Blackbook
Blackbook
BACHELOR OF ENGINEERING
In Electrical Engineering
By
2018-19
CERTIFICATE
This project report entitled “Relay Coordination Study in a Power System Using ETAP” by
Renuka Chavan (401510), Jyotsna Anand (401515), Nincy George (401538) and Melvin
Makasare (401572) is approved for the degree of “Bachelor of Engineering”
in“Electrical
Engineering”.
Examiners:
1.
2.
Date :
Place:
Declaration
We declare that this written submission represents our ideas in our own words and
where others’ ideas or words have been included, we have adequately cited and
referenced the original sources. We also declare that we have adhered to all principles
of academic honesty and integrity and have not misrepresented or idea/data/fact/source
in our submission. We understand that any violation of the above will be caused for
disciplinary action by the institute and can also evoke penal action from the sources
which have thus not been properly cited or from whom proper permission has not been
taken when needed.
Date:
Place:
Acknowledgement
We would like to express our sincere appreciation to our guides for their
guidance, encouragement, and support throughout the course of this thesis work. It was an
invaluable learning experience. We express our warm thanks to our Project guide Mr.
Kuldeep Yadav at HPCL, Mumbai Refinery for his invaluable constructive criticism and
friendly advice.
We are very much thankful to Prof. Dr. Bindu S., Head, Department of Electrical
Engineering, and Dr. S.M. Khot, Principal, F.C.R.I.T, Vashi, for their constant support.
Also, we are indebted to them for providing us all official facilities.
We would like to give a token of appreciation to our family and friends who supported us
and motivated us throughout the project. They have been major contributors to our work.
We are also thankful to all the teachers of electrical department and officials at HPCL and
who provided us conductive and approachable environment for our project activities.
ABSTRACT
Protection devices like relays and circuit breakers form the mainstay of large interconnected
power systems such as those in power generation industries. Relays are designed to detect
faulty scenarios and work to isolate the system at the earliest to ensure that continuous power
supply is ensured. Protective relays are an economical way of preventing damage to equipment
and minimum system disruption of service to healthy portion of network. Selection of
appropriate relay settings under various system conditions plays an important role in timely
isolation of the faulty section of power system. Distance and overcurrent relays are mainly used
for transmission and sub transmission protection system. In many sub-transmission and
transmission power systems directional overcurrent relays are used as secondary protection
while the main protection schemes use distance relays. For optimal coordination of protection
systems, the operating times of the relays are minimized in the frame of the objective function,
subject to coordination constraints, relay characteristic curves and the limits of the relay
settings.
Simulation software can guarantee accurate and fast representation of real-world systems which
are made of many complex interconnected systems. It may be used to test various fault
scenarios without having to experiment on the physical systems.
This report presents relay co-ordination studies and simulation of actual fault area of 50MW
CPP at HPCL, Mumbai Refinery using ETAP Version 7.1.The single line diagram of the system
under consideration is constructed and ETAP software is used for adjusting relay settings and
then to simulate the system.
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE
NO.
Abstract 1
Table of Contents 2
List of Figures 3
Chapter1 Introduction 4
1.1 Background 4
1.2 Motivation 4
1.3 Aim and Objective 5
1.4 Problem Statement 5
1.5 Scope of the Project 5
Chapter 2 Relays and Types of Protection 6
2.1 Working of Relay 6
2.2 Siemens Relays used in HPCL 7
2.3 Protection Requirement 9
2.4 Types of Protection 10
2.5 Desirable Characteristics of Protection 13
2.6 Protection Resistance 15
Chapter 3 Plug and Time Settings 16
3.1 Plug Setting Multiplier of Relay 16
3.2 Time Setting Multiplier of Relay 16
3.3 Time vs PSM Curve of Relay 17
3.4 Calculation of Relay Operation Time 17
3.5 Time Current Characteristics 18
Chapter 4 Software Implementation 20
4.1 Softwares used 20
4.2 Simulation of MSS 5 on ETAP 22
4.3 Simulation Result 23
4.4 Observations from Relay and Breaker Panels 24
Conclusion 26
References 27
2
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURES DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.
3
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The term relay co-ordination covers concepts of discrimination, selectivity and backup
protection. This relay coordination depends on the factors like selectivity, sensitivity and
reliability. Its main objective is to achieve selectivity without losing sensitivity and quick fault
clearance time. Proper co-ordination of relays is essential to minimize power disruption in
healthy part of the system. Relay coordination is an important aspect in the protection system
design as coordination schemes must guarantee fast, selective, and reliable relay operation to
isolate the power system faulty sections.
To ensure continuity of power supply to the Refinery in addition to the CPP at HPCL, Mumbai
Refinery, TATA Power also supplies power. In any power system network, protection should be
designed such that protective relays isolate the faulty portion of the network at the earliest, in
case of failure of primary relays, back up relays operate after enough time discrimination. The
time current characteristic curve is also to be analysed.
These protective relays are designed which are able to discriminate between faulty conditions,
normal and abnormal operating conditions and functions only for those they are designed. It
doesnot operates for any normal or short term abnormal conditions for which they are not
intended to act and thus provides protection.
1.1 Background:
In industries non-coordination of relays causes delayed isolation of fault or it may affect the
healthy part of the system to mitigate these issues, simulation of actual system can be done using
ETAP. ETAP being the major software used for fault analysis at HPCL is chosen as
software platform for our project. ETAP Version7.1 also has advantage of customizing relay
setting and manufacturer, is fast and accurate which is done by entering time and plug setting
appropriate for required protection.
1.2 Motivation:
Replacement of the 3.3 kV, three phase motor would incur a cost of about US
$17,0000. However, if the reasons for fault and mitigation methods are determined, it would
4
ETAP is essential to check relay settings to ensure that faulty area is quickly isolated. It reduces
the cost of testing, safety concerns and removes need for checking various range
adjustments by manual calculations. Characteristics of large power system such as that at
HPCL can be understood. Fault mitigation can also be done comparing time current
characteristics under normal and fault condition.
5
CHAPTER 2
PROTECTIVE RELAY:
For protecting electrical devices and transmission lines, electromechanical relays with same
operating characteristics are used to sense overload, short-circuits, and other defects. While
numerous relays are used, digital protective relays offer equivalent and more compound
protective functions.
A digital protective relay is a computerized system with software-built protection algorithms for
recognition of electrical faults. These relays are known as microprocessor-protective relays.
They are practical alternatives for electro-mechanical protective relays which comprises of
many protective functions in a single unit, along with metering, communication, and self-test
functions. Hence, a digital protective relay is known as "numeric protective relay".
6
2.1.2 LOGIC PROCESSING
The relay examines the resulting outputs of A/D converter to ascertain if action is essential
under its protection algorithms. Protection algorithms as a group of logic equations is created by
the protection engineer and by relay manufacturer.
The relay can utilize advanced logic. It is able to analyze whether or not the relay should trip or
restrain from tripping, based on its parameters fixed by the operator, compared against several
functions of its analog inputs, relay contact inputs, timing and order of event orders. If a fault is
detected, output contacts will trip the related circuit breakers.
7
2.2.1 RELAY 7SJ63
This relay is equipped for motor protection available with all sizes. Motor protection comprises
of under current monitoring, starting time supervision, restart, inhibit locked motors. The
integratedprogrammable logic CFC all-ows the user to implement their own function. Example:
For the automation of switchgear(interlocking),the user can generate user defined messages.
The SIPROTEC 7SS60 is an inexpensive differential relay suitable for centralized configuration
with all the voltage levels adapted to large no of bus bars with unlimited feeders. It has compact
design, short trip times. It is suitable for all voltage levels and allows unlimited number of
feeders
Its purpose is same as 7SJ64. The functions like backup protection supplementary to
transformer differential protection and control to the circuit breaker, further switching devices
and automation functions all these functions are performed by relays. Some user-defined
messages are also allowed to generate by the user. The flexible communication interfaces are
open for modern communication architectures with control systems.
It features 4 voltage inputs. The protections available are for overvoltage, undervoltage,
frequency protection, reverse/ forward power protection, fuse failure monitor and
overexcitation.
8
2.3 PROTECTION REQUIREMENT
The main equipment’s involved in protection of a power system are Relays and Circuit
Breakers. A Circuit Breaker (CB) is basically a switch used to interrupt the flow of current. It
basically opens on relay command. Interrupting capacity of the circuit breaker is expressed in
MVA. Current in an inductive circuit (with finite resistance) cannot change instantaneously. The
abrupt change in current, if it happens due to switch opening, will result in infinite di/dt and
hence will induce infinite voltage. Even with finite di/dt, the induced voltages will be quite high.
The high induced voltage developed across the CB will ionize the dielectric between its
terminals.
This results in arcing. The dielectric medium in CB used at HPCL is vacuum as all CB used are
Vacuum CB. When the current in CB goes through the natural zero, the arc can be quenched.
However, if the interrupting medium has not regained its dielectric properties then the arc can
be prestruck. As the time passes the arcing current reduces after few cycles the current is
interrupted finally .
Usually CB opening time lies in the 2-6 cycles range. The opening mechanism of circuit
breaker requires larger power than what logical element relay provide to it. Hence when relay
gives a trip command, it closes a switch which provides energy to circuit breaker for the
opening mechanism powered by a separate dc source. Protective devices can provide the
following assortment of protection, many of which can be coordinated: Distance, Differential,
Under/Over frequency, Under/Overvoltage, Overcurrent, Earth Fault.
9
NORMAL ABNORMAL FAULT
10
2.4.2 DIRECTIONAL OVERCURRENT PROTECTION
Fig 2.3 shows such a case for a radial system with source at both ends. Due to source at both the
ends fault is fed from both the ends. To interrupt the fault current both the ends are provided
with relays. Here, the magnitude of the current seen by relay2, it is not possible to distinguish
whether the fault is at the section AB or BC. Since faults in section AB are not in its
jurisdiction, it should not trip. A directional overcurrent relay is required here for selectivity as
it uses both magnitude and phase angle information for proper decision making.
The basic principle of distance relay is, in presence of a line fault the apparent impedance seen
by the relay drastically reduces where apparent impedance is the ratio of phase voltage to line
current of transmission line. A distance relay compares this ratio with the positive sequence
impedance (Z1) of the transmission line.If the fraction Zapp/Z1 is less than unity, it indicates a
fault. This ratio also indicates the distance of the fault from the relay. Because, impedance is a
complex number, the distance protection is inherently directional. The first quadrant is the
forward direction i.e. the impedance of the transmission line that is to be protected lies within
this quadrant. If only magnitude information is used, non-directional impedance relays are used.
11
If magnitude of the impedance is within the circular region then the impedance relay gets
tripped. Since the circle spans all the quadrants, it leads to non-directional protection scheme.
The mho relay which covers the first quadrant is directional in nature.
Thus, the trip law for the impedance relay can be written as follows:
(1)
then trip; else restrain. While impedance relay has only one design parameter, ZSet; 'mho
relay' has two design parameters Zn, . The trip law for mho relay is
given by if (2), then trip; else restrain. ' ' is the angle of transmission
line. ' ' is also called 'torque angle'
given by (3)
If we model the utility system with identical values for all the sequence impedances
then, . (4)
This value is identical to three phase fault current. If however, ZS0 < ZS1 then line to ground
fault current of bloted single can be higher than the three phase fault current. For a bloted fault,
fault current reduces due to larger feeder impedance contribution to denominator as we move
away from the source. For such a feeder zero sequence can be much higher than the positive or
negative sequence impedance.
Thus, as we go away from the source, the bolted three phase fault current will be higher than
corresponding ground fault current as it does not depend upon zero sequence impedance of the
feeder. In addition, if the single line to ground fault has an impedance ZF, then the fault current
can fall even below
12
(5)
2.5.1 DEPENDABILITY
If the relay trips when it is expected to trip then the relay is said to be dependable. This happens
only when the fault is in its primary jurisdiction or when it is to be used as backup protection.
However false tripping or tripping for faults that is within or not within the jurisdiction,
compromises system operation.Power system may get unnecessarily stressed or else there can
be loss of service. Dependability is the degree of certainty that the relay will operate correctly:
(6)
2.5.2 SENSITIVITY
Consider the case of overcurrent protection. To detect the smallest possible fault current the
protective system must have the capability.
The smaller the current that it can detect, the more sensitive it is. One way to improve
sensitivity is to determine characteristic of a fault which is unique to the fault type and it does
not occur in the normal operation. For example, earth faults involve zero sequence current. This
provide a very sensitive method to detect earth faults. Once, this characteristic is seen,
abnormality is rightly classified, and hence appropriate action is initialized.
2.5.3 SELECTIVITY
Like sensitivity, selectivity also implies an ability to discriminate. A relay should not confuse
some peculiarities of an apparatus with a fault. For example, transformer when energized can
draw up to 20 times rated current (inrush current) which can confuse, both overcurrent and
transformer differential protection. Typically, inrush currents are characterized by large second
13
harmonic content. This discriminant is used to inhibit relay operation during inrush, thereby,
improving selectivity in transformer protection. A relay for a feeder should be able to
discriminate a fault on its own feeder from faults on adjacent feeders. This implies that it should
detect first existence of fault in its vicinity in the system and then take a decision whether it is in
its jurisdiction.
2.5.4 RELIABILITY
A relaying system must be reliable. Reliability can be achieved by redundancy i.e. duplicating
the relaying system which can be a costly proposition. Another way to improve reliability is to
make an existing relay to protect an apparatus as a backup protection. Back-up protection must
be provided for safe operation of relaying system. Redundancy in protection also depends upon
the criticality of the power apparatus.
(7)
This jurisdiction of a relay is also called as zone of protection. Zones are classified into primary
and backup zones. In detecting a fault and isolating the faulty element, the protective system
must be very selective. Ideally, the protective system should zero-in on the faulty element and
only isolate it, thus causing a minimum disruption to the system. Selectivity is usually provided
by (i) using time discrimination and (ii) applying differential protection principle.
14
2.6 PROTECTION RESISTOR
Neutral Grounding Resistors are used to limit the fault current for safety of equipment and
personnel in industrial systems. In solid grounding, the system is directly grounded, and the
fault current is limited only by the soil resistance. The fault current can be very high and can
damage the transformers, generators, motors, wiring and other equipment’s in the system. The
NGRs are inserted between neutral and ground in order to increase the net resistance in the
event of flow of high current.
Advantages of NGRs include:
• Reduce the single-phase fault currents for securing each equipment in MV electrical networks,
Reduce the transient overvoltage’s which can occur during an earth fault, and be monitored and
used to activate the earth fault relay.
• Increase protection of generators, transformers and related equipment’s,
• Reduced operation/maintenance costs,
• Increase safety, Provide simple, reliable, selective means of protection,
• Allows the use of equipment, and in particular cables with lower insulation levels than for an
insulated neutral scenario
• Reduce the step voltage The fault current value should be limited to a value that can be safely
handled by the machine or transformer.
To be sensed by earth fault protection relays the values must be high enough. The resistance
used in NGR must be of low value, if the value of resistance is high then the fault current will
be very low and will not be able to activate the earth fault protection relay during fault
conditions.
15
CHAPTER 3
PLUG AND TIME SETTINGS
The ratio of relay pick up current to the rated secondary current of CT is known as current
setting of relay. For example, suppose, you want that, an over current relay should operate when
the system current just crosses 125% of rated current. If the rated value is kept as 1A, then the
normal pickup value is kept as 1A which should be equal to rated secondary current transformer
connected to the relay. Then as soon as the CT secondary becomes more than or equal to 1.25
the relay gets operated, the current setting sometimes also referred as current plug setting.
The current setting in relays is different for each relay like for overcurrent relay it is 50% to
200% at the interval of 25% and in earth fault relay it is 10% to 70% at the interval of 10%.
Step-1 From CT ratio, we first see the rated secondary current of CT. Say the CT ratio is
100 / 1 A, i.e. secondary current of CT is 1 A.
Step-2 From current setting we calculate the pickup current of the relay. Say current setting of
the relay is 150 % therefore pick up current of the relay is 1 × 150% = 1.5 A.
17
Step-3 Now to calculate PSM for the specified faulty current level we divide primary faulty
current by CT ratio to get relay faulty current. Say the faulty current level is 1500 A, in the CT
primary, hence secondary equivalent of faulty current is 1500 / (100/1) = 15 A.
Step-4 After calculating PSM, to find out the total time of operation of the relay from
Time/PSM curve, say we found the time of operation of relay is 3 second for PSM =10.
Step-5 Finally that operating time of relay would be multiplied with time setting multiplier, to
get actual time of operation of relay. Hence say time setting of the relay is 0.1. Therefore, the
actual time of operation of the relay for PSM 10, is 3 × 0.1 = 0.3 sec or 300ms
18
Fig 3.2 Types of time-current curves [3]
Simple Inverse,SI
0 .14
t= I 0.02
×(8)
TMS (8)
(I )F −1
s
Very Inverse, VI
13.5
t= I × TMS (9)
( IF )−1
s
Extremely Inverse, EI
80
t= I 2
× TMS (10)
(IF) −1
S
120
t= I × TM (11)
( IF )−1
S
19
CHAPTER 4
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
4.1.1 DIGSI
The PC operating program DIGSI 4.85 version is the user interface to the SIPROTEC devices.
It is designed with a modern, intuitive user interface. With DIGSI 4.85version, SIPROTEC
devices are configured and evaluated – this is used for industrial and energy distribution
systems. For the system engineering of DIGSI 4.85version parameterized devices the IEC
61850 system configurator is used.
The IEC 61850 system configurator is the manufacturer-neutral solution for the interoperable
engineering of IEC 61850 products and systems. This software supports SCL (substation
configuration description language).
FUNCTIONS:
With this software the required function can be selected easily from the numerous functions
installed in it. The required settings can be entered and displayed as primary or secondary
values. This software also allows the switching over between primary and secondary values
with one mouse click in the tool bar.
The DIGSI 4.85 version matrix helps to see the complete configuration of any device at a
glance. For example, the assignment of the LEDs, the binary inputs and the output relays are
displayed in one image.
4.1.2 ETAP
ETAP (Electrical Transient and Analysis Program) is a full spectrum analytical engineering
software company specializing in the analysis, simulation, monitoring, control, optimization,
and automation of electrical power systems. This software offers the best and most
comprehensive suite of integrated power system enterprise solution that starts from modelling to
operation. To analyse and evaluate the performance of power system protection ETAP provides
intelligent tools. ETAP offers insight into troubleshooting false trips, relay mis-operation, and
mis-coordination.
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• Time-Current Characteristic (TCC) Curve
• Protective Device Coordination & Selectivity
• Sequence-of-Operation
• Protection Zone Selection & Viewer
• Automated Protection & Coordination
• Verified & Validated Protective Device Libraries
21
4.2 FAULT ANALYSIS
The SWCT Cooling pump motor 95P1E had tripped and power loss was observed at 3.3KV as
well as 22 KV. The fault was rectified once and coordination was improved. However when
95P1E motor tripped again, only loads at 3.3KV had experienced power loss.
The fault could not be cleared by motor relay 6 when the motor tripped again so blackout was
observed at 3.3KV substation .
22
SIMULATION OF MSS-5 ON ETAP
23
Relay Settings:
OC IEC-VI,0.75,TMS 0.28
EF DT, 0.1,T,S 0.75
When earth fault occurs at 95P1E motor, simulation of MSS-5 fault area is
observed to have overlapping time current curves which represents an improper
coordination situation. Due to this 22KV and 3.3KV loads experienced power loss.
24
Fig. 4.4 Simulation of Fault Area with Improper Coordination
25
Fig 4.5 Simulation of Fault Area with Proper Coordination
26
It is observed that time current curves of Relay 2 is overlapping with that of Relay 4 and
Relay 5 which shows improper coordination.. The relay settings of all the relays are verified and
type of curves are observed. Through trial and error it is understood that type of curve that was
selected for Relay 2 is incorrect. The actual required relay settings for Relay 2 is shown below.
After these relay settings were changed motor 95P1E tripped again wherein relay
5 and relay 6 show the following data
27
28
OBSERVATIONS FROM MB REAKER AND PANEL
29
Why there was a fault in 95P1E motor? Relay-2:MSS-7 outgoing to MSS-5 Siemens
7SJ62-CTR 400/1
Tripping of MSS-5 3.3 KV incomer breaker at due to Earth Fault in 3.3 KV motor 95P1E
and there was trip indication on 95P1E motor as well. It resulted in loss of power to 3.3 KV bus
of MSS-5 as stand by incomer was not in service due to ongoing maintenance activities.
Incomer 1 was taken in service after isolating 95P1E motor. Upon opening the motor Terminal
box it was found that the R Phase lead had grounded..
30
Fig.4.6
The magnitude of earth fault current detected by the relay is 1500 Amps.
The earth fault setting of motor feeder and incomer relays are coordinated up to 600 amps, as
desired, due to current limiting effect of NGR (rated for 600 Amps).
However, the incomer relay 7 sensed 1500 amps at which level time gradation between motor
and incomer earth fault is reduced to only 60 mS while the minimum gradation required to
determine sequence of tripping is 200 mS.
In case of time gradation of less than 200 ms in two radial feeders, both upstream and
downstream breakers are likely to trip while clearing a fault.
31
Fig.4.7 Simulation for Earth fault at 1500A
32
Fig.4.8 Observations from Relay 6 software
4. Why earth fault current detected by 3.3 KV incomer relay 7 is more than the NGR rated current
(600 Amps)?
Upon checking, it was found that vector some of Ia,Ib and Ic is equal to Io (earth fault current).
In fact, magnitude of sum of Ia,Ib and Ic comes out to be 500 amps while the current sensed by the relay is
3 times of it, 1500 Amps.
This phenomena of relay was confirmed by carrying out primary current injection test in which ground
fault element of the relay was sensing 3 times the injected current.
To understand this problem, 7SJ64 relay manual was referred. In which it was given that for normal earth
fault setting, X 65 jumper on relay CT/PT card should be set at IE wherein in this case it was set at IEE. IEE setting
is used for sensitive earth fault.
The jumper was set at IE and carried out primary current injection testing, this time the relay sensed
accurate current i.e. the same current as injected.
Therefore, it could be concluded that the because of wrongly set jumper of X65 on relay card, it was
sensing three times the current of earth fault.
It means that during the fault in the motor , system earth fault magnitude was around 500 Amps which
could not be sensed properly by the motor relay 10 due to open stabilizing resistor and it was sensed three times by
the incomer relay 7 due to wrong jumper setting and the relay coordination between these two relays doesn’t hold
accurate at 1500 amps. Therefore, both the relays operate around the same time too clear the fault.
33
Fig.4.9 Simulation of Fault area after incorporation of recomendations
34
Result of simulation:
A part of the power system namely Main Substation has been simulated on ETAP.The IEC standards are
observed.
Time dial and Pickup settings have been found by trial and error such that no two curves intersect. Working of
Relays have also been observed by DIGSI and softwares AREVA are observed.
Sr. No Recommendation
CONCLUSION
Simulation of MSS5 was done on ETAP software. The time current characteristics was
observed. The basic principle is that if no two curves overlap, the relay settings are appropriate
and detect any faults. The various curves observed are Standard Inverse and Very Inverse which
are standards observed by IEC. The 3.3kV 3 phase Induction Motor causes the relay 7 to trip
due to earth fault as observed by Relay 10 panel . Outgoing motor feeder to 95P1E(B4) also
gets tripped on earth fault.
Relay 6 is MICOM 143 relay for Outgoing motor feeder to 95P1E and Relay 5 Siemens make
7SJ64 relay for Incomer 1 breaker of 3.3 KV Bus.
Firstly motor 95P1E is tripped due to earth fault. Delay in operation of primary relay (Relay 6)
resulted in power loss at 3.3KV and 22KV. Relay settings of Relay 2 were changed from
DT(Definite Time) to NI(Normal Inverse).The second time when the same motor tripped,only
loads at 3.3KV experienced power .loss. Recommendations were incorporated and
improvement in system operation under fault condityiions was observed.
35
REFERENCES
[3] Mr. H Mehta “Relay Setting and Relay Co-ordination” HPCL training Manual
[7] Ms. Serene C Kurian and Mr. Navin Kumar-“ Relay Co-ordination in a 11Kv Substation
using ETAP”, International Journal of Recent Innovation in Engineering and Research
[8] Ralph M. Parsons “Selection of system neutral grounding resistor and ground fault
protection for industrial power systems”, Co-Pasadena US
[9] Rasheek Rifaat “Power System Protection Coordination”, P. Eng., Sr. Member IEEE
Jacobs
Canada, Calgary, AB, Canada
[10] Doug Durand “Overcurrent Protection & Coordination for Industrial Applications”, P.E.
IEEE Continuing Education Seminar - Houston, TX
[12] Yawen Yi and Jun Xie “Study on Relay Protection Coordination In Complex Auxiliary
Power System” ,Three Gorges Hydropower Plant China Yangtze Power Co. Ltd.
36
[14] Overcurrent Protection NPTEL Course: Module 4-
37