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CASE DIGESTS (Consti Law 2 - April 19)

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) in their case against the Court of Appeals regarding the classification of some of INC's television programs as "X-rated" and prohibited for public viewing by the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board. The Court found that the Board did not present clear and convincing evidence that the programs attacked other religions as claimed. The Court noted the constitutional right to free speech and expression and overturned the Court of Appeals decision, allowing the INC programs to air without prohibition.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
82 views10 pages

CASE DIGESTS (Consti Law 2 - April 19)

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) in their case against the Court of Appeals regarding the classification of some of INC's television programs as "X-rated" and prohibited for public viewing by the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board. The Court found that the Board did not present clear and convincing evidence that the programs attacked other religions as claimed. The Court noted the constitutional right to free speech and expression and overturned the Court of Appeals decision, allowing the INC programs to air without prohibition.

Uploaded by

WILLY C. DUMPIT
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

Assignment

ATTY. MOHAMMAD FYZEE P. ALIM


Professor

Submitted:
WILLY C. DUMPIT
FIRST YEAR - LLB
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, Petitioner vs. JUAN RUIZ, Respondent
GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

FACTS:

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City
of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing The more important question raised refers to the alleged
violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that
this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3,
Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public
money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stamp is constitutional?

HELD:

No. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government.". It does not authorize
the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit
or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance
of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not
contemplated But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and
scrutiny of the attending circumstances, there has been no constitutional infraction in
the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps
with new designs. Even if these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and
selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take
in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the
step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the
official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. Hence, the writ of
prohibition was denied, without pronouncement as to costs.
ANDRES GARCES, Petitioner vs. Hon. ESTENZO, Respondent
G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

FACTS:

On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast
day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia. That resolution
designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976
festivity. This was provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the
two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. A
controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao
Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was
the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition.
Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the council's Resolution No. 6, the council
enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file
a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image. On June 14,
1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its
representative in the replevin case. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces,
a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and
Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members a complaint in the
Court of First Instance at Ormoc City. The lower upheld the validity of the resolutions.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Barangay Council has the right over the custody of the
Relic?

HELD:

Yes. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any


religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the
benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The wooden image was purchased in
connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio,
then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot be
branded as illegal. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the
wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council.
The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by
enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12. Not every governmental activity which involves
the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, Petitioner vs. CITY OF MANILA, Respondent
G.R. No. L-963, April 30, 1957

FACTS:

On May 29 1953, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation)
throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects.
The acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting
the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No.
3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff
to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of
1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff
proved, among other things, that it has been in existence in the Philippines since 1899,
and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America; that its, contiguous
real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it
was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does
the American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for
the sale of bible therein; and it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. The
court dismissed the case for the lack of merits. Not satisfied with the verdict, the
plaintiff took up the matter to Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the
case at bar?

HELD:

No. Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal
Revenue Code, Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes. Provided, however, That the income of
whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any
activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed. The price asked for
the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than
the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American
Bible Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as
well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Hence, the court reversed the
decision appealed from, sentencing the defendant return to plaintiff the sum of
P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996

FACTS:

Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner


submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified
the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute
an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Petitioner INC
went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs.
But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that:
(1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed
to the Supreme Court. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MTRCB Board of Review gravely abuse its discretion when
it prohibited the airing of INC’s religious program?

HELD:

Yes. The court held that it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship
will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered
by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can
be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise
of religion. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another
religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. The ground "attack against
another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is
void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and
regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. In x-
rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes
will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical.
The court contended that a system of prior restraint may only be validly administered
by judges and not left to administrative agencies. Thus, the decision of the CA was
affirmed.
EBRALINAG, Petitioner vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF
CEBU, Respondent
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

FACTS:

Roel Ebralinag et. al, and the 43 high school and elementary school students
in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province
filed a case to the Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F.
Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor. All minors, they were assisted by their parents
who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses. All the petitioners
in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department
Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are
"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they cannot conscientiously give to
anyone or anything except God. Hence, this controversy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioners is illegal?

HELD:

Yes. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest


priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship
of man to his Creator Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in
the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through
the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the
solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no
warrant for their expulsion. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools
will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small
religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for
dully constituted authorities. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace,
or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent.
RELI GERMAN, Petitioner vs. GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN, Respondent
G.R. No. L-68828, March 27, 1985

FACTS:

On October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students


and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible
purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang
grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts,
they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists 1 and shouts of anti-
government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent
Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was
located within the Malacañang security area. When petitioners' protestations and
pleas to allow them to get inside the church proved unavailing, they decided to leave.
However, because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa
that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise
be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke is a


violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion?

HELD:

No. Although freedom of religious worship is guaranteed under Article IV,


Section 8, and liberty of abode and travel under Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution,
have exceptions in the interest of national security, public safety, or public helath. Said
restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the
Malacañang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices
include communications facilities that link the central government to all places in the
land. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth
functioning of the executive branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action
would certainly disrupt Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of
belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted
to translate the same into action Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the
use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which have already been
discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law, the same having been established
in the interest of national security between the freedom of belief and the exercise of
said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. Hence, the instant petition was dismissed
by Court.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Petitioner vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006

FACTS:

On July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F.


Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad
Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a
child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor
or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that
she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should
not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones
her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she
was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has
been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years
and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,"
insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good
standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge


of gross and immoral conduct?

HELD:

Yes. All government officials and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. This constitutional mandate
should always be in the minds of all public servants to guide them in their actions
during their entire tenure in the government service. The good of the service and the
degree of morality which every official and employee in the public service must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the
enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part, affecting
morality, integrity and efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and
commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account. The exacting
standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court judges and court employees are
required to maintain the people’s faith in the courts as dispensers of justice, and whose
image is mirrored by their actuations. By aspiring to these positions, government
employees are deemed to have submitted themselves to greater scrutiny of their
conduct, all in the pursuit of a professional civil service. The Court has repeatedly
applied these principles in analogous cases. Hence, the court ruled her is guilty of
immorality and disgraceful conduct.
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA,
Respondent
GR No. 164785, May 29, 2009

FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
The remarks stated: “Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gagokatalaga
Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumaga
nalang doon yung ibaba, ditto kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” After a preliminary conference in
which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with
Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986. The following day, petitioner
sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order. Two days after, however,
petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with
this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. On September 27, 2004, the
MTRCB ruled Soriano liable for his utterances. Hence, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan”
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

HELD:
No. The petitioner’s statements did not convey any particular religious
belief, and nothing furthered his avowed evangelical mission. Merely being in a bible
exposition program does not automatically entail that statements made are of a
religious discourse. In the present controversy, considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s
clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him
from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be
properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to
free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the
given reasons, a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect
on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language. Hence, the
court affirmed the decision of the MTRCB’s three months suspension of Ang Dating
Daan Progarm.
IMBONG, Petitioner vs. OCHOA, Respondent
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:

On December 21, 2012, despite calls to withhold support thereto, however,


Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress. Shortly after
the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors
of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword
that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention. A perusal of
the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 10354 or RH Law violates the right to health?

HELD:

No. Section 9, Article XVI provides that the State shall protect consumers from
trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products. Contrary to the
respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this
regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to
do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied
with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will
still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there
exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe
are made available to the public. Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive
drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in
effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe
and non-abortifacient. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in
fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives is
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective without the proper scientific examination.
Hence, the Court held the Status Quo Ante Order lifted and declared of R.A. No. 10354
as constitutional.

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