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G.R. No. 216607. April 5, 2016. *

 
ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IMELDA E. FRAGATA, and
KRYSTLE MARIE C. BACANI, respondents.

Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy;

Disqualification of Candidates; As the Supreme Court (SC) has earlier
observed in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 574 SCRA 782 (2008),
members of the bench and the bar have “indiscriminately interchanged” the
remedies of a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy
(CoC) and a petition for disqualification, thus “adding confusion to the
already difficult state of our jurisprudence on election laws.”—As this
Court has earlier observed in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 574
SCRA 782 (2008), members of the bench and the bar have “indiscriminately
interchanged” the remedies of a petition to deny due course or cancel
certificate of candidacy

_______________

*  EN BANC.

 
 

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and a petition for disqualification, thus “adding confusion to the

already difficult state of our jurisprudence on election laws.” The remedies,
however, have different grounds and periods for their filing. The remedies
have different legal consequences.
Same; Same; Misrepresentation; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of

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certificates of candidacy (CoCs). However, under Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code, the Commission may deny due course or cancel a CoC
through a verified petition filed exclusively on the ground that “any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false.”—The Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of certificates of candidacy. However, under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Commission may deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy through a verified petition filed
exclusively on the ground that “any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false.” The “material representation”
referred to in Section 78 is that which involves the eligibility or qualification
for the office sought by the person who filed the certificate. Section 78 must,
therefore, be read “in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office.” Moreover, the false
representation “must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” A
person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run. The
candidate must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under
the law. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his Dissenting Opinion in
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 (1995),
“that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as
a candidate for a public office and vice versa.”
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Apart from the grounds
provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code as well as in Section 40 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) may likewise be raised in a petition for disqualification.—Apart from
the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code as well as in

 
 

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Section 40 of the Local Government Code may likewise be raised in a

petition for disqualification.
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; A petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy (CoC) may likewise be filed
against a permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an elective post in
the Philippines on the ground of material misrepresentation in the CoC.—
Private respondent Fragata alleges in her Petition that petitioner is a
permanent resident in the United States, a green card holder who, prior to

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the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor, has resided in the
State of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors her Petition on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, which disqualifies permanent residents of a
foreign country from running for any elective local position. It is true that
under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their
certificates of candidacy declare that they are not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country. Therefore, a petition to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy may likewise be filed against a permanent
resident of a foreign country seeking an elective post in the Philippines on
the ground of material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a petition for disqualification “shall
be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
(CoCs), but not later than the date of proclamation.”—Before the
Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing
either a petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy or a petition for disqualification. In her Petition, private
respondent Fragata did not argue that petitioner made a false material
representation in her Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner
was a permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor under Section 40
of the Local Government Code. Private respondent Fragata’s Petition,
therefore, was a petition for disqualification. It follows that private
respondent Fragata timely filed her Petition before the Commission on
Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission, a petition for disqualification “shall be filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of
proclamation.” Private respondent Fragata filed her Petition on the date of
petitioner’s proclamation on May 15, 2013.

 
 

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The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in

taking cognizance of private respondent Fragata’s Petition.
Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; Petitioner cannot claim
that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the Oath of
Allegiance.—Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American
citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the
sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate
requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to
run for public office. In Jacot v. Dal, 572 SCRA 295 (2008): [T]he oath of
allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially

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similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance
is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship. With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the
time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. Under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was disqualified to run for
Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and
Local Elections.
Same; Permanent Vacancies; Words and Phrases; The permanent
vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising “when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.”—The permanent
vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising “when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.” In these
situations, the vacancies were caused by those whose certificates of
candidacy were valid at the time of the filing “but subsequently had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal

 
 
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impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of

candidacy.”
Same; Same; In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio
certificates of candidacy (CoCs), the person legally entitled to the vacant
position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of
votes among those eligible.—The rule on succession under Section 45,
however, would not apply if the permanent vacancy was caused by one
whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically with respect
to dual citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because
they possess “a substantive [disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior
to the filing of their certificate of candidacy.” Legally, they should not even
be considered candidates. The votes casted for them should be considered

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stray and should not be counted. In cases of vacancies caused by those with
void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the
vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest
number of votes among those eligible. In this case, it is private respondent
Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of Councilor, having garnered
the sixth highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The
Commission on Elections correctly proclaimed private respondent Bacani in
lieu of petitioner.
Same; Dual Citizenship; Disqualification of Candidates; Petitioner
Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified from
running for the position of Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila
during the 2013 National and Local Elections. With her dual citizenship
existing prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy (CoC), her CoC
was void ab initio.—All told, petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua is a
dual citizen correctly disqualified from running for the position of Councilor
in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local
Elections. With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, her Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio. She
was correctly considered a noncandidate. All votes casted for her were stray,
and the person legally entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle
Marie C. Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes
among the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections did not
gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua’s proclamation and
subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani.

 
 
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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Julie Ann V. Chang for petitioner.
  Hernan G. Nicdao for private respondents.

LEONEN, J.:
 
Dual citizens are disqualified from running for any elective local
position. They cannot successfully run and assume office because
their ineligibility is inherent in them, existing prior to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy. Their certificates of candidacy are
void ab initio, and votes cast for them will be disregarded.
Consequently, whoever garners the next highest number of votes

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among the eligible candidates is the person legally entitled to the

position.
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 assailing
the Commission on Elections’ Resolutions dated October 17, 20132
and January 30, 2015.3 The Commission on Elections annulled the
“proclamation of .  .  . Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua as Councilor
for the Fourth District of Manila[,]”4 and directed the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim Krystle Marie C. Bacani
(Bacani) as Councilor for having garnered the next highest number
of votes.5

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1  Rollo, pp. 3-19.

2  Id., at pp. 32-52. The Resolution was signed by Presiding Commissioner Elias
R. Yusoph and Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F. Guia
of the Second Division.
3  Id., at pp. 22-31. The Resolution was signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, Al
A. Parreño, Luie Tito F. Guia, and Arthur D. Lim of the COMELEC En Banc.
4  Id., at p. 51, COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
5  Id.

 
 

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On October 3, 2012, Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed

her Certificate of Candidacy6 for Councilor for the Fourth District of
Manila during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. The
Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six (6) seats in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.7

_______________

6  Id., at p. 100.
7  Rep. Act No. 7166 (1991), Sec. 3(c), in relation to Rep. Act No. 6636 (1987),
Sec. 2.
Rep. Act No. 7166 (1991), Sec. 3(c) provides:
Section 3. Election of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan.—The elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall
be elected as follows:
....

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c. The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod

and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and
any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed
by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636: Provided, That, the
Municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Las Piñas
and Taguig shall have twelve (12) councilors, and Pateros, ten (10): Provided, further,
That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area
into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang
Bayan as nearly as practicable according to the number of inhabitants, each
comprising a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory[.]
Rep. Act No. 6636 (1987), Sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Metro Manila Area.—For purposes of the Local Elections on January
18, 1988, the City of Manila, Quezon City and the City of Caloocan shall have six (6)
councilors for each of their representative districts who shall be residents thereof to be
elected by the qualified voters therein. The City of Pasay and the Municipalities of
Makati, Parañaque, Pasig, Marikina, and Valenzuela, each of which comprises a
representative district, shall have twelve (12) councilors each to be elected at

 
 

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After the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest

number of votes.8 She was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers
on May 15, 2013.9
On the date of Chua’s proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata
(Fragata) filed a Petition10 captioned as a “petition to declare [Chua]
as a nuisance candidate”11 and “to deny due course and/or cancel
[Chua’s] Certificate of Candidacy.”12 Fragata was allegedly a
registered voter in the Fourth District13 who claimed that Chua was
unqualified to run for Councilor on two grounds: Chua was not a
Filipino citizen, and she was a permanent resident of the United
States of America.14 Fragata specifically alleged the following in her
Petition:

3. [Chua] is not a Filipino Citizen.

4. Prior to the filing of her candidacy, [Chua] has been
living in the United States of America (USA) for at least 33
years.
5. [Chua] is an immigrant and was validly issued a Green
Card by the Government of the USA.
6. She resided and continues to reside [in Georgia, USA].
7. [Chua] has been a Registered Professional Nurse in the
State of Georgia, USA since November 17, 1990.

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_______________

large by the qualified voters of the said city or municipality. All the other
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area shall have ten (10) councilors
each, with the exception of the Municipality of Pateros which shall have eight (8)
councilors, to be elected at large by their respective qualified voters.
8   Rollo, p. 23, COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated January 30, 2015.
9   Id.
10  Id., at pp. 95-98.
11  Id., at p. 95.
12  Id.
13  Id.
14  Id., at p. 96.

 
 

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8. . . . [Chua’s] Professional License in the USA is still to

expire in 31 January 2014.15
 
The last paragraph of the Petition prayed that Chua “be
disqualified as a candidate for the position of councilor in the Fourth
District of the City of Manila[.]”16
Answering the Petition, Chua contended that she was a natural-
born Filipino, born to Filipino parents in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija.17 With respect to her residency, Chua alleged that she had
been residing in Sampaloc, Manila since 200818 and had more than
complied with the one-year period required to run for Councilor.19
According to Chua, Fragata’s Petition was belatedly filed,20
whether it was treated as one for declaration of a nuisance
candidate21 or for denial of due course or cancellation of certificate
of candidacy.22 Fragata filed her Petition on May 15,

_______________

15  Id.
16  Id., at p. 97.
17  Id., at p. 104, Verified Answer.
18  Id., at p. 118, Barangay Certification dated May 21, 2010.
19  Id., at p. 110, Verified Answer.
20  Id., at pp. 106-107.
21  COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, Rule 24,
Sec. 3 provides:

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Section 3. Period to File the Petition.—The Petition shall be filed personally or

through an authorized representative, within five (5) days from the last day for the
filing of certificates of candidacy. In case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must
be filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his certificate
of candidacy.
22  COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, Rule 23,
Sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Period to File Petition.—The Petition must be filed within five (5)
days from the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty-
five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the
Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be

 
 

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2013, which was beyond five (5) days from October 5, 2012, the
last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy.23 The Petition was
also filed beyond 25 days from October 3, 2012,24 the date Chua
filed her Certificate of Candidacy.25
Chua stressed that she had already been proclaimed on May 15,
2013, the same date that Fragata filed her Petition; hence, Fragata’s
proper remedy was to file a petition for quo warranto26 under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Chua prayed that the
Commission dismiss Fragata’s Petition.27
On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene with
Manifestation and Motion to Annul Proclamation.28 Bacani alleged
that she likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila,
and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among all
the candidates, next to Chua.29 Should Chua be disqualified, Bacani
claimed that she should be proclaimed Councilor30 following this
Court’s ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.31
Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified to
run for Councilor.32 Based on an Order of the Bureau of
Immigration, Chua was allegedly naturalized as an American

_______________

filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his certificate
of candidacy.
23  Rollo, p. 107, Verified Answer.
24  Id., at p. 100, Certificate of Candidacy.
25  Id., at p. 109, Verified Answer.
26  Id., at p. 111.

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27  Id., at p. 112.
28  Id., at pp. 133-140.
29  Id., at p. 133.
30  Id., at pp. 136-137.
31  709 Phil. 408; 696 SCRA 420 (2013) [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
32   Rollo, p. 134, Motion to Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to Annul
Proclamation.

 
 

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citizen on December 7, 1977.33 She was issued an American

passport34 on July 14, 2006.
Chua took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on September 21, 2011.35 Nonetheless, Chua allegedly
continued on using her American passport, specifically on the
following dates:

October 16, 2012         Departure for the United States

December 11, 2012     Arrival in the Philippines
May 30, 2013              Departure for the United States36

Moreover, Chua did not execute an oath of renunciation of her

American citizenship.37
With Chua being a dual citizen at the time she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy, Bacani prayed that the Commission on
Elections annul Chua’s proclamation.38
In her Comment/Opposition (to the Motion to Intervene of
Krystle Marie Bacani),39 Chua argued that the Motion was a
belatedly filed petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, having been filed after the day of the elections.40
According to Chua, the Motion should not even be considered since
she was already proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers.41 Thus,
Chua prayed that the Motion to Intervene be denied and expunged
from the records of the case.42

_______________

33  Id.
34  Id., at p. 129.
35   Id., at p. 134, Motion to Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to Annul
Proclamation.
36  Id., at p. 135.

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37  Id.
38  Id., at p. 137.
39  Id., at pp. 146-153.
40  Id., at pp. 149-152.
41  Id., at p. 151.
42  Id., at p. 152.

 
 

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The Commission on Elections then ordered the parties to file

their respective memoranda.43
In her Memorandum,44 Chua maintained that Fragata’s Petition
was filed out of time and should have been outright dismissed.45
Reiterating that she had already been proclaimed, Chua argued that
Fragata’s proper remedy was a petition for quo warranto.46
Countering Chua’s claims, Fragata and Bacani restated in their
Joint Memorandum47 that Chua was a dual citizen disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
The Commission on Elections Second Division resolved
Fragata’s Petition. Ruling that Bacani had a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, it allowed Bacani’s Motion to Intervene.48 The
Commission said that should Fragata’s Petition be granted, the votes
for Chua would not be counted.49 In effect, Bacani would garner the
sixth highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, which
would earn her a seat in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila.50
With respect to the nature of Fragata’s Petition, the Commission
on Elections held that it was one for disqualification, regardless of
the caption stating that it was a petition to declare Chua a nuisance
candidate.51 The Petition alleged a ground for disqualification under
Section 40 of the Local Gov-

_______________

43  Id., at p. 24, COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated January 30, 2015.

44  Id., at pp. 175-196.
45  Id., at p. 186.
46  Id., at pp. 190-191.
47  Id., at pp. 154-169.
48  Id., at pp. 39-41, COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated October 17,
2013.
49  Id.
50  Id.

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51  Id., at pp. 41-42.

 
 

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ernment Code,52 specifically, that Chua was a permanent resident

in the United States.
Since Fragata filed a petition for disqualification, Rule 25,
Section 3 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure
governed the period for its filing.53 Under the Rules, a petition for
disqualification should be filed “any day after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of the
proclamation.” Fragata filed the Petition within this period, having
filed it on the date of Chua’s proclamation on May 15, 2013.54
The Commission no longer discussed whether Chua was a
permanent resident of the United States. Instead, it found that Chua
was a dual citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy.55
Although she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2011 by taking
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, petitioner
failed to take a sworn and personal renunciation of her American
citizenship required under Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003.56
Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission held that
Chua was disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of
the Local Government Code.57 Consequently, Chua’s Certificate of
Candidacy was void ab initio, and all votes casted for her were
stray.58 Chua’s proclamation was likewise voided, and per
Maquiling, Bacani was declared to have garnered the sixth highest
number of votes.59

_______________

52  Id.
53  Id.
54  Id., at p. 42, COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
55  Id., at p. 46.
56  Id., at pp. 43-44.
57  Id., at pp. 50-51.
58  Id., at p. 51.
59  Id., at pp. 47-51.

 
 

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Thus, in the Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Commission

on Elections Second Division ruled in favor of Fragata and Bacani.60
The dispositive portion of the October 17, 2013 Resolution reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
(Second Division) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVED:
1. To ANNUL the proclamation of respondent Arlene
Llena Empaynado Chua as Councilor for the Fourth District
of Manila;
2. To DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Manila to CONVENE and PROCLAIM Intervenor Krystle
Marie C. Bacani as the duly elected Councilor of the Fourth
District of the City of Manila, having obtained the sixth
highest number of votes for said position.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations
implement this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.61

Chua moved for reconsideration,62 but the Commission on

Elections En Banc denied the Motion in the Resolution dated
January 30, 2015.
Arguing that the Commission issued its October 17, 2013 and
January 30, 2015 Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion, Chua
filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.63 Fragata and Bacani jointly filed their
Comment,64 while the Commission

_______________

60  Id., at p. 51.
61  Id.
62  Id., at pp. 53-69.
63  Id., at pp. 3-4, Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
64  Id., at pp. 205-215.

 
 

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Chua vs. Commission on Elections

on Elections filed its Comment65 through the Office of the

Solicitor General.
Chua emphasizes that she was already proclaimed as a duly
elected Councilor.66 Assuming that she was ineligible to run for
office, this created a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which was to be filled according to the rule on
succession under Section 45 of the Local Government Code, and not
by proclamation of the candidate who garnered the next highest
number of votes.67
Chua maintains that Fragata belatedly filed her Petition before
the Commission on Elections.68 Since Fragata filed a Petition to
deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy, it should have
been filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than 25 days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy assailed.69 Fragata filed the
Petition on May 15, 2013, more than 25 days after Chua filed her
Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012.70 The Commission on
Elections, therefore, should have outright dismissed Fragata’s
Petition.71
With her already proclaimed, Chua argues that the Commission
on Elections should have respected the voice of the people.72 Chua
prays that the Resolutions annulling her proclamation and
subsequently proclaiming Bacani be set aside.73
As for Fragata and Bacani as well as the Commission on
Elections, all maintain that Fragata’s Petition was a petition for
disqualification assailing Chua’s citizenship and status as

_______________

65  Id., at pp. 219-238.

66  Id., at p. 13, Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
67  Id., at pp. 9-11.
68  Id., at p. 11.
69  Id., at p. 13.
70  Id.
71  Id.
72  Id., at pp. 13-15.
73  Id., at pp. 16-17.

 
 

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a permanent resident in the United States.74 The Petition, which

Fragata filed on the date of Chua’s proclamation, was filed within
the reglementary period.75
The Commission on Elections stresses that Chua was a dual
citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy.76
Consequently, she was ineligible to run for Councilor and was
correctly considered a noncandidate.77 All the votes casted in Chua’s
favor were correctly disregarded, resulting in Bacani garnering the
next highest number of votes.78 Following Maquiling, the
Commission argues that Bacani was validly proclaimed as
Councilor, and, contrary to Chua’s claim, the rule on succession
under Section 45 of the Local Government Code did not apply, with
the disqualifying circumstance existing prior to the filing of the
Certificate of Candidacy.79
Although Chua was already proclaimed, the Commission on
Elections argues that “[t]he will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified.”80 Fragata,
Bacani, and the Commission on Elections pray that the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition be dismissed.81
The issues for this Court’s resolution are the following:
First, whether private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a
petition for disqualification or a petition to deny due course or
cancel certificate of candidacy; and

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74  Id., at p. 210, Fragata and Bacani’s Joint Comment, and p. 231, COMELEC’s
Comment.
75  Id.
76  Id., at pp. 227-228, COMELEC’s Comment.
77  Id., at pp. 228 and 235.
78  Id., at p. 235.
79  Id., at pp. 233-235.
80  Id., at p. 236.
81  Id., at p. 212, Fragata and Bacani’s Joint Comment, and p. 237, COMELEC’s
Comment.

 
 

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Second, whether the rule on succession under Section 45 of the

Local Government Code applies to this case.

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We dismiss the Petition. The allegations of private respondent

Fragata’s Petition before the Commission on Elections show that it
was a timely filed petition for disqualification. Moreover, the
Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in
disqualifying petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua, annulling
her proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private respondent
Krystle Marie C. Bacani, the candidate who garnered the sixth
highest number of votes among the qualified candidates.
 
I
 
As this Court has earlier observed in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections,82 members of the bench and the bar have
“indiscriminately interchanged”83 the remedies of a petition to deny
due course or cancel certificate of candidacy and a petition for
disqualification, thus “adding confusion to the already difficult state
of our jurisprudence on election laws.”84
The remedies, however, have different grounds and periods for
their filing. The remedies have different legal consequences.
A person files a certificate of candidacy to announce his or her
candidacy and to declare his or her eligibility for the elective office
indicated in the certificate.85 Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code on the contents of a certificate of candidacy states:
 
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated

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82  595 Phil. 449; 574 SCRA 782 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
83  Id., at p. 457; p. 784.
84  Id.
85  Election Code, Sec. 74.

 
 

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therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member

of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or section
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post

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office address for all election purposes; his profession or

occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not
a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that
the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through
a court approved proceeding, a candidate shall use in a
certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been
baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion,
the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or
any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law
or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing
the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there
are two or more candidates for an office with the same name
and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of such
fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the
incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname
stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He
may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is
generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix
his latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate
containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
 
 

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The Commission on Elections has the ministerial duty to receive

and acknowledge receipt of certificates of candidacy.86 However,
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,87 the Commission
may deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy through a
verified petition filed exclusively on the ground that “any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false.” The “material representation” referred to in Section 78 is
that which involves the eligibility or qualification for the office
sought by the person who filed the certificate.88 Section 78 must,
therefore, be read “in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.”89
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Moreover, the false representation “must consist of a deliberate

attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.”90
A person intending to run for public office must not only possess
the required qualifications for the position for which he or she
intends to run. The candidate must also possess none of the grounds
for disqualification under the law. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
said in his Dissenting Opinion in

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86  Id., Sec. 76.

87  Id., Sec. 78 provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
88  Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014,
717 SCRA 312, 323 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
89  Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 82 at pp. 465-466; pp. 792-
793.
90  Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, supra.

 
 

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Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,91 “that an

individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa.”92
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for grounds in
filing a petition for disqualification:
 
Sec. 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in
action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed
acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his

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election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this

Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
 
Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the
grounds in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code as well as in
Section 40 of the Local Government Code may likewise be raised in
a petition for disqualification. Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code states:
 
Sec. 12. Disqualifications.—Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or in-

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91  318 Phil. 329; 248 SCRA 300 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
92   J. Mendoza, Dissenting Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections, id., at pp. 464-465; p. 398.

 
 

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competent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for

subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed
or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.
 
Disqualifications specifically applicable to those running for local
elective positions are found in Section 40 of the Local Government

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Code:
 
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.—The following
persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical
cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who
have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
 
 

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Chua vs. Commission on Elections

Private respondent Fragata alleges in her Petition that petitioner

is a permanent resident in the United States, a green card holder
who, prior to the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor,
has resided in the State of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors her
Petition on Section 40 of the Local Government Code, which
disqualifies permanent residents of a foreign country from running
for any elective local position.
It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,
persons who file their certificates of candidacy declare that they are
not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country.
Therefore, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may likewise be filed against a permanent resident of a
foreign country seeking an elective post in the Philippines on the
ground of material misrepresentation in the certificate of
candidacy.93
What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on
the petitioner. If the false material representation in the certificate of
candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification, the petitioner may
choose whether to file a petition to deny due course or cancel a

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certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as

the petition filed complies with the requirements under the law.94
Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata
had a choice of filing either a petition to deny due course or cancel
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification.
In her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that
petitioner made a false material representation in her Certificate of
Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a permanent resident
disqualified to run for Councilor under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. Private respondent Fragata’s Petition, therefore,
was a petition for disqualification.

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93  See Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 601, 632; 683 SCRA 1,
21 (2012) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
94  Id.

 
 

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It follows that private respondent Fragata timely filed her Petition

before the Commission on Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a petition for
disqualification “shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of
proclamation.” Private respondent Fragata filed her Petition on the
date of petitioner’s proclamation on May 15, 2013. The Commission
on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in taking
cognizance of private respondent Fragata’s Petition.
In addition, the Commission on Elections correctly admitted
private respondent Bacani’s pleading-in-intervention.
An adverse decision against petitioner would require a
pronouncement as to who should assume the position of Councilor.
Hence, those who believe that they are entitled to the position may
prove their legal interest in the matter in litigation95 and may
properly intervene for a complete disposition of the case.
Private respondent Bacani claims that she is entitled to the
position of Councilor. In her Motion to Intervene, she argues for
petitioner’s disqualification and alleges the circumstances
surrounding petitioner’s dual citizenship. She then cites Maquiling,
arguing that she should be proclaimed in lieu of petitioner because
she obtained the sixth highest number of votes among the qualified

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candidates. Private respondent Bacani’s intervention was, therefore,

proper.

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95  COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 8, Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. When Proper and Who may be Permitted to Intervene.—Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action
or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion, to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

 
 

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II
 
The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion
in disqualifying petitioner, annulling her proclamation, and
subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani as the duly
elected Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila.
Petitioner was born to Filipino parents in 1967, which makes her
a natural-born Filipino under the 1935 Constitution.96 Ten years
later, on December 7, 1977, petitioner became a naturalized
American. Hence, she lost her Filipino citizenship pursuant to
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63.97
It was on September 21, 2011 when petitioner took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus reacquiring her
Filipino citizenship.98 From September 21, 2011 up to

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96  Constitution (1935), Art. IV, Sec. 1 provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

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(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

97  Commonwealth Act No. 63 (1936), Sec. 1 provides:
Sec. 1. How citizenship may be lost.—A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country[.]
98  Rep. Act No. 9225 (2003), Sec. 3 provides:
Sec. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
“I ____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines

 
 

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the present, however, petitioner failed to execute a sworn and

personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship particularly required
of those seeking elective public office. Section 5(2) of the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 provides:
SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
....
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath[.]
 
Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American
citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance
and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are
separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for
qualification to run for public office. In Jacot v. Dal:99

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and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines, and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
99   592 Phil. 661; 572 SCRA 295 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

 
 

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[T]he oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of

Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained
in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the
personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said
oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite
only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek
elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of
having more than one citizenship.100
 
With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, petitioner was a dual
citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October
3, 2012. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was
disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila
during the 2013 National and Local Elections.
Petitioner, however, argues that the Commission on Elections
gravely abused its discretion in proclaiming private respondent
Bacani, the mere seventh placer among the candidates for Councilor
and, therefore, not the electorate’s choice. Petitioner maintains that
the vacancy left by her disqualification should be filled according to
the rule on succession under Section 45(a)(1) of the Local
Government Code, which provides:
 
SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian.
—(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic

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successions provided above do not apply shall be filled by

appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary,
in the case of the sangguniang panla-

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100  Id., at p. 673; p. 308.

 
 

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lawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly

urbanized cities and independent component cities[.]
 
The permanent vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those
arising “when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated
to discharge the functions of his office.”101 In these situations, the
vacancies were caused by those whose certificates of candidacy were
valid at the time of the filing “but subsequently had to be cancelled
because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.”102
The rule on succession under Section 45, however, would not
apply if the permanent vacancy was caused by one whose certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically with respect to dual
citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because
they possess “a substantive [disqualifying circumstance] . . .
[existing] prior to the filing of their certificate of candidacy.”103
Legally, they should not even be considered candidates. The votes
casted for them should be considered stray and should not be
counted.104
In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio
certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the vacant
position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest
number of votes among those eligible.105 In this case, it is private
respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of
Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest number of votes among
the eligible candidates. The Commission

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101  Local Government Code, Sec. 44.

102  Supra note 93 at p. 633; p. 31.
103  Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, supra note 31 at
p. 448; p. 463.
104  Id., at p. 450; p. 473.
105  Id., at pp. 447-450; pp. 458-459.

 
 

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on Elections correctly proclaimed private respondent Bacani in

lieu of petitioner.
Petitioner may have garnered more votes than private respondent
Bacani. She may have already been proclaimed. Nevertheless,
elections are more than a numbers game. Hence, in Maquiling:
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will
of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise
is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth
the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We
might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed
worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
....
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who
are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.106
 
All told, petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua is a dual
citizen correctly disqualified from running for the position of
Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013

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106  Id., at pp. 444-447; pp. 459-462.

 
 
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VOL. 788, APRIL 5, 2016 441

Chua vs. Commission on Elections

National and Local Elections. With her dual citizenship existing

prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy, her Certificate of
Candidacy was void ab initio. She was correctly considered a
noncandidate. All votes casted for her were stray, and the person
legally entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle Marie C.
Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes among
the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections did not
gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua’s proclamation and
subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
DISMISSED. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin,

Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ.,
concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I concur in the result.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On Leave.

Petition dismissed.

Note.—The Supreme Court (SC) has held that in order to justify

the cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) under Section 78,
it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision
would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run
for the elective post for which he filed the CoC. (Caballero vs.
Commission on Elections, 771 SCRA 213 [2015])
 
 
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