Republic of the Philippines the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear

SUPREME COURT violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of

Manila 1948, as amended.

EN BANC 6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office

as a District Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971
such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to
perform or discharge official duties in the
PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant, administration of justice.
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to
the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that
RESOLUTION he was entering upon the performance of his duties,
which letter of his reads in full:
BARREDO, J.:
'I have the honor to inform you
that I am entering upon the
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable
performance of the duties of the
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of
office of Judge of the Court of
Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as
First Instance of Laguna and
judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross
San Pablo City (Branch VI)
incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948,
today, June 29, 1970.'
as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed
(allegedly) as follows:
That such actuation of deliberately telling a
deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971
bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the
inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent
highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral
herein, has not submitted his monthly reports
character appertaining to holding the position of
containing the number of cases filed, disposed of,
Judge in the administration of justice.
decided and/or resolved, the number of cases
pending decisions for one month, two months to over
three months, together with the title, number, Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging
number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as pertinently that:
evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D.
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy
THE FACTS
of which is hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1,
in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice
dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of
attached as Annex "B"; First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with
station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being
one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service
organized from scratch. After consultations with the
(New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July
officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of
to December, 1970 and from January to February,
Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent
1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued
decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal
by Judge Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of
Government to supply the space for the courtroom
Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2 thereof;
and offices of the court; to utilize the financial
assistance promised by the Laguna provincial
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of government for the purchase of the necessary
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing supplies and materials; and to rely on the national
fully well that he has never performed his official government for the equipment needed by the court
duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative
office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from Code, all these items must be furnished by the
July to December, 1970 and from January to February provincial government. The provincial officials of
1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the
cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice province was not in a position to do so).
hereto attached as Annex "C" and the certificate of Mr.
Pichay Annex "A", last paragraph thereof, aggravated
As to the space requirements of the court, the
by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of
Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent
service in flagrant violation of action 5 of the
that the court could be accommodated in the west
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as
wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the
follows:
office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel
are transferred to another location. When the
... District judges, judges of City projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office
Courts, and municipal Judges was about to be effected, the treasurer and several
shall certify on their application municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor
for leave, and upon salary then requested the respondent to look over some of
vouchers presented by them for the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the
payment, or upon the payrolls commitment that the municipal government will
upon which their salaries are shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's
paid, that all special first choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank
proceedings, applications, branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when
petitions, motions, and all civil the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent
and criminal cases which have to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by
been under submission for respondent was the second floor of the Laguna
decision or determination for a Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the
period of ninety days or more municipality finally signed a lease agreement with
have been determined and the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month
decided on or before the date of passed before the municipal government could
making the certificate and ... no release the amount necessary for the improvements
salary shall be paid without such to convert the space that was rented, which was a big
certificate' (Emphasis hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices
supplied). for the personnel of the court and for the assistant
provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's
representations, the provincial government
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly
appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase
reports from July to December, 1970 and from
of the supplies and materials needed by the court.
January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the
Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his
number of hours of session that the Court holds daily,
order for the necessary equipment with the Property
 Officer of the Department of Justice but, oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not
unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent
of courts of first instance was released only on has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however,
December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge,
equipment chargeable against this allotment is still respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the
under way (please see enclosed certification of the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he
Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take
Annex "A"). a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the
Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the
Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could
presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this
actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during
case, the government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the
the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had,
necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his
due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten
part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early
months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed
action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his
upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without
spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist
being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy
the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for
attending to the needs of his court.
sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the
circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind
"Charges Have No Basis -- . of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being
unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part.
As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the independence
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his
of the judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct
oath of office, grave incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of
which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of
the Judiciary Act.
the government will be discussed a non. At this juncture, the only point We
settle is that complainant's theory of dishonesty cannot hold water.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding
Respondent was like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet
bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars
being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding
control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand,
respondent Could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a
valid confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute
himself available for the purpose for which he was appointed. That he
dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he spent in
could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was
organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice
not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith
(please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S.
seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to
Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than
have it read. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission of this Court,
exert efforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have done, have
respondent could have been assigned to another court pending all these
collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.
preparations, but that is something within the initiative control of the
Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position
then carried a salary of P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with
Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of Justice and Member of the
favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in
Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving
the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the
judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of
courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of Law
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other
where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
great departments of the government must always be kept clear and
jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be
February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in
not actually discharging his judicial duties. the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the
necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not
between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
actually started, to perform their judicial duties to comply with the
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental
abovementioned statutory-provisions and circular (please see enclosed
conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary
certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked
under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or
Annex 'C').
even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position
where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal,
of requiring a judge who has not entered into the Performance of his before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of
judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5, how could a judge Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this
who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal
cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination for
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed.
a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.
before the date of making the certificate.' And bow could such a judge hold
court in his place of permanent station as required by Section 55; observe
the hours of daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section 58; and Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ.,
render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when his court is not yet in concur.
physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary
Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .
Castro and Teekankee, JJ., took no part.

In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in

Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief separate opinion.
their respective complaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof,
Makasiar, J., concurs with the opinion Mr. Justice Fernando.
that the material facts are more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this
case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.
FERNANDO, J., concurring: .
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the
complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge I join the rest of my brethren in yielding concurrence to the ably-written
of dishonesty in the actuations for the respondent complained of. As We opinion of Justice Barredo. Respondent Judge clearly should be exculpated
see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray of the charge filed against him. What is more the opinion of the Court
it. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries possesses the merit of setting forth in forthright and unequivocal language
as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his the disapproval of the practice hitherto followed of having members of the
judiciary perform non-judicial functions. There is no doubt to my mind of sentence.' They will not be preliminary or ancillary to any rule or sentence
its repugnancy to the fundamental concept of separation of power. It is to to be pronounced by the judiciary in any of its branches. They will be mere
that aspect of the question as well as what, to my mind, is the doubtful advice to the Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or reject
constitutionality of allowing the Secretary of Justice to exercise them altogether. From the beginnings of our history, the Principle has been
supervisory authority over lower court judges that this brief concurring enforced that there is no inherent power in Executive or Legislature to
opinion addresses itself. charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties... The exigencies of
government have made it necessary to relax as merely doctrinaire
1. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our
adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a matter of
Constitution, 1 embodies the principle of a tripartite division of
sensible approximation, as that of the separation of powers. Elasticity has
governmental authority entrusted to Congress, the President, and the
not meant that what is of the essence of the judicial function may be
Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law.
destroyed by turning the power to decide into a pallid opportunity to
Three departments of government are thus provided for, the legislative
consult and recommend ..." 9.
vested with the lawmaking function, the executive with the enforcement of
what has been thus enacted, and the judiciary with the administration of
justice, deciding cases according to law. 2 The reason for such a doctrine is Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee," 10 a
to assure liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the 1968 decision, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who penned the opinion, first referred
whole power to govern and thus in a position to impose its unfettered will. to the above Richardson decision as well as to Federal Radio Commission
If it were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be v. General Electric Co.",. It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been held
disregarded; he could be placed at its mercy. The three departments are that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and
coordinate and co-equal, each having exclusive cognizance of matters cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to guarantee assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of
independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate
exclusive concern of each. Much less is control by only one of the three disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric
departments of any or both of the others permissible. 3 . Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." 12 It is clear from the
above Noblejas decision that even prior to the motion there was a
commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be
It is to be admitted that the realities of government preclude the
asked non-judicial functions. For in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
independence of each of the departments from the other being absolute.
Transportation Co., 13 mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm , speaking for
This is so especially as between the legislative and executive departments.
this Court, was quite explicit. Thus Supreme Court and its members cannot
What the former enacts, the latter implements. To paraphrase Roosevelt,
be required to exercise any power any trust or to assume any duty not
the letter of the Constitution requires a separation, but the impulse of a
pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions." 14
common purpose compels cooperation. It could be carried to the extent of
.
such powers being blended, without undue danger to liberty as proved by
countries having the parliamentary forms of government. This is especially
so in England and in Switzerland, where the tradition of freedom possesses 3. Nonetheless, as now decided, respondent Judge Macaraig should not be
strength and durability. It does not admit of doubt, however, that of the held in any wise accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his
three branches, the judiciary is entrusted with a function the most sensitive conduct. What he was required to do was in accordance with the practice
and delicate. It passes upon controversies and disputes not only between herefore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in
citizens but between citizens and government, the limits of whose force, under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can the good
authority must be respected. In a system like ours, every exercise of faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by
governmental competence, whether coming from the President or from the him was likewise in accordance with what previous secretaries of justice
lowest official, may be challenged in court in an appropriate legal were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the statutory authority
proceeding. This is an aspect of the theory of cheeks and balance likewise of the Department of Justice over Court of first instance and other inferior
provided for in the Constitution. 4 It is thus indispensable that judicial courts.15 While a distinction could be made between the performance of
independence should, by all means, be made secure. Not only that. The judicial functions which in no way could be interfered with by the
feeling that judges are not in any way subject to the influence of the Department and the task of administration which is executive in character,
executive and legislative branches must be pervasive; otherwise, there still the conferment of such competence to a department head, an alter ego
would be loss of confidence in the administration of justice. With that gone, of the President, is, to my mind, only unwise but of doubtful
the rule of law is placed in dire peril. constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over
matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the discretion of
judges which should be exercised according to their conscience alone.
Nor is the force, to my mind, of the preceeding observation blunted by the
What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them, is magnified.
recognition that there could be no precise delineation of the respective
It is already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they court
competence alloted the legislative, the executive and the judicial
his goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant of
departments under the Constitution. Necessarily, overlapping and
authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more difficult. It is
interlacing of functions could not entirely be avoided. For as observed by
thus objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That certainly
Justice Holmes in his famous dissent in a case of Philippine origin, "The
is not the way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
in judicial affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in
government as the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other
a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other... When we
litigations is in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could
come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must
be looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must not only be
be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on." 6
independent; it must appear to be so.
Further on, he added: "It does not seem to need argument to show that
however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry
out the distinction between legislative and executive action with The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight oversight then, is, to my mind, anomalous. More specifically, were it not for
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from such power granted the department head, respondent Judge in this case
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires." 7 . could not have been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice.
Considering that the Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be
hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is to be totally freed from any
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
supervisory authority of an executive department.
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrine application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being requited to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him
is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can
pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

It is opposite to quote from an opinion of Justice Cardozo, as Chief Judge of

"the New York Court of Appeals," when that Court nullified a section of a
New York statute that would vest in a justice of its Supreme Court the
power to investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion explained
why: "He is made the delegate Of the Governor in aid of an executive act,
the removal of a public officer... At the word of command he is give over the
work of judging, and set himself to other work, the work of probing and
advising. His findings when made will have none of the authority of a
judgment. To borrow Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or