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Arnault V Nazareno Revised

The Supreme Court denied Jean Arnault's petition for habeas corpus. [1] The Senate had the power to hold Arnault in contempt for refusing to reveal who he gave Php440,000 to, as this information was pertinent to the Senate's investigation. [2] The Senate also had the authority to detain Arnault beyond the legislative session, as legislative committees need to be able to enforce inquiries. [3] Arnault could not invoke his right against self-incrimination because revealing the name would not actually incriminate him based on his own description of legal transactions.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
65 views5 pages

Arnault V Nazareno Revised

The Supreme Court denied Jean Arnault's petition for habeas corpus. [1] The Senate had the power to hold Arnault in contempt for refusing to reveal who he gave Php440,000 to, as this information was pertinent to the Senate's investigation. [2] The Senate also had the authority to detain Arnault beyond the legislative session, as legislative committees need to be able to enforce inquiries. [3] Arnault could not invoke his right against self-incrimination because revealing the name would not actually incriminate him based on his own description of legal transactions.
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ARNAULT V NAZARENO

FACTS:

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land,
known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the
Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s
payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of
Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The
Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from
the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings.
In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge
the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which
he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to
the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers
the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?

2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of leTJgislative session?

3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing


either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is
not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what
is needed.

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was
held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact,
this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which
is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among
other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom
the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry
but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have
already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of


legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called
relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions
may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose
for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the
power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate,
which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power
to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he
gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the
latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination


of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception
of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province
of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate
or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has
violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time
liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot
assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer.
A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an
answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that
question.

ADDED NOTES:

GCTA FOR SALE

The SC decision, cited by Sotto, states that the Senate’s “inherent power of
contempt is of utmost importance” in legislation and that “some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed….during legislative inquiry.”

Gordon also pointed out the High Court decision, saying the contempt power
stays until a legislative inquiry ends.

“That’s the way it is, we have to protect the Senate from that (evasiveness),” he
said.

Senate Minority Leader Franklin Drilon, who previously led the chamber, backed

his colleagues.

“I agree that we have the power to declare in contempt a person who refuses to
answer questions because… if we do not have that power, we can never get the
needed data and information for us to be able to craft the correct policy. So that
being evasive, or not responding to questions, would result in the Senate not
being able to perform its job,” Drilon said.

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