PEOPLE VS NORMA HERNANDEZCA-GR No.

22553-R, Apr 14, 1959 (I)

FACTS:

Vivencio Lascano, and Maria Norma Hernandez have a boyfriend- girlfriend relationship. The
two talked about getting married. Vivencio’s parents went to the house of Norma to have a
“pamamanhikan”. They brought chickens and goats. The marriage was set on March 19, 1955.
The preparation went on but on the day of wedding, Norma did not show up, causing Vivencio
and his family great shame and humiliation. Norma Hernandez confessed that she was not really
in love with him, and that she accepted the proposal because she was convinced by her parents.
That she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage. Norma’s parents also
corroborated her testimony. RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely
and deliberately fled to prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Norma should be convicted on the ground of serious slander by deed

RULING:

NO, SC reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant. A party to an agreement to marry
who backs out cannot be held liable for the crime of slander by deed , for then that would be an
inherent way of compelling said party to go into a marriage without his or her free consent, and
this would contravene the principle in law that what could not be done directly could not be done
indirectly; and said party has the right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. One of the
essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act of the appellant
changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to the marriage
after mature consideration. Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage. Justifying Circumstances (Art. 11 par.4, RPC) Any person who, in order to
avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another, provided that the following
requisites are present; First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the
injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.

PEOPLE VS BONOAN, L-45130, March 31, 1933 (I)

FACTS:
Accused killed Carlos Guison inflicting upon him several injuries. The case was called for
arraignment as he was sentenced for murder, however the defense counsel objected on the
ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the
Psychopatic Hospital. The court issued an order for the accused to be placed under observation
of Dr. Fernandez. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, stating that the
accused was not in a condition to defend himself. The case was suspended indefinitely. After
almost 7 months, he reported to the court that the defendant can now appear for trial as he is now
a recovered case. The court found the defendant guilty of murder. However, defense now
appealed that the court erred in finding that the accused had dementia only occasionally and
intermittently and had not had it immediately prior to commission of defense. It appeared that on
the day of commission of crime, defendant met the deceased and the witness heard the defendant
say that he will kill the deceased. Deceased said that he will pay him, but the defendant replied
that he will kill the deceased and stabbed him thrice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of killing by the defendant was exempted from criminal liability, with the
defense being that of insanity.

RULING:

Yes was exempted from criminal liability. In the Philippines, proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the
ground of insanity. The burden of establishing this is on the defendant. In proving this, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition before and after that time. From the evidence
presented, it appeared that the accused was confined in the insane department in San Lazaro
because of dementia praecox, and that all persons suffering from dementia praecox are clearly to
be regarded as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility
for their actions. It was also noted that the accused had an episode of insomnia 4 days before the
commission of the crime. He was also diagnosed with Manic depressive psychosis. In view of
this, the Court held that the accused was demented at the time that he perpetrated the offense.
Therefore, judgment of lower court is hereby reversed and he is exempt from criminal liability.

PEOPLE VS MADARANG, GR 132319, May 12, 2000 (I)

FACTS:

Accused was charged with parricide for killing his wife. At the arraignment, trial court entered a
not guilty plea for him. The accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed
behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. The Court issued an Order directing
the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric
evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. Initial exam revealed that he was suffering from
schizophrenia. He was managed and after more than 2 years of confinement, accused was
discharged from NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail. The accused proceeded to
adduce evidence to support claim of insanity. He claimed that he had no recollection of stabbing
incident and that his behavior at the time of stabbing was consistent with schizophrenia (violent
tendencies). He also relied on the opinion of the Dr. Tibayan that there was a high possibility that
he was already suffering from insanity prior to the commission of the crime. He urged that he
had no motive to kill his wife who was even scheduled to give birth to their eighth child.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the act of killing by the defendant is exempted from criminal liability, with the
defense being that of insanity.

RULING:

No, he was not exempted from criminal liability. The Court ruled that none of the witnesses
presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated
with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure,
the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the
appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility
that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also
declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing
right from wrong. Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in
his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. His arguments to prove his insanity are
merely speculative. There was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the
appellant after he lost his fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may be
symptomatic of his mental illness. Therefore, the accused failed to establish with convincing
evidence that he was insane when he killed his wife and this the decision of trial court convicting
him of parricide was affirmed.

PEOPLE VS OPURAN

FACTS:

Anacito Opuran, the defendant, was charged with two counts of murder for the death of
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles. He both stabbed the two while they were
defenseless. Two cases were filed in the RTC found that Opuran was guilty with the crime of
homicide. However, he avers that he was suffering from a psychopatic disorder, therefore
completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victim. He also pleads for the mitigating
circumstance of insanity as stated in Article 13, par. 9 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Opuran may invoke the exempting circumstance of Insanity.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that the evidence did not strongly show that Opuran was insane. Although he
was prescribed medicines, it was shown that it was not for mental illness but for lack of sleep
and noisiness. It was also proved that Anacito was never confined in mental institution. Although
he head behavioral oddity three days prior the commission of the crime, it does not prove that
Opuran was indeed insane.

The court stated that there are two distinguishable tests to determine whether a person can be
exempted from criminal liability: (a) the test of cognition whether there was a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act and (b) the test of volition whether
there was a total deprivation of freedom of the will.

Therefore, the decision of the RTC and CA were affirmed, finding Opuran guilty of the crime of
murder.

ORTEGA VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

Joemar Ortega, the petitioner, is a 14 year-old who was charged with two cases of rape of a 6
year-old child. He pleaded not guilty in these two cases which were docked in the Regional Trial
Court. The petitioner were charged with rape, however, the defense avers that the petitioner is a
minor, who lives in a barrio and is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. They
contend that the family of the victim, only accuses them of rape because they want to extort
money from them. The petitioner went to the Court of Appeals however, it also ruled in
convicting Ortega of rape. They also raised the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Actor RA 9344,
saying that the petitioner is exempted from criminal liability, considering that when he
committed the act, he was still a minor (13 yrs old).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Joemar Ortega is exempted from criminal liability with him being a minor at the
time of the commission of the crime.
RULING:

Yes. The ruled that Joemar Ortega is exempted from criminal liability, as the law (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act) was applied retroactively in the case of Ortega and that under Section 6
of RA 9344, it is explicitly provided that:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.

There is no question that in this case this provision explicitly applies. Therefore, Joemar Ortega
is exempted from the criminal liability due to him being a minor, however, he is not exempt from
civil liability.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

William was married to Zenaida. They have two daughters, Karen and Wendy. Zenaida died
ahead of her mother Manolita, William's mother-in-law. In 1992, William made Manolita sign
special powers of attorney appointing Wendy, then only 20 years old, as Manolita’s attorney-in-
fact to sell and dispose four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William told Manolita
(who was already completely blind) that the documents she was signing was merely for paying
taxes. Believing William's misrepresentation, Manolita signed the documents. The parcels of
land were sold and William misappropriated the proceeds thereof amounting to P22,034,000.

After the death of Manolita, Mediatrix, one of the surviving daughters, filed a petition for the
settlement of Manolita’s intestate estate before the RTC praying the she be appointed
administratrix thereof. After her appointment as such, Mediatrix learned from her niece Wendy
about the fraudulent sale of the parcels of land and the misappropriation committed by William.
Thus, as the duly appointed administrator of the estate of her deceased mother, she filed a case
for estafa against her brother-in-law, William.

William averred the Information claiming that under Article 332 (1) of the RPC, his relationship
to Manolita, his mother-in-law exempts him from criminal liability. The RTC sustained
William’s motion and dismissed the information. The court said that the death of Zenaida did not
extinguish the relationship by affinity of her husband William and her mother Manolita, and
therefore Article 332(1) exempting him from criminal liability was still applicable. The CA
affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or now William could be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to
Manolita under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:

No. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.

The Information against William charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the
offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense. What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in
the Information.

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that William is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. He
resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the
deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa. Since the crime with which respondent
was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, thus, he cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

PEOPLE VS ULEP

FACTS:

The defendant, Police Officer Ernesto Ulep was found guilty of the crime of murder and was
sentenced to death by the RTC for killing Wapili whem it went berserk in a subdivision in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. Before the time of the incident, Wapili, was acting oddly and said that he
could not understand himself. After a few moments, he bolted out of his room and became wild
and violent and ran outside, appearing to be completely crazy. A neighbor of Wapili, thereafter
asked for assistance to the police to pacify Wapili.
When the police arrived, Ulep fired a warning shot and told Wapili to put down his weapons,
however, it continued charging to the officers and Ulep shot him. When the victim slumped to
the ground, Ulep approached him and shot him again in the head. Ulep contends that he shot
Wapili out of self-defense and that it was in performance of his official duty.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Ulep can invoke Art. 11, par. 1 and 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Whether or not the incomplete justification in this case is a special or privileged
mitigating circumstance

RULING:

1. No. The court ruled that Ulep did not have the requisites to constitute a self-defense since
they failed to prove that there was “unlawful aggression” on the part of the victim as it is
shown that the victim was lying on the floor when he was shot, therefore making him
defenseless and that there was no need to use a gun. Also, when Wapili was shot when he
was charging towards Ulep, the moment he fell down on the ground, the aggression
ceases, therefore there is no unlawful aggression anymore. In invoking the paragraph 5 of
Article 11, it was ruled that the requisites for this justifying circumstance was incomplete
because he went to the scene in performance of his duty, however he easily decided to
shoot Wapili.
2. Yes, the incomplete justification of the justifying circumstance of the performance of
official duty or right is considered a special and privileged mitigating circumstance
which, not only can offset by an aggravating circumstance but also reduces the penalty by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. The court also recognized the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender by Ulep.

Therefore, the decision of the lower court was modified to Homicide instead of Murder.

PEOPLE VS GONZALES

FACTS:

On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in the course
of her husband’s altercation with the accused and his son along the Garden of Remembrance
within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused guilty of the
complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to
death. The accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes. He seeks reversal of the decision as he had
no intention to kill the victim therefore exempting him from the crime. He also pleaded for the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of
a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.

This case is before us on automatic review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there were mitigating circumstances which attended to the commission of the act.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that the defense failed to prove that there are the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong. However, treachery was not proved in the commission of the act
therefore the Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower court from Frustrated Murder to
Homicide.

US VS TAÑEDO, L-5418, February 12, 1910 (I)

FACTS:

The accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens,
and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation, shot him in the breast with a shotgun which
destroyed the heart and killed him. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tañedo ran back to
his workers and asked one to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall
cogon grass, and later burying in an old well. Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken
was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime. Prior to the
trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The CFI
of Tarlac found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest and
intentionally shooting him in the chest.

So far as can be ascertained, there was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. There
appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The only possible
reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken
and the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired. Hence, the decision
was appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court was correct in ruling that there was criminal liability.
RULING:

No, the court was incorrect in ruling that there was criminal liability. If life is taken by misfortune
or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention
of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. In this case there is absolutely no evidence of
negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial. In the case of the State
vs Legg, it ruled that where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required
to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional
killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional. Evidence of misadventure
gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury.
And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent which constitutes an essential
element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the judgment is reversed.

US VS CABALLEROS, G.R. 1352, March 29, 1905 (I)

FACTS:

Defendants have been sentenced as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination
perpetrated on the persons of the American school teachers without having taken part in the said
crime as principals or accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in
order to conceal the crime.

ISSUE:

WON defendants acted under compulsion of irresistible force, which, according to Article 12 (par
5) of the RPC, exempts them from criminal liability

HELD:

Yes, they were exempted from criminal liability. Although one confessed that he assisted with the
burial of the corpses, it appeared that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers
of the four teachers (as corroborated by witness). The witness said that Rober Baculi was not a
member of the group, and that he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some
bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and
Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their
guns they forced him to bury the corpses. For Caballeros, there was no proof that he took part in
any way in execution of crime. Their failure to report the crime is not an offense punished by the
Penal Code. Therefore, the defendants were acquitted.

LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 157057 June 26,
2007

FACTS:

On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan), were walking
to their respective homes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father. Since the pavement
going to Crisaldo's house followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs called banganga, Allan
walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed weapon on his
back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw his attacker,
petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit
the latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused
petitioner to run away.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty." Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC
rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA, which
affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder.

RULING:

No, he was not guilty of frustrated murder. It must be stressed that it is not only the gravity of the
wounds alone that determine whether a felony is in the attempted stage or frustrated stage.

In the present case, the intent to kill was evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt
through the unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the treacherous manner of execution of the attack
as well as the number of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from behind by petitioner.
When Crisaldo turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting Crisaldo on the left arm as
the latter tried to defend himself. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution,
because Allan came to the aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not
voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help
Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not been
completed. Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the
wounds sustained by Crisaldo.
US vs DELA CRUZ, GR L-0794, March 29, 1912

FACTS:

Defendant (De la Cruz), in the heat of passion, killed his querida when he caught her
redhanded in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. Trial court found defendant
guilty of homicide without any extenuating circumstances present. Defendant was sentenced to
14 years 8 months 1 day of reclusion temporal (medium degree of penalty prescribed by the
code).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of acting under the heat of passion or
obfuscation was present.

RULING:

Yes. There was an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court was of the
opinion that the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion and obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. The Court also differentiated this case from US v Hicks: In the Hicks case, the
cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the defendant was his disappointment due to the
woman’s refusal to live with him. The act of killing was done with premeditation and
preparation. In this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally produced
passion and obfuscation was because of the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him and his
discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.AMAGUIN, GR 54344-54345, January 10, 1994

FACTS:

On their way to the plaza, Pacifico (deceased) was called by accused Celso Amaguin.
After the refusal of the deceased, the accused, Celso, with a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards
Pacifico. Gildo, Celso's younger brother, followed with a knife and slingshot. Celso hacked
Pacifico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguin
brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively shot the brothers Pacifico, Diosdado and the
fleeing Danilo. Diosdado was again shot by Willie who next fired anew at Pacifico. Meanwhile,
Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico who already lying defenseless. The defense however
maintains that it was the Oro brothers who started the fight. Nenita Amaguin, mother of the accused
brothers, affirmed that her son Celso was indeed troublesome, but added that Willie had no prior
violations against the law.

After a joint trial, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo found Gildo Amaguin, guilty of
murder and Willie Amaguin as accomplice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor of the
accused.

RULING:

Yes. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact
is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected. For
voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must
be present: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to
a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. All these requisites appear to have
attended their surrender.

PEOPLE VS CAPALAC, GR No. L38297, Oct. 23, 1982

FACTS:

Moises Capalac, the brother of accused (a police officer), was stabbed by Jimmy Magaso.
Following this incident, in the cockpit of Iligan, Jimmy was trying to escape when he was
confronted by the Moises’ brothers (Mario and Jesus) and 2 other companions. The attempt of
Jimmy to board a jeep was unsuccessful, he having alighted after two shots were fired in
succession. Knowing that he was completely at the mercy of the two brothers, he raised his
hands as a sign of surrender, but they were not appeased. He was pistol-whipped by Mario, and
after having fallen in the ground, was stabbed on the chest 3-4 times by Jesus. He died on the
way to the hospital. Mario was convicted of murder, as qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery. The lower Court also found that he took advantage of his position as a police officer.
He was sentenced to death. Mario appealed, thus this review.

ISSUES:
 1. WON there is an aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office/position

2. WON there was

a. Conspiracy
b. Treachery
c. Evident premeditation
d. Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication

RULING:

1. No. The mere fact that appellant Mario is a member of the police force did not by itself
justify the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office/position. He acted
like a brother (of Moises), instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious assault on
his kin. He pistol-whipped the deceased because it came in handy. That he was a policeman
is of no relevance in assessing his criminal responsibility.

2. a. Yes. There was conspiracy since the two brothers, as well as their 2 companions,
apparently had one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing of Moises. They all acted in
concert.

b. Yes. There was treachery since the crime was committed to insure that Jimmy would die.
His situation was hopeless. There was also no risk to the aggressors since two other
companions assisted them.

c. No. There is no evident premeditation. The brothers were prompted by their desire to avenge
Moises. They went after Jimmy, assaulted him, and relied on the weapons that they carried.
There was no evidence that they deliberately employed means to add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act.

d. Yes. There is mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication since the purpose of the
crime was to vindicate the stabbing of Moises by Jimmy.

URBANO V. PEOPLE, GR No. 182750, Jan 20, 2009

Facts:
The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District
(LIWAD), when they have arrived from a picnic in the nearby town with some other co-workers.
While inside the compound, the two had a heated argument.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows.

Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by the eyewitness, which made
Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their
companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow caused Tomelden to be
unconscious.

Upon arriving home, Tomelden informed his wife about the previous fight last night and of him
being unconscious. He complained about the pain he felt in his nape, head, and ear.

The attending physician, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling
to consider cerebral hemorrhage."

Tomelden died later on due to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident." The defense presented by the petitioner
was that he denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden
was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter's death.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming the conviction of petitioner.

The petitioner next argued that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim shall be appreciated in petitioner's
favor.

Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing that lucky punch in the
course of parrying the latter's blows.
Issues:

Erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the
victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner.
Ruling:
Petition is partly meritorious.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as follows:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances:
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance, the reference is to an
unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating
anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation
must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act... and should immediately precede
the act.
In the case at bar, Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer
Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate
to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from
that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been avoided had it been he has the
financial capacity to get the proper medical attention that was needed.

Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of
homicide.

PEOPLE V. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 740

Facts:

Based on a testimony of the witness, he was in his pedicab when he saw two men trying to gain
possession of a bag from a woman in which one of them was armed. When the bag was taken from
the woman, the one with the gun chased after a man who was trying to help the woman while the
other kicked the woman sending her to the ground.

The guy with the gun returned and shot the woman in the head who was still on the ground. The
bag was taken to a tricycle which the accused is driving and was received by another man. The
armed man, sat on the back while the other sat on the sidecar.

The witness got their plate number and was able to recognize the driver so he immediately
reported it to the nearest police station.

The accused, in his version of the story, contend that he was only rented out to bring them to the
coliseum. At some point, he was asked to stop the tricycle and was made to believe that they will
just buy a cigarette. That is when the incident happened. He was going to ask for help but was
prevented by the man who stayed in the tricycle. He further stated that he did not report them
because he was threatened not to.The court found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged
and sentenced him to death. The accused claims to have been acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and must be exempted from the liability.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, hence, it could not be
considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force
because it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence.
Issue:

Whether or not the accused can be exempted under Art 12 par 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
must be sustained.

He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-
accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was
only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.

As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those
less powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally do what an armed man
asks them to do. In the case at bar, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore
be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger.

A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and
security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.

PEOPLE V. RETUBADO, G.R No. 124058, 2003-12-10

Facts:

The appellant’s younger brother Edwin Rebutado, was joked by someone who inserted a lighted
firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to him. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on
the dining table as he was having dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded.

The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. – the Cañons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter
was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out
that Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter closed.

The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. At about 9:00 pm of the
same day, 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a day and decided to go
home after a day’s work. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook
Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel ignored the
appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house.

The appellant still goes on the victim, upon which the alleged firing happened as to which different
stories were told upon the court.
The accused told that he wrestled with the victim for the possession of the gun and that he was
merely defending himself. He contends that he had no intention of killing the victim, as he merely
wanted to talk to his son.

While it was said that the appellant pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel
on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant is performing a lawful act with due care that he should be not held
criminally liable for the victim’s death.

Ruling:
The appellant does not prove with clear and convincing evidence that he performs a lawful act
with due care as contemplated in paragraph 4 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending himself when he
grabbed the victim’s hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the bullet hit the
victim’s forehead. The accident was not the appellant’s fault. The appellant asserts that when he
wrestled with the victim for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He
contends that he had no intention of killing the victim, as he merely wanted to talk to his son.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence.

By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if such
evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no
longer be disbelieved.

PEOPLE V. DORIA, G.R NO. 125299, 22 January 1999

Facts:

Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was
engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation.
He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he
revealed that he left it at the house of his associate so he led the police team to her house.

The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ”
and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her
house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was
open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana
earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were
examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.

Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. Regional Trial Court
convicted them.

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.

Ruling:
Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but
as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean
that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who
effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest.

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when
the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the
same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent
to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and
its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s house Gaddao
does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.

PEOPLE V. URAL

Alberio went to the municipal building, he saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already
acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a
consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on
his prostrate body.

Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents
on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed
in agony.

Alberio was shocked with the incident so he decided to leave the municipal building. Before his
departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done."

Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, who treated the victim, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck,
left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back. She testified that if the burns were
not properly treated, the burns would cause death.

Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating
"burn" as the cause of death.

During the trial, the prosecutors failed to present the detention prisoners who saw the burning of
Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased. Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of
murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay costs.
Issue:

Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove his guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
Trial court did not err in convicting Ural for murder.

Ural had his own version of the story. According to him he heard a scream for help from Napola
whose shirt was in flames when found by him, he removed the shirt, but did not summon the doctor
because he thought that the burns were not serious. This statement does not prove that he was not
the one who burned Napola, at most this could only mean that he was alarmed by the consequences
of his evil act.

Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as a witness, saying that he was not listed as a prosecution
witness and that he was convicted of murder in the past. They would not preclude him as a credible
witness. The statements of the witnesses for the defense were not inconsistent with that of
Alberio’s.

Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in Alberio’s testimony. The present case is covered by
Art. 4 (par.1- result greater than what was intended). Trial Court erred in not appreciating the
Mitigating Circumstance “that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed”.

People v Pagal L-32040

Facts: On December 26 1969, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to gain, and by means of violence, take away from the person of one
Gau Guan, cash amounting to P1,281.00. Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Gau Guan in the said sum of Pl,281.00; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said amount of P1,281.00, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, treacherously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the said Gau Guan, by then and there stabbing him with an icepick and
clubbing him with an iron pipe on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. When the case was
called for arraigmnent, counsel de oficio for the accused informed said court of their intention to
enter a plea of guilty provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceding the act, and that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and
obfuscation.

Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation can be appreciated.

Ruling: The accused presented evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation on the part of the victim immediately preceding the act and acting upon an impulse so
powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. After the accused had rested their case, the
prosecution presented the statements of the accused, and other pertinent documents regarding the
investigation of the case.

After the trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, both accused are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and there being proven the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation and disregard of respect due the
offended party offset only by the mitigating circumstance of their plea of guilty, sentences
each one of them to DEATH, jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gau
 Guan; P15,000.00 for moral damages; P15,000.00 for exemplary damages, all amounts to
bear interest until they shall have been fully paid; the sum of P1,281.00 representing the
amount taken from the victim; and to pay proportionately the costs.

Guillermo v People GR 153287

Facts: at 5:30 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, the accused was in Cuartero at the restaurant of
Melecio Heyres, husband of Gertrudes Heyres, together with Arnel Socias and Joemar Palma
drinking beer, consuming only about half a bottle, when Winnie Alon, Eddie Roque, Vicente Alon,
and Wilfredo Cabison arrived and ordered beer from Babylou Felipe. Winnie Alon came to him
and requested to join them in their table which he affirmatively answered. Winnie Alon then had
an altercation with Arnel Socias regarding "labtik" (string used in marking wood to be cut).

Winnie Alon challenged Arnel Socias to a contest on clean or straight cutting of wood. Arnel
declined the challenge claiming that he is only an assistant to his brother-in-law. Winnie Alon got
angry and told him that he has long been in [the] chain saw [sic] business but "you re stupid"
("gago ka!"). Arnel responded: "If the wood is crooked and you would deviate from line, you re
stupid.”

Winnie Alon suddenly stood up and said to Arnel: "Don't ever call me stupid," pointing his finger
to Arnel. He told them to settle the matter peacefully as they are friend [sic], but Winnie Alon was
so furious and grabbed Arnel Socias by the collar. Arnel tried to release the hold of Winnie from
his collar. While he was pacifying the two telling them to settle the matter peacefully, Winnie Alon
turned to him and said: "you also," then struck him with a beer bottle. He was hit at the right top
of his head thrice. He stood up and boxed Winnie who again picked up a bottle break [sic] it against
the wall, and struck him with the broken bottle. He stepped back, pulled his knife, and stabbed him
three (3) times but cannot remember what part of his body was hit by his successive stabs.

Issue: Whether or not the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification of self-
defense can be appreciated.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the evidence on record having established the guilt of Noel Guillermo as
principal in the crime of homicide for stabbing three (3) times Winnie Alon which caused the
latter's death, attended by a special or privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
justification, and without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances attendant, he is imposed an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay death
indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Winnie Alon, in the service of his sentence he shall be
credited the period that he undergone [sic] preventive imprisonment, conformably with Art. 29 of
the Code.

Costs against the accused.

For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Arnaldo Socias and Joemar Palma are acquitted of the
crime charged. The bail bond for their provisional liberty is CANCELLED AND DISCHARGED.

People v Lua Chu GR 34917

Facts: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of Opium coming from
Hongkong, who represented agents of the real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing 3,252
tins. He collaborated with Juan Samson and Joaquin Natividad, officers of the Bureau of Customs,
by paying them an amount of P6000 for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On
December 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng
informed Samson that the former consult the real owners on how to proceed the payment of P6000
and will come over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners. On
the same day Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo & the
Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation between Samson & Uy
Se Teung.

On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapao from a law
firm and hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the conversation
between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu. Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao was able to note the
following important facts: Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of
the Opium; Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners named Tan and
another located in Amoy;. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from
the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng; a Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was
on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium.

The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson. Captain
Buencosejo showed up and caught them in the act and arrested the accused. The Constabulary
then arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50000 worth of opium from them.

Issue: Whether or not Samson and Natividad were instigators or not.

Ruling: As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-
appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an
understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them that he
would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was
concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better
to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is
certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government
from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is
induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret
service pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse,
in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to
the prosecution and conviction of the latter.

People vs Loreno L-54414

Facts: On the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe,
who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish
their purpose, did then and there were fully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use
violence and intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands
of the members of his fully and on the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the
floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner
thereof, of the following properties, to an amount totalling P10,619.50, Philippine Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount. That on the occasion
thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse
with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will. The
accused claims that they merely done what is accused of them because of a threat from a man
wearing a black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the NPA who
operated in the locality and threatened them that if they did not obey, the accused and their families
will get killed.

Issue: Whether or not Loreno and Marantal acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.

Ruling: A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.

A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint
brief showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and
rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts
inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. All the foregoing acts
demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts,
though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their
community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which
constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself.

People vs. Castillo GR 172695

Facts: Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the evening of November 5, 1993. The cause
of her death was massive hemorrhage due to "laceration of the jugular vein of her neck". According
to Dr. Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who conducted the autopsy
on the victim’s body, the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument like a nail". There
is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife hitting her at
the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The accused was last seen holding and practicing
his sling and arrow and the next event was the accused carrying his bloodied and unconscious wife
to bring her to the hospital.

Issue: Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental.

Ruling: No. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following
are exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.

"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential
requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
Playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus,
based on this simple fact alone, appellant's defense of accident must not be acknowledged because
he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.