Elites and “Elites”

Introduction: Elites or “Elites”? Towards the Anthropology of

the Concept in Armenia and Georgia

Yulia Antonyan

Goals and methodology

This volume is the result of a joint, Armenian-Georgian anthro-
pological survey of the concept of “elites” in contemporary Geor-
gia and Armenia. The survey has embraced a set of topics related
to the process of the formation of new national elites in the course
of the construction of the nation-states, genealogy and typology of
new elites, mechanisms and principles of organization of power, old
and new hierarchical structures, and their continuity with the cul-
tural heritage of previous periods of history. Particular attention has
been paid to the degree with which the newly-formed or transformed
elites correspond to popular perceptions of the concept of elites, and
how they are changing in the course of transformation of elites and
the elite culture. This study of elites, elitism and the elitist involves
different social (and also ethnic and religious) groups, which have
been affected by the process of reconfiguration of social structures.
The research outcome is organized as a set of individual case
studies, based on common theoretical presuppositions and state-
ments. This approach is justified because of the difference of re-
search interests and specializations of the project participants, as
well as by the variety of possible approaches to the study of elites.

16
Yulia Antonyan

Therefore, we decided not to limit ourselves to the traditional power

elites (mostly economic and political), but tried to enlarge the field
by including elites of ethnic and social minorities, sub-elite groups,
the so-called moral elites, the lost elites of the past and the imagined
elites of the present, and, importantly, relationships, conflicts and
other ways of interlocking of elites.
Research methods included field studies with qualitative inter-
views, queries and observations, analysis of discursive fields reflect-
ed in daily conversations, mass media and social networks. Ques-
tionnaires have been developed separately for each of the studies. In
more detail, the methodology for each case study will be addressed
in the relevant chapters of the monograph, authored by the partici-
pants of the research project (Y. Antonyan, K. Khutsishvili, H. Mel-
kumyan, T. Kamushadze, E. Hovhannisyan, N. Abakelia, G. Cheish-
vili, and H. Muradyan).

Discussing the concept of the elite sociologically and

anthropologically. Main stages of the sociological and
anthropological study of elites
Elites as a concept, as a social unit (group, class, stratum, caste)
have been studied in a sociological and anthropological perspective
for more than a century, starting from the fundamental and already
classic works of Mosca, Pareto, Manheim1, up to the modern studies
of concepts and phenomena of power, the bourgeoisie, aristocracy,
oligarchy, intellectuals, change and conflict of elites, etc. In general,
1
See: Mosca 1994, Pareto 1961, 1961a, Manheim 2000. A comparative analysis
of the works and theories of these authors is represented in many overviews
(e.g. Mills 1956), so we did not find it necessary to address them in detail in this
introduction, though we will refer to some of them later in the text.

17
Elites and “Elites”

as a further analysis will demonstrate, sociology has studied elites

as a part of studies of social structures by addressing their historical
and modern developments in terms of a change of political regimes,
and economic and political transformations in a historical perspec-
tive, in local and global senses. As to the anthropological insight,
the situation is more complicated here. The concept of the elite as a
separate and self-sufficient topic for research has entered into the an-
thropological field quite recently, although even at the outset of the
discipline, the archaic and indigenous institutes of power, leadership
and prestige were the focus of the academic attention of classical
anthropologists (L. H. Morgan, B. Malinovski, A. Radcliff-Brown,
etc.). The specifics of the anthropological field led to the accumula-
tion of very different data on elites which have barely been analyzed
through general and comparative perspectives, by collating the an-
thropological theory with the sociological one. Several edited vol-
umes published quite recently discuss the concept of the elite in the
anthropological perspective (Shore, Nagent 2002; Salverda, Abbink,
2013) and state the main principles and approaches of the anthropo-
logical research of elites. It should be, first, based on the research of
discursive frameworks within which elites are conceptualized and
constituted in different cultural contexts (Shore, Nagent 2002: 3);
second, on studying and understanding elites from within, by chart-
ing the cultural dynamics and the habitus formation that perpetuate
their role, dominance or acceptance (Salverda, Abbink 2013: 2-3);
and, third, concentrating on factors and processes that make elites
culturally determined, that is practices of maintaining dominance
over the subaltern groups, the legitimation of power and leadership
and reproduction of elites over time (Salverda, Abbink 2013: 3).
However, it should be noted that unlike sociologists, who seemed

18
Yulia Antonyan

to be quite at ease with the initial coherency of the concept of elites,

anthropologists have always problematized it. Chris Shore, mention-
ing the chapters in the volume he edited and for which he wrote the
introduction (Spenser), indicated the indefiniteness and mobility of
this concept depending on particular cultural contexts. Our research
also proves this. However, on the other hand, as he notes with ref-
erence to George Marcus, the very concept of the elite suggests that
the process and phenomenon of formation of groups of power and
prestige, and cultural forms of organization and practicing of power
may be mapped and described. And, finally, C. Shore suggests the
working definition of elites as those who occupy the most influen-
tial positions or roles in the important spheres of social life (Shore,
Nugent 2002: 4). This definition does not set the elite as a particular
social group, or a class, or a stratum, but on the other hand, evokes a
question about how to measure the cultural relativity of the import-
ant or unimportant spheres of life.
All the pieces of study of elites in Armenia and Georgia repre-
sented in this volume are of an anthropological nature. Therefore,
particular attention was paid to the specific cultural and social con-
texts that actualized the investigated processes and phenomena. This
is the main reason why we prioritize and rely in theoretical terms
on those authors who contextualize the notion of elite, elite culture
and elitism, and the related social processes in historical and cultural
terms. We can find the historical aspects of this contextualization in
the works of M. Mann and R. Lachmann who tried to demonstrate
the historical mobility and temporal and spatial embeddedness of the
elite (Mann 1986, Lachmann 2000).
M. Mann’s study shows how the power and power networks were

19
Elites and “Elites”

organized in different historical periods and different political and

cultural environments, including both stable and unstable ones, such
as revolutions and wars. Mann’s idea about societies as organized
power networks happened to be useful for understanding how the
power elites of contemporary Georgia and Armenia function, how
different types of elites use various types of power, forming net-
works, conflicting, interacting and interlocking. Richard Lachmann
studied interaction and the structures of elites in different histori-
cal and cultural contexts, and emphasized the concept of conflict of
elites, meaning a conflict of their interests, collisions and fight of
elites, which he believes were the main driving force for the changes
and transformations of the social and political structures of a soci-
ety. According to him, elites and not classes or individuals are the
main agents of history. Lachmann points out that “elite conflict oc-
curs when an elite attempts to undermine another elite’s capacity to
extract resources from non-elites” (Lachmann 2000: 11). His case
study of social and economic processes in Florence of the Renais-
sance, which encompasses the analysis of oligarchic government
and oligarchic power evokes a set of parallels with the current situa-
tion in Armenia and Georgia, despite the differences of epochs.
The other concepts of power elites are also very important for our
research. Thus, M. Mann drew his concept of elites on four types
of power, also identified by him: military, political, ideological and
economic, each being attached to a particular type of elite. (Mann
1986: 2). C. Wright Mills in his study of the “Elites of Power” tried
to answer the question: who is the power elite? Like Mann, he too
identified three “higher circles” of society, i.e. economy, political
order and military order. He emphasized the cumulative nature of

20
Yulia Antonyan

wealth, power and prestige as the main outcomes of the elitist status.
As to the social nature of the elite, C. Wright Mills considers it to be
a social and psychological entity, thus trying to avoid using the con-
cepts of classes, social groups or estates. According to him, the unity
of elites is not a simple unity of institutions; men and institutions are
always related (Mills 1956: 19). However, elite institutes and struc-
tures are mobile and changeable; moreover, elites can transform
the structures within which they function. For instance, “еlites may
smash one structure and set up another in which they enact different
roles” (Mills 1956: 24). This not very flagrant correlation of elites as
groups of individuals and elites as institutions brings about the mess
and the oscillation of scholars studying elites between two extremes:
the elite are omnipotent, and the elite are impotent (Mills 1956: 16).
This is well represented by the transformation of elite institutes in
the post-Soviet period and by “migrations” of elites from one social
institute to another.
In the context of the anthropology of elites, a study by Abner
Cohen, “The Politics of Elite Culture” may be considered as one
of the most important (1981). His research may be characterized as
explorations in the dramaturgy of power, based on modern African
society. He discusses symbolic forms of elitism and techniques of
the symbolization of power. He focuses his attention on the “drama-
turgy” of power, meaning social mechanisms for the wielding and
enactment of power. In the light of his findings, A. Cohen suggests
a concept of “power mystique” – a cult of eliteness, understanding
eliteness as a set of qualities that can be learned only informally,
through social practices, which are attributed to this social group by
origin.
Among those theoretical works that influenced our research, a

21
Elites and “Elites”

piece worth mentioning is the volume edited by M. Dogan entitled

“Elites’ Configuration at the Apex of Power” (2003), which is fo-
cused on problems of the linkage between the elites, the intercon-
nections at the summit of power, and a concept of elite interlocking.
The concepts of elites and elitism, especially in the context of
cultural values considered “elitist” usually encompass those social
and cultural groups that are entitled or pretend to be entitled to rep-
resent a model for a highly moral and civilized mode of life, a kind
of cultural and civilizational ideal of society. Norbert Elias in his
“Court Society” tried to demonstrate how such a perception was
formed and why (Elias 2002).
In Georgia and Armenia, those groups are represented by the in-
telligentsia and descendants of aristocracy (mostly in Georgia) who
have still preserved social memories of their families or have re-
constructed this memory in the post-Soviet period. There is an en-
tire bunch of studies related to aristocracy, the big bourgeoisie (e.g.
Lamont 1992; Pinçon, Pinçon-Charlot 2007) and intelligentsia. The
latter is often categorized as the moral elite as well (Oushakin 2009)
meaning that it is endowed with the capacity to set up, embody
through itself and follow up the norms and criteria of morality. Arti-
cles by Gella 1971; Geiger 1955; N. Basov, G. Simet, J. Van Andel,
et al. 2010; Eyerman 1992; Foucauld 2002 address such issues as the
interactions of moral, intellectual and power elites and their role in
the formation and transformation of political regimes.
One of the aspects of our research considers relationships of dif-
ferent types of elite with religion. Religion has always been a tool for
and a source of the emergence, legitimation and sacralization of dif-
ferent types of power (intellectual, political, military, etc.). Moder-

22
Yulia Antonyan

nity seems to have changed little in this approach. Particular forms

of religion, such as civil religion, may serve as a source of moral
justification of power and prioritization of values that can be best ex-
plained and conceptualized by religion. However, in the post-Soviet
space, re-institutionalized religion plays a more important role in
the formation of institutes and networks of power than just a control
over the boundaries and dimensions of morality and reliability. For
instance, the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Georgian Ortho-
dox Church themselves come forward as power institutions and their
support to or conflict with, power persons or institutions may affect
the positions of the latter. In the light of interaction of religion and
the elites, the issues of legitimation of power, the sacralization of
charisma, interlocking of concepts of personal affluence and pros-
perity, political influence and religion are worthy of attention, es-
pecially in the context of the new economic elites of the region. In
these terms, the works of E. Kantorowicz (1957), T. Koelner (2012),
E. Wolf (1991) may provide a sound theoretical basis.

Study of elites in the post-socialist and post-Soviet academic

discourse
The issue of old and new elites in the post-Soviet and post-social-
ist space as a topic for research emerged in the early stage of post-So-
viet and post-socialist studies. Thus, it is addressed in the volume
edited by G. Eval, I. Szelenyi, E. Townsley, entitled “Making capi-
talism without capitalists. The new ruling elites in Eastern Europe”
(2000). The chapters of the volume discuss the process of transfor-
mation of the socialist elites into their post-socialist counterparts,
with particular attention paid to the continuity of elites in the transi-

23
Elites and “Elites”

tional perspective. It was shown in particular, that “post-communist

capitalism has been promoted by a broadly defined intelligentsia,
committed to the cause of bourgeois society and capitalist economic
conditions” (Eval, Szelenyi, Townsley 2000: 1). According to the
authors, capitalism in the post-socialist space has resulted with two
different forms. Firstly, it is “capitalism without capitalists” (coun-
tries of Eastern Europe), in which the representatives of the previous
“nomenklatura” took on the roles of capitalists as they were those
who had access to privatization of resources of power (as authors
say, there was a transition from “plan” to “clan”). In fact, the no-
menklatura has transformed into the big bourgeoisie, crushing down
the Marxists’ thesis stating that transition to capitalism is impossible
without having a developed class of capitalists. The second form is
“capitalists without capitalism”, which is specific for Russia and,
as the authors implicitly suggest, other post-Soviet countries. This
form means that accumulation of wealth in private hands is far ahead
of the establishment of market institutions (Eval, Szelenyi, Towns-
ley 2000: 5). The absence of the legal and “civilized” institutes of
market economy led to the formation of alternative, “violent” entre-
preneurship institutes, as a Russian sociologist Vadim Volkov called
them. Volkov defines violent entrepreneurship as a set of organiza-
tional decisions and action strategies enabling the conversion of or-
ganized force into money or other market resources (Volkov 2012:
10). This makes criminal circles the important players in, and agents
of, the process of formation of new economic elites, and, therefore,
criminal ways of thinking, behaving and institutionalizing business.
Another academic discourse that influenced our research mecha-
nisms is that of the concept of neo-feudalism in the countries of the

24
Yulia Antonyan

post-Soviet space, which is, in particular, being developed in the

post-socialism studies of K. Verdery (Verdery 1996). The concept of
neo-feudalism seemed relevant to our study and it is developed in a
chapter on the Armenian oligarchy.
Another conceptually meaningful book is a study on the culture
of power in post-communist Russia by Michael Urban, where he
suggests an analysis of elite political discourse (Urban 2010). In the
context of continuity of elites, G. Derluguian’s book “Bourdieu’s
admirer in the Caucasus” should be mentioned (2004). The author
(who is also the adviser for this project) paid much attention to the
shaping of Soviet and post-Soviet social structures and transforma-
tions of elites and individuals in the Caucasus. Also, the works of
A. Bocharov (2006) and T. Schepanskaya (2006) on the origins and
semiotics of power should be mentioned. The authors consider the
practices and attributes of power in the Soviet and post-Soviet peri-
ods as a topic for analysis.

Studies of elites in post-Soviet Armenia and Georgia

The study of elites in Armenia and Georgia has not had a long
history yet. Contemporary research seems to be limited mostly to
the political elite. In particular, British sociologist H. Tschilingiryan
explored the influence of the Karabakh elite on the advancement of
the conflict (1999). He defined “elite” as members of three groups:
intellectuals, top representatives of military-political institutions,
and the economic elite, whose role he considered unimportant.
More or less targeted research on contemporary political elites has
been done by M. Margaryan (2006) and a group of sociologists co-
ordinated by H. Danielyan (Danielyan et al. 2014). The latter was

25
Elites and “Elites”

aimed at a multifaceted study of the political elite of Armenia. The

authors tried to identify the social specifics of the Armenian politi-
cal elite, its social, gender and age characteristics, life strategies of
becoming politicians, values and preferences. They also analyzed
the social networks of which the Armenian political elite comprise
a part, viewing them as a basic tool for the analysis of the political
elite, according to their own definition (Danielyan et al 2014: 40).
However, the research was mostly of a quantitative nature and its
main problem was that all the findings were averaged, so it was not
clear how they might be correlated with the social-age-gender vari-
ety of the Armenian political elite mentioned in the first part of the
research. Nevertheless, some findings turned out to be very useful
for us, in particular the observation on correlations between the de-
gree to which elite representatives are involved in social networking,
their position as networkers and the degree of personal power and
political influence.
As far as other types of elite are concerned, we can mention the
article of one of the participants of the research project, Y. Anton-
yan, in which she analyzes a post-Soviet discursive field developed
around the concept of the Armenian intelligentsia (Antonyan 2012).
In this article, a problem of “false” and “true” (genuine) elites is ad-
dressed, which is relevant for this particular research as well.
As for the situation in Georgia, the study of elites was triggered
by the Rose Revolution of 2003, when a technical change in the
political elites took place, due to the change of political regimes.
Follow-up analyses of these changes have resulted in coining the
concept of “old” and “new” elites, meaning the political and eco-
nomic elites of the pre-Saakashvili and Saakashvili periods (see

26
Yulia Antonyan

Chiaberashvili, Tevzadze 2005, G. Gotua 2008, 2011; Gvalia, Leb-

anidze, Iashvili 2011). One more analysis of the pre-Saakashvili and
Saakashvili elites is presented in the paper of Tukvadze et al. (2006)
about the transformations in the Georgian political system in from
a Soviet and post-Soviet perspective. The authors point out the con-
tinuity of the Georgian elites, and analyze the role of the image of
a charismatic leader in the Georgian culture. The concept of “old”
and “new” elites is also considered in this paper, again in the sense
mentioned above.
However, the division of elites in the context of the Rose Rev-
olution is too situational and the latest political developments (the
dismissal of Saakashvili’s regime) demonstrate the non-relevance of
this approach.
Chapters addressing the interaction among political and econom-
ic power, elites and religion may be found in a volume called “Reli-
gion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus” A. Agadjanian,
A. Jodicke, E. van Der Zveerde (eds.), 2015, chapters by A. Jodicke,
B. Janelidze, Y. Antonyan, T. Kekelia, and S. Hovhannisyan)

Anthropological description of elites, cultures of elites and elite

cultures
Prior to speaking about the anthropological description of elites,
it would be logical to give a working definition of the elite, appropri-
ate for this volume. There are several definitions and most of them
agree that elites are power groups. Thus, Mosca characterized elites
as a ruling class. R. Lachmann defines elites in a similar way: “An
elite can be defined as a group of rulers with the capacity to appro-
priate resources from non-elites and who inhabit a distinct organi-

27
Elites and “Elites”

zational apparatus” (Lachmann 2000: 9). Besides, to define elites,

Lachmann uses the concepts of social and cultural capital, though
unlike Bourdieu, he thinks that cultural capital as the basis of the
elite control may be related not to individuals or their families, but
to the organizations creating the elite (Lachmann 2000: 9-10). The
cultural capital of elites, among other things, is in the symbols and
attributes of legitimate power.
Not only formal power, but also the cultural capital couched in
the symbols and paraphernalia of legitimized power makes the elite
what they are. This is demonstrated by our research which points
out the differences between what the elite should be and what it is
in reality. Those differences come out of certain symbolic models of
cultural representation of the elite persisting in the cultural memory
of society. This discrepancy between the real and the imagined elites
in Armenian society produces an important discourse on “true” or
“genuine” and “false” elites. The authenticity or falsehood of the
elite, in fact, are believed to be defined by the presence of cultural
symbolism and “innate” qualities which legitimize the elite in the
framework of the so-called “high culture”, a model of which is al-
legedly reproduced through generations and, because of this continu-
ity, it has a right to dominate over other strata of the society. In case
the elite does not meet these imagined characteristics, it is deprived
the right of being called the elite. This corresponds to A. Cohen’s
writings about elitism and elite power. He defines “eliteness” as
qualities that can be learned only informally through social practic-
es. (Cohen 1981: 2) The elite, according to him, is an elaborate body
of symbols and dramatic performances: manners, etiquette, styles
of dress, accent, patterns of recreational activity, marriage rules etc.

28
Yulia Antonyan

(Cohen 1981: 3) He also points out that when symbols of their cult
(of elite) lose their potency, when outside audiences cease to defer
to them, such elites lose their legitimacy and are likely to lose power
(Cohen 1981: 4). The Armenian power elites do not seem to lose
their power, not only because they possess the main economic and
military resources of power, but also because they follow the cultur-
al codes of elite groups of the Soviet and post-Soviet times, i.e. the
party nomenklatura and criminals, or the so-called thieves-at-law.
The discrepancy between power and legitimacy in post-Soviet
Georgia and Armenia is directly or indirectly addressed in the pres-
ent research and many of the chapters of this volume examine this
particular problem. After all, this discrepancy is seen as the main and
intriguing point of formation of the concept of elitism in Armenia
and Georgia.
Other definitions like those of R. Lachmann and M. Mann refer-
ring to the elite as a certain social organization or a power network
(and not a class, or a group, as Marx or Mosca thought) also seem
to work out for Armenia and Georgia. However, inside this organi-
zation or network one can nevertheless identify different social and
cultural groups, whose cultural and social capitals are shaped de-
pending on the types of social connectivity and cultural heritage in-
trinsic to these groups. For instance, the current political elites may
encompass different social and cultural groups whose values, habi-
tus and social practices originate from a criminal, Soviet partocratic,
post-imperial aristocratic, intelligentsia-related, or traditionalistic
cultural milieu. Similarly, intellectual elites may also descend from
different social and cultural milieus, e.g., unlike the old intelligentsia
of imperial times that consisted of low and middle bourgeoisie, the

29
Elites and “Elites”

new Soviet intelligentsia was intentionally recruited from the lower

parts of society, mostly workers and peasants.
Given the type of legitimation, there were two ways of building
a social hierarchy in the Soviet Union. Members of the formal elites
(nomenklatura, top officials of science, education and art spheres)
used to be legitimized “from top to bottom”. The alternative, in-
formal elites (descendants of aristocracy, intelligentsia, criminals,
informal economic elites) got their legitimation “from inside”. A.
Yurchak, in his analysis of the late Soviet period, wrote about the
circles of informal intellectual elite, membership in which could be
available only to those who were recognized as “insiders”, that is
those who shared the same values and spoke the same cultural lan-
guage (Yurchak 2005:142). The same may be said about criminal
elites or informal economic elites, the so called tsekhoviks who es-
tablished closed, clan-based networks, involvement in which was
possible only through the mediation of insiders. (see e.g. Mars, Al-
tman 1983).
An analysis of frameworks and limits of access to resources and
the power of formal elites has demonstrated how closely they were
dependent upon their interactions with informal structures and prac-
tices. For instance, low or middle-level party functionaries formally
did not get high salaries though they had some privileges and bonus-
es (like an office car with a personal driver, or access to some goods
in deficit). But they were key knots in a network of acquaintances
exchanging informal services.
The formal and informal segments of intellectual elites were
intermingled and interdependent, too. Both might be members of
the same institutions like universities, academic research institutes,

30
Yulia Antonyan

creative unions, etc., but their way of affecting the non-elites and
their access to resources were diametrically opposed. Thus, the So-
viet ethnologist V. Kabo wrote in his memoirs that some colleagues
working in the same institutions, having the same positions and ac-
ademic degrees were allowed to travel abroad and others were not,
depending on their “dossier” that needed formal evidence of loyalty
to the Soviet authorities such as the “right” social or ethnic origin,
an impeccable biography, or even personal sympathies (Kabo 1995:
260-262). Intellectuals, who were not provided access to resources
and privileges, however, tried to extend their influence in alternative
ways, through involvement in closed intellectual circles or employ-
ment in provincial institutions where they had comparative freedom
of activities, etc. Interestingly, this “interlocking” of formal and in-
formal elites continued in the post-Soviet period as well.
Discussing informal elites, it is necessary to clarify how they are
related to the concept of power, which is an irremovable quality of
the elite. I am rephrasing some statements of C. Wright Mills about
the specific types of power (Mills 1956: 3) in order to get some ideas
on what kind of power the informal elites may exert without be-
ing directly engaged in political or business activities. Firstly, they
can affect the lives, minds, goals and imagination of ordinary men
through their intellectual and creative activities. Secondly, they cre-
ate the demands and imperatives of the day (like ideologies, reli-
gions, morality norms, fashion, etc.).
Democratic regimes have a different way of becoming power
elites, from “the bottom to the top”, through elections. One also can-
not declare himself president, unless he is elected by the people and
recognized as such by presidents of other countries. During Soviet

31
Elites and “Elites”

times, such a “democratic” way of being elected and “crowned” as

the “elite” was adopted by the criminal sphere (Glonti, Lobzhanidze
2004: 65-66). Being opposed to other types of Soviet formal and
informal elites and respected for this, criminals offered specific val-
ues, a morality and mode of life that were later adopted (totally or
partially) by the new economic elites in the post-Soviet period.
Membership among the elites can be also achieved by getting
specific credentials like titles, diplomas, licenses etc., even though
the credentials may be formal and, in reality, may not be convincing
enough to be recognized by other members of the elite. In Armenia
and Georgia this type of elite is illustrated, for example, by some
representatives of the Academy, who have been awarded with dif-
ferent types of credentials (diplomas, academic degrees, titles), yet
have no access to administrative or financial resources, nor are they
capable of influencing society as intellectuals. Or, leaders of the so
called “pocket” political parties can be mentioned, who fully possess
all the symbols of a political leader, but have no impact, even a mi-
nor one, in the political field. During a recent (February 2015) con-
flict between the President of Armenia S. Sargsyan and one of the
most prominent Armenian oligarchs, a head of the second biggest
party of Armenia, both of them would duel by sending secondary
politicians from both sides to the forefront, thus giving them illusory
“credentials” of political leadership and influence. As soon as the
conflict was exhausted, those politicians were immediately silenced.

32
Yulia Antonyan

General types of elites. Elites versus non-elites.

Continuity of elites
Discussing the elites in Armenia and Georgia, we may prelimi-
narily identify two basic types: power elites (political and econom-
ic), and moral-intellectual elites. The first are those who have access
to resources that allow them to concentrate different types of power
in their hands (ideological, political and administrative, military, and
economic), according to M. Mann (Mann 1986: 2). The second are
those who pretend or are thought to be producers and keepers of the
cultural (meaning intellectual and behavioral) and moral values of
society, i.e. the intelligentsia, aristocracy, clergy, and artists. Some
binary oppositions of formal-informal, true-false, genuine–artificial
generated by public discourse serve as indicators of negotiated pat-
terns of morality, values, and behavioral norms for the newly-formed
elites. In this context, the problem of continuity of the Soviet and
post-Soviet elites becomes acute, though differently manifested in
Armenia and Georgia.
A number of researchers indicate that, until 2004, the continui-
ty of Soviet and post-Soviet elites in Georgia was interrupted only
during the brief and tempestuous leadership of Gamsakhurdia. Af-
ter that, the Soviet nomenklatura came to power once more, head-
ed by the previous Soviet communist leader E. Shevardnadze. The
previous party and Soviet administrative elite, couched this time in
the form of family clans, took back all the important administrative
and economic resources (Chiaberashvili, Tevzadze 2005: 187-207,
Tukvadze et al, 2006: 109, Gotua 2008: 2018), as also occurred in
most post-socialist countries (Eval, Szelenyi, Townsley 2000: 4-6).
Old members of the Soviet nomenklatura were mostly removed by

33
Elites and “Elites”

M. Saakashvili after the Rose Revolution. The Rose Revolution was

actually an attempt to change the power elite, even though new po-
litical leaders had been shaped in close contact with and under the
patronage of the old nomenklatura.
In Armenia, the top members of the nomenklatura were dis-
missed during the Karabakh movement and shortly after that most
of them left the country because of the war and blockade (1991-95).
The only attempt at the reinstitution of power positions for the So-
viet elite was a failed effort by a previous Soviet party leader, K.
Demirchyan. K. Demirchyan himself was shot dead a while after the
failed elections, during a terroristic act in the Parliament on October
27, 1999. The continuity of elites was however provided by low-
and middle-level members of the nomenklatura who had just started
their career before the collapse of the Communist party and easily
switched to the new ideology.
However, the continuity of elites is not defined by just a physical
inheritance of power, but rather by a transfer of the principles of
organization of power, practices of power and moral and behavior-
al norms, accompanying the processes of coming to, and exerting,
power.
It is impossible to avoid a mention of charisma when analyz-
ing the elites. M. Weber distinguished a specific type of charismatic
leader, who is believed to possess “exceptional sanctity, heroism,
or exemplary character” as superhuman qualities that legitimate his
power (Weber 1946: 79-80). A. Cohen thinks the power charisma,
the “power mystique” or the “cult of eliteness” is an inherent pe-
culiarity of power elites (Cohen 1981: 2-4). The Georgian and Ar-
menian political cultures developed different attitudes towards the

34
Yulia Antonyan

concepts of charisma and charismatic leaders. Tukvadze, Jaonash-

vili and Tukvadze seriously addressed “a traditional specific char-
acteristic of Georgians to worship a strong authoritarian and char-
ismatic leader”. They link public trust and strong unconventional
loyalty and worship towards every upcoming leader (Tukvadze et
al. 2006: 105) We do not think this can be strongly supported by
academic arguments, but at least as an observation which makes a
part of public discourse on leadership and charisma, this statement
is worthy of being mentioned. Unlike Georgia, none of the leaders
in Armenia has experienced a high level of trust and worship like
their Georgian counterparts (including religious ones), and public
humiliation and strong sometimes offensive criticism toward the
ruling authorities have always been a part of public attitudes and
opinion in Armenia. The discourses on charisma in Armenia usu-
ally end up with the statement that there has not been a leader who
could be called charismatic. Some charismatic qualities sometimes
are attributed to the first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, but even in
his case the discussed charisma was colored in negative tones. This
contrast may be related to differences in the traditional perceptions
of elites and types of interaction and relationships of elites and non-
elites in both countries.

Variety of elites and concepts of elitism in Armenia and

Georgia: case studies
This volume embraces very different approaches to the problem
of elites in Armenian and Georgian contexts. Being both very much
alike and very much distinctive from each other, these two coun-
tries have developed social structures similar by form, yet discrepant

35
Elites and “Elites”

through their inner interplay of meanings, interpretations and cor-

relations of the parts of these structures. The formal similarity is
stipulated by a common pre-Soviet (imperial) and Soviet past, and
the affinity of political, economic, cultural and social processes. The
discrepancies may refer to the current political and cultural context
with different ways and conditions for the continuity of elites. Indi-
vidual studies fulfilled as parts of the joint project aimed to clarify
the concepts and dimensions of elitism, the places of elites in the
Armenian and Georgian social and cultural realities, and to analyze
and find the roots of practices of power and elitism among old and
new elites.
The volume consists of four parts each containing two chapters.
Part one, Elitist groups and networks relates to social groups that
are marginal and non-elitist by default, built into existing hierar-
chies and acquiring elitist statuses within their groups. It opens with
a chapter by Eviya Hovhannisyan, where she explores the process
of formation of new business elites among the refugees settled in
the rural areas in the north of Armenia (the Gegharkunik region, af-
ter the Karabakh movement and subsequent war of 1988-1994. The
author’s fieldwork reveals a complicated system of relationships
between newcomers and the local population, resulting in the for-
mation of kinship and social solidarity networks that lie in the basis
of the new economy and social structure of the region. The chapter
identifies the types of local elites and ways in which refugees have
been integrated into them or the reasons why they could not be in-
tegrated.
An instrumental understanding of the concept of elites is pivotal
for the chapter by Haykuhi Muradyan, where she views people who

36
Yulia Antonyan

are employed in elitist families such as domestic staff, assistants or

bodyguards as a specific type of elite among those who do the same
work for less elitist “masters”. She operates a conventional notion
of a “big family”, meaning an association of the wealthy elite with
their domestic and personal employees, who thus acquire elitist po-
sitions in their social group. In the context of the topic, a particular
ethno-religious minority group of Russian Molokans is addressed as
the most elitist among other ethnic and social groups involved in this
type of employment.
The first chapter in part two, New Economic Elites, authored by
Giorgi Cheishvili, addresses contemporary social interplays that
have emerged as a result of the strong economic intervention of
Turkish businessmen in the Ajara province of Georgia during the
last decade. By attracting businessmen from Turkey, the former
leader of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili hoped to bring to life his proj-
ect of modernizing Batumi, the capital of Ajara. Wealthy newcomers
quickly became the owners of most business enterprises in Batumi,
occupied elitist economic niches and changed the image of the city.
The chapter analyzes the protests of the intelligentsia, a formerly
privileged layer of society, against the new economic elite with its
non-elitist origin. The intelligentsia’s movement was supported by
Saakashvili’s opposition, the Georgian Dream party. Thus, the con-
frontation of the old cultural elite (Soviet-type intelligentsia) with
the new economic elite (Turkish businessmen) may be interpreted
as a part of political clashes between Saakashvili’s and Ivanishvi-
li’s regimes. In particular, it symbolizes shifts in the developmental
paradigm - Saakashvili’s economic modernization and cultural di-
versity project would be succeeded by traditionalism and cultural
nationalism.

37
Elites and “Elites”

The topic of new economic elites continues in a chapter by Yulia

Antonyan about the Armenian “oligarchs” - the new political and
economic elite. Oligarchy as a cumulative term covers a number
of extremely wealthy businessmen and politicians who have con-
centrated political and economic power in their hands, at a local or
country-wide level. Although they have originated from different
social and cultural backgrounds, nevertheless they form a particular
social layer with some common specifics of everyday culture and a
system of values. The chapter is an attempt to prepare an ethnogra-
phy of oligarchs by identifying the most characteristic features of
their behavioral and socio-cultural practices that would help under-
stand what kind of elite they are. Those practices include the ways
in which they build their “clans” and support networks, represent
themselves, construct their reputation and authority, exert power and
climb the social ladder, organize their everyday life and socializa-
tion, develop styles and preferences resulting in the emergence of
a specific habitus compared to that of oligarchies and similar social
structures throughout human history.
The chapters in part three, Religion, nationalism, identity and
elites, contribute to understanding how religion and nationalism can
shape elites. Thus, the contradiction between new and old national
elites among the Yezidis, a Kurmanji-speaking ethnic and religious
group of Armenia is described and analyzed in a chapter by Ham-
let Melkumyan. This contradiction emerged as a result of the trans-
formation of perceptions of power, elitism and prestige through the
transitional period from the Soviet epoch to the post-Soviet one. The
abolition of the Yezidi three-caste social system during the Soviet
time led to drastic changes of social roles and positions for the caste

38
Yulia Antonyan

of laymen, murids, who were being granted educational opportuni-

ties and had input in the formation of a new stratum of Yezidi intel-
lectuals. The restoration of the old elite, a caste of sheikhs, created
tensions between nationalistic and modernizing intellectuals and
noble traditionalists, both of whom claimed to be elite. The chapter
discusses the specifics of their relationships and claims against the
background of current political and social processes.
The chapter by Ketevan Khutsishvili examines the relationships
between religion and the formation of the new political elite in
post-Soviet Georgia. It is suggested that the correlation of religion
and politics in Georgia has invested into the establishment of prof-
itable ground for the permanent flows of leaders from the religious
sphere to the political one and the influential part of the political elite
in Georgia of the 1990s was created in this way. Along with this,
religion played a serious part in the nationalistic and political dis-
courses of that period. On the contrary, upon the arrival of Mikheil
Saakashvili and the new political elite aiming at the modernization
and democratization of Georgia, the Church became part of the op-
position to the new authorities and, consequently, the new elites.
Chapter four, Post-soviet transformations of Soviet elitism deals
with current changes in the social structures inherited from Soviet
times. Nino Abakelia’s chapter gives a panorama of the historical
development of the concepts of “elite” and “intelligentsia” in Geor-
gia during the pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet times, and ana-
lyzes the correlation of these two concepts. This analysis is based
on a case-study of life stories of the representatives of different gen-
erations of a family considered elitist during the different periods
the Georgian history in Soviet and post-Soviet times. Through the

39
Elites and “Elites”

history of a family, the epochal transformation of the elitist strata

of Georgian society and their specifics can be observed. During al-
most a century, members of different generations of this family have
been subsequently transforming into all possible types of elite: intel-
ligentsia, nomenklatura, and art/show business celebrities. This may
serve as an illustration to the thesis of continuity of elites no matter
what type of elitist layer they represent.
The last chapter of the volume, written by Tea Kamushadze, is
about the construction of Soviet elitism in relation to the title of Hero
of Socialist Labor and to the lifestyle associated with this title. In the
Soviet system of values, labor was expected to play a crucial role in
the formation of the socialist identity and social hierarchies. The title
of Hero of Socialist Labor was granted along with a number of life-
long privileges and material awards that made the awardee a part of
the Soviet nomenklatura. The chapter is based on the life stories of
several Heroes living in the city of Rustavi, Georgia. It reveals how
the concept of Heroism was integrated into the Georgian traditional
system of values and folk culture to become a part of the new Soviet
identity, and how the elitist position of Heroes transformed after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
This volume does not claim to deeply and overwhelmingly en-
compass the topic of elites in Armenia and Georgia, but we hope that
it may at least contribute to existing and further research in this field.

40
Yulia Antonyan

References

1. Abbink J., Salverda T. Еds. 2013. The anthropology of elites, Pal-

grave Macmillan: New-York.
2. Antonyan Yu. 2012. The Armenian Intelligentsia today: discourses
of self-identification and self-perception, Laboratorium, vol. 4(1), pp. 76-
100.
3. Agadjanian A., Jodicke A., Van der Zveerde E. Eds. 2015. Reli-
gion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus, Routledge: London
and New York.
4. Basov N. Simet G. Van Andel J. et al. Eds. 2010. The intellectual:
a phenomenon in multidimensional perspectives, Inter-disciplinary Press:
Oxford, OK.
5. Bocharov 2006: Бочаров В. В. 2006. Истоки власти, в: Бочаров
В. В. Ред., Антропология власти, т. 1, Издательство Санкт-Петербург-
ского Университета: СПб. (The Sources of Power, in: Bocharov V.V. (ed.)
The Anthropology of Power, The Publishing House of the Saint Petersburg
University).
6. Chiaberashvili Z., Tevzadze G. 2005. Power Elites in Georgia:
Old and new, in: Fluri Ph., Cole E. From Revolution to Reform: Geor-
gia’s struggle with democratic institution building and security sector re-
form, Publication of Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of
Defence; National Defence Academy, Vienna and Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces in co-operation with PfP-Consortium
of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Vienna and Geneva,
pp. 187-207.
7. Cohen A. 1981. The politics of Elite culture. Explorations in the
Dramaturgy of Power in a Modern African Society, University of Califor-
nia Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.
8. Elias 2002: Элиас Н. Придворное общество, Языки славянской
культуры: Москва. (The Court Society, Yazyki slavyanskoj kultury (The
Languages of Slavic Culture): Moscow).
9. Glonti, Lobzhanidze 2004: Глонти Г., Лобжанидзе Г.
Профессиональная преступность в Грузии (воры в законе), ООО
“Полиграф”: Тбилиси. (Professional Criminality in Georgia (thieves-at-
law), Polygraph Ltd: Tbilisi).

41
Elites and “Elites”

10. Gvalia G., Lebanidze B., Iashvili Z. 2011. Political Elites, Ideas and
Foreign Policy: Explaining and Understanding the International Behaviour
of Small States in the Former Soviet Union, Ilia State University: Tbilisi.
11. Eyerman R. 1992. Intellectuals: A Framework for Analysis with
Special Reference to the United States and Sweden, Acta Sociologica, Vol.
35, No 1
12. Eval G., Szelenyi I., Townsley E. 2000. Making capitalism without
capitalists. The new ruling elites in Eastern Europe., Verso: London, New-
York.
13. Foucault M. 2002: Фуко М. Интеллектуалы и власть, Праксис:
Москва. (Intellectuals and Power, Praxis, Moscow).
14. Danielyan H. et al. 2014. The political elite of Post-independence
Armenia, Edit-Print: Yerevan.
15. Derluguian G. 2004. Bourdieu’s secret admirer in the Caucasus,
Verso: London, New-York.
16. Dogan M. (ed.) 2003. Elites configuration at the apex of power,
Brill: Leiden, Boston.
17. Geiger T. 1955. Intelligentsia, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.
49-61
18. Gella A. 1971. The life and death of the Old polish Intelligentsia,
Slavic Review, vol. 30, #1, March.
19. Gotua G. 2008: Г. Готуа, Изменения районной элиты в Грузии
в 1990-2003 гг., в: Разгадать Южный Кавказ: общества и среда обита-
ния, сборник статей стипендиатов Фонда Г. Белля, Издательство Фон-
да Г. Белля: Тбилиси. (Changes of the Local Elites in Georgia in 1990-
2003, in: Figuring out the South Caucasus: Societies and the Environment:
A Collection of Papers. Heinrich Böll Foundation, Tbilisi).
20. Gotua G. 2011. Different governments in Tbilisi, same people in
region: local elites in the years of independence, in: Changing identities:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia. eds. V. Voronkov, S. Khutsishvili, J. Horan,
Heinrich Boell Foundation, Tbilisi.
21. Hovhannisyan S. Myths and politics: Old and new aspirations in
independent Armenia, in: Agadjanian A., Jodicke A., Van der Zveerde E.
Eds. Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus, Routledge:
London and New York.
22. Janelidze B. 2015. Secularization and desecularization in Gerogia:

42
Yulia Antonyan

state and church under the Sahakashvili government (2003-2012), in: Ag-
adjanian A., Jodicke A., Van der Zveerde E. Eds. Religion, Nation and De-
mocracy in the South Caucasus, Routledge: London and New York.
23. Jodicke A. 2015. General trends in the interaction of religion and
politics as applied to the South Caucasus, in: Agadjanian A., Jodicke A.,
Van der Zveerde E. Eds. Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South
Caucasus, Routledge: London and New York.
24. Kabo 1995: Кабо В. Р. Дорога в Австралию: Воспоминания.
(The Road to Australia: Memoirs) Effect Publishing, New York. Can be
retrieved at: http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/auth/?t=book&num=564
25. Kantorowicz E. 1957. The King’s two bodies. Studies in mediaeval
political theology, Prinston University Pres: Prinston, New Jersey.
26. Kekelia T. 2015. Building Georgian national Identity: a comparison
of two turning points in history, in: Agadjanian A., Jodicke A., Van der
Zveerde E. Eds. Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus,
Routledge: London and New York.
27. Koelner T. 2012. Practicing without belonging. Entrepreneurship,
morality and religion in contemporary Russia, LIT Verlag: Zurich, Berlin.
28. Lachmann R. 2000. Capitalists in spite of themselves. Elite con-
flict and Economic transtitions in Early Modern Europe, Oxford University
Press: Oxford, New-York.
29. Lamont M. 1992. Money, Morals and Manners. The University of
Chicago Press: Chicago.
30. Mann M. 1986. The Sources of Social Power. Vol. I. Cambridge
University Press.
31. Mannheim 2000: Манхейм К. Проблема интеллигенции: иссле-
дование ее роли в прошлом и настоящем, в: Манхейм К. Избранное:
социология культуры, Университетская книга: М., СПб. (The Problem
of the Intelligentsia. An Enquiry into its Past and Present Role, in: Man-
heim K. The Selected: A Sociology of Culture, Universitetskaya Kniga,
Saint Peterburg).
32. Margaryan M. 2006: Մարգարյան Մ. Քաղաքական ընտրանին
և ժողովրդավարական անցման հիմնախնդիրները Հայաստանի
Հանրապետությունում, Պետական Ծառայություն: Ե. (Political
elite and Problems of Democtratic Transition in the Republic of Armenia,
Petakan tsarayutyun: Yerevan).

43
Elites and “Elites”

33. Mars G., Altman Y. 1983. The Cultural bases of Soviet Georgia’s
Second Economy, Soviet Studies, vol. 35, #4 (Oct.), pp. 546-560.
34. Mills C. Wright 1956. The power elite, Oxford University Press.
35. Mosca 1994: Моска Г. Правящий класс, Социологические ис-
следования, #10, сс. 187-198. (The Ruling Class, Sotsiologicheskie issle-
dovaniya (Sociological research), # 10).
36. Pareto W. 1961. The circulation of elites, in: Parsons T. (ed.), The-
ories of Society; Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory, Vol. 2, The
Free Press of Glencoe, Inc.: New-York.
37. Pareto W. 1961a. The Use of force in Society, in Parsons T. (ed.),
Theories of Society; Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory, Vol.
2,The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc.: New-York.
38. Pinçon M., Pinçon-Charlot M. 2007. Sociologie de la bourgeoisie,
La decouverte: Paris.
39. Oushakine S. 2009. Introduction. Wither the intelligentsia: the end
of the moral elite in Eastern Europe, Stud. East Eur. Thought, 61, pp. 243-
248.
40. Tchilingiryan H. 1999. Nagorno Karabagh: transition and the elite,
Central Asian Survey, 18 (4), pp. 435-461.
41. Tukvadze et al. 2006: Туквадзе А., Джаошвили Г., Туквадзе
Р. Трансформация политической системы в современной Грузии,
Центральная Азия и Кавказ, 2(4), с. 103-112. (The Transformation of the
Political System in Contemporary Georgia, Central Asia and the Caucasus,
2 (4)).
42. Schepanskaya T. 2006: Щепанская Т. Символическая репре-
зентация власти, в: Бочаров В. В. Ред., Антропология власти, т. 1,
Издательство Санкт-Петербургского Университета: СПб. (A Symbol-
ic Representation of Power, in: Bocharov V.V. (ed.) The Anthropology of
Power, The Publishing House of the Saint Petersburg University).
43. Shore C., Nugent S. Еds. 2002. Elite cultures. Anthropological per-
spectives, London and New-York.
44. Urban M. 2010. Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia, an
analysis of Elite political discourse, Cambridge University Press: Cam-
bridge, UK.
45. Verdery K. 1996. What was socialism and what comes next?, Princ-
eton University Press.

44
Yulia Antonyan

46. Volkov 2012: Волков В. Силовое предпринимательство XXI

век, Европейский Университет в Санкт-Петербурге: СПб. (Violent
Entrepreneurship, XXI Century, European University in Saint Petersburg,
Saint Petersburg).
47. Weber M. 1946. Politics as a Vocation, in: Gerth H.H. and Mills C.
Wright (Translated and edited). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
pp. 77-128, Oxford University Press: New York.
48. Wolf E. 1991. Religious regimes and state formation: Perspectives
from European Ethnology, State University of New-York Press.
49. Yurchak A. 2005. Everything was forever until it was no more: the
last soviet generation, Princeton University Press.

45