HANDBOOK

of
REVOLUTIONARY
WARFARE
A Guide to the Armed Phase of the
African Revolution

INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS
New York
 To
The African Guerrilla

Copyright © by Kwame Nkrumah, 1968

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

First United States Edition, 1969

Printed in the United States of America

 PUBLISHER'S NOTE
The Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare was published
toward the end of 1968 by Panaf Books, Ltd., London. A
significant historical document, it provides basic source mate-
rial for the study of the new phase of the African Revolution.
Within the present decade guerrilla warfare has emerged
as a new feature of the liberation movement in those areas of
Southern Africa dominated by white racial minorities. Be-
ginning with the launching of armed struggles in the Portu-
guese colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissau and later in
Mozambique, it appeared also in Southwest Africa and more
recently in the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia. Other
African countries have helped train and supply the guerrilla
forces, while preparations for similar movements seem to be
under way elsewhere in Africa.
Although each of these liberation movements have their
specific features and their own leaderships, there is present a
strong tendency toward the coordination of their efforts, in
face of the supra-national oppressive military role being as-
sumed by the apartheid oligarchy of South Africa and the
intervention of the neo-colonial powers. A formal coordinat-
ing body already exists for the struggles in the Portuguese
colonies and the movements in Rhodesia and South Africa
are coordinated through their respective organizations. In the
Handbook, President Kwame Nkrumah presents his analysis
of the new stage of the African Revolution and his proposals
for anti-imperialist coordination on a continental scale.
 AUTHOR'S NOTE

This book has been written during my stay in Conakry.

Previous notes I made for a manual of guerrilla warfare
for African freedom fighters were left behind in Ghana
when I departed for Hanoi on 21st February 1966. The
manuscript was handed over to imperialist and neo-
colonialist intelligence organisations by the military and
police traitors.
This HANDBOOK, presenting a completely new approach
will, I hope, help to make possible the successful completion
of the armed phase of the African revolutionary struggle
for total emancipation and an All-African Union Govern-
ment.
The Black Power movement in the U.S.A., and the
struggles of peoples of African descent in the Caribbean,
South America and elsewhere, form an integral part of the
African politico-military revolutionary struggle. Our victory
will be their victory also, and the victory of all the revolu-
tionary, oppressed and exploited masses of the world who
are challenging the capitalist, imperialist and neo-colonialist
power structure of reaction and counter-revolution.

Conakry, Guinea.
30th July 1968.
 RULES OF DISCIPLINE

1. Obey orders in all your actions.

2. Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the

masses.

3. Turn in everything captured.

4. Speak politely.

5. Pay fairly for what you buy.

6. Return everything you borrow.

7. Pay for anything you damage.

8. Do not hit or swear at people.

9. Do not damage crops.

10. Do not take liberties with women.

11. Do not ill-treat captives.

12. Keep your eyes and ears open.

13. Know the enemy within.

14. Always guide and protect the children.

15. Always be the servant of the people.

 CONTENTS

PAGE
BOOK ONE—KNOW THE ENEMY 1

PREFACE

CHAPTER ONE
THE WORLD STRATEGY OF
I MPERIALISM 1
Know the enemy—Collective imperialism—
Sham independence—Neo-colonialism—The
struggle against neo-colonialism—Propa-
ganda and psychological warfare—Foreign
military preparedness—The need for Pan-
African organisation.

CHAPTER TWO
OUR OBJECTIVES 24
Nationalism — Pan-Africanism — Socialism
—The present stage of the liberation struggle
—Accumulated experience of the African
people's unity movement—Sham indepen-
dence and the unity movement—African
people's wars and imperialist escalation—
The Organisation of African Unity—Some
essential features of the enemy's offensive—
The need for self-critical objective diagnosis.
BOOK TWO—STRATEGY, TACTICS AND
TECHNIQUES
PAGE
PREFACE 42

CHAPTER ONE
ORGANISATION FOR REVOLU-
TIONARY WARFARE
A. THE MILITARY BALANCE 43
Liberated areas—Zones under enemy control
— Contested zones — Retarding factors —
High command—The need for co-ordinated
revolutionary action.
B. POLITICO-MILITARY
ORGANISATION 56
The All-African People's Revolutionary Party
( AAPRP) and the All-African Committee
for Political Co-ordination (AACPC)—The
All-African People's Revolutionary Army
(AAPRA) — AAPRA headquarters — The
AACPC and our revolutionary strategy—
The army corps—AAPRA's structure and
strategy—Equipment and composition of the
armed forces—Recruitment—General princi-
ples of training—Physical training—Tech-
nical training—Political education—Leader-
ship.
C. OUR HUMAN FORCES 75
The peasants—The rural proletariat—Neo-
colonialist control over the advanced sectors
of production—Workers in the mines, indust-
ries and trade—Neo-colonialist attempts at
integration—The truth behind the salaries
The failure of imperialist tactics—The
 workers' movement and revolutionary strat-
egy—The role of students—The nationalist
bourgeoisie—Revolutionary outsiders—The
role of women—Women in enemy-held zones
—Women in the bases and liberated areas—
The training of women.
PAGE
D. PROPAGANDA 95
Propaganda to subvert the enemy—Propa-
ganda addressed to the people—Suggestions
for propaganda items.

CHAPTER TWO
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES
OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

A. ORGANISATION OF A GUERRILLA
ARMY 103
Recruitment — Information — Operations
—Sabotage — Instruction — Armament —
Provisions — Health — Propaganda — Vol-
unteers — Communications — Guerrilla units
— Guerrilla unit and group leaders
Training — Equipment.

B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 108

Mobility—Concentration and dispersal of
forces—Bases—Choice of objectives for attack
— Combat in favourable terrain—Combat in
unfavourable terrain — Villages — Towns —
Discipline — Reconnaissance — Prisoners —
Camouflage—Acquisition of arms—Storage
of arms — Espionage — Enemy spies and
 infiltrators — Enemy attack — Sabotage —
Attacking a village—Dead and wounded—
Defence of an occupied village—Relations
between guerrillas and civilians—Political
work—Civilian organisations.
PAGE
C. MATERIALS FOR DESTRUCTION 122
The guerrilla is the masses in arms
 BOOK ONE

KNOW THE ENEMY

PREFACE
The new phase of the armed revolutionary struggle in Africa
embraces the entire continent. It is essential that we know
what we fight, and why we fight. Imperialism and neo-
colonialism must be broken down into their component
parts so that we can clearly see them. We must know their
world strategy.
In this book I have attempted to show the nature and
extent of imperialist and neo-colonialist aggression, and our
objectives in the struggle for the freedom and the political
unification of Africa.

CHAPTER ONE

THE WORLD STRATEGY OF IMPERIALISM

Know the enemy
A number of external factors affect the African situation,
and if our liberation struggle is to be placed in correct per-
spective and we are to KNOW THE ENEMY, the impact
of these factors must be fully grasped. First among them is
imperialism, for it is mainly against exploitation and
poverty that our peoples revolt. It is therefore of paramount
importance to set out the strategy of imperialism in clear
terms :
1. The means used by the enemy to ensure the continued
economic exploitation of our territories.
2. The nature of the attempts made to destroy the lib-
eration movement.
Once the components of the enemy's strategy are deter-

1
mined, we will be in a position to outline the correct strategy
for our own struggle in terms of our actual situation and
in accordance with our objectives.
Before the Second World War, the world (excluding the
USSR, China, etc.) was divided into :
(a) Capitalist states practising orthodox imperialism
under the generally known form of imperialism.
(b) Colonial territories which fed the economies of the
capitalist imperialist states. (The Latin American
territories had already passed from the status of
"Spanish" and "Portuguese" colonies to that of neo-
colonies.)
However, after the Second World War, serious economic,
social and political tensions arose in both spheres.
(a) Inside the capitalist-imperialist states, workers'
organisations had become comparatively strong and
experienced, and the claims of the working class for
a more substantial share of the wealth produced by
the capitalist economy could no longer be ignored.
The necessity to concede had become all the more im-
perative since the European capitalist system had
been seriously shaken up by the near-holocaust which
marked the experience of imperialist wars.
(b) While the capitalist system of exploitation was coming
to grips with its internal crises, the world's colonised
areas were astir with the upsurge of strong liberation
movements. Here again, demands could no longer be
cast aside or ignored especially when they were chan-
nelled through irresistible mass movements, like the
Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA),
the Parti Démocratique de Guineé (PDG) and the
Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) in Ghana. In
certain areas, for example in Vietnam, Kenya and
 Algeria, direct confrontation demonstrated the readi-
ness of the oppressed peoples to implement their
claims with blood and fire.
Both in the colonial territories and in the metropolitan
states, the struggle was being waged against the same
enemy : international finance capital under its external and
internal forms of exploitation, imperialism and capitalism.

Threatened with disintegration by the double-fisted

attack of the working class movement and the liberation
movement, capitalism had to launch a series of reforms in
order to build a protective armour around the inner
workings of its system.
To avoid an internal breakdown of the system under the
pressure of the workers' protest movement, the govern-
ments of capitalist countries granted their workers certain
concessions which did not endanger the basic nature of the
capitalist system of exploitation. They gave them social
security, higher wages, better working conditions, profess-
ional training facilities, and other improvements.
These reforms helped to blur fundamental contradictions,
and to remove some of the more glaring injustices while at
the same time ensuring the continued exploitation of the
workers. The myth was established of an affluent capitalist
society promising abundance and a better life for all. The
basic aim, however, was the establishment of a "welfare
state" as the only safeguard against the threat of fascism
or communism.
However, the problem was to find a way to avoid sacri-
ficing the all-important principle of ever-increasing profits
for the owning minority, and also to find the money needed
to finance the welfare state.
By way of a solution, capitalism proceeded to introduce
not only internal reforms, but external reforms designed to
raise the extra money needed for the establishment and the
maintenance of the welfare state at home. In other words,
modern capitalism had come to depend more heavily than
before on the exploitation of the material and human re-
sources of the colonial territories. On the external front,
therefore, it became necessary for international finance
capital to carry out reforms in order to eliminate the
deadly threat to its supremacy of the liberation movement.
The urgent need for such reforms was made clear by the
powerful growth and expansion of the liberation forces in
Africa, Asia and Latin America, where revolutionary move-
ments had not only seized power but were actually con-
solidating their gains. Developments in the USSR,
China, Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and in
Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria and other parts of
Africa, showed that not only was the world balance of forces
shifting, but that the capitalist-imperialist states were con-
fronted with a real danger of encirclement.

Collective imperialism
The modifications introduced by imperialism in its strategy
were expressed :
(a) through the disappearance of the numerous old-
fashioned "colonies" owing exclusive allegiance to a
single metropolitan country.
(b) through the replacement of "national" imperialisms
by a "collective" imperialism in which the USA
occupies a leading position.
 The roots of this process may be traced back to the period
of the Second World War, when the socialist camp was
still too small and weak to give decisive assistance to the
European working class movement. The workers were
therefore all the more easily deflected from the objectives
of their struggle, and allowed themselves to be dragged into
a bloody war of imperialism.
The Second World War seriously strained the political
and economic strength of Europe, although capitalism as a
system emerged relatively intact. However, the true winner
of the whole contest turned out to be the United States of
America. Having helped the allies to win the war, the USA
was from then on able to retain its pre-eminent position,
and to acquire increasing influence in the economic life of
the exhausted European states.
This "internationalisation" or "syndicalisation" enabled
US imperialism to forestall temporarily an incipient
crisis by fulfilling two sin qua non conditions :
I. The need to expand
The US-European post-war alliance not only enabled
the USA to benefit from the advantages of the Euro-
pean market, which had hitherto been largely closed
to its penetration; but also opened up new horizons in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America where the USA
had already superceded European supremacy and
established neo-colonialist domination.
2. The need to militarise
The militarisation of the US economy, based on
the political pretext of the threatening rise of the
USSR and later of the People's Republic of China as
socialist powers, enabled the USA to postpone its in-
ternal crises, first during the "hot" war (1939-1945)
and then during the "cold" war (since 1945) .

6
 Militarisation served two main purposes :
1. It absorbed, and continues to absorb, an excess of
unorganised energy into the intense armaments drive
which supports imperialist aggression and many blocs
and alliances formed by imperialist powers over the
last twenty years.
2. It made possible an expensive policy of paternalist
corruption of the poor and oppressed people of the
world.
The principle of mutual inter-imperialist assistance
whereby American, British, French and West German
monopoly capital extends joint control over the wealth of
the non-liberated zones of Africa, Latin America and Asia,
finds concrete expression in the formation of interlocked
international financial institutions and bodies of credit:
International Monetary Fund (IMF), USA 25% of the
votes.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), USA 34% of the votes.
International Development Association (IDA), USA
41% of the votes.
On a lesser scale, Europe as a whole, and West Germany
in particular, find profitable outlets for big business in
Africa through the agencies of such organisations as the
European Common Market (EEC).
The imperialists even make use of the United Nations
Organisation in order to camouflage their neo-colonialist
objectives. This can be seen, for example in US policy in
South Korea and the Congo.

Sham independence
But as far as the imperialists are concerned the real solu-
tion to the problem of continued exploitation through con-

7
cessions and reform lies in the concept of "sham-indepen-
dence". A state can be said to be a neo-colonialist or client
state if it is independent de jure and dependent de facto.
It is a state where political power lies in the conservative
forces of the former colony and where economic power re-
mains under the control of international finance capital.
In other words, the country continues to be economically
exploited by interests which are alien to the majority of
the ex-colonised population but are intrinsic to the world
capitalist sector. Such a state is in the grip of neo-
colonialism. It has become a client state.

Neo-colonialism
The pre-requisite of a correct and global strategy to defeat
neo-colonialism is the ability to discover and expose the
way in which a state becomes neo-colonialist. For although
a neo-colonialist state enjoys only sham independence it is
to all outward appearances independent, and therefore the
very roots of neo-colonialism must be traced back to the
struggle for independence in a colonial territory.
If the liberation movement is firmly established, the colo-
nial power invariably resorts to a "containment" policy
in order to stop any further progress, and to deaden its
impact. To achieve this objective, the colonial power uses
its arsenal of alliances, its network of military bases, eco-
nomic devices such as corruption, sabotage and blackmail,
and equally insidious, the psychological weapon of propa-
ganda with a view to impressing on the masses a number of
imperialist dogmas :
1. That western democracy and the parliamentary
system are the only valid ways of governing; that
they constitute the only worth-while model for the
training of an indigenous élite by the colonial power.
 2. That capitalism, free enterprise, free competition,
etc., are the only economic systems capable of pro-
moting development; that the western powers have
mastered the liberal-capitalist technique perfectly;
that the colonial territory should become an economic
satellite in its own interest; that there is no reason to
put an end to the policy of "co-operation" pursued
during the colonial regime; and that any attempt to
break away would be dangerous, since the colonial
power is always ready to give "aid".
3. That the slightest "lapse" on the part of the leaders
of the liberation movement could push the country
into the grip of "communism" and of "totalitarian
dictatorship".
4. That the carve-up agreed upon by the imperialists
during the colonial period is fair and sacred; that it
would be unthinkable even to attempt to liberate areas
in terms of their common cultural and historical links;
that the only acceptable version of "liberation" must
apply to the artificial units designed by the imperia-
lists, and hurriedly labelled "nations" in spite of the
fact that they are neither culturally unified, nor
economically self-sufficient.
As a further justification of its policy, i mperialism usu-
ally resorts to all types of propaganda in order to highlight
and exploit differences of religion, culture, race, outlook,
and of political ideology among the oppressed masses, or
between regions which share a long history of mutual
commercial and cultural exchange.
Such methods aim to orientate the leaders of the libera-
tion movements towards a brand of nationalism based on
petty-minded and aggressive , chauvinism, as well as to steer
the liberation movement along a reformist path. The prob-
lem of "liberation" is therefore usually raised in terms of
a participation of "good" indigenous elements in the
administration of the colonised territory, for instance
through a policy of "africanisation" devoid of any funda-
mental changes in the political, economic and administrative
structure of the territory.
The transition to neo-colonialism is marked by a succes-
sion of more or less important measures which culminate
into a ritual of so-called free elections, mostly organised
through methods of intimidation. Local agents, selected by
the colonial power as "worthy representatives" are then
presented to the people as the champions of national inde-
pendence, and are immediately given all the superficial
attributes of power : a puppet government has been formed.
By the very nature of its essential objective, which is
exploitation, neo-colonialism can only flourish in a client
state.
When the farce of sham elections to form a puppet gov-
ernment proves too difficult to enact, the colonial power
tries to divide the liberation movement into a "moderate"
wing with which it seeks accommodation, and a militant
wing which it endeavours to isolate and to suppress by
force.
In the last resort, neo-colonialists can even set up a bogus
"progressive" party or organisation using local agents and
maintain an artificial liberation movement which serves
both as a worthy partner for negotiations and as an intelli-
gence and/or repression agency against the genuine libera-
tion movement supported by the oppressed masses. Such
is the role played by FLING in regard to Guinea-Bissao,
and UPA in regard to Angola. And so once more the stage
is set for negotiations, autonomy and the formation of a
puppet government.

10
 However, the machinations of the colonial power will fail
wherever the leaders of the struggle for independence main-
tain a clear spirit of vigilance, and cultivate genuinely
revolutionary qualities.
Then, and only then, does a truly independent govern-
ment emerge, dedicated to national reconstruction in
the liberated territory, and determined to assist all those
engaged in anti-imperialist struggle.
Such a government is an obstacle barring the advance of
neo-colonialism, and such obstacles must be increased be-
cause the example of genuine independence is contagious
and will help to fortify extensive zones against imperialist
aggression.
Faced with genuine independence, imperialism is increas-
ingly compelled to resort to encirclement and subversion
in order to overthrow these popular governments, using
such weapons as coups d'etat, assassination, mutiny within
the party, tribal revolt, palace revolutions, and so on, while
at the same time strengthening neighbouring puppet
regimes to form a political safety belt, a cordon sanitaire.
Therefore, the main sphere in which we must strive to
defeat neo-colonialist intrigues is within the movement for
true independence; that is, within the progressive political
party which forms the government. This is particularly true
in the one party state which can only function successfully
under socialism. Usually, this ruling party is made up
of several groups each with its distinct economic and politi-
cal interests. The relative importance of each group in the
party and state machinery will determine the course of de-
velopment. Imperialist strategy is therefore directed
towards bringing into a position of pre-eminence that group
which most nearly shares its economic and political views.
If a member of a group which is absolutely opposed to

11
imperialism is in control of the state and party, attempts
are made to organise :
Either
1. Assassination or a coup d'état or "palace revolu-
tion" which will permit political power to fall into
the lap of the rival but pro-imperialist group.
Or
2. A decentralisation of political power within the ruling
party, one group being strong in the state machinery,
the other strong in the party machine. Even in the
state machine, the vital organs are artfully put into
the hands of forces ready to parley with imperialists.
The nursing of discontent and confusion within the
party and among the people, through the spread of
conflicting ideologies, rumours of economic run-
down, maladministration and corruption, will per-
mit the creation of an atmosphere of dissatisfaction
favourable to a change in the personnel of govern-
ment. Ostensibly the same party is in power. In
truth, a qualitative change in the nature of political
power has taken place.
Since the conglomerate nature of the ruling party is the
basic fact on which neo-colonialist strategy depends, the
main remedial measures must be directed to this sphere,
and this problem must be borne in mind even before the
achievement of independence. It is essential that positive
action should in its dialectical evolution anticipate the
seminal disintegration and discover a way of containing
the future schismatic tendencies.
Neo-colonialism constitutes the necessary condition for
the establishment of welfare states by the imperialist
nations. Just as the welfare state is the internal condition,
neo-colonialism is the external condition, for the continued

12
hegemony of international finance capital.
It is precisely the increasing dependence of the imperialist
system on neo-colonialist exploitation on an international
scale which renders its existence so precarious, and its future
so uncertain.

Significantly, the neo-colonialist system costs the capi-

talist powers comparatively little, while enormous and in-
creasing profits are made. This is shown by the ever-rising
graphs representing the turn-over figures of the big capitalist
business concerns implanted in the neo-colonialist areas of
the world, and by the ever-widening gap between the
wealthy and the poor peoples of the world.
In the final analysis, the neo-colonialist system of exploi-
tation, which is the external condition for the maintenance

13
of the capitalist welfare state, remains essentially dependent
on the production of the neo-colonised workers, who must
not only continue to produce under stagnant and continu-
ally worsening living conditions, but must produce sub-
stantially more than they did in the colonial days. They
must do more than satisfy the needs of the metropolitan
state. They must cater for the insatiable demands of the
client government.
The explosive character of this situation cannot be
denied. The neo-colonialist government is virtually in a

state of permanent conflict with its own masses, whilst the

gap between the puppet administration and neo-colonised
workers widens every day.
It is therefore clear that a puppet regime cannot draw its
strength from the support of the broad masses. It can only
stay in power as long as it manages to subsist in the teeth
of popular opposition and revolt. Hence, the imperative
need to depend on a foreign power for military assistance
merely to keep the neo-colonised government physically in
power.
Thus, the three essential components of neo-colonialism
are :
1. Economic exploitation
2. Puppet governments and client states
3. Military assistance
4. Economic "aid"
The vital necessity of "military aid" is fulfilled through
various channels : foreign technical assistance to the armed
forces, control of the armed forces by officers and western
military cadres, secret military agreements, the formation
of special units for the repression of popular insurrection,
and so on. The important thing is to know how to recognise
this type of "aid", in whatever guise it appears, for it is
the most blatant proof of the anti-popular, aggressive and
basically violent character of all neo-colonialist regimes. Its
escalation and impact increase proportionately to the widen-
ing gap between the puppets and the oppressed masses, and
it is directly related to the development of organised,
popular resistance.
It is also to be noted that US policy found its most
complete expression, after the murder of President
Kennedy, in the Johnson doctrine whereby military aggres-
sion, under the name of "preventive measures", became an
integral part of neo-colonialist practice.

The struggle against neo-colonialism

Military strategy presupposes political aims. All military

15
problems are political, and all political problems are
economic.
Both the basic nature of neo-colonialism and the accu-
mulated experience of liberation movements in Africa, Asia
and Latin America indicate clearly that the only way for
the broad masses to eradicate neo-colonialism is through
a revolutionary movement springing from a direct confront-
ation with the imperialists, and drawing its strength from
the exploited and disinherited masses. The struggle against
puppet governments, and against all forms of exploitation,
is the basic condition for the survival and development of
a genuine liberation movement in Africa. We must accept
the challenge and fight to destroy this threat to our future
as a free and united continent.
Independence must never be considered as an end in it-
self but as a stage, the very first stage of the people's revo-
lutionary struggle.

Propaganda and psychological warfare

Throughout the struggle we must recognise and combat
enemy attempts to demoralise us. For, in the face of the
failure to achieve military solutions against well-organised,
broadly-based guerrilla forces, as for example in Vietnam,
the enemy has stepped up its efforts in the propaganda war.
The aim is:
1. To prevent a liberation movement from getting under
way, by destroying it at its source, i.e. by under-
mining the will to fight.
2. Where revolutionary warfare has actually begun, to
conquer it by political means, i.e. by granting just
sufficient political, economic and social "reform" to
encourage all but the so-called "extremists" to aban-
don the struggle.

16
 Psychological attacks are made through the agency of
broadcasting stations like the BBC, Voice of Germany,
and above all, Voice of America, which pursues its brain-
washing mission through newsreels, interviews and other
"informative" programmes at all hours of the day and
night, on all wavelengths and in many languages, including
"special English". The war of words is supplemented by
written propaganda using a wide range of political devices
such as embassy bulletins, pseudo "revolutionary" publi-
cations, studies on "nationalism" and on "African socia-
lism", the literature spread by the so-called independent
and liberal publishers, "cultural" and "civic education"
centres, and other imperialist subversive organisations.
The paper war penetrates into every town and village,
and into the remotest parts of the "bush". It spreads in the
form of free distributions of propaganda films praising the
qualities of western civilisation and culture. These are some
of the ways in which the psychological terrain is prepared.
When the target, a certain country or continent, is suffi-
ciently "softened", then the invasion of evangelist brigades
begins, thus perpetuating the centuries old tactic whereby
missionaries prepare the way for guns. Peace Corps divi-
sions stream in, and Moral Rearmament units, Jehovah
witnesses, information agencies and international financial
"aid" organisations.
In this way, a territory or even an entire continent is
besieged without a single marine in sight. A sprinkling of
political and little-publicised murders, like that of Pio
Pinto in Kenya, and Moumié in Geneva, are used to assist
the process.
A recent development in the psychological war is the
campaign to convince us that we cannot govern ourselves,
that we are unworthy of genuine independence, and that

17
foreign tutelage is the only remedy for our wild, warlike
and primitive ways.
Imperialism has done its utmost to brainwash Africans
into thinking that they need the strait-jackets of colonialism
and neo-colonialism if they are to be saved from their retro-
gressive instincts. Such is the age-old racialist justification
for the economic exploitation of our continent. And now,
the recent military coups engineered throughout Africa by
foreign reactionaries are also being used to corroborate
imperialism's pet theory that the Africans have shamelessly
squandered the "golden opportunities" of independence,
and that they have plunged their political kingdoms into
blood and barbarism.
Therefore, the imperialist mission : we must save them
anew; and they hail the western-trained and western-bought
army puppets as saviours. The press, films and radio are
fast spreading the myth of post-independence violence and
chaos. Everywhere, the more or less covert implication is :
Africa needs to be recolonised.
The fact that Africa has advanced politically more
quickly than any other continent in the world is ignored.
In 1957 when Ghana became independent and the political
renaissance began in Africa, there were only eight inde-
pendent states. Now, in just over ten years, there are over
forty and the final liberation of the continent is in sight.
Imperialists are not content with trying to convince us
that we are politically immature. They are telling us, now
that we are realising that armed revolution is the only way
to defeat neo-colonialism, that we are inherently incapable
of fighting a successful revolutionary war.
This new psychological propaganda campaign is being
waged in various subtle ways. First, there is what may be
called the "moral" argument : Africans are constantly

18
being reminded that they are a peace-loving, tolerant and
communalist-minded people. The African is projected as an
individual who has always been loath to shed blood. The
corollary of this argument is that it would be immoral and
against our nature to engage in revolutionary warfare.
The moral argument is easily destroyed. Centuries of
liberation wars, wars of conquest, revolution and counter-
revolution in the west were not considered to be moral or
immoral. They were simply part of western historical de-
velopment. Our armed struggle for freedom is neither
moral nor immoral, it is a scientific historically-determined
necessity.
The second argument used to deflect us from the inevi-
tability of armed struggle is the so-called "economy" argu-
ment. It runs something like this : modern neo-colonialism
does not constitute a danger to young, revolutionary Afri-
can states, and therefore the military training and arming
of the broad masses is an expensive and frivolous enter-
prise. The corollary of this reactionary argument is : since
you cannot, in the present under-developed state of your
economy, afford the "luxury" of your own defence, let
us take care of it for you. And the trap is set.
Last but not least, is a third series of racialist and de-
featist arguments designed to spread the myth that no Afri-
can revolutionary is capable of carrying an armed struggle
through to the end. It condemns a-priori all African revo-
lutionary activities to failure. It wraps revolutionary war-
fare on our continent in an aura of disparagement, and tries
to cripple us with a sense of inadequacy as freedom fighters.
By means of press and radio, accounts are given of the
capture of "terrorists" by "security forces", (note the
choice of words), the "terrorists" being usually described
as poorly-trained, ill-equipped, demoralised and uncertain

19
of the cause for which they are fighting. Where arms and
military equipment are seized, it is always labelled
"Russian" or "Chinese", to suggest that the freedom
fighters who use them are not African nationalists, but the
dupes and tools of foreign governments.
When freedom fighters are captured and tried in courts
of law, they are treated as criminals, not as prisoners of war,
and are imprisoned, shot or hanged, usually after
so-called confessions have been extorted. This refusal to
recognise freedom fighters as soldiers is again part of im-
perialist strategy designed to pour scorn on the armed revo-
lutionary movement, and at the same time to discourage
further recruits.
The campaign is based on the counter-insurgency law
whereby "it is necessary to attack the revolution during
the initial stages of the movement when it is still weak,
when it has not yet fulfilled that which should be its main
aspiration,—a total integration with the people". (Ché
Guevara.) This is why we are being told that Africans are
incapable of sustaining revolutionary warfare : —
(a) racially
(b) because of our historical background
(c) for lack of cadres, ideology and leadership.
In one breath, we are accused of being too primitive to
govern ourselves, and in the next we are accused of not
being primitive enough to wage guerrilla warfare !
The problem is not whether one is born or is not born
a natural revolutionary fighter. The problem is not whether
revolutionaries are naturally suited to Africa, or Africa to
revolutionary warfare. Predestination of this sort never
exists. The fact is that revolutionary warfare is the key to
African freedom and is the only way in which the total

20
liberation and unity of the African continent can be
achieved.

Foreign military preparedness

In pursuing their aggressive aims and fulfilling the re-
quirements of military strategy, the imperialists have built
up a system of military blocs and alliances which provide
the framework for a pattern of military bases in strategically
important positions all over the world. The African freedom
fighters, while mainly concerned with enemy strength in
Africa, must nevertheless study this world pattern if they
are to assess correctly the true dimensions of their struggle.
The anti-imperialist and neo-colonialist struggle will, in
fact, be world-wide, since revolutionary warfare will occur
wherever the enemy operates.
A substantial part of the military, anti-revolutionary
effort is channelled into four organisations:
NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (1949)
USA, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland,
Luxembourg, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark,
Portugal. Since October 1951 Greece and Turkey, and
since 1954 West Germany.
SEATO—South East Asia Treaty Organisation (1954)
USA, Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia,
Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.
ANZUS—Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty
(1951). The Pacific Pact.
CENTO—Central Treaty Organisation (1959)
Britain, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. Emerged from
the 1955 Baghdad Pact. USA in 1959 entered into
bilateral defence agreements with Turky, Iran and
Pakistan.
In effect, this system of military blocs and alliances en-

21
ables US imperialism to exert de facto leadership not
only over the entire "western" world, but over extensive
zones in Latin America and Asia. This is achieved through
an external network of some 2,200 bases and installations
manned by approximately a million troops in readiness for
war.
The US external forces of intervention may be grouped
as follows.
Group One : Against the USSR with bases in Western
Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.
Group Two : Against China with bases in Pakistan,
South East Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
Group Three : Against revolutionary movements in Latin
America—the Organisation of American States
( OAS) group with bases in Panama, the Bermudas
and Porto Rico.
In Africa, there are at present seventeen air bases owned
and operated by members of NATO. There are nine foreign
naval bases. Foreign military missions exist for example
in Kenya, Morocco, Liberia, Libya, South Africa, Senegal,
Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon and Ivory Coast. In addi-
tion, there are three rocket sites and an atomic testing range
in North Africa.
The armed forces of foreign powers in various strategi-
cally-important parts of our continent present a serious
threat but not an insurmountable obstacle in the African
revolutionary struggle. For they must be assessed in con-
junction with the forces of settler, minority governments in
Rhodesia and South Africa, and with imperialist forces in
the few remaining colonial territories.
The formation of NATO led to the signing of the Warsaw
Treaty in 1954, by which the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Ru-

22
mania, Czechoslavakia and Albania made arrangements
to protect themselves against imperialist aggression. An
attack on any one member would be regarded as an attack
on all. Provision was made for:
1. A political consultative body to take political decisions
and to exchange information
2. A united military command with headquarters in
Warsaw.

The need for Pan-African organisation

In comparison, the Independent States of Africa are at
present militarily weak. Unlike the imperialists and neo-
colonialists they have no mutual defence system and no
unified command to plan and direct joint action. But this
will be remedied with the formation of the All-African
People's Revolutionary Army and the setting up of organi-
sations to extend and plan effective revolutionary warfare
on a continental scale.
We possess the vital ingredient necessary to win,—the
full and enthusiastic support of the broad masses of the
African people who are determined once and for all to end
all forms of foreign exploitation, to manage their own
affairs, and to determine their own future. Against such
overwhelming strength organised on a Pan-African basis,
no amount of enemy forces can hope to succeed.

23
 Chapter Two

OUR OBJECTIVES

Our objectives are defined by the three political compo-

nents of our liberation movement :
1. Nationalism
2. Pan-Africanism
3. Socialism
The three objectives of our struggle stem from our posi-
tion as peoples in revolt against exploitation in Africa.
These objectives are closely inter-related and one cannot
be achieved fully without the other. If one of the three com-
ponents is missing, no territory on our continent can secure
genuine freedom or maintain a stable government.

Nationalism
Nationalism is the ideological channel of the anti-colonia-
list struggle and represents the demand for national inde-
pendence of colonised peoples. It is a concept most easily
grasped by the population of territories where the low level
of development of productive forces (and therefore of capi-
talist implantation), and the absence of indigenous elements
in the spheres of political power, are factors that facilitate
the formation of a united militant front, one of the primary
conditions for a successful liberation movement.
Colonised peoples are not highly differentiated from a
social point of view, and are exploited practically without
discrimination by the colonial power. Hence the slogan :
"the nation must be freed from colonialism" is a univers-

24
ally accepted rallying cry whose influence is heightened by
the fact that the agents of colonialism, exploiting the terri-
tory from within, are there for everybody to see. It is there-
fore the people as a whole who revolt and struggle as a
"nation-class" against colonial oppression, and who win
independence.
The nationalist phase is a necessary step in the liberation
struggle, but must never be regarded as the final solution
to the problem raised by the economic and political exploi-
tation of our peoples. For nationalism is narrow in its appli-
cation. It works within the geopolitical framework pro-
duced by the colonial powers which culminated in the carve-
up agreed upon in 1884 at the Berlin Conference, where
today's political maps of Africa were drawn.
The various peoples of Africa cannot be, and historically
never have been, confined behind rigid frontiers sealing off
territories labelled "Nigeria", "Togo", "Senegal", and so
on. The natural movements of the African peoples and of
their societies have from time immemorial swept along ex-
tensive axes as for example from the Nile to the Congo,
from Senegal to the Niger, and from the Congo to the
Zambesi.
The African "nations" of today, created artificially by
foreigners for their own purposes, neither originate from
ancient African civilisation, nor do they fit in with our
African way of life or habits of exchange. They are not
even, for the most part, economically viable. Yet they
continue to struggle on, each one separately, in a pathetic
and hopeless attempt to make progress, while the real
obstacle to their development, imperialism, mainly in its
neo-colonialist stage, is operating on a Pan-African scale.
Already, huge zones of Africa have been integrated eco-
nomically in the exclusive interest of international finance

25
capital. A study of the organisation and workings of most
of the large trading firms, mining trusts and industrial
cartels operating in Africa shows that they all function
directly or indirectly on a continental scale. Many of them
form part of a general network spreading over several
continents.
This monopolistic system of exploitation is the direct
outcome of prolonged capitalist practice, the experience
being that extended and unified industrial, commercial or
mining units are less costly to maintain, are more efficient,
and produce higher profits.
It is time that we also planned our economic and political
development on a continental scale. The concept of African
unity embraces the fundamental needs and characteristics of
African civilisation and ideology, and at the same time satis-
fies all the conditions necessary for an accelerated economic
and technological advance. Such maximum development
would ensure a rational utilisation of the material resources
and human potential of our continent along the lines of an
integrated economy, and within complementary sectors of
production, eliminating all unnecessary forms of competi-
tion, economic alienation and duplication. The idea is not
to destroy or dismantle the network of foreign mining com-
plexes and industrial companies throughout Africa, but to
take them over and operate them in the sole interest of the
African peoples.
Finally, the limitations of "nationalism" may be seen in
the experience of countries which have succeeded in casting
off one imperialism only to be oppressed by another, or by
a syndicate of imperialisms, as in Latin America. Merely
to change masters is no solution to colonial poverty or neo-
colonialist strangulation, even if exploitation is subsequently
practised in a more subtle way.

26
 African unity gives an indispensable continental dimen-
sion to the concept of the African nation.

Pan-Africanism
The limitations of nationalism have already been acknow-
ledged by the most mature leaders of the liberation move-
ment; but wherever the conditions for the transition to a
higher ideological level and a wider form of struggle were
lacking, the necessary leap could not be made, and nationa-
lism was never transcended.
The true dimensions of our struggle were outlined at the
Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England
in 1945, when resolutions were passed specifying that the
supreme objective of the national liberation movement was
to pave the way to national reconstruction and to promote
democracy and prosperity for the broad masses through
an All-African struggle against colonialism and all the new
manifestations of imperialism No reference was made to
neo-colonialism as such, because this only developed on a
massive scale in Africa after 1957. But the Pan-Africanism
which found expression at the Manchester Congress (1945),
and the All-African People's Conference (1958) was based
on the age-old aspiration towards unity of all peoples of
African origin exploited as workers and as a race.
African unity therefore implies:
1. That imperialism and foreign oppression should be
eradicated in all their forms.
2. That neo-colonialism should be recognised and elimi-
nated.
3. That the new African nation must develop within a
continental framework.
However, the specific content of the new social order
within the developing African nation remains to be defined.

27
Socialism
At the core of the concept of African unity lies socialism
and the socialist definition of the new African society.
Socialism and African unity are organically complemen-
tary.
Socialism implies:
1. Common ownership of the means of production, dis-
tribution and exchange. Production is for use, and
not for profit.
2. Planned methods of production by the state, based
on modern industry and agriculture.
3. Political power in the hands of the people, with the
entire body of workers possessing the necessary gov-
ernmental machinery through which to express their
needs and aspirations. It is a concept in keeping with
the humanist and egalitarian spirit which character-
ised traditional African society, though it must be
applied in a modern context. All are workers; and no
person exploits another.
4. Application of scientific methods in all spheres of
thought and production.
Socialism must provide a new social synthesis in which
the advanced technical society is achieved without the
appalling evils and deep cleavages of capitalist industrial
society.
Socialism has become a necessity in the platform diction
of African political leaders, though not all pursue really
socialist policies. We must therefore be on our guard against
measures which are declared to be "socialist" but which
do not in fact promote economic and social development.
An example of muddled thinking about socialism is the
attempt made in recent years to suggest the existence of an
"African Socialism" peculiar to our continent.

28
 There is only one true socialism and that is scientific
socialism, the principles of which are abiding and universal.
The only way to achieve it is to devise policies aimed at
general socialist goals, which take their form from the con-
crete, specific circumstances and conditions of a particular
country at a definite historical period.
The socialist countries of Africa may differ in the details
of their policies. There are different paths to socialism, and
adjustments have to be made to suit particular circum-
stances. But they should not be arbitrarily decided, or sub-
ject to vagaries of taste. They must be scientifically
explained.
Only under socialism can we reliably accumulate the
capital we need for our development, ensure that the gains
of investment are applied to the general welfare, and
achieve our goal of a free and united continent.

The present stage of the liberation struggle

An objective appraisal of the degree of success so far
attained in our struggle leads to the consideration of three
theses of major importance :
1. The achievement of genuine independence by an
African state is but a part of the over-all process of
continental decolonisation.
2. No independent state is immune to imperialist in-
trigue, pressure and subversion as long as imperialism
under any guise is left free to operate on the African
continent.
3. The degree of completeness of our victory over im-
perialism has a determining influence on how far post-
independence reconstruction can go. In other words,
the people will have no equitable share in national
reconstruction and its benefits unless the victory over

29
 i mperialism in its colonialist and neo-colonialist stages
is complete.
It therefore follows that the unity of the African people
expressed in a Union Government is necessary :
(a) to accelerate the liberation struggle in territories still
under colonial domination.
(b) for the security of already independent states, and
particularly for those which have chosen to follow a
line of total opposition to imperialism.
(c) to protect the flanks of our drive towards socialist,
domestic reconstruction.
These considerations should be able to serve as :
1. A basic formula to link up with all aspects of the anti-
imperialist struggle in Africa.
2. A blue-print for the people's action.
3. A yardstick for the evaluation of political develop-
ment and phases in the history of Africa.

Accumulated experience of the African People's unity

movement
Equipped with a clear knowledge of our objectives, we
are in a position to undertake a critical appraisal of recent
developments in African history. This is necessary if we
are to draw positive lessons from past experience, to deter-
mine both the area of deviation and the need for correction,
and to devise a more effective strategy for the future.
Shortly after Ghana achieved independence in 1957 there
began a rapid succession of events caused by a great up-
surge of interest in the African people's movement towards
emancipation and unity. The three most significant events
which sparked off the process were :
1. The first Conference of Independent African States
held in Accra in April 1958. At that time there were

30
 only eight independent states : Ethiopia, Ghana,
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Egypt.
The purpose was to :
(a) discuss questions of mutual interest
(b) explore ways and means of consolidating and
safeguarding independence
(c) strengthen the economic and cultural ties between
the independent states
(d) find ways of helping Africans still oppressed
under colonial rule.
The African leaders in attendance were resolutely and
unanimously anti-imperialist, and agreed to co-
ordinate diplomacy, mainly at UN level.
Pan-African conferences had hitherto been held over-
seas. In 1958, Pan-Africanism had moved to the
African continent, where it really belonged.
2. The All-African Peoples' Conference held in Accra
in December 1958. Representatives of sixty-two
African nationalist organisations attended and dis-
cussed the various aspects of the liberation movement.
The organisation of unitary action between African
political movements was then launched.
3. The third All-African Peoples' Conference held in
Cairo in March 1961, when the whole question of neo-
colonialism was brought to the forefront in discus-
sions on the African revolutionary struggle.
The development of unitary, anti-imperialist action be-
tween struggling peoples, and at the level of the governments
of independent states, constituted a two-pronged attack
against imperialism.
The imperialists acted accordingly :
(a) through diplomatic pressure
(b) by granting sham independence to a number of states.

31
 The trick worked well. However, a clear prefiguration of
later events was to be enacted at the Sanniquellie Conference
held in Liberia in July 1959. Two views were expressed on
the question of African unity. The first advocated the
tightest "binding together of our forces in political unity",
while the second was in favour of a "formula flexible
enough to enable each state to safeguard its national
sovereignty and personal identity".
The latter view fitted in only too well with the objectives
of the imperialists who had already recognised the need to
adapt their policies to the changing colonial situation. Hard
pressed by the armed struggle of the FLN in Algeria
and to avoid any further crystallisation of revolutionary
awareness amongst "extremist" African leaders, they
decided to play their own version of nationalism.
Accordingly, between 1959 and 1960, thirteen indepen-
dent states emerged : eleven former French colonies, and
Congo-Leopoldville and Nigeria. A close analysis of the
specific conditions under which each one of the thirteen
states became independent reveals that neo-colonialism was
incipient during the movement for independence, and
emerged fully once independence was acquired.

Sham independence and the unity movement

Few were deceived by such a deliberate and obvious
stratagem. Imperialism was merely using the device of
sham independence to prepare the African terrain to suit
its own convenience, and to avoid a direct and costly
confrontation with the liberation movements.
It was therefore not surprising that the divisions of
opinion on the question of unity expressed at Sanniquellie,
were much more in evidence during the Second Conference

32
of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa in 1960.
At this Conference :
1. The pivot of African unity was seen no longer as a
firm political union, but merely as a loose policy of
co-operation between African states. Moreover, the
concept of regional groupings between states was
endorsed.
2. The principle of a collective foreign policy as agreed
upon in Accra in 1958 gave way to the principle of a
separate foreign policy for each state. In this way,
imperialists gained more room for manoeuvre, for
infiltration and for stirring up difficulties between
African states.
3. It was agreed that assistance to the Algerian liberation
struggle was to take the form of diplomatic pressure
on France, but was to by-pass official recognition of
the GPRA.* In plain words, diplomatic shilly-
shallying was to take the place of a genuine anti-
imperialist confrontation.
Therefore, as early as 1960, a wide gulf developed
between those independent states which favoured co-
operation with imperialism, and those which proclaimed an
unflinching offensive against it.
The emergence of conflicting trends was not fortuitous
but a logical consequence of the state of tension between
qualitatively different situations :
1. Genuine independence, the product of a mass politi-
cal movement or an armed liberation struggle.
2. Sham independence, established by imperialists in an
attempt to arrest the progress of the people's move-
ment through a betrayal of its essential objectives.

*Algerian Provisional Government

33
 It is important to note that it was not the moderate policy
of co-operation with imperialism which created the "mod-
erate" African states. On the contrary, it was the deliberate
creation of such states by imperialism which gave rise to
moderation and co-operation. The will to compromise is
but a reflection, at diplomatic level of the neo-colonialist
character of certain African states; it is the external mani-
festation of the inner characteristics of neo-colonial regimes.

African people's wars and imperialist escalation

However, far from weakening the anti-imperialist struggle
and the vanguard revolutionary states, such measures can
only strengthen their vigilance and revolutionary deter-
mination.
Since 1960, the struggle of the African people and the
more or less latent state of crisis inside many African terri-
tories have reached maturity. To counter-balance the
growing revolutionary character of the African situation,
the enemy's reaction has become more open and direct.
Both the Algerian and the Congolese wars were born of the
people's determination to free themselves at whatever cost,
the only difference being that the Algerian revolt developed
in an essentially colonial context, whereas the Congolese
struggle is being waged in a neo-colonialist setting, marked
by major imperialist aggression throughout the African
continent.
From a practical point of view, the differences between
the various segments of the liberation struggle in time and
space are minimal. The only factors which render the
Congolese, Angolese or Rhodesian struggles (to take these
examples only) more violent than others are, first, the
escalation of imperialist action; and secondly, the more
advanced nature of the people's organisation, though the

34
actual level of readiness to revolt may be just as high else-
where.
Significantly, it was the frenzy of imperialist repression
against the Algerian and Congolese liberation struggles
which led to the calling of the Casablanca Conference
in 1961, to which the GPRA was invited. The
"Casablanca" states, as they were subsequently named, (i.e.
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Morocco), and the
Algerian FLN called for decisive action on the part of the
independent states to support the anti-imperialist struggle
in Africa. Further, a strong appeal for unity was made.
For "in unity lies strength. African states must unite or
sell themselves out to imperialist and colonialist exploiters
for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually".
Meantime, two new groupings, alike in content and with
similar policies, were being formed :
1. The Monrovia group which met in Monrovia in May
1961 consisting mainly of English-speaking states
whose loyalties were basically Anglo-American.
2. The Brazzaville group made up of French-speaking
states mostly aligned to France.
Both these groups adopted a "go slow" attitude towards
African emancipation and unity, and pursued a policy of
conciliation with imperialism. Their views were expressed
at the Lagos Conference (January 1962) when twenty of
Africa's twenty-eight independent states met to discuss ways
in which co-operation could be achieved. They agreed that :
(a) The absolute sovereignty and legality of each African
state must be respected.
(b) The union of one state with another should be effected
on a voluntary basis.
(c) There should be non-interference in each other's
affairs.

35
 (d) Political refugees from one state should not be given
asylum in another state.
North Africa was unrepresented at the Lagos Confer-
ence because the Algerian Provisional Government was not
invited. The Casablanca powers and the Sudan also
declined to go for the same reason.
Imperialist diplomacy appeared to have achieved its
purpose admirably, in splitting up the independent states
of Africa into separate and conflicting groups. The efforts
of the militant Casablanca group were checked by a pro-
i mperialist bloc, which was in its turn sub-divided into
pro-French and pro-English branches.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The militant African forces did achieve a certain amount
of success when all blocs and groups joined together to
form the OAU at Addis Ababa in 1963. However,
appearances are sometimes deceptive: the dissolution of
pro-imperialist groups did not mean that the interests they
represented had also vanished.
On the contrary, an examination of recent events exposes
serious weaknesses within the OAU. The Organisation
failed to solve the crises in the Congo and Rhodesia : both
of them test cases,—the former involving a direct challenge
to neo-colonialism, and the latter open confrontation with
a minority, settler government. In fact, the OAU is in
danger of developing into a useful cover for the continued,
sterile action of conflicting interests, the only difference
being, that in the context of one big "brotherly" organi-
sation reactionary tactics are camouflaged and applied
through the subleties of negotiation.
This change of tactics works as strongly as ever against
the fundamental interests of progressive forces in Africa,

36
 since it hides concessions to imperialism.
Negotiations are conducted behind closed doors and sur-
rounded by a mysterious cloak of diplomatic protocol,
making knowledge of the proceedings inaccessible to the
general public.
However, four explosive issues discussed at the OAU
Conference in Accra in 1965, alerted progressive opinion to
the dangers of continued compromise :
1. The crisis in Rhodesia.
2. The struggle in the Congo.
3. The treatment of African political refugees.
4. The problem of South West Africa.
In the first case, the African heads of state failed to agree
on a practical way of checking Ian Smith's rebellion, and
instead fell back on the futile policy of negotiations with
Britain combined with diplomatic pressure at international
and UN level.
Similarly, in the Congo, the fundamental issue of the
crisis was avoided in spite of the tense situation resulting
from the gallant stand of the freedom fighters carrying on
the struggle in the spirit of Lumumba.
On the question of the status and treatment of African
political refugees the OAU again failed to find a solution,
and heads of state continued to regard them merely as out-
laws or barter-goods.
The radical African states in the OAU were confronted
with the difficulty of finding effective expression for the
aspirations of the broad masses of the people. The struggle
seemed to unfold in two different spheres : the one in the
streets, villages, workshops and factories; and the other in
the hushed and closed atmosphere of air-conditioned houses
and offices. In this situation the genuine threat of imperia-
lism and its neo-colonialist agents tended to be under-esti-

37
mated, and the progressive states placed too much reliance
on the OAU.
In the meantime, the pro-imperialist states, although
pretending to rally to the revolutionary elements within the
OAU in order to avoid a direct confrontation, had been
creating and expanding an organisation after their own
heart : the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache
(OCAM), into a larger unit to include all French-
speaking African states under the name "Francophonie".
As a result, the progressive states, failing to close their
ranks, were left to fight inadequately and alone against the
massive escalation of imperialism, and the active consolida-
tion of its position through plots and a series of coups d'état.

Some essential features of the enemy's offensive

1. Externally
Mounting imperialist aggression in Africa foreshadows a
decline in the strength of imperialism since the use of
violence to maintain imperialist rule invariably sparks off
a stronger explosion of revolutionary activity among op-
pressed peoples, and experience has shown that such move-
ments can be neither destroyed nor contained. The Ameri-
can fiascos in Vietnam, Santo Domingo and Cuba illustrate
the point. So, also do the resolutions condemning US
i mperialism passed by representatives from three continents
( Africa, Asia and Latin America) when they met in con-
ference at Havana in 1966. Taken aback by the compelling
reality of tri-continental solidarity, the US imperialists
hastened to condemn the Havana resolutions as "subver-
sive" and resolved to take "appropriate preventive meas-
ures, including military action" against any popular move-
ment considered to be a danger to the "free world" under
US leadership. At the same time, they predicted other

38
coups in Africa during the ensuing year, and immediately set
to work, with or without the collaboration of European
accomplices, to help this prediction to come true.
It was evidently felt that the resort to quick action was
necessary because of the uncompromising stand against
imperialist action in the "hot" zones of the world, taken by
progressive governments. The latter were succeeding in
arousing world opinion against imperialist atrocities in Viet-
nam, and in drawing attention to the worsening crises in
Rhodesia and the Congo, the South African military build
up, NATO's assistance to Portugal in her colonial wars,
and "interventions" in Latin America and the Caribbean.
2. Internally
The capitalist imperialist states face serious economic and
social difficulties. Rising prices, balance of payments prob-
lems, widespread and repeated strikes are only a few of
the symptoms of the general malaise. In the United States,
the grave domestic situation is aggravated by the massive
counter-attacks of the African-American revolutionaries.
Almost everywhere, behind the smoke screens, the social
and economic situation is unhealthy, and particularly in the
second class capitalist states. And these mounting economic
crises mean heavier and heavier dependence on the exploi-
tation of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The need for self-critical objective diagnosis

If imperialists are faced with so many external and dom-
estic difficulties, how then can they afford to step up their
aggression in Africa? To answer this question, it is necessary
to examine the internal factors which make our continent
so vulnerable to attack, and particularly to look closely
at the whole question of African unity. For this lies at the
core of our problem.

39
 There are three conflicting conceptions of African unity
which explain to a large extent, the present critical
situation in Africa :

1. The mutual protection theory: that the OAU serves

as a kind of insurance against any change in the
status quo, membership providing a protection for
heads of state and government against all forms of
political action aimed at their overthrow. Since most
of the leaders who adhere to this idea owe their
position to imperialists and their agents, it is not
surprising that this is the viewpoint which really
serves the interests of imperialism. For the puppet
states are being used both for short-term purposes of
exploitation and as spring-boards of subversion
against progressive African states.

2. The functional conception: that African unity should

be purely a matter of economic co-operation. Those
who hold this view overlook the vital fact that Afri-
can regional economic organisations will remain
weak and subject to the same neo-colonialist pressures
and domination, as long as they lack overall political
cohesion. Without political unity, African states can
never commit themselves to full economic integration,
which is the only productive form of integration able
to develop our great resources fully for the well-being
of the African people as a whole.
Furthermore, the lack of political unity places inter-
African economic institutions at the mercy of power-
ful, foreign commercial interests, and sooner or later
these will use such institutions as funnels through
which to pour money for the continued exploitation
of Africa.

40
 3. The political union conception: that a union govern-
ment should be in charge of economic development,
defence and foreign policy, while other government
functions would continue to be discharged by the ex-
isting states grouped, in federal fashion, within a
gigantic central political organisation.
Clearly, this is the strongest position Africa could
adopt in its struggle against modern imperialism.
However, any sincere critical appraisal of past activities
and achievements of the OAU would tend to show that,
as it is now constituted, the OAU is not likely to be able
to achieve the political unification of Africa.
This is obviously why imperialists, although against the
idea of political union, will do nothing to break the OAU.
It serves their purpose in slowing down revolutionary pro-
gress in Africa. This state of affairs is mirrored both in the
discouragement of freedom fighters in the remaining
colonial territories and South Africa, and in the growing
perplexity amongst freedom fighters from neo-colonised
territories.
The struggle for African continental union and socialism
may be hampered by the enemy within,—those who declare
their support for the revolution and at the same time, by
devious means, serve and promote the interests of imperial-
ists and neo-colonialists.
Examination of recent events in our history, and of our
present condition, reveals the urgent need for a new strategy
to combat imperialist aggression, and this must be devised
on a continental scale.
Either we concentrate our forces for a decisive armed
struggle to achieve our objectives, or we will each fall one
by one to the blows of imperialism in its present stage of
and desperate offensive.

41
 BOOK TWO

STRATEGY, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

PREFACE
Revolutionary warfare is the logical, inevitable answer to
the political, economic and social situation in Africa today.
We do not have the luxury of an alternative . We are faced
with a necessity.
Throughout the world, the escalation of imperialist
aggression is making the issues clear, and exploitation can
no longer be disguised. In Africa, a point of explosion
against imperialism has been reached. But only a massive
and organised will to fight can spark it off.
Time is running out. We must act now. The freedom
fighters already operating in many parts of Africa must no
longer be allowed to bear the full brunt of a continental
struggle against a continental enemy. The collective and
continental nature of our will and our space, the urgency
of conquering the initiative and the protracted nature of a
revolutionary war calls for a united All-African organisation
of all freedom fighters on the African continent.
We must co-ordinate strategy and tactics, and combine
experience. Co-ordination requires organisation, and orga-
nisation can only be effective if each fighting unit is a dis-
ciplined part of the whole. Attack must be planned with
diversion, retreat with consolidation, losses in one zone
compensated for by gains in another, until the liberation

42
movement is finally victorious, and the whole of Africa is
free and united.
As a continental nation we are young, strong and resilient.
The cohesive planning of our struggle and the combined
strength of our will to win will do the rest.
Africa is one; and this battle must be fought and won
continentally.

Chapter One

ORGANISATION FOR REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

A. THE MILITARY BALANCE

The dimension of our struggle is equal to the size of the
African continent itself. It is in no way confined within
any of the absurd limits of the micro-states created by the
colonial powers, and jealously guarded by imperialist
puppets during the neo-colonialist period.
For although the African nation is at present split up
among many separate states, it is in reality simply divided
into two : our enemy and ourselves. The strategy of our
struggle must be determined accordingly, and our conti-
nental territory considered as consisting of three categories
of territories which correspond to the varying levels of
popular organisation and to the precise measure of victory
attained by the people's forces over the enemy :
1. Liberated areas
2. Zones under enemy control
3. Contested zones (i.e. hot points).
Liberated Areas
These areas may present minimal differences due to the
varying ways in which independence was obtained. How-

43
ever, they can be collectively defined as territories where :
(a) Independence was secured through an armed strug-
gle, or through a positive action movement represent-
ing the majority of the population under the leader-
ship of an anti-imperialist and well-organised mass
party.
(b) A puppet regime was overthrown by a people's move-
ment (Zanzibar, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt).
(c) A social revolution is taking place to consolidate
political independence by:
1. promoting accelerated economic development
2. improving working conditions
3. establishing complete freedom from dependence on
foreign economic interests.
It therefore follows that a liberated zone can only be
organised by a radically anti-imperialist party whose duty
it is :
(a) to decolonise, and
(b) to teach the theory and practice of socialism as app-
lied to the African social milieu, and adapted to local
circumstances.
The people's socialist parties take the necessary steps
to transform the united but heterogeneous front which
fought for independence into an ideologically monolithic
party of cadres.
Thus, in a truly liberated territory, one can observe :
1. Political growth achieved as a result of discussions
and agreements concluded within the party.
2. Steady progress to transform theory into practice
along the ideological lines drawn by the party.
3. Constant improvement, checking and re-checking of
the development plans to be carried out by the party
and at state level.

44
 4. Political maturity among party members, who are no
longer content to follow a vague and general line of
action. Revolutionary political maturity is the pre-
lude to the re-organisation of the party structure along
more radical lines.
However, no territory may be said to be truly liberated
if the party leadership, apart from consolidating the gains
of national independence does not also undertake to :
( a) Support actively the detachments of revolutionary
liberation movements in the contested zones of Africa.
(b) Contribute to the organisation and revolutionary
practice of the people's forces in neo-colonialist states,
i.e. in zones under enemy control or in contested areas.
( c) Effect an organic liaison of its political and economic
life with the other liberated zones of the African
nation.
This implies a system of mutual servicing and aid be-
tween the various detachments of the liberation movements
and the liberated zones, so that a continuous exchange of
experience, advice and ideas will link the progressive parties
in power with the parties struggling in the contested zones.
Each liberated zone should be ready to offer the use of
its territory to detachments of the liberation movements so
that the latter may establish their rear bases on friendly
soil, and benefit from the provision of communications,
hospitals, schools, factories, workshops, etc.
It is important to bear in mind that a liberated area is
constantly exposed to the many forms of enemy action and
attack. It is the duty of both the liberation movements and
the liberated zones :
1. To make objective and up-to-date analyses of the
enemy's aggression.
2. To take action to recapture any base lost to the

45
 enemy, and to help correct the mistakes which
enabled the enemy to gain temporary victory.
In fact, the liberated areas of Africa do not yet come fully
up to all the standards required of them. For example, in
certain liberated zones, the level of economic liberation is
clearly inferior to the high level of revolutionary awareness.
But the main criterion for judging them to be liberated is
the actual direction in which they are moving, since our
assessment is of changing, not static phenomena.

Zones under enemy control

The imperialists control such zones:
(a) through an administration manned by foreigners.
The territory is then externally subjected.
(b) through a puppet government made up of local ele-
ments. The territory is then both internally and ex-
ternally subjected.
(c) through a settler, minority government. In this terri-
tory, settlers have established the rule of a majoriy
by a minority. There is no logic except the right of
might that can accept such a situation. The predomi-
nant racial group must, and will, provide the govern-
ment of a country. Settlers, provided they accept the
principle of one man one vote, and majority rule, may
be tolerated; but settler minority governments, never.
They are a dangerous anachronism, and must be
swept away completely and for ever.
A territory under enemy control therefore is governed
against the interests of the majority. Such zones are eco-
nomically, militarily and politically alienated. It is precisely
in these territories that the enemy has its military camps,
aerodromes, naval establishments and broadcasting stations,
and where foreign banks, insurance firms, mining, indust-

46
 rial and trading companies have their headquarters. In
other words, these zones are enemy nerve centres.
Clear proof of the neo-colonialist and neo-liberated
character of these states is seen in the refusal of their
governments to allow liberation movements to open offices,
establish bases or enjoy freedom of transit for troops and
equipment on their way to the front.
The strength of a territory under enemy control may be
assessed by taking into account the following factors :
(i) the level of organisation attained by the reactionary
forces in control there
(ii) the type and degree of repression exerted against the
people's liberation movement
(iii) the degree and modes of exploitation exerted upon the
toiling masses
(iv) the military means available to the reactionaries in
power
(v) the nature of the economic interests imperialism is
out to promote in that territory and in neighbouring
areas, (for example, strategic materials, important
commercial and industrial complexes etc.)
(vi) the over-all strategic advantages which imperialism
hopes to gain from the subjugation of the territory.
Such gains may be exclusively political.
As far as our struggle is concerned, our most vital asset
is the degree of revolutionary awareness attained by the
workers and the masses in the zone under enemy control.
The political maturity or immaturity of the masses con-
stitutes the main difference between an enemy-held zone
and a contested zone.
The revolutionary awareness of the broad masses in an
enemy-held zone, must express itself in national boycotts,
strikes, sabotage and insurrection.

47
 It would be a mistake to maintain that the total of areas
under enemy control is exactly equal to the sum of neo-
colonialist and colonialist governments. Socio-political
phenomena are less mechanical than that. In each case
it is the level of the people's awareness and participation
that counts.

Contested zones
A zone under enemy control can at any time become a
contested area if the revolutionary forces in activity there
are either on the verge of armed struggle or have reached
an advanced stage of revolutionary organisation. In some
cases, a spark is enough to determine the turning point
from preparation to action. In other circumstances, the
embers can smoulder underground for a much longer
period.
"Sham independence" zones, where the awakened
masses have placed the enemy in such a precarious posi-
tion that a "single spark can start a prairie fire", can no
longer be said to be "under enemy control". In such a
situation, the enemy is only superficially in command, and
relies exclusively on support in the police, civil service and
the army, where it retains control only as long as the force
of habit remains unchallenged. It is to be noted that the
army and police are never homogeneous forces in Africa,
and that this factor is of obvious tactical interest in a revo-
lutionary struggle primarily based on the workers and
peasants, but also aiming to obtain the support of all other
possible elements.
In these zones of revolutionary transition, the population
feels deeply in sympathy with the revolutionary forces in
neighbouring areas, and often gives them invaluable
assistance.

48
 These transitional zones may :
1. Either be used to organise the liberaton of another
neighbouring territory which is economically more
important and politically more mature, (for instance,
where a party of revolutionary opposition is already
operating against the government).
2. Or, in case of strategic necessity, be directly seized
from the enemy through the organisation and armed
action of the dissatisfied masses.
A careful study should be made of the range of possibili-
ties offered by a territory under puppet, neo-colonialist
control. Full investigation will disclose that the puppet
government is not homogeneous, and that it is therefore
vulnerable. It will also be found that the people are often
virtually liberated but that they are not aware of it because
no one has organised them to act purposefully to seize what
is their due (i.e. political control and the control of
economic wealth).
Between a zone under enemy control where the masses
are awakening and a hotly-contested zone, there is only
one missing link: a handful of genuine revolutionaries
prepared to organise and act.
There are many more contested zones than liberated
ones. In fact, the total area of contested zones covers most
of the African continent. All the more reason why we should
take vigilant care of our liberated territories.
A contested zone is not only a zone of revolutionary acti-
vity, but it is also an area in which a people's party works
underground or semi-clandestinely to organise the over-
throw of a puppet government. For there is no fundamental
difference between armed struggle as such and organised
revolutionary action of a civil type. The various methods
of our struggle, and the changing from one method to

49
another should be determined mainly by the circumstances
and the set of conditions prevailing in a given territory.
The forces struggling in the contested zones are in the
front line of the revolutionary liberation movement. They
must receive material support from the liberated zones in
order to carry their mission through to a successful end.
This involves a development of the struggle until a people's
insurrectionary movement is able to assume power.
A political party operating in a contested zone may be
said to be truly revolutionary if :
1. It is actively organising the people, training cadres,
etc.
2. Its essential objective is the total destruction of the
puppet government or the colonial power, in order
to build in its place the organs of the people's political
power based on mass organisation and mass
education.
The latter objective can only be achieved through a policy
of direct confrontation with the enemy, and not through
devious negotiations and compromise. This is the only
correct approach to the African situation if the problem of
the revolution is to be studied in depth and from the people's
point of view.

Retarding Factors
However, certain factors have retarded the final un-
leashing of anti-imperialist action and the unfolding of a
people's revolution throughout the African nation :
1. The readiness of imperialists to exploit any cracks in
our armour.
2. The undue emphasis placed on diplomatic procedure
and negotiations to provide solutions.
3. The varying degrees of isolationism practised by the

50
 cadres of ruling parties in spite of their recognition,
on a theoretical level, of the necessity for a conti-
nental, anti-imperialist struggle and reconstruction.
4. The tendency manifested by certain ruling parties in
the liberated zones to indulge in a slack, wait-and-
see policy, merely toying with progressive ideas, and
neglecting to analyse, handle and resolve national
problems in a positive way. This has created a dan-
gerous climate of uneasiness, confusion and dis-
couragement for African revolutionaries, and fertile
ground for neo-colonialist intrigue and attacks.
5. The existence of a more or less conscious opportunism
amongst some leaders of the liberation movement
both in the liberated and contested territories, which
is symptomatic of a low level of ideological convic-
tion.

High Command
Africa will he liberated sooner or later against all odds.
But if it is to be soon, by an accelerated revolution of the
people, and a total war against imperialism, then we must
establish a unified continental high command here and
now, to plan revolutionary war, and to initiate action.
If we fail to do this, and to lead the people's revolution,
we are likely to be swept away one by one by imperialism
and neo-colonialism. It is no longer feasible to take a mid-
dle course. The time for reform, however progressive, is
past. For reforms cannot hold the enemy at bay, nor can
they convince the silent, internal agents of neo-colonialism,
eliminate the puppets, or even destroy the capitalist struc-
ture and mentality inherited from colonialism. The cancer-
ous growths are proliferating at the very heart of our parties
and territories whether they emerge under the cloak of con-

51
stitutionalism, parliamentarianism, bureaucratic etiquette,
an imposing civil service, officers trained in western "a-
political" tradition to maintain the bourgeois-capitalist
status quo by means of military coups, or if they appear in
the more obvious guise of corruption and nepotism.
The people's armed struggle, the highest form of poli-
tical action, is a revolutionary catalyst in the neo-colonia-
list situation.
Peaceful political action to achieve liberation has been
proved ineffective
(a) with the accession of the majority of African states
to independence and the advent of neo-colonialism
on a massive scale
(b) with the increasingly continental dimension of our
struggle.
Pacific political action was, in general, potent during the
national phase of the liberation movement, and mainly in
sub-Saharan Africa, where independence often developed
in a chain reaction. However, even then there were signifi-
cant exceptions. In Kenya for example, where recourse
to peaceful political action was denied to the masses, the
people's movement resorted to more direct and concentrated
action in the form of Mau Mau. In Algeria, a seven year
armed liberation struggle was needed. Elsewhere, the in-
dependence movement pushed beyond the fringe of paci-
ficism, as in Ghana and Guinea where "positive action"
was employed.
The crystallisation of a more concentrated form of poli-
tical action is in fact to be found in the development of
almost all African independence movements. The reason for
this was the need to establish a new social order after nomi-
nal independence has been achieved, and the escalation of
imperialist action. The latter appeared in :

52
 (i) the corruption of independence through neo-colonial-
ism and puppet regimes.
(ii) direct imperialist aggression against liberation
forces, for example in the Congo.
(iii) increased multilateral and bilateral imperialist sup-
port to :
(a) remaining colonial powers (Portugal, Spain)
(b) fascist-racist regimes (Rhodesia, South Africa)
(c) puppet regimes and local reactionaries to assist their
infiltration and attempts to suppress progressive and
revolutionary forces throughout the continent.
In less than three years, from 1960, the armed form of
struggle became a necessity of the African anti-colonial
liberation movement, and the same process may he ob-
served in most neo-colonialist situations.
From 1961 onwards, the armed form of political action
reached another turning point with the creation of a united
front co-ordinating the struggle of freedom fighters in all
the "Portuguese" colonies. This organisation (CONCP)
links up the politico-military struggle of 12,400,000
inhabitants over an area of some 2 million square
kilometres.
In effect, then, anti-imperialist pacifism is dying, and
on a continental scale, because :
1. The political action which led to independence devi-
ated to become the sole monopoly and privilege of
a reactionary "élite" which deprives the masses of
the right to political action, even in its pacific and
constitutional form.
2. Neo-colonialism has created a situation whereby the
masses are exploited beyond the "safe" limits of
exploitation.
The ensuing massive explosion of pent-up discontent

53
 can be nothing but violent. The masses seize back
their right to political action and make maximum use
of it.
3. Imperialist action is escalating
(a) to consolidate its positions (military coups d'état
in neo-colonialist states) .
(b) to gain ground and recapture lost initiative (re-
actionary coups d'état in progressive states) .
4. Imperialism constantly infiltrates revolutionary oppo-
sition groups with agents, "special police", and
others, compelling such groups to arm even before
they have attained the organisational stage of armed
struggle.
5. Whenever the pseudo-democratic institutions inheri-
ted from colonial rule are not used by its inheritors
to build capitalism but are gradually remodelled or
suddenly re-structured towards a socialist line of
development, imperialists intervene violently.
6. Violence clears the "neo-colonialist fog" and reveals
the invisible enemy and the subtle methods of camou-
flage employed by neo-colonialists. The issues are
made clear.
As soon as the initial revolutionary units emerge, the pup-
pet regime is doomed. A chain reaction begins. The puppets
are compelled to break the promises they have made. They
had survived in the teeth of opposition only because they
uneasily preserved an outward appearance of progressive
action. Now, they have to suppress and kill openly in order
to survive. Once the first drop of patriotic blood is shed in
the fight the puppet regime is irrevocably condemned.
Guerrilla points spread like oil stains. Not only have the
internal contradictions of neo-colonialism fully ripened
but the African masses have attained such a degree of poli-

54
tical awareness that they literally force the struggle to break
out into the open.

The Need for Co-ordinated Revolutionary Action

The international balance of forces, and more particu-
larly the existence of powerful socialist states, gave rise
to the theory that in certain territories dominated by im-
perialism on our continent it was possible to take a pacific
road to socialism. But such reasoning is based on the false
premise that the question of co-ordinating revolutionary
action in Africa and the world has already been solved and
that therefore imperialism is no longer able to concentrate
its forces to act decisively against the most threatening
parts of the popular liberation front.
In reality, the situation is quite different :
1. Imperialists are waging an all-out struggle against the
socialist states, and the revolutionary liberation move-
ments through military means, and through insidious
but powerful methods of psychological warfare
(propaganda).
2. Imperialists have formed an international syndicate
of military and economic forces to achieve its aggres-
sive aims.
3. Imperialists have, in recent years, assisted in the
establishment of numerous puppet governments in
Africa.
The historical experience of the people of Asia, Latin
America and of Africa has shown that imperialism has often
forcefully intervened to prevent the peaceful achievement
of socialism. In the case of Ghana a coup occurred at the
very time a decisive turning point in socialist development
was about to be reached.
The continental scope now attained by popular insur-

55
rection in Africa is a reality. It remains for us to devise
effective co-ordinating machinery.
Our accumulated experience has shown that only prac-
tical and planned co-ordination on a continental scale will
prevent the enemy from concentrating its forces on isolated
and therefore more vulnerable targets. In our war, isolation
is one of the greatest dangers.
We have already been able to outpace the enemy in
certain ways by :
(i) increasing our means or production
(ii) bringing a higher level of organisation to the people
(iii) spreading the essential features of the African
people's revolution
(iv) unmasking neo-colonialism and its puppets.
We have succeeded in accummulating energy and will-
power. But it is also true that we have not yet defeated
either the external, or the internal enemy. For victory, a
politico-military organisation must be established to
provide the machinery for a qualitative conversion of
revolutionary action in Africa.

B. POLITICO-MILITARY ORGANISATION
The following measures should be taken :
1. The formation of the All-African People's Revolu-
tionary Party (AAPRP) to co-ordinate policies and
to direct action.
2. The creation of an All-African People's Revolutionary
Army (AAPRA) to unify our liberation forces and to
carry the armed struggle through to final victory.

AAPRP and the All-African Committee for Political

Co-ordination (AACPC).
The formation of a political party linking all liberated

56
territories and struggling parties under a common ideology
will smooth the way for eventual continental unity, and will
at the same time greatly assist the prosecution of the All-
African people's war. To assist the process of its formation,
an All-African Committee for Political Co-ordination
( AACPC) should be established to act as a liaison between
all parties which recognise the urgent necessity of conduct-
ing an organised and unified struggle against colonialism
and neo-colonialism. This Committee would be created at
the level of the central committees of the ruling parties and
struggling parties, and would constitute their integrated
political consciousness.
The AACPC as the political arm of AAPRA would fulfil
the following functions :
1. Ensure co-operation between the ruling parties of the
liberated territories building socialism, and enable
them to support each other in the fight against the
internal enemy.
2. Promote widespread and collective ideological training
for the cadres of parties teaching the theory of anti-
colonialist and anti-neo-colonialist struggle, the case
for African unity and for the building of socialism.
This would be done in AACPC schools or in political
training camps throughout the liberated territories.
3. Co-ordinate and harmonise all political effort and
assistance given to the revolutionary movements in
colonised or apartheid areas, and to the progressive
forces in all the neo-colonised areas.
4. Provide an organic link with the peoples of Africa,
Asia and Latin America who are struggling against
imperialism (Organisation of Solidarity with the
Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America
( OSPAAL) .)

57
 5. Ensure permanent relations with the socialist states
of the world.
6. Maintain and create links with all workers' move-
ments in the capitalist-imperialist states.
Thus the AACPC would emerge as the organisational
instrument of a united struggle, and a centralising and dis-
ciplinary organ providing permanent contact with the masses
and with the scattered centres of their revolutionary activi-
ties. Such co-ordination would unify revolutionary action
of the vanguard African territories and would enable them
to exert decisive influence on the revolutionary liberation
movement by allowing them to participate actively in it.

The All-African People's Revolutionary Army (AAPRA)

Members of AAPRA will be the armed representatives of
the African people's socialist parties struggling against colo-
nialism and neo-colonialism. They will be the direct product
of the African revolutionary, liberation movement, and will
be organised as in Chart 5 (Page 64).
These revolutionary armed forces will be under the direc-
tion of a high command made up of the military leaders
( AAPRA) of the various revolutionary movements in Africa.
This in its turn will come under the All-African Committee
for Political Co-ordination (AACPC) which represents the
political leadership of the entire revolutionary movement.
Thus the military, i.e. the armed forces, will always be
subordinate to, and under the control of, the political lead-
ership.

AAPRA headquarters
The headquarters of the high command of AAPRA will
be located in a liberated territory where :
1. The people's power is firmly entrenched.

58
 2. Economic development is advanced enough to enable
the territory to provide maximum resistance against
imperialist aggression in whatever form it might
occur.
3. There are adequate communications, hospitals,
printing presses and other essential facilities.
The territory must be in a condition of permanent
preparedness for war, all its material and human resources
being mobilised to make the area impregnable.
As far as the mobilisation of the people is concerned,
trained and armed workers should be organised into mili-
tias. Likewise in the agricultural sector, modern agricultural
production should be organised along strategic lines. Co-
operatives and state farms and other farmers' organisations
will constitute the nuclei of self-defence throughout the terri-
tory and will be located strategically. Miners, industrial
workers, transport employees and others, will be organised
into disciplined, self-defence units and will receive military
training. Membership of militias will be voluntary and
selective.
The militant front thus created will struggle :
1. For a rapid transformation of the old order
2. Against internal and external enemies
3. For the building of socialism.
The struggle will entail hardship and suffering, but it is
a phase through which we must pass if we are to accelerate
the achievement of a radical, qualitative transformation of
the liberation movement.
Such measures will result in :
(i) the reinforcement of political rectitude and moral
strength
(ii) the abolition of apathy and inertia
(iii) the achievement of a higher capacity of resistance

59
 throughout the population
(iv) an improvement of discipline in work and conse-
quently an increase in productivity.
Thus in base areas, it is essential to use the armed forces
in conjunction with the masses in order to defeat the enemy.
This can best be done through the creation of people's self-
defence units (militia) trained to form a broad, united front
against imperialism ready to operate anywhere in Africa.
If armed militia are not organised the masses cannot
manifest their power in the struggle against the enemy.
In general, a comparatively large territory will provide
the best conditions for AAPRA headquarters if it contains
a variety of physical features such as mountains, rivers,
lakes, forests, plains and even deserts giving partisan de-
tachments room to manoeuvre. Usually, the best base areas
are in the mountains or near rivers, lakes and estuaries.
Those in the plains are generally of a more temporary
nature.
AAPRA regional operational commands will be located
in appropriate regions of the contested zones.

The AACPC and our revolutionary strategy

The High Command of AAPRA will work in close co-

ordination with AACPC, and the smoothness of the
liasion will be ensured by the fact that the leaders of the
revolutionary movements animating the high command
will also be members of AACPC. The programme and
the strategy of the revolutionary forces will therefore be
drawn up at High Command—AACPC level, on the basis
of surveys of the political, economic and military situation
in the contested zones and in the enemy-held territories of
the continent. Special account will be taken of the objective

60
conditions favouring the liquidation of the oppressive regime
in a particular zone or territory.
A study will be made of the pro-revolutionary forces in-
side the society under investigation, and an assessment made
of the socio-political importance of the workers, peasants
and members of the co-operative movement. This assess-
ment will be based on the position occupied by the workers
in the socio-economic context, the level of their class con-
sciousness, and their degree of organisation. In other
words, the quality of the group will be a more important
criterion than its numerical size.
Investigation along these lines is vital because in order
to win a revolutionary war, a prolonged campaign for the
support of a crucial social group must be carried out. Like-
wise, no socio-economic programme for the winning over
of social groups can be drawn up without a clear under-
standing of the healthy and strategic elements of the country
to be liberated.
Based on attentive study and investigation our revolu-
tionary strategy will take into account and exploit the most
determinant factors :
A. The existence in Africa of five, broadly differentiated
zones :
(a) North
(b) West
(c) South
(d) Central
(e) East
These zones differ widely in climate, natural resources,
industrial potential, and in the general pattern of their
social and political development.
B. The existence within one zone of varying levels of
productive development and of political maturity. For ex-

61
ample, note the difference between conditions in the
Republic of South Africa and in South-West Africa, although
they are geographically neighbours and are both under
enemy control. There is a gap between the productive forces
of the Mali—Niger—Dahomey—Togo zone and those of
territories like Ghana and Nigeria; but at the same time,
the level of political awareness is almost identical amongst
the people of Mali, Niger, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroun.
C. The existence, on the continent, and even inside one
zone, of industrial "patches" and of powerful portuary
complexes. These represent highly strategic targets for our
struggle, and this is why, in certain areas, more attention
should be paid to mobilising the proletariat while in other
parts attention should first be paid to the rural workers.
For example the socio-political lever in one province of a
state may be different from the one in another although the
same revolutionary struggle is being waged throughout the
country as a whole.
Our revolutionary strategy will, therefore be adapted
suitably to the variations between zones and territories
endowed with important patches of industrialisation, and
areas where feudal and patriarchal rural institutions pre-
dominate. Again, it will distinguish between territories with
a vertical class structure, denoting low development of pro-
ductive forces but with an embryo of industrialisation, and
territories with a strong modern proletariat force, part of
which may be working outside the African continent. The
latter may, if organised cohesively, play an important part
in the liberation movement by means of sabotage and sub-
version at the very core of the capitalist-imperialist states.
The study in depth of the objective situation, and the
elaboration of a revolutionary strategy are tasks to be under-
taken jointly by AAPRA and the AACPC in order to

62
ascertain our own situation at all levels, as well as that of
the enemy. The deepening of our knowledge will enable us
to avoid wasting our energy in useless skirmishes and
battles.
Once the strategic targets and the points of maximum
anti-imperialist resistance are determined, the revolutionary
forces will know exactly which parts to avoid for the time
being, and which to attack first.
There will be no question of AAPRA violating "sover-
eignty" when entering a national territory for the purpose
of liberating and uniting Africa, since all African territory
belongs to the African people as a whole, and the will of
the African people is expressed in the African revolution.

The army corps

On the basis of our revolutionary strategy the liberation

forces of AAPRA will be divided into five armies :
Northern
Western
Southern
Central
Eastern
The divisions constituting the various army corps will be
formed from the following sources :
1. Troops allocated to AAPRA by the ruling parties in
the liberated territories.
2. Volunteers.
3. Freedom fighter units already in existence.
The creation of our continental people's militia is the
logical consequence of the unfolding of the African libera-
tion struggle, and it is the essential condition for the
emergence of a people's free and united Africa.

63
64
AAPRA's structure and strategy
Since the objectives of the armed liberation forces are
both political and military, AAPRA's structure is devised
accordingly, with separate chains of command and machi-
nery for co-ordination (Chart 5).
AAPRA divisions C may be used to follow up and com-
plete the political and insurrectionary work developed by :
(i) the political committees which prefigure the new form
of administration to be established in the newly-
liberated zone.
I ii) the guerrilla units B
Therefore, AAPRA forces C will act in support of the
armed people's struggle and not precede it, although in
certain extreme cases, specialised sections of AAPRA
can serve as generators of the people's armed struggle by
supplying equipment and cadres to the partisan units still
lacking such material.
As the people's revolutionary struggle advances, profes-
sional armies as such will gradually disappear, until with
the achievement of total African liberation and unity, and
the establishment of an All-African Union Government they
will vanish completely. The defence of Africa will then rest
entirely on the continental people's militia.
During the preliminary stag' of the liberation of a parti-
cular territory, AAPRA divisions will be stationed in a base
area in a nearby liberated zone. However, once the people's
struggle has begun inside the contested zone the supporting
divisions of AAPRA will camp along the borders of the
contested zone. This movement is to be co-ordinated at the
level of the regional or zonal army staff and the regional
or zonal partisan command, in order to begin the campaign
in co-ordination with the territorial partisan command con-
cerned. This step is to be decided upon at the level of the

65
Army and Divisional Staff. The result is a vice-like move-
ment closing in on the enemy in the contested zone, with
the guerrilla units and political committees always ahead
of the visible front line. (Chart 6).

Equipment and composition of the armed forces

AAPRA will be a force ready to operate in any part of
Africa. It must therefore be equipped with the most modern
aircraft, vehicles and weapons, emphasis being placed on
firing power, speed, mobility and lightness.
AAPRA will also include specialised, technical units. For
example :
(a) Mass psychology teams and units spreading audio-
visual and written propaganda by means of radio,
films, news-sheets etc.
(b) Social service specialists trained to conduct literacy
campaigns, to promote child care, public hygiene and
other social welfare services.
(c) technicians specialising in agriculture and in rural
processing industries
(d) cattle raising and fishery specialists
(e) medical officers
(f) cultural experts.
Members of AAPRA are not to be considered primarily
as professional soldiers, but as civilians trained in arms,
highly qualified fighters who are at the same time efficient
workers. They will act to serve, not to subjugate, the broad
masses.
Our war is not a war of conquest, it is a war of revolu-
tionary liberation. We fight not only in self-defence but to
free, unite and reconstruct.

67
Recruitment
It is from the broad masses of the people that the revo-
lutionary liberation movement is born, and it is therefore
from among the peasants, workers, members of co-opera-
tives and youth that AAPRA will draw its main strength.
In recruiting volunteers, preference will initially be given
to members of organisations of an All-African character:
(i) peasants' organisations
(ii) trade unions
(iii) progressive students' organisations
(iv) youth organisations
(v) women's organisations
(vi) co-operative movements.
These forces will be supplemented by volunteers
allocated to AAPRA by progressive and militant African

68
parties and governments. (Chart 7).
Before enrolling a volunteer, the Commission of Control
and Recruitment will investigate :
(a) his social origin
( b) his qualities as a worker and as a man
(c) his ideological orientation.
He will then undergo tests to assess his character,
intellectual capacity, moral fibre and physical fitness.
Enemy agents and adventurers of all kinds will attempt
to join AAPRA. We must be constantly on the alert to
recognise them and prevent them from infiltrating our
revolutionary armed forces. For this reason, particular
attention will be paid to tests designed to discover if the
volunteer is ideologically sound, and if he has given a true
account of his origin and previous place of employment.
As the armed liberation struggle develops and expands,
whole units of African troops at present being used by the
enemy (on their principle of "let African fight African"),
will desert and want to join the AAPRA forces. These troops
will be welcomed and given every encouragement. But as
soon as possible they will be "screened" individually in
accordance with regular AAPRA procedure, and will
receive ideological instruction.
General principles of training
Since members of the revolutionary armed forces have
social, political and military responsibilities, recruits will
go through various levels of training in these three spheres.
The aim of our training is not to turn our men into killing
machines or mercenaries, but into mature and progressive
men intellectually and materially equipped for their revolu-
tionary tasks.
The quality and training of recruits for revolutionary
units is of particular importance:

69
 (a) because our effective strength will, at the start, be
much lower than the enemy's numerical strength,
(often as low as ten to one).
(b) because by the very nature of his performance, and
because our initial effective force is comparatively
small, the African revolutionary fighter must be a
highly specialised soldier.
Thus, the initial military imbalance between ourselves
and the enemy will be compensated for by our technical and
moral superiority.
All recruits will receive the same basic training, and will
then proceed to specialist courses to prepare them for the
specialised units of AAPRA.
Commanders of revolutionary armed units will constantly
bear in mind the need to carry out frequent checks on all
members of AAPRA :
(i) to make sure that the highest standard of work and
performance of duty is maintained
(ii) to test morale (the will to fight).
They will also see that organisational machinery is tightly
consolidated, and that ideological training is thoroughly
and regularly pursued.
It is not the object of our education and training to turn
out men who are servilely obedient, but men who respect
discipline and are efficient and active because they are fully
committed to the revolutionary struggle.
Instead of promoting hierarchic, coercive and follow-like-
sheep relationships, our training will seek to develop
an intelligent, egalitarian, critical and self-critical outlook
within the armed forces. Our fighters will be self-disciplined,
revolutionary men and women.
Training courses (social-political-military) will be given
in training centres located in a base area in an already con-

70
solidated, liberated zone. It is necessary to have several
centres operating in different territories or regions. Such
centres must remain secret.
Before the volunteers are sent to the centres they will
be put under observation in schools where they will receive
basic education and political instruction, and pursue courses
designed to develop their faculties of observation and de-
duction. During this stage, the final process of screening
and recruiting will be applied, and the unsuitable volun-
teers rejected.
At the end of the basic course, the successful recruits will
be directed to primary training centres.

Physical training
The body and its physical endurance must be weathered,
strengthened and developed by exercise and by exposure
to many varied conditions.
For example :
(i) marching under conditions of duress
(ii) camping in difficult terrain
(iii) subsisting on short rations for limited periods
(iv) enduring periods of isolation in small groups cut off
from base
(v) carrying out rigorous individual initiative and en-
durance tests.
Daily exercises will help to promote both physical and
moral stamina.
Our troops must be trained to operate equally effectively
face to face with the enemy, and in various guises, behind
the enemy lines. They should be taught the art of imperso-
nation, and how to conduct themselves if captured and
interrogated.
The development of speed and skill is of the greatest

71
importance in practising :
(i) attacks
(ii) dispersion
(iii) regrouping
(iv) encircling
(v) retreating
(vi) close combat
(vii) commando-type manoeuvres
(viii) sabotage

Technical training
The aim of the primary training centres is not to form a
military élite, but to help our men to establish contact with
the concrete realities of the struggle, and to maintain this
contact.
The centres will therefore be self-sufficient, and the men
will engage in farming, plantation work and cattle-raising
on adjacent plots of land as part of their daily tasks. They
will be taught to set up small handicraft and processing
industries to manufacture uniforms and equipment, (shoes,
cartridge belts, ammunition, light arms, etc.) This will
enable the AAPRA budget to concentrate on the purchase
of military and transport equipment which cannot be manu-
factured locally, while leaving the major part of provis-
ioning and clothing to the men themselves.

Military training
The practice of shooting will be given special emphasis,
for "marksmanship is the core of apprenticeship." In this
field, the guerrilla-fighter must be very skilled for it is
necessary to use a minimum of ammunition.
Recruits will be taught to use a varied range of arms,

72
and to shoot with deadly accuracy at fixed and moving
targets.
The use of explosives will also be taught. Apart from
acquiring a thorough knowledge of all kinds of AAPRA
arms and equipment, pupils of the training centres must:
(a) study and be familiar with equipment used by the
enemy
(b) recognise the different types of aircraft the enemy
uses or is likely to use in the various regions of our
national territory
(c) learn to make full use of any supplies captured from
the enemy.

Political education
Every fighter must know :
1. Against whom he is fighting
2. Why he is fighting.
Political education should centre on the key motive for
the war—the will to be free. Our essential objective is to
build a socialist society promoting better living and working
conditions for all—a socialist society under a Union
Government of Africa.
Each recruit will, during the course of his training,
attend classes in which the ideological aspects of our
struggle will be explained and discussed. He will study such
subjects as, for example:
(i) African history
(ii) Pan-Africanism
(iii) Socialism tin Africa and in the world context)
(iv) Imperialism and neo-colonialism.
Teachers will encourage recruits to express their own
views, and to discuss any current political, social, economic,
or religious problems which may interest them. Discussions

73
between recruits from different parts of Africa will be parti-
cularly valuable in stimulating mutual understanding and
dedication to the common ideal of continental liberation and
unity.

Leadership
The egalitarian nature of AAPRA forces should elimi-
nate or reduce to a minimum the hierarchic partitioning
of ranks. Instead, our forces will be characterised by a well-
planned division of revolutionary labour between intelli-
gent and purposeful men. Intimidation and bossing must
be relentlessly fought against because it is based on a hier-
archic, pyramid-like conception of authority which is merely
a useful screen for the rise to power of ambitious and petty-
minded men.
However, it is vital that certain men should assume
command, and in this connection useful reference may be
made to the solution provided by the Cuban revolution
where ranks are only introduced from lieutenancy upwards,
and revolutionary fighters pass directly from the rank of
ordinary soldier to that of lieutenant, but only as a result of
acts of initiative and courage shown in the course of the
struggle.
Our revolutionary fighters must be so highly-trained and
self-reliant that each one of them is capable of assuming
responsibility if the need arises.
Authority and subordination are required in the organi-
sation of any collective effort, and this applies particularly
in military affairs where discipline is essential. But the
idealisation of leaders must be guarded against. The general
must be seen not in isolation from the masses, but as
inseparable from them.
No general, however skilled, can be successful without

74
the loyal support of inspired, disciplined men who have a
thorough knowledge of the issues at stake in the war, are
prepared to make any sacrifice required of them, and have
confidence in his leadership.
The people are the makers of history and it is they who,
in the final analysis, win or lose wars.
Thus, the leaders of our armed forces will be the repre-
sentatives of the political leadership of our great liberation
struggle, and will express the basic interest of the entire
African nation.

C. OUR HUMAN FORCES

African society cannot be divided into clearcut, sharply-
differentiated classes because :
1. Too many complex and varying factors criss-cross and
interact rendering the socio-economic groups fluid and
interdependent.
2. The level of development of the means of production
is still too low.
Nevertheless, there does exist an emerging pattern of
social groups, some of which are more developed than
others. Most of them are potentially revolutionary. But in
sharp contrast, there is a surface "scum" of puppets,
opportunists and local reactionaries.
It must be our aim to bring out the revolutionary poten-
tials of all sections of African society, though our initial
campaign must be directed towards peasants and workers
and members of co-operative movements where revolution-
ary awareness is high.
The structure of AAPRA-AACPC, the politico-military
organisation of our united revolutionary front, will be
animated by :
(a) the peasants

75
 (b) the workers in industries, mines and trade
(c) the enlightened elements of the petty bourgeoisie, i.e.
the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, some of whom
will help to organise and canalise the people's insur-
gency against imperialist aggression into a real revo-
lutionary struggle.
(d) students
(e) certain anti-imperialist elements of the local bour-
geoisie, i.e. the patriotic bourgeoisie
(f) co-operative and farmers' movements
(g) nationalist bureaucratic bourgeoisie
(h) revolutionary outsiders, i.e. those elements who have
dissociated themselves from the conservative ideology
connected with their class origin. These are usually
young men and women with a certain educational
background.
Some of these forces may be temporarily oppressed and
weakened; and their level of economic, cultural and educa-
tional development may be heterogeneous.
The peasants
Our liberation struggle must be based on the immense,
revolutionary potential of the peasantry :
1. Because the peasants form the overwhelming majority
of our population
2. Because the revolutionary units live in their midst and
depend on their assistance to survive, and on their
active participation in order to develop.
The winning over of the peasant sector is in fact, a funda-
mental necessity.
We must first make a careful investigation of the
condition of our peasantry, the traditional patterns and
relationships of production, and the basic problems of
agricultural development. There is urgent need for:

76
 (a) an improvement of existing farming and irrigation
(b) more widespread use of fertilisers
( c) a co-ordinated programme of pest control
(d) greater research facilities
(e) technical training.
In short, we are faced with,
(i) an educational problem
(ii) a problem of capital investment
(iii) the need to rationalise the use of the existing means
of production, and to introduce new methods.
The task of the revolutionary cadres is therefore not pri-
marily to satisfy land hunger but to awaken the peasants to
the realities of their economic potential, and to win them
over to a new form of organisation of agricultural produc-
tion and distribution.
These forces are from the bread masses, are in absolute
majority, and must be matured, organised, trained and
drawn into the struggle against exploitation and poverty
throughout the continent.

The rural proletariat

The agricultural labourers who are the quickest to grasp
the problems of the revolution and the inevitability of the
struggle are mainly those who produce such goods as cotton,
sisal, cocoa, coffee, rubber, citrus fruits, etc., in other
words those employed within the orbit of international trade
and industry. It is precisely in this sector that our agri-
cultural workers are massively absorbed, and it is these
workers who are in daily contact with modern economic
realities and exploitation.
They are the strategic links in the chain of exploitation
of our material and human resources which we are deter-
mined to break.

77
 The task will not be difficult since agricultural wage-
earners (plantation workers, cattle farmers, African
farmers working in a family or semi co-operative system of
agricultural production) are the easiest to persuade that the
ending of exploitation is the prerequisite of :
(a) modernisation and accelerated development in
agriculture
(b) i mprovement of working conditions for all workers
and peasants and that conditions (a) and (b) are the
necessary prelude to the industrialisation of our
territories, and a full possibility of self-realisation.

Neo-colonialist control over the advanced sectors of

production.
It must be remembered, however, that imperialism in its
neo-colonialist stage, and particularly in Africa, draws the
bulk of its profits from its grip over the advanced sectors
of production:
(a) mining
(b) manufacturing
(c) commerce
(d) retail trade
(e) transport
(f) fisheries (either through direct control over open-sea
fishing enterprises or through indirect control over
the production of ice, indispensable for the conserva-
tion of fish).
Enterprises in the above-mentioned sectors attract about
90% of all western capital invested in Africa, and are there-
fore the main areas of neo-colonialist expansion. Conversely,
imperialism is increasingly withdrawing from the agricul-
tural sector, leaving its exploitation to indigenous elements.
There is nothing magnanimous about the imperialists' with-

78
 drawal from this sector : they are simply placing their stakes
in the sectors best suited to their own interests.
Indeed, although agriculture absorbs the majority of the
African working population :
(i) the agricultural sector is, in general, not highly pro-
ductive because modern techniques have not been
widely applied
(ii) the promotion of agricultural production requires
heavy capital investment which is recoverable only
on a long term basis. For example, irrigation schemes,
the construction of training centres, use of fertilisers,
purchase of agricultural machinery, involve large
capital outlay and a high degree of organisation.
(iii) the unpopular equation: plantation = settling= colo-
nialism has remained anchored in the minds of too
many progressive Africans for neo-colonialists to ven-
ture back into agricultural exploitation. No foreigners
can now afford to revert to the old pattern of rural
slavery used in the time of old-fashioned colonialism.
In certain states, where no revolution took place to make
a clean sweep of the settlers, as in Algeria, foreign settlers
are either trying to re-orientate their activities into sectors
which are less dangerous from a psychological point of
view; or are trying to sell their plantations to high-ranking
nationals in order to retire abroad with their ill-gotten
fortunes. The explosive situation existing in some African
countries where the crucial problem of land still under
foreign control has remained unsolved in the post-indepen-
dence period is enough to discourage any enterprise in this
direction by new-style colonialists.
The present nature of imperialist objectives shows up
clearly in the fact that over two-thirds of the capital injected
into Africa by the major capitalist countries (USA, Great

79
Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan) goes to South
Africa, Rhodesia and Katanga. This trend is not coinci-
dental, nor is it due to any marked preference for the type
of government in power in these territories. Western capital
pours into them because they are the wealthiest mineral,
industrial and strategic nucleii on our continent. The second
important magnetic pole for imperialist interests is northern
Sahara, with its oil, gas, manganese and iron. The remain-
der of western capital is directed towards commercial busi-
ness and various other projects where the line between
orthodox procedure and corruption and subversion, is al-
most impossible to draw.
The huge turnover figures of important trading firms
(SCOA, UTC, UAC, PZ, etc.) implanted in Africa, are ex-
pressed in the soaring graphs published in company reports.
The reason here is that the opportune relaxation of the
colonial grip has enabled many Africans to quench freely
an increasing craving for capitalist, habit-forming consumer
goods introduced by colonialism as the status symbols of
"civilisation" and "modernity" associated with the prestige
of political power.
We may therefore conclude that :
1. It is as correct as ever to base our struggle on the
mobilisation of the majority, i.e. the workers and
peasantry
2. We must, at the same time, penetrate the very heart
of imperialist and neo-colonialist centres of exploita-
tion by winning the workers to our side.
We must have every inch of our land and every one of
our mines and industries.

Workers in the mines, industries and trade

The industrial proletariat is indispensable to our struggle

80
because workers in this sector are :
1. The essential labour force for the continued existence
of neo-colonialism, i.e. of the continued exploitation
of Africa by alien economic interests
The human lever of the economic and social revolu-
tion which is the constructive aspect of our war against
imperialism.
The importance of winning over the workers in the key
sector of our economy and of integrating them as powerful
forces in our revolutionary struggle is recognised and accep-
ted by all genuinely progressive Africans. Yet in recent
years a certain amount of confusion has been caused by
the spread of myths denying the existence of a working
class in Africa. Those who spread these myths are generally
African political "personalities" often in government cir-
cles, who have an opportunist petty bourgeois outlook and
a deep-seated fear of the masses. It is not that they are
blind to realities, but they deliberately ignore the existence
of a social force whose development might lead to the
destruction of the very clique from whom they receive
income and privilege.
Even before the advent of puppets, the imperialists did
all in their power to avoid the emergence of an organised
African working class:
(a) for a long time, the French prevented the workers
in their colonies from forming trade unions
(b) the English integrated "TUC advisers" into their
colonial administration to set up trade unions
tailored to western capitalist standards.
Later, the puppets and their local reactionary partners
continued to refuse to recognise the existence of the ex-
ploited classes which had emerged in African society, in
order to avoid exposing the class of exploiters of which

81
they themselves were the leaders.
They refuse to see the workers because they believe
they can thus prevent the workers from seeing them and
tearing them to pieces. But not even a so-called "élite" can
bury its head in the sand for very long.
Consequently, African reactionaries were soon compelled
to make certain concessions to reality to avoid being en-
gulfed by the rising tide of discontent. They resorted to the
well-known ritual of setting up puppet trade unions to stifle
the workers' movement by creating
(i) employers' trade unions
(ii) clerks' trade unions controlled by a swarm of white-
collared employees who are not directly involved in
the productive process, and who poison the workers'
movement
(iii) unions dominated by corrupted leaders.
The high degree of attention paid to the workers by neo-
colonialists indicates their crucial importance in the revolu-
tionary struggle. They are paid comparatively high wages,
and led to believe that if the imperialists withdraw they will
be unemployed. In some cases, they are given houses at
reduced rents and "amenities" to keep them happy while
they are being exploited, and to lull them into a false sense
of security and well-being. The object of this attention is
to instil into them the idea that they have something to
gain by a continuance of the imperialist way of life, and
everything to lose by a revolution.
This kind of indoctrination makes the task of drawing
the workers into the ranks of our liberation struggle some-
what difficult. But then nothing is easy in a revolutionary
situation, and already, hundreds of thousands of African
workers are aware of their true position and are ready to
act.

82
Neo-colonialist attempts at integration
Probably the most insidious of the enemy's attempts to
win the African workers to their side is the campaign to
"integrate" them into the neo-colonialist, capitalist sys-
tem of exploitation. This is the so-called solution of
"Africanisation", made palatable by the promise of wages
and salaries equal to those of foreign workers.
The main problem for our workers is not that an African
earns three, five or ten times less than his western counter-
part, but that he, like they, is exploited, and will never be
able to achieve full self-realisation within the imperialist,
capitalist system.
Far from constituting a serious challenge to the system,
Africanisation harmonises and attempts to rationalise it
so that its running is more smooth and efficient, and there-
fore more profitable for the enemy.

The truth behind the salaries

In South Africa, where African workers live in conditions
close to slavery, the fascist-racist regime is obliged to give
its mining and industrial workers comparatively better
salaries than those usually paid in the rest of Africa for a
similar job. However, this fact does not prove that workers
have something to gain from the apartheid regime, or that
they occupy a - privileged" position in relation to the rest of
the African workers. On the contrary, such salary scales are
a clear indication that the enemy cannot do without this
labour force, and this is true both in the colonised and neo-
colonised territories in Africa. For example, if all African
miners in South Africa withdrew their labour the country's
economy would be paralysed and political power within
their grasp. Such is the potential and, as yet, unrealised
strength of our workers.

83
 At present, it might appear that African workers are only
ready to strike for increases in salary. If this is the case,
it can only mean one of two things :
1. That they are unable to attempt any other form of
action in the conditions prevailing at their places of
work
2. Or that they are not yet aware that there is something
else to be done.
The first alternative is due to measures taken by the
enemy. The second, is the result of both enemy measures
and revolutionary deficiencies :
(a) The enemy both needs and fears the African labour
force, and therefore does its utmost to arrest the in-
tellectual and professional development of the workers
by keeping them in the unskilled category for life.
(b) African revolutionaries have not yet been successful
in explaining to the workers the crucial part they can
play in the liberation struggle.
In certain extreme cases, the purely economic form of
struggle has definite positive aspects. But it is becoming
increasingly true that in Africa, particularly in the zones of
intensive mining and industrial activity, this form of
struggle can only achieve very limited results, and does not
match up to the urgency of the situation.
Being forced to abandon working-sites so strategically
and economically indispensable to the enemy cannot be a
solution for the workers. But the presence of African
workers inside neo-colonialist strongholds opens up
interesting possibilities for a quick and thorough liquidation
of the enemy.
It is essential for the leaders of the revolutionary libera-
tion movement :
1. To bring the truth out into the open

84
 2. To establish close and active contact with the African
workers
3. To link the African workers' movement organically
to the struggle by determining specific intermediary
objectives so that whatever progress is achieved in
the workers' struggle will mean progress in the whole
anti-imperialist movement, and the promotion of
socialism on a continental scale.

The failure of imperialist tactics

To prevent the workers from realising their true position,
and to avoid the immense strength of the African workers
from being unleashed inside the strongholds of neo-colonial-
ism, the enemy does its utmost to disintegrate the workers'
movement, rendering it spineless and isolating the workers
from the realities of African society, and above all from the
revolutionary movement, during the whole of the time they
spend on the working-sites.
However, the enemy can never manage to cut them off
completely, for one of the essential features of African
labour is its mobility.

The workers' movement and revolutionary strategy

Even in territories under intense enemy control no worker
in the modern economic sector :
(i) is totally isolated from the broad masses
(ii) or permanently established on his working-site under
enemy surveillance.
Inside enemy strongholds and in key positions, African
workers remain part of a vast mobile force. They come from
the reserves, villages, rural areas and neighbouring
territories to work for a stipulated period of time in the
factories, mines, plantations, harbours or transport centres.

85
Once the contract is terminated they return to their homes
either permanently, or to stay for a while before once again
setting out to obtain work.
The permanent mobility of the African labour force was
encouraged, and even deliberately organised in places, by
the enemy, in order to avoid confrontation with a corporate
and fully-constituted African proletariat. But this very
mobility has proved of great value to the revolutionary
movement. Mobile workers establish an active liaison be-
tween the rural population and the centres of neo-colonialist
strength. They penetrate the innermost strongholds of the
enemy and are becoming qualified to take them over.
Therefore, if our revolutionaries are faced with major
difficulties in their attempts to educate and organise the
workers on the working-sites, they must seek their :
1. original points of departure
2. transit points.
It is at the points of departure, and along the lines of
transit that political education must be emphasised. Once
the workers' trajectories have been determined, mobile
teams specialised in propaganda work and in political agi-
tation, may even infiltrate into the circuit, enabling revolu-
tionaries and revolutionary ideas to penetrate the very
bloodstream of the enemy's economy. (Chart 8).
Therefore, the integration of the workers in the revolu-
tionary struggle may be achieved through various means
and at different levels,—methods and arguments varying
according to conditions and circumstances. Any action
taken by workers to advance their position is an integral
part of our revolutionary struggle. For example :
(i) in an enterprise under foreign capitalist control, when-
ever the workers claim a rise in pay
(ii) in an enterprise under indigenous capitalist control,

86
87
 whenever the workers go on strike
(iii) in a nationalised or state enterprise whenever the
workers demand better working conditions, or rebel
against an inefficient or corrupt administrator.
These isolated battles must be fought as part of the great
revolutionary, liberation struggle, and within the frame-
work of our politico-military organisation (AAPRA-
AACPC).

The role of students

The youth belong to the Revolution. Our universities,
colleges and schools in enemy-held and contested zones can
become centres of revolutionary protest. Students should
establish close links with the workers and provide the
spark needed to set in motion demonstrations, strikes, boy-
cotts and armed insurrection. Effective student-worker co-
operation can paralyse a reactionary power structure and
compel change.
In liberated areas, students must constantly guard and
revitalise the revolution. On our youth depends the future
of Africa and the continent's total liberation and unity.

The nationalist bourgeoisie

These anti-imperialist elements of the local bourgeoisie
form a relatively small, though important part of our lib-
eration movement, particularly in the contested zones and
in areas under enemy control. They are, for example, often
in a position to undermine a puppet regime by exposing its
imperialist masters, and by supporting anti-imperialist
movements.
Their social position and their genuine patriotism will
command respect, but at the same time they may be thought
to be "armchair revolutionaries", since they represent a
"privileged" sector of the population known to be out of

88
sympathy with our socialist objectives. This should not dis-
courage our revolutionary cadres from drawing them into
the main stream of our movement since they can be of
inestimable help in achieving our first two objectives of
liberation and continental unity, and many of them may,
in the course of the struggle become convinced of the need
for socialism.
Revolutionary outsiders
These include :
1. Africans who have dissociated themselves from the
ideology connected with their class origin
2. Men and women of African descent living overseas
3. Foreigners who for various reasons have become
interested in the African revolution, and wish to
take an active part in the revolutionary struggle.
There is room for all these people in our great struggle.
For our objective remains the same throughout, to mobilise
all the human forces at our disposal in order to create a
decisive, revolutionary, flexible and multiform striking
force.
The role of women
The women of Africa have already shown themselves to
be of paramount importance in the revolutionary struggle.
They gave active support to the independence movement
in their various countries, and in some cases their coura-
geous participation in demonstrations and other forms of
political action had a decisive effect on the outcome. They
have, therefore, a good revolutionary record, and are a
great source of power for our politico-military organisation.
Maximum use must be made of their special skills and
potentialities.
First, it is necessary to examine the nature of the African

89
woman's resources in terms of the revolutionary struggle,
and then to determine how these can best be used and
developed.
The following is a proposed questionnaire of some
essential points to be studied by our revolutionary cadres,
concerning the position of women in African society.
(i) In statistical and qualitative terms, how has the
African woman assimilated the two-fold experience of
our traditional, communalistic society? That is, how
does she stand in relation to the Euro-Christian
experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to
the Islamic experience?
(ii) What is the nature of her links and/or dependence
on the imperialist oppressor? How can these links be
used to the advantage of our revolution?
Sometimes these links are predominantly economic,
for example in the relationship between the super-
mammies and the foreign trading firms. In other
cases, the links may be purely personal. Prostitution
in the colonial and neo-colonial context combines
personal and economic dependence on the monied
class, with political links in the form of espionage and
collaboration.
(iii) To what extent is the African woman's revolutionary
role a prolongation, a modification, or a total
departure from her traditional communalistic milieu
and her duties, rights and general position? How does
it affect her subjective views of emancipation and
happiness?
(iv) To what extent did she formerly take part in produc-
tive work?
(v) Is she entitled to the fruits of her labour? In what
proportion?

90
 (vi) How far is the practice of polygamy synonymous
with feudalism? And to what extent does this practice
mean that the African woman is exploited?
(vii) In which specific cases can it be said that women
in Africa are exposed to a two-fold exploitation as
workers (i.e. class exploitation in the Marxist sense
of the term), and as women?
In the case of each social-ethnic group under analysis,
the final ratio of the positive answers to the negative ones
will determine the nature of the efforts to be made to ful-
fil the final objective which is the same throughout Africa :
the revolutionary mobilisation of African women.

Women in enemy-held zones

Women in zones under enemy control must participate
fully in the work of political education and organisation.
The influence of women over the youth of the country, and
the fact that they are the wives, sisters, and mothers of
future freedom fighters must be utilised to the full by the
revolutionary cadres.
The degree of a country's revolutionary awareness, may
be measured by the political maturity of its women.
They are in a particularly strong position to infiltrate
the enemy ranks since they can exploit the lack of austerity,
the mercenary state of mind, and the feeble sense of pur-
pose which are characteristic of the counter-revolutionary
soldier.

Women in the bases and liberated areas

The majority of women in these areas, particularly
mothers and older women, can ensure the continuity of the
consolidation process and the growth of self-sufficiency and

91
preparedness, while the men within the action units remain
essentially in preparedness for war.
Their main tasks, inside the liberated zones where
creative work can begin, is to ensure self-sufficiency,
stability and resistance on all levels.

The training of women

If they satisfy the physical, social and ideological
recruitment standards determined by the Commission of
Control and Recruitment of AAPRA, women may join the
training centres on the same basis as men, and be eligible
for the same responsibilities and authority. They will
receive similar political, military and social training as men,
the courses being adapted to their capacities and physical
strength.
Comparatively more emphasis will be placed on :
a. Political instruction
1. Propaganda techniques. The following tasks can be
usefully fulfilled by women in the bases:
(i) the production and reproduction of leaflets
(ii) the distribution and explanation of newspapers,
news-sheets, slogans and instructions to the local
population.
(iii) dramatisation of repressive incidents; the organisa-
tion of victim's funerals with a political dimension;
demonstrations of passive resistance; the production
of placards, banners and other insignia.
Intelligence work. For example, women "petty"
traders and "market" women can use the mobility
required by their trade as a cover for the carrying of
messages, arms and intelligence reports.
3. Interpreting and liaison duties. Women who can speak

92
 more than one language will be invaluable as inter-
preters, and for the interrogation of prisoners.
4. Administrative, judicial and secretarial activities.
For example, women should be trained to replace
men in local government. Reliable and efficient secre-
taries will be needed to ensure the smooth running of
the AAPRA-AACPC organisation, to keep records and
to carry out other essential office work.
b. Education
A nursery and primary school should be attached to each
production unit, workshop or medical centre organised by
women. These will absorb :
(a) the children of the women workers
(b) AAPRA orphans and freedom fighters' children
(c) children of the local population
Trained infant and primary school teachers will be
assisted by working mothers taking turns to help in the
general duties of caring for the children.
Likewise, each production unit should elect its literacy
campaigning group to persuade adults to study after work-
ing hours. Incentives may be usefully employed; and a
moderate degree of competitiveness between the various
groups will also help to encourage maximum effort.
The close network of secondary schools, which it should
be the ultimate goal of every liberated zone to possess.
should be utilised for evening lectures and class discussions.
c. Medical training
Hospitals, first aid posts, infant and child welfare cen-
tres, and birth control clinics will be set up in the base
areas, and will be staffed largely by women.
Nurses with suitable guerrilla training will be attached as
regulars to the action units.

93
d. Driving instruction
We cannot afford to waste a single fighting man on non-
combat duties. Women should, therefore, be trained to
drive the many different vehicles used within the AAPRA-
AACPC organisation, cars, lorries, jeeps and so on.
e. The provisioning of AAPRA forces
1. Food. In view of the increasing involvement of men
in part-time or full-time guerrilla activities, the
responsibility of producing and distributing sufficient
food for all will belong mainly to the women. In areas
not yet liberated, freedom fighters in action units will
encourage the local women to take over food produc-
tion duties from the men, so that more local men can
be recruited into the permanent guerrilla force.
Farming, fishing, food stocking and preservation will
be increasingly done by women.
Interest in food preservation techniques, and time-
saving methods involving minimum expense should be
encouraged. Dependence on provisions from external
allies should be lessened to promote local qualities of
autarchy.
The local population as a whole is the main pro-
vider of food, but since it is the primary objective of
guerrilla activities to absorb increasing numbers of
local men into the action units, the women will
remain as the only permanent, full-time producers
and distributors of food.
Women in the bases and liberated areas will set up
permanent or mobile distribution centres, canteens and
people's shops. They will supervise the rationing of
scarce commodities, and organise barter activities in
regions where the use of the enemy's currency is
barred.

94
 2. Clothing. Women will be trained to set up and operate
workshops for the manufacture of uniforms, covers,
canvas bags, shoes and other equipment needed by
the freedom fighters.

D. PROPAGANDA
Propaganda is a means of liberation, an instrument of
clarification, information, education and mobilisation.
It serves two different but essential functions in our war :
1. To subvert the enemy
2. To awaken and mobilise our people.

Propaganda to subvert the enemy.

An indispensable preliminary to battle is to attack the
mind of the enemy, to undermine the will to fight so that
the result of the battle is decided before the fighting begins.
The revolutionary army attacks an irresolute and demora-
lised army.
This type of propaganda must have two main objectives:
(a) to undermine the morale of non-African troops, ex-
posing the injustice of their cause and the certainty
of their defeat.
(b) to encourage African troops who have been misled
into fighting for the enemy, to desert and join
AAPRA.
The main problem in both cases is the difficulty of access,
or communication, particularly in enemy-held zones. Broad-
casts, the distribution of leaflets, and the holdings of secret
meetings and discussions are some of the methods most
likely to produce results.
In contested zones, where revolutionaries operate more
freely, all the various media of propaganda can be used,
(e.g. radio, television, cinema, press, exhibitions).

95
Propaganda addressed to the people
The object of this propaganda is to :
(i) denounce enemy action to the people
(ii) explain our cause
(iii) mobilise the masses so that they break free from inertia
and participate actively in the revolutionary struggle.
This can be done on two levels :
1. Theoretically, by accelerating the political awaken-
ning of the majority. Such an awakening often occurs
in phases with the spread of :
(a) the idea of an independent existence (anti-colonial-
ism, nationalism)
(b) the idea that "something is rotten" (the awakening
to neo-colonialist exploitation)
(c) the idea that the situation can change (i.e. a conscious
anti-neo-colonialist attitude)
(d) the idea that victory can be achieved only by action
(the need to use force; the will to fight).
2. On a practical level, by integrating our educational
work within the politico-military organisation
( AAPRA-AACPC), and providing the actual means
for carrying out our revolutionary aims.
The suggested mechanism of our revolutionary struggle
is illustrated in detail in Chart 5 on page 64.
Chart 9 (page 97) is a simplified plan to show the nature
and functions of the triple chain of command.
Structure A, the political executive, is to carry out
intensive and extensive political education. This structure
branches out to village level in the rural areas, and to wards
in the townships. A will gradually provide the oppressed.
exploited and dissatisfied masses with political organisation
and education. The people will thus become an informed.
organised and determined force.
 B comes into being as a result of the successful work
achieved by A in co-ordination with the Military Executive
which specialises in the practical organisation of the
revolutionary units.
When action is initiated, through the joint decision of
the Political Executive, the Military Executive and the
Army General Staff, chain B assumes foremost importance.
In the meantime A pursues its organisational work and
even reinforces it, since the action of B will often be carried
out on the basis of the preliminary work done by A or on
the strength of information provided by A.
A runs a system of propaganda and of intelligence which
has certain links with the B structure, though it never
completely merges with it. In other words, various types of

97
agents attached to A will never be known to B. B itself
will have its own propaganda section and network of agents
of an essentially operational character, but these will never
be completely merged with A, or even with the equivalent
bodies of C, the conventional armed forces. Therefore, if :
(i) B suffers reverses
(ii) the progress of B is not uniform
(iii) certain guerrilla units are disintegrated
(iv) B is forced by particularly unfavourable circum-
stances to go temporarily underground,
the organs and cells of A will continue to function. This
arrangement ensures that there will be no void, gap or
lapse in the revolutionary struggle.
Once action is launched at the level of B and C final
victory is assured, and any retreat or loss will represent
only a momentary ebb of the revolutionary wave.
To sum up, general preparations for action are made by
the structure as a whole and with chains A, B and C
co-ordinating with each other. Fieldwork begins with A
which creates the conditions for the setting up of B, whose
activity is co-ordinated with C.
A, B and C constitute a huge, well-equipped ideologi-
cally formed and physically trained force. But the complex
is initially set in motion by propaganda A.
The type of propaganda needed is first and foremost
organisational and ideological. It is therefore necessary to
have a clear conception of the essential features of the
propaganda we need, and a carefully selected and highly
trained corps of agents to spread it.
Our propaganda covers the entire field of revolutionary
political education. It is the subjective vector of the
struggle and is based on a chain of constants :
clarifying—denouncing—explaining

98
 clarifying—denouncing—explaining—solving
clarifying—explaining--solving— mobilising
The chain of propaganda tasks does not vary, but
different degrees of emphasis will be laid on one link in the
chain rather than on another according to :
(i) the level of the audience (national forces or an inter-
national public)
(ii) the specific situation it treats
(iii) the stage reached in the struggle and the various
circumstances conditioning it.
Propagandists will also vary their techniques and themes
to suit conditions in the various types of territory they are
operating in. For example:
(a) a liberated territory, where the people's power must
be consolidated
(b) a contested territory, where the liberation movement
must be supported, where popular consensus must be
achieved, and where the enemy must be demoralised
(c) an enemy-held territory, where it is essential: to ana-
lyse and denounce enemy action; to show the breaks
in his armour; to show why and how the people's
forces must be organised and led to victory.
Propaganda is spread through various media:
(a) Radio
(b) Television
(c) Press (newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets)
(d) Cinema (documentaries, news reels)
(e) Conferences, discussions, debates
(f) Exhibitions (using posters, slides, maps, charts,
photographs, documents).
Media a, b, c and d are generally more easily available in
liberated zones or bases.
Media c, e and f are adaptable anywhere provided

99
capable cadres and appropriate means are available. The
cadres can be trained in AACPC schools.
The ways of producing written propaganda change
according to prevailing conditions. In areas where propa-
ganda can be openly produced, printing presses are used.
In a clandestine situation, portable duplicating machines
with their compact accessories are suitable.
There are two main kinds of clandestine publications:
1. Leaflets which deal with immediate on-the-spot
news, and which spread slogans, rallying-cries and
watchwords
2. Bulletins or newspapers.
However, all propaganda media must convey the follow-
ing ideas, encouragement and information:
(i) the struggle to the death against imperialism and neo-
colonialism, its agents and all reactionaries
(ii) African liberation and unity, and the construction of
a socialist society
(iii) news of the problems, progress and achievements of
other socialist countries
(iv) information about the progress of AAPRA forces
(v) practical advice and directions of all kinds for the
fighters, workers, peasants, students, women, etc.
Our propagandists must leave no problem untackled, no
mistake unexposed. Truth must always be told. It is a proof
of strength, and even the hardest truth has a positive
aspect which can be used.
Finally, our propaganda must promote self-induced
morality, that is, self-reliance, self-education, self-disci-
pline and self-criticism. These qualities are basic in the
revolutionary guerrilla fighter who is by nature and training:
(a) courageous
(b) skilful

100
 (c) disciplined
(d) loyal.
Our propaganda should undertake to illustrate and
demonstrate the necessity of cultivating and consolidating
these four qualities, not only subjectively, but scientifically.
The revolutionary fighter must by the very nature of his
highly specialised performance and the speediness of his
action, adopt a scientific attitude in all fields. Superstition,
magic or irrational beliefs, fatalism and wishful thinking
must be fought against.

Suggestions for propaganda items

A. Blueprint for a monthly AAPRA review
B. Blueprint for a weekly of:
(i) the armed forces
(ii) the military executive
(iii) the political executive
C. Blueprint of a local revolutionary newspaper or
bulletin dealing with various themes:
(i) the preliminary phase of the formation of cells
(ii) the prelude to insurrection
(iii) the unfolding struggle (victories and reverses
expressed in figures, etc.)
D. Blueprint for leaflets:
(i) denouncing the enemy for political and economic
reasons
(ii) addressing the various sectors of the population
Since intensive and extensive political education is
pioneering work (i.e. preparing the ground for action), and
constitutes the mainstay of action, the political activists in
charge of propaganda must be well-grounded in the rules
and general principles of action. They must always bear
in mind the essential objective, the take-over by the

101
people and workers of:
(i) the civil administration
(ii) the police
(iii) the armed forces
and control over :
(i) industry
(ii) agriculture
(iii) mining
(iv) transport
Hence the need for the organisation and mobilisation of
the :
(i) workers
(ii) peasants
(iii) members of co-operatives
(iv) students
(v) youth
(vi) women
with specific rules, suggestions and programmes for each
sector and in accordance with the supreme objective :
—African unity and socialism—
To conclude, prop-, nda must:
(a) prepare for the organisation of popular insurrection
(b) spread dissension and subversion amongst the enemy's
ranks, and undermine morale
(c) expose the enemy's propaganda, and attempts to
misinform and mislead
(d) spread information, intelligence etc.
These basic tasks constitute the necessary prelude to
action, the condition for the smooth unfolding of our
struggle, and its final guarantee of success,—the achieve-
ment of a Union Government of Africa.

102
 CHAPTER TWO
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES OF
GUERRILLA WARFARE
The main part of the armed revolutionary struggle will be
carried out by centrally-directed guerrilla forces. These will
receive expert and rigorous training in base camps where
the most modem fighting methods will be taught. The object
of the final part of this Handbook is therefore, merely to
provide a source of ready reference to some of the funda-
mental elementary principles and techniques of guerrilla
warfare.

A. ORGANISATION OF A GUERRILLA ARMY

A guerrilla army, although operating in small, widely-
dispersed groups needs centralised direction and co-ordina-
tion. The following sections must be established :
1. Recruitment
See the section on recruitment for AAPRA forces pp. 68-
69.
2. Information
It is the task of this section to provide information about
anything which may have a bearing on the struggle in a
particular place.
(a) inhabitants : those who are supporters of the revolu-
tionary struggle, those who are enemies, and those who
are indifferent
(b) physical features of the country : rivers, forests,
mountains, valleys, etc.

103
 (c) strategical position of towns, roads, bridges, rail-
ways, airfields, etc.
(d) attitude of members of the armed forces and the
police; behaviour of freedom fighters and of those
who wish to join them.
The information section is also responsible for :
(i) drawing maps
(ii) espionage and counter-espionage
(iii) compiling and keeping dossiers on every freedom
fighter in the zone
(iv) coding and decoding of messages
(v) liaison and co-operation with information sections in
other zones.
3. Operations
This section must authorise all operations by guerrilla
groups. All chiefs of zones must be consulted so that
tactics and every aspect of each operation can be discussed.
The leader of the guerrilla group which is to carry out the
operation will of course take part in the discussions.
4. Sabotage
This is one of the most important sections of guerrilla
organisation. The officer in charge must see that the
most modern techniques and equipment are employed, that
saboteurs are constantly active, and that the enemy's weak
points are pin-pointed and attacked and his economic life-
lines destroyed.
5. Instruction
The officer commanding this section will be in charge of
the training camps for freedom fighters. He will also pro-
mote the education of peasants and supervise all other
aspects of education in the region.
6. Armament
This section is responsible for the purchase and storage

104
of all fighting equipment, arms and ammunition, and for
its distribution among the guerrilla forces.
7. Provisions
It is the task of the officer in charge of this section to see
that revolutionaries are provided with adequate food, uni-
forms and other supplies.
8. Health
Qualified doctors and nurses will generally be in base
camps and hospitals, and may not be able to attend
guerrillas who fall sick or who are injured while on opera-
tional duties. All members guerrilla groups will re-
ceive first aid instruction in the training camps, and will
carry basic essential medical supplies. The officer in charge
of the Health section will ensure that guerrilla groups
are adequately equipped medically, and that all sick and
wounded brought back to base areas receive prompt medi-
cal attention. He will also keep an eye on all health prob-
lems in his area, particularly concerning himself with the
prevention of any epidemic spreading to the guerrilla
forces.
9. Propaganda
See Book Two, Chapter One, section D. It is parti-
cularly important in guerrilla warfare, where military
action is usually unpublicised, that the propaganda section
issues communiques to spread news of revolutionary vic-
tories. This will raise the morale of revolutionary groups,
and demoralise the enemy.
10. Volunteers
The officer in charge of this section should see that volun-
teers are given non-combat duties and remain unarmed
until reliable information is obtained about them. The
normal recruitment processes of AAPRA will apply to both
men and women volunteers. Where a district or zone has

105
more volunteers than it needs, the central command should
be informed, so that arrangements may be made for volun-
teers to be transferred to where they are most needed.
11. Communications
Courses in radio telegraphy and in the use of all com-
munications media will be given in the training camps. It
is the task of the communications section, therefore, to
organise and supervise the whole communications network
of the revolutionary movement, and to see that the latest
and best equipment is made available to the guerrilla units.
Guerrilla units
These should normally consist of 10-25 men, though the
precise number of men in a unit will depend on fighting
conditions and local circumstances. In general, small units
are easier to operate, and are often more effective, than
larger ones. Members of each unit should be friends, true
brothers who are ready to give their lives in the revolution-
ary struggle. Numbers of small guerrilla units may form
part of a larger guerrilla group under a group commander.
Guerrilla unit and group leaders
Leaders should be:
(i) highly-trained, efficient fighters
(ii) able to command obedience and to make correct and
rapid decisions
(iii) patient, and never unjust.
Each guerrilla must know the hierarchy of his unit and
group so that when there are casualties, the leadership is
never in doubt.
Training
A guerrilla must be :
(a) absolutely clear in his mind about what he is fighting
for

106
 (b) convinced of the justness of his cause
(c) a skilled soldier
(d) of strong moral fibre
Every guerrilla should be able to :
(i) shoot with a rifle, revolver and machine gun
(ii) handle and throw a knife well
(iii) make and throw bombs
(iv) march continuously for long periods with very little

(v) ride a bicycle, paddle a canoe and row a boat

(vi) climb walls and surmount obstacles with the aid of
ropes
(vii) change and mend wheels on bicycles and cars, and
carry out other elementary repairs
(viii) read and understand maps and know how to make
use of them
(ix) send and receive messages in the morse code.
Not every soldier will be accomplished in all these tasks
but the more education and knowledge he has, the greater
the chance he has of becoming a good revolutionary fighter.

Equipment
Apart from arms and ammunition, every guerrilla
unit should carry certain basic equipment such as first aid
supplies, compass, watch, whistles, torches, files, saws,
fishing line and hooks, water bottles, etc. In addition, each
guerrilla must always carry a rope of about 2 metres,
or some other substitute (e.g. palm tree fibres tied together).
This rope can prevent a comrade from becoming separated
from other members of his unit on a dark night, when
comrades can tie themselves to each other. It can also be
useful, for example, for crossing rivers, and for securing
prisoners.

107
B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The tactics of guerrilla warfare must be subordinate
to the strategy of the revolutionary war. Tactics will, there-
fore, vary according to the particular phases of the struggle,
and the activity and actions of the enemy. Attack is the
first principle, though there are times when defence is both
necessary and useful. These two methods—attack and
defence—are therefore closely linked, and basic in guerrilla
tactics.
Mobility
According to necessity the guerrilla unit must be able
to move in a few minutes from the field of battle, and
in a few hours even from the region of struggle. For this
reason it must change its front continually and avoid en-
circlement—the most dangerous tactic employed by the
enemy.
It is the task of guerrilla units to surprise the enemy,
to inflict casualties and destruction, and to disappear with-
out loss. This is the tactic of surprise attack and rapid
disappearance.
Three days is the longest time a guerrilla unit should
remain in any one place. On arriving at a new hiding place,
tracks and paths must be covered up and no noise made.
Marches should be carried out at night. There should
be no talking or smoking. The feet should be lifted high
at each step to avoid tripping on stones, branches and other
obstacles. During the day, the guerrillas should sleep
(in turns), study maps of the region, do special section
work, and so on.
By rapid manoeuvre, guerrilla units are able to :
(i) retreat from unfavourable battle conditions, and in
this way avoid losses
(ii) link up with other guerrilla units to draw the enemy

108
 out to cause the greatest material and human damage
possible.

Concentration and dispersal of forces

The enemy is numerically superior and better armed than
the guerrilla army. Guerrilla units must overcome this dis-
advantage by knowing when to concentrate their forces
and when to disperse them. They must concentrate their
forces, by linking up with other units and by reinforce-
ments, when the enemy is in a weak position and can be
attacked. They must disperse forces when confronted by
large confrontations of enemy units, when there is danger
of encirclement, and where the terrain is unfavourable.
Bases
A base must be established before a guerrilla move-
ment can begin. A village, a section of liberated territory,
for example, can serve as a base. It is of vital importance
to make the correct choice of site. It must be strategically
placed, defensible and secret, and be in an area where the
masses solidly support the revolutionary struggle.
Where geographical conditions make the formation of
a base impossible, a circle of civil collaborators must be
formed .

Choice of objectives for attack

Communications, above all, railways, airfields and roads
are some of the most suitable objectives for guerrilla
attack. Military transportation, for example, columns of
vehicles, troops on the march, convoys of lorries carrying
provisions are obvious targets.
The guerrilla unit will occupy positions inaccessible
to the enemy, favourable for mobile defence, and which lie
in the direction from which the enemy is expected.

109
 The primary condition for the success of an attack is a
profound knowledge of the terrain, the exploitation of this
knowledge, and careful preparation of the action.

Combat in favourable terrain

In favourable terrain, such as mountains and forests, it
is possible to form and train large numbers of guerrillas
to construct bases, repair units, dispensaries, education
centres, arms depots and so on. Conditions are also
favourable for the establishment of contingency forces.
With contingency forces, the leader must take into account
the terrain, quantity of arms and ammunition at his dis-
posal, and the problem of reinforcements.
The sphere of activity of a partisan unit must be as large
as conditions permit, and co-ordinate with the activities of
neighbouring units. If units mobilise at night, the journey
must not be longer than five or six hours from the safe
place. Small groups can be sent out of the safe place to
reconnoitre, but so as not to alert the enemy, they must
not engage in battle before the main force arrives. Where-
ever possible, similar arms and ammunition as that used
by the enemy should be employed.
Food supplies are difficult to obtain in inaccessible ter-
rain. It is necessary, therefore, to form strong liaison with
local suppliers to ensure that there is always sufficient. It
should be remembered that there are arms and other
supplies needed by the guerrilla forces, in enemy supply
depots. These depots must be raided and the supplies seized.
Guerrilla units must maintain regular liaison with
the leaders of the liberation struggle by means of a network
of people who are trustworthy, and who will hide pro-
visions and emissaries in their houses. Internal liaison must
be carried out by radio and various technical means.

110
Combat in unfavourable terrain
Plains, unforested areas, etc. are, in general, unfavour-
able terrain for the operation of guerrilla forces. In
these areas, attention must be focussed on the destruction
of the enemy's means of communication. It is here that the
saboteurs can operate effectively in blowing up bridges,
cutting telephone and telegraph wires and so on.
A guerrilla unit in unfavourable terrain should con-
sist of from 10 to 15 men, since speed and mobility are
vital. For a particular operation, guerrilla units may
unite. But they should disperse again immediately after-
wards.
Unfavourable terrain usually means dense habitation and
farms. This is good country for supplies. Guerrillas must
make contact with trustworthy people who will help to
supply the unit.
In these circumstances it is not possible to have the
amenities of base camps. But guerrillas will be able
to depend on support from among the local population. A
dense population allows guerrillas to pass information,
but at the same time there is greater risk of betrayal. Im-
portant messages must be written in code, or sent orally.

Villages
The group of village revolutionaries is responsible for the
struggle in their own particular village. The group consists
of politically-aware villagers who live side by side with the
other inhabitants, but who maintain contact with the
guerrilla units operating in the region.
A group of village revolutionaries can be established only
when the area borders on a zone occupied by the liberation
movement. A village group must be small, and the leader
must be under orders from the leader of the region. The

111
activities of the group are concerned mainly with espionage,
sabotage and propaganda. Members of the group have arms
and explosives, but the objectives of their military opera-
tions are determined by the commander of the guerrilla
units in the region.
The group must help the guerrilla units in the region,
give them information, and provide supplies. It is night
work; and during the day members of the group must live
like other villagers.

Towns
Guerrillas may infiltrate the outlying areas of towns
and form special freedom fighter units. Their task is
sabotage, propaganda and the acquiring and passing on
of information. Attacks can be carried out at night on soli-
tary members of the enemy forces and police. It is the re-
sponsibility of members of town freedom fighter units to
back up the revolutionary struggle by paralysing the
economic life of the centre.

Discipline
There must be no abuse of power of any kind. A free-
dom fighter who steals, loots, rapes or commits any other
crime against the community must be tried and severely
punished. It should be explained that such a breakdown
in discipline endangers the whole revolutionary movement.
Discipline comes from inner conviction. It is not a gift,
but can be acquired by education, exercise and life in the
guerrilla unit.
A suspected traitor should be tried by a military court
and given every chance to defend himself. If found guilty,
he must be shot.

112
Reconnaissance
This must be carried out ceaselessly so that the most
up-to-date information is obtained about the enemy's
position and strength. Information can be collected by :
(a) observation
(b) the tapping of enemy telephone and radio messages
(c) questioning local inhabitants
(d) interrogating deserters and prisoners
(e) reconnoitre in combat, i.e. the ambushing of an
enemy unit and the seizing of equipment and
prisoners
(f) making use of the network of secret collaborators.
Information obtained from local inhabitants and from
deserters and prisoners must always be verified, since the
enemy uses agents to spread false information. Prisoners
should be interrogated by the unit commander or an ex-
perienced member of the revolutionary, political organisa-
tion. Interrogations should be conducted in secret and in-
dividually.

Prisoners
The question of prisoners, particularly during the initial
stages of revolutionary warfare poses a number of prob-
lems. A small unit of guerrillas, sometimes without even
a base camp, cannot spare time, energy or supplies in
looking after them. It is sometimes necessary to abandon
them after seizing their weapons and supplies. In general,
they should be treated as humanely as possible. If the
enemy retains the hope that he can save his life by sur-
rendering, his will to fight will be considerably reduced.
On the other hand, if the enemy is unaware of the moderate
and humane treatment given by guerrillas to prisoners, he

113
will fight with greater fury, in the belief that there is no
escape.
When the revolutionary forces have liberated a consider-
able area, and have safe base camps, prisoners can be
taken, and made to do useful work.

Camouflage
The use of effective camouflage is of supreme importance,
since the guerrilla's first duty is to remain hidden, and
his camps, fortifications, arms depots etc. must be con-
cealed both from land and from the air. Branches, grass,
canes, straw and similar local materials should be used.
Each terrain has a dominant colour which must deter-
mine the colour of the guerrillas' clothing and equipment.

Acquisition of arms
At the start of guerrilla warfare, each unit acquires arms
for its own use by :
(a) purchasing them
(b) raiding arms depots
(c) disarming enemy soldiers and police
(d) making them themselves
(e) obtaining them through workers in munitions factories.
For the acquisition of arms it is often sufficient to use
rudimentary weapons such as knives, axes, assegais,
sharpened canes, sabres etc.In this way, the guerrilla unit
arms itself little by little, and prepares the conditions for
the acquisition of more arms.

Storage of arms
Arms should be stored in boxes lined with tin, and buried
deeply in widely dispersed areas. The places where arms

114
are stored should be known only to very few people, for
example, unit and group leaders.
Arms and equipment should be regularly inspected and
all metal parts protected against rust. A badly preserved
weapon, or its loss, can cause the failure of an operation,
and endanger the lives of every member of the unit.

Espionage

A spy serving the revolution is a comrade who pretends

to be a friend of the enemy, and obtains and passes informa-
tion of use in the waging of the revolutionary struggle.
Information should be sent via a third party, and if it is
of crucial importance and urgent, by word of mouth.
The revolutionary double agent has a very important
and difficult task. He must deceive the enemy and be un-
suspected even by his closest friends. He must be in a posi-
tion to obtain vital secret information about the enemy's
strength and his plans, and know how to convey the in-
formation safely to the revolutionary forces. Where a coun-
ter-spy is a member of the enemy army he can give details
of the enemy's battle units, the disposition of troops, their
morale, equipment and tactical and strategic plans. A very
important part of the help they can give is by leaving stra-
tegic points undefended in battle (e.g. with little ammuni-
tion or in charge of a coward) so that these points can be
easily captured. An officer in the enemy army who is a
double agent, could be worth more than ten officers in the
revolutionary forces.

Enemy spies and infiltrators

These must be tried by a military court, and if found

guilty, sentenced to death. Each case must be thoroughly

115
and carefully investigated before sentence is passed. Revo-
lutionary intelligence agents may be mistaken for enemy
spies and the danger of their condemnation must be guarded
against.

Enemy attack
When fired on, comrades must immediately fall to the
ground. Then, as soon as possible, each one should run in
a separate direction, look for a safe hiding place, and await
calmly for the night.
In the darkness, contact can again be made through
specially-arranged signals (animal and bird cries, drum-
ming, etc.) with the rest of the unit, and a new hiding
place sought.
No attempt should be made to fight back. Only under
very special conditions, when it is certain that casualties
can be inflicted on the enemy, without the guerrillas
suffering any loss, should a counter-attack be made. It
must never be forgotten, that it is the task of the guerrilla
not to fight or to provoke a fight, but to carry out the
operation assigned to him, and then to disappear.
In general, the guerrilla shoots to demoralise the enemy
and to keep him constantly on the alert. The enemy must
not be allowed to rest.
After an enemy attack, one or two comrades should stay
behind to keep an eye on the enemy. If the enemy en-
camps, the unit should be informed so that at night it may
be fired on. Constant harassment of the enemy is the pri-
mary task of the guerrilla forces.

Sabotage
The enemy may be sabotaged in a number of ways, apart
from the more obvious blowing up of bridges, railways,

116
and key industrial points. For example:
(i) Post Office employees can delay mail, "lose" official
correspondence either by sending it to the wrong des-
tination, or by preventing it from being delivered.
They can scrutinise mail, and pass on important in-
formation to the guerrillas.
(ii) Telephone company employees must listen in to all
calls likely to be of interest in the revolutionary
struggle, and see that any useful information is made
known to the guerrillas.
(iii) Garage attendants should adulterate petrol by adding
sugar to it, put sand into the tanks of enemy army
vehicles, and remove vital tools and spare parts.
(iv) Drivers should cause accidents without arousing
suspicion.
(v) Teachers should tell their pupils that every one has
a right to be free. They should explain the present
African situation and the working of colonialism and
neo-colonialism. Reference should be made to the
liberated areas of Africa, and the progress being made
there.
(vi) Workers should stay away from work as often as they
can, feigning illness. They should constantly seek
ways of undermining the economic strength of the
enemy.
(vii) Civil servants should be as slack as possible in the
carrying out of their duties. While pretending to be
loyal to the oppressors they should continually criti-
cise their policies to subordinates, and spread des-
pondency and lack of confidence in the way the
country is being administered.
(viii) Tradesmen, engineers, etc., should block drains and

117
 pipes, cause electrical failures, etc., in the homes and
offices of the enemy.
(ix) Every member of the community can assist in the
spreading of rumours, the creation of a general atmos-
phere of discontent and unease, and in the under-
mining of the enemy people's morale by making it
apparent that they are unwelcome in the country and
that they will shortly be ejected.
Attacking a village
Before an attack, as much information as possible should
be obtained about the village and the local terrain. For ex-
ample :
(a) Where the cables are (telegraphic and telephonic)
(b) How many people are armed
(c) If no-one is armed, how far away are the nearest armed
men
(d) If there is a radio transmitter, or an amateur radio
transmitter
(e) The names and whereabouts of traitors and colonial-
ist agents.
(f) The location of bridges, roads, airfields, etc.
Once all this data has been collected, the appropriate
files should be given to the operations section, and only
after every detail has been examined should a decision be
made whether or not to attack.
When an attack is decided upon the timing must be fixed,
and the men chosen to carry out the attack, so that the
operation may be carried out efficiently and successfully,
each group acting independently from each other. One
group will cut the telephone wires; a second, the telegraph
cables; a third one will, with the help of villagers, search
houses where there are arms and seize them. A fourth group
will capture traitors and policemen. All these tasks should

118
be carried out swiftly so that, apart from anything else,
the guerrillas may impress the enemy with their efficiency,
discipline and moral conviction. When the operation is
concluded, the guerrilla forces must rapidly disappear from
the village and hide once more in neighbouring territory.
Dead and wounded
If time allows, the dead should be buried. The wounded
should, if possible, be carried to a safe place for treatment.
Arms and equipment of dead and wounded must be
retrieved immediately.
Defence of an occupied village
Each house should be regarded as a fortification to be
connected with the next one by a trench about a metre
deep. Revolutionaries should be able to pass safely from one
house to another, protected from enemy fire. Barricades
( made from bricks, stones, logs, furniture, etc.) should be
prepared and ready to be put into position in streets where
an enemy attack is imminent. In all houses, there should
be holes made (just over the height of a man), through
which the enemy may be fired on. To shoot, comrades
should stand on a bench, box or stool in order to reach the
necessary height. Enemy bullets entering through these
holes when the guerrilla is moving around the room will
be too high to do any damage. Villagers who are not pre-
pared to assist in the fight should be compelled to leave the
village.
Large villages where a considerable number of guerrillas
are operating, should be divided up into zones, each zone
being the responsibility of one leader. There should be one
leader in supreme command.
If the enemy captures a house, smoke must be used, to
halt the advance and provide cover by setting alight pre-

119
pared old rags and other inflammable material soaked in
petrol or oil.
In the course of the revolutionary armed struggle it will
be necessary at times to destroy some of the country's
assets, such as bridges, crops, buildings, airfields and tele-
phone and telegraphic networks. Obviously no more de-
struction will be carried out than is strictly necessary for
the success of military operations.
Once colonialism and neo-colonialism have been totally
defeated, and freedom attained, it will be comparatively
easy, inspired by love of country, to rebuild what has been
destroyed and for the people to advance to complete fulfil-
ment.
Relations between revolutionaries and civilians
The guerrilla should always show gratitude for the food
he eats in villages and homes. He should explain to the
donor that the help he is giving to the guerrillas is assisting
the progress of the revolutionary struggle which is liberating
the people from colonialism and neo-colonialism.
Where possible, the guerrilla should help with house-
work, farming and any other work needing to be done. At
all times, the guerrilla must set an example of respect, hard
work and devotion to the revolutionary cause.

Political work
Guerrilla forces are invincible because of their liaison
with the masses. Propagandists must explain the revolu-
tionary movement to the people, and see that they are
informed of guerrilla victories. They should be people who
have authority and influence in the region, particularly
among the workers. Pamphlets, newspapers, broadcasts
can all carry the message of the revolution. Discussion
groups and meetings can be organised.

120
 The more efficacious the propaganda work, the more
rapidly will the public conscience be aroused. This in turn
will greatly affect revolutionary operations by ensuring mass
support.
Those organising and carrying out guerrilla activities
must be supplied with information of a political nature:
(i) the political composition of the area in which they
are operating--political parties, aims, leadership, and
the possibility of infiltration
(ii) the reaction of the masses to the economic situation
(iii) the degree of the people's collaboration with the
enemy
(iv) the morale of urban and agricultural workers
(v) the response of the masses to revolutionary activities
(vi) the centres of political life in the town or village
(vii) the composition and strength of trade unions and
such like organisations.

Civilian organisations
These play an important part in the liberation movement.
Their duties are manifold. They arrange the collection of
contributions and taxes, maintain supplies, and spread
propaganda. In enemy-held areas, civilian organisations
must be clandestine.
In liberated areas it is necessary to establish administra-
tive organs which should be responsible for the formula-
tion of laws, rules and regulations for the administration
of the zone. The establishment of political, economic and
social instruments and their organisational techniques over
the whole of the Continent must be built up on the basis of
scientific socialism. The organs of the people's administra-
tion are vital factors in the liberation movement, and must

121
be so organised as to become the nucleii from which the
people's revolutionary states and the All-African Union
Government will crystallise.

C. MATERIALS FOR DESTRUCTION

The manufacture and uses of destructive materials such
as T.N.T., plastic bombs, dynamite, gunpowder, incen-
diary bottles, detonators and lighting fuses, form part of
the basic training of the freedom fighter. Recruits will be
taught in the base training camps and workshops how to
make them and the other many and varied weapons used
by guerrilla units and by saboteurs operating within
enemy-held positions.
The fully-trained guerrilla is armed both ideologically
and physically for the revolutionary struggle. The tactics
of guerrilla warfare rest in the main with him. With the
support of the masses, and with unified direction of the
revolutionary party, he is invincible.

People of Africa, arise!

Defeat imperialism, neo-colonialism and settler domination.
Stand together and unite in the revolutionary struggle.
Forward to victory.
We shall conquer.

122
 I NDEX
Accra, 31, 33, OAU Conference in, 37.
Addis Ababa, 33, 36.
Africa, 5, 6, 25, 26, 27, 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40-43, 48, 51, 52, 55,
56, 60, 61, 67, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84; contested zones
of, 45; defence of, 65; foreign bases and missions in, 22; history
of, 73; independent states of, 36; liberated areas of, 43-46,
117; liberation forces in, 5, 16, 21; non-liberated zones of, 7;
peoples of, 25, 26, 28, 34, 40, 57, 63; political advance
of, 18; political unification of, 1, 40-41; revolutionary struggle
in, 1, 20, 42; socialist countries of, 29; women of, 89-95.
African-Americans, 39.
African nation, 27, 43, 45, 50, 75.
African revolution, 63, 77, 89.
"African socialism", 17, 28.
African unity, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 39, 40, 57, 63, 65, 74, 89,
100, 102.
Aid, 9, 15, 17.
Albania, M.
Algeria, 3, 5, 32, 79; liberation struggle of, 33, 34, 35, 52;
Provisional Government of (GPRA), 33, 35, 36.
All-African Committee for Political Co-ordination (AACPC),
56-58, 62, 64 (Chart 5), 75, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97 (Chart 9), 100.
All-African People's Conference (Dec. 1958), 27, 31.
All-African People's Revolutionary Army (AAPRA), 23, 56, 57,
58-59, 62, 63, 64 (Chart 5), 66 (Chart 6), 69, 75, 88, 92, 93,
94, 95, 96, 97 (Chart 9), 100, 101, 105; equipment and com-
position of, 67; leadership of, 74-75; political education of,
73-74; recruitment of, 68-69; regional operational commands
of, 60; structure and strategy of, 65-67; training of, 69-74.
All-African People's Revolutionary Party (AAPRP), 56.
All-African Union Government, 30, 65, 73, 102, 121.
Angola, 10.
Apartheid, 57, 83.
Arms, acquisition of, 114; storage of, 114-115.
Asia, 5, 6, 22, 38, 39, 55, 57; liberation movement in, 16; non-
liberated zones of, 7.
Australia, 21.
Baghdad Pact, 21.
Barricades, 119.
Bases, 109, 110, 114.
Belgium, 21.
Berlin Conference, 25.
Bermuda, 22.
Black Power, Author's Note, 39.
Brazzaville, group of states, 35.
Britain, 21, 37, 79-80.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 17.
Bulgaria, 22.
Cairo, 31.
Cameroon, 22, 62.
Camouflage, 114.
Canada, 21.
INDEX- continued
of exploitation, 4, 26.
Capitalist states, 2, 13, 14, 62, 79; system of exploitation, 2, 83.
Caribbean, 39.
Casablanca Conference (1961), 35; powers, 36.
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO 1959), 21.
Chad, 22.
China, 2, 5, 6, 22.
Civilian organisations, 121.
Civilians, 120.
Client state, 8, 10; government of, 14, 15.
Collective imperialism, 4, 5-7.
"Cold War", 6.
Colonialism, 13, 18, 24-25, 27, 51, 57, 79, 80, 90, 117, 120; anti-
colonialist struggle, 57, 96.
Colonial powers, 8, 10, 11, 25, 42, 50.
Colonies, 2, 3, 5.
Combat, in favourable terrain, 110; in towns, 112; in unfavourable
terrain, 111; in villages, 111-112.
Commission of Control and Recruitment, 68, 69, 92.
Communications, 106, 109.
Communism, 4, 9.
CONCP, 53.
Conference of Independent African States (April 1958), 30.
Congo, 7, 25, 32, 36, 39, 53; liberation struggle of, 34, 35, 37.
Congo-Brazzaville, 44.
Co-operative movement (co-operatives), 59, 61, 68, 75, 76, 78, 102.
Contested zones, 43, 45, 47, 48-50, 51, 60, 65, 88, 95, 99.
Convention People's Party (CPP), 2.
Counter-revolutionary soldier, 91.
Coup d'etat, 11, 12, 38, 52, 54.
Cuba, 5, 38, 74
Czechoslovakia, 23.
Dahomey, 62.
Dead, the, 119.
Denmark, 21.
Deserters, 113.
Discipline, 112.
Egypt, 5, 31, 35, 44.
Enemy (ies), 43, 45-46, 48, 50, 56, 60, 63, 70, 71, 83, 84, 85, 86,
94, 95, 96, 99, 101-105 passim, 108-119 passim, 121; agents,
69; attack, 88, 116; external, 56, 59; incontested zones, 67;
internal, 56, 57, 59; know the, 1-4; spies and infiltrators,
115-116; strategy, 1-5, 83; zones (areas) under enemy control,
43, 46-48, 49, 60, 62, 88, 91, 95, 99.
England (see also Britain), 27.
Espionage, 90, 104, 112, 115.
Ethiopia, 31.
Europe, 6, 7.
European Common Market (EEC), 7.
Exploitation, economic, 1-5, 16.
Fascism (fascist), 4, 13, 83.
Fifth Pan-African Congress, 27.
France, 21, 33, 80.
 INDEX-con tinued
Francophonie, 38.
Freedom fighters, 19-20, 21, 37, 41, 42, 53, 63, 91, 94, 95, 104,
112, 122.
FLING, 10.
FLN (Algeria), 82, 35.
Gabon, 22.
Geneva, 17.
German Democratic Republic, 22.
Ghana, 2, 5, 18, 30, 31, 35, 52, 55, 62; coup, 55.
Greece, 21.
Guerrilla(s), 72, 94, 100, 105, 108-114 passim, 116, 117, 119, 120,
121; qualities of, 106-107; training of women, 93; units
(groups), 65, 67, 98, 104-114 passim, 122.
Guerrilla army, 109; bases, 109; equipment of, 107; leadership of,
106; mobility of, 108-109; organisation of, 103-107; recruit-
ment of, 103; training of, 106-107.
Guevara, Che, 20.
Guinea, 5, 35, 52.
Guinea-Bissao, 10.
Havana, 38.
Health, 105.
High command, 51; AAPRA, 60.
Holland, 21.
"Hot War", 6.
Hungary, 22.
Iceland, 21
Imperialism (imperialist), 1, 3, 11, 18, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 34,
37, 40-41, 46, 51, 55, 67, 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 90, 100;
aggression of, 1, 7, 11, 21-22, 23, 29, 34, 38, 39, 41, 53, 55,
59, 76; anti-imperialist struggle, 21, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 50, 51,
60, 63, 85, 88; escalation of, 34-36, 38, 42, 52-54; failure of
tactics of, 85; inter-imperialist assistance, 7; in zones under
enemy control. 46-48; objectives of, 79; orthodox, 2; strategy
of, 1-5, 9, 11, 20; subversive organisations of, 17; victory over,
29-30; wars of, 2, 6.
Independence, 4, 16, 31, 32, 33, 43, 44, 45, 52, 53, 89-90.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
7.
International Development Association (IDA), 7.
International finance capital, 3, 5, 8, 13, 25-26.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 7.
Iran, 21.
Italy, 21, 80.
Ivory Coast, 22.
Japan, 80.
Jehovah Witnesses, 17.
Johnson, President of USA, 15.
Katanga, 80.
Kennedy, John, 15.
Kenya, 2, 17, 22, 52.
Lagos Conference (Jan. 1962), 35, 36.
Latin America, 2, 5, 6, 22, 26, 38, 39, 55, 57; liberation movement
INDEX- continued

in, 16, 22; non-liberated zones of, 7.

Leadership (see also AAPRA, leadership of), 119.
Liberated areas, 43-46, 51, 57, 58, 63, 65, 71, 92, 94, 99, 109,
117, 121.
Liberation movement (struggle), 1-5, 8, 9, 10, 24-25, 27, 29, 30,
31, 32, 34, 42-43, 46, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 62, 64, 68,
69, 75, 76, 82, 84, 88, 99, 110, 111, 121; artificial, 10;
attempts to destroy, 1-5, 16-21; in Africa, 16; in Asia, 16; in
Latin America, 16.
Liberia, 22, 31.
Libya, 22, 31, 35.
Lumumba, Patrice, 37.
Luxembourg, 21.
Mali, 5, 35, 62.
Manchester, 27
Mau Mau, 52.
Mercenaries, 69.
Middle East, 22.
Military training (see also AAPRA, training of), 92.
Militia, 60; continental people's, 63, 65.
Monopoly capital, 7.
Monrovia Conference (May 1961), 35.
Moral rearmament, 17.
Morocco, 22, 31, 35 .
Moumié , 17.
Nationalism, 9, 16, 24-27, 32, 96.
Nationalist bureaucratic bourgeoisie, 76, 88-89.
Neo-colonialism (neo-colonialist), 4, 6, 8-15, 16, 18, 19, 27, 31, 32,
34, 36, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 73, 81, 82, 85, 86, 90, 100, 117, 120,
aggression of, 1, 51, 54, 78-79; attempts at integration,
83; control over advanced sectors of production, 78-80; ex-
ploitation of, 13, 15, 26, 80, 83, 96; in zones under enemy
control, 47-48; strategy of, 12; the struggle against, 1, 15-16,
21, 57, 96.
Neo-colonies (neo-colonialist states), 2, 7-12, 45, 49, 54, 57.
New Zealand, 21.
Niger, 22, 62.
Nigeria, 25, 32, 62.
Nile, 25.
North Africa, 22, 36.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 21, 22, 39.
North Korea, 5
Norway, 21.
One man one vote, 46.
One party state, 11.
Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), 38.
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 36-38, 40-41; Accra Con-
ference of, 37.
Organisation of American States (OAS), 22.
Organisation of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and
Latin America (OSPAAAL), 57.
Pacific Pact (ANZUS), 21.
Pacific Ocean, 22.
 INDEX-con tinued
Pakistan, 21, 22.
Pan-Africanism, 23, 27, 31, 73; conferences, 31.
Panama, 22.
Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), 2.
Patriotic bourgeoisie, 76.
Peace corps, 17.
Peasants, 48, 61, 68, 75, 76-77, 78, 80, 100, 102, 104.
Philippines, 21.
Physical training (see AAPRA, training of), 69-74.
Pio Pinto, 17.
Poland, 22.
Political education (training), (see also AAPRA, training of), 86
91, 92, 96, 98, 101.
Puerto Rico, 22.
Portugal, 21, 39, 53.
"Portuguese" colonies, 2, 53.
Positive action, 52.
Prisoners. 107, 113-114.
Propaganda (propagandist), 8, 9, 16-21, 55, 86, 95, 97, 98, 112,
120, 121; addressed to the people, 95-101; suggestions for
propaganda items, 101-102; techniques, 92; to subvert the
enemy, 95.
Psychological warfare, 16-21, 55.
Puppet states, 4, 40, 49, 53, 54, 56, 75, 88; government of, 10, 15,
16, 46, 49, 50, 53, 55.
PZ, 80.
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), 2.
Reconnaissance, 113.
Recruitment, (see AAPRA).
Rhodesia, 22, 36, 37, 39, 53, 80; liberation struggle of, 34.
Revolutionary outsiders, 76, 89.
Revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, 76, 88.
Revolutionary struggle (movement), 16, 19, 48, 62, 65, 70, 76, 81,
84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96, 98, 103, 106, 109, 112, 115, 117, 120;
in Africa, 1, 5, 31; in Asia, 5; in Latin America, 5.
Revolutionary warfare, 1, 20, 21, 23, 42, 51, 61, 67.
Rumania, 22.
Rural proletariat, 77-78.
Sabotage (saboteur), 8, 47, 62, 72, 104, 111, 112, 116-118, 122.
Sahara, 80.
Sanniquellie Conference (July 1959), 32.
Santo Domingo, 38.
SCOA, 80.
Second Conference of Independent African States (1960), 33.
Second World War, 2, 6.
Senegal, 22, 25.
Settlers, 46, 79.
Sham independence, 7-8, 31, 32-34; zones of, 48.
Smith Ian, rebellion of, 37.
Socialism (socialist), 11, 28-29, 44, 55, 57, 59, 73, 85, 88, 89, 100,
102; scientific, 29.
Socialist states (countries), 55, 58, 100.
South Africa, 22, 41, 53, 62, 80, 83; military build up of, 39.
INDEX— con tinued

South East Asia, 22.

South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), 21.
South Korea, 7.
Spain, 53.
Spanish colonies, 2.
South West Africa, 37, 62.
State farms. 59.
Strategy, 15; and tactics of guerrilla army, 108-113; of imperialism
and neo-colonialism, 1; of revolutionary forces, 60-63.
Subversion, 62.
Sudan, 31, 36.
Syndicalisation, 6.
Tactics, choice of objectives for attack, 109-110; concentration
and dispersal of forces, 109.
Technical training, (see AAPRA).
Thailand, 21.
Togo, 25, 62.
Towns, 112.
Trade Unions, 68, 82, 121.
Tunisia, 31.
Turkey, 21.
United Africa Company (UAC), 80.
United Nations Organisation (UNO), 7, 31, 37.
United States of America (USA), 5, 6, 79; aggression of, 15; anti-
revolutionary effort of, 21-23; European post-war alliance of,
6; financial institutions of. 7; imperialism of, 6, 22, 38; mili-
tarisation of, 6; policy in Korea and the Congo, 7.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 2, 5, 6, 22.
UPA, 10.
UTC, 80.
Vietnam, 2, 5, 16, 38, 39.
Village(s), (villagers), 85, 96, 109, 111, 112, 120, 121; attacking of
118-119; defence of, 119-120.
Voice of America, 17.
Voice of Germany, 17.
Volunteers, 105-106.
Warsaw, 23.
Warsaw Treaty, 22.
West Germany, 7, 21, 80.
Welfare state, 4-5, 12-13.
Women, 100, 102; in enemy-held zones, 91; in the bases and
liberated areas, 91-92; organisations, 68; the role of, 89-91;
training of, 92-95.
Workers, 2, 6, 28, 47, 48, 59, 61, 67, 68, 75, 78, 80, 86, 87 (Chart
8), 88, 91, 100, 102, 117, 120, 121; exploitation of, 4; in
agriculture, 77-78; in the mines, industry and trade, 76, 80-
85; movement of, 3, 6, 85-88; neo-colonised, 13, 14; organisa-
tions of, 2, 4, 58.
Wounded, 119.
Zambesi, 25.
Zanzibar, 44.