Baytan V Comelec
Baytan V Comelec
FACTS:
On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
they met the newly elected Barangay Captain Ignacio who led them to register in Precinct No.
83-A of Barangay 18. They wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar to
them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study the precinct map
of Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of
Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew
on June 22, 1997. Petitioners then through a letter addressed to the former COMELEC Asst.
Director, requested for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. They also explained
the reason and circumstances of their second registration and expressed their intention to
redress the error. The election officer of Cavite then forwarded copies of the petitioner’s
registration to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Ravanzo for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the
matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department endorsed the
case to Ravanzo for resolution. Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double
registration against petitioners. In an en banc meeting held on November 09, 2000, the
COMELEC in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc denied the motion.
Petitioners argue that they did not intend to perpetrate the act prohibited, and therefore they
should be exculpated. They claim honest mistake and good faith in registering twice. Moreover,
petitioners argue that they did not intend to perpetrate the act prohibited, and therefore they
should be exculpated. They claim honest mistake and good faith in registering twice.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction
A: in the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear and convincing
evidence on record that they had no intention of committing said election offense;
B: Taking cognizance of the case in the first instance in violation of Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
HELD:
A. No. The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people of "free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections." This grant is an adjunct to the COMELEC’s
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws. Failure by the COMELEC to
exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make an idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.
Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued in the preliminary
investigation stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means
to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine probable
cause. It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election
offenses rests in the COMELEC’s sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional
authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. Generally,
the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC’s exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.
B: No. "[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers that the COMELEC is
mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration,
by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional." The Solicitor General contends that
the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information in court does not in
any way adjudicate with finality the rights and liabilities of the parties investigated.
The COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which
expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be
decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the
COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated
to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when
the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to "prosecute
cases of violations of election laws." The prosecution of election law violators involves the
exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly
approve the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for double
registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no constitutional requirement that
the filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable
in administrative cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is determining whether
probable cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of the provision of the Election Code
prohibiting double registration.