The last march of the lemmings
Hegel’s critique of Rousseau’s theory of the general will
“I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel.”
– Mary Shelley1
Abstract
Hegel constructs a critique of Rousseau’s political philosophy in the Anmerkungen of his
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, focusing on the theory of the general will. Academic
consensus is that Hegel misrepresents Rousseau. I will claim that Hegel has elaborated a
powerful critique that even risks undermining Hegel’s own political philosophy. The problem
of Rousseau’s theory of the general will is that it is necessarily embodied in concrete
individuals who have arbitrary wills. This arbitrariness contains the risk of the general will
suppressing the individuality on which it is based. The people could decide to collectively
commit suicide and Rousseau would need to praise this decision for its democratic quality.
Since the general will is its own standard, there is no way to distinguish a good from a bad
collective distinction. Hegel claims to eliminate this problem by proposing a constitutional
monarchy instead of radical democracy. The general will would then be embodied in the king
and not in the people. Although his political system contains some checks on the decision-
making competences of the king, Hegel did not completely eliminate the problem. The king
too is an individual with an arbitrary will and can thus engender chaos within the limits of the
constitution. I end my article by concluding that the embodiment of the general will as such is
the core problem for both Rousseau and Hegel. It would be better to suppose that no one can
embody the will of the people and hence leave the position of sovereignty open. In that case
there are only claims to represent the general will, but no certitude. This leaves room for
contestation between different interpretations of the will of the people.
1. Introduction
1
Mary Shelley (1999), Frankenstein, p. 126.
1
A lot of commentators of Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts agree on one point:
Hegel misrepresents Rousseau and consequently criticizes him for the wrong reasons.2 This
observation is not unfounded. Hegel states that Rousseau considers the general will to be no
more than a lowest common denominator of the collection of individual wills, 3 while
Rousseau argues in Du contrat social that this is not the case. 4 It would however be strange
that Hegel, who was obviously an avid reader of Rousseau’s books, made such a caricature of
Rousseau’s concept of the general will. This paper defends the view that Hegel’s argument
actually reaches at the core of Rousseau’s philosophy and discloses an irresolvable and even
dangerous paradox. To arrive at this insight I will firstly discuss the meaning of the general
will in Rousseau. This theory will lead us to a central paradox, namely that the general will of
the people transcends the individual and yet can only exist in individuals. I will then show that
Hegel’s critique is directed against the paradox. The main thrust of his argument is that
Rousseau leaves open the possibility that the general will destroys all individuality.
Individuals create the general will in a social contract, but this creation can turn out to be a
monster consuming its makers. I consider Hegel to argue that the general will of the people,
as conceived by Rousseau, runs the risk of making the people run off a cliff towards their own
death, just like lemmings do.5 A Rousseauian democracy would hence be the last march of the
lemmings. Lastly, I will demonstrate that Hegel’s own political philosophy only minimizes
the threat, but does not eliminate it. The general will remains tainted by individuality when,
instead of the people, a king is made sovereign.
2. Rousseau’s theory of the general will
2
R. Stern (2002), Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 157-165; D. Knowles (2002), Hegel and the philosophy of
right, p. 308; R. Wokler (1998), “Contextualizing Hegel’s phenomenology of the French Revolution and terror”, Political
theory, vol. 26, No. 1, p. 35.
3
G.W.F. Hegel (1970), Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §258A (henceforth PR).
4
J.-J. Rousseau (1978), Du contrat social, p. 209 (henceforth CS).
5
For the sake of completeness it has to be mentioned that, in reality, lemmings do not behave suicidal. The only evidence for
this theory is a documentary called White wilderness from 1958. Later it was revealed that the animals were actually pushed
of the cliff by the film crew of the Disney documentary.
2
The term ‘general will’ is by far the concept that causes the most confusion in Rousseau’s
texts. For some it refers to the general interest, 6 for others to the driving force of
insurrections.7 Rousseau sums up the fundamental problem of Du contrat social as follows:
Trouver une forme d’association qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne
et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun s’unissant à tous n’obéissent pourtant
qu’à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu’auparavent. 8
The goal of the text is to reconcile individual liberty and the communal force to secure liberty.
According to Rousseau, the solution to this riddle lies in the social contract. 9 Free individuals
come together and form a public person, the sovereign.10 In contrast to Hobbes or Grotius,
Rousseau regards the sovereign not as the center of power, but as the center of the formation
of the general will.11 The sovereign is identical with the people and it delegates power to a
government after the people has been unified in the sovereign.12 Where absolutist
philosophers sacrificed individual liberty for security, Rousseau tries to reconcile both. The
government protects individuals, but the latter remain free because the power of government
is dependent on the deliberations of the sovereign people.
The sovereign has two main characteristics. Firstly, it is inalienable. 13 The sovereign
can delegate power, but not the general will, since it is nothing but he exercise of the general
will. If the sovereign would delegate the will to, for instance, a king, the will would no longer
be general and the social contract, installing popular sovereignty, would be broken. Secondly,
sovereignty is indivisible.14 The general will is not simply the will of all individuals. 15 It is a
unity separated from the mere juxtaposition of its members. Through the social contract the
people receives “son unité, son moi commun, sa vie at sa volonté”. 16 The will of the sovereign
can become general under three conditions.
6
G. Van Roermond (2008), “Inleiding: Jean-Jacques Rousseau en zijn politieke filosofie”, in J.-J. Rousseau, Het
maatschappelijk verdrag, p. 21.
7
H.R. Lauritsen (2013), “The general will between conservation and revolution”, in H.R. Lauritsen & M. Thorup (ed.),
Rousseau and revolution, p. 104.
8
CS, p. 178.
9
Ibid., p. 179.
10
Ibid., p. 180.
11
Ibid., pp. 174-175.
12
Ibid., p. 196.
13
Ibid., pp. 195-196.
14
Ibid., p. 198.
15
Ibid., p. 202.
16
Ibid., p. 180.
3
General participation. If sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible, then everyone
should participate in the formation of the general will. 17 All who enter the social contract are
members of the sovereign. Every citizen should utter his own opinion, which cannot be
delegated to a faction or corporation.18 Factions would only promote the collected self-
interests of their members. The general will is however not identical to the consensus of the
people.19 The people can err, but the general will cannot. How this is possible is explained by
the third characteristic.
General scope. The laws emerging from the sovereign can only have a general scope.
They cannot directly apply to individual cases.20 For instance, the sovereign can declare that
murder is punished with imprisonment, but it cannot decide that murderer X should be
condemned to 20 years of imprisonment. This follows from the generality of participation:
“[La volonté générale] doit partir de tous pour s’appliquer à tous.”21 Either the particular
application concerns an individual outside the sovereign and the sovereign consequently does
not have authority over that person, or it concerns a member of the sovereign in which case
the sovereign is divided and the individual in question is blocked from participating.22
General subjectivity. Viewed separately, general participation and scope are
insufficient. The possible divergence between the general will and the people’s consensus is
unclear and there is no reason to think that the members of the sovereign would promote the
general interest instead of their private interests. For now Hegel’s critique of the general will
being a sum of individual wills still stands.23 Rousseau has not yet explained why the
sovereign is a body separate from its individual members. The people gains general
subjectivity through the lawgiver. This is an individual of superior intellect who is
independent of the people’s desires and can see through the hearts of men. 24 His intentions are
not directed toward private interests, but toward a future glory, while his authority is not
based on reason or power, but on the Gods.25 Some individuals can educate the people to
leave their private interests behind to concern themselves with the general interest. This
17
Ibid., p. 206.
18
Ibid., p. 203. Hegel is much more optimistic about factions in the sense of corporations (see, for example: PR, §295).
19
Ibid., p. 201.
20
Ibid., p. 206.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., pp. 214-215.
23
PR, §258A.
24
CS, p. 219.
25
Ibid., pp. 219 & 223.
4
education is not performed through reasoned argument, but through myths and stories. 26 The
lawgiver presents to the people narratives that enable them to transcend their own
individuality. One does not have to think here of fictional manipulation or far-fetched
theology.27 When Martin Luther King proclaimed he had a dream, he was not under
psychoanalysis. The speech was meant to move people beyond their private interests. The
civil rights movement did not demand privileges for themselves. The world was at stake. The
lawgiver is the medium through whom these mobilizing ideas express themselves and inspire
the people with non-rational, mythic means. The general will is formed when the lawgiver’s
story is met with consent from the people. 28 The sovereign becomes one entity separated from
the collection of individuals because those individuals transcend their individuality through
the narrative of the lawgiver.
In principle, everyone is a lawgiver. The sovereign is formed insofar as the general
will of the public body transcends its individual members and hence it can only decide on the
grounds of transcendent motives, such as the ideas of liberty or equality. When members
argue for a certain position, the reasons they can use within general participation are limited
to the reasons with which they can persuade others to transcend their own individuality as
well.
3. Rousseau’s paradox
Rousseau’s theory of the general will seems to amount to a paradox concerning the relation
between the individuals constituting the social contract and the sovereign that is the result of
this act. The same individuals are the necessary precondition and the field of application of
the sovereign. They are the subjects of the sovereign in the two meanings of the term.
Whereas in the beginning, the people is a collection of private interests, afterwards these same
people transcend themselves toward the general will. This does not mean that the individual
29
with his private interests disappears. Society does not turn into one single agora for the
26
G. Van Roermond (2008), “Inleiding: Jean-Jacques Rousseau en zijn politieke filosofie”, in J.-J. Rousseau, Het
maatschappelijk verdrag, p. 30.
27
J. Habermas (1992), The structural transformation of the public sphere, p. 98.
28
CS, p. 222. Lauritsen restricts the unity of the sovereign to the moment of insurrection against the government. It should
be clear that this is mistaken. The unity of the people is constituted in the consent of the people with the lawgiver’s narrative
in which the people transcends itself toward generality. Whether this consent leads to an insurrection or not, is irrelevant.
(H.R. Lauritsen (2013), “The general will between conservation and revolution”, in H.R. Lauritsen & M. Thorup (ed.),
Rousseau and revolution, p. 106).
29
As a result, it is wrong to say that, according to Rousseau, individuality can only be realized as part of a whole and not as
an individual separated from the sovereign, as Angelica Nuzzo argues. (See: A. Nuzzo (2013), “Arbitrariness and freedom:
Hegel on Rousseau and revolution”, in H.R. Lauritsen & M. Thorup (ed.), Rousseau and revolution, p. 66.)
5
sovereign. Apart from the sovereign, there is a civil society of private individuals. 30 Civil
society is even the foundation of Rousseau’s political system. According to Rousseau, men
only enter the social contract because they encounter difficulties they cannot solve on their
own.31 The social contract is hence constituted through private interest. Eliminating private
interest would amount to undermining the general will of the sovereign that is made possible
by the social contract.
Consequently all individuals have two identities. Within civil society they are the
bourgeois pursuing his private interests. As a member of the sovereign, he is a citoyen
transcending his individuality in the general will. Consequently, the general will becomes
incarnate in the same individuals it transcends. As Jürgen Habermas poignantly remarks:” The
volonté générale as the corpus mysticum was bound up with the corpus physicum of the
people as a consensual assembly.”32
The question is how the sovereign and civil society relate to each other. At first sight,
Rousseau seems to sacrifice civil society at the altar of the general will. He demands a full
alienation of individual rights to the community.33 However, Rousseau does not find this
suspicious, because these rights are not given to other individuals, but to the sovereign. In
fact, every individual regains the rights he gives away, because he is a member of the
sovereign to whom these are given. Later in the text Rousseau adds that the individual only
entrusts those aspects of his life to the sovereign that are publicly relevant:
On convient que tout ce que chacun aliène, par le pacte social, de sa puissance, de ses biens,
de sa liberté, c'est seulement la partie de tout cela dont l'usage importe à la communauté; mais
il faut convenir aussi que le souverain seul est juge de cette importance. 34
4. Hegel’s critique of Rousseau
Hegel’s critique of Rousseau’s theory of the general will is stressed in two passages of the
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, namely in §29A and §258A. I will discuss each
separately.
30
Rousseau himself does not use the term ‘civil society’. I use the term in the meaning Hegel gives it. Civil society is the
sphere where concrete persons with particular interests relate to each other through ‘the form of generality’, which means that
the particular interests are (self-)organized. They form a whole through interacting with each other. (See: PR, §182.)
31
CS, p. 177.
32
J. Habermas (1992), The structural transformation of the public sphere, p. 99.
33
CS, p. 179.
34
Ibid., p. 206. The fact that the sovereign decides what is publicly relevant is important for Hegel’s critique.
6
A. THE NEGATIVE FORMALITY OF THE GENERAL WILL
In §29A Hegel focuses on Rousseau’s conception of the relation between reason and free will. Hegel
claims that, according to Rousseau, reason only forms a negative, external limitation on the will.
Die angeführte Definition des Rechts [, i.e. Kant’s definition of right as the restriction of
arbitrary freedom] enthält die seit Rousseau vornehmlich verbreitete Ansicht, nach welcher
der Wille nicht als an und für sich seiender, vernünftiger, der Geist nicht als wahrer Geist,
sondern als besonderes Individuum, als Wille des Einzelnen in seiner eigentümlichen Willkür,
die substantielle Grundlage und das Erste sein soll. Nach diesem einmal angenommenen
Prinzip kann das Vernünftige freilich nur als beschränkend für diese Freiheit sowie auch nicht
als immanent Vernünftiges, sondern nur als ein äußeres, formelles Allgemeines
herauskommen. 35
Hegel argues that right is not a restriction on freedom, but the “Dasein des freien Willens”.36
As he sees it, Rousseau’s conception of right is at odds with the positive notion of freedom. 37
For Rousseau, the general will limits the civil liberties of the individual in civil society and
the individual can experience this only as an external constraint. 38 It is only in his quality of
citizen of the sovereign that the individual can perceive law in the right way.
Moreover, for Hegel, the general will is only a ‘formelles Allgemeines’. 39 Rousseau
has not given any substance to what the sovereign can decide. He only states that the general
will can never be mistaken.40 This leaves open the possibility of arbitrariness. Whatever the
sovereign decides can become contingent on what a lawgiver can persuade the people to
consent to. This would not be much of a problem if the private sphere was protected from the
general will. As already mentioned, Rousseau takes this into account. 41 The general will only
applies to whatever is publicly relevant. It is however important to note that it is the
sovereign, not the private individual, that decides on public relevance.
We start to enter dangerous terrain. The general will puts a constraint on private wills
and its formality leaves open the possibility of some arbitrary will determining the general
35
PR, §29A. I here omit the critique of individualism already apparent, because it is stressed more poignantly in §258A.
36
Ibid., §29.
37
See on this D. James, Rousseau and German idealism, p. 153.
38
CS, p. 188.
39
PR, §258A.
40
CS., p. 201.
41
Ibid., p. 206.
7
will. The goal of Du contrat social was to find a system that could secure the freedom of
individuals while at the same time being a collective order.42 The problem is that this order
can undermine individual security. If a lawgiver persuades the people to perform some
terrible act, the only conditions are that (1) everyone participated in the deliberation and gave
consent and (2) the scope of the decision extends to the whole people. Hegel shows the
possibility of the Rousseauian sovereign becoming a group of lemmings rushing off a cliff
toward their death. Subsequently, Hegel’s will argue that the general will is arbitrary. The
lemming scenario is not simply a potential danger, but a real threat.43
B. INDIVIDUAL ARBITRARINESS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL
SOCIETY AND THE STATE
§258A adds another dimension to Hegel’s critique. He underlines Rousseau’s use of social
contract theory. This approach confounds the domains of civil society and the state.
In Ansehung des Aufsuchens dieses Begriffes hat Rousseau das Verdienst gehabt, ein Prinzip,
das nicht nur seiner Form nach (wie etwa der Sozialitätstrieb, die göttliche Autorität), sondern
dem Inhalte nach Gedanke ist, und zwar das Denken selbst ist, nämlich den Willen als Prinzip
des Staats aufgestellt zu haben. Allein indem er den Willen nur in bestimmter Form des
einzelnen Willens (wie nachher auch Fichte) und den allgemeinen Willen nicht als das an und
für sich Vernünftige des Willens, sondern nur als das Gemeinschaftliche, das aus diesem
einzelnen Willen als bewußtem hervorgehe, faßte, so wird die Vereinigung der Einzelnen im
Staat zu einem Vertrag, der somit ihre Willkür, Meinung und beliebige, ausdrückliche
Einwilligung zur Grundlage hat, und es folgen die weiteren bloß verständigen, das an und für
sich seiende Göttliche und dessen absolute Autorität und Majestät zerstörenden
Konsequenzen.44
Many commentators claim that Hegel misrepresents Rousseau in this passage, because the
general will is reduced to the commonness of individual wills. 45 We should however read this
passage in its proper context. Hegel argues that the state embodies a substantial (and hence
42
Ibid. P. 178.
43
Ludwig Heyde calls this the ‘danger of indifferentism’. See: L. Heyde (1987), De verwerkelijking van de vrijheid, p. 77.
44
PR, §258A.
45
R. Stern (2002), Hegel and the phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 157-165; D. Knowles (2002), Hegel and the philosophy of
right, p. 308; R. Wokler (1998), “Contextualizing Hegel’s phenomenology of the French Revolution and terror”, Political
theory, vol. 26, No. 1, p. 35.
8
not merely formal) will and that the highest duty of the individual lies in his citizenship. 46 In
the Anmerkung he contrasts this model with social contract theory. The social contract takes
private interest as both the foundation and the goal of the state, as is clearly true for Rousseau.
Consequently, the general will is considered to be incarnated in the collection of individuals.
Hegel opposes Rousseau’s paradox in a double fashion. What Rousseau takes to be a balance
between the sovereign and civil society tends to transform (1) the sovereign into a kind of
civil society and (2) civil society into a potentially self-destructive sovereign.
(1) According to Rousseau, the social contract is a consensus of individual wills. The
latter enter the contract to liberate themselves from the burdens of nature. Hegel shows that
this explanation is insufficient. It interprets the general will as something common to
individual wills instead of getting at “das an und für sich Vernünftige des Willens”. 47 On his
account, there is something about the will that is rational and universal as such. As a result,
even in the individual contractor’s will there is some generality assumed instead of
constituted. The generality of the state is not a product of individuals, but a presupposition.
Even civil society is not simply a collection of particular interests, but contains a second
principle of generality to organize those interests.48 For Hegel, particularity has its truth only
in generality.49 Even the individual who tries to escape the worries of natural existence,
always already assumes some kind of generality. Before the deliberation for the contract
starts, the contractors feel some kind of community with each other. It is only on such a basis
that they can entrust (Zutrauen) their particular interests to the state. 50 The standpoint of the
state of nature, external to communal life, is not simply historically incorrect, but also
metaphysically impossible. There is no standpoint outside the state from where we can decide
our loyalty.51
(2) The main thrust of Hegel’s argument is not directed against the individual as
foundation of the sovereign, but against the individual’s arbitrariness as foundation. As
already mentioned, Rousseau’s paradox is that individuals transcend their own private
interests in the general will, while the latter can only really exist in these same individuals.
One individual would hence be both bourgeois and citoyen separately. Hegel’s criticism in
§29A means that the general will does not have any predetermined content and can only
46
PR, §258.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., §182.
49
Ibid., §186.
50
Ibid., §268. This argument is affirmed in the Zusatz of §153, where Hegel argues that Rousseau’s theory of education in
solitude is mistaken. Instead education is only meaningful when performed in the context of the state.
51
Ibid., §273A in fine; D. Knowles (2002), Hegel and the philosophy of right, p. 310.
9
manifest itself as a constraint on the private individual. Moreover, the sovereign can turn
everything into an object of the general will. Combined with Hegel’s criticism of the previous
paragraph, Hegel rightly argues that the sovereign finds its basis in an illusory individuality.
Accordingly, the formation of the general will is subject to the “Willkür, Meinung und
beliebige, ausdrückliche Einwilligung” of individuals.52 The lawgiver, who can be any
individual member of the sovereign, can persuade the people of whatever story and hence the
resulting general will is arbitrary. Even if the general will itself transcends individuality, the
act of persuasion does not. General will A can be transcendent, but the choice between A and
B is not. This is why Hegel writes that founding the general will in the individual arbitrariness
has “fürchterlichsten und grellsten” results.53 The transcendence from individuality to the
general will can become a last march of the lemmings running towards death and destruction,
while the lawgiver’s arbitrary persuasions would be the film crew pushing the lemmings off
the cliff.
For Hegel, eventually the means undermine both the foundation and the goal. The
individual bourgeois is the centrepiece of Rousseau’s political system and yet he is eliminated
by the citoyen. However arbitrary the decision may be, no one can criticize the sovereign. The
general will does not have a standard external to itself. This entails that the individual has no
higher law to appeal to. Every contestation of the general will by the individual is
impossible:54 “ Quiconque refusera d'obéir à la volonté générale y sera contraint par tout le
corps : ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera d'être libre.”55
We can show what Hegel’s critique amounts to with a historical example. In 1978
almost 1,000 people, members of a cult called ‘Peoples Temple’, committed suicide. Jim
Jones, the leader, acted as a lawgiver persuading his followers that the end of the world was
near and that they should commit suicide. His followers agreed and, since everyone had to die
(even Jones), the scope of the decision was general. All conditions of the general will are
satisfied and yet we think of it as a horrible decision. The problems were that (1) the general
will was the result of an arbitrary process of persuasion, (2) the general will’s negative
formality and self-decided field of application left no boundaries to what could be decided
52
PR, §258A.
53
Ibid. Hegel is here referring to the reign of terror during the French Revolution. See: G.W.F. Hegel (1970),
Phänomenologie des Geistes, pp. 431-441.
54
Angelica Nuzzo claims that all individuality is negated in the movement of transcendence toward the general will. This
would however stretch it too far. Rousseau leaves room for individuality, but only insofar as the sovereign agrees to it. The
problem manifests itself not in individuality as such, but when an individual contests the sovereign. (See: A. Nuzzo (2013),
“Arbitrariness and freedom: Hegel on Rousseau and revolution”, in H.R. Lauritsen & M. Thorup (ed.), Rousseau and
revolution, p. 71.)
55
CS, p. 185.
10
and (3) there was no possibility whatsoever to protest against this decision by any follower
who got cold feet after the decision was finalized.
5. Hegel’s alternative
The attentive reader will now perhaps ask a pertinent question, namely whether Hegel himself
avoids the problems he poses against Rousseau. There are some clear differences between the
two philosophers. Rousseau tries to protect civil society by installing a sovereign with a
general will, but eventually undermines individuality.56 Hegel starts from ‘das Allgemeine’ as
the presupposition of every contract and this gives him the opportunity to separate civil
society from the state.57 Moreover, Hegel leaves room for constructive contestation of the law
and even the constitution, although in a rather limited way.58
However we should notice that Hegel did not circumvent the core problem of
Rousseau’s philosophy, namely the paradox of the incarnation of the general in individual and
hence arbitrary wills. Hegel condenses this incarnation to the body of the King, but the will of
the king is no less arbitrary.59 However, binding the King to a constitution and ministerial
decisions beyond his immediate control minimizes the risks, but it remains questionable
60
whether Hegel completely eliminates the threat. For instance, the King determines who
enters civil service, which means he can appoint whomever he likes and can hence indirectly
influence politics.61 Moreover, decisions of war and peace are the sole responsibility of the
King.62 The chances of this ending in a massacre are not as threatening as in Rousseau’s case,
but they are not eliminated either. The case of the Roman emperor Nero shows that, even with
an excellent entourage, a mad king can wreak havoc. The reason is that his individual body is
deemed the seat of the general will, which taints the latter with the arbitrariness of the
individual will. Maybe it is better to leave the locus of power empty so that the general
interest becomes a transcendent focal point with which no individual can coincide. 63 No one
embodies the general will and that is why no one has absolute authority over society. In this
56
Lauritsen seems to know that the theory of the general will leads to revolutionary governments, like Mao’s China, but he
does not seem to see it as a problem. (See: See: H.R. Lauritsen (2013), “The general will between conservation and
revolution”, in H.R. Lauritsen & M. Thorup (ed.), Rousseau and revolution, p. 110-111.)
57
D. James, Rousseau and German idealism, p. 154.
58
PR, §273A in fine, §298 & §298Z.
59
Ibid., §279.
60
Ibid., §280, §279Z & 280Z.
61
Ibid., §292.
62
Ibid., §329.
63
C. Lefort (1988), Democracy and political theory, p. 17.
11
case there can be temporary holders of the offices of power, but none of their decisions are
written in stone, nor do they coincide with the will of the people. Contestation is a
constitutional aspect of politics, not something to be overcome.
6. Conclusion
I have shown that Hegel does not misrepresent Rousseau in his critique in Grundlinien der
Philosophie des Rechts. In fact, his arguments strike at the heart of Rousseau’s philosophy,
namely the paradoxical core of his thinking. The general will transcends and pervades the
individual. As a result, the general will is infected by the individual’s arbitrariness and
contains the possibility of becoming suicidal like lemmings or the Peoples Temple cult. The
people are consumed by their own creation. Hegel’s theory of the monarchy limits the risk,
but does not eradicate the problem.
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