U.S. Supreme Court 6.

Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional

statute is present and real before the statute is to be
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) effective, and will

Nos. 583, 584 Page 268 U. S. 511

Argued March 16, 17, 1925 become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a
suit to restrain future enforcement of the statute is not
premature. P. 268 U. S. 536.
Decided June 1, 1925
296 Fed. 928, affirmed.
268 U.S. 510
APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED preliminary injunctions restraining the Governor, and
STATES other officials, of the State of Oregon from threatening
or attempting to enforce an amendment to the school
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON law -- an initiative measure adopted by the people
November 7, 1922, to become effective in 1926 --
Syllabus requiring parents and others having control of young
children to send them to the primary schools of the
State. The plaintiffs were two Oregon corporations
1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all owning and conducting schools.
governments of this Union rest excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. Page 268 U. S. 529
P. 268 U. S. 535.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the
2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., § Court.
5259) which, with certain exemptions, requires every
parent, guardian or other person having control of a These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied
child between the ages of eight and sixteen years to allegations, which granted preliminary orders
send him to the public school in the district where he restraining
resides, for the period during which the school is held
for the current year, is an unreasonable interference Page 268 U. S. 530
with the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing of the children, and in that respect
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 268 U. S. 534. appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce
the Compulsory Education Act * adopted November 7,
1922, under the initiative provision of her Constitution
3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot by the voters of Oregon. Jud.Code, § 266. They present
claim for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the the same points of law; there are no controverted
Fourteenth Amendment, and, in general, no person in questions of fact. Rights said to be guaranteed by the
any business has such an interest in possible customers federal Constitution were specially set up, and
as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power by appropriate prayers asked for their protection.
the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of
patronage;
The challenged Act, effective September 1, 1926,
requires every parent, guardian or other person having
4. But where corporations owning and conducting control or charge or custody of a child between eight
schools are threatened with destruction of their and sixteen years to send him "to a public school for the
business and property through the improper and period of time a public school shall be held during the
unconstitutional compulsion exercised by this statute current year" in the district where the child resides, and
upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. There are
immediate, and entitles them to protection by
injunction. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. P. 268 U. S. 535.
Page 268 U. S. 531
5. The Act, being intended to have general application,
cannot be construed in its application to such exemptions not specially important here -- for children
corporations as an exercise of power to amend their who are not normal, or who have completed he eighth
charters. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. P. 268 grade, or who reside at considerable distances from any
U. S. 535. public school, or whose parents or guardians hold
special permits from the County Superintendent. The Page 268 U. S. 533
manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at
public schools by normal children, between eight and in owning, operating and conducting for profit an
sixteen, who have not completed the eighth grade. And elementary, college preparatory and military training
without doubt enforcement of the statute would school for boys between the ages of five and twenty-one
seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable years. The average attendance is one hundred, and the
features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the annual fees received for each student amount to some
value of their property. eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is
divided into eight grades, as in the public schools; the
Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon college preparatory department has four grades, similar
corporation, organized in 1880, with power to care for to those of the public high schools; the courses of study
orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and conform to the requirements of the State Board of
maintain academies or schools, and acquire necessary Education. Military instruction and training are also
real and personal given, under the supervision of an Army officer. It owns
considerable real and personal property, some useful
Page 268 U. S. 532 only for school purposes. The business and incident
good will are very valuable. In order to conduct its
affairs, long time contracts must be made for supplies,
property. It has long devoted its property and effort to equipment, teachers and pupils. Appellants, law officers
the secular and religious education and care of children, of the State and County, have publicly announced that
and has acquired the valuable good will of many parents the Act of November 7, 1922, is valid, and have declared
and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and their intention to enforce it. By reason of the statute and
high schools and junior colleges, and maintains threat of enforcement, appellee's business is being
orphanages for the custody and control of children destroyed and its property depreciated; parents and
between eight and sixteen. In its primary schools, many guardians are refusing to make contracts for the future
children between those ages are taught the subjects instruction of their sons, and some are being
usually pursued in Oregon public schools during the withdrawn.
first eight years. Systematic religious instruction and
moral training according to the tenets of the Roman
Catholic Church are also regularly provided. All courses The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then
of study, both temporal and religious, contemplate alleges that the challenged Act contravenes the
continuity of training under appellee's charge; the corporation's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
primary schools are essential to the system and the Amendment and that, unless appellants are restrained
most profitable. It owns valuable buildings, especially from proclaiming its validity and threatening to enforce
constructed and equipped for school purposes. The it, irreparable injury will result. The prayer is for an
business is remunerative -- the annual income from appropriate injunction.
primary schools exceeds thirty thousand dollars -- and
the successful conduct of this requires long-time No answer was interposed in either cause, and, after
contracts with teachers and parents. The Compulsory proper notices, they were heard by three judges
Education Act of 1922 has already caused the (Jud.Code § 266) on motions for preliminary injunctions
withdrawal from its schools of children who would upon the specifically alleged facts. The court ruled that
otherwise continue, and their income has steadily the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees
declined. The appellants, public officers, have against the
proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce the statute.
Page 268 U. S. 534
After setting out the above facts, the Society's bill
alleges that the enactment conflicts with the right of deprivation of their property without due process of
parents to choose schools where their children will law consequent upon the unlawful interference by
receive appropriate mental and religious training, the appellants with the free choice of patrons, present and
right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a prospective. It declared the right to conduct schools was
school, the right of schools and teachers therein to property, and that parents and guardians, as a part of
engage in a useful business or profession, and is their liberty, might direct the education of children by
accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that these
And, further, that, unless enforcement of the measure is schools were not unfit or harmful to the public, and that
enjoined the corporation's business and property will enforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully
suffer irreparable injury. deprive them of patronage, and thereby destroy their
owners' business and property. Finally, that the threats
Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation to enforce the Act would continue to cause irreparable
organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged injury, and the suits were not premature.
No question is raised concerning the power of the State The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise we must determine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently
and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require it was expected to have general application, and cannot
that all children of proper age attend some school, that be construed as though merely intended to amend the
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic charters of certain private corporations, as in Berea
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. No argument in favor of
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught such view has been advanced.
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no
The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act person in any business has such an interest in possible
under consideration would be destruction of appellees' customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of
primary schools, and perhaps all other private primary proper power of the State upon the ground that he will
schools for normal children within the State of Oregon. be deprived
These parties are engaged in a kind of undertaking not
inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and Page 268 U. S. 536
meritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present
records to indicate that they have failed to discharge
their obligations to patrons, students or the State. And of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not
there are no peculiar circumstances or present against the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs
emergencies which demand extraordinary measures asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and
relative to primary education. unlawful interference with their patrons and the
consequent destruction of their business and property.
Their interest is clear and immediate, within the rule
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, approved in Truax v. Raich, Truax v.
we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 Corrigan and Terrace v. Thompson, supra, and many
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and other cases where injunctions have issued to protect
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of business enterprises against interference with the
children freedom of patrons or customers. Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Page 268 U. S. 535 Deering, 254 U. S. 443; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184; Nebraska
under their control: as often heretofore pointed out, District v. McKelvie, 262 U. S. 404; Truax v. Corrigan,
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be supra, and cases there cited.
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees
State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the
governments in this Union repose excludes any general remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing effective date of the Act, the injury would have become
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those action is a well recognized function of courts of equity.
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, The decrees below are
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations. Affirmed.

Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, *

they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the
proper sense, this is true. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. "Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:"
Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 203 U. S. 255; Western Turf
Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 204 U. S. 363. "Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the
But they have business and property for which they same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:"
claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants "Sec. 5259. Children Between the Ages of Eight and
are exercising over present and prospective patrons of Sixteen Years -- Any parent, guardian or other person in
their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect the State of Oregon, having control or charge or custody
against loss threatened by such action. Truax v. of a child under the age of sixteen years and of the age
Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. of eight years or over at the commencement of a term of
312; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197. public school of the district in which said child resides,
who shall fail or neglect or refuse to send such child to a
public school for the period of time a public school shall
be held during the current year in said district, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and each day's failure to send
such child to a public school shall constitute a separate
offense; provided, that, in the following cases, children
shall not be required to attend public schools:"

"(a) Children Physically Unable -- Any child who is

abnormal, subnormal or physically unable to attend
school."

"(b) Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade --

Any child who has completed the eighth grade, in
accordance with the provisions of the state course of
study."

"(c) Distance from school -- Children between the ages of

eight and ten years, inclusive, whose place of residence
is more than one and one-half miles, and children over
ten years of age whose place of residence is more than
three miles, by the nearest traveled road, from public
school; provided, however, that, if transportation to and
from school is furnished by the school district, this
exemption shall not apply."

"(d) Private Instruction -- Any child who is being taught

for a like period of time by the parent or private teacher
such subjects as are usually taught in the first eight
years in the public school; but before such child can be
taught by a parent or a private teacher, such parent or
private teacher must receive written permission from
the county superintendent, and such permission shall
not extend longer than the end of the current school
year. Such child must report to the county school
superintendent or some person designated by him at
least once every three months and take an examination
in the work covered. If, after such examination, the
county superintendent shall determine that such child
is not being properly taught, then the county
superintendent shall order the parent, guardian or
other person, to send such child to the public school the
remainder of the school year."

"If any parent, guardian or other person having control

or charge or custody of any child between the ages of
eight and sixteen years shall fail to comply with any
provision of this section, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be
subject to a fine of not less than $5, nor more than $100,
or to imprisonment in the county jail not less than two
nor more than thirty days, or by both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court."

"This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force

from and after the first day of September, 1926."