3. Reyes V.
Gonzales
G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. On December
1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul
Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to
the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17
others for lack of probable cause.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case
against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA
as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s
counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007,
petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the
NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion
of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of
HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ
is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to
travel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
HELD:
No. The Writ of Amparo does not cover the Constitutional right to travel. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are
thefollowing: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of
the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion."
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed
against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner
and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
