Constitutional Law II Cases 105-200-1.

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Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes, the Court held that the Oregon
statute, as applied, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing
the record, the Court determined that De Jonge's sole offense was assisting in a public meeting held
under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Court reasoned that to preserve the rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly - principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment - not the
auspices under which a meeting is held, but the purpose of the meeting and whether the speakers'
remarks transcend the bounds of freedom of speech must be examined, which had not occurred in
De Jonge's case. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

181. EVANGELISTA vs. EARNSHAW

57 PHIL 255

FACTS:

The plaintiff, president of the Communist Part of the Philippine Islands, requested the necessary
permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the afternoon of March 12,
1931, to be followed by a parade through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal,
Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the Governor-General a message from the
laboring class; that on the 3d of March, 1931, the mayor of the city denied the plaintiff's petition,
instructing his subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist
Party throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and licenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the prohibition made by respondent violated the constitutional right to
assembly by the petitioner.

HELD:

No. In the case of People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599, 605), this court said, “. . . when the intention and
effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the
State.”

In this case, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended for having taken a prompt,
courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter
could do more damage by its revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and
utterances of its members.

182. Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The
petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

HELD:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered
of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of
the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’,
they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

183. Garces v Estenzo

104 SCRA 510

FACTS:

On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, adopted Resolution No. 5, reviving
the traditional socio-religious celebration every 5th day of April the feast day of Señ or San Vicente
Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia. Said resolution provided for 1) the acquisition of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay’s projects. Funds for
the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. The
controversy arose when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeñ a, refused to return that
image to the barangay council after thenimage was place in the Church for the mass that was
conducted on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for
its acquisition. Also, several days after the fiesta during his mass sermon, Father Osmeñ a allegedly
uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in
connection with the disputed image. This provoked Veloso to file a charge for grave oral defamation
against Father Osmeñ a. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church
of Valencia because Father Osmeñ a did not accede to the request of the hermano mayor to have
custody of the image. The barangay council filed Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer
to file a replevin case against Father Osmeñ a for the recovery of the image. After the barangay
council had posted a cash bond of Php 800, Father Osmeñ a turned over the image to the council, but
in his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
He and members of other religious sects filed against the barangay council and its members a
complaint in the CFI at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions. The lower
court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolutions. They appealed, and one of
their contentions is that the resolutions contravene Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII,
Constitution

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is unconstitutional for establishing a religion.

HOLDING:

The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The
image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money, thus it belongs to the barangay council,
and as owner of the image, it has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. The
construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The momentous issues of separation of
church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not
involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly.

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It is not a microcosmic test case on those issues. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a
saint’s image. The barangay council also did not favor the Catholic religion by using the funds raised
by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden image and making it
available to the Catholic church. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose
of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. As noted in the first resolution,
the barrio fiesta is a socioreligious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural
communities.

CASE NO. 184 ENGELVS VITALE (370 US 421)

FACTS:

The Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New York, adopted a program of daily
classroom prayers in public schools. The prayer was brief, denominationally neutral, and its
observance on the part of the students was voluntary. Shortly after the adoption of the program, the
parents of ten pupils brought an action in mandamus in the New York Supreme Court, Nassau
County, asserting that the official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or
religious practices of both themselves and their children. They also challenged the constitutionality
of both the state law authorizing the school district to direct the use of the prayer in public schools
and the school district's regulation ordering the recitation of the prayer, on the ground that these
actions violated that part of the First Amendment, which commanded that Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion. The request for mandamus was denied by the trial court,
but the matter was remanded to the Board of Regents for amending its regulations with a view to
protecting voluntariness of participation in the prayer. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of
Appeals likewise affirmed the order.

ISSUE: Does a New York state program of daily classroom prayers in public school violate the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

RULING:

Yes. On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the respondent’s
decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer constituted the adoption
of a practice entirely inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I. The Court held
that respondent's use of the prayer in public school classrooms breached the constitutional wall of
separation between church and state. According to the Court, the constitutional prohibition of laws
establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any
segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. Thus, the Court
found that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause.

CASE NO.185 ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE 43 PHIL. 43

Facts:

Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left
property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1)

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Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo
with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to
Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely
Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court
that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere
letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee
had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate
as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial
court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been
adequately proved but that under the laws of thePhilippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower
court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as
an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid.

2. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid

HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has
only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to
be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the
rights accruing to them under the law. The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the public
is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together inapparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive
force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should
retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline
the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the
public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect.
Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands, which

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would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to
prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is
then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage
followed by23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the
death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon proof so clear, strong
and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment.” A marriage
alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held
not to be valid in the Philippines.

186

Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila

51 Phil 4220

Facts:

1. Petitioner (Angel Gonzales) wanted to collect the income from certain properties situated in Calle
Rosario, District of Binondo. He was assigned by the property owner (Petronila de Guzman) for the
maintenance of a collative chaplaincy founded by her. The ownership dates back to June 20, 1901.

2. Petitioner contends that as the chaplain, incumbent and beneficiary of the said chaplaincy, he had
the right, by virtue of a title in perpetuity, from June 20, 1901, to receive and retain all the income
and revenues of the said property. The property mentioned had been producing and yielding not
less than Php 650/month. Thus, from June 20, 1901 to the time the action was instituted, the
property in question is a sum of Php 12,500.00.
3. Respondents are the Archbishop of Manila (Msgr. Harty) and the administrator of funds of the
Sagrada Mitra (Thomas Hartigan).

4. Going back to history, by virtue of the provisions contained in the will executed by Donya Petronila
de Guzman on March 3, 1816, a collative chaplaincy was founded in this archdiocese. It entailed a
certain obligation of a spiritual character and possessed a capital of Php 1,700. It was also provided
that the first executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as administrator of the property
subject to the chaplaincy during the minority of Esteban de Guzman, the first chaplain appointed for
the foundation. Angel Gonzales, a descent of Petronila, was appointed chaplain on August 21, 1901.

Ruling:

1. Our attention has been invited to the fact that the property affected by the chaplaincy should have
been administered by the chaplains and not by the administrators of the Sagrada Mitra inasmuch as
clause 11 of the foundress’ will so provided. To refute this assertion, it suffices to say that the
provisions of the said will set forth that the first testamentary executor of the estate of the testatrix
should act as the administrator of the property during the minority of the first chaplain appointed in
that document. This provision must be understood to be mandatory, except as otherwise provided
by the canonical laws and as, pursuant therewith, the chief ecclesiastical authority may order for,
after the latter had accepted the foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its property
appertains to the authorities established by the Church, pursuant to the latter’s own laws, and this
rule has been observed since 1863.

2. The defendants in this case were absolved.

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187. Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417

Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop
Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all
the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme
bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.

Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was
Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was turned over to
bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally
joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.

CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop
of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration

CA affirmed the decision of the CFI

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.
Held: Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los
Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the
Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws

To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule
in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other superior
ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving
such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the
majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities
within the congregation, then that should be followed.

(188) German vs. Barangan

135 SCRA 514

“ The exercise of the religious freedom and of all fundamental rights must be done in good faith”

FACTS:

Petitioner German and other businessmen, students and employees wearing yellow shirts marched
with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives on the way to St.Jude Chapel
which was located within the Malacanang security area. They were barred and was given an alleged
warning that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be
prevented.

Petitioners’ alleged purpose was to pray and hear at the said chapel. The respondents assured the
petitioners that they have never restricted from entering and worshipping at said church. However,
respondent maintained that petitioners’ intention was not to perform an act of religious worship, but
to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of
the President of the Republic.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition on petitioners from worshipping and praying at the chapel
violates their freedom to worship.

HELD:

No. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious
freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good
faith. Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, the
reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the
same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of
their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.

189. EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

219 SCRA 256

Several students, members of the Jehovas’ Witnesses, were expelled for disobedience of RA 1265
and DECS Order 8, series of 1955, by refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge. These acts were considered to be “acts of worship” or “religious devotion”
which they “cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of the students was constitutional.

HELD:

NO. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully
constituted authorities. Coerced unity and loyalty even to the country—assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be attained through coercion—is not a global that is constitutionally obtainable at the
expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. Petition is
GRANTED. Expulsion orders are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

191. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

59 SCRA 54

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been employed with Elizalde Rope
Factory (ERF) and a member of the ERWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union) since 1958. Under the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and ERWU, a close shop agreement is being
enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the ERWU. In
order to retain employment in the said factory, one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962,
Victoriano tendered his resignation from ERWU claiming that per R.A. 3350, he is an exemption to
the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC. Apparently INC forbids their
members from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the
Union was acted upon by ERWU which notified ERF about it. ERF moved to terminate Victoriano due
to his non-membership from the ERWU. ERWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the
close shop agreement

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because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is
unconstitutional and that said law violates the ERWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.

ISSUE: WON R.A. 3350 is unconstitutional for respecting an establishment of religion.

HELD:

No, RA 3350 does not violate the constitutional inhibition of the “no-establishment” of religion
clause. The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection
of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving
certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is the Court’s view that the
exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the
interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious
sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to
require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.

CASE NO. 192 PAMIL VS TELERON ( 86 SCRA 413)

Facts:

Petitioner/apellant is the rival candidate of Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest who won asp the mayor
in Albuquerque, Bohol, who filed a quo waranto case against the latter. This is as per the 2175
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) that states: “In no case there shall be elected/appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastes, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation
from provincial/national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.”

Respondent-appellee is the judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol.

Court of First Instance ruled that the RAC was repealed by the Election Code of 1971, which therefore
allowed the prohibitions of the RAC.

Issue: Whether or not the RAC is not in effect or already repealed, thereby making the appointment
of Fr. Gonzaga in mayor’s position as a priest, constitutional.

Held:

Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote
of eight (8) which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this,
the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga
is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. It is also pointed out that how can one who
swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may
conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the

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separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no
implied repeal.

CASE NO. 193 American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 phil. 386

Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines, with its principal office in Manila. They distribute
and sell bibles throughout the country. The City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society
that it violated Ordinance No. 3000 and 2529 as it was conducting business of general merchandise
since November 1945, without the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license and required
them to secure the permit and license within three days together with compromise in the sum of
P5,821.45. To avoid the closure of their business, they paid under protest. They filed a complaint and
prayed that the ordinance be declared illegal and unconstitutional as it infringes religious freedom.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 3000 and 2529 are unconstitutional because it provides for religious
censorship and the free exercise of its religious profession through the distribution and sale of bibles
and other religious literature in the Philippines.

Held:

No. Ordinance No. 3000 is of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like
the plaintiff. It does not contain any provisions prescribing religious censorship nor does it restrain
the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. The necessity of the permit is made to
depend upon the power of the City to license or tax a business, trade or occupation. As to Ordinance
No. 2529 with respect to the license fees, they are not imposed directly upon any religious institution
but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations, such as retail “dealers in general
merchandise.”

Article III, Section 1(7) guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. The
constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In the case at bar, the
license fee is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature which is not for commercial rather for purely religious purposes.

The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. The
power to impose a license tax on the exercise of this freedom is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is flat license tax
levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.

For this reason, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, as it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as

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its right of dissemination of religious beliefs. As to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, it does not
impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices.

194
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS

236 SCRA 197

Facts:

The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the
solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As
a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the
Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations
made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as
the construction of a chapel.

Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
religious purpose?

HELD:

No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would
not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious
purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

195. Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil 851

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which
was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained.
The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation
expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?

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Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation
of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to
choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause
harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of
choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as
much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.