City of Manila vs Judge Laguio (2005)
Summary Cases:
● City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, Jr. 455 SCRA 308
Subject:
Substantive Due Process (Test of Valid Ordinance), Police Power of LGU, Regulatory Power of LGU,
Equal Protection Clause, Right to Liberty and Privacy, Unlawful taking (restriction on use of property)
Facts:
City of Manila issued Ordinance No. 7783 which prohibited certain types of business from being
established or operated in the Ermita-Malate area on the basis that these businesses “use women as
tools in entertainment” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community”. The
prohibited businesses enumerated under the Ordinance include -- Sauna Parlors, Massage Parlors,
Karaoke Bars, Beerhouses, Night Clubs, Day Clubs, Super Clubs, Discotheques, Cabarets, Dance Halls,
Motels, Inns. The Ordinance also provided that the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments (3)
months from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside
of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area."
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), owner and operator of Victoria Court, challenges the
constitutionality of such Ordinance on the ground that (1) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law (2) Ordinance is ultra vires -- the City Council has no power to prohibit the
operation of motels as the Local Government Code of 1991 grants it only the power to regulate. (3) the
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power and amounts to taking without just compensation.
Judge Laguio enjoined the implementation of the Ordinance.
Held: Ordinance is ultra vires and void.
Test of Valid Ordinance
| Page 1 of 5
1. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Due Process
2. The due process clause imposes two separate limits on government-- Procedural due process and
Substantive due process.
3. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
4. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the government's action.
Under US Case law, justification depends on the level of scrutiny used. Where only ‘rational basis’
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. But where ‘strict scrutiny’ is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then
substantive due process is satisfied only if the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.
Police Power (exercised by LGU)
| Page 2 of 5
5. Local government units (LGU) enjoy delegated police power as found in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), known as the general welfare clause.
6. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
7. Ordinance No. 7783 was an invalid exercise of police power as it contravenes Constitutional
provisions including the due process clause. Specifically, the means employed for the accomplishment
of the government objective were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
a. The objective can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
b. The means employed constitutes unlawful taking. (see discussion below)
c. The Ordinance fails to set up a standard to limit the discretion of the Mayor to close down
establishments. The grant of such arbitrary and unrestricted power makes the measure
unreasonable and invalid.
8. Petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of a
nuisance per se without judicial proceedings. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may
be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.
9. That motels are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal
prostitution is of no moment. Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most
innocent of places. The problem is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be
injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable
human activity that may occur within its premises.
Regulatory power of LGU
10. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the
| Page 3 of 5
nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of
the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council.
11. As a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or
to license, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress
and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
Equal Protection
12. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.
13. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar
subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it
does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
14. There is also no logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.
15. The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as
prostitution is not a profession exclusive to women. This discrimination based on gender violates equal
protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives.
Right to Liberty and Privacy
16. The Ordinance also offends the right to liberty of the patrons of the banned establishments.
| Page 4 of 5
17. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke the right to autonomy to consummate their
bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises. Their right to liberty under the due process
clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long
as they do not run afoul of the law.
18. Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it
must include privacy, or ‘the right to be let alone’, as well.
Unlawful taking (restriction on use of property)
19. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.
20. There are two different types of taking -- A "possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
21. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, the regulation is equivalent to “taking” if (1) it
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use; or if (2) the restriction on use of property is not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.
22. Ordinance No. 7783 cannot be saved by classifying it as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power. However, private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation.
23. Property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public
use or purpose and is therefore ‘wholesome’.
| Page 5 of 5
