G.R. No.
229380, June 06, 2018
LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Leniza
Reyes y Capistrano (Reyes) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
36821, which affirmed the Decision4 dated June 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding Reyes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in her custody and control 0.04
gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet which substance was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6,
2012, a group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Jefferson Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc,
Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman
with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay
Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the
said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if
she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal
kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something
out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand.8 PO1
Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where
he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents, conducted
the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles.9 Thereafter,
PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the
seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza),
who confirmed10 that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.11
For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on
November 5, 2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree
and was about to board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a
certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was
blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1
Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession
which she denied having. She was then brought to the police station where the police
officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But
since she failed to give the money, the police officers took her to Taytay for inquest
proceedings.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section
11, Article II of RA 9165. Accordingly, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with
an order for her immediate arrest.14
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested
and thereupon, found to be in possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered
to the police officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it observed that the chain of custody of
the seized item was sufficiently established through the testimony of PO1 Monteras,
which was not ill-motivated.15
Aggrieved, Reyes appealed16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime
charged.18 It held that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet
of shabu was valid as she was caught in flagrante delicto in its possession and was
legally arrested on account thereof.19 The CA likewise found substantial compliance with
the chain of custody rule and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item were properly preserved.20
However, it corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to
0.04 gram in order to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly,
modified the penalty imposed to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum.21
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be
upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.22 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."23
"Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure
[become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2),25 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on
the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.26
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be
[e]ffected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process
cannot be reversed.28
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter,
the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should – as a general rule – be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests
may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.29
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements
must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it.30
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is essential. [The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [contemplates that] the officer himself
witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, [the officer] knows for a fact
that a crime has just been committed."31
Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act
test, showing that "the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the
police officers suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal drugs at the
time [she] was apprehended."32 Absent any overt act showing the commission of a
crime, the warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was
apprehended for merely carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting
suspiciously.33 Similarly, in People v. Racho,34 a search based solely on a tip describing
one of the passengers of a bus was declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension,
the said accused was not "committing a crime in the presence of the police officers,"
nor did he commit a crime or was about to commit one.35
In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do
anything as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime when she was just
passing by.36 During cross-examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:
[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]: Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only
information that they gave you is that there is a woman with a tattoo?
[PO1 Monteras]: Yes ma'am.
Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?
A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.
Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?
A: None ma'am.
COURT: What is the tattoo on her left arm?
A: I think it was a Dragon sir.
Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon
tattoo can be possessed by any other person aside from the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?
A: Not anymore ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?
A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic)
coming towards us who fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.
Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did
nothing wrong against you?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx
Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?
A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.
Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will
elicit a response from you?
A: None ma'am.
x x x x37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes.
PO1 Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously
or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act
could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras
that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the
arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while
reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.39
Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule
113, particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal
knowledge" is determined from the testimony of the witnesses that there
exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.40 As
ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law
enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the
person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime."41 In this case, records failed
to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2)
teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance."42 Surely, to interpret
"personal knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a
dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under
Section 5 (b), Rule 113.43
Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the
subject item as lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the
testimony of PO1 Monteras, claimed that when the police officers asked Reyes if she
purchased shabu, she turned her back and voluntarily showed the plastic sachet
containing the same which she retrieved from her brassiere. According to
jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of a witness's testimony is determined by its
conformity with knowledge and consistency with the common experience of
mankind.44 As the Court observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human experience
for a person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his or her
conviction for a crime, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or
her to do so.
In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the
sachet of shabu to the police officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the
time of arrest, Reyes was so intoxicated that she "simply let her senses down" and
showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46 but later, in the same Comment, the OSG argued
that Reyes was actually "in her right senses when she reminded the police officers" that
they were not allowed to frisk a woman.47 These material inconsistencies clearly render
suspect the search conducted on Reyes's person and likewise, destroy the credibility of
the police officers who testified against Reyes.48 In order to deem as valid a consensual
search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and in no uncertain
terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent
thereof established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in this
case.
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized
from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal
liability.
Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
through their admission that only the Barangay Captain was present during the marking
and inventory of the seized items.51 Records are further bereft of any showing that
efforts were made by the police officers to secure the presence of the other necessary
personalities under the law or provide any justification for their absence, which could
have excused their leniency in strictly complying with the said procedure.52 Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,53 requires, among others,
that the apprehending team shall immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the
seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination.54 It is well-settled that unjustified non-
compliance with the chain of custody procedure would result in the acquittal of the
accused,55 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the
Resolution dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for
any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
