EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26876. December 27, 1969.]

LUCRECIA JEREZ, JULIA JALANDONI, JULIETA JALANDONI, EVA

JALANDONI, CARMELO JALANDONI, JOSE JALANDONI and ELISEO
JALANDONI , petitioners, vs . HON. EMIGDIO V. NIETES, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, LUCILO JALANDONI and VICTORIA
JALANDONI DE GORRICETA , respondents.

Tomas Concepcion, Lorenzo F. Miravite and Corazon Miraflor for petitioners.

No appearance for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS

AND INTERVENTION THEREIN; REOPENING THEREOF EVEN AFTER APPROVAL OF
PARTITION PROJECT AND FINAL ACCOUNTING. — We do so now and de nitely hold
that rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not
recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to le a separate and independent
action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a
reopening of the case even after a project of partition and nal accounting had been
approved. Such a view nds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for
intervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF PROOF OF INTEREST OF MOVANTS;
ABSENCE OF SUCH REQUIREMENT IN INSTANT CASE. — The veri ed motion on the
part of the alleged illegitimate children of the deceased, who were preterited in the
project of partition, did not su ce to call into play the power of respondent Judge to
allow intervention in the intestate proceedings. There must be proof beyond allegations
in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the
action taken by respondent Judge in reopening the proceedings and allowing
intervention, could be considered premature.

DECISION

FERNANDO , J : p

This Court has not had previously the opportunity to pass squarely on the
question raised in this petition for the review of a resolution of the Court of Appeals
sustaining an order of respondent Judge Emigdio V. Nietes of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, reopening the proceedings in the intestate estate of the late Nicolas
Jalandoni, after having approved a project of partition and nal accounting, and
allowing a plea of intervention led within the reglementary period by the other
respondents, Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, allegedly children of
the deceased with an illegitimate status. The petitioners are the widow and the
legitimate children of the late Nicolas Jalandoni. 1
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 The Court of Appeals cannot be reversed for recognizing the existence of such a
power possessed by the respondent Judge to thus act favorably on a motion to
intervene even if submitted at such a stage. That is the answer we give to the main
issue thus posed. Our approval of the action taken, however, is not unquali ed. For
respondent Judge apparently was much too generous in his appraisal of the right of the
private respondents to intervene, accepting as established what ought to have been
proved. A modification of the appealed resolution is thus called for.
The facts are undisputed. Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960. Before the
end of that month, on October 27, a special proceeding 2 for the settlement of his
estate was led before the sala of respondent Judge, petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his
widow, being appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and nal accounting
was submitted on June 14, 1966, resulting in an order from respondent Judge dated
June 15, 1966, approving the same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni,
alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and
respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter,
sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project
of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law.
Then came on July 30, 1966 an order of respondent Judge allowing intervention and
reopening the proceedings to permit the movants, now private respondents, "to present
whatever evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the
deceased." After a motion for reconsideration, led by petitioners, was denied, the
matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction filed on September 3, 1966.
As set forth at the opening of this decision, the Court of Appeals in a resolution
of September 21, 1966 denied such petition to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge. The basis for such resolution, penned by Justice Martin with the
concurrence of Justice Rodriguez, Justice Esguerra concurring in the result with a
separate opinion, was explained in this wise: ". . . that the determination of a prima facie
interest in an estate to justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is
primarily addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate court; that,
while no supporting documents are appended to the motion to reopen tending to show
the personality to intervene, the said motion is nevertheless veri ed upon oaths of the
claimants of interest and the probate court has authority to require the submission of
at least a prima facie showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was led on
June 29, 1966 before the order closing the proceeding of June 15, 1966 had achieved
nality and during the reglementary period within which the court still had the
jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them comfortable to law and justice; that, because the closure
order aforesaid had not yet become nal, the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief
from judgment do not apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any
of the grounds therein stated is not fatal; that the better practice in case of the
appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to secure relief by reopening the proceedings
by a proper motion within the reglementary period (Ramos, et al. vs. Ortuzar, et al., G.R.
No. 3299 August 20, 1951), it being desirable that all aspects of a controversy be
ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity of suits; . . ." 3
Evidently, an ordinary division of three Justices did not su ce for a decision on
such petition for certiorari and prohibition resulting in a creation of a division of ve.
Two Justices dissented from the aforesaid resolution, the dissenting opinion being
penned by Justice Lucero with whom Justice Villamor concurred. The dissent is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 premised on the following considerations: "We should not let Lucilo Jalandoni (alleged
acknowledged natural son) and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (alleged illegitimate
daughter) to come in rst and identify themselves later, because the better policy
according to jurisprudence (Asinas vs. Court, 51 Phil. 665) is to require them rst to
produce prima facie evidence of such a civil status before opening the door and letting
them in. Under Section 2, Rule 12, Revised, 'a person may, before or during a trial, be
permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest
in the matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in the
estate cannot be totally discounted specially considering that the present intestate
proceedings had been pending for the last six (6) years without a motion to intervene
having been filed by the present claimants in spite of the notice of publication and the in
rem character of the intestate proceedings. According to their residence certi cate, the
claimants are residents of Iloilo City (Rec. 20). The procedure adopted by the lower
court is more conducive to prejudice and unnecessary loss of time, effort and expense
than the method suggested by jurisprudence of requiring rst a prima facie evidence of
status before letting them come in to intervene. Hence, the order of July 30, 1966
sought to be nulli ed under the present petition insofar as it reconsidered the approval
of the project of partition and the rst accounting is unjusti ed, as practically putting
the cart before the horse instead of the horse before the cart. Moreover, the claims can
be asserted in a separate action against the legitimate children to whom the share of
the deceased Nicolas Jalandoni was adjudicated." 4
Stress is laid in this petition for review in respondent Judge allowing private
respondents to intervene after the intestate proceedings were closed. We do not see it
that way. We repeat what we said at the outset. The challenged resolution cannot be
reversed insofar as it recognized the power of respondent Judge to reopen the
proceedings and allow intervention. While it is undeniable that the question presented
has not been de nitely passed upon before, still an indication of how such an issue
should be resolved is to be found in an opinion of Justice Tuason in Ramos v. Ortuzar, 5
referred to in the resolution of the Court of Appeals. Thus: "The only instance that we
can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a nal
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within
the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
decision or order already nal and executed and reshu e properties long ago
distributed and disposed of."
The above excerpt commends itself for approval. We do so now and de nitely
hold that rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was
not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to le a separate and independent
action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a
reopening of the case even after a project of partition and nal accounting had been
approved.
Such a view nds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention
so consistently followed and adhered to by this Court. 6 As was emphatically expressed
by Justice Makalintal, speaking for this Court, in Balane v. De Guzman: 7 "Respondent
Judge would have done well to brush aside narrow technicalities in this case, allow the
intervention prayed for and thus avoid needless delay in the resolution of the con icting
interests of all the parties."
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 It is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of Appeals upholding
the power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow intervention is not
vulnerable to attack. It was within his competence to do so. The question remains,
however, whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is not the existence of the
power but the mode of its exercise that is open to question. In that sense, the appealed
resolution bears further scrutiny.
It is indisputable that after the project of partition and nal accounting was
submitted by the counsel for petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as administratrix, on June 14,
1966, respondent Judge approved the same and declared closed and terminated the
intestacy the next day, June 15, 1966. Subsequently, on a veri ed petition by private
respondents, led on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion made that they should
have had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but that they were omitted in the
aforesaid project of partition, they sought to be allowed to intervene and "to have the
project of partition rejected for being contrary to law." Such a pleading, without more,
resulted in the questioned order of July 30, 1966, reopening the proceedings and
reconsidering the approval of the project of partition and nal accounting, to enable the
private respondents "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to
participate in the estate of the deceased." Although the recognition of their right to
intervene appeared to be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they were
given a standing sufficient to set aside the project of partition.
Respondent Judge acted too soon. The veri ed motion on the part of private
respondents did not su ce to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow
intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the
interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent
Judge could be considered premature. As was stated by us in an opinion penned by
Justice Sanchez: "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on
whether to admit or reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited." 8
WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby modi ed in the sense that respondent Judge, Honorable Emigdio V. Nietes of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Judicial District, Branch I, or whoever may be acting
in his place, is directed to require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria
Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before such
sala. In the event that they could so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of
such evidence is to proceed conformably to law. Without pronouncement as costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Lucrecia Jerez, Julia Jalandoni, Julieta Jalandoni, Eva Jalandoni, Carmelo Jalandoni,
Jose Jalandoni and Eliseo Jalandoni.

2. Special Proceeding No. 1562 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

3. Petition, Annex L, pp. 1-2.

4. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

5. 89 Phil. 730 (1951).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 6. Cf. Ahag v. Cabiling, 18 Phil. 415 (1911); Joaquin v. Herrera, 37 Phil. 705 (1918);
National Bank v. Phil. Vegetable Oil Co., 49 Phil. 857 (1927); De la Riva vs. Escobar, 51
Phil. 243 (1927); Otto Gmur v. Revilla, 55 Phil. 627 (1931); Barretto v. Tuason, 59 Phil.
845 (1934); Santaromana v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 456 (1936); Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 67
Phil. 340 (1939); Pampanga Bus Co. v. Fernando, 70 Phil. 306 (1940); Seva v. Rivera, 73
Phil. 477 (1941); Gaw Sin Gee v. Peña, 79 Phil. 663 (1947); Peyer v. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72
(1951); Republic v. Ysip, 89 Phil. 535 (1951); Republic v. Phil. Resource Dev. Corp., 102
Phil. 960 (1958); Francisco v. Rodriguez, 6 SCRA 443 (1962); Toledo v. Court, 8 SCRA
499, (1963); Lacuna v. Board of Liquidators, 12 SCRA 469 (1964); Phil. Resources Dev.
Corp. v. Republic, 13 SCRA 519 (1965); Zulueta v. Muñoz, 17 SCRA 972 (1966); Balane v.
De Guzman, 20 SCRA 177 (1967); Cue v. Dolla, 23 SCRA 832 (1968); Dizon v. Romero, 26
SCRA 452 (1968); Roxas v. Dinglasan, 28 SCRA 431 (1969).

7. 20 SCRA 177 (1967).

8. Cue v. Dolla, 23 SCRA 832 (1968).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com