ERWIN B. JAVELLANA v. DILG & SEC.

LUIS SANTOS
G.R. No. 102549, 10 August 1992, EN BANC, (Grino-Aquino, J.)

Atty. Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia filed an administrative case against Javellana averring that Javellana, an incumbent member of the
Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director. Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando
Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and
Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule. Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and
civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of various DLG memorandum
circulars for such purpose.

Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request.
Secretary Santos replied in favor of Javellana. During the pendency of the case, the LG Code was signed into law,
Section 90 of which allows exercise of profession subject to some limitations and exceptions.

ISSUE:
Did Javellana violate the LG Code and other pertinent DLG Memo circulars when it acted as counsel against
the City Engineer and on various cases without permission from the DLG?

RULING:
YES.
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City
Engineer Divinagracia, Javellana violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a government official from
engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor
the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in
those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It
applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90
explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all
the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
 RAUL A. VILLEGAS, PETITIONER, VS. ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI
These two cases were filed which involves the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which used to
read: "Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with
appellate jurisdiction, x x x"

First case: A complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by Raul A. Villegas against the Vera Cruz
spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private respondents) before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. An Answer, was filed
by private respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa
from the province of Cebu. Raul A. Villegas "challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi as counsel of record
on the ground that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance, which are
essentially trial Courts or Courts of original jurisdiction.

Second case: Edgardo P. Reyes filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) against N. V. Verenigde
Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and private respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's
shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T. C. Acero, allegedly on the ground that,
prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred by Section 11,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.

Issue: Whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A.
Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance?

Held:
No. Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on
April 7, 1981, Section 11 now reads: "SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before
any court without appellate jurisdiction, x x x"

Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any Court without
appellate jurisdiction."

By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. However, under the same statute, their
jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate. They have appellate jurisdiction over all
cases arising in City and Municipal Courts.

It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of the suits in the
exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi axe still
prohibited from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention.

The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the
administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus
preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a single Judge of the Court
of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the latter Court acts in the exercise of its
appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his
office possesses is more felt and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases because the decision or
resolution appealed from in the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but also of correctness
in its favor.

In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice and public interest.

Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi were declared prohibited from appearing as counsel before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, respectively.
 HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
A.M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983

FACTS: In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as a hearing officer of the
Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet Noriega alleged that
Sison has created another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in private practice and
represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.

Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the same is with the permission of
the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal
services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never represented himself deliberately and
intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always signed
the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court
staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”,
notices were sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”,

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.

RULING: NO. Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint do not warrant
disbarment of the respondent. There is no evidence that the respondent has committed an act constituting deceit,
immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and
willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so.

The only case DRC Case No. E-01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant. It being an
isolated case, the same does not constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent did not derive any pecuniary
gain for his appearance because respondent and defendant therein were close family friends. Such act of the respondent
in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of
harrassment against respondent.

The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the respondent was dismissed from the service because
being a government employee, he appeared as counsel in a private case, cannot be applied in the case at bar because the
respondent in said Zeta case had appeared as counsel without permission from his superiors.

Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the complainant however states that the basis of
his complaint for disbarment is not the respondent's act of appearing as counsel but the unauthorized use of another
name.

A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is indeed a pleading entitled "Objection/Opposition to the
2 Formal Offer of Evidence" (Annex "C" to the Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as "Manuel Sisori", counsel
for defendant, 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of the Records), there is, however, no showing that respondent
was thus motivated with bad faith or malice, for otherwise lie would not have corrected the spelling of his name when
the court staff misspelled it in one of the minutes of the proceeding. Moreover, We find no reason or motive for
respondent to conceal his true name when he have already given express authority by his superior to act as counsel for
Juan Sacquing in the latter's case pending before the JDRC And while it may be True that subsequent errors were made
in sending notices to him under the name "Atty. Manuel Sison, ' the errors were attributable to the JDRC clerical staff
and not to the respondent.

At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to be more careful and cautious in signing his name so
as to avoid unnecessary confusion as regards his Identity.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 EDGAR Y. TEVES AND TERESITA Z. TEVES V. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004, EN BANC, (DAVIDE JR., CJ.)

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves were convicted for
violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
issuing of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of
one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the
fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves. This pecuniary interest
is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and
thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of a business
permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center for not being well-founded. However, they
were convicted for violation of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019. The petitioners filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE. Whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, may be convicted,
together with his spouse?

HELD:
No. Wife should be acquitted not being a public official and conspiracy has not been proven.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or
employee, directly or indirectly, to:…
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering that it was not charged in
the information?

The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule
120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or
not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense
charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute
the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby
warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

The next question we have to grapple with is under what law should petitioner Edgar Teves be punished. It must be
observed that Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is a general provision, it being applicable to all prohibited interests;
while Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 is a special provision, as it specifically treats of interest in a cockpit.

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with
a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict,
the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute.[23] Or where two statutes are of
contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail over the other.[24]

Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials from possessing pecuniary
interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and which, in itself, prescribes the punishment for violation
thereof, is paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a general manner.
Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August 1960, while the former became effective on 1 January 1991. Being the
earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of legislative
will.

In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of the penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we take judicial notice of the
fact that under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 41[26] thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC
of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection
with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the
prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not
excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under
Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.

Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. The charge against her is conspiracy in causing “the
issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center.” For this
charge, she was acquitted. But as discussed earlier, that charge also includes conspiracy in the possession of prohibited
interest.

Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must
reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.

Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse.[28] For a spouse or any person to be a party to
a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it
is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators.
 ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS (APP), et al. v. CITY OF URDANETA, et al.
G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008, SECOND DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.)

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo Parayno entered into 5 contracts for the
preliminary design, construction and management of a 4-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a
massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from PNB. For minimal work, the
contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is
outside the commerce of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted
to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study
to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo Perez, Jr., asserted that the
contracts were properly executed by Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus
Motion. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its
inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests. The RTC admitted the entry of appearance of
the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor.

ISSUE. Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta
City despite the clear statutory and jurisprudential prohibitions?

HELD.
YES. Its appearance as Urdaneta City's counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who should
represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city. Section 481(a) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the
LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special
proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, city governments
may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as
legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. In the case of Urdaneta City, however,
the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter was enacted way back in 1998.

Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor's appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City
Prosecutor remains as the city's legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to
the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro
Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the city's Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez.
The City Prosecutor prepared the city's pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question
was raised against the City Prosecutor's actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the
city lacked adequate legal representation.

Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section
481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where
a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta
City and the Province of Pangasinan. The Court has consistently held that an LGU cannot be represented by private
counsel as only public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire
private lawyers. Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been
allowed.
 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. HONORABLE JOSE LINA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG

FACTS.
Petitioner Social Justice Society, a registered political party, filed before the RTC a petition for declaratory relief
against the then DILG Secretary Jose Lina praying for the proper construction of Section 90 of RA 7160, which
provides that: “SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives. x x x”

Based on the said provision, specifically paragraph (a) thereof, petitioner posited that actors who were elected
as governors, city and municipal mayors were disallowed by law to appear in movies and television programs as one of
the characters therein, for this would give them undue advantage over their political opponents, and would considerably
reduce the time that they must devote to their constituents. To strengthen its point, petitioner later amended its
petition to implead as additional respondents then Lipa City Mayor Vilma Santos, then Pampanga Provincial Governor
Lito Lapid, and then Parañaque City Mayor Joey Marquez.

DILG Secretary moved for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that (1) petitioner has no legal standing to file
the petition, because it is not a “person whose rights are affected” by the statute; (2) it is not the real party-in-interest;
(3) there is no judicial controversy; (4) there is no need for construction of the subject provision; (5) there is already a
breach of the statute as alleged in the petition itself; and (6) declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. The RTC
sustained the respondent’s arguments and dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE. WON the court erred in not resolving the issue raised in the petition for declaratory relief.

HELD.
NO. Petitioner contends that as a registered political party composed of citizens, established to relentlessly
pursue social justice in the Philippines, and allowed to field candidates in the elections, it has the legal interest and the
right to be informed and enlightened, on whether or not their public officials, who are paid out of public funds, can,
during their tenure, lawfully appear as heroes or villains in movies, or comedians in television shows, and flaunt their
disdain for legal and ethical standards.

It also argues that a party’s legal standing is a procedural technicality which may be set aside where the issues
raised are of paramount public interest. In the instant case, the importance of the issue can never be minimized or
discounted. The appearance of incumbent city or municipal mayors and provincial governors, who are actors, in
movies and television programs enhances their income but reduces considerably the time that they should devote to
their constituents. This is in violation of Section 90 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Their appearance further gives them undue
advantage in future elections over their opponents who are not actors.

The Court agrees with petitioner’s contentions on locus standi considering the liberal attitude it has taken in
recent decisions.
However, following rules of procedure, we find as proper the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for
declaratory relief in Civil Case No. 02-104585. Readily discernable is that the same is an inappropriate remedy to
enforce compliance with Section 90 of R.A. 7160, and to prevent local chief executives Santos-Recto, Lapid and
Marquez from taking roles in movies and television shows. The Court, thus, grants the OSG’s move to dismiss the case.
 Indeed, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.
The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. For the action to prosper, it must be shown that (1) there is a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
Suffice it to state that, in the petition filed with the trial court, petitioner failed to allege the ultimate facts which satisfy
these requisites. Not only that, as admitted by the petitioner, the provision the interpretation of which is being sought
has already been breached by the respondents. Declaratory relief cannot thus be availed of.
 JUAN G. FRIVALDO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND RAUL R. LEE,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, EN BANC
FACTS.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo1 filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed
a petition with the COMELEC docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or
holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled. Such was granted by the COMELEC and disqualified Frivaldo. The MR filed by Frivaldo was
unacted upon until the 1995 elections, so his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections and won as
Governor of Sorsogon.
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as
the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. On June 21, 1995, the COMELEC en banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995. He was proclaimed as governor in the evening of June 30 at
8:30pm.
Frivaldo sought the annulment of the proclamation on the ground that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00pm, he took
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order of
June 21 of the COMELEC was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there
was no more legal impediment to the proclamation of Frivaldo as governor. In the alternative, he averred that pursuant
to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice Governor and not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995 the COMELEC granted the petition of Frivaldo.
ISSUE.
WON the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal and;
WON it cured the citizenship requirement required to be proclaimed as Governor of Sorsogon.

DECISION.
1. Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress2, by naturalization or by repatriation. Petitioner now boasts of having successfully passed through the third
and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General
himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent
Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took
his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
It will be noted that the Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on
June 30, 1995--the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began--he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said
date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.3 This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was

1
Frivaldo have been previously elected twice as governor but was disqualified due to his citizenship thus counting the facts of the case, he had
won the elections thrice. (elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995)
2
He tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals."
3
Thus the citizenship requirement is reckoned on the date of proclamation and not on the date of election nor filing of certificate of candidacy.
enacted. So too, even from a literal construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered
as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter--much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time
of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the
citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands
to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a
voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence,
registration--not the actual voting--is the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern--and not
anywhere else. Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized--and Lee has not disputed--that he "was and is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In
fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995” It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province
where he intended to be elected.

2. Yes, According to the NCC laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are
settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS. It is remedial in nature filling certain void in Philippines laws regarding repatriation
through creation of new rights and remedies. P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization
law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their
husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of
undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
It is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of
the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"
The court answers this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship--long before
May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship. Quoting the assailed resolution of December 1995, it states that -
“By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
Assailed resolution of COMELEC affirmed.
Note
 Lee’s proclamation was not valid. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
 The court decision contains a part regarding the dissenting opinion of Justice Davide and the court’s refutation
of his dissent.
 QUITERIO HERMO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROSALIO G. DELA ROSA, JUDGE, RTCBRANCH 28,
MANILA, RESPONDENT.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-897, November 24, 1998, EN BANC, QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS.
On September 20, 1991, Juan G. Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization4 before the sala of the respondent judge
of the RTC of Manila. The petition was set for hearing on March 16, 1992 and publication in the Official Gazette and
in a newspaper of general circulation were ordered once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of
which should be at least six months before the date of hearing. Judge de la Rosa likewise required the posting of the
order and of the petition in a public and conspicuous place in the office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC.
Frivaldo caused the publication of respondent's order in the Philippine Star.
On January 20, 1992, Frivaldo filed a motion to set the hearing of his petition ahead of schedule since he was
planning to run in the elections of May 11, 1992 and he had to file his certificate of candidacy before March 15, 1992, a
day before the scheduled hearing. Respondent judge granted the motion and reset the hearing of February 21, 1992. It
does not appear that the order granting the motion was published or posted. On February 27, 1992, respondent judge
rendered his decision granting Frivaldo's petition and on the same day, Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance.
Herein petitioner charges respondent judge in an administrative case, with gross ignorance of the law and
malfeasance in the performance of his official duties on the following circumstances: (1) Non-publication of
respondent's order of publication in the Official Gazette; (2) Resetting of the hearing to an earlier date, which date is
within six months from the date of the petition's last publication which was November 21, 1991; (3) Allowance of the
petition and of Frivaldo's taking his oath of allegiance on the same date the petition was heard; (4) Allowing Frivaldo to
take his oath of allegiance before two years had elapsed from the date of the decision; (5) Non-submission by Frivaldo
of the affidavit of two disinterested persons to "testify on (his) wherewithals"; (6) Allowance of Frivaldo's petition
despite the fact that he was convicted of libel in a case filed in Sorsogon; and (7) An apparent attempt to cover up the
proceedings as shown by Alma Catu's experience when she tried to inquire into the progress of the case.
ISSUE. WON respondent judge was guilty of gross ignorance of law and malfeasance

DECISION.
Yes, the court sees no reason to disturb the foregoing findings in the case of Republic v. De la Rosa. The failure to
observe the procedure required by law as regards the date of hearing the petition and granting the same is clearly
attributable to respondent judge. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530 clearly provides that “...no petition for Philippine
citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law,
nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation.”
Under Section 2 of the same law, the applicant may only take his oath of allegiance after the Solicitor General finds that
within the period of two years from the date the decision granting citizenship is promulgated, that the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

4
Aside from this administrative case, three other petitions were filed before this Court in connection with Frivaldo's petition and
his reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship: G.R. No. 104654, G.R. No. 105715, and G.R. No. 105735. This two cases were
consolidated in the case of Republic v. De la Rosa wherein the court held that he naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-
58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1)the hearing of the petition was set ahead of
the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2)the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition, (3)petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of judgment; and (4)petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
In the case herein, respondent judge heard Frivaldo's petition before the lapse of six months from the date the petition
was published in a newspaper of general circulation. He allowed Frivaldo to take his oath of allegiance on the same day
the petition was granted, disregarding the requisite two-year waiting period.
What made the matter more questionable is the fact that six (6) days after the hearing of the petition was scheduled, a
decision was rendered by respondent Judge on February 27, 1992. On that very same day it was rendered, Mr. Frivaldo
was allowed to take his oath of allegiance despite the fact that the decision has not yet become final.
Respondent was found liable for serious procedural lapses with regard to the proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645,
and ordered him to pay a FINE of P5,000.00 to be deducted from benefits previously withheld from him.
 URBANO M. MORENO, PETITIONER, VS. COMELEC and NORMA L. MEJES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS.
Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the RTC. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states
no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also
argued that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order
of the trial court allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for.

The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that Moreno be
disqualified from running. The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed.

In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged
sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefore. He never
served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC does not apply to him.

ISSUE. Whether or not Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on WON his sentence was served

RULING.
YES. The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase “within two (2) years
after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC.

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is
rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage.

In this case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended
upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the
execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation
order. Moreno’s sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for Punong Barangay.
 BAUTISTA v. COMELEC
FACTS.
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July
2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño refused to accept Bautista’s certificate of candidacy
because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza were candidates for the
position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. The Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected
Punong Barangay on July 15, 2002.
Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August 2002. In
Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en
banc directed the Election Officer to delete Bautista’s name from the official list of candidates.

ISSUE. WON Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay Lumabangan when he filed his certificate of candidacy.

HELD.
No. Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one
of the qualifications – that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a
misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan.[42] An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office
should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid
certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process.[43] Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A
candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3)
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION),
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), AND THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., RESPONDENTS.

Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local
elections. ] seeks to disqualify [Cayat] for material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. This can be deduced
from the fact that the petitioner cited in his petition that the respondent declared that he is eligible for the office he is
seeking to be elected where in fact, [Cayat] is not eligible due to his conviction of a criminal offense ( Forcible Acts of
Lasciviousness).
In COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004, the Commission RESOLVED to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy
of Respondent REV. FATHER NARDO B. CAYAT.
In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cayat's motion for reconsideration for failure
to pay the required filing fee. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat's name remained on the COMELEC's
list of candidates. In the Certificate of Canvass of Votes dated 12 May 2004, Cayat received 8,164 votes.Palileng, on the
other hand, received 5,292 votes.[11] Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took
his oath of office on 17 May 2004.
Meanwhile, on 13 May 2004, Cayat received a photocopy of the 9 May 2004 order of the COMELEC First Division
denying his motion for reconsideration for his failure to pay the filing fee.

ISSUE. Whether the nullification of Cayat's proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, and the declaration of
Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, legal?

HELD.
Yes. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes
final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is
categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for
him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May
2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat's favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10
May 2004 elections. Palileng's proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.

Petition was Dismissed.

 ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, vs.
COMELEC and MARINO "BOKING" MORALES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007

FACTS: A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in
Mabalacat,Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms
in the office he seeks to run.

Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd
term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared void by the
RTC in its Decision dated April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case.

On May 6, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution finding respondent Morales
disqualified to run for the position of municipal mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive
terms. Accordingly, his Certificate of Candidacy was cancelled. On May 7, 2004, he filed with the COMELEC En Banc
a motion for reconsideration.

The COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision in EPC No. 98-131 of the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles
City declared respondent Morales’ proclamation void, his discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor in
Mabalacat is that of a de facto officer or a de facto mayor. Therefore, his continuous service for three consecutive terms
has been severed.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position?

RULING: YES. It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following consecutive terms:

a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998

b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007

Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth
because his second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served, may not be
counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City.

Respondent Morales is wrong. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)consecutive
terms.

Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position.
He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of
the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Whether as
"caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him
"to stay on indefinitely".
 In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections.
Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declare delected.
A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Since his disqualification became final and
executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position.
Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.
 ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DAN ERASMO, SR.
G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012, EN BANC, (ABAD, J.)

Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. After eight months, Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board
(ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voter’s registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village. Dan Erasmo, Sr., opposed the application, ERB granted jalosjos’ application. Undeterred, Erasmo
filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in MCTC. The latter ruled in favor of Erasmo.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[6] On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application. Jalosjos filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny to cancel his COC before the
COMELEC,[7] claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he
resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint resolution, dismissing
Erasmo’s petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.

While Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010
elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos’ winning the elections. Meantime, on June 2, 2010 the CA rendered judgment
in the voter’s exclusion case before it, holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of
Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic Act 8189 to vote in that
place. Erasmo filed a petition for review. Several counter cases were filed by the parties after. The Court ordered the
consolidation of the three related petitions.

ISSUE. Does the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency
qualification for running for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering
that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office?

HELD: YES.

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such
power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely
upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the
HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the
HRET.

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed
on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon
the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay.

It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the proclamation of Jalosjos was an
exception to the above-stated rule. Since the COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his
proclamation was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has
jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of Republic Act 6646. Section 6 provides:

Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal
from the Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final
judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing
official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s Second Division that allowed his name
to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending
its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his
qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and
decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring
Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the
elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R.
193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul his
proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the respondent
Commission on Elections En Banc’s order dated June 3, 2010, and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second
Division resolution dated February 23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr. Further, the
Court DISMISSES the petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of jurisdiction over the issues they raise.
 ROLANDO DELA TORRE v. COMELEC AND MARCIAL VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996, EN BANC (Francisco, J.)

The first assailed resolution declared Dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8,1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160
which stated “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence.” COMELEC held that Dela Torre was found guilty by the
MTC for violation of P.D. 1612, the Anti-fencing Law. Thus there exists legal grounds to disqualify Dela Torre as
candidate for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna this coming elections. Although there is dearth of jurisprudence involving
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, the nature of the certainly involves moral turpitude. The second assailed
resolution denied Dela Torre’s MR. In said motion, Dela Torre claimed that Section 40 (a) of the LGC does not apply
to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of
conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.

ISSUE. Does the crime of fencing involve moral turpitude which disqualifies Dela Torre from running as mayor?

HELD.
YES. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the SC to determine. The Court is guided by
one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not. The
Court in this case shall nonetheless dispense with a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime, inasmuch as petitioner after all does not assail his conviction. Petitioner has in
effect admitted all the elements of the crime of fencing. At any rate, the determination of whether or not
fencing involves moral turpitude can likewise be achieved by analyzing the elements alone.

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element of fencing – The accused knows or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft. Actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are
crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time
and in degree, both the "fence" and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion
for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process "private duties" they owe their "fellowmen" or "society" in a manner
"contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good morals."

Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the
sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the
sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods
sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the
illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of
P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, x x x, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing"- a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference
can arise from the established fact of x x x possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." All told, the COMELEC did not
err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted
by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude.
 ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and COMELEC

FACTS.
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other candidate was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the
election show that Eduardo Manzano got the highest count of votes, however his proclamation was suspended in view
of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril
and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen5
and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position.

COMELEC en banc, however, reversed its previous ruling and declared Manzano as qualified to run. The pertinent
portions of the resolution reads: “As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the
principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother
were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an
American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.”

ISSUE. WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

HELD.
NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country
such children are citizens of that country;

5
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration
No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He
was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US
Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Hence, the dual
citizenship.
 (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160, Sec.40(d) and in RA 7854, Sec.20 must be understood
as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, mere dual citizenship does not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their CoC, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states.

The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective
renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein
it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine
the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
 CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO Y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, EN BANC, SERENO, C.J.
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 2008. On April 2009 Arnado again took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On November
2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
On April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with
the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as ―USA-American. However, the COMELEC only ruled on Balua’s
petition after Arnado was already proclaimed as Mayor of Kauswagan. Nevertheless, it ruled to disqualify Arnado as a
candidate thus nullifying his proclamation as mayor.
The COMELEC en banc on appeal6, ruled in favor of Arnado.

ISSUE. WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for
public office.

DECISION.
Yes, such has the effect of undoing the renunciation of American citizenship making the respondent a dual
citizen. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements
required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became
eligible to run for public office.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of
the foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American7,
in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on November 2009, Arnado was

6 Petitioner Macquiling intervened in the case as he was the candidate with the second highest number of votes next to Arnado. He moves to
disqualify Arnado and declare him as the Mayor of Kauswagan. He was later on, declared as the Mayor of Kauswagan.
7
Note, though it undoes the effect the renunciation of American citizenship, it does not operate to renounce Filipino Citizenship.
a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by
the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the LGC, he was not qualified to run for a local elective
position.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged.
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ANGELINA DG.
DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS.
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. The latter filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that
petitioner is an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.

The petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American but has already applied for dual citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Upon approval, he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is now
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as
vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating to which the trial court
decided in the former’s favor, declaring him the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty.

On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled against the petitioner in the petition for disqualification filed against
the latter as he should have renounced his American citizenship before he can run for any public elective position.
Thus, he is a dual citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy making him disqualified to run for the said
elective position.

ISSUE. WON petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225

RULING
YES. R.A. No. 9225 provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x xx x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

Contrary to petitioner's claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation
of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the
instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements (passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned
the Court's rulings in said cases).

In Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, the Court ruled that a candidate's Oath and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

In the instant case, petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is
disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.
 CIRILO R. VALLES v. COMELEC & ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000, 9 August 2000, EN BANC, (Purisima, J.)

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 on Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia. Her parents
are Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. At the age of 15, she came to settle to PH.
She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen.
She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for
governor of the province and won. Her elections was contested when Gil Taojo, Jr. filed a petition for quo warranto
alleging that she is an Australian Citizen. The COMELEC dismissed it. She experienced the same upon her re-election
in 1995 when Francisco Rabat filed the same petition on the same ground. The COMELEC, likewise, dismissed it.
On her bid for re-election in the 1998 elections, Cirilo Valles filed a petition for disqualification alleging that
she is an Australian citizen. The COMELEC dismissed it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Is Rosalind Ybasco Lopez a natural-born Filipino citizen?

RULING:
YES, because his father was a Filipino to which the PH follows the jus sanguinis principle and that she had
renounced her Australian citizenship as reflected in his COC and Affidavit of Renunciation.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and
resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an
entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport,
is bereft of merit.

The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had
an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express… [A]n application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one’s citizenship.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country
has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does
not hold water.
 In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence
of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship
as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

It is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12,
1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to
by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC,
the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation
holds no water.

In order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) A person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) The finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL
M. ALVAREZ, respondents.

FACTS.
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.[2] From 1970
to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.[3] Otherwise, even after his
retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5,
2000.[4] Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171[5] to the Special Committee on
Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and
Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application
was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.[6] On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”[7]

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile,
petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a
margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.[8] He subsequently took his oath of office.

ISSUE. Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy?

HELD.
No. First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis
added)

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,”[21] but rather to “domicile” or legal residence,[22] that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi).”[23] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where
the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).[24]

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a
visitor or as a resident alien.
 PRISCILA R. JUSTIMBASTE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RUSTICO B.
BALDERIAN, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner filed with the Office of the Leyte Provincial Election Supervisor a petition to disqualify private respondent as
a candidate for mayor of Tabontabon, Leyte during the May 14, 2007 elections.

Petitioner asserts that private respondent committed material misrepresentation when he stated in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen and that his name is Rustico Besa Balderian, instead of Chu Teck Siao. Further,
petitioner asserts that the immigration records of private respondent who frequently went to the United States from
1998 up to 2006 reflected the acronyms "BB" and "RP" which petitioner takes to STAND FOR "Balikbayan" and "Re-
entry Permit," thus showing that private respondent either harbors dual citizenship or is a permanent resident of a
foreign country in contravention of Section 40 of the LGC:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted of final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis in the original and supplied)

Upon the other hand, private respondent insists on his Filipino citizenship.

ISSUE. Whether or not Balderian should be disqualified as a candidate for mayor due to his citizenship?

HELD.
No. Republic Act 6768 provides that a balikbayan is
1. A Filipino citizen who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a period of at least one year;
2. A Filipino overseas worker; or
3. A former Filipino citizen and his or her family, who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or
returns to the Philippines.

Re-entry permits are, under the Philippine Immigration Act, issued to lawful resident aliens who depart temporarily
from the Philippines.

The record of the case yields no concrete proof to show that private respondent, who holds a Philippine passport, falls
under the third category of a balikbayan (former Filipino citizen).

Private respondent's Certificate of Live Birth, the entry on the date, as well as the place of marriage of private
respondents' parents, reads "no data available." In his brother's Certificate of Live Birth, the entry on the same desired
information is left blank. In light of these, absent any proof that private respondent's parents Peter Siao and Zosima
Balderian contracted marriage, private respondent is presumed to be illegitimate, hence, he follows the citizenship of
his mother who is a Filipino.

In fine, petitioner has not shown that public respondent, in issuing the assailed Resolution, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition was DISMISSED.

 EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 157526. April 28, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Moll and Private Respondent Ceriola were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Malinao,
Albay, during the elections of May 14, 2001. Moll obtained the highest number of votes cast for the position while
Ceriola came in second. Kare was elected vice mayor in the same election.

On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a “Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of Dindo K.
Moll to Run for Any Elective Position.” The Petition alleged that the latter had been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, for the
crime of usurpation of authority or official functions.

In its May 28, 2001 Resolution, the Comelec First Division dismissed the Petition. Ceriola filed his Motion for
Reconsideration with the Comelec en banc which, on August 31, 2001, set aside the said Resolution. It thereafter
directed the clerk of the Comelec to remand the Petition to the provincial election supervisor of Albay for hearing and
reception of evidence. The Comelec ruled that the trial court’s final judgment of conviction of Moll disqualified him
from filing his certificate of candidacy and continued to disqualify him from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast
in his favor were stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola -- the candidate who had obtained the second highest number of
votes -- was adjudged the winner.

ISSUES:
1. Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the position of mayor?
2. If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should become the mayor -- Ceriola, the second
placer in the mayoral election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor?

RULING: 1. YES. Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his judgement of
conviction -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. The period for appeal is
interrupted by the filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear that his
filing of a motion for reconsideration should have stayed the running of the period for filing an appeal. What he did
file, however, was a “Motion to Quash the Information”; and when it was denied, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial.

The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily follows that this period is interrupted only by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being appealed.

Neither Moll’s Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was directed at the judgment
of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the period of
appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the conviction.

Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, the judgment against him has
become final. Thus, the Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor, under
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:

“Section 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;”
 Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months
of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective local position.

2. In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount consideration, and their expressed will must at all times
be given effect. When the majority speaks by giving a candidate the highest number of votes in the election for an
office, no one else can be declared elected in place of the former. In a long line of cases, this Court has definitively
ruled that the Comelec cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes, should the winning candidate be declared ineligible or disqualified.

When the electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. Thus, on the
part of those who voted for him, their votes are presumed to have been cast with a sincere belief that he was a qualified
candidate. Thus, their votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.

In Aquino v. Comelec, we said:

“x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality
of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.”

The law on succession under Section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, would then apply. This provision relevantly states:

“SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor. —

(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as
the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

Accordingly, when Moll was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was created for failure of the
elected mayor to qualify for the office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice mayor shall succeed as provided by
law.
 SERGIO G. AMORA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA
G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011, EN BANC, (NACHURA, J.)

On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. (Amora) filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. Respondent Arnielo S. Olandria (Olandria) was one of the candidates for councilor of the
NPC in the same municipality. He filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria
alleged that Amora's COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting
competent evidence of his identity. Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora.
The COMELEC en banc denied Amora’s MR but he was proclaimed the winner as the mayor of Candijay.

ISSUE: Did the Comelec err in disqualifying Amora for presenting only a CTC before the notary public?

HELD: YES
In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to
possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an additional
ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the OEC in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is party is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the elections laws.

and of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in
the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for
the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it
is a petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or
accomplishment fit for the position of mayor. The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the formal
requirement in Section 73 of the OEC that a COC be under oath is not simply a question of semantics as the statutes
list the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate.

Recently, we have had occasion to distinguish the various petitions for disqualification and clarify the grounds therefor
as provided in the OEC and the LGC. We declared, thus:
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While
a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68
can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is
never considered a candidate.

Our ruling herein does not do away with the formal requirement that a COC be sworn. In fact, we emphasize that the
filing of a COC is mandatory and must comply with the requirements set forth by law.

Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice lists the act to which an affirmation or oath refers:

Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. -- The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a
sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just
colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as distant
relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out
to be sufficient in this instance. On the whole, the COMELEC should not have brushed aside the affidavit of Atty.
Granada and remained inflexible in the face of Amora's victory and proclamation as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND ALEJANDRO VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008, SECOND DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.)

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M.
Tiape, a relative of Villapando's wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while
Tiape lost. Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente. A Contract of
Consultancy was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente and Tiape whereby the former employed the
services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal
Mayor for a period of 6 months. Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation
of Article 244 of the RPC8 wherein they alleged that Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing mayoralty candidate,
hence is ineligible for appointment to a public office within 1 year from the date of the elections, to the damage and
prejudice of the government and of public interest.

The law that provides for the legal qualification for the position of municipal administrator is Section 480, Article
X of the LGC.9 It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much less prove that Tiape lacked any of
the qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal Administrator. Prosecution's argument rested on the
assertion that since Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998 election, he necessarily lacked the required legal qualifications. It
bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who
possessed the required legal qualifications for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public
position by reason of the one year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be
temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal
qualifications imposed by law.

ISSUE: Did Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the RPC does not complement the provision on the 1 year
prohibition found in the Constitution and the LGC?

HELD:
YES. Villapando's contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division's interpretation of the term legal
disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of
1991.

Sandiganbayan, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its
interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the LGC. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.

8 Unlawful appointments.-Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
9 No person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the LGU concerned, of good moral character, a holder

of a college degree preferably in public administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and administration work for at least 5 years in the case of the provincial or city
administrator, and 3 years in the case of the municipal administrator.
 BORJA v. COMELEC

FACTS.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending
in June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor. On March 27,
1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory
that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent
Capco disqualified from running for re-election as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority
overturned the original decision.

ISSUE. WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor.

HELD.
NO. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “x x x the term of office of elective local officials x x x
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that “x x x
no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected x x x”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose
of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of
the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
 ROMEO LONZANIDA v. COMELEC & EUFEMIO MULI
G.R. No. 135150, 28 July 1999, EN BANC, (Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)

Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections, Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and
was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was
contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC, which declared a failure of
elections and that the office of the mayor was declared vacant. Upon appeal to the COMELEC, the COMELEC, after a
revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed CoC for mayor of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli timely
filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that
he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

ISSUE: May Lonzanida’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995-March 1998 be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government
officials?

RULING:
NO. The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the exception of barangay officials
from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs.
COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr. where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor
by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered
to have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. The Court pointed out that from
the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the premise that the
official’s assumption of office is by reason of election.

Not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8
contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of
“the term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such officials” from serving for more than three consecutive
terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of
office, states that “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” The term served must therefore be one “for
which the the official concerned was elected.” The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.” This Court held that two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, Lonzanida cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision of the contested
ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot
be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly
held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a
term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post;
he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it
decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Lonzanida vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

CORRELATING WITH:
ROMEO LONZANIDA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 160243-52, 20 July 2009, FIRST DIVISION, (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

The complaints alleged that Lonzanida, as Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, notarized 13 Affidavits of
Ownership of parcels of 117-hectare public land, particularly described as Lot No. 5504. The Affidavits of Ownership
appeared to have been executed by Edzel L. Lonzanida, Leo Lonzanida, Japhet Lonzanida, Peter John Madarang, Leo
Madarang, Dolores Joy Madarang, Elsie de Dios, Medardo Domingo, Pedro Lacorte, Efren Tayag, Cedric Legrama,
Charlie Lacap and Raphael Gonzales (Edzel Lonzanida, et al.). The purported affiants either denied executing and
signing the same or were the minor children of petitioner and of Madarang. All of this alleged happened during
Lonzanida’s 1995-1998 mayoral term and before nullification by the COMELEC.

Thus, ten (10) Informations for Falsification of Public Document against Lonzanida were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) convicted Lonzanida of 10 counts of Falsification. 2003, The Sandiganbayan en banc
convicted Lonzanida of the crimes charged. In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan belittled the recantation of the three
prosecution witnesses.

ISSUE: Is Lonzanida guilty of the charges?

RULING:
YES. Lonzanida is a public officer who has taken advantage of his position to commit the felonious acts
charged against him, i.e. knowingly subscribing or signing the oath as administering officer the affidavits mentioned in
the informations under false circumstances. Lonzanida’s acts of signing the oaths as administering officer in the said
affidavits were clearly in abuse of the powers of his office for hisauthority to do so was granted to him by law as
municipal mayor and only in matters of official business.

As alleged in the Informations and proven during the trial of the cases, Lonzanida was exercising his authority to
administer oath as a municipal mayor when he committed the acts complained of.

In Lumancas v. Intas, the Court held that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public
officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.

All told, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction. With the
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution and applying Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, there
are more than enough bases to sustain the findings of the Sandiganbayan that herein petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171, particularly paragraph 2, “causing it to appear
that persons have participated in an act or proceeding when in fact and in truth, they did not participate in the act or
proceeding.” and paragraph 4, “making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.”
 ARATEA v. COMELEC

FACTS.
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo)were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo(Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he
sought election.

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010
elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively
proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea assumed the position of Mayor, but Antipolo (garnering the second highest vote next to Lozanida) asserted that
he should be the one to be proclaimed as Mayor.

ISSUE. Who, between Aratea and Antipolo, is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor?

HELD.

Antipolo is the rightful occupant.

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.
Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate,actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared bycompetent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
byfinal judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offensefor which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
monthsor for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be acandidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardonor granted amnesty.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty ofprisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from
holding any publicoffice, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetualdisqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment ofconviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
 FEDERICO T. MONTEBON AND ELEANOR M. ONDOY, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION AND SESINANDO F. POTENCIOSO, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the
Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April 30, 2007,
petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the
COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections
as it would be his fourth consecutive term.

In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004
when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L.
Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.

Petitioners maintained that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered
an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal
councilor. They argued that, according to the law, voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not disqualified from running for the fourth
consecutive time to the same office if there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms.

ISSUE. Whether respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as
municipal councilor?

Held: NO.
The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving more than three consecutive terms in
the same post. Section 8, Article X thereof states:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be
three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is
clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his
office as municipal councilor.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, `Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. We quote with approval the ruling of the
COMELEC that -
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of
the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to
succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the
official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the
successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so
if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the
performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible
administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is
therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

Petition was Dismissed.

 ROBERTO L. DIZON, Petitioner, vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARINO P. MORALES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009

FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to
disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully
served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that
Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004, thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s
ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of
Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three--term limit under Section 43 of the LGC.
Hence, Respondent’s certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections was
cancelled pursuant to the aforementioned Supreme Court decision which was promulgated on May 9, 2007. As a result,
respondent was not only disqualified but was also not considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections.

The vice-mayor elect then took his oath and has assumed office as mayor of Mabalacat on May 17, 2007 until
the term ended on June 30, 2007. For failure to serve for the full term, such involuntary interruption in his term of
office should be considered a gap which renders the three-term limit inapplicable.

Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed.
The three--term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly--elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales has
failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May
16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term.

ISSUES: 1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004--2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as
Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term.

2. WON the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th term.

RULING: 1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term.
We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July
1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We
disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial
court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the
continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only
on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-
2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed
the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the
mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not
hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.

2. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998

1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have
served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
NICASIO BOLOS, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND REY ANGELES
CINCONIEGUE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009, EN BANC, PERALTA, J.
FACTS.
Petitioner has been elected for 3 consecutive terms as Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol in 1994, 1997,
and in 2002. In 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as
Punong Barangay. He served as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan until 2007, thereafter he filed his COC for Punong
barangay for Biking in Oct. 29, 2007 Barangay elections.
Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the same office,
filed before the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the ground that he had
already served the three-term limit. Hence, petitioner is no longer allowed to run for the same position in accordance
with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160. He contends that petitioner's
relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that
it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. On the
other hand, petitioner countered that in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections, he ran and won as Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. By reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member, his remaining term of
office as Punong Barangay, which would have ended in 2007, was left unserved.
The COMELEC ruled in favor Cinconiegue hence, this petition.
ISSUE. WON assumption and discharge of the functions as a counselor by petitioner is considered voluntary,
effectively disqualifying him to run as Punong Barangay due to the three term limit.
DECISION.
The court answered in the affirmative. As held in David v. COMELEC, the Constitution did not expressly
prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to lawmakers full discretion to
fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. Thus as provided in section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code10 barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit as imposed by congress.
In Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the court held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in
the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt the continuity of service. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term.
As conceded even by him, petitioner had already completed two consecutive terms of office when he ran for a
third term in the Barangay Elections of 2002. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang
Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004, he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit
of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once
elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after
being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would
entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is
voluntary.

10(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.
 The situation is different if an official simply succeeded an empty seat for he assumed such position by
operation of law which is involuntary; such however is not the case herein.
Petition denied. Assailed resolution affirmed.
RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA,
JR., respondents.

FACTS.
Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City for the 2001 elections.
Talaga, Jr. was then the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in 1992 and was again re-elected in 1995-1998. In the
election of 1998, he lost to Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term
of the latter until 2001. Adormeo filed a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga,
Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Talaga, Jr. responded
that he was not elected City Mayor for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2 consecutive terms since he was defeated in
the 1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness of his years as mayor. COMELEC First Division found Talaga,
Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor. He filed a MR and COMELEC en banc ruled in his favor and held that
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the 1998 elections and that his
victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule.
After canvassing, Talaga, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.

ISSUE. WON private respondent, as provided by the Constitution, had already served three consecutive terms in the
said office.

RULING.
NO. The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, where we held:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the
following case or situation: x x x

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1
year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission
that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care
should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Accordingly, COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections. Petition denied.

*Petitioner contended that in allowing respondent to run violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To bolster his case,
respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.” But as correctly pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the
House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress.
 ARSENIO A. LATASA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND ROMEO SUNGA
G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, EN BANC, (AZCUNA, J.)

Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992,
1995, and 1998. During petitioner's third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known
as the City of Digos. A plebiscite was conducted or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end
of petitioner's tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter,
petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as
the city mayor.On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001
elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city
mayor.

Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny
Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. COMELEC's First
Division held that Latasa’s Certificate of Candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule.
Latasa filed an MR but was not acted upon, he was proclaimed winner in the said elections.

ISSUE: Is Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately
after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

HELD:
NO. As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern
them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the
people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier,
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people's freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for
the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat
the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
 SIMON ALDOVINO, JR., et al. v. COMELEC & WILFREDO ASILO
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, EN BANC (Brion, J.)

Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms. During his 3rd term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however,
subsequently lifted theSandiganbayan's suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In
the next election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny
due course to Asilo's CoC or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for 3 terms. The
COMELEC's 2nd Division ruled in Asilo's favor and reasoned out that the 3 term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed
to render complete service for his 3rd term because of the suspension.

ISSUE: Is Asilo’s preventive suspension an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule?

HELD:
NO. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not
be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond 3 terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred
from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since
no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a 4th and prohibited term is to close our eyes to
this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many
reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary - some of them personal and some of them by operation of law - that may
temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive
suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a
penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for
a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of
service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective
interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given
the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The
standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing
determination of what an effective interruption is.

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part
of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the
basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title
to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus
viewed, preventive suspension is - by its very nature - the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and
temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is
that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by
the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-
term limit rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore
not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than
voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been
imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
 To recapitulate, Asilo's 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official's term. Thus, the COMELEC
refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilo's
CoC for a prohibited 4th term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than
the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.
 ABUNDO, SR. v. COMELEC

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs,
he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as
mayor. In the 2004 elections, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for
his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed
each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres sought the formers disqualification to run.

The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of,
and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC,
which was also affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE. WON the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared
as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.

HELD.
NO. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only
consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently,
an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit
he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term
but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An
interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course,
the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by
merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
xxx
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by
operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest,
declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as
the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.

The Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit
of the three-term limit rule.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo
cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he
assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title
to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only
upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for
only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is
that Abundo actually served less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is
and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting
the three-term threshold.