VOL.
207, MARCH 18, 1992 343
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court
of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 100727. March 18, 1992.
COGEO-CUBAO OPERATORS AND DRIVERS
ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, LUNGSOD SILANGAN TRANSPORT
SERVICES, CORP., INC., respondents.
Public Service Law; Common Carriers; Certificate of public
convenience.—A certificate of public convenience is included in the
term “property” in the broad sense of the term. Under the Public
Service Law, a certificate of public convenience can be sold by the
holder thereof because it has considerable material value and is
considered a valuable asset (Raymundo v. Luneta Motor Co., et
al., 58 Phil. 889). Although there is no doubt that it is private
property, it is affected with a public interest and must be
submitted to the control of the government for the common good
(Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 70 Phil. 221). Hence,
insofar as the interest of the State is involved, a certificate of
public convenience does not confer upon the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of
Appeals
holder any proprietary right or interest or franchise in the route
covered thereby and in the public highways (Lugue v. Villegas, L-
22545, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 409). However, with respect to
other persons and other public utilities, a certificate of public
convenience as property, which represents the right and authority
to operate its facilities for public service, cannot be taken or
interfered with without due process of law. Appropriate actions
may be maintained in courts by the holder of the certificate
against those who have not been authorized to operate in
competition with the former and those who invade the rights
which the former has pursuant to the authority granted by the
Public Service Commission (A.L. Ammen Transportation Co. v.
Golingco, 43 Phil. 280).
Civil Law; Human Relations; Violation of legal rights.—
Although there is no question that petitioner can exercise their
constitutional right to redress their grievances with respondent
Lungsod Corp., the manner by which this constitutional right is to
be exercised should not undermine public peace and order nor
should it violate the legal rights of other persons. Article 21 of the
Civil Code provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. The provision covers a situation where a person has a
legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. It presupposes loss or
injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of
such violation. It is clear from the facts of this case that petitioner
formed a barricade and forcibly took over the motor units and
personnel of the respondent corporation. This paralyzed the usual
activities and earnings of the latter during the period of ten days
and violated the right of respondent Lungsod Corp. to conduct its
operations thru its authorized officers.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Michael P. Moralde for petitioner.
Romeo F. Conda for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
decision
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VOL. 207, MARCH 18, 1992 345
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs.
Court of Appeals
of the Regional Trial Court awarding damages in favor of
respondent Lungsod Silangan Transport Services Corp.,
Inc. (Lungsod Corp. for brevity).
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
“It appears that a certificate of public convenience to operate a
jeepney service was ordered to be issued in favor of Lungsod
Silangan to ply the Cogeo-Cubao route sometime in 1983 on the
justification that public necessity and convenience will best be
served, and in the absence of existing authorized operators on the
line applied for x x x. On the other hand, defendant-Association
was registered as a non-stock, nonprofit organization with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 30, 1985 x x x
with the main purpose of representing plaintiff-appellee for
whatever contract and/or agreement it will have regarding the
ownership of units, and the like, of the members of the
Association x x x.’
“Perturbed by plaintiffs’ Board Resolution No. 9 x x x adopting
a Bandera’ System under which a member of the cooperative is
permitted to queue for passengers at the disputed pathway in
exchange for a ticket worth twenty pesos, the proceeds of which
shall be utilized for Christmas programs of the drivers and other
benefits, and on the strength of defendants’ registration as a
collective body with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
defendants-appellants, led by Romeo Oliva decided to form a
human barricade on November 11, 1985 and assumed the
dispatching of passenger jeepneys x x x. This development as
initiated by defendants-appellants gave rise to the suit for
damages.
“Defendant-Association’s Answer contained vehement denials
to the insinuation of take over and at the same time raised as a
defense the circumstance that the organization was formed not to
compete with plaintiff-cooperative. It, however, admitted that it is
not authorized to transport passengers x x x.” (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
On July 31, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of respondent Lungsod Corp., the dispositive portion
of which states:
“WHEREFORE FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION,
the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
“1. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of
P50,000.00 as actual damages;
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346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of
Appeals
“2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
“SO ORDERED.” (p. 39, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner Association
appealed with the Court of Appeals. On May 27, 1991,
respondent appellate court rendered its decision affirming
the findings of the trial court except with regard to the
award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00. The Court of
Appeals however, awarded nominal damages to petitioner
in the amount of P10,000.00.
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner
assigning the following errors of the appellate court:
“I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN MERELY
MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT.
“II. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER USURPED
THE PROPERTY RIGHT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
“III. AND THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
Since the assigned errors are interrelated, this Court shall
discuss them jointly. The main issue raised by the
petitioner is whether or not the petitioner usurped the
property right of the respondent which shall entitle the
latter to the award of nominal damages.
Petitioner contends that the association was formed not
to compete with the respondent corporation in the latter’s
operation as a common carrier; that the same was
organized for the common protection of drivers from
abusive traffic officers who extort money from them, and
for the elimination of the practice of respondent corporation
of requiring jeepney owners to execute deed of sale in favor
of the corporation to show that the latter is the owner of
the jeeps under its certificate of public convenience.
Petitioner also argues that in organizing the association,
the members thereof are merely exercising their freedom or
right to redress their grievances.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public
conven-
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VOL. 207, MARCH 18, 1992 347
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court
of Appeals
ience is an authorization issued by the Public Service
Commission for the operation of public services for which
no franchise is required by law. In the instant case, a
certificate of public convenience was issued to respondent
corporation on January 24, 1983 to operate a public utility
jeepney service on the CogeoCubao route. As found by the
trial court, the certificate was issued pursuant to a decision
passed by the Board of Transportation in BOT Case No. 82-
565.
A certificate of public convenience is included in the
term “property” in the broad sense of the term. Under the
Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience can
be sold by the holder thereof because it has considerable
material value and is considered a valuable asset
(Raymundo v. Luneta Motor Co., et al., 58 Phil. 889).
Although there is no doubt that it is private property, it is
affected with a public interest and must be submitted to
the control of the government for the common good
(Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 70 Phil. 221).
Hence, insofar as the interest of the State is involved, a
certificate of public convenience does not confer upon the
holder any proprietary right or interest or franchise in the
route covered thereby and in the public highways (Lugue v.
Villegas, L-22545, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 409). However,
with respect to other persons and other public utilities, a
certificate of public convenience as property, which
represents the right and authority to operate its facilities
for public service, cannot be taken or interfered with
without due process of law. Appropriate actions may be
maintained in courts by the holder of the certificate against
those who have not been authorized to operate in
competition with the former and those who invade the
rights which the former has pursuant to the authority
granted by the Public Service Commission (A.L. Ammen
Transportation Co. v. Golingco, 43 Phil. 280).
In the case at bar, the trial court found that petitioner
association forcibly took over the operation of the jeepney
service in the Cogeo-Cubao route without any
authorization from the Public Service Commission and in
violation of the right of respondent corporation to operate
its services in the said route under its certificate of public
convenience. These were its findings which were affirmed
by the appellate court:
348
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court
of Appeals
“The Court from the testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses as well as
the documentary evidences presented is convinced that the
actions taken by defendant herein though it admits that it did not
have the authority to transport passengers did in fact assume the
role as a common carrier engaged in the transport of passengers
within that span of ten days beginning November 11, 1985 when
it unilaterally took upon itself the operation and dispatching of
jeepneys at St. Mary’s St. The president of the defendant
corporation, Romeo Oliva himself in his testimony confirmed that
there was indeed a takeover of the operations at St. Mary’s St. x x
x.” (p. 36, Rollo)
The findings of the trial court especially if affirmed by the
appellate court bear great weight and will not be disturbed
on appeal before this Court. Although there is no question
that petitioner can exercise their constitutional right to
redress their grievances with respondent Lungsod Corp.,
the manner by which this constitutional right is to be
exercised should not undermine public peace and order nor
should it violate the legal rights of other persons. Article 21
of the Civil Code provides that any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. The provision covers
a situation where a person has a legal right which was
violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. It presupposes loss or injury,
material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of
such violation. It is clear from the facts of this case that
petitioner formed a barricade and forcibly took over the
motor units and personnel of the respondent corporation.
This paralyzed the usual activities and earnings of the
latter during the period of ten days and violated the right
of respondent Lungsod Corp. to conduct its operations thru
its authorized officers.
As to the propriety of damages in favor of respondent
Lungsod Corp., the respondent appellate court stated:
“x x x it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff-appellee is
entitled to actual damages and attorney’s fees. While there may
have been allegations from plaintiff-cooperative showing that it
did in fact suffer some form of injury x x x, it is legally unprecise
to order the payment of P50,000.00 as actual damages for lack of
concrete proof
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Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of
Appeals
therefor. There is, however, no denying of the act of usurpation by
defendants-appellants which constituted an invasion of plaintiffs’-
appellees’ property right. For this, nominal damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 may be granted. (Article 2221, Civil Code).”
(p. 18, Rollo)
No compelling reason exists to justify the reversal of the
ruling of the respondent appellate court in the case at bar.
Article 2222 of the Civil Code states that the court may
award nominal damages in every obligation arising from
any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case
where any property right has been invaded. Considering
the circumstances of the case, the respondent corporation is
entitled to the award of nominal damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the respondent appellate court dated
May 27, 1991 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., No part.
Petition denied; decision affirmed.
Note.—Certificate of public convenience could not be
sold when the subject of the certificate was no longer
operational. (Cohon vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 719.)
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350
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