procurement have been heavily dedicated to (1)
isolating Taiwan in case of a conflict; (2) quickly destroying Taiwan’s stand-off
capability and invading if necessary; and (3) creating stand-off capabilities to
discourage or prevent effective U.S. military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
While cross-strait tensions escalated in the last years of former President Lee
Teng-hui’s rule, the election of the pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian
in 2000 sparked constant tension between Beijing and Taipei. This tension and
China’s concern over Chen’s perceived “splittism” have been highlighted in Chi-
na’s defense white papers since 2000. As Taiwan’s security guarantor, the United
States has remained highly sensitive to moves on either side of the strait that
would spark armed conflict.
China has built up various military resources across from or near Taiwan. Such
items include over six hundred short-range ballistic missiles, attack fighters, and
a concentration of surface ships, submarines, and amphibious craft. Additionally,
the PLA conducts periodic, large-scale military exercises modeled upon a conflict
with Taiwan. These exercises are often near Taiwan. Although China has refused
to renounce the use of force to reunify Taiwan, a variety of confidence-building
measures with the United States have assuaged U.S. fears of an imminent military
conflict.
The reunification of Taiwan with mainland China is an historic obligation of
the CCP and much of the PLA’s modernization has been devoted to equipping
and training the PLA to be prepared to force a reunification if necessary. Should
such a circumstance arise, the United States may very well be placed in a position
to intervene. China’s modernization program must then take into account the
possibility of coming into conflict with the United States. Thus, China’s mod-
ernization is a dual process of preparing for retaking Taiwan while also develop-
ing the stand-off capabilities that may be necessary to prevent an effective U.S.
intervention.
In February 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense released its latest Qua-
drennial Defense Review. This document identifies China as having the “greatest
potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military
technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent
U.S. counter strategies” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, 29). This report was
not well received in China. An item published in the People’s Liberation Daily days
after the release of the report quoted PLA Major Peng Guangqian as saying, “The
fabrication of ‘foreign threats’ by the United States reflected the Pentagon’s deep-
rooted style of ‘making enemies’ and that its real intention is to secure additional
defense funds to help its arms industry fish for more profits” (People’s Liberation
Daily, 2006b).

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 National Defense: China  n  413

Military Doctrine
China’s military doctrine has emerged from the competition of three primary doc-
trinal schools. During Mao’s leadership, the PLA was prepared to fight a “People’s
War.” The People’s War school holds prominence with the oldest PLA cadre. Blasko
wrote in 1999 that the People’s War school was composed of “the vast majority of
the PLA today” (Blasko, 1999, 260). However, Ji writes in 2002 that “the majority
of PLA generals belong to the school of hi-tech warfare” or “fighting future wars
under hi-tech conditions” (Ji, 2002). By the turn of the century, approximately 80
percent of China’s ground, navy, and air forces were equipped to fight a People’s War
(Blasko, 1999, 260). The People’s War school has relied upon the experiences of the
United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to bolster the utility
of this strategy against a numerically inferior, yet better equipped aggressor.
The conflict scenario would involve an invasion by a major power such as the
United States, Japan, and, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union. The envisioned
scenario was one in which a technologically superior enemy would penetrate
quickly into China, although due to a long supply chain, would be unable to pen-
etrate deeply. The Chinese would be prepared to quickly move the political capital
and military production facilities. Millions of Chinese militia members would be
armed and sent against the invading forces to bog down the enemy and buy time.
A long and protracted war would result from China’s inability to quickly defeat an
invader, but this would serve the ends of the Chinese leadership, as such wars of
attrition would increasingly become costly and unpopular abroad.
Under Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, doctrine began to move away from a
major war with probable use of nuclear weapons to one more localized against a
nonsuperpower aggressor from within the region and possibly contain a nuclear
exchange. Deng felt that a major war fought against a major power was not immi-
nent and called for preparation against a “local, limited” war (Finkelstein, 1999,
127). As such, China would seek a quick outcome through the use of rapid reaction
forces (Pillsbury, 1999, 112).
Operation Desert Storm highlighted the change (revolution) in military affairs
that new munitions, targeting, and delivery technologies were introducing. In
1993, Jiang Zemin, in his capacity as chairman of the Military Affairs Commis-
sion, amended the Local War doctrine with the addition of “high-tech conditions”
and instructed the PLA to meet a “new historical period” through appropriate
reform. Thus, “Local (or Limited) Wars under Modern High-Tech Conditions”
(LWUMHTC) initiated a major transformation in which emphasis began to shift
toward an expanded battle space, high-tech systems, rapid reaction, improving C4I
capabilities, and carrying out asymmetrical warfare.
Although active defense is the overall strategy, the asymmetrical approach calls
for gaining the initiative through a first strike. Once an enemy is revealed and
the massing of troops begins, the PLA should strike prior to receiving the first
blow. In contrast to the traditional approach calling for a strike after an attacker

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 414  n  Handbook of Military Administration

has committed himself, the asymmetrical approach allows for preemptive strikes.
Such strikes are intended to “deal a mortal blow, winning victory with one strike”
(Stokes, 1999, 9).
The third doctrinal school seeks to commit China’s military modernization
more fully to accommodating the RMA and is still the smallest group of theorists.
The steps that the CCP and PLA are taking to bring China in line with the RMA
are fairly straightforward and are evinced in the country’s technology acquisition,
domestic production, and resource allocation to the various branches of the PLA.
Steps to bring China in line with the RMA are laid out in the 2004 defense white
paper and begin with the adaptation of a “composite and leapfrog” approach to
acquiring technology that will allow for the “informationalization” of military
strategy. Second, the PLA is transitioning from mechanization to informational-
ization. Third, the PLA seeks to move away from emphasis on quantity (manpower
intensive) and build qualitatively superior (technology intensive) armed forces.
Fourth, restructuring and reform of the armed forces are intended to create more
efficiency, integration, and improved decision making. Fifth, the PLA reform and
training are to prepare for winning “local wars under conditions of informational-
ization” as well as for a “people’s war” scenario envisioning the invasion of China.
This aspect places emphasis on improving joint logistical support and officer edu-
cation. Finally, the PLA is to conduct military exchanges and cooperation under
conditions of nonalignment, nonconfrontation, and not directed against any par-
ticular international third party. Beijing’s negative reactions to U.S. annual defense
reports is largely driven by the fact that the United States has “singled” China out
as a strategic competitor to be countered despite China’s claims of noninterference
and nonexpansion.

The People’s Liberation Army

The People’s Liberation Army is composed of the army, air force (PLAAF), navy
(PLAN), and the 2nd Artillery Force (also known as the Strategic Missile Force).
Historically, due to the People’s War doctrine of defending against an invasion,
defense emphasis has been devoted to building a large land-based army. Given
China’s large population, size, and scarce resources to commit to defense industry
and technological development, this doctrine suited local conditions. This stance
began to change with China’s rising acknowledgment of the challenges presented
by the RMA movement and reinforced by events in the Persian Gulf and the air
campaign during the Balkans conflict.
The role of the armed forces is enumerated in the People’s Republic of China
Constitution in Chapter 1 (General Principles); Article 29 (Armed Forces). First,
“The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China belong to the people. Their
tasks are to strengthen national defense, resist aggression, defend the motherland,
safeguard the people’s peaceful labor, participate in national reconstruction, and

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 National Defense: China  n  415

work hard to serve the people.” Second, “The state strengthens the revolutioniza-
tion, modernization and regularization of the armed forces in order to increase
the national defense capability.” The current main tasks for the PLA are to (1)
increase modernization, (2) safeguard national security and unity, and (3) ensure
the smooth process of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way
(IOSC, 2004).

Command and Control

The Constitution of the PRC states that the armed forces are controlled by the Cen-
tral Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (CMC), as stipulated
in Chapter 3 (Structure of the State); Article 93 (The Central Military Commis-
sion). The CMC is composed of the chairman, vice chairmen, and members of the
CMC and individuals serve overlapping terms with the National People’s Congress
(NPC). The chairman is elected by and directly responsible to the NPC and the
Standing Committee of the NPC, as stipulated in Chapter 3; Section 1; Article
62:6. In reality, it is the Party Central Military Commission, not the state CMC
that exercises the “equivalent of national command authority over most aspects
of PLA operational, logistical, and support activities for war fighting and internal
security operations” (Krawitz, 2003, 3).
Falling under the party and NPC Central Military Commissions are the four
general headquarters. The General Staff Department (GSD) is the largest and most
influential of the general headquarters. With offices in Beijing, the GSD maintains
a mirror of its own bureaucratic chain in all military branches, military regions
and districts, and within the People’s Armed Police. The GSD is empowered with
overall command authority as “the command center of the army and the leading
organ for military work … [and] … the ‘nerves’ that control the action of units”
(Shambaugh, 2003, 128).
The General Political Department (GPD) is the primary organ responsible for
the political work of the armed forces and since the 1990s has become active in root-
ing out corruption and factionalism within the PLA. The GPD, in part, maintains
supervision and indoctrination through political commissars. Commissars tradition-
ally held dual decision-making powers with the unit military commander, although
in the post-Tiananmen period commanders have emerged as the preeminent deci-
sion makers (Shambaugh, 2003). The GPD also maintains records on all officers. As
such, the GPD has considerable influence on promotions and reassignment.
The General Logistics Department (GLD) is charged with securing the neces-
sary procurements an armed force needs, from clothing and medicine to weapons
and ordinance. The GLD is currently struggling to keep up with the overall mod-
ernization of China’s armed forces and has been the subject of numerous new regu-
lations and reorganizations. Some of the challenges faced by the GLD are building
a logistical support system capable of moving the PLA into greater independence

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 416  n  Handbook of Military Administration

from local resources, supporting joint operations, and standardizing and auto-
mating logistical services. Twice, since 2003, the GSD, GPD, GLD, and General
Armaments Department (GAD) have formed joint working groups to coordinate
inspections “of strict administration of the troops” (IOSC, 2004).
The GAD is the newest department, created in 1998. It is now responsible for
managing the defense industry with departments dedicated to functions such as
the research and production of armaments, equipment technology, and electronic
and information base. Conventional weapons testing, nuclear testing, and satellite
launches are also within the purview of the GAD.
The next link in the chain of command is found in the seven military regions
(MR) of the PLA, each exerting control over military districts (MD) and garrison
commands (GC). There are currently four levels of command, beginning with the
MR. Each MR is subdivided into military districts distinguished by province. Each
MD is further broken down into subdistricts at the county level and each subdis-
trict is divided into garrisons at the municipal level.
The Lanzhou Military Region is headquartered in Lanzhou, Gansu. The areas
of responsibility for this military region are Shaanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai prov-
inces, as well as Ningxia and Xinjiang autonomous regions. The Jinan Military
Region is headquartered in Jinan, Shandong. The areas of responsibility for the
Jinan military region are Shandong and Henan provinces. The Nanjing Military
Region is headquartered in Nanjing, Jiangsu and is responsible for Shanghai and
Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian provinces. The Guangzhou Military
Region, headquartered in Guangzhou, Guangdong, is responsible for Guangdong,
Hunan, Hubei, and Hainan provinces, Guangxi Autonomous Region, Hong Kong,
and Macao. Chengdu Military Region is headquartered in Chengdu, Sichuan. This
region’s responsibilities include Chongqing, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Sich-
uan, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces. Table 19.1 shows the group army strengths
as of approximately 2004.

Force Structure
The People’s Liberation Army is the largest armed force in the world, totaling
approximately 2.3 million personnel at the end of 2005. As reported in China’s
National Defense 2004, the distribution of personnel across the armed forces is the
PLA (64 percent), PLA Air Force (16 percent), PLA Navy (14 percent), and the 2nd
Artillery or Strategic Missile Force (6 percent) (Table 19.2).
Obtaining hard numbers for specific force structures is acknowledged as a dif-
ficult task due to a dearth of detailed reporting by the Chinese. Questions remain as
to the composition of a squad or the number of tanks in a platoon. Blasko (2000, 2)
writes that “though we may be able to see the green PLA forest, we have a difficult
time understanding the individual trees.” With regard to the PLAAF, Allen (2005,

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 National Defense: China  n  417

Table 19.1  PLA Group Army Force Structures 2004a

Shenyang Beijing Lanzhoub Jinan
Army groups 3 5 2 3
Armored
  Brigade 3 3 1 1
  Division 1 2 1 2
Motorized Infantry
  Brigade 6 7 3 2
  Division 5 4 5 2
Artillery
  Brigade 3 4 2 2
  Division 1 1 0 1
AAA
  Brigade 3 3 3 1
  Division 0 0 0 0
Army Aviation
  Group 1 2 1 1
  Regiment 0 0 1 0
Air Defense
  Brigade 1 2 0 2
Antitank
  Brigade 1 0 0 0
Infantry
  Brigade 0 0 1 0
Mechanized Infantry
  Brigade 0 0 0 3
  Division 0 0 0 1
Amphibious Mechanized
  Brigade 0 0 0 0
  Division 0 0 0 0
Amphibious Armored
  Brigade 0 0 0 0
  Division 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0
Nanjingc Guangzhou Chengdud

Army groups 3 2 2
Armored
  Brigade 0 1 2
  Division 2 1 0

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 418  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 19.1  PLA Group Army Force Structures 2004a (Continued)

Nanjingc Guangzhou Chengdud
Motorized Infantry
  Brigade 5 0 1
  Division 1 3 4
Artillery
  Brigade 2 1 2
  Division 1 1 1
AAA
  Brigade 1 1 3
  Division 0 0 0
Army Aviation
  Group 1 0 0
  Regiment 0 0 0
Air Defense
  Brigade 2 1 0
Antitank
  Brigade 0 0 0
Infantry
  Brigade 0 0 2
Mechanized Infantry
  Brigade 0 0 0
  Division 0 0 1
Amphibious Mechanized
  Brigade 0 0 0
  Division 1 1 0
Amphibious Armored
  Brigade 1 0 0
  Division 0 0 0
Other 1 0 1
a Except where noted, garrisons, units directly subordinate to the military region,
and provincial military district forces are not included in the above.
b Lanzhou has two army groups, but also does the Xinjiang Military District, for-

merly the Urumqi Military Region. The Xinjiang Military District enjoys greater
powers than provincial military districts.
c The Shanghai Garrison is included in addition to the three Nanjing Army

Groups.
d The Tibet Military District enjoys greater powers than normal provincial mili-

tary districts.
Source: Compiled from china defense today, “Ground Forces, Order of Battle,”
http://sinodefense.com/army/default.asp

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 National Defense: China  n  419

Table 19.2  PLA Force Structure 2004

Force Approximate Number Approximate Share (%)
PLA Army 1.41 million 64
2nd Artillery 130,000  6
PLA Navy 329,000 14
PLA Air Force 370,000 16
Source: China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council,
People’s Republic of China.

6) wonders about the number of hours pilots fly each year and the quality of their
training.
The PLA ground forces are the largest branch of China’s military and make up
over 60 percent of total PLA forces. Under the People’s War and “local war under
information conditions,” the PLA has not developed as a force for power projection,
but preparing for defense. The largest troop concentrations, by estimated size, are
found in the Beijing (capital defense), Shenyang (Manchuria), Nanjing (coastal/
Taiwan area), and Lanzhou (western borders) MRs. These deployments date back
to the Cold War period and have not changed a great deal since.
The PLA ground forces are structured into the following size units: group army
(commanded by a major general), division/brigade, regiment, battalion, company,
platoon, and squad. Functional units are divided into infantry, armored, artil-
lery, antiair, antichemical, communications, and engineering units, cartography,
electronic countermeasures, and army aviation. An expressed goal of the PLA is to
create at least one rapid reaction unit within each group army.
PLA units are armed with a mix of low-, medium-, and high-tech weaponry.
The majority of weaponry, however, is low tech and rather dated. Of approximately
ten thousand main battle tanks (MBT) most are the T-59 variety (based on Russian
T54s) and, while upgraded, have been in service for several decades. Newer vari-
ants are of Type 69 and 79, retrofitted for export. The T-62 and T-63 are smaller
versions of the T-59 designed as light and amphibious models, respectively. Newer
models of MBT are the Type 80, Type 85, Type 90, and Type 90-II. The Type 90,
at forty-eight tons, is equipped with modular composite armor, stabilized turret,
slaved targeting and gun, passive thermal imaging, and auto-loading, smooth bore
125 mm gun capable of firing armor piercing, high explosive, and high explosive
fragmentation rounds. The Type 90-II is upgraded with reactive armor panels, an
improved laser rangefinder, and increased mobility (Federation of American Scien-
tists, 2006). There are an additional 5,500 armored vehicles, 25,000 artillery guns
(towed and self-propelled), and multiple rocket launchers.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) is charged with maintaining maritime security and
sovereign control over territorial waters. The PLAN is divided into three fleet com-
mands (North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea) and headquartered in Beijing. The

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 420  n  Handbook of Military Administration

North Sea Fleet is headquartered in Qingdao (Shandong Province) and responsible

for the area south of the Yalu River to Jiangsu Province. This area corresponds
with the Beijing, Jinan, and Shenyang MRs. The East Sea Fleet is headquartered
in Ningbo and is responsible for an area south through Fujian Province. This cor-
responds with the Nanjing MR. The South Sea Fleet is headquartered in Zhanji-
ang (Guangdong Province) and is responsible for the South China Sea. All six of
China’s nuclear submarines are in the North Sea Fleet (Shambaugh, 2003, 165).
With the expansion of the battle space, the PLAN is increasingly expected to
project defensive operations farther from coastal defense and to building a stronger
amphibious assault capability. As such, the PLAN has experienced a gradual expan-
sion from a “brown” water (coast out to one hundred nautical miles) to a “green”
water (from one hundred nautical miles to the next major land mass) force. The
next step would be to develop a genuine “blue” water navy. China’s efforts to obtain
technology to construct an indigenous aircraft carrier have resulted in the 1985
purchase of the decommissioned Australian HMS Melbourne and former Soviet
carriers Minsk, Kiev, and Varyag in the late 1990s. China took delivery of two Rus-
sian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, with another two on order.
The PLAN possesses fifty-seven submarines (fifty-one diesel and six nuclear),
twenty-one destroyers, forty-three frigates, and fifty-one missile-equipped ships for
coastal defense (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005, 44). There are an estimated
twenty tank landing ships and twenty-three medium landing ships. The PLA Naval
Air Force (PLANAF) holds nine aviation divisions with each division containing
two or three aviation regiments.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is charged with protecting China’s airspace, yet in
order to meet the challenges and demands of informationalized warfare, has shifted
from territorial air defense to defensive and offensive projection capabilities. The
PLAAF operates under four operational and organizational levels: headquarters air
force, military region air force, air force corps/bases, and operational units. There
are eight operational branches: aviation, surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery,
airborne, radar, communications, electronic countermeasure, and meteorological.
The PLAAF consists of approximately thirty divisions with twenty-two fighter
divisions, three bomber divisions, three attack (ground attack) divisions, and two
airlift divisions. Between the PLAAF and PLANAF, there are approximately 2,600
combat aircraft (Department of Defense, 2005). Of these, approximately 1,500 are
fighters (J-6/MiG-19, 720 J-7/MiG-21, J-81, and J-11/Su-27SK). The PLAAF has
purchased over 120 Russian-built Sokhoi SU-27 and Su-30 fighters and is produc-
ing third-generation aircraft such as the J-10, J-11, and JH-7. There are an estimated
780 bombers and ground attack aircraft. Bombers consist principally of the H-5/Il-
28 (Beagle) and H-6/Tu-16 (Badger) varieties.
The PLAAF has increasingly focused on reducing the total number of aircraft
and creating a slightly smaller, yet more technologically equipped force. The largest
reductions have been in the oldest model fighter, the J-6, which entered produc-
tion in the early 1960s and continued phased reductions of the J-7, which entered

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 National Defense: China  n  421

production in the late 1960s. A goal is to strike a generational balance within the
fighter craft with third- and fourth-generation fighters (models entering production
in the 1990s and after) composing about 40 percent of the PLAAF fighters by the
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Shambaugh, 2003, 262).
The PLA Second Artillery Force is China’s strategic missile force. This force is
charged with deterring a nuclear strike, conducting nuclear counterstrikes, and ini-
tiating precision strikes with conventional missiles. The Second Artillery operates
as a service arm and is under the GSD and CMC. The Second Artillery headquar-
ters is in Qinghe and there are launch bases found in Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan,
Henan, Hunan, and Qinghai provinces.
The missile force of the Second Artillery is composed of short-, medium-, and
intercontinental-range missiles. The bulk of the force is composed of up to 730
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), all of which are in Fujian Province across
from Taiwan, with a range of 300 to 600 kilometers. China possesses approxi-
mately twenty-three medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with a range in the
neighborhood of 1,770 kilometers and up to forty-two intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) with ranges from 5,470 to 8,460 kilometers (U.S. Department of
Defense, 2006).
Having long relied upon a large army to offset technological deficiencies, Bei-
jing realized after the PRC’s border conflict with Vietnam in 1979 that a smaller,
better trained and equipped army would best serve China’s defense needs. Since
the mid-1980s, the size of the PLA has been decreased by over one million ground
troops. The most recent reduction occurred by the end of 2005.
In the same year, the PLA announced that its two-year troop reduction program
had accomplished a further downsizing of about 200,000 personnel, leaving a total
of about 2.3 million troops. Between 1980 and 1987, more than one million posi-
tions were cut, bringing the PLA forces to about 3.2 million. Another 200,000 troops
were cut by 1997. Further reductions were implemented after 1997, when the PLA
cut another half a million troops, bringing the total to about 2.5 million. In the three
years after 1997, the army was downsized by approximately 19 percent. This com-
pared to the smaller decreases in the navy (11.6 percent) and air force (11 percent).
According to a report in the PLA Daily, the most recent cuts hit the Army
the hardest, reducing its share of personnel to a historic low (Niu, 2006). Of the
200,000 reductions completed in 2005, about 170,000 personnel were officers.
This was necessitated by the PLA’s desire to “optimize the ratio between officers
and soldiers” (Nei, 2006).

China’s Defense Spending

While a great deal of secrecy complicates assessment of China’s military capabili-
ties, this shroud is perhaps greatest in the area of China’s military spending. As
Bitzinger (2000) writes, “Few areas of Chinese military studies actually have access

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 422  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Table 19.3  Defense Expenditures 1994 to 2004

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
RMB (10 millions) 934.9 1076.7 1207.5 1442.0 1694.4 1881.9 2100
USD (10 millions) 112.01   128.98   145.84   174.16   204.6   227.55   254
% GDP   1.19    1.31    1.35    1.48    1.62    1.63   na
Growth Rate   15.03   15.19   12.15   19.42   17.5   11.07   11.6

Sources: China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Coun-
cil, People’s Republic of China; National Defense Report 2004, Ministry of
National Defense, Republic of China.

to less reliable data than defense budget analysis” (2). Without a doubt, the PRC’s
annual increase in military expenditures remains in the double digits, yet according
to the 2004 China defense white paper, the growth in military expenditures has
dropped significantly since 2002 (Table 19.3).
In 2003, China reported spending 1.63 percent of GDP on defense expendi-
tures. This equated to 7.74 percent of the country’s total financial expenditures. The
distribution of expenditures was reported at roughly 33.6 percent for operations,
32.5 percent for human resources, and 33.9 percent for equipment. In 2000, this
distribution was 35 percent for operations, 33 percent for human resources, and 32
percent for equipment. The rate of increase in spending has fluctuated throughout
the 1990s, but leveled off at around 11 percent in 2003 and 2004.
Many estimates indicate that the reported figures are only one third of the
actual spending. The official budget does not include expenditures on items such as
those for the Second Artillery, the People’s Armed Police, defense industry subsi-
dies, and subnational units’ contribution to the PLA (U.S. Department of Defense,
2006, 22). Excluded from the budget are foreign weapons procurement, a figure
approaching $3 billion annually just from Russia. On the other hand, Shambaugh
(2003) notes that a large portion of spending has actually been dedicated to defense
industry reforms such as those accruing from the decommercialization of the PLA
and forced downsizing. China’s Defense White Paper 2004 indicates that military
expenditures have been devoted primarily to increasing salaries, improving the
social insurance system and education, along with “moderate” increases in equip-
ment expenses (IOSC, 2004).

Civil–Military Relations and the PLA

as a National or Party Army
Traditionally, a discussion of civil–military relations in the PRC would best be
termed a discussion of party–army relations. Due to the high degree of integration,
or symbiosis, of the armed forces as the coercive mechanism behind CCP political

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 National Defense: China  n  423

hegemony and its commitment to internal as well as external security on behalf of

the CCP, the PLA has not been a typical national army. At the core of the sym-
biotic relationship is an interlocking directorate in which senior military officers
serve in the CCP’s Central Committee and Politburo. Retired officers also serve in
important CCP leadership roles and while “civilians,” continue close relationships
with and act as advocates for the PLA. As a result of many of the changes discussed
below, however, “it is now more analytically appropriate to consider civil–military
rather than party–army relations in the PRC” (Shambaugh, 2003, 13).
The dual role of the PLA as defender of the CCP and the state is well docu-
mented. The PLA originated as the army of the CCP in 1928 and since the found-
ing of the PRC in 1949, party and state political and military power has been highly
integrated. According to Shambaugh, the PLA has experienced three basic stages in
its development parallel to the CCP: symbiosis (until 1989), control (1989–1997),
and relative autonomy (post-1997) (Shambaugh, 2003, 43).
Until 1989, the party–military relationship was characterized as one of sym-
biosis, in which the party and army were “fused due to a lack of functional dif-
ferentiation and clear institutional boundaries” (Li, 2005, 1). After the Tiananmen
Square Incident (1989), the party extended its efforts to ensure political loyalties
of the military. Since the ascendance of Jiang Zemin, a new period of (relatively)
increased professionalization of the PLA has transpired. Although the PLA has
moved from a “party army” to a “party army with professional characteristics,” the
primacy of its role as protector of the CCP has not changed (Joffe, 1997, 109).
Others argue that the professionalization, institutionalization, and regulariza-
tion of the PLA over the last decade are not minor, and while not completely end-
ing the symbiotic relationship that has long existed, have introduced significant
prospects for a long-term trend of further moving the PLA from a party army to
a national or statist armed force (Shambaugh, 2001). Of concern are the poten-
tial frictions that this professionalization may produce. Would a professionalized
armed force be more willing to clash with party control? Will the rising level of offi-
cer education in the PLA introduce a new class conflict within a military founded
upon the peasant soldier? The PLA and the Party have long relied upon the support
of the mass peasantry, and that support has been a bulwark of CCP control. The
possibility exists that “modernization will introduce factors that could stimulate a
reemergence of class distinctions and class frictions and subsequently alter tradi-
tional perceptions” within the PLA and between the PLA and society (Krawitz,
2003, 3).
The PLA’s role vis-à-vis the CCP and the state is institutionalized in a variety of
documents and recently in the new regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army, constituted in December 2003. The 2004 China defense
white paper clearly states that this regulation “maintains that political work is the
fundamental guarantee of the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces and
the assurance for the armed forces to accomplish their missions” (IOSC, 2004).
Commitment of PLA cadres was reinforced in the Provisions on Strengthening

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 424  n  Handbook of Military Administration

the Education and Management of High and Middle Ranking Cadres of the PLA,
promulgated in February 2004. This provision refines the system of maintaining
“correct” ideology of the officer corps at the regiment level and above and commits
cadres to “do self-study and review, to receive thematic education, to take [sic]
admonishment talks, to make ideological and political assessment” among other
political duties (IOSC, 2004). A People’s Daily editorial on New Year’s Day 2006
praised the PLA as being instrumental in making the previous year one that “deep-
ened the Party-wide education on maintaining the advanced nature of the Party
members” (PLA Daily, January 1, 2006).
As reported in China’s National Defense in 2002 (IOSC, 2002), the NPC
enacted the Legislation Law in March 2000, which defined the legislative pow-
ers of the CMC and the CMC standing with regard to general headquarters and
services. The fact that the NPC, rather than the CCP, is increasingly influential in
matters related to regulating and funding the PLA is a positive step towards proper
civil–military relations. The Legislation Law is important for the trend in moving
the PLA toward a professionalized, state army and provides that

the CMC may formulate military statutes in accordance with the Con-
stitution and laws. The general headquarters/departments, services and
arms, and military area commands may, within their respective author-
ities, formulate military regulations in accordance with the law and the
military statutes, decisions and orders of the CMC. Procedures for for-
mulation, amendment and nullification of military statutes and regula-
tions shall be stipulated by the CMC in accordance with the principles
specified in the provisions of the said Law. (IOSC, 2002, 10)

Conclusion
The PRC’s military rise has now gained prominence alongside the country’s eco-
nomic ascendance and is clearly a major concern regionally and in the long term
globally. Without question, China’s military planners are dedicated to modern-
ization. Although such assessments are so common as to be cliché, there remain
very real challenges to China accomplishing this feat as well as to our own under-
standing of the scale, quality, and speed of China’s ascendance to global military
power. As well, due to the general lack of transparency in matters related to China’s
military affairs, foreign scholars and planners will continue to rely on some degree
of educated speculation for some time to come.
China’s ability to modernize its military at the same speed as its economy, how-
ever, is questionable. Two decades of concerted effort in economic restructuring
have created a global economic dynamo, yet most estimates place China’s rise to
the regional military power at another three to four decades. This begs the ques-
tion as to whether regional or global power is the end goal driving PRC strategic

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 National Defense: China  n  425

modernization. The immediate priority is preparation for a possible military action

against Taiwan and, thus, resources will continue to be dedicated to information
warfare, missile, blockade capacity, and amphibious assault capabilities. As long as
the recovery of Taiwan remains a priority, a second aspect to this preparation is the
improvement of the PRC’s stand-off capabilities vis-à-vis the United States.
Of interest is a scenario in which the Taiwan issue was to be resolved peacefully
and what the consequences of this would be for PRC security and defense strategy
and policy. Dialogue initiated in 2005 and 2006 between the CCP and Taiwan’s
leading opposition leaders may hold potential for improved relations should the
Nationalist Party in Taiwan win the 2008 presidential election. Should relations
between Beijing and Taipei be demilitarized, to which theater would the PLA
redirect its military modernization? Peaceful resolution of cross-strait tensions will
most likely complicate U.S. planning to contain the PRC and provide the PRC a
greater blue water projection potential.
Limitations to the scope and speed of modernization remain. Military modern-
ization must compete for resources in an economic climate dependent upon foreign
trade, growing socioeconomic inequality within China, and demands for improved
health care, environmental protection, and education. Tending to these needs, provid-
ing the capital to continue double-digit growth, and increasing military spending all
rely upon continued high growth in what some analysts see as a “bubble economy.”
The challenges facing the PLA are numerous and costly. Raising the education
levels of armed forces, paying pensions and health care for veterans, investing in
indigenous arms development and production, purchasing hardware and technolo-
gies from abroad, and restructuring the civil-defense sector are costly long-term
endeavors. Some debate within the PLA over its overarching military doctrine and
long-term direction will continue, yet there is little question of a continued adapta-
tion to the RMA.
In conclusion, China’s military modernization poses more immediate chal-
lenges to the country’s Asian neighbors: Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Conten-
tious territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea may also
spark armed conflict and the PRC is increasing its preponderance of power. As
neighboring states become increasingly reliant upon trade with China, the promi-
nence of high politics that has bolstered the U.S.’s Pacific relations may dwindle. As
security guarantor, the United States will find itself increasingly probed for weak-
ness in political will and military capability.

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DK3629.indb 428 11/1/07 2:27:06 PM
 Index

A Airland Battle, 206–207, 210–211, 214

Alden, Guerney and, studies, 34
Abbas, Abu, 264 All volunteer force (AVF), 172, 214, 217n5, 302
Abbott, Andrew, 14, 16–17, 24 Althea, 340
Abrams, Creighton (General), 171 Ambrose and Brinkley studies, 259
Abrhamson studies, 41 American Civil War, 278
Abu Ghraib case, 309–310, 312 American exceptionalism, 198, 209
“Accent” as subculture, 293–294 American Indians, 39–41
Accountability Ammunition, 155–156
and authority alignment, 52–53 André, John, 271
bureaucratic aspects, 18–20 Andres, Goldman and, studies, 193
deniability, 169, 185 Appleby studies, 13
international, private military companies, Appropriations, 105–106, 117–118
179–181 Arab-Israeli conflict (1973) impact, 145–146
lack of oversight, 170, 183–184 Argentina, 398–400
levels, 186 Armaments industry, 333–336
Acheson, Dean (Undersecretary of State), 259 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 177
Achille Lauro incident, 264 Armstrong studies, 161–188
Adams, John (President), 258 Army
Adams, Samuel, 168 Brazil forces, 391–393, 392
Adams studies, 171 Colombia forces, 381–383, 382
Administration Artemis, 339
1850-1900 (U.S.), 31–42 Aspin, Les, 110
defined, 2–3 Assessment, 50, 83–84
private military companies, 181–184 Assumptions abandonment, 4–5
Adolphus, Gustavus, 166 Athearn studies, 40
AECA, see Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Attina studies, 339
Aegis Defense Services, Ltd., 178–179 Attitudes, military policy, 305
Afghanistan Authority, 38, 52–53
Navy SEALS incident, 178 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF),
reconstruction efforts, 181 265n
terrorist weapon of choice, 48 Autonomous professionalism, 11–16, see also
Air Force Professionals and profession of arms
Brazil forces, 394, 395 Avant studies, 15, 25, 173–174, 181, 237–238,
Colombia forces, 384, 384 244–245, 248–249
Venezuela forces, 389, 389 Ayatollah Khomeini, 262–263

429

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 430  n  Handbook of Military Administration

B Booth, Gimbel and, studies, 313

BOP baseline prediction outcomes, 202–207,
Bacevich studies, 237 203
Bachman, Blair and Segal studies, 10, 21 Bracken, Paul, 246, 250
Bachman studies, 303, 305–306 Bradtke, Robert, 350
Baker studies, 20 Brainwashing, 303
Baldwin, Reinke and, studies, 285 Brazil forces
Balkan crisis, 212, 318 Air Force, 394, 395
Barnett, Thomas P.M., 256, 265, 279–280 Army, 391–393, 392
Bartone and Snook studies, 285 chain of command, 391, 391
Bass studies, 286 facts and developments, 394–396
Battle fatigue, 312 fundamentals, 390
Battlefield Development Area Assessment, 147 Navy, 393, 393–394
Battle Groups (BG), 327–328
structure and organization, 391–394
Battle Labs Program
Brinkley, Ambrose and, studies, 259
historical developments, 157
British East India Company, 165
TSM Abrams, 149
Broedling studies, 285
Battle of Wounded Knee, 41
Brooks studies, 221–233, 248–249
BCP, see Budget Change Proposals (BCP)
Brown, Harold (Secretary), 110
Be, Know, Do model, 289
Brownlow, Louis (committee chairman), 13
Beckwith, Charles (Colonel), 263
Belknap, William W., 40 Brusselization effect, 338–339
Bell studies, 267 Brussels studies, 319, 322
Bennett studies, 262 BTA, see Business Transformation Agency
BENS, see Business Executives for National (BTA)
Security (BENS) Budget Change Proposals (BCP), 116
Betts studies, 194, 198, 244 Budgeting, 52, 115–117, see also Defense budget
Bialke studies, 181 (U.S.)
Bicanic studies, 163, 175 Buffalo Soldiers, 39
Biddle, Stephen, 251n9 Builder studies, 198–199, 211
Biddle and Zirkle studies, 247, 249 Bunker, Lewicki and, studies, 291
“Big five” concept, 146, 148 Burk studies, 21, 24–25, 237, 243
Bilchik studies, 353 Burnside, Ambrose, 34
Bitzinger studies, 421 Burnside, Ambrose (Senator), 39
Black Americans in service, 37, 39 Bush, George H. W. (President), 264, 266, 268
Blackwater employees, 175 Bush, George W. (President) and
Blackwell studies, 18 administration, 111–112, 182, 187,
Blair, Tony, 318 271
Blair and Segal, Bachman, studies, 10, 21 Business Executives for National Security
Blakeman studies, 145–158 (BENS), 111
Blanchard, Hersey and, studies, 286 Business Transformation Agency (BTA), 54
Blasko studies, 413, 416 Business transformation drivers, 53–54
Bledstein studies, 17 Butler studies, 291
Blomberg, Peterson and, studies, 324
Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating,
279–280
Bobbitt studies, 166–167
Bohn studies, 255, 264
C
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 166–167 Cahlink studies, 310–311
Bong, Chris, 23 Cairo, U.S. Embassy in, 264
Bongard, Dupuy, Johnson and, studies, 33, 39 Calculus-based trust, 290

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 Index  n  431

Caldera, Louis (Secretary of the Army), 151, unity of effort, 64–65

158 Chapman studies, 152
Calhoun, John C. (Secretary of War), 31 Chavez, Hugo, 377, 390
Calling, following, 303–304 Checkel studies, 7, 338
Callum, Guay and, studies, 335–336 Cheney, Dick, 110
Cameron studies, 146, 148–150 Chen Shui-bian, 412
Capabilities, 326–337, 329–332 Chernow studies, 168
Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), Chile, 397–398
327 China, see People’s Republic of China
Capital acquisition, governance reforms, 50 Chirac, Jacques René, 333
Caribbean basin, 401–403 Chontosh, Brian (Marine Capt.), 283
Caribbean basin forces, 401–403 Citizen-solider ideal, 20–24
Carlos the Jackal, 164 Civilian Control of the Military, 245–246
Carney, William H., 37 Civilian Crisis Management Committee
Carter, Jimmy (President) and administration, (CCMC), 325
110 Civilians as screens, 310
CBO, see Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Civil-military relations
CBRS, see Concept Based Requirements System American historical development, 12–16
(CBRS) challenges, 25–26, 249–250
CCMC, see Civilian Crisis Management classic works, 239–243
Committee (CCMC) dependent variables of literature, 243–247
CDM, see Capability Development Mechanism divorce, 22
(CDM) foot dragging, 211–212
Central America, 400–401 fundamentals, 237–239, 250
Ceremony, 293 gap, 22, 306–307
Cerovsky, Milan, 356–357 homeland security, 228–230, 231
CFSP, see Common Foreign and Security Policy military effectiveness, 247–249
(CFSP) People’s Liberation Army (China), 422–424
Chadian forces, 269 Civil War, American, 278
Chain of command Clark studies, 15, 212
Brazil forces, 391, 391 Classic literature works, 239–243
Colombia forces, 381, 382 Clausewitz studies, 162
Mexico forces, 377–379, 378 Client-relevant expert knowledge, 14
Venezuela forces, 386, 386 Clinton, William J. (President) and
Chairman’s legacy administration, 110, 212, 237, 264,
Myers, Richard B. (2001-2005), 89 268
Powell, Colin L. (1989-1993), 87–88 “Coalition of the Billing,” 181, 182
Shalikashvili, John M. (1993-1997), 88–89 Coast Guard, 225
Shelton, Henry Hugh (1997-2001), 89 Coercion, 290
Chairman’s responsibilities, 76–77 Coffman studies, 38
Challener studies, 42 Cohen, Eliot, 23, 228, 237, 246, 251n8
Challenges, see also National Security Personnel Cohen, William, 110
System (NSPS) Cohesion, 292, 293
civil-military relations, 25–26, 249–250 Cold War
NSPS implementation, 136–137 abandonment of linked activities, 4–5, 151
strategic planning, 78 Army impact, 198
Changes baseline predictions, 204–207
early U.S. administrative systems, 3 culture issues, 212–213
homeland security, 224–225 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 87
planning system, 79–82 legal authorities segregation, 69
strategic planning, 80–81 obsolescence, 11, 64–65

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 432  n  Handbook of Military Administration

speech at The Citadel, 111 Corporate decision making, governance

Collins and Jacobs, Ulmer, studies, 287, reforms, 50
293–296 Corporateness, 303
Collins studies, 295–296 Cosmas studies, 39
Colombia forces Costner, Kevin, 182
Air Force, 384, 384 Countering nonstate terrorist and guerilla
Army, 381–383, 382 networks
chain of command, 381, 382 adjudication, 270–271
contractor distancing, 178 Colombia, 277
facts and developments, 384–385 counterterrorism genealogy, 257–265
fundamentals, 381 detention, 270–271
Navy, 383, 383–384 foreign internal defense, 269
structure and organization, 381–384 fundamentals, 255–257
Combat stress, 311–312 future outlook, 278–280
Command and control, EU’s problem area, 333 general warfare, 265–267
Commanger studies, 34 imperfect warfare, 267–270
Commitment, 293 impressions importance, 273–274
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), information operations, 275
5 intelligence, 272–273
Communications Israel, 277–278
law enforcement support, 269–270
friendly fire, 310–311
low-intensity conflict, 267
interagency operations, 72
military operations other than war, 267–270
interception, 343n1
nonkinetic considerations, 270–275
NSPS implementation, 136–137
opinion importance, 273–274
Powell’s approach, 88
public opinion importance, 273–274
Compliance, civil-military relations, 244–255
September 11, 2001 impact, 275–276
Compromising values, 230–231
targeted strikes, 267–268
Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS)
world opinion importance, 273–274
abandonment, 151
Coups, civil-military relations, 243
historical developments, 157
Craig and Gilbert, Paret, studies, 166
TSM Abrams, 147–149, 148 CRC, see CONUS Replacement Center (CRC)
Concepts, doctrine, 195–196 Croly, Herbert, 12
Confederate army, 33–35 Cronke and Feaver studies, 306
Confederate States of America, 33 Cuba, 41–42, 401–402
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 105 Cubic Applications, 364–365
Connotations, positive, 214–215 Cullen studies, 34
Consideration behaviors, 285 Culture issues
Constitutional impact “accent” as subculture, 293–294
defense budget, 101–102 European Security and Defense Policy,
homeland security, 228 337–339
military development, 174 operationalization of strategy, 212–213
values, 230 pressures, 295–297
Construction, military, 118 skills development, 61
Contiguous enemies, 198 social experimentation, 297
Contractors, 3, see also Private military strategic planning, 78
companies (PMCs) subcultures, 293–297
Control, EU’s problem area, 333 Curran studies, 156
CONUS Replacement Center (CRC), 184 Czech Republic
Coons, Stogdill and, studies, 285 drafting the plan, 363–365
Cooper studies, 34, 38–39 economic assumptions, 366

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 Index  n  433

education, 367 findings from study, 201–209

force structure and modernization, 366 fluctuations, 207–208, 208
fundamentals, 7, 347–348, 368–370 foot dragging, 211–212
key elements of, 366–368 fundamentals, 191–192, 215–216
leader development, 367 grand strategy, 194–195
national security documents, 363 hypotheses, 199–201
overview, 365 liberal foundations, 193–194
personnel reform, 367 necessary distinctions, 196–199, 200
reform background, 348–349, 361–362 operationalization of strategy, 209–214
scope of reform effort, 362 positive connotations, 214–215
September 11, 2001 impact, 349–352 public impact, 213–214
supporting programs, 367–368 realist foundations, 193–194
sustaining and stationing, 368 strategy, 194–195
study findings, 201–209
threatening signals, 210–211
Defense spending, China, 421–422, 422
D de Gribeauval, Jen-Baptiste, 166
Democratic control of military, 174
Dahl, Robert, 21 Dempsey studies, 334
Daley and Vasu studies, 291 Denhardt and Denhardt studies, 287
Darby, Joseph M., 301 Department of Defense (DoD)
Davis, Jefferson (President), 33, 35, 37 authority and accountability alignment,
Davis studies, 306 52–53
Day-to-day activities, TSM Abrams, 154–156 business transformation drivers, 53–54
DBSMC, see Defense Business Systems changes needed, 64–65
Management Committee (DBSMC) control and direction through budgeting,
Declaration of Paris, 165 100
Defense acquisition performance, 55–56 defense acquisition performance, 55–56
Defense budget (U.S.) DoD reforms vision, 49–50
budgeting, 115–117 DoD Total Force development, 58–63
Constitutional impact, 101–102 employee unions, 127
defense budget, 106–120 fundamentals, 47–49, 72–73
documents, 102–103 governance reforms, 50–55
execution, 117–119, 118 horizontal organizational development, 55
federal budget, 102–106 Human Capital Strategy, 62–63
fundamentals, 99–100 interagency operations, 65–72
historical developments, 107–112 joint capability portfolios, 52–53
network, 119–120 joint task assignment management, 53
planning, 113, 113–114 management and work reforms, 55–57
processes, 101, 103–106, 104, 107, 112–119 medical health system transformation, 57
programming, 114–115 National Security Personnel System, 63
public budget overview, 100–101 operational framework, 65
Defense Business Systems Management performance measurement, 54
Committee (DBSMC), 53–54 public administration systems, 2–3
Defense policy and doctrinal insulation Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 47–73
American exceptionalism, 209 reconfiguration, 59
BOP baseline prediction outcomes, risk management, 54
202–207, 203 senior leadership focus, 50–52
cultural issues, 212–213 service continuum, 59–60
doctrinal changes, 196 shared service model migration, 55
doctrine defined, 195–196 single lead advocate designation, 55

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 434  n  Handbook of Military Administration

size, 1, 58 Dunbar, Lt. John (fictional character), 182

skills development, 60–62 Dunlap studies, 243
strategic framework, 65 Dupuy, Johnson and Bongard studies, 33, 39
supply-chain logistic management, 56–57 Dzurinda, Mikulas, 353
unions, 127 Dzurinda government, 353
unity of effort, 64–72
Department of Defense (DoD), budget
budgeting, 115–117
Constitutional impact, 101–102 E
defense budget, 106–120
documents, 102–103 Early implementation challenges, NSPS,
execution, 117–119, 118 139–140
federal budget, 102–106 East India Company, 165
fundamentals, 99–100 Economic assumptions
historical developments, 107–112 Czech Republic, 366
network, 119–120 Slovakia, 358–359
planning, 113, 113–114 EDA, see European Defense Agency (EDA)
processes, 101, 103–106, 104, 107, 112–119 Education
programming, 114–115 Czech Republic, 367
public budget overview, 100–101 Slovakia, 360
Department of Homeland Security, 67–68 Edwards and Walker studies, 193
Dependent variables of literature, 243–247 Effectiveness, see Civil-military relations
DePuy, William E. (General), 146–147, 206 Egeberg studies, 339
Desch studies, 229, 238, 243, 245–247 Eisenhower, Dwight (General/President) and
Design, phased approach, 128–130, 129 administration, 107–108, 169–170,
Deterrence trust, 290 205, 208
Developments and facts EISS, see European Institute for Strategic
Brazil forces, 394–396 Studies (EISS)
Colombia forces, 384–385 El Al Flight 219, 261
Mexico forces, 381 ELAS, see People’s Liberation Army (ELAS)
Venezuela forces, 390 Electronic warfare (EW), 275
Dewey, George (Commodore), 42 Eliasson studies, 1–8, 317–342
Dingwall and King studies, 16–17 Elisha (Biblical prophet), 308
Discipline, 292 Elsea and Serafino studies, 177
Distinctions, necessary, 196–199, 200 Emotional bonds, 293
Doctrine, 195–196, 216n1 Employees, see also Personnel
Doctrine, training, leadership, organization, involvement, 137–139
material, personnel, and force unions, 127
(DTLOMPF), 149, 150 Ender, Hajjar and, studies, 18
Documents, defense budget, 102–103 Enterprise Transition Plan, 54
Dodge Commission, 42 Equipment compatibility, 4–5
Dodgson studies, 291 ESC, see European Satellite Center (ESC)
Dominican Republic, 402–403 Escobar, Pablo, 264
DOTLMS requirements, 147–149 ESDP, see European Security and Defense
Doughty and Gruber studies, 33–34 Policy (ESDP)
Drew and Snow studies, 306 Espirit de corps, 293
Driver, Darrell W., studies, 9–26 ESS, see European Security Strategy (ESS)
DTLOMPF (doctrine, training, leadership, Ethics
organization, material, personnel, leadership, 291–292
and force), 149, 150, 157 profession of arms, 304–306, 305
Duke studies, 327 training, 3–4

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 Index  n  435

Etiquette, 293 Venezuela forces, 390

EUMC, see European Union Military Fairholm studies, 284, 286, 291
Committee (EUMC) Fallujah (2004) incident, 175, 178, 182
European Defense Agency (EDA), 334–335, Farrell studies, 196
336 Feaver, Cronke and, studies, 306
European Institute for Strategic Studies (EISS), Feaver and Gelpi studies, 172, 174
325 Feaver and Kohn studies, 22, 246–247
European Satellite Center (ESC), 325–326 Feaver studies, 9, 16, 18–19n, 23, 238,
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 242–247, 250–251
armaments industry, 333–336 Federal budget, 102–106, see also Defense
Brusselization, 338–339 budget (U.S.)
capabilities, 326–337, 329–332 Feickert studies, 276
Civilian Crisis Management Committee, Fesler studies, 13
325 Field lessons, interagency operations, 66
European Institute for Strategic Studies, 325 Fields studies, 15
European Satellite Center, 325–326 Fifty Million Bill, 41
European Security Strategy, 320–321 Fillmore, Millard (President), 32
European Union Military Committee, Findings from study
324–325 American exceptionalism, 209
fundamentals, 5–6, 317–320, 341–342 BOP baseline prediction outcomes,
future developments, 341–342 202–207, 203
goals, headline, 326–333 fluctuations, 207–208, 208
headline goals, 326–333 Finkelstein studies, 413
historical developments, 5 Fisher studies, 262, 271
military culture, 337–339 Fligstein and Sandholtz, Stone-Sweet, studies, 7
NATO assets links, 336–337 Flipper, Henry Ossian, 39
operations, 339–341, 340 Flournoy and Smith studies, 327, 336
Politico-Military Group, 325 Fluctuations, 207–208, 208
problems, 340–341 Flying Tigers, 169, 178
Strategic Planning Branch, 324–325 Focus group sessions, 138–139
strategy and command structure, 320–324 Foot dragging, 211–212
terrorism, 321–324, 323 Forbidden activities, 310
European Security Strategy (ESS), 320–321 Force employment, 50–51
European Union (EU), 5–6 Force structure and modernization, 366
European Union Military Committee Ford, Gerald (President), 262
(EUMC), 324–325 Foreign assistance, 70–72
Evaluation and testing, 118 Formation, TSM Abrams, 147
EW, see Electronic warfare (EW) Forrestal, James (Secretary of Defense), 107
Execution, PPBES process, 117–119, 118 Forsberg and Herd studies, 318
Experimental Force (EXFOR), 148 Fourth generation warfare (4GW), 279–280
Expertise, 290, 302 Fox, Vicente, 378–379
Expert knowledge, 14 Fox studies, 311
Franks, Tommy (General), 311
Fratricide, 310–311
Fredland studies, 172
F French and Raven studies, 290
Friction, civil-military, 244
Facts and developments Friedman, Thomas, 172
Brazil forces, 394–396 Friendly fire, 310–311
Colombia forces, 384–385 Fule, Stefan, 364–365
Mexico forces, 381 Function, TSM Abrams, 153–154

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 436  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Functional imperatives, 240 senior leadership focus, 50–52

Future developments, 341–342 shared service model migration, 55
single lead advocate designation, 55
Government Accountability Office, 125–142
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, 262–263
G Grand strategy, 194–195
Gabal, Ivan, 368 Grant, Ulysses S. (Lieutenant-General/
GAD, see General Armaments Department President), 32, 35, 37–38, 40–41
(GAD); Global Approach on Grant studies, 38
Deployability (GAD) Great Depression, 203
GAERC, see General Affairs and External
Greek National Army (GNA), 259–260
Relations Council (GAERC)
Greene, Nathanial (Major General), 257
Ganor studies, 278
Gansler, Jacques (Under Secretary of Defense), Green studies, 36, 301, 308–310
111 Grenada incident, 266–267
Garamone studies, 310 Gruber, Doughty and, studies, 33–34
Gates studies, 12 Guangqian, Peng, 412
Gelpi, Feaver and, studies, 172, 174 Guay and Callum studies, 335–336
Gender integration, 296–297 Guay studies, 334
General Affairs and External Relations Council Guerilla networks and nonstate terrorists,
(GAERC), 322–324 countering
General Armaments Department (GAD), 416
adjudication, 270–271
Geneva Convention, 271, 308, 312
Colombia, 277
Gibson studies, 245
Gilbert, Paret, Craig and, studies, 166 counterterrorism genealogy, 257–265
Gimbel and Booth studies, 313 detention, 270–271
Glatthaar studies, 33 foreign internal defense, 269
Gledhill, Stephen (Brigadier), 360 fundamentals, 255–257
Global Approach on Deployability (GAD), 333 future outlook, 278–280
Global war on terror (GWOT), 264, 276 general warfare, 265–267
Gnesotto studies, 318–319, 325, 338 imperfect warfare, 267–270
Goals impressions importance, 273–274
European Security and Defense Policy, 319,
information operations, 275
326–333
intelligence, 272–273
NSPS implementation, 134–136, 135
Goldman and Andres studies, 193 Israel, 277–278
Goldman studies, 250 law enforcement support, 269–270
Goldstein studies, 237 low-intensity conflict, 267
Goldwater-Nichols requirement, 62, 237 military operations other than war, 267–270
Goodman studies, 228–229 nonkinetic considerations, 270–275
Goodnow, Frank, 12 opinion importance, 273–274
Governance reforms public opinion importance, 273–274
authority and accountability alignment, September 11, 2001 impact, 275–276
52–53
targeted strikes, 267–268
business transformation drivers, 53–54
world opinion importance, 273–274
horizontal organizational development, 55
joint capability portfolios, 52–53 Guerney and Alden studies, 34
joint task assignment management, 53 Guiding principles, NSPS implementation,
performance measurement, 54 132–133
risk management, 54 4GW, see Fourth generation warfare (4GW)

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 Index  n  437

H scenario, 223–224
soldiers compared to police force, 225–228
Hadley studies, 22 Hooker, Joseph (“Fighting Joe”), 34
Hague Conventions, 308, 312 Horizontal organizational development, 55
Hajjar and Ender studies, 18 House Appropriations Committee, 105–106
Halberstam studies, 212 Howard, Bob (Major General), 356–357
Halleck, Henry (General in Chief), 34–35, 37 Howard studies, 166–167
Hamelink studies, 328 Howarth studies, 36–37
Hamilton and Jay, Madison, studies, 20 Howorth studies, 318, 325, 337–339
Hammond studies, 32 Huchthausen studies, 263, 268
Handel studies, 167, 194, 210 Hudson’s Bay Company, 165
Haotien, Chi, 411 Hudson studies, 37
Harrell and Miller studies, 293, 297 Hughes studies, 145–158
Harris studies, 156 Human Capital Strategy, 59, 62–63
Hartley studies, 172 Human intelligence (HUMINT), 272
Hartz studies, 194 Humanitarianism, 309
Havel, Vaclav, 364 Huntington, Samuel, 9, 11–12, 14, 16, 22–23,
HBCT, see Heavy Brigade Combat Team 167, 193, 228, 239–243, 247, 250,
(HBCT) 270, 292, 302–306
Headline goals, 319, 326–333 Hurricane Katrina response, 67–68
Heads of government (HoGs), 322–323 Hussein, Saddam, 211, 268, 309
Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), Hypotheses, 199–201
156–157
Hedlund studies, 287
Heisbourg studies, 326
Henry, Kreidberg and, studies, 33, 37, 41 I
Herbert studies, 310–311
Herd, Forsberg and, studies, 318 ICTs, see Integrated concept teams (ICTs)
Hersey and Blanchard studies, 286 Identification-based trust, 290
Hewes studies, 42 Identity, governance reforms, 50
Hillen studies, 304, 306 Identity cards, 179–180
Historical developments IMET, see International military education and
1850-1900, 31–42 training (IMET)
1990-2005, 75–93 Indian wars, 39–41
counterterrorism, 257–265 Influence, civil-military relations, 244
European Security and Defense Policy, 5 Influence of European Union, 5–6
private military companies, 164–168 Ingraham, Romzek and, studies, 20
TSM Abrams, 145–147 Ingraham and Moynihan studies, 18
Hitch, Charles J., 110 Ingraham studies, 18
Hizbullah incident, 263 Initial proposals, 126
Hobbes, Thomas, 193, 216 Initiating structures behaviors, 285
Hoffman, Stanley, 21 Integrated concept teams (ICTs), 150–151, 153
Holsti studies, 246, 303–304, 306 Integrity, 292
Holt, Joseph (Secretary of War), 33 Intelligence and Security Command
Homeland contingencies, 67–68 (INSCOM), 272–273
Homeland security Interagency operations
compromising values, 230–231 communications, 72
discussion, 232–233 field lessons, 66
fundamentals, 221–223 foreign assistance, 70–72
politicization, 228–230 fundamentals, 65–66
reasons for change, 224–225 homeland contingencies, 67–68

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 438  n  Handbook of Military Administration

international allies and partners, 68–70 Joint Planning System (JPS), 3

overseas contingencies, 66–67 Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), 48
Interagency operations development, 61–62 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 51
International accountability, 179–181 Joint task assignment management, 53
International allies and partners, 68–70 Joint training, 60
International cooperation, 4–5 Joint U.S. Military and Planning Group
International Military Education and Training (JUSMAPG), 259–260, 269
(IMET), 71–72, 173 Jones, John Paul, 168
International Traffic in Arms Regulations Jones, McCaffery and, studies, 109
(ITAR), 176–177 Jordan, Taylor and Mazarr studies, 256, 267,
Iraq 269
reconstruction efforts, 181 Jordan studies, 156
terrorist weapon of choice, 48 JPD, see Joint Planning Document (JPD)
ITAR, see International Traffic in Arms JPS, see Joint Planning System (JPS)
Regulations (ITAR) JRAC, see Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC)
Jumper, John P. (General), 292
Jurisdictional sovereignty, 14–16
JUSMAPG, see Joint U.S. Military and
J Planning Group (JUSMAPG)
Justified killing compared to war crimes,
Jacobs, Ulmer, Collins and, studies, 287, 308–309
293–296
Janowitz, Shils and, studies, 284, 303–304
Janowitz studies, 21–23, 239, 241–243, 247,
250
Jay, Madison, Hamilton and, studies, 20
K
JCIDS, see Joint Capabilities Integration Kacer, Ratislav, 351, 357
Development System (JCIDS) Kaldor and Salmon studies, 337
Jefferson, Thomas (President), 258, 266 Karpinski, Janis (Brigadier General), 312
Jenkins studies, 270 Karsten studies, 12
Jervis studies, 192, 195, 211 Katrina (Hurricane) response, 67–68
JFCOM, see Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Keegan studies, 284, 303, 308
JIEDDO, see Joint Improvised Explosive Device Kelly studies, 146–147
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Kennedy, John F. (President) and
Jingshi, Liu and, studies, 411 administration, 19n, 108–109, 205,
Ji studies, 413 208, 261
Joffe studies, 423 Kerber, Linda, 24
Johnson, Andrew (President), 38–40 Key elements of
Johnson, Lyndon (President) and Czech Republic, 366–368
admininstration, 261 Slovakia, 358–360
Johnson, Wong and, studies, 14 Khomeini, Grand Ayatollah, 262–263
Johnson and Bongard, Dupuy, studies, 33, 39 Kier, Elizabeth, 198–199, 201, 209, 211, 214,
Johnston, Joseph Eggleston, 35 248–249
Joint Capabilities Integration Development Killegrew studies, 14
System (JCIDS), 152, 158 King, Dingwall and, studies, 16–17
Joint capability portfolios, 52–53 King, Rodney, 225, 227
Joint Chiefs of Staff, PPBES process, 113–114 Kohn, Feaver and, studies, 22, 246–247
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 59 Kohn studies, 170, 237, 245
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Korb studies, 249
Organization (JIEDDO), 257 Korean War, impact on budget, 108
Joint Planning Document (JPD), 113 Kornacki studies, 147

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 Index  n  439

Kosovo (Serbia), 212 National Guard, Venezuela forces, 389

Kostelka, Miroslav, 366 Navy
Kramer studies, 291 Brazil forces, 393, 393–394
Krawitz studies, 415, 423 Colombia forces, 383, 383–384
Krebs, Ron, 24 Mexico forces, 380, 380–381
Kreidberg and Henry studies, 33, 37, 41 Venezuela forces, 386–388, 387–388
Krislof, Samuel, 22 Peru, 396–397
Kuhn, Thomas, 21 South America, 396–400
structure and organization
Brazil forces, 391–394
Colombia forces, 381–384
L Mexico forces, 379–381
Venezuela forces, 386, 387
La Belle discothèque, 268 Venezuela forces, 385–390
Labor unions, 127 Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 180, 181
Lacquement, Richard, 15, 174 Laws governing violence management, 308–310
Laird, Melvin (Secretary of Defense), 171 Law studies, 35
Lancaster, Lipari and, studies, 297 Lead advocate designation, single, 55
Langley studies, 259 Leadership, see also DOTLMS requirements
Language skills development, 61 Czech Republic, 367
Later implementation challenges, NSPS, NSPS implementation, 130–131
140–141 Slovakia, 360
Latin America Leadership and culture
Air Force “accent,” 293–294
Brazil forces, 394, 395 culture issues, 292–297
Colombia forces, 384, 384 ethics, 291–292
Venezuela forces, 389, 389 fundamentals, 283–284, 297–298
Argentina, 398–400 leadership defined, 284–285
Army models, 288, 288–289
Brazil forces, 391–393, 392 power, 290
Colombia forces, 381–383, 382 pressures, 295–297
Brazil forces, 390–396 social experimentation, 297
Caribbean basin, 401–403 teaching leadership, 286–288, 287
Central America, 400–401 theories, 285–286
chain of command Leadership and Force Development, 289
Brazil forces, 391, 391 Leaf, Daniel (Lieutenant General), 310
Colombia forces, 381, 382 Lee, Robert Edward, 35–36
Mexico forces, 377–379, 378 Lee Teng-hui, 412
Venezuela forces, 386, 386 Legal frameworks, 176–178
Chile, 397–398 Legitimacy, social, 14
Colombia forces, 381–385 Lewicki and Bunker studies, 291
context, 375–377 Liberal foundations, 193–194
Cuba forces, 401–402 Lieber, Francis, 308
Dominican Republic forces, 402–403 Lincoln, Abraham (President), 19n, 34–36, 308
facts and developments Lind, William, 278
Brazil forces, 394–396 Lipari and Lancaster studies, 297
Colombia forces, 384–385 Li studies, 423
Mexico forces, 381 Literature, see Civil-military relations
Venezuela forces, 390 Little studies, 164
fundamentals, 7–8, 373–375, 374, 403–404 Liu and Jingshi studies, 411
Mexico forces, 377–381 Locke, John, 193, 216

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 440  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Logan, John, 39 Matthews, Snider, Watkins and, studies, 14

Logistics, EU’s problem area, 333 Matthews, Snider and, studies, 14
Long studies, 13 Mazarr, Jordan, Taylor and, studies, 256, 267,
Long War, 171 269
Los Angeles riots, 227 MBI, see Major Budget Issues (MBI) sessions
Louis XIV (King), 164 McCaffery and Jones studies, 109
Loyalty, private military companies, 176 McCausland and Martin studies, 15
Luttwak studies, 237 McClellan, George Brinton (General), 19n,
Lynn-Jones, Miller and, studies, 211 34–35
McDermott studies, 40
McDonaldization, 18
McGregor studies, 284
M McKinley, William (President), 41
McNabb studies, 255–280
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 161, 163–165, 185 McNamara, Robert S., 109–110
MacLeish, Archibald, 275 McPherson studies, 37
Macro resource allocation, governance reforms, Meade, George G., 34
50 Mearsheimer studies, 211
Madison, Hamilton and Jay studies, 20 Measurement and signaling intelligence
Madison, James, 168 (MASINT), 272–273
Maggart, Lon E. (Major General), 151 Measurements, governance reforms, 54
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 41 Meciar regime, 352–353
Mahnken studies, 295 Medal of Honor, 37
Maintenance, PPBES process, 117 Medical Health System (MHS), 57
Major Budget Issues (MBI) sessions, 117 Meinhart, Richard, 75–93
Management, leadership comparison, 285 MEJA, see Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Management and work reforms Act (MEJA)
defense acquisition performance, 55–56 Mercenaries, 163, see also Private military
medical health system transformation, 57 companies (PMCs)
supply-chain logistic management, 56–57 Method, TSM Abrams, 153–154
Management of violence Mexico forces
Abu Ghraib case, 309–310 chain of command, 377–379, 378
combat stress, 311–312 facts and developments, 381
friendly fire, 310–311 fundamentals, 377
fundamentals, 302, 307, 324 Navy, 380, 380–381
justified killing compared to war crimes, structure and organization, 379–381
308–309 MHS, see Medical Health System (MHS)
laws governing, 308–310 Michaels studies, 170
prevention, 324 Miles studies, 311
residual impact, 313–314 Military, conceptions of
Mandelbaum studies, 215 citizen-solider ideal, 20–24
Manners and Whitman studies, 338 fundamentals, 9–11, 24–26
Mao Zedong/Tse Tung, 413 as profession, 11–16
Marion, Francis (Colonel), 258 as public bureaucracy, 16–20
Markusen studies, 173 Military culture, see Culture issues
Marshall, George (State General), 259 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
Martin, McCausland and, studies, 15 (MEJA), 177, 183
Marx, Groucho, 350 Military Strategy (Slovak Republic), 355
Masi studies, 284, 286 Miller, Charles R., studies, 191–216
Material, see DOTLMS requirements Miller, Harrell and, studies, 293, 297
Matloff studies, 33, 35, 42 Miller, L., studies, 297, 304

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 Index  n  441

Miller, Randall, studies, 283–298, 301–314 employee involvement, 137–139

Miller and Lynn-Jones studies, 211 employees covered, 126–127
Millett, Murray and Watman studies, 249 fundamentals, 125, 142
Misconduct, 312 goals, implementation, 134–136, 135
Missiroli studies, 338 guiding principles, 132–133
Models of leadership, 288, 288–289 initial proposals, 126
Moe studies, 18 later implementation challenges, 140–141
Moltke studies, 167 leadership as driver, 130–131
Morgan studies, 295, 304, 306 performance parameters, 132–133
Morgenthau studies, 193 steps, implementation, 127–128
Moroney studies, 350 team establishment, 133–134, 134
Mosher studies, 13 timeline, 134–136, 135
Moskos, Williams and Segal studies, 14 Total Force development, 63
Moskos studies, 10, 14, 21–22, 284, 294–297, National Security Planning Guidance, 66
302–303 National Security Presidential Directive, 66–67
Moynihan, Ingraham and, studies, 18 National Security University, 62
Murphy studies, 181 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Murray and Watman, Millett, studies, 249 (NATO)
Murray studies, 293, 295 Naumann, Klaus, 342
Myers, Richard B. (General), 75, 81, 86, 90–92 Naval Security Group Command (NSGC), 273
Navy
Brazil forces, 393, 393–394
Colombia forces, 383, 383–384
N Mexico forces, 380, 380–381
Venezuela forces, 386–388, 387–388
Naftali studies, 261, 264, 268 Navy SEALS, 178, 264, 267
Nagl and Pfaff, Snider, studies, 9, 21 Necessary distinctions, 196–199, 200
Nagl studies, 179 Neff and Price studies, 175
National Defense University, 62 Negro Soldier Law, 37
National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Nei studies, 421
272–273 Network, defense budget, 119–120, see also
National Guard Countering nonstate terrorist and
defense budget, 119 guerilla networks
homeland security, 223–228, 232–233 Network-centric warfare (NCW), 279
responsibilities shift, 234n11 New requirements system, TSM Abrams,
validity, 216n4 149–150, 150
Venezuela forces, 389 NGIC, see National Ground Intelligence Center
National Military Establishment (NME), 107 (NGIC)
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Nielsen studies, 15, 237–250
Terrorism, 276 1989 status, strategic planning, 79–80
National Military Strategy (NMS), 113 Niu studies, 421
National Security Council (NSC), 13 Nixon, Richard (President) and administration,
National security documents 261, 269
Czech Republic, 363 Nixon-Ford administration, 110
Slovakia, 354–355 NKPA, see North Korean People’s Army
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) (NKPA)
challenges, 139–141 Nomenclature, private military companies,
communication strategy, 136–137 163–164
design, phased approach, 128–130, 129 Noncombatants protection, 179
DoD’s employee unions, 127 Nonstate force, 164, see also Private military
early implementation challenges, 139–140 companies (PMCs)

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 442  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Nonstate terrorist and guerilla networks, OMB, see Office of Management and Budget
countering (OMB)
adjudication, 270–271 ONI, see Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Colombia, 277 Operational framework, 65
counterterrorism genealogy, 257–265 Operationalization of strategy
detention, 270–271 cultural issues, 212–213
foreign internal defense, 269 foot dragging, 211–212
fundamentals, 255–257 fundamentals, 209–210
future outlook, 278–280 public impact, 213–214
general warfare, 265–267 threatening signals, 210–211
imperfect warfare, 267–270 Operational Requirements Document/
impressions importance, 273–274 Capabilities Development Document
information operations, 275 (ORD/CDD), 153
intelligence, 272–273 Operation Concordia, 339
Israel, 277–278 Operation Desert Storm, 310, 413
law enforcement support, 269–270 Operation Eagle Claw, 263
low-intensity conflict, 267 Operation Enduring Freedom, 265, 266, 276
military operations other than war, 267–270 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 276, 310–311
Operations
nonkinetic considerations, 270–275
European Security and Defense Policy,
opinion importance, 273–274
339–341, 340
public opinion importance, 273–274
other than war, 296
September 11, 2001 impact, 275–276
PPBES process, 117
targeted strikes, 267–268
Operation Tulip, 264
world opinion importance, 273–274
Operation Urgent Fury, 266
Noriega, Manuel, 264
Ops tempo, 296
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
ORD/CDD, see Operational Requirements
alliance relationships, 68–69
Document/Capabilities Development
assets links, 336–337 Document (ORD/CDD)
North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), 260 Organization, see DOTLMS requirements
NSGC, see Naval Security Group Command Organizational development, horizontal, 55
(NSGC) Organization and structure
NSPS, see National Security Personnel System Brazil forces, 391–394
(NSPS) Colombia forces, 381–384
Mexico forces, 379–381
Venezuela forces, 386, 387
Organization for Joint Cooperation in
O Armaments (OCCAR), 335
OCCAR, see Organization for Joint Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT),
126, 129
Cooperation in Armaments
Overseas contingencies, 66–67
(OCCAR)
Offense stance, 216n3
Office of Facts and Figures, 275
Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
103–105, 116, 128–132
P
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 273 Pace, Frank (Budget Director), 108
OIPT, see Overarching Integrated Product Palmer studies, 302
Team (OIPT) Pan Am Flight 93, 261
Ojanen studies, 317 Paparone studies, 291
Olmert, Ehud, 278 Paret, Craig and Gilbert studies, 166

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 Index  n  443

Paret studies, 167, 194 Czech Republic, 363–365

Patriot Act, see USA Patriot Act PPBES process, 113, 113–114
Patton, George (General), 2 Slovakia, 356–358
PCA, see Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PDM, see Program Decision Memorandum (PPBS), 109–112
(PDM) Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Peacekeeping operations, 180–181 Execution System (PPBES)
Pelton studies, 175 budgeting, 115–117
People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), 259–260, developments, 3
269 execution, 117–119, 118
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 414–415 fundamentals, 112
People’s Republic of China historical developments, 107–112
civil-military relations, 422–424 planning, 113, 113–114
command and control, 415–421, 417–418 programming, 114–115
defense spending, 421–422, 422 Planning products
doctrine, 413–414 assessment, 83–84
force structure, 416, 419, 419–421 plans, 87
fundamentals, 8, 409–410, 424–425 resources, 86–87
overview, 410–412 strategic planning, 82–87
party-military relationship, 422–424 strategy, 85–86
People’s Liberation Army, 414–415, vision, 84–85
422–424 Planning system changes, 79–82, 82
Performance PMCs, see Private military companies (PMCs)
governance reforms, 50, 54 Pocock, John, 20
NSPS implementation, 132–133 Police force compared to soldiers, 225–228
Perlak studies, 177 Politicization, homeland security, 228–230
Perry, William, 110 Politico-Military Group, 325
Persian Gulf War, 207, 211 POM, see Program Objectives Memorandum
Persona non grata declaration, 183 (POM)
Personnel, see also Employees Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Czech Republic, 367 (PFLP), 261
PPBES process, 117 Porch, Douglas, 209
Slovakia, 359–360 Porch studies, 198
Up or Out policy, 171 Posen and Ross studies, 195
Peru, 396–397 Posen studies, 197–199, 241, 248–249
Petersberg Tasks, 327 Positive connotations, 214–215
Peterson and Blomberg studies, 324 Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878, 224, 232
Petraeus studies, 244 Post-9/11 approach, see also Homeland security
Pfaff, Snider, Nagl and, studies, 9, 21 Czech Republic, 349–352
Pfeffer, Salancik and, studies, 290 global war on terrorism, 264, 276
PFLP, see Popular Front for the Liberation of nonstate terrorist and guerilla networks,
Palestine (PFLP) 275–276
Phisterer studies, 36–37 private military companies, 187
Pick, Otto, 363–364 Slovakia, 349–352
Pierson studies, 7 Post-Cold War approach
Pillsbury studies, 413 Army activities, 191–192
Pivaric, Josef, 356 civil-military relations, 237–238
PLA, see People’s Liberation Army (PLA) downsizing military, 171
PLA Air Force (PLAAF), 420–421 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 87
PLA Navy (PLAN), 419–420 military as public bureaucracy, 18
Planning outsourcing, 170–171

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 444  n  Handbook of Military Administration

understanding changes, 25 Psychological operations (PSYOPS), 275

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 313–314 PTSD, see Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
Powell, Colin L. (General), 75, 87–88, 91–92, Public budget overview, 100–101
237, 240 Public bureaucracy, 16–20
Power
Public impact, operationalization of strategy,
balance of, 199–201, 200
213–214
leadership, 290
PPBES, see Planning, Programming, Budgeting Public military force, 164
and Execution System (PPBES) Purpose, doctrine, 195
PPBS, see Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS)
Prediction outcomes, BOP baseline, 202–207,
203 Q
Presidential Reserve Call-up, 59–60
Qaddafi, Muammar, 268
Presley, Elvis, 178
Pressman and Wildavsky studies, 13 QRF, see Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
Pressures, cultural, 295–297 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006
Prevention, violence management, 324 authority and accountability alignment,
Price, Neff and, studies, 175 52–53
Principles, NSPS implementation, 132–133 business transformation drivers, 53–54
Prisoners of war (POWs), 309 changes needed, 64–65
Private military companies (PMCs) defense acquisition performance, 55–56
absence and lack of evidence, 181, 184
DoD reforms vision, 49–50
administration, 181–184
DoD Total Force development, 58–63
fundamentals, 3, 161–162, 184–188
historical developments, 3, 164–168 fundamentals, 47–49, 72–73
international accountability, 179–181 governance reforms, 50–55
legal frameworks, 176–178 horizontal organizational development, 55
reasons for use, 170–176 Human Capital Strategy, 62–63
reliance on, 187 interagency operations, 65–72
terms and taxonomy, 163–164 joint capability portfolios, 52–53
United States, 168–170 joint task assignment management, 53
Problems, European Security and Defense management and work reforms, 55–57
Policy, 340–341
medical health system transformation, 57
Processes, defense budget, 101, 103–106, 104,
National Security Personnel System, 63
107, 112–119
Procurement, PPBES process, 117 operational framework, 65
Professional ethos, 292 performance measurement, 54
Professionals and profession of arms reconfiguration, 59
civil-military relations, 240, 306–307 risk management, 54
conceptions of military, 11–16 senior leadership focus, 50–52
ethics, 304–306, 305 service continuum, 59–60
fundamentals, 301–304, 307 shared service model migration, 55
Program Change Proposals, 115 single lead advocate designation, 55
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), 115
skills development, 60–62
Programming, PPBES process, 114–115
strategic framework, 65
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM),
114–116 supply-chain logistic management, 56–57
Progressive Era administration, 13 unity of effort, 64–72
Project management, TSM Abrams, 155 Quick Reaction Force (QRF), 183
Proportionality Quille studies, 321

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 Index  n  445

R fundamentals, 4, 6
RFID, see Radio Frequency Identification
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), 56 (RFID)
Raven, French and, studies, 290 Rhodes studies, 361
Rawlins, John A., 40 Richelson studies, 272–273
RDT&E, see Research, Development, Training, Ricks studies, 22, 175, 246
and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding Risk management, 54
Reagan, Ronald (President), 263–264, 266, 268 RMA, see Revolution in military affairs (RMA)
Realist foundations, 193–194 Rogers, Robert (Major), 257
Reasons for use, private military companies, Rohr, John, 17, 20
170–176 ROK, see Republic of Korea (ROK)
Reconfiguration, Total Force development, 59 Romjue studies, 146–147, 149
Reconstruction period, 38–39 Romzek and Ingraham studies, 20
Recruit quality, 295–296 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (President), 19n, 204,
Reeve studies, 270 271
Referent power, 290 Root, Elihu (Secretary of War), 12–13, 42
Reform background Rosen studies, 196, 241, 248–249, 251n10
Czech Republic, 348–349, 361–362 Ross, Posen and, studies, 195
Slovakia, 348–353 Rough Riders, 169
Reforms vision, 49–50 Rumsfeld, Donald H. (Secretary of Defense),
Regan studies, 310–311 47, 99, 112, 115, 117, 120, 152, 158,
Regional defense policy 311
Central and Eastern Europe, 347–352 Rutten studies, 325
Czech Republic, 361–368
Europe, 317–342
Latin America, 373–404
People’s Republic of China, 409–425 S
Slovakia, 352–360
Reinke and Baldwin studies, 285 Safety, TSM Abrams, 156
Reinke studies, 283–298, 301–314 Sagan, Scott, 197
Reiter, Dan, 248 Sagan and Waltz studies, 197
Reiter and Stam studies, 248–249 Sako studies, 291
Republic of Korea (ROK), 260 Salancik and Pfeffer studies, 290
Research, Development, Training, and Salmon, Kaldor and, studies, 337
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, 156 Salmon and Shepard studies, 327
Research and development, PPBES process, 118 Sample studies, 313
Reserve forces Samson studies, 352
defense budget, 119 Sandholtz, Stone-Sweet, Fligstein and, studies,
homeland security, 225 7
responsibilities shift, 234n11 Satellites, 341
validity, 216n4 Schake studies, 318
Residual impact, violence management, Schengen Information System (SIS), 341
313–314 Schmitt studies, 335
Resources Schroeder studies, 366–367
planning products, 86–87 Schubert, Frank N., 37
stewardship, 289 Schubert studies, 39
Responsibilities of Chairman, 76–77 Scope of reform effort, 354
Restrictions on means and methods, 309 Scorched earth tactics, 310
Retaliatory strikes, 268 Scott, Winfield (General in Chief), 32–35, 40
Revolution in military affairs (RMA) Scroggs studies, 229
Chinese characteristics, 8, 411, 414 Sea piracy, 262

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 446  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Search and seizure, 234n6 Skaff studies, 153–154

Sea rovers, 164 Skills development, 60–62, see also Training
Security Skopek, Jaroslav, 362–364
Navy SEALS compared to contractors, 178 Skowronek, Stephen, 12, 17, 20, 24
police force compared to soldiers, 225–228 Slovakia
Sedivy, Jiri, 363–364 drafting the plan, 356–358
Sefton studies, 40 economic assumptions, 358–359
Segal, Bachman, Blair and, studies, 10, 21 education, 360
Segal, Moskos, Williams and, studies, 14 force structure and modernization, 359
Segal studies, 23, 284–285 fundamentals, 7, 347–348, 368–370
Selfless service, 293 key elements of, 358–360
Senate Appropriations Committee, 105–106 leadership development, 360
Senior leadership focus, 50–52 national security documents, 354–355
Senior Level Review Group (SLRG), 115 overview, 358
September 11, 2001 impact personnel reform, 359–360
Czech Republic, 349–352 reform background, 348–353
impact on Chairmen, 75–76 scope of reform effort, 354
nonstate terrorist and guerilla networks, September 11, 2001 impact, 349–352
275–276 SR Force 2010, 358–360
private military companies, 187 supporting programs, 359–360
Slovakia, 349–352 sustaining and stationing, 360
Serafino, Elsea and, studies, 177 SLRG, see Senior Level Review Group (SLRG)
Service before self, 293 Smith, Flournoy and, studies, 327, 336
Service continuum, 59–60 Smith, Gustavus Woodson, 35
Shalikashvili, John M. (General), 75, 81, Smith studies, 318, 321
88–89, 91–92 Snider, Don, 17
Shalit, Gilad, 278 Snider, Nagl and Pfaff studies, 9, 21
Shambaugh studies, 415, 420–423 Snider, Watkins and Matthews studies, 14
Shannon studies, 36 Snider and Matthews studies, 14
Shared service model migration, 55 Snider and Watkins studies, 9, 18, 211
Shay studies, 145–158, 285, 291–293, 297, 303, Snider studies, 18, 21, 247, 292–293, 296
305, 310–311, 313–314 Snook, Bartone and, studies, 285
Shearer studies, 162 Snow, Drew and, studies, 306
Shelton, Henry Hugh (General), 15, 75, 81, 89, Snyder, Claire, 24
91–92 Snyder, Jack, 197–198, 248–249
Shepard, Salmon and, studies, 327 Social cohesion, 293
Sheridan, Phillip H. (General), 41 Social experimentation, 297
Sherman, William Tecumseh, 32, 35, 37, 40–41 Social legitimacy, 14
Shiff, Rebecca L., 251n6 Socially approved manner, 303
Shils and Janowitz studies, 284, 303–304 Social representation, 20–24
Shinseki, Eric K. (General), 151, 158 Societal imperatives, 240
Shrader studies, 32 Socrates (philosopher), 161
Shui-bian, Chen, 412 Solana studies, 317
Signals, threatening, 210–211 Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 244
Signals intelligence (SIGINT), 272–273 Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-military Gap
Silverstein studies, 186 and American National Security,
Simmons studies, 40 246–247
Simon, Herbert, 13 Soldiers compared to police force, 225–228
Singer studies, 163, 165, 173, 182 Soldiers requirements, see DOTLMS
Sioux Indians, 40–41 requirements
SIS, see Schengen Information System (SIS) Sorensen studies, 275

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 Index  n  447

Spanish-America War, 41–42 strategy, 85–86

SPB, see Strategic Planning Branch (SPB) structure, 78
Special Operations Command, 276 vision, 84–85
Spiral One/Spiral Two, 126–127 Strategic Planning Branch (SPB), 324–325
Spongenberg studies, 335 Strategies and strategic planning
SR Force 2010, Slovakia, 358–360 capability to inform, 51–52
S.S. Mayaguez, 262 defense policy and doctrinal insulation,
Stam, Allan, 248 194–195
Stam, Reiter and, studies, 248–249 direction, governance reforms, 50
Stanislawski studies, 7–8, 373–404 European Security and Defense Policy,
Stank, Josef, 357 320–324
Stanton, Edwin (Secretary of War), 35, 37, 40 planning products, 85–86
Stark studies, 165, 167, 169 structure, 78
Starry, Donn A. (General), 147 unity of effort, 65
Stationing Stress, 311–312
Czech Republic, 368 Structure
Slovakia, 360 doctrine, 196
1989 status, strategic planning, 79–80 strategic planning, 78
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), 177 Structure and organization
Steele and Walters studies, 296 Brazil forces, 391–394
Stein studies, 313 Colombia forces, 381–384
Steps, NSPS implementation, 127–128 Mexico forces, 379–381
Stevenson studies, 168, 174 Venezuela forces, 386, 387
Stevens studies, 37 Study findings
Stockton studies, 8, 409–425 American exceptionalism, 209
Stogdill and Coons studies, 285 BOP baseline prediction outcomes,
Stokes studies, 414 202–207, 203
Stone-Sweet, Fligstein and Sandholtz studies, 7 fluctuations, 207–208, 208
Strategic planning, 1990-2005 Subordination of self, 293
1989 status, 79–80 Summers studies, 273
1990 change, 80 Sung, Kim Il, 260
1993 change, 80 Sun Tzu studies, 194, 304–305
1997 change, 81 Supply-chain logistic management, 56–57
1999 change, 81 Supporting programs
2005 system, 81–82, 83 Czech Republic, 367–368
assessment, 83–84 Slovakia, 359–360
Chairman’s legacy, 87–90 Sustaining
Chairman’s responsibilities, 76–77 Czech Republic, 368
challenges, 78 Slovakia, 360
changes, 80–81 Svec studies, 354
cultural issues, 78 Swain studies, 146
evolution of planning system, 82 Swissair Flight 100, 261
fundamentals, 75–76, 91–93 2005 system, strategic planning, 81–82, 83
Myers, Richard B. (2001-2005), 89 Szayna studies, 353
planning products, 82–87
planning system changes, 79–82
plans, 87
Powell, Colin L. (1989-1993), 87–88
resources, 86–87
T
Shalikashvili, John M. (1993-1997), 88–89 Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
Shelton, Henry Hugh (1997-2001), 89 reinstatement, 156

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 448  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Tacit knowledge, 288 interagency operations development, 61–62

Tacticization of strategy, 216n2 joint training, 60
Taguba, Antonio (Major General), 309, 312 language skills, 61
Taguba studies, 296 National Security Personnel System, 63
Taillon studies, 258–259, 261, 273 reconfiguration, 59
Taiwan, 412, see also People’s Republic of China service continuum, 59–60
Task cohesion, 293 skills development, 60–62
Task differentiation, 15 Town hall meetings, 138–139
Taxonomy, private military companies, TRADOC system manager (TSM) Abrams,
163–164 see also Training and Doctrine
Taylor, Maxwell (General), 108 Command (TRADOC)
Taylor, Zachary (General and President), 32 Battle Labs Program, 149
Taylor and Mazarr, Jordan, studies, 256, 267, Concept Based Requirements System,
269 147–149, 148
Taylor studies, 232 day-to-day activities, 154–156
TDA, see Table of Distribution and Allowances DOTLMS requirements, 147–149
(TDA) reinstatement formation, 147
Teaching leadership, 286–288, 287, see also function and method, 153–154
Training fundamentals, 157–158
Teams Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 156–157
NSPS implementation, 133–134, 134 historical developments, 145–147
TSM Abrams, 150–151 integrated concept teams, 150–151
Technology, pressures on military culture, 295 Joint Capabilities Integration Development
Teheran, U.S. Embassy in, 262–263 System, 152
Teng-hui, Lee, 412 new requirements system, 149–150, 150
Termination, TSM Abrams, 156–157 termination of, 156–157
Terms, private military companies, 163–164 Transformation initiative, 151–152
Terrorism Trager and Zagorcheva studies, 268
of civilians, 310 Training, see also DOTLMS requirements;
National Security Presidential Directive, 67 International military education and
1970’s and 1980’s, 262–264 training (IMET); Skills development
strategy and command structure, 321–324, developments in, 3–4
323 interagency operations, 61–62
Terrorists, see Nonstate terrorist and guerilla joint, skills development, 60
networks, countering leadership, 286–288, 287
Testing and evaluation, PPBES process, 118 Training and Doctrine Command
Theories, leadership, 285–286 (TRADOC), 145–147, see also
The Professional Soldier, 239, 241–243 TRADOC system manager (TSM)
The Soldier and the State, 239–241, 242–243 Abrams
Thie studies, 15–16 TRANSCOM, see U.S. Transportation
Thigpen studies, 37 Command (U.S. TRANSCOM)
Thomson studies, 162, 165–166, 175 Transformation initiative, 151–152
Threatening signals, 210–211 Treasure Department, 118
Thucydides (historian), 151 TRICARE, 57
Tiger attach helicopter, 335 Tripoli incident, 268
Timeline, NSPS implementation, 134–136, 135 Truman, Harry S. (President), 107–108, 259
Toner studies, 290, 292, 303–304, 306, 308 Trust, 290–291
Total Force development Turf war model, 15
cultural skills, 61 Tvrdik, Jaroslav, 364–365
fundamentals, 58–59 TWA Flights, 261, 264
Human Capital Strategy, 62–63 2005 system, strategic planning, 81–82, 83

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 Index  n  449

Tzu studies, 194, 303–305 V

Values
compromising, homeland security, 230–231
U development of, 3–4
sense of alienation, 304
Ulmer, Collins and Jacobs studies, 287, shared, 303, 304–305
293–296 Van Evera, 199
Ulmer studies, 292 Variables of literature, dependent, 243–247
Ulrich studies, 7, 347–370 Vasu, Daley and, studies, 291
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 177, Vegetius (Roman military writer), 305
183 Venezuela forces
Union army, 34–35 Air Force, 389, 389
Unions, labor, 127 chain of command, 386, 386
United East India Company, 165 facts and developments, 390
United Nations Security Council, 180–181 fundamentals, 385–386
United States (U.S.), defense budget National Guard, 389
budgeting, 115–117 Navy, 386–388, 387–388
Constitutional impact, 101–102 structure and organization, 386, 387
defense budget, 106–120 Vetchy, Vladimir, 364
documents, 102–103 Vietnam, baseline predictions, 205
execution, 117–119, 118 Violence management
federal budget, 102–106 Abu Ghraib case, 309–310
fundamentals, 99–100 combat stress, 311–312
historical developments, 107–112 friendly fire, 310–311
network, 119–120 fundamentals, 302, 307, 324
planning, 113, 113–114 justified killing compared to war crimes,
processes, 103–106, 104, 107, 112–119 308–309
programming, 114–115 laws governing, 308–310
public budget overview, 100–101 prevention, 324
Unity, sense of, 303 residual impact, 313–314
Unity of effort Vision
changes needed, 64–65 DoD reforms, 49–50
communications, 72 planning products, 84–85
field lessons, 66 Volunteers, see All volunteer force (AVF)
foreign assistance, 70–72 Von Clausewitz, Carl, 194, 210, 213, 240–241,
fundamentals, 64 292, 302–307
homeland contingencies, 67–68 Von Sydow studies, 327
interagency operations, 65–72 Vroom studies, 286
international allies and partners, 68–70
operational framework, 65
overseas contingencies, 66–67
strategic framework, 65
W
Upton, Emory (Colonel), 12, 32–33, 36 Wait studies, 36
Uribe, Alvaro, 385 Wakin studies, 291
U.S. Joint Forces Command (U.S. JFCOM), 59 Waldo, Dwight, 13
U.S. Transportation Command (U.S. Walker, Edwards and, studies, 193
TRANSCOM), 49 Wallander studies, 349, 351
USA Patriot Act, 231, 235n16 Walters, Steele and, studies, 296
Utley studies, 37, 39, 41 Walter studies, 38

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 450  n  Handbook of Military Administration

Waltz, Sagan and, studies, 197 World War I

Waltz studies, 193 baseline predictions, 202–203
War crimes compared to justified killing, changes in warfare methods, 278
308–309 World War II
War of the Rebellion, 34–37, 40 baseline predictions, 203–204
Washington, George (General/President), 33, fluctuations, 208
258, 271 Wounded Knee battle, 41
Watkins, Snider and, studies, 9, 18, 211
Watkins and Matthews, Snider, studies, 14
Watman, Millett, Murray and, studies, 249
Webb studies, 34–35 X
Weber, Heidi Amelia-Anne, studies, 31–42
Weber, Jeffrey A., studies, 1–8, 99–120 Xiaoping, Deng, 410, 413
Weber, Max, 166, 168, 292, 303, 307
Weeks studies, 41
Weigley, Russell F., 17, 33–34, 237
Weinberger, Casper, 110 Y
Weiss studies, 15 Yousef, Ramzi, 264, 270
Westphalia developments, 162, 163, 278 Yunis, Fawaz, 264
Wheelan studies, 258
Whitman, Manners and, studies, 338
Whitney studies, 333, 337–338
Wildavsky, Aaron, 110
Wildavsky, Pressman and, studies, 13
Z
Williams and Segal, Moskos, studies, 14 Zagorcheva, Trager and, studies, 268
Williams studies, 313 Zand studies, 291
William the Conqueror, 162 Zarate studies, 164, 186
Wills studies, 181 Zedillo, Ernesto, 378
Wilson, Woodrow (President), 12 Zegart, Amy, 251n7
Winter War 1939-1940, 249 Zeman, Milos, 362
Wong and Johnson studies, 14 Zemin, Jiang, 413, 423
Woodward, Bob (journalist), 264 Zielonka studies, 5, 317
Work and management reforms, 55–56 Zirkle, Robert, 247, 249
Worldview, 304 Zisk studies, 197

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