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Republic of the Philippines

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

ROMERO, J.:

May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated
by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?

This is the issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC). This quasi-judicial body recognized Loyola
Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA) as the sole homeowners' association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly
registered subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was owned and developed by Solid Homes, Inc. It
revoked the certificates of registration issued to Loyola Grand Villas homeowners (North) Association Incorporated
(the North Association for brevity) and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association Incorporated (the
South Association).

LGVHAI was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand
Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent HIGC, as the
sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197. It was organized
by the developer of the subdivision and its first president was Victorio V. Soliven, himself the owner of the developer.
For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.

Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. 2 To the officers'
consternation, they discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision — the North
Association and the South Association. According to private respondents, a non-resident and Soliven himself,
respectively headed these associations. They also discovered that these associations had five (5) registered
homeowners each who were also the incorporators, directors and officers thereof. None of the members of the
LGVHAI was listed as member of the North Association while three (3) members of LGVHAI were listed as
members of the South Association.3 The North Association was registered with the HIGC on February 13, 1989
under Certificate of Registration No. 04-1160 covering Phases West II, East III, West III and East IV. It submitted its
by-laws on December 20, 1988.

In July, 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal
department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First, it did
not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of
corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association's activities. Apparently, this
information resulted in the registration of the South Association with the HIGC on July 27, 1989 covering Phases
West I, East I and East II. It filed its by-laws on July 26, 1989.

These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the HIGC. They questioned the
revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration without due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North and South Associations by reason of the earlier issuance
of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI.

On January 26, 1993, after due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling from HIGC
Hearing Officer Danilo C. Javier who disposed of HIGC Case No. RRM-5-89 as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association,
Inc., under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197 as the duly registered and existing homeowners association
for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners, and declaring the Certificates of Registration of Loyola Grand Villas
Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. as
hereby revoked or cancelled; that the receivership be terminated and the Receiver is hereby ordered to
render an accounting and turn-over to Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., all assets and
records of the Association now under his custody and possession.

The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC. In its Resolution of September 8, 1993, the
Board 4 dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.

Rebuffed, the South Association in turn appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising two issues. First, whether or not
LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code resulted in the
automatic dissolution of LGVHAI. Second, whether or not two homeowners' associations may be authorized by the
HIGC in one "sprawling subdivision." However, in the Decision of August 23, 1994 being assailed here, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the HIGC Appeals Board.

In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals held that under the Corporation Code, a private corporation
commences to have corporate existence and juridical personality from the date the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issues a certificate of incorporation under its official seal. The requirement for the filing of by-
laws under Section 46 of the Corporation Code within one month from official notice of the issuance of the certificate
of incorporation presupposes that it is already incorporated, although it may file its by-laws with its articles of
incorporation. Elucidating on the effect of a delayed filing of by-laws, the Court of Appeals said:

We also find nothing in the provisions cited by the petitioner, i.e., Section 46 and 22, Corporation Code, or in
any other provision of the Code and other laws which provide or at least imply that failure to file the by-laws
results in an automatic dissolution of the corporation. While Section 46, in prescribing that by-laws must be
adopted within the period prescribed therein, may be interpreted as a mandatory provision, particularly
because of the use of the word "must," its meaning cannot be stretched to support the argument that
automatic dissolution results from non-compliance.

We realize that Section 46 or other provisions of the Corporation Code are silent on the result of the failure to
adopt and file the by-laws within the required period. Thus, Section 46 and other related provisions of the
Corporation Code are to be construed with Section 6 (1) of P.D. 902-A. This section empowers the SEC to
suspend or revoke certificates of registration on the grounds listed therein. Among the grounds stated is the
failure to file by-laws (see also II Campos: The Corporation Code, 1990 ed., pp. 124-125). Such suspension
or revocation, the same section provides, should be made upon proper notice and hearing. Although P.D.
902-A refers to the SEC, the same principles and procedures apply to the public respondent HIGC as it
exercises its power to revoke or suspend the certificates of registration or homeowners association. (Section
2 [a], E.O. 535, series 1979, transferred the powers and authorities of the SEC over homeowners
associations to the HIGC.)

We also do not agree with the petitioner's interpretation that Section 46, Corporation Code prevails over
Section 6, P.D. 902-A and that the latter is invalid because it contravenes the former. There is no basis for
such interpretation considering that these two provisions are not inconsistent with each other. They are, in
fact, complementary to each other so that one cannot be considered as invalidating the other.

The Court of Appeals added that, as there was no showing that the registration of LGVHAI had been validly
revoked, it continued to be the duly registered homeowners' association in the Loyola Grand Villas. More
importantly, the South Association did not dispute the fact that LGVHAI had been organized and that, thereafter, it
transacted business within the period prescribed by law.

On the second issue, the Court of Appeals reiterated its previous ruling 5 that the HIGC has the authority to order
the holding of a referendum to determine which of two contending associations should represent the entire
community, village or subdivision.

Undaunted, the South Association filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. It elevates as sole issue for
resolution the first issue it had raised before the Court of Appeals, i.e., whether or not the LGVHAI's failure to file its
by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving
the said corporation.

Petitioner contends that, since Section 46 uses the word "must" with respect to the filing of by-laws, noncompliance
therewith would result in "self-extinction" either due to non-occurrence of a suspensive condition or the occurrence
of a resolutory condition "under the hypothesis that (by) the issuance of the certificate of registration alone the
corporate personality is deemed already formed." It asserts that the Corporation Code provides for a "gradation of
violations of requirements." Hence, Section 22 mandates that the corporation must be formally organized and
should commence transaction within two years from date of incorporation. Otherwise, the corporation would be
deemed dissolved. On the other hand, if the corporation commences operations but becomes continuously
inoperative for five years, then it may be suspended or its corporate franchise revoked.

Petitioner concedes that Section 46 and the other provisions of the Corporation Code do not provide for sanctions
for non-filing of the by-laws. However, it insists that no sanction need be provided "because the mandatory nature of
the provision is so clear that there can be no doubt about its being an essential attribute of corporate birth." To
petitioner, its submission is buttressed by the facts that the period for compliance is "spelled out distinctly;" that the
certification of the SEC/HIGC must show that the by-laws are not inconsistent with the Code, and that a copy of the
by-laws "has to be attached to the articles of incorporation." Moreover, no sanction is provided for because "in the
first place, no corporate identity has been completed." Petitioner asserts that "non-provision for remedy or sanction
is itself the tacit proclamation that non-compliance is fatal and no corporate existence had yet evolved," and
therefore, there was "no need to proclaim its demise." 6 In a bid to convince the Court of its arguments, petitioner
stresses that:

. . . the word MUST is used in Sec. 46 in its universal literal meaning and corollary human implication — its
compulsion is integrated in its very essence — MUST is always enforceable by the inevitable consequence —
that is, "OR ELSE". The use of the word MUST in Sec. 46 is no exception — it means file the by-laws within
one month after notice of issuance of certificate of registration OR ELSE. The OR ELSE, though not
specified, is inextricably a part of MUST . Do this or if you do not you are "Kaput". The importance of the by-
laws to corporate existence compels such meaning for as decreed the by-laws is "the government" of the
corporation. Indeed, how can the corporation do any lawful act as such without by-laws. Surely, no law is
indeed to create chaos. 7

Petitioner asserts that P.D. No. 902-A cannot exceed the scope and power of the Corporation Code which itself does
not provide sanctions for non-filing of by-laws. For the petitioner, it is "not proper to assess the true meaning of Sec.
46 . . . on an unauthorized provision on such matter contained in the said decree."

In their comment on the petition, private respondents counter that the requirement of adoption of by-laws is not
mandatory. They point to P.D. No. 902-A as having resolved the issue of whether said requirement is mandatory or
merely directory. Citing Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 8 private respondents contend that Section
6(I) of that decree provides that non-filing of by-laws is only a ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate
of registration of corporations and, therefore, it may not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Moreover,
the adoption and filing of by-laws is a condition subsequent which does not affect the corporate personality of a
corporation like the LGVHAI. This is so because Section 9 of the Corporation Code provides that the corporate
existence and juridical personality of a corporation begins from the date the SEC issues a certificate of incorporation
under its official seal. Consequently, even if the by-laws have not yet been filed, a corporation may be considered a
de facto corporation. To emphasize the fact the LGVHAI was registered as the sole homeowners' association in the
Loyola Grand Villas, private respondents point out that membership in the LGVHAI was an "unconditional restriction
in the deeds of sale signed by lot buyers."

In its reply to private respondents' comment on the petition, petitioner reiterates its argument that the word " must" in
Section 46 of the Corporation Code is mandatory. It adds that, before the ruling in Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate
Appellate Court could be applied to this case, this Court must first resolve the issue of whether or not the provisions
of P.D. No. 902-A prescribing the rules and regulations to implement the Corporation Code can "rise above and
change" the substantive provisions of the Code.

The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. — Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after
receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code. For the adoption of
by-laws by the corporation, the affirmative vote of the stockholders representing at least a majority of the
outstanding capital stock, or of at least a majority of the members, in the case of non-stock corporations, shall
be necessary. The by-laws shall be signed by the stockholders or members voting for them and shall be kept
in the principal office of the corporation, subject to the stockholders or members voting for them and shall be
kept in the principal office of the corporation, subject to inspection of the stockholders or members during
office hours; and a copy thereof, shall be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission which shall be
attached to the original articles of incorporation.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, by-laws may be adopted and filed prior to
incorporation; in such case, such by-laws shall be approved and signed by all the incorporators and submitted
to the Securities and Exchange Commission, together with the articles of incorporation.

In all cases, by-laws shall be effective only upon the issuance by the Securities and Exchange Commission of
a certification that the by-laws are not inconsistent with this Code.

The Securities and Exchange Commission shall not accept for filing the by-laws or any amendment thereto of
any bank, banking institution, building and loan association, trust company, insurance company, public utility,
educational institution or other special corporations governed by special laws, unless accompanied by a
certificate of the appropriate government agency to the effect that such by-laws or amendments are in
accordance with law.

As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins with the determination of the
meaning and import of the word "must" in this section Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imperative act or
operates to impose a duty which may be enforced. 9 It is synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion or
mandatoriness. 10 However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent
with an exercise of discretion. In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the context or a
reasonable construction of the statute in which it is used demands or requires. 11 This is equally true as regards the
word "must." Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object
reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that
meaning.12

In this respect, the following portions of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 are illuminating:

MR. FUENTEBELLA. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

On page 34, referring to the adoption of by-laws, are we made to understand here, Mr. Speaker, that by-laws
must immediately be filed within one month after the issuance? In other words, would this be mandatory or
directory in character?

MR. MENDOZA. This is mandatory.

MR. FUENTEBELLA. It being mandatory, Mr. Speaker, what would be the effect of the failure of the
corporation to file these by-laws within one month?

MR. MENDOZA. There is a provision in the latter part of the Code which identifies and describes the
consequences of violations of any provision of this Code. One such consequences is the dissolution of the
corporation for its inability, or perhaps, incurring certain penalties.

MR. FUENTEBELLA. But it will not automatically amount to a dissolution of the corporation by merely failing
to file the by-laws within one month. Supposing the corporation was late, say, five days, what would be the
mandatory penalty?

MR. MENDOZA. I do not think it will necessarily result in the automatic or ipso facto dissolution of the
corporation. Perhaps, as in the case, as you suggested, in the case of El Hogar Filipino where a quo warranto
action is brought, one takes into account the gravity of the violation committed. If the by-laws were late — the
filing of the by-laws were late by, perhaps, a day or two, I would suppose that might be a tolerable delay, but if
they are delayed over a period of months — as is happening now — because of the absence of a clear
requirement that by-laws must be completed within a specified period of time, the corporation must suffer
certain consequences. 13

This exchange of views demonstrates clearly that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on
time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, even without resorting to the records of deliberations of the
Batasang Pambansa, the law itself provides the answer to the issue propounded by petitioner.

Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli
interpretatix est ipsum statutum), 14 Section 46 aforequoted reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and
not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second
paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in the same
section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws "within one (1) month
after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission." It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of
the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the "government" of the corporation but these are subordinate to the
articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related statutes.15 There are in fact cases where by-
laws are unnecessary to corporate existence or to the valid exercise of corporate powers, thus:

In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not necessary either to the
existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of the powers conferred upon it, certainly in all cases where
the charter sufficiently provides for the government of the body; and even where the governing statute in
express terms confers upon the corporation the power to adopt by-laws, the failure to exercise the power will
be ascribed to mere nonaction which will not render void any acts of the corporation which would otherwise
be valid. 16 (Emphasis supplied.)
As Fletcher aptly puts it:

It has been said that the by-laws of a corporation are the rule of its life, and that until by-laws have been
adopted the corporation may not be able to act for the purposes of its creation, and that the first and most
important duty of the members is to adopt them. This would seem to follow as a matter of principle from the
office and functions of by-laws. Viewed in this light, the adoption of by-laws is a matter of practical, if not one
of legal, necessity. Moreover, the peculiar circumstances attending the formation of a corporation may impose
the obligation to adopt certain by-laws, as in the case of a close corporation organized for specific purposes.
And the statute or general laws from which the corporation derives its corporate existence may expressly
require it to make and adopt by-laws and specify to some extent what they shall contain and the manner of
their adoption. The mere fact, however, of the existence of power in the corporation to adopt by-laws does not
ordinarily and of necessity make the exercise of such power essential to its corporate life, or to the validity of
any of its acts. 17

Although the Corporation Code requires the filing of by-laws, it does not expressly provide for the consequences of
the non-filing of the same within the period provided for in Section 46. However, such omission has been rectified by
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the pertinent provisions on the jurisdiction of the SEC of which state:

Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) To suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of
corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law, including the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Failure to file by-laws within the required period;

xxx xxx xxx

In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such
other bodies, boards, committees and/or any officer as may be created or designated by the Commission for
the purpose. The decision, ruling or order of any such Commissioner, bodies, boards, committees and/or
officer may be appealed to the Commission sitting en banc within thirty (30) days after receipt by the appellant
of notice of such decision, ruling or order. The Commission shall promulgate rules of procedures to govern
the proceedings, hearings and appeals of cases falling with its jurisdiction.

The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting en banc to the
Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Even under the foregoing express grant of power and authority, there can be no automatic corporate dissolution
simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the
Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise" of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal
components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society. In other words, the incorporators must
be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.

That the failure to file by-laws is not provided for by the Corporation Code but in another law is of no moment. P.D.
No. 902-A, which took effect immediately after its promulgation on March 11, 1976, is very much apposite to the
Code. Accordingly, the provisions abovequoted supply the law governing the situation in the case at bar, inasmuch
as the Corporation Code and P.D. No. 902-A are statutes in pari materia. Interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. 18

As the "rules and regulations or private laws enacted by the corporation to regulate, govern and control its own
actions, affairs and concerns and its stockholders or members and directors and officers with relation thereto and
among themselves in their relation to it," 19 by-laws are indispensable to corporations in this jurisdiction. These may
not be essential to corporate birth but certainly, these are required by law for an orderly governance and
management of corporations. Nonetheless, failure to file them within the period required by law by no means tolls
the automatic dissolution of a corporation.

In this regard, private respondents are correct in relying on the pronouncements of this Court in Chung Ka Bio v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 20 as follows:

. . . . Moreover, failure to file the by-laws does not automatically operate to dissolve a corporation but is now
considered only a ground for such dissolution.

Section 19 of the Corporation Law, part of which is now Section 22 of the Corporation Code, provided that the
powers of the corporation would cease if it did not formally organize and commence the transaction of its
business or the continuation of its works within two years from date of its incorporation. Section 20, which has
been reproduced with some modifications in Section 46 of the Corporation Code, expressly declared that
"every corporation formed under this Act, must within one month after the filing of the articles of incorporation
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws." Whether this provision should be
given mandatory or only directory effect remained a controversial question until it became academic with the
adoption of PD 902-A. Under this decree, it is now clear that the failure to file by-laws within the required
period is only a ground for suspension or revocation of the certificate of registration of corporations.

Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Under Section 6(I) of PD
902-A, the SEC is empowered to "suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or
certificate of registration of a corporation" on the ground inter alia of "failure to file by-laws within the required
period." It is clear from this provision that there must first of all be a hearing to determine the existence of the
ground, and secondly, assuming such finding, the penalty is not necessarily revocation but may be only
suspension of the charter. In fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on
time may be penalized merely with the imposition of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate
existence of the erring firm.

It should be stressed in this connection that substantial compliance with conditions subsequent will suffice to
perfect corporate personality. Organization and commencement of transaction of corporate business are but
conditions subsequent and not prerequisites for acquisition of corporate personality. The adoption and filing of
by-laws is also a condition subsequent. Under Section 19 of the Corporation Code, a Corporation
 commences its corporate existence and juridical personality and is deemed incorporated from the date the
Securities and Exchange Commission issues certificate of incorporation under its official seal. This may be
done even before the filing of the by-laws, which under Section 46 of the Corporation Code, must be adopted
"within one month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation." 21

That the corporation involved herein is under the supervision of the HIGC does not alter the result of this case. The
HIGC has taken over the specialized functions of the former Home Financing Corporation by virtue of Executive
Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1989. 22 With respect to homeowners associations, the HIGC shall "exercise all
the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . , the
provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding." 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Antonio M. Martinez and concurred in by Associate Justice Quirino D.
Abad Santos, Jr. and Godardo A. Jacinto.

2 On March 4, 1993, LGVHAI filed its by-laws with the HIGC. Its filing fee was duly receipted for under
O.R. No. 6393291 (Private Respondents' Comment, p. 5; Rollo, p. 72).

3 Private Respondents' Comment, pp. 3-4.

4 Fernando M. Miranda, Jr., Chairman, and Wilfredo F. Hernandez, Arthur G. Tan and Aida A.
Mendoza, Members.

5 This was in Bagong Lipunan Community Association v. HIGC, CA-G.R. SP No. 12592, November 16,
1987.

6 Petition, pp. 7-10.

7 Ibid., p. 10-11.

8 G.R. No. 71837, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 534.

9 Soco v. Hon. Militante, et al., 208 Phil. 151, 154 (1983); Caltex Filipino Managers & Supervisors
Ass'n v. CIR, 131 Phil. 1022, 1029 (1968).

10 People v. Tamani, L-22160 & 22161, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 153, 157.

11 Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608, 611 (1952).

12 27A WORDS AND PHRASES 650 citing Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Mabry, 315 S.W.
2d 900, 905, 229 Ark. 261.

13 Record of the Batasang Pambansa, Vol. III, November 12, 1979, p. 1303.

14 Lopez and Javelona v. El Hogan Filipino, 47 Phil. 249, 277 (1925) cited in AGPALO, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, 3rd ed., p. 197.

15 CAMPOS, THE CORPORATION CODE, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 123.

16 18 C.J.S. 595-596.

17 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 640.

18 Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992, 214 SCRA 378, 392.

19 8 FLETCHER, supra, at p. 633.

20 Supra.

21 Ibid., at pp. 543-544.

22 The capitalization of HIGC was increased to P2,500,000,000 Rep. Act No. 7835.

23 No. 2 (a), Executive Order No. 535 dated May 3, 1979 (78 O.G. 6805).

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