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Agrarian reform
Agrarian reform can refer either, narrowly, to government-initiated or government-backed redistribution
of agricultural land (see land reform) or, broadly, to an overall redirection of the agrarian system of the country,
which often includes land reform measures. Agrarian reform can include credit measures, training, extension, land
consolidations, etc. The World Bank evaluates agrarian reform using five dimensions: (1) stocks and market
liberalization, (2) land reform (including the development of land markets), (3) agro-processing and input supply
channels, (4) urban finance, (5) market institutions.[1]
Ben Cousins defines the difference between agrarian reform and land reform as follows:
Land reform… is concerned with rights in land, and their character, strength and distribution, while… [agrarian
reform] focuses not only on these but also a broader set of issues: the class character of the relations of production
and distribution in farming and related enterprises, and how these connect to the wider class structure. It is thus
concerned economic and political power and the relations between them…[2]
Along similar lines, a 2003 World Bank report states,
…A key precondition for land reform to be feasible and effective in improving beneficiaries' livelihoods is that such
programs fit into a broader policy aimed at reducing poverty and establishing a favourable environment for the
development of productive smallholder agriculture by beneficiaries.[3]
Examples of other issues include "tenure security" for "farm workers, labour tenants, … farm dwellers… [and]
tenant peasants", which makes these workers and tenants better prospects for receiving private-sector
loans;[4] "infrastructure and support services";[5] government support of "forms of rural enterprise" that are
"complementary" to agriculture;[6] and increased community participation of government decisions in rural areas.[6]

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Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, more commonly known as CARP, is an agrarian reform law of the
Philippines whose legal basis is the Republic Act No. 6657,[1] otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).[2] It is the redistribution of private and public agricultural lands to help the beneficiaries
survive as small independent farmers, regardless of the “tenurial” arrangement. Its goals are to provide landowners
equality in terms of income and opportunities, empower land owner beneficiaries to have equitable land ownership,
enhance agricultural production and productivity, provide employment to more agricultural workers, and put an
end to conflicts regarding land ownership.

Background
The agrarian reform is part of the long history of attempts of land reform in the Philippines. [3] The law was outlined
by former President Corazon C. Aquino through Presidential Proclamation 131 and Executive Order 229 on June
22, 1987,[4] and it was enacted by the 8th Congress of the Philippines and signed by Aquino on June 10, 1988. In
1998, which was the year that it was scheduled to be completed, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8532 [5] to
allocate additional funds for the program and extending the automatic appropriation of ill-gotten wealth recovered
by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) for CARP until the year 2008.[6]
An amendatory law, CARPER or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms or the
Republic Act. 9700 was passed. It extended the deadline of distributing agricultural lands to the farmers for an
additional five years. This law also amends other provisions and regulations formerly stated in the CARP. It was
signed into law on August 7, 2009 and was set to be accomplished by the year 2014.[7]
The implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program relies heavily on the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). As the lead implementing agency, the DAR has the responsibility in carrying out the principal
aspects of the program, which are Land Tenure Improvement (LTI), Program Beneficiary Development (PBD), and
the Agrarian Justice Delivery (AJD).
The Land Tenure Improvement is highly recognized as the most integral aspect of the program. This component
seeks to secure the tenurial status of the farmers and farmworkers. The DAR implements this component through
Land Acquisition and Distribution (LAD) or Non-land Transfer Schemes.
The Land Acquisition and Distribution involves the redistribution of private and government-owned land to
landless farmers and farm workers. Under Section 6 of RA 9700 ( Section 16 of RA 6657 as amended) regarding
Land Acquisition, the DAR identifies lands that are eligible for distribution under the CARP with accordance to the
law, acquires the land by delivering a notice containing the offer with its corresponding value to the owner should
he choose to accept the payment. Following the acquisition of lands under Section 11 of RA 9700(Section 26 of RA
6657 as amended) the DAR distributes these to the qualified beneficiaries, who then pay for the land through the
Land Bank of the Philippines or directly to their former owners.[8]
Under the CARP, a total target of 10.3 million hectares of land was programmed to be distributed over a span of ten
years. Out of the total land, 6.5 million hectares of public disposal lands and Integrated Social Forestry areas are to
be distributed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) while 3.8 million hectares of
private agricultural lands are to be distributed by the DAR. From July 1987 to June 1992, the DAR was able to
distribute 1.77 million hectares benefiting .933 million beneficiaries, while the DENR has distributed 1.88 million
hectares to .760 million farmers.[9]
Leasehold Operations is the alternative non-land transfer scheme that covers all tenanted agricultural lands in
retained areas and in yet to be acquired or distributed lands. Under this component, the DAR mediates between the
landowners and tenants so that their share tenancy arrangement could be turned into a leasehold agreement,
whereby the beneficiaries will pay a fixed fee based on their own historical production records instead of paying a
large percentage share of their produce to the landowner.[10]
The Program Beneficiaries Development is a support service delivery component of CARP. It aims to aid the
agrarian reform beneficiaries by providing them necessary support services to make their lands more productive,
and enable them to venture in income generating livelihood projects in accordance to Section 14 of RA 9700(Section
37 of RA 6657 as amended) .[11] Under the support service delivery programs, the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council(PARC) ensures that agrarian reform beneficiaries are provided with support services such as land surveys
and tilting, construction of infrastructures, marketing and production assistance, credit and training. [8]
Agrarian Justice Delivery provides agrarian legal assistance and oversees the adjudication of cases. Under Section
19 of RA 97600 (Section 50 of RA 6657 as amended), the DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[2]
The Agrarian Legal Assistance is under the Bureau of Legal Assistance (BALA). The BALA provides legal
assistance to the beneficiaries affected by agrarian cases, particularly those whose legal rights as ARB’s are
challenged by landowners.
The Adjudication of Cases involves the adjudication of cases by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). The adjudication of cases deals with disputes pertaining to tenancy relations;
valuation of lands acquired by DAR under compulsory acquisition mode; rights and obligations of persons, whether
natural or juridical, engaged in the management cultivation and use of all agricultural lands; ejectment and
dispossession of tenants/leaseholders; review of leasehold rentals; and other similar disputes. [10]

Development[edit]
At the end of the 20th century, the population of the Philippines increased rapidly to 75.32 million in a country of
297,410 square kilometers, with an average family size of six, making the Philippines known for high population
density. In addition to this, with a population growth of 2.02 per year, the Philippine population is expected to
double in the span of 25 years. 60 percent of the Philippine population is rural, and over 12 million Filipinos make
a living directly from agricultural cultivation. Around 9.5 million hectares of land across the Philippines are used to
plan various crops. In terms of landlessness, the number of landless agricultural families rose up from 5 million to
11.32 million families. Out of these 11.32 families, 4.6 million make a living from lands they don’t own. 0.70 million
are rented, 2 million are laborers, while 1.9 million are farming as tenants.[9]
Land reform under Aquino administration (1986–1992)[edit]
During the start of President Corazon Aquino’s term in 1986, the Constitutional Commission approved Section 21
under Article II, which states that “The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.”
This led to the drafting of CARP, which took the Congress a year to make. On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No.
6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), was passed to promote social justice and
industrialization. Although it was still a product of adherence to democratic principles, this law was found to have
many flaws. Because of much dissatisfaction with the agrarian reform law, proposals from peasant groups and
non-government organizations grew in order to implement an alternative program that was more advantageous to
them. However, this did not succeed.
CARP recognizes not only farmers but all landless workers as beneficiaries with the condition that they cultivate the
land. The two main departments in charge of this program are Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Aside from the land distribution, it also provides the
delivery of support services and security to the farmers.
Under the Aquino administration, a total of 898,420 landless tenants and farmers became recipients of land titles
and support services. Even with this, it can be considered unsuccessful because it only accomplished 22.5 percent
of land distribution in 6 years. This was due to the fact that Aquino assigned 4 different DAR secretaries. The major
setback for CARP was Aquino’s Hacienda Luisita’s Stock Distribution Option, which says that she was the first
landlord to evade CARP on a grand scale.
Land reform under Ramos administration (1992–1998)[edit]
The policies on agrarian reform under the Ramos administration focused on accelerating the direct land transfer
and non-land transfer through adopting more rational, fair and inexpensive settlements. It encouraged landowners
to invest in rural-based industries that are connected to agriculture. It made an amendment to Section 63 of CARL
to increase the fund of this project to 100 billion. Salaries of workers and members of DAR board were increased to
motivate them for more successful results as well.
The target land to be given to farmer beneficiaries under this Administration was 3.4 million hectares, 4.7 million or
60 percent of which was successfully distributed. It achieved more than double the output of the Aquino
administration. It focused on “less contentious landholdings and acquisition modes,” where they chose to work with
autonomous NGOs and peasant organizations. However, controversies were unavoidable as they encountered
landlords openly harassing peasants with guns and forcing them out of the lands.
Land reform under Estrada administration (1998–2001)[edit]
This administration focused on fast tracking land acquisition and distribution. It wanted to reduce uncertainties in
land market in rural places to help farmers’ efficiency and private investment to grow. It encouraged joint ventures,
corporative, contact farming and other marketing arrangements to protect the status of stakeholders and promotion
of agri-industrialization. They also improved the databases of the implementing agencies of DAR and DENR to fully
record and update the lands covered. Estrada highlighted that there was a need to conceptualize new approaches in
doing things to build a new social agreement where producers, government and private sectors work with a
common goal.
The program encountered some problems such as strong landowners' resistance. Tenants also complained on the
limited amount of fund allocation provided by the government for the project. It aimed to complete 7.8 million
hectares by 2004. Since President Estrada lasted only 2.5 years as president, the total beneficiaries of CARP was
only 0.18 million or 10 percent.[12]

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER)[edit]

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms, known also as CARPER or CARPer,
(Republic Act 9700)[13] is the amendatory law that extends again the deadline of distributing agricultural lands to
farmers for five years. It also amends other provisions stated in CARP.
In December 2008, the budget for CARP expired and there remained 1.2 million hectares of agricultural land
waiting to be acquired and distributed to farmers. CARPER was signed into law on August 7, 2009 by Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and was set to expire on June 30, 2014.[14] However the program of distributing lands to farmer-
beneficiaries continued even after June 2014. Section 30 of RA 9700 or CARPER law states that cases on the
matter which are still pending “shall be allowed to proceed to its finality and be executed even beyond such
date.” [15]
Beneficiaries[edit]
Beneficiaries of CARPER are landless farmers, including agricultural lessees, tenants, as well as regular, seasonal
and other farmworkers. In a certain landholding, the qualified beneficiaries who are tenants and regular
farmworkers will receive 3 hectares each before distributing the remaining land to the other qualified beneficiaries
like seasonal farmworks and other farmworkers (Section 22 of CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) identifies and screens potential beneficiaries and validates their qualifications. Beneficiaries must be least 15
years old, be a resident of the barangay where the land holding is located, and own no more than 3 hectares of
agricultural land.[16]
The CARPER law has bias for organized farmers to be beneficiaries because the Congress believes that the success
rate of organized farmers is high and can make their awarded lands productive.[citation needed]
Significant provisions[edit]

 Gender-Sensitive Agrarian Reform – Section 1 of the CARPER law states that "The State shall recognize and
enforce, consistent with existing laws, the rights of rural women to own and control land, taking into
consideration the substantive equality between men and women as qualified beneficiaries, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof, and to be represented in advisory or appropriate decision-making bodies. These
rights shall be independent of their male relatives and of their civil status." Rural women will have a
representative in the highest policy making body of DAR – the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC).
 Budget – Section 21 amending Section 63 for CARL state that the budget allocated for the 5-year extension is
150 Billion pesos which will be sourced from three funds: Agrarian Reform Fund, General Appropriations Acts
(GAA) and other sources of funding like privatization of government asset, foreign donors, etc. This budget is
the largest per year in the history of CARP.
 Creation of a Congressional Oversight Committee – Section 26 of the CARPER law created a joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to oversee and monitor the implementation of the act, which will be
composed of the Chairpersons of the Committee on Agrarian Reform of both Houses of Congress, three
Members of the House of Representatives, and three Members of the Senate of the Philippines, to be designated
respectively by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate of the Philippines.
The chairpersons of the COCAR are the Chairpersons of the Committees on Agrarian Reform of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate of the Philippines. The term of the COCAR will end six months after the
expiration of the extended period of five years. The COCAR is provided with twenty-five million pesos
(P25,000,000.00) every year.
 CARPER as a Continuing Program – Section 30 of the CARPER law mandates that “any case and/or
proceeding involving the implementation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, which may
remain pending on June 30, 2014 shall be allowed to proceed to its finality and be executed even beyond such
date". Section 30 of CARPER law provides a way to legally continue the implementation of pending CARP cases
after the 5-year extension by filling the initiatory process of CARP.
 Policies in Converting Agricultural Lands – Section 73 of the CARPER law: "Any conversion by any
landowner of his/her agricultural land into any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this
Act to his/her landholdings and to dispossess his/her bonafide tenant farmers." Failure to comply will result in
an imprisonment of 6 to 12 years and/or a penalty of 200,000 pesos to 1 million pesos. The CARPER law
prohibits any conversion of irrigated and irrigable lands and mandates the National Irrigation Administration to
identify these. CARPER law also states that non-implementation of the conversion plan will result to automatic
coverage of the subject by CARP.
Achievements[edit]
In 2003, 15 years into the program, studies funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ADB,
FAO, European Union (EU) and the Philippine Government, had shown that poverty incidence among program
beneficiaries declined from 47.6 to 45.2 percent, while increasing among their non-participating counterparts from
55.1 to 56.4 percent.[17]
The Official Gazette released an update on the accomplishments in the field of agrarian reform as of June 30, 2014.
"As of December 31, 2013, the government has acquired and distributed 6.9 million hectares of land, equivalent to
88% of the
total land subject to CARP." Of this area, the Aquino administration has distributed a total of 751,514 hectares, or
45% of the total landholdings to be distributed to the farmer beneficiaries left under this administration. From this,
DAR has distributed 412,782 hectares and DENR has already distributed
338,732 hectares.[16]
In 2014 – 2016, Department of Agrarian Reform still needs to acquire 771,795 hectares (187,686 hectares in 2014;
198,631 hectares in 2015; and 385,478 hectares in 2016). The Department of Environment and Nation
Resources still needs to acquire 134,857 hectares — a total of 906,652 hectares.

 Land reform in the Philippines

 Department of Agrarian Reform (Philippines)

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Chance for modernization and social justice for the Philippines

Published 1 year ago on July 26, 2018 12:52 AM
By: Antonio Tujan

There are many indicators and elements for modernization for a country such as the Philippines. Some would look
at infrastructure like high-rise buildings. Others look at education while others will look at media development.

But a fundamental change promoting modernization for any country is agrarian reform. This is what Taiwan and
South Korea implemented as a basic condition towards their industrialization.

Agrarian reform frees peasants from serfdom to landlords. It redistributes land as the prime agricultural resource to
the peasants who till the farms who can become farmer-entrepreneurs. This reform is the base for modernization
towards industrialization.

Our society has long stood for social justice and our Constitution provides assurance for that. The 1935
Constitution provides: “The promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State.” (Section 5, Article II)

The 1973 Constitution continues this tradition — “The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity,
welfare and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.” (Section 6,
Article II).

The 1987 Constitution further improves it in Section 9, Article II: “The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all.”

Indeed, out of a total Philippine land area of 299,404 square kilometers or approximately 30 million hectares, there
were 14.1 million hectares agricultural land as of 1991 of which around 10 million hectares were devoted to
farmlands and 4 million to swine and chicken farms.

But seven out of 10 farmers are landless. Of every 100 farmers, 21 are agricultural workers, 28 are unpaid family
workers, 26 are under some form of tenancy relation and only 25 own land. The latter own or lease an average of
1/2 to one hectare. [All these data come from the Department of Agrarian Reform or DAR].

On 21 October 1972, Marcos issued Presidential Decree 27 implementing agrarian reform but it only covered
tenanted rice and corn lands. It also was essentially a land sale since tenants had to pay for the land through
regular amortizations at 6 percent interest.

After a series of presidential decrees, Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, was enacted into law under the late Corazon Aquino on 10 June 1988. The law became effective on 15 June
1988 30 years ago.

But several infirmities hound the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) which lay doubt to its effectivity
to achieve social justice for the rural poor. First is coverage – In 1989, the target for distribution was 10.3 million
hectares in 10 years. 3.8 million is to be distributed by DAR and 6.6 million by Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). But in 1995, the target was lowered to 7.8 million due to several exceptions; 4.3 million
to be distributed by DAR and 3.5 million by DENR.

Second, not unlike the Marcos land reform program, CARP remains a land sale where the DAR is the broker and
the Land Bank collects the 30-year annual amortization at 6 percent. Thus, the social justice element of the reform
is negated. Land Bank data show that only 10 percent of beneficiaries are amortizing and the rest face foreclosure
for three years non-payment of amortizations.
Agricultural land should be distributed free to the peasants if we want to achieve social justice and similar to
Taiwan 70 years ago, the government can enact a scheme where the landowners can be paid from government
funds through bonds.

Third, the CARP loopholes allow for land use conversion which has resulted in a lot of disputes and loss of
livelihood for tenants as their lands are forced to lie fallow towards conversion to housing estates, development
schemes and plantations for commercial crops.

Worse, market-oriented land reform schemes promoted by the World Bank found its way into the program. Section
8 of RA 6657 legalized and allowed Multi-National Corporations to maintain their control and operation of vast
tracts of agricultural lands through lease, management, grower or service contracts for a period not exceeding 25
years, renewable for not more than 25 years.

Corporate schemes were implemented such as leaseback arrangements, contract growing and corporative schemes.
Section 31 of RA 6657 provided for the Stock Distribution Option (SDO) as alternative to actual land distribution.
Which has been implemented in Hacienda Luisita and 15 other SDO in Negros Occidental.

It is 30 years since CARP – 4,726,604 hectares reportedly acquired and distributed with 2,790,644 agrarian reform
beneficiaries. Only that much?

How much has CARP impacted the lives of the farmers? Do the lands still remain in the hands of the farmers? Has
it made a dent on rural poverty?

We suffer from low agricultural production and the Philippines is now a net importer of food products for over $1
billion every year. Poverty incidence is worst in agricultural areas with farmers among the least-paid workers. Land
use conversion is rampant and we see the gradual decrease in agricultural lands hampering food security and
displacing thousands of farmers.

Shouldn’t we do better and learn our lesson? We need another better agrarian reform program now.

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Kaisahan: Land reform about social justice, not big businesses

(Philstar.com) - June 14, 2018 - 4:35pm

MANILA, Philippines — Agrarian reform is about social justice and not about selling off land to big businesses, a
land rights group said Thursday in response to President Rodrigo Duterte's statement that Boracay "natives" can
sell lots awarded to them under government land reform.

Kaisahan, which has been working with agrarian reform beneficiaries or ARBs since 1990, said the president's
statement shows "lack of understanding of the agrarian reform law and the very essence of land reform – social
justice through providing land to the tillers."

In a speech in Central Luzon on Tuesday, Duterte reiterated that he will convert the entire island — except for a
portion that Congress might set aside for commerce and tourism — into a land reform area. The island has been
closed to tourists for six months from April 26 for environmental rehabilitation.

"So I will give it to the natives. So when it is time for business and the big business would go in, the land title is
with them and they can sell it," Duterte said in a mix of English and Filipino.
The president said land reform had failed in Mindanao because ARBs did not have capital and sold their land
instead. He said he wants Boracay's "natives" to also have money.

"The president must be forgetting that agrarian reform is all about economic viability and ecological integrity; and
that it is about developing the capacity of the once landless farmers become profitable, environmentally-sound
agricultural producers," Kaisahan said in a statement.

"Instead of encouraging the natives (and all the other ARBs in the country) to sell their property to big firms, the
government should be working on the sustainability of the said agricultural lands, through providing support
services and strengthening the farmers and their organizations as landowners," the group also said.

The Department of Agrarian Reform has promised ARBs credit assistance and infrastructure like farm-to-market
roads to help them earn from the land awarded to them. The department has also encouraged farmers to form
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries' Organizations so they can work together and boost productivity and profitability on
their farms.

Kaisahan stressed that selling awarded land is prohibited by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Under
Section 27 of the law, the government can void the sale of land sold within 10 years of awarding.

"In case the agrarian reform beneficiaries decide to sell their land right after the 10-year period, we must note that
the Land Bank of the Philippines is the first in line when it comes to buying and selling private agricultural land. It
will be considered a double sale when a big business firm buys the land from an ARB," the group said.
"The farmers are this country’s backbone that must continuously be strengthened. Farming is a lucrative activity
and is a rich resource for the country. We, as a nation, should be more encouraging and start validating the
farmers’ work instead of pushing them to give in to large businesses," Kaisahan also said. — Jonathan de Santos

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AGRARIAN REFORM AND OTHER SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Atty. Glenn Capanas

Meaning of Social Legislation

 Laws that seek to promote the common good, generally by protecting and assisting the weaker members of
society.
 Common good = social justice
 In the case of agrarian reform – 2 principal parties:
o Landowner
o Farmers (1935 constitution– tenants -> individuals)
 Weaker members in terms of ownership of the land (i.e. enjoyment) since they do not own
those parcels of land.
 SSS, ECL, GSIS –
o Employer
o Employee
 Weaker member (context of opportunities, advantages, capital, profit, power)
Construction
 Construed in favor of the promotion of social justice
 Social Justice – Calalang vs. Williams Case

The Constitutional Provisions of Agrarian Reform (Article XIII)

 Sec 4 – the state shall by law undertake an agrarian reform program (RA 6657 - CARL) founded on the right
of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own the lands they till and receive a just fruits
they’re entitled thereof.
o Constitution itself recognizes that there is inequality between the principal parties
o Agrarian Farmers have the RIGHT TO OWN THE LAND THEY TILL
o 3 kinds:
 Farmers (usually have higher priority) & Regular farm workers – both have right to own but
no more distinction.
 Other farm workers – just fruits of the land. **in the law, have right to own already.
o The law itself as implemented and worded, even if the farmers do not till the land, the land can be
awarded to them without a pre-requisite of tilling the land.
o How is right to own the land enforced? Through SALE ---
 Voluntary (offer)
 No hassles, landowner will execute Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
government
 Government will now choose qualified ARB (Agrarian Reform Beneficiary via DAR
(Department of Agrarian Reform)
o ARB will pay the govt annual amortization with reasonable interest
 Involuntary (government constrained to forced sale or expropriation)
o Sec 4 provides for 2 major limitations:
 Retention Limit shall be prescribed by Congress(at 5 hectares)
 JUST COMPENSATION
o PROCESS:
 Notice of Coverage
 Initial Determination of Just Compensation
o **No choice**
 Register
 Publication
o RTC - just compensation and criminal prosecution
o Outside of that – jurisdiction of DAR
 Section 5. SUPPORT SERVICES
o 1973 talks about emancipation of tenant from bondage of the soil
 RA 3844 – abolished shared tenancy
 There was this relationship institutionalized by the government – LEASEHOLD
 But no support services.
o Why are the farmers given the right to own?
 Uplift standards of living.
 There should be support – capital, mechanism,
o Coverage of Support Services:
 Irrigation system
 Road Construction
 Facilities
  Section 6. RESPECT FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, HOMESTEAD RIGHTS (another imitation of CARL)
o If a person is a holder of a homestead title – cannot be covered by CARL
 Section 7. SUBSISTENCE FISHERMEN *not relevant to agra*
 Section 8. Incentive to landowners

June 30, 2014

RA 3844
Extinguishment of relation (Sec. 8)
1. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agri lessor
2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served
three months in advance (lack of notice would not be strictly construed against the lessee; different case if
the heirs of the lessee are involved);
3. Absence of the persons under section 9 to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent
incapacity of the lessee.

Legal Redemption (Sec 12) - Lessee’s right of redemption.

Po. V.Dampal

Grounds to dispossess a lessee (Sec 36.)

**Civil law lessee, agricultural lessee, agrarian reform lessee – not so accurate
 Failure to substantially comply with terms and conditions unless by fortuitous events.
 Planting of crops or use land for other purpose than that agreed
 Failure to adopt proven farm practices to conserve land
 Fault or negligence resulting in substantial damage
 Does not pay rental when due-
o SC: willfull and deliberate AND must have lasted at least 2 years (PD 816)
 Employed a sublessee

Check case: Sta. Ana v. Carpo; Natividad vs. Mariano

Notes:GCC
 PD 816 is a decree related to PD 27 (Agra Reform Law – Marcos; rice and corn only)
 PD 816 – October 1975
 Ra 3844 – is silent on the period of refusal to pay. When will PD 816 apply? It will apply if the ground to
dispossess is non payment of rentals and if agri land is devoted to rice and corn.
 In natividad, there is no fact established in case whether the subject property is rice and corn (although it
can be presumed because of the words “crop year” and considering that the party has been issued a CLT –
certificate of land transfer)
 Probably, since the petition is via Rule 45 (pure question if law)
 Neither rice or corn – do not apply PD 816; no minimum period of nonpayment under 3844

Extinguishment of relation vs. dispossession

 Extinguishment – no court (Agra court) approval, voluntary act of lessee to surrender of abandon or act of
God *2 instance where regular courts have jurisdiction – just compensation and criminal cases
 Dispossession – with court order; premised on offense by lessee.

Can relation be terminated by death (sec 9 )

 No, continue between lessor and members of lesse’s immediate farm household to be chosen by lessor
within 1 month from death.
LEASE RENTAL –
 Not bemore than 25% of the average normal harvest during the 3 agri years preseding the date of leasehold
after deducting amount used for sees and costs of harvesting, threshing, loading,

-================================-

PD 27 TENANTS EMANCIPATION DECREE

BENEFICIARIES:

-==============================-

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following road for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which
is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state
in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means
of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”

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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 173329 : December 21, 2009]
SUSAN G. PO and LILIA G. MUTIA, Petitioners, v. OMERO DAMPAL,* Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon which were covered by OCT No. P-4146
and OCT No. 4147, with an approximate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were mortgaged
for P33,000.00 by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through their attorney-in-fact Manuel Causin, to the
now-defunct Rural Bank of Tagoloan, Inc.
For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the lots at public auction on July 8,
1992 to petitioner Susan G. Po (Susan) who was the highest bidder. OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147 were
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-39280 and TCT No. 39281 were, in their stead, issued in Susan's favor,
following the spouses Causin's failure to redeem the property.

On September 13, 1993, Susan sold the lot covered by TCT No. 39281 to her herein co-petitioner Lilia G. Mutia
(Lilia) who was issued TCT No. T-40193.

On September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein respondent Omero Dampal (Dampal) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich a complaint against the bank for Annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-280 (the civil case).

While the civil case was pending or on June 16, 1997, Dampal filed a complaint against Susan and Lilia before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region X, for Legal Redemption with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. X-05-361.

By Decision1 of September 16, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator of DARAB Region X disallowed the redemption
prayed for on the ground of prescription, albeit he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a
tenant; and that although Dampal was not given notice in writing of the public auction sale, he was deemed to have
knowledge thereof because of the civil case for annulment, hence, there was substantial compliance with the rules.

Dampal's motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order2 dated October 28, 1997, he appealed to the
DARAB Central Office where it was docketed as DARAB Case No. 7315.

By Decision3 of October 19, 2004, the DARAB Central Office reversed the Adjudicator's ruling. It held that Dampal,
as a tenant, had the right to redeem the mortgage in the amount of P40,000.00 plus interest; and that the right had
not prescribed, owing to the lack of written notice to him and to the DAR of the sale. It accordingly ordered the
cancellation of the title issued in favor of Susan and that of Lilia and the issuance of new ones in Dampal's favor,
upon his payment of the redemption amount. Susan and Lilia's motion for reconsideration of the said Decision was
denied by Resolution4 of July 7, 2005, hence, they appealed via certiorari to the Court of Appeals.

By Resolution5 of October 19, 2005, the appellate court, holding that petitioners should have appealed the DARAB
Decision via Rule 43, instead of Rule 65, dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari .

Petitioners thereupon filed before the appellate court a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of
Amended Petition, which motion was denied by Resolution6 of March 28, 2006. In denying the motion, the appellate
court held that dismissal due to error in the mode of appeal cannot be reconsidered by the mere expediency of filing
an amended petition. Moreover, it noted that it was filed out of time.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the appellate court's March 28, 2006 Resolution, alleging that their error in
the choice of remedy was excusable as they relied on Sec. 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure,
reading:

Sec. 1. Appeal to the Board. - An appeal may be taken to the Board from a resolution, decision or final order of the
Adjudicator that completely disposes of the case by either or both of the parties within a period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the resolution/decision/final order appealed from or of the denial of the movant's motion for
reconsideration in accordance with section 12, Rule X by:

1.1 filing a Notice of Appeal with the Adjudicator who rendered the decision or final order appealed from;

1.2 furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal to all parties and the Board; and

1.3 paying an appeal fee of Seven Hundred Pesos (Php700.00) to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the
Adjudicator is situated or through postal money order, payable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the
Adjudicator is situated, at the option of the appellant.

A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.

Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the Board and payment of appeal fee shall be filed,
within the reglementary period, with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form part of the records of the case.

Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (underscoring supplied)

By Resolution7 of May 22, 2006, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that nothing in
the above-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV states that the remedy of an aggrieved party from an adverse decision of the
DARAB is by certiorari, and that the applicable rule is Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure.

On petitioners' attribution of the faux pas to their counsel, the appellate court held that they are bound thereby.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assert that the appellate court, in dismissing their petition due to technicality, denied them the
opportunity to establish the merits of their case. They maintain that Dampal's right of redemption has prescribed,
he having admitted Susan's acquisition of title to the property as early as 1993 but that it was only in 1997 that he
filed the action for redemption before the DARAB. They thus conclude that the need for sending him notice in
writing could be dispensed with; and that Dampal's inaction estopped him from asserting his right as a tenant.

The petition is bereft of merit.

The earlier-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure dwells on how appeals to
the DARAB Board from the decisions, resolutions or final orders of the Adjudicator are to be taken. How
petitioners could have been misled to file their appeal from the DARAB's Decision to the Court of
Appeals via certiorari escapes comprehension.

Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the Court of
Appeals by verified Petition for Review . Thus, Sec. 1 of Rule 43 provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.

-=========================-

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191694 December 3, 2014

NARCISO ZAPANTA, EDILBERTO CAPULONG AND CLARITA CAPULONG, Petitioners,

vs.
CO KING KI as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact WILLIAM CO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the November 20, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106882
which dismissed the petition3 for certiorari filed by herein petitioners Narciso Zapanta, Edilberto Capulong and
Clarita Capulong (petitioners) together with Ernesto de Guzman (Ernesto) and Marciano Martin (Marciano). Also
assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated March 22, 2010 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The essential facts follow:

On September 7, 2000, respondent Co King Ki (respondent), through his Attorney-in-Fact William Co, filed a
Complaint5 for Ejectment against petitioners, Ernesto, Marciano and one Lawrence Smith (defendants) before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent alleged that he is the
owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-501 (90470)6 and located at Barangay San
Francisco, Lubao, Pampanga, with an area of 68,483 square meters more or less (subject property).

The defendants filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,7 averring, among others, that they are qualified
farmer beneficiaries of the subject property and that respondent was no longer the owner thereof as early as August
15, 1983 as the same was already foreclosed by the Philippine Veterans Bank.

On December 27, 2007, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered a Decision 8 in favor of
respondent, declaring defendants as illegal occupants and not tenants of the subject property, and directing them
to vacate the same. The said decision was received by the defendants’ former counsel, Atty. Rolando Miranda (Atty.
Miranda) on February 15, 2008. On February 29, 2008, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration 9 which
the RARAD, however, denied in his Order/Resolution10 dated June 5, 2008. Said Order/Resolution was received by
Atty. Miranda on June 18, 2008.

On June 30, 2008, defendants’ new counsel Atty. Marc Terry C. Perez (Atty. Perez) filed a Notice of Appeal and
Formal Entry of Appearance,11 attaching therewith the Withdrawal of Appearance12 of Atty. Miranda as defendants’
counsel. Respondent moved to dismiss said appeal for being filed out of time. Defendants opposed the motion to
dismiss appeal.13

On September 18, 2008, the PARAD issued an Order,14 denying the notice of appeal filed by defendants for having
been filed out of time. Invoking the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of
Procedure, the PARAD opined that the period within which defendants should have interposed their appeal expired
on June 23, 2008. Thus, the notice of appeal filed by the defendants on June30, 2008 was filed out of time.

Defendants sought reconsideration of the September 18, 2008 Order while respondent moved for the execution of
the December 27, 2007 Decision. In his Joint Order15 dated November 17, 2008, the PARAD denied the defendants’
Motion for Reconsideration and granted respondent’s Motion for Execution. On December 4, 2008, the PARAD
issued the Writ of Execution.16

Petitioners, together with Ernesto and Marciano, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on January 9, 2009.17

On November 20, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution,18 dismissing the petition for certiorari because petitioners
failed to append a clearly legible duplicate original/certified true copy of the assailed PARAD Order dated
September 18, 2008 and PARAD Joint Order dated November 17, 2008 in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Likewise, the CA held that petitioners should have elevated their case
before the DARAB on appeal as provided by Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

The CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its Resolution19 dated March 22, 2010.

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

1. Whether the CA committed a serious reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the basis
of a strict application of Section 3, Rule46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the
attachment of clearly legible duplicate original/certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or
ruling subject thereof; and

2. Whether the CA committed a serious reversible error in ruling that petitioners’ remedy was to elevate
their case to the DARAB and not through the petition for certiorari filed before the CA.20

Petitioners assert that what was attached to the petition for certiorari which they filed before the CA was the copy of
the September 18, 2008 Order that was furnished to them by the PARAD through registered mail. They also assert
that the attached November 17, 2008 Joint Order had been signed by the officer having custody thereof. Thus, they
submit that said petition for certiorari substantially complied with the requirements of the rules. Moreover,
petitioners opine that appeal would be slow and inadequate in their case as they are under threat of the immediate
execution of the assailed orders and of the demolition of their properties. Hence, they resorted to certiorari. Lastly,
petitioners appeal for the liberal construction of the rules because they will suffer insurmountably if the case would
be dismissed based on a technicality.21

On the other hand, respondent avers that petitioners had ample time to appeal the December 27, 2007 Decision to
the DARAB in accordance with the latter’s rules. Since petitioners failed to file their appeal on time, respondent
submits that said decision has become final and executory. Respondent also relies on the CA’s ruling that the
special civil action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal.22

We deny the petition.

The complaint in this case was filed on September 7, 2000, during the effectivity of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure which is applicable in this case. It bears noting that the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was
effective at the time when petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal, expressly provides
in Section 1, Rule XXIV (Miscellaneous Provisions) thereof that "[a]ll cases pending with the Board and the
Adjudicators, prior to the date of effectivity of these Rules, shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the
time of their filing."

Pertinently, the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure provides:

Rule XIII

APPEALS

SECTION 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision of the
Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse party,
if the appeal is in writing.

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a copy thereof
shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of the oral appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

However, petitioners failed to consider the effect on their appeal of the motion for reconsideration which they filed to
assail the December 27, 2007 Decision. Section 12, Rule VIII of the same DARAB Rules clearly provides that if a
motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of
the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial, to wit:

SECTION 12. Motion for Reconsideration. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution or
decision of the Board or Adjudicator, a party may file a motion for reconsideration of such order or decision,
together with the proof of service of one (1) copy thereof upon the adverse party. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed a party which shall be and based on the ground that: (a) the findings of facts in the
said decision, order or resolution are not supported by substantial evidence, or (b) the conclusions stated therein
are against the law and jurisprudence.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period within which the appeal must be
perfected. If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the
remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within
which to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioners received a copy of the December 27, 2007 Decision on February 15, 2008. They filed their
Motion for Reconsideration thereof on February 29, 2008 or 14 days from their receipt of a copy of the Decision. On
June 18, 2008, they received the Order/Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioners
only had one more day or until June 19, 2008 within which to file their Notice of Appeal before the PARAD.
However, it is evident that their new counsel Atty. Perez belatedly filed said Notice of Appeal on June 30, 2008.
Clearly, petitioners’ Notice of Appeal in this case was filed out of time.23

While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the approval of a notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or
tribunal which rendered the decision, it is required, however, that said appeal must have been filed on time.24 It
bears reiterating that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to
avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal
must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the
judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. 25

Petitioners’ resort to certiorari before the CA is also proscribed because they lost their remedy of appeal due to their
own negligence. Aproposis our ruling in Espinoza v. Provincial Adjudicator of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Office of Pampanga:26

A special civil action of certiorari is an independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of such action is to keep
an inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts.

A petition for certiorari was never meant as a mode of reviewing errors of judgment committed by an inferior
tribunal.1âwphi1 Thus, it has been settled that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal lost by the
party entitled thereto especially if the right of appeal was lost through negligence. When the remedy of appeal is
available but is lost due to petitioner's own negligence or error in the choice of remedies, resort to certiorari is
precluded.27 (Emphasis supplied)

Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise
of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended
to hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard
following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a
conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.28

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and March 22,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106882 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE C. MENDOZA*

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1896 dated November 28, 2014.

1 Rollo, pp. 9-18.

2CA rollo, pp. 92-95. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guarifia III and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo concurring.

3 Id. at 2-18.

4 Id. at 108-109.

5 Id. at 63-65.

6 Id. at 66.

7 Id. at 67-74.

8 Id. at 27-31.

9 Id. at 32-35.

10 Id. at 36-37.

11 Id. at 38-41.

12 Id. at 42.

13 Id. at 43-50.

14 Id. at 19-22.

15 Id. at 23-26.

16 Id. at 52-53.

17 Supra note 3.

18 Supra note 2.

19 Supra note 4.
 20 Supra note 1, at 11-12.

21 Id. at 12-14.

22 Id. at 127-130.

23See Plopenio v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 161090 & 161092, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA
537, 544-545.

24Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010, 618
SCRA 181, 199, citing Oro v. Judge Diaz, 413 Phil. 416, 426 (2001).

25 Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, 581 Phil. 517, 530 (2008).

26 545 Phil. 535 (2007).

27 Id. at 540-541.

28 Po v. Dampal, 623 Phil. 523, 529 (2009), citing Audi AG v. Judge Mejia, 555 Phil. 348, 354-355 (2007).

-==============================-

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 164340 : November 28, 2008]

OTILIA STA. ANA,Petitioner, v. SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and AURORA CARPO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated March 5, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 and reinstated the
Decision4 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Laguna dated October 12, 1993.

The Facts

Respondent Leon Carpo5 (Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 2175 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision, situated at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-172726 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, with an area of 91,337 square
meters, more or less. A portion thereof, consisting of 3.5 hectares, pertained to Leon and his wife, respondent
Aurora Carpo. It was devoted to rice and corn production (subject land) and was tenanted by one Domingo
Pastolero (Domingo), husband of Adoracion Pastolero (Adoracion).7 When Domingo passed away, Adoracion together
with her son Elpidio Pastolero, assumed the tenancy rights of Domingo over the subject land.

However, on December 29, 1983, Adoracion, by executing a notarized Pinanumpaang Salaysay 8 with the conformity
of Leon, and for a consideration of P72,500.00, transferred her rights in favor of petitioner Otilia Sta.
Ana9 (petitioner) who, together with her husband, Marciano de la Cruz (Marciano), became the new tenants of the
subject land.

At the outset, the parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship.10 Unfortunately, circumstances transpired which
abraded the relationship. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) mediated in order to amicably settle the
controversy, but no settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, the instant case.

In their Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease Rentals11 dated December 1, 1989, respondents
alleged that it was their agreement with petitioner and Marciano to increase the existing rentals from 36 cavans to
45 cavans, and that, if respondents wanted to repossess the property, they only had to pay the petitioner the
amount of P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to Adoracion. Respondents further averred that despite
repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual rentals from July 1985 to September 1989, in violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817; and that the subject land had been declared, upon the recommendation of the
Human Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of
the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ejected from the subject land and be
directed to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.

In their Answer12 dated January 26, 1990, petitioner and Marciano denied that there was an agreement to increase
the existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a year depending on the availability
of irrigation water; that neither was there an agreement as to the future surrender of the land in favor of the
respondents; that they did not refuse to pay the rentals because they even sent verbal and written notices to the
respondents, advising them to accept the same; and that in view of the latter's failure to respond, petitioner and
Marciano were compelled to sell the harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings Account No. 9166 with
the Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of Leon and Marciano. As their special
affirmative defense, petitioner and Marciano claimed that Marciano is a farmer-beneficiary of the subject land
pursuant to P.D. 27. Petitioner and Marciano prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint and for the
declaration of Marciano as full owner of the subject land.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The PARAD's Ruling

On October 12, 1993, the PARAD ruled that petitioner and Marciano deliberately defaulted in the payment of the
rentals due the respondents. The PARAD found that the deposit made with Republic Planters Bank was actually in
the names of petitioner and Marciano, hence, personal to them. The PARAD also found that it was only during the
hearing that petitioner and Marciano deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Universal Savings Bank for the
unpaid rentals. As such the PARAD considered the deposits as late payments and as implied admission that indeed
petitioner and Marciano did not pay the past rentals when they fell due. The PARAD further held and disposed
thus:

The intent of the defendant to subject the said area under PD 27 should pass the criteria set. Foremost is the
determination of the aggregate riceland of plaintiff. He must have more than seven (7) hectares of land principally
devoted to the planting of palay. Area over seven (7) hectares shall be the one to be covered by PD 27 on Operation
Land Transfer (OLT). In the case at bar, defendants failed to prove that plaintiff has more than the required
riceland. In fact the subject 3.5 hectares are jointly owned by two. Hence, coverage for OLT is remote.

Defendant claimed that plaintiff is covered by LOI 474, and therefore, he is zero retention of area. In reference to
said law, wherein it provides landowner with other agricultural land of more than 7 hectares, or have other
industrial lands from where he and his family derived resources, then, the owner cannot retain any riceland.
However, this is not applicable in the instant case, as the defendant failed to prove that plaintiff has other source of
income from where they will derive their sustenance.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Ordering the ejectment of defendant from the subject landholding for non-payment of lease rentals;

b) Ordering the defendant Marciano de la Cruz to surrender the possession and cultivation of the subject land to
herein plaintiffs;

c) Ordering the defendant to pay as actual damage the amount of P75,016.00 corresponding to the unpaid rentals
from July 18, 1985 up to September 16, 1989[; and]

d) [D]eclaring the subject land not covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, Republic Act [No.] 6657, and Executive
Order No. 228.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner and Marciano sought relief from the DARAB.13

The DARAB's Ruling

On June 24, 1998, the DARAB held:

It is a fundamental rule in this jurisdiction that for non-payment of lease rentals to warrant the dispossession and
ejectment of a tenant, the same must be made in a willful and deliberate manner (Cabero v. Caturna, et al., CA-G.R.
05886-R, March 10, 1977). For a valid ouster or ejectment of a farmer-tenant, the willful and deliberate intent not
to pay lease rentals and/or share can be ascertained when there is a determination of will not to do a certain act.

Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be concluded that the defendants-appellants
deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It was not the fault of defendants-appellants herein that the
rentals did not reach the plaintiffs-appellees because the latter choose to lend a deaf ear to the notices sent to
them. Clearly, therefore plaintiffs-appellees failed to show by substantial evidence that the defendants-appellants
deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It has been held that the mere failure of a tenant to pay the
landowner's share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate
intent on the part of the tenant to pay (Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, 1 SCRA 1106).

Thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal interposed by the defendants-appellants to be meritorious, the Decision appealed
from is hereby SET ASIDE and another judgment issued as follows:

1. Enjoining plaintiffs-appellees to respect the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land in suit by the
defendants-appellants; and
2. Directing the MARO of Sta. Rosa, Laguna to assist the parties in the proper accounting of lease rentals to be paid
by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On April 16, 2003, Marciano passed away.14

The CA's Ruling

On March 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the PARAD that petitioner and Marciano failed to pay the
rentals and that there was no valid tender of payment. The CA added that this failure to pay was tainted with bad
faith and deliberate intent. Thus, petitioner and Marciano did not legally comply with their duties as tenants.
Moreover, the CA held that the subject land was not covered by P.D. 27, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 228, since the same had become a residential, commercial and industrial land, to wit:

In the case at bar, We opted to give more weight to the petitioners contention that the "subject landholding is for
residential, commercial, and industrial purposes as declared by zoning ordinance of 1981 of the town of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna upon recommendation of the Human Settlement Committee xxx." The vicinity map of the subject
landholding shows that it is almost beside Nissan Motors Technopa[r]k and surrounded by the South Expressway
and several companies such as the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and Toyota Motors Philippines along the
Pulong Santa Cruz, National Road. The vicinity map shows therefore that the subject landholding is a residential,
commercial, and industrial area exempted from the coverage of P.D. No. 27, Republic Act. No. 6657 and Executive
Order No. 228.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, the present
Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-
Central Office, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City (promulgated on June 24, 1998) is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered - REINSTATING the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-Region IV, Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (dated
October 12, 1993). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 assailing the aforementioned Decision which the CA, however, denied
in its Resolution16 dated June 28, 2004.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARROGATING UPON ITSELF WHAT IS
OTHERWISE DAR'S POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS
BECOME RESIDENTIAL/INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT EQUATED "LAND RECLASSIFICATION"
WITH "LAND CONVERSION" FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PROPRIETY OF EJECTMENT OF AN
AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO NOTE THAT AN EJECTMENT
SUIT BASED ON A CLAIM OF NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTAL IS DIAMETRICALLY ANTITHETICAL TO THE
CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS NO LONGER AGRICULTURAL BUT "A RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL AREA EXEMPTED FROM THE COVERAGE OF P.D. NO. 27, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228.

THE DECISION DATED MARCH 5, 2004 - -INSOFAR AS IT ADOPTED THE FINDING OF DARAB-REGION IV,
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA INSTEAD OF THAT OF THE DARAB-CENTRAL
- -IS VIOLATIVE OF SEC. 14, ART. VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION FOR HAVING DECIDED WITHOUT
EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID DECISION IS
BASED.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RESORTING TO SURMISES AND CONJECTURES
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER DECEASED HUSBAND TO
DELIVER THE LEASE RENTALS TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS, WAS DONE SO IN BAD FAITH AND WITH
DELIBERATE INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE LAND OWNERS THEREOF.

Petitioner asseverates that there is no evidence to support respondents' claim that the failure to pay the lease
rentals was tainted with malevolence, as the records are replete with acts indicative of good faith on the part of the
petitioner and Marciano and bad faith on the part of respondents.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that the power to determine whether or not the subject land is non-agricultural,
hence, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), lies with the DAR, and not
with the courts; that mere reclassification by way of a zoning ordinance does not warrant the dispossession of a
tenant but conversion does, and entitles the tenant to payment of disturbance compensation; the legal concepts of
reclassification and conversion are separate and distinct from each other; that respondents' complaint before the
PARAD alleged and established the fact that the subject land is a riceland, therefore, agricultural; that the CA failed
to explain why it upheld the findings of the PARAD on the issue of non-payment of lease rentals; and that though
the issue of non-payment of lease rentals is a question of fact, due to the conflict of the factual findings of the
PARAD and CA with those of the DARAB, petitioner asks that this Court review the evidence on record, and
pursuant to the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna, et al.,17 rule on whether petitioner willfully and deliberately
refused to pay lease rentals as to warrant her dispossession from the subject land.18

On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioner and her family are wealthy, as they own numerous properties
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna including a luxurious house;19 that, as such, petitioner cannot be considered as a landless
tenant deserving the protection of agrarian reform laws; that the DARAB negated the highest degree of respect the
factual findings of the PARAD deserved; that petitioner's claims that Marciano repeatedly made verbal and written
notices20 for Leon to accept their lease rentals were fraudulent designs to disguise the deliberate intent of petitioner
not to pay the lease rentals; that when Leon went to petitioner's residence, petitioner did not pay the P10,000.00
due as lease rentals; that during the hearing before the PARAD, when respondents' counsel requested that they be
furnished a bank certificate as to the existence of said bank deposits in Republic Planters Bank as of April 20, 1987
and October 1, 1987, petitioner herself commented, "Nagdeposito ho talaga kami sa pangalan namin";21 that the
statement of petitioner is an admission that bank deposits, if any, were made, not in the name of Leon as contained
in the written notices, but rather in the names of petitioner and Marciano; that such certificate was not introduced
in evidence and that upon inquiry, said deposits do not actually exist; that per recent inquiry, the bank deposit in
Universal Savings Bank only contains P1,020.19 due to previous withdrawals made by Marciano; that the foregoing
circumstances indicate a pattern of fraudulent misrepresentations by the petitioner to mislead the DARAB into
believing that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately refuse to pay the lease rentals; that from July 18, 1985
up to the present, petitioner failed to pay the lease rentals showing again, the deliberate refusal to pay; that this
default on the part of the petitioner has been recurring for several years already, thus depriving the respondents as
landowners of their share of the subject land in violation of the principle of social justice; that as raised in
respondents Omnibus Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration22 before the DARAB and as found by the CA based
on its vicinity map,23 the subject land is of a residential, commercial and industrial character, exempted from
agrarian reform coverage; and that the DARAB erred in not finding the sale of the tenancy rights of Adoracion to
petitioner and Marciano for P72,500.00 violative of P.D. 27 even if the same was with Leon's consent. The sale,
respondents contend was therefore, null and void ab initio, not susceptible of any ratification.24

Our Ruling

Before we resolve this case on the merits, a procedural issue must be disposed of.

Respondents strongly argue that the instant Petition was filed out of time because, while petitioner originally
claimed to have received her copy of the CA Resolution25 dated June 28, 2004, denying her Motion for
Reconsideration,26 on July 12, 2004, petitioner eventually admitted, after respondents showed proof to the
contrary, that she actually received the said Resolution on July 7, 2004.27 Thus, petitioner had only up to July 22,
2004 to appeal the CA's ruling to this Court. In this case, petitioner filed her Motion 28 for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Motion) on July 23, 2004. As such, there was no more period to extend. Further,
the instant Petition was filed on August 27, 2004, or three (3) days beyond the thirty-day extended period. Hence,
respondents submit that the CA decision had already become final and executory.29

Petitioner alleges that on July 15, 2004, she met with her counsel to engage the latter's legal services. During said
meeting, counsel asked petitioner about the date of receipt of the assailed CA Resolution. Petitioner replied that she
received her copy on July 12, 2004. On July 20, 2004, counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with the CA.30 On July
23, 2004, petitioner through counsel filed the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. On August
11, 2004, petitioner received a copy of respondents' Opposition to the Motion. Thereafter, upon verification,
petitioner admitted that she received the copy of the CA Resolution on July 7, 2004. Thus, her Motion was
admittedly filed one day late. Petitioner begs the indulgence of this Court for her oversight and mistake, attributing
the same to her lack of education and old age.

Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except
a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance
with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put
an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard. 31

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo32 is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the
appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of
the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always
tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every
litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

In this case, petitioner was one day late in filing her Motion for Extension. To deny the Petition on this ground alone
is too harsh a penalty for a day's delay, taking into consideration the time, resources and effort spent by petitioner
and even by the respondents, in order to pursue this case all the way to this Court. Thus, we dispense with the
apparent procedural defect and resolve this case on the merits. The ends of justice are better served when cases are
determined on the merits – with all parties given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses – rather
than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.33

The Petition is impressed with merit.

In sum, there are two (2) ultimate issues that require resolution in this case:

1) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already become residential, commercial and/or
industrial, thus, excluded from the coverage of our laws on agrarian reform; and

2) Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay her lease rentals when the same fell due as to
warrant her dispossession of the subject land.

On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative.

To recapitulate, the instant case sprang from a Complaint for Ejectment based on Non-Payment of lease rentals.
Though an allegation was made by the respondents that the land had been declared, upon the recommendation of
the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981
of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, no argument was advanced by respondents to support such allegation, in the same
way that no prayer for the ejectment of the tenants was raised based on that allegation. The PARAD held that
petitioner should be ejected for non-payment of lease rentals. It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by
P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of the allegation in the complaint, but on the
respondents' right of retention.

On appeal, the DARAB concentrated on the issue of petitioner's failure to pay lease rentals. When the DARAB ruled
that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately fail to pay said rentals, respondents raised a new issue in their
Omnibus Motion that the transaction between Adoracion and petitioner was void in violation of P.D. No. 27, despite
the conformity of Leon. This issue was not resolved by the DARAB.

Finally, when the case reached the CA, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the PARAD that petitioner and
Marciano deliberately and in bad faith did not pay the lease rentals. The CA, however, also held that the subject
land had already become a residential, commercial and industrial area based on the vicinity map showing that the
land was surrounded by commercial and industrial establishments.

Without doubt, the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land was no longer covered by
our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the respondents. The CA likewise acted without jurisdiction
when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural based on a zoning ordinance of 1981– on the strength of a
mere vicinity map. These rulings violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has
initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is
vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.34

In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,35 we held:

As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno [343 SCRA 153], "the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate
jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229,
228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations."

Under Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) . . . any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes
any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee."

Simply put, agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within the primary and exclusive
original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under
agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary.

Thus, Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:

SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. – The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over
matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative
orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in
accordance with his issuances, to wit:

3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program and the initial
issuance of CLOAs and EPs, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such coverage;

3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-

beneficiaries;

3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;

3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary
Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall,
or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;

3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;

3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657;

3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);

3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine, and poultry raising;

3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;

3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory
Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for agricultural purposes;

3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural
uses and purposes including protests or oppositions thereto;

3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;

3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's landholdings;

3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;

3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its predecessors; or

3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents in this case. An action for
Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by

the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.36 But issues with respect to the retention rights of the respondents as
landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not
cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.

It has not escaped our notice that, as this case progressed and reached a higher level in the hierarchy of tribunals,
the respondents would, invariably, proffer an additional theory or defense, in order to effect petitioner's eviction
from the land. As a consequence, the simple issue of ejectment based on non-payment of rentals has been
muddled.

Proof necessary for the resolution of the issue of the land being covered by, or excluded/exempted from, P.D. No.
27, R.A. No. 6657, and other pertinent agrarian laws, as well as of the issue of the right of retention of the
respondents, was not offered in evidence. Worse, the PARAD resolved the issue of retention even if it was not raised
by the respondents at that level, and even if the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the same.

Likewise, the CA ruled that the land had ceased being agricultural on the basis of a mere vicinity map, in open
disregard of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, since the issue was within the province of the Secretary of DAR.

We take this opportunity to remind the PARAD and the CA that "courts of justice have no power to decide a
question not in issue." A judgment that goes beyond the issues, and purports to adjudicate something on which the
parties were not heard, is extra-judicial, irregular and invalid. This norm applies not only to courts of justice, but
also to quasi-judicial
bodies such as the PARAD. Accordingly, premature and irregular were the PARAD ruling on the retention rights of
the respondents, and the CA decision on the non-agricultural character of the land subject of this controversy - -
these issues not having passed the scrutiny of the DAR Secretary - - are premature and irregular.37

Thus, we cannot allow ourselves to fall into the same error as that committed by the PARAD and the CA, and
resolve the issue of the non-agricultural nature of the subject land by receiving, at this stage, pieces of evidence
and evaluating the same, without the respondents having first introduced them in the proper forum. The Office of
the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the issues on retention and exclusion/exemption from agrarian
reform coverage, being the agency lodged with such authority inasmuch it possesses the necessary expertise on the
matter.38

Likewise, we refrain from entertaining the issue raised by respondents that petitioner and her family are not
landless tenants and are therefore not deserving of any protection under our laws on agrarian reform, because
fairness and due process dictate that issues not raised in the proceedings below should not be raised for the first
time on appeal.39

On the second issue, we rule in the negative.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844,40 as amended, coupled with the fact that the respondents are the
complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of the
petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the respondents as agricultural lessors.41 This proceeds from the
principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure. Petitioner can only
be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.42 Section 36 of the same law pertinently
provides:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. – Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:

xxx

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop
is not thereby extinguished;

xxx

Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease rentals must be
willful and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of the land that he tills.

Petitioner's counsel opines that there appears to be no decision by this Court on the matter; he thus submits that
we should use the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna. This is not correct. In an En Banc Decision by this Court
in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.,43 we held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure of a tenant to
pay the landholder's share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay. This ruling has not been overturned.

The term "deliberate" is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of
effects and consequences.44 The term "willful," on the other hand, is defined as one governed by will without
yielding to reason or without regard to reason.45

We agree with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the fault of petitioner that the lease rentals did not reach
the respondents because the latter chose to ignore the notices sent to them. To note, as early as November 10,
1986, Marciano executed an Affidavit46 stating that Leon refused to receive the respective lease rentals consisting of
37 cavans for November 1985 and July 1986. For 1987, Marciano wrote Leon two letters47 informing him of the
availability of the lease rentals for April and October of the same year. On April 27, 1988, Marciano sought DAR
intervention and mediation with respect to the execution of a leasehold contract and the fixing of the leasehold
rentals.48 Meetings were set but respondents failed to attend.49 The dispute was referred to the barangay but the
parties failed to amicably settle.50

These factual circumstances negate the PARAD findings of Marciano's and petitioner's deliberate and willful intent
not to pay lease rentals. Good faith was clearly demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner when, because
respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they even went to the point of seeking government
intervention in order to address their problems with respondents. Absent such deliberate and willful refusal to pay
lease rentals, petitioner's ejectment from the subject land is not justified.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60640 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 in DARAB Case No. 2203 is REINSTATED without prejudice to the rights of
respondent-spouses Leon and Aurora Carpo to seek recourse from the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Secretary on the other issues they raised. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:

1 Rollo, pp. 21-72.

2Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Associate
Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos, concurring; id. at 74-85.

3 Id. at 135-141.

4 Id. at 122-131.

5 Also referred to as Leony Carpo and Leon Carpio in other pleadings and documents.

6 Records, p. 232.

7 Also referred to as Asuncion Pastolero in other pleadings and documents.

8 CA rollo, pp. 213-214.

9 Also referred to as Otilla and Otelia Sta. Ana-de la Cruz and Ofelia de la Cruz in other pleadings and documents.

10 In a handwritten affidavit dated July 18, 1985, Leon attested, to wit:

"Ito ay bilang pagpapatunay na si G. Marciano dela Cruz, aking magsasakang namumuwisan ay bayad ng lahat sa
buwis sa aking bukid na kanyang sinasaka subalit mayroon pa naging utang na Dalawampu at pito (27) cavans at
nangangako rin siya na ang nasabing utang ay babayaran niya bago sumapit ang Oktubre 31/85.

Sa katunayan ay lumagda kaming dalawa sa ibaba nito bilang pag-sangayon." (Records, p. 110)

11 Id. at 3-6.

12 Id. at 7-11.

13 Notice of Appeal dated January 6, 1994; id. at 220.

14 Rollo, p. 117.

15 Id. at 86-116.

16 Id. at 119-120.

17 CA-G.R. 05886-R, March 10, 1977.

18 Petitioner's Memorandum dated August 5, 2005; rollo, pp. 302-364.

19 Respondents' Comment dated November 16, 2004; id. at 189-247 (with annexes).

20 Per record, the first written notice sent by Marciano was dated April 20, 1987 essentially stating that Leon may
get the lease rentals worth P10,000.00 from Marciano's residence until May 4, 1987. If Leon failed to get said
rentals before said date, said amount would be deposited in the Republic Planters Bank-Sta. Rosa Laguna Branch
under Leon's name. The second written notice was dated October 1, 1987 essentially stating that if Leon or any of
his representatives failed to get the lease rentals on or before October 15, 1987, Marciano would sell the palay due
to Leon and deposit the proceeds thereof in the same bank under Leon's name. (Records, pp. 115-116.)

21 TSN, March 5, 1990, p. 14.

22 Rollo, pp. 469-501.

23 CA rollo, p. 103.

24 Respondents' Memorandum filed on October 18, 2005; rollo, pp. 383-425.

25 Id. at 119-120.

26 Id. at 86-116.
27 Respondents' Opposition to the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review dated August 4, 2004; id.
at 14-17.

28 Id. at 3-7.

29 Respondents' Supplement to the Memorandum dated June 13, 2007; id. (unpaged).

30 Id. at 8-10.

31Land Bank of the Philippines v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 160395, May 7, 2008, citing Great
Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, 452 SCRA 422 (2005) and Barnes v. Padilla, 461 SCRA 533
(2005).

32G.R. No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348, 364, citing Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633, 643
(2005).

33 Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 828, 843.

34Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005 468 SCRA 471, 483-484, citing
Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena, 438 SCRA 259, 262-263 (2004).

35 G.R. No. 163285, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 30, 40.

36 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Section 1, Item No. 1.4.

37Moraga v. Somo, G.R. No. 166781, September 5, 2006, 501 SCRA 118, 133-134, citing Mon v. Court of Appeals,
427 SCRA 165, 171-172 (2004), Bernas v. Court of Appeals, 225 SCRA 119, 129 (1993), and Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Franco, 471 SCRA 74, 93 (2005).

38 Roxas & Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106, 154.

39 Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. NOS. 166143-47, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 352, 373.

40Entitled "An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines,
Including the Abolition of Tenancy and the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary
Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds therefor and for other purposes;" which took effect on August 8, 1963.

41 Mon v. Court of Appeals; supra note 37, at 177.

42 Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas, G.R. No. 145568, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 203, 212.

43G.R. No. L-16963, April 26, 1961, 1 SCRA 1106, 1108, citing Section 50 (c), Republic Act 1199 and Paz, et al. v.
Santos, et al., L-12047, September 30, 1959 (unreported - 106 Phil. 1161).

44 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, Copyright © 1993.

45 Id.

46 Records, p. 112.

47 Supra note 20.

48 Records, p. 119.

49 Id. at 120 and 122.

50 Id. at 121.

-==========================-

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 179643, June 03, 2013

ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO MARIANO, ANDRES MARIANO AND DOROTEO

GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION
 BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the November 28, 2006 decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89365. The assailed decision affirmed the February 21, 2005 decision3 of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 10051. The DARAB ruling, in
turn, reversed the decision4 dated October 27, 1999 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Nueva Ecija granting the petition for ejectment and collection of back lease rentals filed by petitioner Emesto L.
Natividad against respondents Fernando Mariano, Andres Mariano and Doroteo Garcia.

The Factual Antecedents

At the core of the dispute in this case is a 66,997 square meter parcel of agricultural land (subject property) situated
in Sitio Balanti, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, owned and registered in the name of Esperanza Yuzon under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-15747. The respondents are the tenants of the subject
property.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 23, 1998, Ernesto filed with the PARAD a petition6 for ejectment and collection of back lease rentals
against the respondents. In his petition, Ernesto alleged that he purchased the subject property in a public auction
held on July 17, 1988. Immediately after the purchase, he verbally demanded that the respondents pay the lease
rentals. Despite his repeated demands, the respondents refused to pay, prompting him to orally request the
respondents to vacate the subject property. He filed the petition when the respondents refused his demand to
vacate.

Although duly served with summons, the respondents failed to answer Ernesto's petition and were deemed to have
waived their right to present evidence. The PARAD allowed the case to proceed ex parte.

The PARAD granted Ernesto's petition in its October 27, 1999 decision, and ordered the respondents to vacate the
subject property and to pay the lease rentals in arrears. The PARAD found merit in Ernesto's unrebutted
allegations.

The respondents did not appeal the decision despite due notice.7 Thus, the PARAD's decision became final and
executory, and on April 6, 2000, the PARAD granted Ernesto's motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On May 4, 2000, the respondents, through a private law firm, filed an Appearance and Petition for Relief from
Judgment9(first petition) on the ground of excusable negligence. The respondents claimed that their inexperience
and lack of knowledge of agrarian reform laws and the DARAB Rules of Procedure prevented them from appearing
before the PARAD in due course; these also led to their belated discovery of the approved Barangay Committee for
Land Production (BCLP) valuation. They cited these reasons as their excusable negligence justifying the grant of the
relief from judgment prayed for.

In answer to Ernesto's allegations, the respondents denied knowledge of Ernesto's purchase of the subject property
and, alternatively, disputed the validity of the purchase. They averred that they had been paying lease rentals to the
landowner. In support of their position, the respondents attached copies of rental payment receipts 10 for the crop
years 1988-1998 issued by Corazon Quiambao and Laureano Quiambao, the authorized representatives of Aurora
Yuzon.11 They added that Diego Mariano, the father of respondents Andres and Fernando, and respondent Doroteo
were issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) on July 28, 1973.12 Andres and Fernando added that, as heirs of
Diego, they are now the new beneficiaries or allocatees of the lots covered by Diego's CLT.13 Finally, the respondents
pointed out that as of the year 2000, they have an approved valuation report issued by the BCLP.

On June 7, 2000, the PARAD denied the respondents' first petition, finding no sufficient basis for its grant. 14 The
PARAD declared that none of the grounds for the grant of a petition for relief exists and can be invoked against its
October 27, 1999 decision, or could have prevented the respondents from taking an appeal. The records show that
the respondents were duly notified of the scheduled hearing date and of the issuance of its decision; despite due
notices, the respondents failed to appear and to appeal, for which reasons the decision became final. Lastly, the
PARAD considered that the respondents' petition had been filed out of time. On July 13, 2000, the PARAD
denied15 the respondents' motion for reconsideration of the June 7, 2000 order.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 23, 2000, the respondents, this time represented by the Agrarian Legal Assistance, Litigation Division of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), filed a second Petition for Relief from Judgment (second petition).17 The
respondents repeated the allegations in their first petition, but added lack of sufficient financial means as the
reason that prevented them from seeking appropriate legal assistance.

On July 20, 2000, the PARAD denied the respondents' second petition based on technical grounds. When the
PARAD denied their subsequent motion for reconsideration,18 the respondents appealed to the
DARAB.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Ruling of the DARAB

On February 21, 2005, the DARAB granted the respondents' appeal and reversed the PARAD's October 27, 1999
decision.20 The DARAB ordered Ernesto to maintain the respondents in the peaceful possession and cultivation of
the subject property, and at the same time ordered the respondents to pay the rentals in arrears as computed by
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). Unlike the PARAD, the DARAB found the evidence insufficient to
support Ernesto's allegation that the respondents did not pay the lease rentals. The respondents' respective receipts
of payment, the DARAB noted, controverted Ernesto's claim.

Ernesto appealed the February 21, 2005 DARAB decision to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Ruling of the CA

In its November 28, 2006 decision, the CA denied Ernesto's petition for review for lack of merit.22 The CA declared
that Ernesto failed to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence the respondents' failure to pay the lease
rentals and, in fact, never repudiated the authority of Corazon and Laureano to receive rental payments from the
respondents. The CA ruled that under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, once a leasehold relationship is
established, the landowner-lessor is prohibited from ejecting a tenant-lessee unless authorized by the court for
causes provided by law. While non-payment of lease rentals is one of the enumerated causes, the landowner
(Ernesto) bears the burden of proving that: (1) the tenant did not pay the rentals; and (2) the tenant did not suffer
crop failure pursuant to Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844. As Ernesto failed to prove these elements, no lawful cause
existed for the ejectment of the respondents as tenants.

The CA also declared that the DARAB did not err in taking cognizance of the respondents' appeal and in admitting
mere photocopies of the respondents' receipts of their rental payments. The CA held that the DARAB Rules of
Procedure and the provisions of R. A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) specifically
authorize the DARAB to ascertain the facts of every case and to decide on the merits without regard to the law's
technicalities. The CA added that the attendant facts and the respondents' substantive right to security of tenure
except the case from the application of the doctrine of immutability of judgments.

Finally, the CA noted that the issues Ernesto raised were factual in nature. It was bound by these findings since
the findings of the DARAB were supported by substantial evidence.

Ernesto filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration23 in its August 10, 2007
resolution.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarycralaw lawlibrary

The Petition

Ernesto imputes on the CA the following reversible errors: first, the finding that he authorized Corazon and
Laureano to receive the respondents' lease rentals on his behalf; second, the conclusion that the respondents
cannot be ejected since they were excused from paying lease rentals to him for lack of knowledge of the legality of
the latter's acquisition of the subject property; and third, the ruling that the final and fully executed decision of the
PARAD could still be reopened or modified.

Ernesto argues that the respondents' admission in their pleadings and the rental receipts, which they submitted to
prove payment, evidently show that the respondents paid the lease rentals to Corazon and Laureano as
representatives of Esperanza and not as his representatives.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ernesto further insists that the respondents cannot deny knowledge of the legality of his acquisition of the subject
property and are, therefore, not excused from paying the lease rentals to him. He claims that the respondents had
long since known that he is the new owner of the subject property when the petition for the annulment of the levy
and execution sale, which the respondents filed against him, was decided in his favor.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, Ernesto claims that the CA erred in disregarding the doctrine of immutability of final judgments simply on
the respondents' feigned ignorance of the rules of procedure and of the free legal assistance offered by the DARAB.
Ernesto maintains that despite due receipt of their respective copies of the PARAD's decision, the respondents
nevertheless still failed to seek reconsideration of or to appeal the PARAD's decision. Ernesto concludes that the
respondents' inaction rendered the PARAD's decision final and fully executed, barring its reopening or
modification.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarycralaw lawlibrary

The Case for the Respondents

In their comment,28 the respondents maintain that Ernesto's purchase of the subject property is null and void. The
respondents contend that both Diego and Doroteo acquired rights over the subject property when they were granted
a CLT in 1973.29 Ernesto's subsequent purchase of the subject property via the execution sale cannot work to
defeat such rights as any sale of property covered by a CLT violates the clear and express mandate of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, i.e., that title to land acquired pursuant to the Act is not transferable.30 In fact, when -
through the PARAD's final decision - he ejected the respondents from the subject property, Ernesto also violated
R.A. No. 6657.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The respondents further contend that the doctrine of immutability of judgments does not apply where substantive
rights conferred by law are impaired, such as the situation obtaining in this case. The courts' power to suspend or
disregard rules justified the action taken by the DARAB (as well as the CA in affirming the former) in altering the
decision of the PARAD although it had been declared final.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lastly, the respondents posit that the CA did not err in upholding the DARAB's ruling since the findings of facts of
quasi-judicial bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, bind the
CA.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarycralaw lawlibrary

The Issue

The case presents to us the core issue of whether Ernesto had sufficient cause to eject the respondents from the
subject property.cralaw lawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the petition.

Preliminary considerations

As a preliminary matter, we reiterate the rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court shall raise only questions of law.34 A question that invites a review of the factual findings of the lower
tribunals or bodies is beyond the scope of this Court's power of review35 and generally justifies the dismissal of the
petition.

The Court, as a rule, observes this Rule 45 proscription as this Court is not a trier of facts.36 The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower tribunals or bodies whose findings, when duly supported by substantial
evidence and affirmed by the CA, bind this Court.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The reviewable question sanctioned by a Rule 45 petition is one that lies solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.38 In the present petition, Ernesto essentially argues that the CA erred in ruling that he
failed to sufficiently prove any cause to eject the respondents from the subject property. In effect, Ernesto asks this
Court to re-examine and re-evaluate the probative weight of the evidence on record. These are factual inquiries
beyond the reach of this petition.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under exceptional circumstances, however, we have deviated from the above rules. In the present case, the PARAD
gave credit to Ernesto's claim that the respondents did not pay the lease rentals. The DARAB, in contrast, found
Ernesto's claim unsubstantiated. This conflict in the factual conclusions of the PARAD and the DARAB on the
alleged non-payment by the respondents of the lease rentals is one such exception to the rule that only questions of
law are to be resolved in a Rule 45 petition.40 Thus, we set aside the above rules under the circumstances of this
case, and resolve it on the merits.

On the issue of the DARAB's grant of the respondents' appeal;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Doctrine of immutability of judgments

We cannot blame Ernesto for insisting that the PARAD decision can no longer be altered. The doctrine of
immutability of final judgments, grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice, is well
settled. Indeed, once a decision has attained finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect,41 whether the modification is to be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land.42 The doctrine holds true even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law.43 The judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must, on some definite date fixed
by law, become final even at the risk of occasional errors.44 The only accepted exceptions to this general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution
unjust and inequitable.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This doctrine of immutability of judgments notwithstanding, we are not persuaded that the DARAB and the CA
erred in reopening, and ruling on the merits of the case. The broader interests of justice and equity demand that we
set aside procedural rules as they are, after all, intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice. 46 If the
rigid and pedantic application of procedural norms would frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court always
has the power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation,47 particularly if defects of
jurisdiction appear to be present. This is the precise situation that we presently find before this Court.

In the present petition, the DARAB granted the respondents' appeal, despite the lapse of ten months from the
respondents' notice of the PARAD's decision, because the PARAD denied the respondents' petition for relief from
judgment simply on a sweeping declaration that none of the grounds for the grant of the petition exists and that the
petition had been filed out of time. The records, however, sufficiently contradict the PARAD's reasons for denying
the respondents' petition for relief; not only do we find justifiable grounds for its grant, we also find that the
respondents filed their petition well within the prescriptive period. Thus, the PARAD effectively and gravely abused
its discretion and acted without jurisdiction in denying the petition for relief from judgment.

A petition for relief from the judgment of the PARAD is governed by Section 4, Rule IX of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure48 (the governing DARAB rules at the time Ernesto filed his complaint). It reads in
part:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SECTION 4. Relief from Judgment. A petition for relief from judgment must be verified and must be based on
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable neglect x x x; Provided, that the petition is filed with the
Adjudicator a quo within three (3) months from the time the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect was
discovered and six (6) months from notice of order, resolution or decision from which relief is sought[.] [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]

A reading of Section 4 shows that four grounds justify the grant of the petition for relief from judgment, namely:
fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence. The same provision also presents two periods that must be
observed for such grant — 90 days and six months.

In their first and second petitions, the respondents invoked the ground of excusable negligence. They alleged that
they failed to appear before the PARAD due to their inexperience and ignorance of agrarian reform laws and of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure, as well as indigence. These circumstances — their averred ignorance coupled with
financial constraints if not outright poverty - taken altogether sufficiently convince us that the respondents'
negligence is more than excusable and constitutes a justifiable ground for the grant of their petition for relief.

We are also convinced that the respondents complied with the twin period requirement set by Section 4, Rule IX of
the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. First, the records show that the respondents received a copy of the PARAD's
October 27, 1999 decision on December 10, 1999, at the earliest; they filed their first petition on May 4, 2000 or
five months after. Second, following our above discussion that the respondents had sufficiently shown grounds for
the grant of their petition, we perforce count the 90-day period from the respondents' discovery of their excusable
negligence. We construe this date as the time when the respondents discovered the adverse consequence of their
failure to answer, seek reconsideration or appeal the PARAD's decision, which was when they were evicted from the
subject property on June 9, 200049 or 35 days before they filed their first petition. Clearly, the respondents filed
their petition well within 6 months from their notice of the PARAD's decision and within 90 days from the discovery
of their excusable negligence.

Based on these considerations, we are convinced that the DARAB did not err in granting the respondents' appeal
despite the procedural lapses. Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure,50 the DARAB and its
adjudicators "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court,
but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity." The
same provision is essentially embodied in R.A. No. 3844 upon which Ernesto heavily relied. In our view,
considerations of equity, justice and jurisdiction surround this case, justifying the relaxation of the rules and the
DARAB's grant of the respondents' appeal.

In sum, we rule that the DARAB correctly allowed the respondents' appeal despite the lapse of the reglementary
period. Accordingly, we cannot impute error on the CA in not reversing the DARAB's decision simply under the
doctrine of immutability of judgments.

Non-payment of lease rentals as ground for eviction of tenants;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Landowner with burden to prove sufficient cause for eviction

Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844 ordains that once the tenancy relationship is established, a tenant or agricultural lessee
is entitled to security of tenure.51 Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 strengthens this right by providing that the
agricultural lessee has the right to continue the enjoyment and possession of the landholding and shall not be
disturbed in such possession except only upon court authority in a final and executory judgment, after due notice
and hearing, and only for the specifically enumerated causes.52 The subsequent R.A. No. 6657 further reiterates,
under its Section 6, that the security of tenure previously acquired shall be respected. Finally, in order to protect
this right, Section 37 of R.A. No. 3844 rests the burden of proving the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment
of the agricultural lessee on the agricultural lessor.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ernesto's petition for ejectment against the respondents was anchored precisely on the latter's alleged non-payment
of the lease rentals beginning 1988 until 1998 despite his repeated verbal demands. When confronted with the
respondents' defense of due payment with supporting documentary evidence of it, Ernesto countered that their
payments should not be considered as he did not authorize Corazon and Laureano to receive the payments on his
behalf.

These allegations pose to us three essential points that we need to address. First, whether Ernesto indeed made
demands on the respondents for the payment of the lease rentals; second, assuming that Ernesto made such
demands, whether the respondents deliberately failed or continuously refuse to pay the lease rentals; and third,
whether the lease rentals paid by the respondents to Corazon and Laureano are valid.

We rule in the NEGATIVE on the first point.

Our review of the records shows that Ernesto did not present any evidence, such as the affidavit of the person or
persons present at that time, to prove that he demanded from the respondents the payment of the lease rentals.
We, therefore, cannot accord any merit to his claim that he made such demands. His allegation, absent any
supporting evidence, is nothing more than a hollow claim under the rule that he who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it as mere allegation is not evidence.54 Thus, Ernesto should be deemed to have made his demand only at
the time he filed the petition for ejectment before the PARAD. At this point, the respondents were not yet in delay55
and could not be deemed to have failed in the payment of their lease rentals.

We again rule in the NEGATIVE on the second point.

Non-payment of the lease rentals whenever they fall due is a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee
under paragraph 6, Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844.56 In relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
816,57deliberate refusal or continued refusal to pay the lease rentals by the agricultural lessee for a period of two (2)
years shall, upon hearing and final judgment, result in the cancellation of the CLT issued in the agricultural
lessee's favor.

The agricultural lessee's failure to pay the lease rentals, in order to warrant his dispossession of the landholding,
must be willful and deliberate and must have lasted for at least two (2) years. The term "deliberate" is characterized
by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences, while the term
"willful" is defined, as one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason. 58Mere failure of
an agricultural lessee to pay the agricultural lessor's share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the
former absent a deliberate intent on the part of the agricultural lessee to pay.59chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the present petition, we do not find the respondents' alleged non- payment of the lease rentals sufficient to
warrant their dispossession of the subject property. The respondents' alleged non-payment did not last for the
required two-year period. To reiterate our discussion above, the respondents' rental payments were not yet due and
the respondents were not in default at the time Ernesto filed the petition for ejectment as Ernesto failed to prove his
alleged prior verbal demands. Additionally, assuming arguendo that the respondents failed to pay the lease rentals,
we do not consider the failure to be deliberate or willful. The receipts on record show that the respondents had paid
the lease rentals for the years 1988-1998. To be deliberate or willful, the non-payment of lease rentals must be
absolute, i.e., marked by complete absence of any payment. This cannot be said of the respondents' case. Hence,
without any deliberate and willful refusal to pay lease rentals for two years, the respondents' ejectment from the
subject property, based on this ground, is baseless and unjustified.
Finally, we rule in the AFFIRMATIVE on the third point.

Ernesto purchased the subject property in 1988. However, he only demanded the payment of the lease rentals in
1998. All the while, the respondents had been paying the lease rentals to Corazon and Laureano. With no demand
coming from Ernesto for the payment of the lease rentals for ten years, beginning from the time he purchased the
subject property, the respondents thus cannot be faulted for continuously paying the lease rentals to Corazon and
Laureano. Ernesto should have demanded from the respondents the payment of the lease rental soon after he
purchased the subject property. His prolonged inaction, whether by intention or negligence, in demanding the
payment of the lease rentals or asserting his right to receive such rentals, at the very least, led the respondents to
consider Corazon and Laureano to still be the authorized payees of the lease rentals, given the absence of any
objection on his part.

Import of the respondents' CLT

Diego and respondent Doroteo were undoubtedly awarded CLTs over the subject property pursuant to P.D. No. 27.
Thus, we agree with their position that they have acquired rights over the subject property and are in fact deemed
owners of it.

A CLT is a document that evidences an agricultural lessee's inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily
devoted to rice and corn production.60 It is the provisional title of ownership61 issued to facilitate the agricultural
lessee's acquisition of ownership over the landholding. The transfer of the landholding to the agricultural lessee
under P.D. No. 27 is accomplished in two stages: (1) issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR
transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is a "deemed owner"; and
(2) issuance of an Emancipation Patent as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the
annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer- beneficiary.62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CLTs of Diego and of respondent Doroteo were issued in 1973. Thus, as of 1973, Diego and respondent Doroteo
were deemed the owners of the subject property pursuant to P.D. No. 27, but subject to the compliance with certain
conditions and requirements, one of which was the full payment of the monthly amortization or lease rentals to
acquire absolute ownership.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the event the tenant-farmer defaults in the payment of the amortization, P.D. No. 27 ordains that the
amortization due shall be paid by the farmer's cooperative where the defaulting tenant-farmer is a member, with
the cooperative having a right of recourse against the farmer. Thus, if the tenant-farmer defaults, the landowner is
assured of payment since the farmers' cooperative will assume the obligation. In the present petition, the records
show that the respondents were members of a Samahang Nayon. Pursuant to P.D. No. 27, Ernesto should have
claimed the unpaid lease rentals or amortizations from the respondents' Samahang Nayon.

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, issued on July 17, 1987, modified P.D. No. 27 on the manner of payment and
provided for different modes of payment of the value of the land to the landowner. The pertinent portion
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SECTION 3. Compensation shall be paid to the landowners in any of the following modes, at the option of the
landowners:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(a) Bond payment over ten (10) years, with ten percent (10%) of the value of the land payable immediately in cash,
and the balance in the form of LBP bonds[;]

(b) Direct payment in cash or in kind by the farmer-beneficiaries with the terms to be mutually agreed upon by the
beneficiaries and landowners and subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform; and

(c) Other modes of payment as may be prescribed or approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council.
[emphases supplied]

In the event a dispute arises between the landowner and the tenant-farmer on the amount of the lease rentals,
Section 2 of E.O. No. 228 provides that the DAR and the concerned BCLP shall resolve the dispute. In any case, the
Land Bank of the Philippines shall still process the payment of the landowner's compensation claim, which it shall
hold in trust for the landowner, pending resolution of the dispute. Thus, under this scheme, as with P.D. No. 27,
the landowner is assured of payment of the full value of the land under E.O. No. 228.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 6657 on June 10, 1988, the manner and the mode of payment were further
modified with the options available to the landowner, provided as follows:

"SECTION 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — x x x

xxxx

(1) Cash payment, x x x;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other
qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

(4) LBP bonds[.]" (emphases ours; italics supplied)

Following these guarantees to the landowner under P.D. No. 27 and E.O No. 228, as well as R.A. No. 6657, the
clear rule is that notwithstanding the non-payment of the amortization to the landowner, the tenant-farmer retains
possession of the landholding.64 In addition, we point out that under P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657, the transfer or
waiver of the landholding acquired by virtue of P.D. No. 27 is prohibited, save only by hereditary succession or to
the Government; effectively, reversion of the landholding to the landholder is absolutely proscribed. In light of this
decree, we hold that the DARAB correctly reversed the decision of the PARAD, which ordered the respondents to
surrender the possession of the subject property to Ernesto as this was in clear contravention of the objectives of
the agrarian reform laws.

Nevertheless, we cannot agree with the DARAB's ruling that the MARO should assist the parties in executing a new
leasehold contract. To recall, Diego and respondent Doroteo are valid holders of CLTs. Also, as of the year 2000, the
concerned BCLP has already issued an approved valuation for the subject property. Under these circumstances, the
proper procedure is for Ernesto and the DAR to agree on the manner of processing the compensation payment for
the subject property. Hence, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 228, in relation to Department Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and the related issuances and regulation of the DAR, we must remand the case to
the DAR for the proper determination of the manner and mode of payment of the full value of the subject property
to Ernesto.

As a final note, we observe that on April 11, 1988, Diego waived his right over the 3-hectare.lot covered by his CLT
(which formed part of the subject property) in favor of his two sons, Andres and Fernando, with each obtaining an
equal half interest. This arrangement directly contravenes Ministry Memorandum Circular No.19, series of 1978.
This memorandum circular specifically proscribes the partition of the landholding; should the farmer-beneficiary
have several heirs, as in this case, the ownership and cultivation of the landholding must ultimately be
consolidated in one heir who possesses the requisite qualifications.65 Thus, under paragraph 2 of the memorandum
circular, Andres and Fernando must agree on one of them to be the sole owner and cultivator of the lot covered by
Diego's CLT.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated November 28,
2006 and the resolution dated August 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp No. 89365. Petitioner
Ernesto L. Natividad is ORDERED to immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents,
and the DARAB is directed to ensure the immediate restoration of possession of the subject property to the
respondents. We REMAND the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the: (1) proper determination of the
manner and mode of payment of the full value of the land to petitioner Emesto L. Natividad in accordance with R.A.
No. 6657, Executive Order No. 228, Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other related
issuances and regulation of the Department of Agrarian Reform; and (2) proper determination of the successor-in-
interest of Diego Mariano as the farmer-beneficiary to the landholding covered by his CLT, in accordance with the
provisions of Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1978. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, ** JJ., concur.

Brion,* (Acting Chairperson).

Endnotes:

* In lieu of Associate JusticAntonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 1460 dated May 9, 2013.

**Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 1461 dated May
29, 2013.

1Rollo, pp. 24-42.

2Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, and Concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. de
Leon and Ramon R. Garcia; id. at 7-20.

The August 10, 2007 resolution of the CA denied for lack of merit Ernesto's subsequent motion for reconsideration;
id. at 60.

3 Penned by DARAB Member Augusto P. Quijano; id. at 194-199.

4Decision rendered by Adjudicator Napoleon D. Baguilat; id. at 96-99.

5 Id. at 195.

6 Id. at 90-94.

7 Per the Certification dated April 5, 2000 issued by the PARAD; CA rollo, p. 47.

8 Writ of Execution; rollo, pp. 101-102.

9 Dated May 2, 2000; id at 103-105.

10 Id. at 107-126.

11 Referring to Esperanza; rollo, p. 9. She is also referred to as Nanang Anzang Yuzon.

12Diego Mariano was granted CLT No. 0-049335 covering an area of 3 hectares, more or less; id at 191. While
respondent Doroteo was granted CLT Nos. 0-049016 and 0-049017, covering 2.23 and 0.74 hectares, respectively;
CA rollo, pp. 170-172.
13 Per the November 21, 1990 order of the DAR- Region III; "Kasunduan sa Pananakahan" executed by Diego in
favor of his sons, respondents Andres and Fernando; and letter of consent executed by Esperanza; CA rollo, pp. 75-
77.

14Rollo, pp. 130-132.

15 Id. at 137.

16 Dated June 26, 2000; id. at 134-136.

17 Dated June 22, 2000; id. at 138-142.

18Id. at 143-145. The PARAD denied this motion for reconsideration per the order dated September 6, 2000; id. at
146-148.

19 Notice of Appeal dated October 1, 2000, rollo, pp. 149-150.

20Supra, note 3.

21 CA rollo, pp. 15-34.

22Supra, note 2.

23 CA rollo, pp. 233-251.

24Supra, note 2.

25Rollo, pp. 32-34.

26Id. at 34-36. June 28, 1993 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 35, on the
respondents' petition for the annulment of the levy and execution sale; id. at 80-89.

27 Id. at 36-41.

28 Id. at 165-174.

29Supra, note 12.

30Rollo, pp. 167-170.

31 Id. at 170.

32 Id. at 170-171.

33 Id. at 171-172.

34Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil. 119, 132 (2002); and Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 422
Phil. 675, 682 (2001).

35See NGEI Multi-Purpose Cooperative Inc., et al. v. Filipinas Palmoil Plantation Inc., et al., G.R. NO. 184950, October
11, 2012; and Pascual v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 682. See also Esquivel v. Atty. Reyes, 457 Phil. 509, 515-517
(2003).

36Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 562, 575 (2006).

37 Ibid. Maylem v. Ellano, G.R. NO. 162721, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 440, 448-449.

38 See Cando v. Sps. Olazo, 547 Phil. 630, 636 (2007).

39 See National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, G.R. NO. 180979, December 15, 2010; 638 SCRA 660, 666.

40 See Esquivel v. Atty. Reyes, supra note 35, at 516.

41Berboso v. Court of Appeals, 527 Phil. 167, 189 (2006).

42Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R. NO. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406, 418.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. Sofio v. Valenzuela, G.R. NO. 157810, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 55, 65.

45Mercado v. Mercado, G.R. NO. 178672, March 19, 2009, 582 SCRA 11, 16-17.

46Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, supra note 42, at 418-419.

47 Ibid.

48 Now Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVI of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
49 Per the Implementation Report dated June 13, 2000; rollo, p. 133.

50 Also Section 3, Rule I of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

51 See Galope v. Bugarin, G.R. NO. 185669, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 733, 740.

52Sta.
Ana v. Carpo, G.R. NO. 164340, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 463-485. See also Perez- Rosario v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 36, at 576-577.

53 See Galope v. Bugarin, supra note 51, at 739-740; and Pascual v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 34, at 683.

54Concerned Citizen v. Divina, A.M. NO. P-07-2369, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 167, 176.

55 Article 1169 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The pertinent portion reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation." (emphasis ours)

56 Section 36(6) of R.A. No. 3844 reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions — x x x

xxxx

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop
is not thereby extinguished[.]" (emphasis and italics supplied)

57Presidential Decree No. 816 promulgated on October 21, 1975, entitled "PROVIDING THAT TENANT-
FARMERS/AGRICULTURAL LESSEES SHALL PAY THE LEASEHOLD RENTALS WHEN THEY FALL DUE AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR."

58Sta.
Ana v. Carpo, supra note 52, at 485-486; and Antonio v. Manahan, G.R. NO. 176091, August 24, 2011, 656
SCRA 190, 200.

59Sta.Ana v. Carpo, supra note 52, at 485, citing Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al., G.R. NO. L-16963, April 26,
1961, 1 SCRA 1106, 1108. See also Antonio v. Manahan, supra, at 199-200.

[60Del Castillo v. Orciga, 532 Phil. 204, 214 (2006).

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63Coruña v. Cinamin, 518 Phil. 649, 662 (2006).

64Del Castillo v. Orciga, supra note 60, at 218.

65 See Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19-78. The pertinent portion reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"1. Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation Land Transfer, shall be governed by the pertinent
provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines subject to the following limitations:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a. The farmholding shall not be petitioned or fragmented.

b. The ownership and cultivation of the farmholding shall ultimately be consolidated in one heir who
possesses the following qualifications:

(1) being a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

(2) capable of personally cultivating the farmholding; and
(3) willing to assume the obligations and responsibilities of a tenant-beneficiary." (emphasis ours)

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