G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993 On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . .

On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in
the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the original
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a
ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents. Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to comment on
the said motion.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman. Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent. Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in
contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes
were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against
QUIASON, J.: petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. (1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et al.,
to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners, obstructing the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; 260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional
Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and and unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by
Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus
asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation
of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21). On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992,
alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing respondents to
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to petitioners' preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September
controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension, the status
Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15). quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing
to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating and
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on the petition. approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation
of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the aforesaid
130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an "Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation" (Rollo, resolution" (Comment attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614 thereof).
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively,
averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and stressing the urgency for In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
 It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such functions or duties as
status which preceded the present controversy was the situation obtaining at the may be provided by law."
time of the filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners
were then actually occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution,
that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective positions and to the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other agencies the
receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully entitled to, and that preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his
respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.
refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of
September 22, 1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
615 thereof). Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:

On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for
the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case" (Attached
to Rollo without pagination). The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has
three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against
public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine,
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated
that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected with his office. December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
Petitioners also refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners' counsel and to cite them for
contempt (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one bears
in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government suspension.
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a
public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative
Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension"
which provides: should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular
word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v.
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid
in the investigation of the administrative charges.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office
of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate
in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient
manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24
of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase "subordinate
tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, officer and employee in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his
etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority
charges should be preventively suspended. may preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to "preventively
[1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris,
Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words "subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the
criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; phrase to read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . . . ."
35 N.E. 644). The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before and the words
"in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of
efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, whether they are employed "in his office" or in other offices of the government. The moment a
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed
effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed
work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. under preventive suspension.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners
Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary conference and even
206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]). after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo,
pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that assuming arguendo that the
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public officials and employees who are
penalty, said: working in other departments and offices, the questioned order remains null and void for his failure
to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3,
1992, pp. 11-19).
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly
penalty. issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties.
In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of
administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the phrase petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was
"suspend any officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v.
Garcia., supra).
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any
subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation . . . ." There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the
preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the
performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's
Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees
However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the Civil
under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the
administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive SO ORDERED.
suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the
"Motion for the Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the charges in the
criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases
of harassment by petitioners of the members of the private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and the
respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and documentary
evidence.

Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of
Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).

Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de
Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners.
Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting
favorably on their recommendation.

The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or
otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by
the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should
be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts
alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question
the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.

On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private
respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private
Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental
Comment, pp. 4-5).

A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both
oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession
and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115
SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes
at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned
language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.

The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is
confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from
the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of
members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.