The Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiations:

Important Interactional Features

Terry Royce

In recent years understandings of the interactional features of

police crisis negotiations have developed through approaches
which have built on and developed the precursor bargaining and
expressive models of crisis negotiations. This paper draws upon
this more interactional interpretation of police crisis negotiations
by highlighting and discussing their main features: the use of
active listening to build rapport with a person of interest (POI), the
discourse staging of the negotiation (critical moments), and the
role that features of the context before and during the incident can
play in the language choices made by the negotiator in interaction
with the POI. These interactional features are illustrated via
extracts from a police crisis negotiation in Australia, and
suggestions for further research are provided.

Keywords: negotiation, negotiators, crisis negotiation, police,

active listening, forensic linguistics, interaction, critical moments

1 Introduction

The hostage crisis at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games culminated in

the deaths of eleven Israeli athletes and coaches, one West German
police officer, and eight members of the Black September terrorist
group. This was an event that stunned the world, not the least because
local media outlets broadcast the actions of the German police live; the
kidnappers were thus able to watch the police as they prepared their
tactical response, and the world was presented with the iconic images
of kidnappers leaning over balconies to look at the police taking up
positions. Since that crisis and subsequent critical and political
International Journal of Law, Language & Discourse, 2012, 2(3), 1-24
© IJLLD
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 2

evaluations, law enforcement agencies and professionals have

increasingly been pressured to use negotiation as the most appropriate
alternative to the use of tactical assault to resolve terrorist, hostage,
barricade [siege] and suicide situations (Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt,
1997).
The term typically used in the literature and police training
manuals in this area is that of ‘crisis negotiations’. A ‘crisis’ is deemed
to occur when a subject is unable to cope with a life situation or to
utilise familiar problem-solving methods; typically the person
experiences a cycle of escalating tension, associated with a range of
increasingly intense feelings where there may be shifts from fear to
panic, from anger to rage, and the development of increasingly
confused thinking (McMains & Mullins, 2001, p. 68). An individual
experiencing this kind of emotional excitation can be considered to be
‘in crisis’, and when the situation escalates to the point where police
intervention is required, and where there is a need to de-escalate the
crisis, crisis negotiation methods are typically utilised.
Initial classifications of negotiation dynamics by early scholars in
this area have identified two main approaches to modelling crisis
negotiation, one characterized as the instrumental approach, and the
other as the expressive acts approach (Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt,
1997). The instrumental approach derives from social exchange theory
and “conceptualizes crisis negotiations in terms of instrumental issues
present during negotiation”. The orientation of the behaviours of the
subjects or the negotiators in this “bargaining” approach is thus towards
some kind of substantive instrumental outcome and it essentially views
negotiation as “agreement-making through bargaining or problem-
solving, typically via quid pro quo” (Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt,
1997, p. 11). The way this approach works out in practice is that in the
interchange between the parties, there are expressed goals that they
hope to meet, and an understanding that neither side can meet those
goals without some kind of balancing between rewards and costs, a
quid pro quo or tradeoff, where the goal is to maximize returns
(rewards) and to minimize what must be given up (costs).
The expressive negotiation approach has its derivation in
psychotherapy (see discussions of the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ in
Schlossberg, 1979), which presumes that “the nature and quality of
3 T. Royce

interpersonal relationships plays a large role in resolving conflict”

(Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1997, p. 12). This approach views
emotion and relationship variables as the central elements, so
relationship development, developing rapport, and building trust are
accepted as being crucial to resolving crisis incidents. In typical
negotiator training contexts the emphasis is thus placed on [active]
“listening, paraphrasing, self-disclosure, open-ended questioning, and
specific skills for reducing the perpetrator’s anxiety level” (Rogan,
Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1997, p. 13). The establishing, building and
maintaining of rapport is important in other policing contexts besides
crisis negotiation: it is especially emphasized in police investigative
interviewing, as well as in interrogation contexts. The discussion of
active listening which follows below explains and illustrates the ways
that rapport can be established, and the role it can play in a crisis
negotiation.
More recently, a third approach emphasises communicational
aspects in negotiations (Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1997): this
approach assumes that all communication, in line with basic
communication theory, has both a content and a relational dimension,
the former relating to the instrumental focus of communication, and the
latter to its expressive features (which is further broken down into
relational and identity information). In this interpretation of crisis
negotiation “parties to conflict interaction pursue three functional
interactional concerns which impact on conflict escalation/de-
escalation – these are instrumental, relational, and identity or face
goals” (Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1997, pp. 14-15). This
approach has been further developed into the S.A.F.E. model, which
proposes that there are 4 "triggers" working as predominant "frames"
for communicative interaction as a crisis incident unfolds (Hammer,
2008). These can be summarised as:
 Substantive Demands: instrumental wants/demands made by
subject & negotiator
 Attunement: the relational trust established between the parties
 Face: the self image of each of the parties that is threatened or
honored
 Emotion: the degree of emotional distress experienced by the
parties 

 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 4

Given the context of this developing interactional interpretation of

police crisis negotiation dynamics, this paper highlights and discusses
the main interactional features that are typically emphasized in both
police training modules and in the published literature. The features
discussed cover the use of active listening to build rapport in the
interaction, aspects of the discourse staging of the negotiation (often
referred to as critical moments), and the role that features of the context
before and during the incident can play in the language choices made
by the negotiator. The discussion of these interactional features will be
illustrated via extracts from a case study of a police crisis negotiation in
Australia.

2 Active Listening

Active listening as an interpersonal skill is taught and utilized in a wide

range of contexts, and the way it is defined depends on how and why it
is used. Generally however, it deals with empathizing and listening
constructively, with a focus on developing and showing an
understanding of another's feelings (Cambria et. al., 2002, p. 339). It is
used in a range of contexts: in dispute/conflict resolution and mediation
(Potter, 1995), in marital, religious, self-help, parenting and even
educational counseling or advice (Charles, 2007; Active listening skills,
2012), in journalism, sales and management (Romano, 2002), and in
suicide prevention (Listening Skills: A powerful key to successful
negotiating, 2000). An alternative characterisation is “empathetic
listening”, which according to Pickering (1986) can be interpreted in
terms of the desire to be other-directed and non-defensive, to imagine
the roles, perspectives, or experiences of the other person, and to listen
to understand rather than trying to achieve agreement or produce some
kind of change in the other person.
Active listening in the literature for crisis negotiators however is
generally defined as “the ability to see a circumstance from another’s
perspective and to let the other person know that the negotiator
understands his [or her] perspective” (Lanceley, 1999, p. 17). Two of
the most prominent of the major classifications are those by Noesner &
Webster (1997) in their work on specific verbal skills in the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, and McMains & Mullins’ (2001) generalised
5 T. Royce

groupings (which subsume the verbal skills developed by Noesner &

Webster). These classifications are listed in Table 1 below.

Noesner & Webster verbal skills (1997 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin)
Labelling emotion labelling (you sound…, I hear…)
Silence/pausing the use of silence/pausing to encourage a subject to
talk
Back-channelling the use of back-channelling or minimal encouragers
(OK, oh…, I see…, really?)
‘I’ Messages the use of ‘I’ messages or first person singular by the
negotiator (I know that …; I feel.. xx .. when you …)
Questions open-ended questions which do not encourage
yes/no answers (how, when, what, where, why, who
… etc.)

McMains & Mullins groupings (2001)

Paraphrasing a response in which the negotiator gives the subject
the essence of his message in the negotiator’s words
Reflecting feelings a response in which the negotiator mirrors back to
the subject the emotions the subject is
communicating (mirroring)
Reflecting a response in which negotiators let the subject know
meaning they understand the facts and the feelings the subject
is communicating
Summative a response in which the negotiator summarises the
reflections main facts and feelings that the subject has
expressed over a relatively long period

Table 1: Classifications of Active Listening

The New South Wales Police Service in Australia (which is the
context of the case study of police crisis negotiation used in this paper)
takes a more verbal skills approach to the use of active listening in the
professional development training workshops it offers to its serving
police negotiators. These approximate most of the FBI’s listings, with a
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 6

couple of psychologically derived terms (association, interpreting)

included. These may be summarised as:
 Attending (being physically or vocally there for a subject)
 Paraphrasing (statements which exactly/closely mirror the
subject’s words)
 Reflection (helps the subject understand that negotiator
understands his/her feelings)
 Summarising (clarifies the subject’s meanings & shows the
negotiator is listening)
 Association (building rapport through sharing feelings,
attitudes, opinions etc.)
 Probing (open-ended questions to get subject to express more
ideas)
 Interpreting (drawing upon ideas expressed and re-framing
them for the subject)
 Confrontation (using questions/statements to clarify avoided
feelings or states)
The case study of a police crisis negotiation that is commonly used
in workshops for professional development purposes by the New South
Wales (NSW) Police Service in Australia is an effective illustrative
exemplar of the ways that active listening can be used in a negotiation
(for full analyses see Royce, 2005; 2009). The incident, referred to
internally by the NSW Police and in subsequent press reports as
Operation Terrall (The Sun-Herald, 2001; Daily Liberal, 2002),
involved NSW police negotiators tasked with the serving of a “high-
risk warrant” on a “person of interest’ (POI) who is known to be armed,
is expected to resist, and has demonstrated that he is a serious danger to
other people (McMains & Mullins, 2001, pp. 39-40). The subject of
this warrant lives on a farm in rural NSW and was alleged to be
regularly entering a nearby town carrying loaded weapons and wearing
a live, home-made body-bomb, apparently for self-protection against
perceived threats.
A more detailed analysis of this incident published in Harvard
University’s Negotiation Journal (Royce, 2005) revealed the use of a
majority of the identified verbal skills that have been outlined by
Noesner & Webster (1997) in their FBI report:
7 T. Royce

• the interactional use of ‘I’ messages or first person singular by

the negotiator
• the use of mirroring, where he repeats the last words/ phrases or
main idea
• the use of tag questions and eliciting statements which are used
to draw out some appreciation or acknowledgment of other
people’s feelings and positions.
• reflective empathizers, which ellipse the meanings expressed
and operate to maintain the interactional exchange at a
discoursal level (a verbal skill not included by Noesner &
Webster 1997, but introduced by Royce, 2005).
A sampling and brief discussion of these elements is provided in the
following.

2.1 The interactional use of ‘I’ messages

In active listening for crisis incidents, the usage of ‘I’ messages is
usually discussed in terms of a negotiator expressing his feelings about
the POI’s actions so the sense that he/she is a real person with feelings
is projected. However, in the initial exchange and as the text below
shows, the negotiator does in fact use ‘I’ messages, but not simply to
express his feelings about what has been said. What is interesting
interactionally is the shift that occurs in the usage of a range of
referential forms, the reasons why, and the effect these choices have on
the exchange as it unfolds.
POI: Hello?
Neg: Hello, “POI”.
POI: Who's this?
Neg: Yes, my name's John, “POI”. I'm a police negotiator.
POI: Oh, yeah.
Neg: We know you've been going into town with a bomb and there's a
lot of people very worried about that. O.K. That's why we're here,
because we know you've got guns and we know that you've got a
bomb.
POI: Well that's only if I was attacked.
Neg: I understand what you mean, but no-one wanted to attack you, no-
one wants to go near you, they're frightened, very worried about
the bomb. You can understand that, can't you?
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 8

POI: Yes, but it's absolute safe when I've got it.
Neg: Yes, look I know what you're saying and I know you have been
into town and I know no-one's been injured.
POI: No-one will be either unless you decide to declare war on me.
Neg: No, we don't want to declare war on you, not at all, not at all, but
I do need you to take off the bomb and to leave the guns on the
roadway there.
POI: Well certainly I'm going to keep my weapons, I've had them for
most of my life.
Neg: I know that, I know that, but police have to make sure that the
bomb is disarmed.
POI: Yes.
Neg: And they can't let you go with the weapons, they are going to
have to take the weapons from you now. You are under arrest,
O.K.?
POI: Now listen, this is absolutely bloody ridiculous.
Neg: I know from your perspective it may seem ridiculous, but the
people in town are very worried about it and the police are
obligated to act, as you can understand.
~~~~
Neg: Now there's no problem, you're safe if you stay where you are, but
you won't be safe if you leave that spot.
POI: The police - - -
Neg: Now just listen to me for one second please, “POI”. The police
can't let you get near them because of that bomb.
POI: I don't intend to get near them, dear or dear, I'll go back home.
Neg: No, you can't go home “POI”.
POI: What are you gunna do, shoot me in the back?
Neg: You can't leave that area, there's police all around you, there's
police back down the road towards your house. If you look down
the road you'll see a saracen.
POI: Down the, which way?
Neg: The way you've come, you can't go back that way.
POI: This is amazing.
Neg: O.K.
POI: Rightio, well what are you going to do?
9 T. Royce

The negotiator starts the exchange by identifying himself and his

relationship to the NSW Police; however he immediately chooses a
referential first person plural ‘we’, which aligns himself with the other
interactants in the situation (the police tactical and bomb disposal teams
present, the townspeople). The POI immediately personalizes through
his choice of first person singular ‘I’, but in order to establish initial
rapport and to distance himself from these ‘others’, the negotiator shifts
to first person singular “I” and the non-assertive “no-one” to make a
generalised claim about the people’s intentions. There is also a first
usage, which acts to create some distancing, of a referral to the
previously identified ‘others’, through the third person plural and
verbal contraction “they’re”.
The ensuing and multiple use of ‘I know’ in response to the POI’s
direct challenges on safety are also instances of ‘I’ messages for
rapport-building. And although the negotiator still must ensure that the
POI still sees him, at some level, as a figure associated with the police
via a brief usage of the inclusive first person plural “we”, he quickly
chooses the more intimate first person singular to project the idea that
the POI will be dealing with him, and not those ‘others’, whom he also
refers to as ‘police’ and later as ‘the police’. These choices are
deliberate and necessary for the POI to be able to start aligning himself
with the negotiator, to feel some sense of rapport (O’Reilly, 2003). This
attempt at relationship building is further reinforced through the use of
the third person plural pronominal “they” for the tactical team and the
noun phrase “the people in town” in the following choices.
This facilitates the next series of exchanges in the negotiation,
where the negotiator starts to firmly take on the role of the ‘rescuer’,
but where the POI’s developing realization that he is in a predicament,
that he is boxed in by the police leads to some agitation. At this point
the negotiator cuts him off with an imperative, but continues to refer to
‘the police’ and ‘them’ in order to maintain the sense of separation and
the idea that it is these “others’ who are constraining the POI, not the
negotiator. His reference to the ‘Saracen’ adds further to the sense of
the ‘otherness’ for the POI, and is a deliberate choice of words by the
negotiator because he knows that the POI would be impressed by the
machine and the tactics used, a point discussed in terms of context-
driven choices later in this paper (O’Reilly, 2003). The POI confirms
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 10

this perception of being constrained by the ‘others’ and signals the start
of his acquiescence and a change in attitude by expressing his
amazement; this is further confirmed by the next comment when he
asks what the negotiator intends to do next, not the police. In doing this,
the POI has assigned the negotiator agency in the situation.
The interactional sub-text in these choices by the negotiator is that
‘they’ can do these things, that these “others” are frightened and
worried, but “I” [the negotiator] am here to help “you” [the POI] get
out of this predicament. In doing this, the negotiator distances himself
from an association with the potential actions of the ‘others’, and starts
to set himself up as the ‘rescuer’. He is in a sense identifying with the
plight of the POI and projects the message that he wants to work with
him to help him save himself.

2.2 The use of mirroring

The negotiator also makes use of mirroring, where he repeats the last
words/ phrases or main idea provided by the POI to mirror back to him
the ideas or feelings that he has stated, to let him know that what is
being stated is being listened to (though not necessarily accepted), and
that he is being understood.
POI: Well that's only if I was attacked.
Neg: I understand what you mean, but no-one wanted to attack you,
no-one wants to go near you, they're frightened, very worried
about the bomb. You can understand that, can't you?
POI: No-one will be either unless you decide to declare war on me.
Neg: No, we don't want to declare war on you, not at all, not at all, but
I do need you to take off the bomb and to leave the guns on the
roadway there.
POI: Now listen, this is absolutely bloody ridiculous.
Neg: I know from your perspective it may seem ridiculous, but the
people in town are very worried about it and the police are
obligated to act, as you can understand.
Here we have various instances where the negotiator reflects back
what the POI has stated. These are where the negotiator is mirroring to
negate and reassure the POI regarding his fear of attack, or his
perception of a threat of declaration of war by police. The negotiator is
11 T. Royce

also mirroring in order to reflect the POI’s feelings/emotions about the

fact that the he is under arrest and cannot keep his weapons.

2.3 The use of tag questions and eliciting statements

Tag questions and eliciting statements are used to draw out some
appreciation or acknowledgment of other people’s feelings and
positions, thus further reinforcing other rapport-building choices.
POI: Well that's only if I was attacked.
Neg: I understand what you mean, but no-one wanted to attack you, no-
one wants to go near you, they're frightened, very worried about
the bomb. You can understand that, can't you?
POI: Yes.
Neg: And they can't let you go with the weapons, they are going to
have to take the weapons from you now. You are under arrest,
O.K.?
POI: Now listen, this is absolutely bloody ridiculous.
Neg: I know from your perspective it may seem ridiculous, but the
people in town are very worried about it and the police are
obligated to act, as you can understand.
Here the exchange reveals that the negotiator is using a tag
question to obtain an acknowledgment or some kind of verbal or
emotive response from the POI about the townspeople’s fears, and a tag
question to elicit some kind of understanding from the POI that he is
under arrest – this of course produces a rather emotive response from
the POI, which the negotiator responds to with the eliciting statement
designed to convey the police’s obligation to act to protect the
townspeople from their perceptions of the danger that the POI’s
weapons pose.

2.4 The use of reflective empathizers

What is interesting from the analysis of this incident however, is the
consistent and effective usage, throughout the entire negotiation of what
Royce (2005) refers to as reflective empathizers, an interactional
technique which has not really been covered in the literature on active
listening in crisis situations. This interactional technique does not reflect
back the propositional content of the POI’s utterances through repetition
or synonymizing (which is what mirroring is basically described as
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 12

doing), but ellipses the meanings expressed and works to maintain the
interactional exchange at a discoursal level.
POI: Well that's only if I was attacked.
Neg: I understand what you mean, but no-one wanted to attack you, no-
one wants to go near you, they're frightened, very worried about
the bomb. You can understand that, can't you?
POI: Yes, but it's absolute safe when I've got it.
Neg: Yes, look I know what you're saying and I know you have been
into town and I know no-one's been injured.
POI: Well certainly I'm going to keep my weapons, I've had them for
most of my life.
Neg: I know that, I know that, but police have to make sure that the
bomb is disarmed.
POI: Now listen, this is absolutely bloody ridiculous.
Neg: I know from your perspective it may seem ridiculous, but the
people in town are very worried about it and the police are
obligated to act, as you can understand.
Reflective empathizers are used for maintaining the interactional
flow for rapport building purposes (by acknowledging the focus of
previously given messages), and assume as understood (or ellipse) the
meanings expressed, in order to maintain the interactional exchange. In
this extract there is an ellipsis of the knowledge that the POI loves his
weapons and has had them most of his life, followed by an expressed
empathy with what the POI is going through in the situation he now finds
himself.

3 Discourse: the stages in crisis negotiations

It can be assumed that all communication, no matter what the context

or whether the mode is written or spoken, can be interpreted in terms of
an understanding that it unfolds through time, and is generally
organised into recognizable stages. The interaction between a
negotiator and a POI in a critical incident can also be interpreted as
unfolding in stages, and an understanding of how crisis incidents can
unfold naturally or be moved along in stages is important for negotiator
teams to be able to obtain a resolution. Two well-known approaches to
crisis negotiation staging, both of which approach it mainly from the
13 T. Royce

point of view of the negotiator are important: the first derives from a
forensic psychology perspective, and the second a law enforcement and
corrections context (adapted from Royce, 2009, pp. 26-27).
From a forensic psychology perspective, Call (2003; 2008, p. 280)
suggests that crisis negotiations may be interpreted in terms of five
distinct stages, or what can be characterised as strategic steps the
negotiation teams should take:
1. Intelligence gathering: the need here is to develop strategy(s)
to approach the crisis and to make preparations so the team can
deal with any potential or unforseen problems.
2. Introduction and relationship development: after contact is
made with the POI, steps need to be taken to build rapport. The
team also needs to defer action on instrumental demands until
rapport is evident and established.
3. Problem clarification and relationship development: with
rapport established negotiate (bargain) ‘normatively’ rather than
by using ‘brinkmanship’.
4. Problem solving: based on the developing rapport, start to
advance proposals to solve the situation and seek compliance
from the POI.
5. Resolution: based on continuing rapport carefully organise
steps for any hostage release, and steps for an efficient and safe
surrender.
In the police training and correctional context, the stages of a crisis
as suggested by McMains and Mullins (2001, pp. 68-76) are
characterised as going through four distinct, unfolding stages:
1. Pre-crisis: those involved in a potential crisis carry on their
normal daily activities.
2. Crisis/Defusing: something triggers intense emotional
excitation in the subject, unpredictability and uncertainty
increases, and he/she chooses a course of action which leads to
police involvement and their initial attempts to defuse the crisis.
3. Accommodation/Negotiation: the subject involved is
beginning to be open to suggestions, emotional excitation
decreases, and rational thinking increases (often with
instrumental purposes).
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 14

4. Resolution/Surrender: the subject can start to see solutions

and perhaps a clear path for alternative choices, agrees with and
tries new ideas, and makes moves towards a conclusion.
McMains and Mullins take the view that a crisis should be viewed
as a process, with “predictable stages through which people move [and
that] each stage has different issues with which negotiators must deal
and requires different skills that are valuable in dealing with the issues
of that particular stage” (2001, p. 68). Their view of the interaction as a
process is an interactive, process-based view, which takes into account
that the stages unfold as the interlocutors involved draw upon various
interactive processes.
Given these two main approaches as background, the exchange
between the POI and negotiator has been analyzed in terms of:
1. The pre-incident context: the important background details of
the intelligence gathered on the POI prior to the crisis, and
details about the tactical setup (extracted from a tape-recorded
interview and police video).
2. The initial stages of the POI text: an analysis of how the POI
is isolated and contained, and the moves made towards
establishing rapport and moving towards defusing the crisis.
3. The subsequent and final stages: where the interaction
unfolds towards resolution and surrender via cycles of
instrumental and expressive processes.
The whole exchange between the negotiator and the POI from
initiation to arrest lasts for around 47 minutes. The analysis and
characterisation of the stages will be informed by elements of the
model suggested by McMains and Mullins (2001), and due to the
incident’s atypical nature (in terms of the role and use of prior
contextual knowledge), elements of Call’s (2003, 2008) perspectives on
staging from forensic psychology will be drawn upon and adapted
(specifically the intelligence gathering stage). A full summative
analysis of the stages and processes, the purposes associated with each,
and sample utterances are given in Table 2 following.
15 T. Royce

STAGES PROCESSES EXCHANGES AND

INSTANCES
• Incidents in town (visiting town,
PRE-CRISIS INTELLIGENCE- bank, police station wearing armed
GATHERING body IED and guns).
• Police interview (with person who
knows POI)
• Police intel on property (carrying
guns while patrolling perimeters;
general paranoid behaviours)
N: “POI” You are under arrest. Stop
CRISIS CONTAINMENT & immediately, and stay exactly where
ISOLATION you are ….., There are police all
around you, …… You will be safe if you
stay exactly where you are, and do
exactly as I ask.
N: We know you've been going into town
with a bomb and there's a lot of people
very worried about that…
P: Well that's only if I was attacked……
N: … but no-one wanted to attack you,
no-one wants to go near you, …. very
CRISIS-DEFUSING EXPRESSIVE worried about the bomb ......
P: Now listen, this is absolutely bloody
ridiculous.
P: Well certainly I'm going to keep my
weapons, I've had them for most of my
life.
N: I know that, I know that, but police
have to make sure that the bomb is
disarmed.
P: Rightio, well what are you going to
do?
N: Well I need you to take off your
overalls …..
P: Then what do you intend to do? …..
P: Well what about my property and
everything? …. ….. what do you intend to
do with my weapons? …… my land, my
bike … selling my land? ….. getting out
of the country? ….. The pistol ….
N: Well they are your property …….
NEGOTIATION N: ….. but you just can't go into town
with a bomb.
P: What I've got is absolutely safe, that's
the only problem. …..
N: Well I know that you've got it really
and INSTRUMENTAL
well made and I know it's as safe as it can
(BARGAINING) be …...
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 16

P: I was worried you were attacking me

on my land to get my weapons which I've
had for years, because you've all gone
bloody well mad. …..
P: OK I'll leave my things here on the
ACCOMMODATION road. …..
N: And if you feel you could, if you can
disarm it [the IED] easily.
P: It is disarmed now. ….. Rightio, I'll
even disconnect the battery from it. …..
N: Yes, I can guarantee that that [the
money] will be returned to you. …..
P: But you're giving me a guarantee that
I can definitely get out of this country?
P: Rightio, now you want me to walk
down toward the armoured personnel
RESOLUTION / SURRENDER RITUAL carrier?
N: Please, if you could just place the
SURRENDER
phone there ….. And if you do that you'll
be absolutely safe. …..
N: Just keep walking towards them ….
until they call out to you.
P: This is wonderful .....

Table 2: The Stages in Operation Terrall (Adapted from Royce, 2009, pp. 36-
38)

4 Context: the activating role of contextual knowledge

While the exchanges between a negotiator and POI can and should be
viewed interactively from the point of view of instrumental and
expressive concerns, another fundamental aspect which is important to
consider is the understanding that all communication (no matter what
type) occurs in some kind of context of situation (Halliday, 1978), and
that this context also plays a very important role for realizing a
negotiator’s and a POI’s verbal message choices. This view also
incorporates an understanding that a particular exchange does not occur
in isolation but can also often be the result of previous interactions that
have differing contextual features. One can say, in effect that the
“context is in text” via the choices that the interactants make through
time (Eggins, 1994, p. 49). Accordingly, the context, and the use of
contextual knowledge by the negotiator, can be examined as to their
role and importance in facilitating the successful resolution of
17 T. Royce

Operation Terrall (besides the controlling effect of the tactical setup,

and the use of active listening). For a fuller discussion of these factors
in this incident, see Royce (2005; 2009).
Apart from the immediate contextual knowledge used in active
listening as an exchange develops and unfolds, the negotiator can also
draw upon prior contextual knowledge that may have been gathered
prior to the incident (from police reports about a POI, possible
immediate causes of the excitation, or notes from the initial attending
officers etc.), or via tactical intelligence gathering. One of the most
interesting aspects of the way that Operation Terrall developed and was
ultimately resolved, is the use of a great deal of information garnered
from a formal interview the NSW Police negotiator and members of the
tactical/bomb disposal teams held with an informant who was aware of
the POI’s personality, attitudes and behaviours (see the Pre-crisis Stage
in Table 2). The details of this interview, which have been derived from
the negotiator’s own personal recordings and which reveal a rather
disturbed individual with sociopathic tendencies, focussed on the POI’s
background profile in terms of his personality traits, feelings towards
others, habitual actions, possessions, interests and skills, and living
circumstances.

Table 3 below summarises these characteristics.

 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 18

Secretive, explosive temper. Paranoia - feels protected and in command when wearing IED in town – always
Personality traits wears it in town – feels it is better protection in town than just handguns. Admires ‘Rambo’. Limited
conversational abilities. Likes to feel that he is in control or has power.
Belief systems No religious affiliations or beliefs in organised religion. Machines come before people. His pets come before
people. Human life has no value.
Mechanical aptitude and has respect for machines. Pilots licence. Significant knowledge of and background with
Interests and skills weapons. Able to build own firearms/cannon and to construct a pressure-switched IED. Strong interest in
Thailand where he feels he can do anything he wants [money and prostitution].
Family relations Estranged – did not attend mother’s funeral. No contact with father. Other family members seen very
occasionally. His guns and dogs come before family.
Reaction to authority Government are ‘thugs’ who manipulate everyone (telephones, banks, TV, police etc.). Hates local council –
they should be shot. No trust in doctors – self medicates.

Feelings towards others Weapons are more valuable than people. Misogynist. Humans are ‘domestics’, ‘two legs’ or ‘functionoids’. The
local townspeople should be shot and used for fertiliser. No friends except an ‘Old Nazi’ in Thailand.
Living circumstances Lives in a caravan on own property. Largely self- sufficient existence – buys supplies in town occasionally.
Caravan is booby-trapped when he is away. Has made land mines ready to plant on property away from access
track.
Possessions Keeps antique pistols/guns, 1-inch cannon, stockpile of weapons and ammunition. Owns and uses forge, lathe
and machine tools.
Habitual actions No history of actual violence. Used to wear two IEDs and carried two handguns in town. Now carries one more
powerful body IED and three handguns. Has been wearing a ‘hot’ pressure-switched IED to town for about four
months. Uses a motorised bike to leave property along sandy access track.

Table 3: Informant Interview Results

19 T. Royce

Evidence of the use of this prior knowledge is sprinkled throughout

the negotiation exchange, some of which is illustrated below (for a
fuller discussion of these factors the way this case relates to Register
Theory, see Royce, 2009). The first uses of this prior knowledge occur
at the very beginning of the interaction, when the negotiator switches
from the megaphone announcing the POI’s need to stop where he is, to
the police radio phone line. Here he identifies himself, and once the
identification phase of the exchange is over, he then consistently draws
upon, directly and indirectly, the background contextual knowledge
obtained from the previously mentioned informant interview. These
can be analysed and summarized in terms of the following:
Neg We know you've been going into town with a bomb [habitual
actions] and there's a lot of people very worried about that. O.K.
That's why we're here, because we know you've got guns
[possessions] and we know that you've got a bomb [possessions].
Here the negotiator states facts all derived from the informant. The
POI of course is already aware of this information since they involve
him, and he is well aware of the town situation - what is new for him is
the fact that the police also know about him carrying a bomb and
weapons into town, and that people are concerned.
Neg I understand what you mean, but no-one wanted to attack you
[feelings towards others], no-one wants to go near you [feelings
towards others], they're frightened [personality traits], very
worried about the bomb [personality traits]. You can understand
that, can't you?
Here the negotiator lets the POI know that he understands that the
POI is carrying the weapons and bomb in case of attack, or fear of
attack, and he refers to the fears of the townspeople who are worried
and fearful [again based on the informant’ interview]. This is repeated
throughout the rest of the negotiation. An important aspect of this
expressed fearfulness by the people is that it feeds into the POI’s
feelings of superiority and disdain towards the townspeople, and it
feeds into his need to be in control. It is thus a clear recognition and
appreciation of the POI’s insecurities.
Neg Yes, look I know what you're saying [interests and skills – the
POI has made a safe bomb] and I know you have been into town
[habitual actions] and I know no-one's been injured [interests
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 20

and skills – the POI has made a safe bomb].

Again, the negotiator knows that the bomb is relatively safe
because of the knowledge he has gained about the construction of the
bomb the POI made; it is relatively safe for detonation because it has an
enclosed push-switch [speed of detonation is important in this context,
because of it were a more sensitive detonation switch, the implications
for police and public safety would change markedly].
Neg You can't leave that area, there's police all around you, there's
police back down the road towards your house. If you look down
the road you'll see a Saracen [interests and skills].
POI This is amazing. …….
~~~~~
Neg2 Yes, he had a look at the Saracen and that was the clincher, yes.
[interests and skills].
The negotiator’s and the tactical team’s prior knowledge of the
POI’s love for technology, tactics, and mechanical devices is also at
play here. This can be seen in the reaction of the POI to the use and
placement of a Saracen (armoured personnel carrier), and the later
comments by a second negotiator that the POI seemed impressed with
the use of such a show of quasi-military firepower.
POI Well certainly I'm going to keep my weapons [possessions], I've
had them for most of my life [possessions].
Neg I know that, I know that, but police have to make sure that the
bomb is disarmed.
This is an important exchange in relation to the importance of the
POI’s weapons. The negotiator demonstrates his knowledge and
understanding of this, which he continues to do throughout the
bargaining phase, via statements demonstrating surety of knowledge [I
know that, I know that]. The importance of this particular usage based
on prior knowledge grows in importance during the middle and latter
part of the negotiation, where considerable numbers of exchanges
revolving around the bargaining over the POI’s property, guns, money,
etc. occur.
Neg No, you can't go home [living circumstances] “POI”.
POI What are you gunna do, shoot me in the back?
Neg You can't leave that area, there's police all around you, there's
police back down the road towards your house [living
21 T. Royce

circumstances]. If you look down the road you'll see a Saracen.

The use of background knowledge obtained is also used tactically to cut
off the POI from his home base. When the POI states his intention or
desire to go back home, he is quickly told that he cannot go home, that
he is effectively isolated, and that if he tries to return he will be in
danger. The police already know that this is the source of the POI’s
security, strength and multiple forms of weaponry and booby traps, so
they make sure that he is dissuaded from trying to return.

5 Conclusion

The analysis and discussion that has been presented in this paper has
shown that police crisis negotiations are complex interactive events
which can and should be looked at from a range of different aspects.
There are instrumental or bargaining aspects, as well as expressive and
emotional aspects to how the exchanges can unfold. It is important
however to look at how the exchanges unfold due to the choices made
by the interactants in response to each other (the importance of active
listening for building rapport), the ways that the interaction can be
moved along through various stages (the discourse stages in crisis
negotiations and their associated critical moments), and the ways that
purposeful choices can be made based on the negotiator’s prior
contextual knowledge (the activating role of contextual knowledge).
Operation Terrall is unusual in that the police were able to obtain a
great deal of prior intelligence which was used to great effect in the
incident, but it is also true that a crisis negotiation which occurs rapidly
in real time, with little time to gather such extensive information, can
also be influenced by the purposeful, context-driven choices of the
negotiator and his/her team.
This analysis suggests areas for further interactional study of this
kind of incident. One important area would be an intonational analysis
of vocal recordings of these kinds of interactions, especially in the
move from a public megaphone to the more ‘intimate’ police phone.
This could be correlated with the stages and functional moves
occurring as an interaction unfolds. The implications of this kind of
analysis would be interesting for police training, as an awareness of
how their voice can be used in conjunction with their lexical choices to
 Analysis of Police Crisis Negotiation 22

build rapport, and where needed move the exchange along in stages,
and bring in the “voice of reason” to start to move the interaction
towards the resolution/surrender phase (O’Reilly, 2003), can greatly
assist the successful resolution of crisis incidents. Another good
example of this is the insertion of the active listening skill the NSW
Police refer to as “Confrontation”, where they purposely use
questions/statements to clarify avoided feelings or states, and to ensure
that the POI is ‘getting the message’ or should be ‘jolted’ along a little.
The usage of this kind of interactive device could be seen as having its
dangers, so an understanding of its usage along with effective
intonational choices could help in its more subtle and effective use.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Detective Superintendent John O’Reilly, Commander,

Operations Group, Counter Terrorist & Special Tactics Command,
NSW Police Force, for his cooperation, assistance and advice in the
preparation of this paper, and the invaluable data upon which the
analyses are based.

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Dr. Terry Royce is a Senior Lecturer in the Graduate Research School,

University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) responsible for Research Literacies.
He holds a PhD in Linguistic Science from the University of Reading (UK),
and his research interests include forensic linguistics (critical incident
policing), the analysis of multimodal discourse, discourse and cohesion
analysis across disciplines, systemic-functional linguistics, and TESOL
education. He also supervises doctoral candidates in applied linguistics and
forensic linguistics. His external teaching and research work is in forensic
discourse analysis and forensic stylistics, where he has carried out questioned
authorship analyses for various organizations. He has also conducted
workshops on active listening and communicational staging in critical
incident policing to senior members of the NSW Police Service Negotiators
Unit in the State Protection Group, and consulted on communication issues
with other elements of the NSW Police Service such as the Counter Terrorist
and Special Tactics Command in Sydney.