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Corps Artillery - Final Phases, Italian Campaign, 25 July '44 To Victory in Italy 2 May '45

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
174 views29 pages

Corps Artillery - Final Phases, Italian Campaign, 25 July '44 To Victory in Italy 2 May '45

Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 29

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OCT 2 9 2003

ACCE&siUri W

P Q REGISTER JC'^T,^ •

FINAL PHASES

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
25 JULY'44 TO VICTORY IN ITALY 2 M A Y ' 4 5
PRO®

M 2 I 0 2 I . I
HEADQUARTERS II CORPS ARTILLERY

APO 19

10 June 1945

THE ARNO TO THE ALPS

PREFACE

This abbreviated report covers the actions of the II Corps

Artillery for the period from 25 July 1944 to 2 May 1945, and has

been written as a sequel to a previous report, "MINTURNO TO ROME",

covering the period 25 March 1944 to 5 June 1944.

I hope that the experiences of the artillery recorded during

this campaign will be interesting and prove of value for future

instruction and planning.

It was a wonderful experience and gave a feeling of great

satisfaction to be a member of the team that caused the disintegration

and final surrender of the German Armies in Italy.

It was a privilege to command the II Corps Artillery and I

desire to express my appreciation for the superior work and unstinting

efforts of the members of my staff and every officer and man under

my command during this operation.

Brigadier General, U. S. Army

Commanding, II Corps Artillery

Preparation for AfiNO Crossing

(25 July 1944 - 10 Sept 1944)

Upon re-entry of II Corps into the line S of the ARNO River on

25 July 1944, Corps Artillery became operative with the Fire Direction

Center located vie PECCIOLI and the mission of general support of the

three divisions attached to Corps, The specific mission was long range

harassing, destruction, interdiction and counterbattery fires which were

to be executed without an increase in the amount of ammunition expended

during previous period, in accordance with the deception plan then in

effect.

Emphasis was placed on observed counterbattery firing with the A0P*s

doing the greater share of the observing with the aid of aerial photo­
graphs. That this program was effective is evidenced by the fact that

enemy gun positions which formerly held 3 or 4 guns were reduced to 1 or

2 gun positions in the Hostile Battery List.

By the first of August the situation had stabilized to the point

where 2 battalions were sent to bivouac areas for rest and rehabilitation

and a large continuous quota was filled at the Fifth Army Officers1 and

Enlisted Mens' Rest Centers at ROME.

Tac/R and AOP reports of much traffic N of the ARNO caused an Air-

Artillery Harassing program to be instituted. The program was very sim­


ilar to the one developed at MINTURNO earlier in the year. 90mm AA Artillery

was used extensively in a ground role for this purpose.

About the middle of August, Corps plans were changed and Corps Artillery

was to be prepared to support an attack from positions S of FLORENCE. Move­


ment to new positions southwest, south and southeast of FLORENCE started

on 21 august and was completed 27 August; the Fire Direction Center moved

to the vicinity of GaLLUZZO. In conformity with the Corps Security Plan,

battalions in position E of the 78 Easting were prohibited from firing or

using the radio. On 26 August the plan was modified to permit these battal­
ions to fire observed missions but no more than one battalion on any one

target at the seme time, so that the strong build up of artillery in this

new sector would not be revealed.

Notable among the activities during the month of August were the many

successful Spitfire shoots with the 698 FA Bn (240mm How) and an adjustment

by the 15 FA?0bsn Bn Flash Base of the 8" gun on an enemy gun at 30,000

yards range in which fire for effect started after 2 adjusting rounds,

silenced the hostile gun and set off a fire in the area.

- 1­
The enemy attempted to confuse our Counterbattery Officer by utilizing

a variety of deceptive measures, such asj flash simulators, dummy positions,

light caliber weapons firing simultaneously and along the gun-target line

of heavier weapons, and much lateral fire. We continued to take our toll

however, and as the British troops continued their advance across the ARNO

E of FLORENCE, the enemy withdrew the bulk of his artillery to defensive

positions behind the GOTHIC LINE - leaving only a small number of pieces

and quite a few SP weapons to impede our advance.

Organization for the period*

II Corps Arty

Hq & Hq Btry II Corps Arty

15 FA Obsn Bn (Reverted to II Corps 25 July)

77 FA Gp (Atchd 25 July)

173 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd 25 July; 423 FA Gp 16 Aug; 77 FA Gp 23 Aug)

631 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 25 July)

935 FA Bn (4.5" G) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 26 July; 77 FA Gp 31 July)

932 FA Bn (8" How) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 26 July; 77 FA Gp 31 July;

IV Corps 24 Aug)

936 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 26 July; 77 FA Gp 31 July;

Harkins Groupment 16 Aug; 77 FA Gp 21 Aug)

178 FA Gp
(Atchd 26 July)

403 FA
Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 30 July-16 Aug)

339 FA
Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 31 July-16 Aug)

347 FA
Bn (105 H) (Atchd 31 July-16 Aug)

248 FA
Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 30 July; Harkins Groupment 19 Aug; 178 FA Gp

22 Aug)

178 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 30 July)

939 FA Bn (4.5" G) (Atchd 30 July)

423 FA Gp (Atchd 10 Aug)

633 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 30 July; Harkins Groupment 19 Aug;

423 FA Gp 23 Aug)

98 5 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 26 July; 77 FA Gp 31 July; Harkins

Groupment 18 Aug; 423 FA Gp 23 Aug)

698 FA Bn (240 H & 8" G) (Atchd II Corps Arty 25 July; 423 FAJJp 16 Aug)

697 FA Bn (-)(240 H & 8" G)(Atchd II Corps Arty 2 Sept; 423 FA Gp 9 Sept)

10 Agra (Br) (Atchd 22 Aug)

17 Med Regt (5.5" G)

18 Med Regt (5.5" G)

178 Med Regt (5.5" G)

- 2­
Summary of operations for the periods

Missions fireds Counterbattery 824

Harassing 821

Registration 262

Destruction 216

Personnel & Vehicles 190

Preparation Fires 41

Tanks 18

Defensive Fires 21

Observed missions«

Ground OP 602

Air OP 454

Locationsj Sound 250

Flash 30

Rounds fired by calibers

155 How 377 35

4.5" Gun 17718

105 How 15249

155 Gun 12941

240 How 2715

8" How 2035

8" Gun 923

Note? Above statistics do not include Div ijrtys.

FLORENCE to LIV3RGAN0

(10 Sept 1944 - 27 Oct 1944)

The crossing of the ARNO River by the British Thirteenth Corps changed

the entire situation making it unnecessary for Corps Artillery to support a

river crossing operation. New plans called for the support of the attack on

10 September from positions around FLORENCE. The 91st Division on the right

and the 34th Division on the left jumped off against light scattered resist­
ance and progressed rapidly to the N bank of the SIEVE River assisted by the

85 Division which was committed on 13 September. An artillery preparation

was not deemed necessary and subsequent events proved the soundness of this

decision. Corps Artillery fired only missions on call and rather extensive

nightly harassing programs.

- 3­
Enemy shelling during this phase consisted mostly of light harassing

fires on our forward elements with particular attention placed on the town

of SESTO (74-7 5) which was located on one of our main supply routes. Due

to lack of ground observation and unsuitable locations for sound and flash

bases, the AOPs continued to be our primary means of observation. Photo

cover was adequate but the situation was so fast moving that very few lo­
cations of enemy installations or gun positions were revealed south of the

GOTHIC LINE.

At the SIEVE River the Corps Artillery drew up for the assault on the

GOTHIC LINE. Heavy counterbattery programs and close support preparation

were fired in support of all three divisions. The line was very heavily

defended with many dug-in artillpry emplacements, some of which were steel

beamed, concrete reinforced construction and contained field pieces and

anti-tank weapons. Many of these heavy emplacements were engaged by the

240mm Howitzers and the results reported were most gratifying. The follow­
ing is an extract from a daily periodic report for 15 September* "Among

the highlights of today's activities were the destruction of 5 pillboxes

by the 698 FA Bn (240mm How) and 2 more by the 697 FA Bn (240mm How)".

The advantage of the high ground was again with the enemy, severely

limiting sound raid flash operations but this limitation was offset by the

increased use of AOP patrols which were organized to operate in prearranged

zones continually from dawn to dusk. Continued precision adjustments by

AOPs, which were habitually flown at an elevation of 7000-8000 feet, dis­


couraged the enemy from digging in and he began to rely upon frequent moves

into position areas abundant in natural cover. In following this policy

he was favored by deeply cut ravines and defiladed positions which made

observation and photo interpretation extremely difficult.

Although the attack on the GOTHIC LINE drew considerable enemy artillery

fire only a very small percentage of it could be classed as counterbattery

in spite of the fact that he had available 170mm and 210mm guns and howitzers

for counterbattery work. The most likely explanation for this policy was

given by a PW who was formerly an F0 with a 170mm battery: "It is useless

for us to fire against the vastly superior numbers of Allied artillery pieces,

since such fire always draws very heavy retaliatory fire. We cannot afford

to lose any artillery pieces and neutralization or destruction of Allied

artillery secures no appreciable effect. Under such conditions we feel we

can do more damage by directing our fire into forward elements."

As our .elements advanced to the GOTHIC LINE the enemy's fire became

increasingly heavy with some concentrations of more than 100 rounds reported.

As was the case previously, the fire was directed mainly on forward elements.

- 4

After the capture of M. BATTAGLIA (0617) by the 88 Division the enemy

reinforced his artillery in this sector and prefaced several counterattacks

with preparations up to 400 rounds. Until he was forced to withdraw by the

flanking units, this area received a daily treatment of 600 to 2100 rounds.

After the breach of the GOTHIC LINE the Corps Artillery advanced over

some of the most difficult roads yet encountered in Italy to the SANTERNO

River Valley, where, at the end of September it was supporting the assault

on the highest ridge of mountains between it and the PO Valley.

Communications during this period proved quite a problem. Due to the

mountainous terrain and lack of suitable road net most of the field wire was

laid directly across country and despite the great distance involved communi­
cations were maintained with all units including the supported Division

Artillery Headquarters. Excellent results were obtained with W-143 wire

substituted for W-110 in many cases. Enemy radio interference increased

which necessitated the extensive use of continuous wave transmissions, con­


tinuous change of frequencies and many relays in order to maintain communi­
cations.

Near the middle of October friendly troops secured the high ground of

the battlefield and for the first time since the start of the attack ground

OPs had the dominating observation on the greater part of the Corps front.

Flash teams came into their own again and were particularly successful in

silencing hostile gun fire at night.

The weight of the Corps Artillery suffered a severe set back in October

when the 697 and 698 FA Bns (240mm How & 8" Gun) were ordered out of the

line and transferred to the Seventh Army. During the assault of the GOTHIC

LINE the 240*s played the very important role of destroying pillboxes and

strong points that were holding up the advance of the infantry. A sample

of the accuracy and effectiveness of the fire delivered by the 240's was

revealed when an enemy 88mm position at 888-069 was inspected. The location

contained 2 dual purpose 88*s protected by 2 or more 20mm guns. The pieces

were located in a circle with a radius of about 50 yards. Six 240mm craters

were found in the center of the circle. Hits by fragments had been scored

on both 88's and pieces of the traversing mechanism were found in one gun

pit with several exploded 88mm shells. The other position had 40 to 50

damaged unexploded 88mm projectiles and the area for a radius of 20 yards

had been badly burned. The near-by house, which civilians claimed had been

used as living quarters for the German gun crews, had a direct hit and severe

interior damage.

As the month of October progressed our ammunition restrictions became

increasingly severe. The 155mm How battalions were moved well forward to

allow greater use of the M102 (1917-18) ammunition of which there was a

more plentiful supply. The AA guns of the 403 Bn were also pushed up to

increase their range arc and assume a larger share of the nightly harassing

missions.

- 5­
Our salient pushed well forward of adjacent Corps troops, received

considerable fire from flanking guns which were firihg NW into M. BATTAGLIA

and NE into the left flank troops. Considerably concerned over the possi­
bility of our cutting Hwy $9 the enemy further reinforced his artillery oft

our right flank sector. Locating this new artillery as well as those pieces

which had moved back to the more extensile road net south of BOLOGNA con­
tinued to pose quite a problem for the CBO. All leads were followed vig­
orously as the enemy continued to fire ammunition recklessly in a manner

which left no doubt as to his intention of holding as long as possible.

MSR's and rear installations were lashed with a fury rarely before experienced.

Organisation for the periods

II Corps Arty

Hq & HQ Btry II Corps Arty

15 PA Obsn Bn

77 FA Gp

173 FA Bn (155 G)

631 FA Bn (155 Hi)

935 FA Bn (4.5" G) (Detchd 15 Sept)

936 FA Bn (155 Hi)

403 AA Bn (90mm G) (Atchd 22 Sept)

178 FA Gp

248 FA Bn (155 HI)

178 FA Bn (155 Hi)

939 FA Bn (4.5" G) (Detchd 15 Sept)

633 FA Bn (-)(155 G)(Atchd 423 FA Gp 10-19 Sept; 26 Sept-7 Oct)

Btry B 633 FA Bn (Atchd 423 FA Gp 10-26 Sept)

423 FA Gp

985 FA Bn (155 G)

698 FA Bn (240 H & 8" G) (Detchd 17 Oct)

697 FA Bn (-)(240 H & 8" G) (Atchd 77 FA Gp 24-30 Sept; Detchd 423 FA Gp

17 Oct)

10 Agra (Br)

17 Med Regt (5.5" G)

18 Med Regt (5.5" G)

178 Med Regt (5.5" G) (Detchd 28 Sept)

- 6­
Summary of operations for the period:

Missions fired: Counterbattery 3215

Harassing 2185
Destruction 332
Personnel & Vehicles 493

Registration 379

Preparation Fires 490

Tanks 5
Defensive Fires 83

Observed missions: Air OP 758


Ground OP 464

Locations: Sound 112


Flash 37

Rounds fired by caliber:

155 How 90254


155 Gun 40152
240 How 6303
4.5" Gun 5752
8° Gun 1371

Note: Above statistics do not include Div Arty's.

THE APENNINE "iTINTER

(27 Oct 1944 - 1 April 1945)

With the advent of the rainy season, presaging the Apennine winter the

II Corps front stabilized and found the Corps Artillery battalions in

positions along the 4 main axis roads of the Corps approximately 20 kilo­
meters south of BOLOGNA. The enemy was very determined to hold on this line

and had the means to enforce his determination. He continued to reinforce

his artillery until, around the first of December, he had approximately 400

pieces capable of firing in Corps zone. Our activity was severely handi­
capped by the stringent restrictions on ammunition allocations, necessitating

a very careful evaluation of each target to be engaged and practically

eliminating harassing fires at night. The assumption of a primary mission

of AA defense by the 403 AAA Bn on 8 November further reduced the amount of

harassing fires.

- 7­
Hear the close of November the artillery was regrouped and plahs were

completed for a resumption of the attack. The 178 FA Group was moved from

positions in the vicinity of VILLA DI SASSANERO (96-23) to positions west

of Hwy 65 in vicinity of LOIANO (86-23). The battalions were silent ii| t)ie

new area except for the registration of one piece of each battery jMPVi^MflM**

This firing restriction lasted until the end of December when the pro­
posed offensive was postponed due to adverse weather conditions and the

threat of an enemy attack in the IV Corps zone. The latter caused the 248,

633 and 403 FA Bns, 10 AGRA (Br) and Btry "A" 15 FA Obsn Bn to be displaced

to the vicinity of LUCCA and attached IV Corps. All moves were completed by

29 December.

On 30 November II Corps .artillery was charged with the development of

the 4.5" rocket equipment for employment in coordination with fires of other

cannon with the Corps. For this purpose one platoon was drawn from the Anti-

Tank company of each of the four infantry divisions with the Corps and formed

the II Corps (Provisional) Special Weapons Company which was attached to the

423 FA Group. After a week of training which commenced on 8 December the

company moved to BAGNI, ITALY and conducted two days of test firing with

observation and survey furnished by a detachment from the 15 FA Obsn Bn.

On 19 December a demonstration of firing the three mounts thus far developed;

the 37mm AT gun carriage, the. fixed mount and the M-4 Tank,, was given. Since

facts determined from the training and experimentation proved the 37mm mount

more suitable for a tactical use, twenty of these mounts were constructed

and training was continued to the end of the winter with stress laid on re­
connaissance, selection and occupation of positions and laying oh a platoon

basis.

Early in December an elaborate defense system was planned for the Corps

sector which called for the selection and preparation of firing positions

for the support of an Intermediate Defense Line and Defense Line No. 2. This

was accomplished by all artillery units with Corps to include digging of gun

pits, stoackage of ammunition and laying of telephone lines. Fortunately

it never became necessary to occupy these positions.

Heavy snows which fell around the middle of December caused the situation

to become more stabilized. Vehicles and weapons were winterized, additional

housing facilities for the personnel were erected and special winter clothing

issued. Camouflage policy was altered to fit the new conditions; nets were

removed and all pieces painted with white gasoline soluble paint. The Corps

Camouflage Officer inspected each unit weekly thereby maintaining strict

camouflage discipline.

During this stabilized period the CBO instituted a .series of Counter-

battery orientation conferences for the education of infantrymen and artillery­


men of the attached divisions. These conferences were held twice or three

times daily with an average attendance of 20 EM and officers and during the

period 15 January-5 April a total of 860 personnel attended these conferences.

The purpose was to explain to the frontline soldier how a counterbattery

section operates and thus impress on him the absolute necessity for accurate,

timely shellreps and other obserTed enemy action. That the program was a

complete success was illustrated later by the great increase in information

forwarded to the CBO by ground troops.

An extensive wire net was in operation during this period, which, at

its peak, consisted of more than 140 miles of wire. Most of these lines

were rerouted, elevated and serviced daily in 6rder to insure against

breaks by ice and vehicles and continued to operate uninterruptedly thru-

out the winter.

ftie introduction of the variable time (VT) fuze in this theater on


3 January posed an additional problem in communications., namely, the air­
craft warning net necessary to clear aircraft from the line of flight of
VT fuzed projectiles, this was accomplished-by the establishment of a
standard warning procedure and transmitted over the SCR 193 Fire Control
Net. Groups and Division Artillery Headquarters were responsible for
their AOPs receiving warnings relayed by their SCR 600 series Radio Net.
In order to minimize the effect of radio failures during high performance
Jk/0 shoots using the SCR 522; which proved particularly vulnerable to high
humidity and extreme temperature changes, an SCR 522 radio net was estab­
lished wherein all battalions would monitor each shoot and be prepared to
take over in case of radio failure.

A Field Radar Unit was installed in vicinity of SCANELLO (8823) early

in January for the purpose of locating enemy mortars and field.pieces. All

possible assistance was given to this unit inoluding information of in­


dicated active areas and the location of those gun positions we intended

to engage. Generally speaking, the mountainous terrain was hot suitable

for radar operation and the results obtained were not satisfactory* How­
ever with changes in technique and procedure instituted, some improvement

was noted during the following months and greater employment of -talis method

of locating hostile installations is expected in future operations.

During February increased traffic was reported behind the enemy lines

and Corps G-2 became increasingly aware of the possibility of a mass

evacuation of certain sectors by the enemy. To be prepared for this

contingency and also effectively to cover the main approach routes of

enemy reinforcements a fire plan was developed and issued to artillery

units with II Corps to facilitate the rapid delivery of fire, by codeword,

on the four main roads opposite Corps zone. Between 50 and 80 points were

selected on Highway 64, 65 and 6531 and 17 points oil Highway 937 for pre­
arranged targets. The division battalions fired on points close-in and

the Corps battalions on the points at greater range* TOT was prescribed

by FDC and two pieces fired two volleys on each location with converged

sheaf at maximum rate of fire. Each volley from the howitzers was fired

l/2 VT and l/2 quick fuze.

Emphasis was continued on precision shoots for destruction of enemy

artillery pieces, and from the photo interpretation center we received

damage assessment reports on those positions taken under fire* These

assessments were of great assistance to the observers and stimulated con­


siderable interest.. Copies of the photos were also sent to the firing

battalions and were an effective morale builder. A study made pf several

hundred precision shoots during the month of March showed that photo damage

assessment reports proved our observer's reports to be correct 80$ of the

time. In view of the many reports we were receiving of rounds* in gun pits,

direct hits on guns, fires, explosions, etc,, this was most encouraging.

During a 3 week periad the. enemy moved 65% of his artillery. This amount

of movement, in a static situation, proved the effectiveness of our counter-

battery fire.

- 9 ­
Commencing 26 March all night and inclement weather harassing fires

by artillery with Corps were coordinated by an Air-Artillery committee

constituted by the AC of S, G-2, II Corps. This committee, which con­


sisted of representatives from G-2, Photo Interpretation, G-3, G-3 (Air)

and Artillery, met daily and selected profitable targets for both artillery

harassing and air shoots. This committee continued to function successfully

until the beginning of the spring offensive.

Organization for the periods

II Corps Arty

Hq & Hq Btry II Corps Arty

15 FA Obsn Bn

A Btry 15 FA Obsn Bn (Atchd IV Corps 27 Dec-29 Jan)

77 FA Gp

I7T~FA Bn (155 G & 8" H) (Atchd 423 FA Gp 15 Jan-15 March)

631 FA Bn (155 Hi)

936 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd IV Corps 1-16 March)

403 AA Bn (90mm G) (Detchd 6 Nov)

178 FA Gp

248 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd IV Corps 27 Dec-19 March)

185 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 1 Jan-14 Feb; atchd II Corps Arty 15-16 Feb)

527 FA Bn (8tf How) (Atchd II Corps Arty 23 March; 178 FA Gp 28 March)

423 FA Gp (DS Montecatini, Italy 12 Nov-1 Dec)

985 FA Bn (155 G & 8" H) (Atchd II Corps Arty 10 Nov-1 Dec)

633 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 27 Oct-1 Dec; IV Corps 27 Dec)

178 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 27 Oct-17 March)

536 FA Bn (8,f How) (Atchd II Corps Arty 23 March; 423 FA Gp 27 March)

11 Btry 54 SH Regt (-)(8n G & 240 H) (Br)'(Atchd 6 Dec.)

Summary of operations for the period?

Missions fired? Counterbattery 4124

Harassing 604

Personnel & Vehicles 646

Registrations 546

Destruction 340

Preparation Fires 8

Defensive Fires 27

Tanks 5

Observed missionsj Ground OP 1169

Air OP 1543

Locations! Sound 655

Flash 97

10 ­
Rounds fired by caliber? 155 How 74040
155 Gun 51426
7,2" How 4579
8" How 1042
240 How 423
8" Gun 364
Note? Above statistics do not include Div Arty's

EOLOGNA to 7-1
(1 April ' 4 5 - 2 May »45)

II Corps was selected to spearhead the spring offensive of 5 Army,

plans were drawn and accepted for the accomplishing of this mission and

the first of April found the Corps Artillery busily engaged in the final

preparations. The Corps Artillery was augmented by the addition of the

following units?

527 FA Bn (8" H)

536 FA Bn (8" H)

765 FA Bn (155 Hi)

Btry A, 530 FA Bn (155 G)

12/54 Super Heavy Regt (Br)(1x8" G,, 2x240mm Hows)

With the exception of Btry A, 530 FA Bn, the units listed above occupied

new positions and were governed by the Cover Plan which was put in effect

3 April. Under this plan the battalions were to observe the most strict

camouflage discipline to conceal the increase in the number of our guns,

radio silence was imposed and registrations held to one gun per battery

at the last possible moment before the attack. Further development of the

Cover Plan included the sending of reconnaissance parties from Headquarters

II Corps Artillery, 15 FA Obsn Bn, Hq 77 FA Gp, 536 and 527 FA Bn to the

FORLI Area in the Eighth Army sector to create the illusion that II Corps

would pass thru the Eighth Army along Hwy 9. The units which sent out

reconnaissance parties went immediately into radio silence 'until D-Day.

Subsequent FW interrogation failed to, verify the success of this attempted

deception. II Corps Artillery radio traffic was handled by a net control

station set up by IV Corps near the II Corps boundary.

The normal firing on hostile batteries and remunerative personnel and

vehicular targets was supplemented by counterbattery programs in support

of deceptive infantry raids made daily in specified sectors along the Corps

front.. Enemy strong points, buildings, pillboxes and the like received

particular attention in a continuation of the softening-up process in­


augurated in the latter part of the previous month. Although the enemy

reacted to each of these programs with much flare and some MG and mortar

activity there was very little retaliatory artillery fire received. The

small amount of hostile artillery fire reported was of a harassing nature

and directed principally on our forward elements and MSRs* The enemy

continued to move his guns frequently within localized artillery areas as

artillery continued to blast them with precision and unobserved shoots*

- 11 ­
On 13 April the 536 PA Bn and ll/54 Super Heavy Regiment were visited

by the 15 Army Group Commander signifying the official completion of the

preparation period.

Commencing at H-Hour (2230B) 15 April the Corps Artillery plus the

medium battalions of the 34, 91 and S3 Div Artys fired a counterbattery

and enemy CP program on 53 locations in support of the attack of the. 6

South African Armd Div and the 88 Inf Div. This program was followed by

a series of TOT concentrations on hostile batteries and targets requested

by divisions, massing all available artillery on each location. The whole

program was extremely reminiscent of the one fired in support of the attack

at MINTURNO in May 1944. For the 34 and 91 Div attack which jumped off at

160300B another counterbattery and CP program was fired and was followed by

a series of TOT concentrations which kept our guns firing until daylight.

Our artillery ammunition expenditure for the 24 hours ending 161800B was

17882 rounds as compared to 1050 rounds of enemy fire received in Corps zone

for 48 hours ending 161800B clearly indicated the excellent neutralization

effect of our fire. A high percentage of the hostile fire received was re­
ported as SPs or infantry support weapons fire.

Beginning the night 16-17 April the e**emy' withdrew a number of his guns

north along Hwys 64 and 65. Some of these guns retreating along Hwy 65-went

into- previously prepared positions north of BOLOGNA. These positions, hither­


to unoccupied, had been plotted on our Hostile Battery Chart and as shelling

reports indicated they might have become occupied they were taken under fire.

On 18 April the objective of M. ADONE was taken by our troops for the

first breach of the enemy's vaunted defense line. This was a signal for a

shift of the Corps Arty emphasis to the west and accordingly the 77 FA Gp,

which had been firing from the IDICE River Valley, was displaced laterally

to the RENO River valley. The rate of advance of the infantry increased at

this time and the artillery with Corps was displaced forward rapidly to

support the attack on each succeeding objective.

Upon reaching the PO Valley and crossing Hwy the advance became a

virtual rout with all known hostile artillery locations overrun and only

rearguard enemy action to impede our advance. In order adequately to

support the divisions the 77 and 178 FA Groups worked directly with the 88

and 91 Divisions respectively. For the PO River crossing 2 batteries of

155mm guns were attached to each of the two Div Artys. The last shelling

report to the CBO was received at this point when 200 rounds fell in the 88

Division's bridgehead on 24 April. The littered south banks of the PO offered

mute testimony to the haste of the enemy's flight and the accuracy of our

artillery fire and bombing. Guns of all calibers were found every where in

various states of destruction. An incomplete check revealed 12x21cm and

7x17cm pieces.

12

After crossing the PO the situation became so fluid a "No fire line"

was an impossibility and only the 155mm guns could reach a safe distance

into enemy territory to fire on retreating enemy vehicles and personnel.

The same attachment of 155mm guns to the Div Artys was made for the ADIGE

River crossing while the balance of the Corps Artillery was drawn up in

positions to support the crossing. Enemy resistance was weak and no firing

was called for by our infantry* The pursuit into the mountains dropped

Corps Artillery out of the picture and by the end of the month all battalions

were in assembly areas and furnishing trucks for infantry and supply movements.

The planes of the Arty AOPs again proved their value during the pursuit phase

by doing reconnaissance, messenger and personnel transportation services that

would have been impossible by other means.

The complete disintegration and final surrender of the German war machine

in ITALY on 2 May 1945 culminated one of the most gruelling military operations

in the history of warfare. The Corps Artillery can truly point with justi­
fiable pride to the most successful accomplishment of its role of support for

the assault elements in a victorious campaign.

Organization for the period*

II Corps Artillery

Hq & Hq Btry II Corps Arty

15 FA Obsn Bn

11 Btry 54 SH Regt (8" G & 240 H)(Atchd 423 FA Gp 1-22 April; 77 FA Gp

23-25 April)

12 Btry 54 SH Regt (8" G S 240 H)(Atchd 178 FA Gp 10-25 April)

77 FA Gp

248 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 178 FA Gp 1-18 April)

536 FA Bn (8" How) (Atchd 423 FA Gp 1-25 April)

173 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd 88 Div 26 April; Hq & C Btry reverted to 77 FA

Gp 27 ApriJ; A & B Btrys reverted to 77 FA Gp 29 April)

A Btry 530 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd II Corps Arty 1 April; 178 FA Gp 2 April;

88 Div 26 April; 77 FA Gp 27 April)

178 FA Gp

178 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 423 FA Gp 1-25 April)

527 FA Bn (8" How)

985 FA Bn (155 G) (Atchd 423 FA Gp 1-25 April; 91 Div 26 April; Hq & B

Btry reverted to 178 FA Gp 27 April; A & C Btrys reverted

to 178 FA Gp 30 April)

423 FA Gp

631 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 77 FA Gp 1-25 April)

936 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd 77 FA Gp 1-17 April)

765 FA Bn (155 Hi) (Atchd II Corps Arty 1-4 April; 178 FA Gp 5-25 April)

-13

Summary of operations for the period?

Missions firedj Counterbattery 1329

Harassing 1244

Registration 240

Destruction 180

Personnel & Vehicles 255

Tanks 13

Preparation Fires 64

Observed missionss Air OP 627

Ground OP 196

Locations\ Sound 52

Flash 10

Rounds fired by calibers

155 Hew 48944

155 Gun 24265

8" How 10315

240 How 48 3

8" Gun 427

Notes Above statistics do not include Div Artys.

- 14 ­
xi CORPS A m u m s
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 01 CIRCUITS
North Apennines

Field Rsdsr Sec.

//
Lessons Learned, Artillery With the

Corps

a* Division Artillery:

1. Use of a fire direction center in six gun batteries permits

continuous massed fire support in a rapid moving situation*

2. In addition to the regimental liaison section, a fourth liaison


section together with necessary equipment and transportation should be in­
corporated as a permanent change in T/o and S*
3. In the pursuit the light artillery battalions can best be

utilized by placing them under combat team control. In the case of motorized

columns, artillery should be attached to each column.

4. Liaison officers should be equipped with SCR 193.

5* Relay radio stations should be established prior to their need.

Air OP's are valuable relay stations.

6. To support a fast-moving front, the direct support unit must

have at least two FO's with each infantry battalion.

7. Heavy demands for ammunition were met by attaching one-third

of the service battery ammunition train to each firing battery. As each

truck was emptied, regardless of the time or circumstances it was immediately

sejxt back to the ASP for more ammunition.

8. All artillery personnel should have training in basic infantry

tactics.

9. On M5 tractors bogie wheels with synthetic rubber rims would

not stand long forced marches.

b. Corps Artillery:

1. Long range adjustment on hostile batteries can be accomplished

only by close cooperation and understanding as to methods of adjustment and

limitations of material on the part of the air corps squadron. Adequate

signal personnel trained in the repair and adjustment of the SCR-522-A must

be made available to keep the using ground sets in operating order. These

sets are extremely delicate and need constant attention to prevent communi­
cations failures during a shoot.

2. Major effort in selection and construction of air strips is

essential. Centralization of air observation sections on a field with which

good communications can be established, and at which centralized control of

tactical operations and maintenance can be exercised, is most desirable.

3. Future availability of ammunition should be known when plans for

deployment and employment of artillery are being made. It is inefficient to

emplace large amounts of artillery where they are difficult to supply and

maintain when they cannot be used to anywhere near full capacity due to short­
age of ammunition. Appropriate assignment of ammunition to individual fire

missions cannot be made unless ammunition supply for a long period is known.

- 15 ­
4. It has been found necessary in rapid moving situations to infiltrate

one gun to the new position area ahead of the battalion in order to assure

a registration before darkness. The gun is accompanied by the Ass*t S-3,

fire direction personnel and equipment enabling a small fire direction

center to be set up at the gun. Since the survey is usually not complete

at this time, location of the gun is pin pricked on the map by inspection.

The map is used as a firing chart and direction measured off the map to a

suitable check point. The gun is laid by compass. Observation is arranged

for with an air OP. After the registration is complete the base angle of

the adjusted direction is measured. When the survey is completed, comparison

of the adjusted data and the survey data results in the deflection correction

and K.

5. After considerable experimentation it was determined that a com­


bination of charge VII, M-2 Schneider 155 howitzer powder and the $7. increr
ment of M-4, 155 howitzer M-l powder produces very satisfactory results,
giving a maximum range of about 14,800 yards with a muzzle velocity of
approximately 1670 F / s . Obviously only #7 increment saved in sealed contain­
ers when charge VI of the M-4 powder is fired should be used in the above
combination. FT 155 Q-l, charge VII; with the use of a K, is employed.
6. Direct local lines from Corps Artillery FDC to each Group headquarters

greatly enhanced the rapid massing of fire and speeded up fulfillment of

Division requests which came from liaison officer through the supporting

group headquarters. To avoid duplication of effort, groups were required

to notify Corps Artillery of all Division requests.

7. In the pursuit Group Hq with one or two attached battalions worked

directly with Division Artilleries. Sometimes Group and Div Arty CPs were

adjacent.

8. For river crossings batteries of 155 guns were attached to battalions

of Division Artillery. Div Arty Bn CO's were hampered by being concerned

with movement of these heavier guns. Both Corps Artillery and Div Arty Bn

CO's agreed that a better solution would have been the attachment of the

155 gun batteries to Div Arty Hq with a liaison officer from the gun battalion

situated at Div Arty Hq to receive commands from Div .^rty commander.

9. Coordination of firing of VT fuze and Air Corps activity was

difficult. Careful evaluation must be made of the destructive effect of

VT fuze as opposed to bombing, particularly on close support missions.

10. A ground check of over-run gun positions which have been fired on,

using the precision method, revealed that more delay fuze should be used

during the adjustment. It was also revealed that much unobserved artillery

fire fell short on mountains defilading enemy positions. Study of aerial

photographs is essential to eliminate this error.

- 16 ­
LETTERS OF C0MM2NDATI0K?

1.

HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP

3 May 1945

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

I take great pleasure in conveying to each American officer and

enlisted man in 15th Army Group the following message received by me

from the President of the United States?

"ON THE OCCASION OF THE FINAL BRILLANT VICTORY

OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY IN IMPOSING UNCONDITIONAL

SURRENDER UPON THE ENEMY, I WISH TO CONVEY TO THE AMERICAN

FORCES UNDER YOUR COMMAND AND TO YOU PERSONALLY THE APPRECIATION

AND GRATITUDE OF THE PRESIDENT AND OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED

STATES. NO PRAISE IS ADEQUATE FOR THE HEROIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND

MAGNIFICENT COURAGE OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL UNDER YOUR COMMAND DURING

THIS LONG AND TRYING CAMPAIGN.

"AMERICA IS PROUD OF THE ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION MADE

BY YOUR AMERICAN ARMIES TO THE FINAL ALLIED VICTORY IN ITALY.

OUR THANKS FOR YOUR GALLANT LEADERSHIP AND THE DEATHLESS VALOR

OF YOUR MEN.

SIGNED - HARRY S. TRUMAN."

/s/ Mark W. Clark

/t/ MARK W. CLARK

General, USA

Commanding

- 17 ­
2. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

APO 464 US ARMY

AG 006-AM 3 May 1945

SUBJSCTs Congratulatory Message

TO See distribution

The following message has been received from Commanding General,

MTOUSAt

Supreme Allied Commander has just received the following

message from His Majesty King Georges

"To you and all those under your command I send

my heartfelt congratulations on the overwhelming

victory by which you are bringing to so triumphant

an end your long and arduous campaign in Italy*"

Field Marshal Alexander has replied on behalf of you all,

as follows?

"Vfith my humble duty I thank Your Majesty personally

and on behalf of all those sailors, soldiers and airmen

whom I have the honor to command, for your very gracious

message which is deeply appreciated."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL TRUSCOTTs

/s/ M. F. Grant

/t/ M. F. GRANT

Colonel, AGD

Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

All Troops

18 ­
3. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

APO 464 U.S.ARMY

2 May 1945

TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE FIFTH ARMY*

The enemy in Italy has surrendered unconditionally, and the bitter

Italian campaign has ended. Its hardships and tribulations are now behind,

but to you men of the Fifth Army who have fought so gloriously through to

victory, they will remain unforgettable memories. They m i l be forged, too,

in th'e history of this war as a record of the inspired bravery and the

traditional courage of free peoples.

The long months of steady, difficult operations over perhaps the

most formidable terrain that any army has had to fight against the most

seasoned and the toughest troops that the enemy could produce - mark a campaign

which not only opened the assault upon the continent of Europe but which,

in the shattering blows that it has struck, has contributed in a very great

measure to that final victory in the West which is now in sight.

It is fitting that this campaign should have culminated in your

magnificent performance in the final battles of these past few weeks. The

accomplishments of every fighting unit have been superb, officers and men

rising to inspired heights. Storming rapidly and relentlessly out of your

Winter positions in the Apennines - through defenses heavily prepared and

in great depth - manner by an enemy resisting to the last because of &

fanatical belief in his own' abortive cause, you swarmed out of the valley

of the Po to overwhelm him* Creating confusion and chaos in his ranks, by

the weight and fury of your attack, in scarcely more than two weeks you

captured enormous numbers of personnel, seized huge quantities of stores

of equipment, inflicted thousands of casualties, generated the widespread

demoralization which rendered utterly ineffective one of the best fighting

machines that the enemy had been able to place on the battlefield.

Throughout all operations, the feats performed by service and

supporting units have been prodigious. Your accomplishments engendered in

the combat elements a confidence which permitted them a complete freedom

of action and enabled them to go forward in the knowledge you would not

fail them.

You are all - every man and every officer - of all of the nation­
alities which go to make up this Army - deserving of the high praise that

grateful nations now extend to you.

Please accept my own humble tribute. I regret that I cannot find

words to express fully and adequately the sincerity of my respect for the

character and fighting qualities of you, the members of this magnificent

Army. I am proud - as only the Commander of a valiant, victorious army Can

be - and deeply gratified by your splendid victory.

/s/ L. K. Truscott, Jr.

/t/ L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

Commanding

- 19 ­
APO 19 US ARMY

In the Field

18 September 1944

TO: THE OFFICERS AND M M OF II CORPS.

You have broken the GOTHIC LINE. I congratulate you upon this

significant victory - the first step toward the ultimate destruction

of our enemy. You must not pause in your gallant and determined drive,

but push the enemy relentlessly, giving him n« rest. The final goal is

in sight, and I have every confidence that the men of II Corps will give

the Fifth Army another Speedy Victory,

/s/ Geoffrey Keyes

/t/ GEOFFREY KETE3

Major General, U3A,

Cwrmanding.

5. HEADQUARTERS II CORPS

APO 19 US ARMY

In the Field

19 April 1945

TO: THE OFFICERS AND kEN OF II COPi'S.

Congratulations on your fine w r k . You have cracked the

enemy's strongest defenses and he is reeling backward,

M.th the continued coordination and cooperation of all arms,

and with your unceasing drive and will to win we shall rout him and

desti-oy him.

Keep up the good fight.

/s/ Geoffrey Keyes

/t/ GEOFFREY KEYES

Major General, USA,

Commanding;

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
APO 19 U. S. A M Y

30 April 1945
TOi The Officers and Men of II Corps.

The German Army in ITALY has been destroyed.

Spearheading the overwhelming drive of the Fifth Army, you have

played a major role in this destruction. In addition to capturing over

37 thousand of the enemy's finest fighting troops, our hospitals are

filled with his wounded, and your zone of advance is strewn with his

his dead and his war material.

You drove through the strongest enemy defensive positions in NORTH

ITALY, you forced the crossings of the PO, ADIGE, and BRENTA RIVERS with

such speed and relentlessness that you. slashed through the main routes

of retreat of the fleeing German Army, encircling great numbers of his

demoralized troops.

On the eve of the regrouping of our ivrmies for the closing phase

of the ITALIAN Campaign, I want to express to each of you my appreciation

of all that you have accomplished as individuals and as a team, and my

pride in having commanded you in your historic victory.

/s/ Geoffrey Keyes

/t/ GEOFFREY KEYES


Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.
DISTRIBUTION*

1 copy per Co and Sep Detachment, II Corps Troop List 29 Apr '45.
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